COMMANDERS GUIDE TO HUMINT

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

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Commanders Guide to Human Intelligence
(HUMINT)

20 August 2012

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Human Intelligence Collection Activities

Army commanders rely upon timely, relevant, and accurate combat information and intelligence in order to successfully plan, prepare, and execute operations. Human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) are two critical assets commanders have, either organic to their unit’s table of organization and equipment (TOE) or through attachment from a supporting command, which can provide input to both combat information and intelligence. While there are similarities between the methodology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by HUMINT and CI, their training and missions are separate and distinct.

This publication serves as a guide to U.S. Army commanders with organic or attached HUMINT elements supporting their unit at the tactical level. This guide is designed to provide the supported commander with an understanding of the mission, capabilities, and effective employment of HUMINT personnel.

HUMINT MISSION AND CAPABILITIES

1-1. HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to—

- Collect information and cue from an almost endless variety of potential sources, including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and source-related documents.
- Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other means. This includes information on threat intentions, and local civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due to restrictive terrain or environmental conditions.
- Corroborate or refute information collected from other reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
- Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements. Additional equipment and resources may be required for controlled source operations (CSO) due to mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (mission variables) and operational environment considerations.

HUMINT FUNCTIONS

1-2. The functions of HUMINT include—

- Military source operations (MSO).
- Interrogation.

MILITARY SOURCE OPERATIONS

1-3. MSO include the HUMINT activities of—

- Liaison.
- Screening.
- Debriefing.
- CSO.
Liaison

1-4. Liaison operations are programs to coordinate activities and exchange information with host country and multinational military and civilian agencies, and non-governmental organizations (FM 2-22.3). Liaison is conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government, military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition infrastructure. Information obtained by these elements through liaison normally tends to reflect the official positions of their superiors and may not be entirely accurate or complete.

Screening

1-5. Screening is the process of identifying and assessing individuals to identify those that may have information of intelligence value (FM 2-22.3). Screening is not in itself an intelligence collection technique but a timesaving measure identifying those individuals most likely to have information of value. Screening operations are conducted to identify the level of knowledge, level of cooperation, and the placement and access of a given source. Screening operations can also assist in the determination of which discipline or agency can best conduct the exploitation. Screening operations include but are not limited to—

- Tactical Screening (detainees and persons of interest during operations).
- Checkpoint Screening (refugees and displaced persons).
- Local Population Screening (for example, cordon and search operations).
- Collection Facility Screening (enemy prisoner of war [EPW] and detainees).

Debriefing

1-6. Debriefing refers to the systematic questioning of individuals not in the custody of the U.S. to procure information to answer collection tasks by direct and indirect questioning techniques (FM 2-22.3). The primary categories of sources for debriefings are friendly forces and civilians, including refugees, displaced persons (DPs), and local inhabitants. Debriefing uses the least resources of any type of MSO, and should therefore be the most productive. The use of cooperative sources increases the fidelity of information obtained; however, it should be supplemented by controlled operations for information not available through debriefing.

Controlled Source Operations

1-7. A CSO is the use of a person in the employ or under the control of an intelligence activity and responding to intelligence tasking. In operational and strategic operational environments, CSO may take months to years to fully develop and recruit based upon the political sensitivity involved with this type of activity. However, during a contingency or combat operation, there is generally less political risk associated with this type of activity since the U.S. and multinational partners control the operational environment, and there is usually a lack of functioning government. Tactical CSO can normally be developed and recruited in a few days to a few weeks depending upon the security conditions of the operational environment, operational pace of the HUMINT collection team (HCT) and supported unit, and the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

INTERROGATION

Note. Interrogation is not considered MSO since the activity has separate governing guidelines and certification criteria in accordance with DODI S-5200.42 and DCS, G-2 Memorandum, Interim Policy Guidance for the Conduct and Oversight of Army Human Intelligence Operations (S//NF).

1-8. Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning (FM 2-22.3). Some examples of interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees. Interrogation sources range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic. Interrogations may be conducted at all echelons in all operational environments. Detainee interrogation operations conducted at a military police
(MP) facility, coalition-operated facility, or other agency-operated collection facility are more robust and require greater planning, but have greater logistical support. Army interrogations may only be conducted by personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology (in military occupational specialties [MOSs] 35M and 351M). Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the law of war, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the HUMINT collector is operating.

**HUMINT Collection Team Versus Multifunctional Team**

1-9. HUMINT Soldiers are assigned to either HCTs or multifunctional teams (MFTs). However, the mission for the HUMINT Soldier is significantly different between the two teams. The MFT is a multidiscipline intelligence team that collects, exploits, and disseminates combat information. MFTs assist supported commanders by providing—

- Multidiscipline intelligence collection, exploitation, and combat information.
- Support to the targeting process, including development, detection, exploitation, analysis, dissemination, and reacquisition of targets.

1-10. The MFT provides a multidiscipline collection and exploitation capability with a flexible design that, based upon mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (mission variables) [METT-TC], permits it to be employed as a team or broken into sub-elements for simultaneous missions. It possesses organic equipment to accomplish most missions but may be augmented with specialized equipment to expand its capabilities. METT-TC factors can also influence MFT composition necessitating augmentation of Soldiers from other intelligence disciplines.

1-11. The MFT is currently comprised of Military Intelligence (MI) Soldiers representing the specific disciplines of all-source intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and HUMINT, which are combined to produce a unique capability. Based on operational variables and specific mission requirements, the disciplines are combined to provide focused collection and exploitation. MFT HUMINT capabilities include—

- Support to targeting: The MFT collects information aiding the detection or finding of a target.
- Support to site exploitation: The MFT systematically searches for and collects information and material; questions personnel on an objective; and analyzes the information to answer CCIRs and facilitate subsequent operations.
- HUMINT activities (primarily interrogation, debriefing, screening, and liaison).

1-12. The HCT is focused on executing the full spectrum of HUMINT functions in support of the CCIRs. HCTs are designed to only perform HUMINT collection operations and only have HUMINT collectors assigned to them. MFTs are normally focused on answering tactical commanders’ immediate CCIRs and/or assisting in developing the tactical commanders’ situational awareness and situational understanding of the operational environment. MFT missions may only be measured in hours or days. HCTs can be used to support these mission sets, but are normally focused on developing source networks in support of long-term (weeks or months) operations. MFTs can provide source leads to HCTs and vice versa.

**HUMINT Operational Focus**

1-13. In combat or contingency operations, HUMINT may initially focus on obtaining information from interrogating detainees and debriefing DPs and refugees, all of whom are under the immediate control of U.S. and/or multinational forces. Most of these activities can be conducted from the security of the HUMINT operating location or interrogation facilities on base camps. As the operation progresses, HUMINT elements will incorporate more time-intensive activities, such as CSO in order to answer the CCIRs.

1-14. Once security or operational considerations permit, the operational focus should shift from waiting for walk-in sources (DPs, refugees, friendly force patrols, or others) or detainees to come to the base, to operations outside the base. These operations expand to include identifying continuous and recruited sources that may be met and debriefed both on and off base, depending on security requirements. Collectors, operations management teams (OMTs), human intelligence and counterintelligence staff elements (2Xs), and commanders must balance HUMINT operations to obtain the maximum amount of information with the least amount of risk to the collector and source.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE VERSUS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1-15. Some U.S. Army and MI leaders often misunderstand the differences between the HUMINT and CI disciplines or try to use the two interchangeably. While both disciplines utilize similar methodologies (talking to a human source) and TTP (used to collect and exploit the information), the overriding differences between the two collection activities are the type of information targeted and the objective of the collection. Both HUMINT and CI disciplines require specific training and certification criteria for those agents and collectors allowed to conduct these operations. Additionally, both disciplines have legal restrictions on who is authorized to conduct these operations, as well as when and where.

Note. The contrast of HUMINT and CI is provided in this handbook so that commanders understand the differences between the two disciplines. Although there are no organic CI assets assigned to brigade combat teams (BCTs), the expectation is that during contingency or combat operations, higher echelon organizations will provide CI teams, OMTs, and a counterintelligence coordinating authority (CICA) element to BCTs.

1-16. HUMINT collection is requirements focused. HUMINT is a discipline responsible for the collection of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. HUMINT collectors conduct MSO and interrogation. MSO refers to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by humans from humans (FM 2-22.3). MSO encompasses liaison, screening, debriefing, and CSO. HUMINT collects information in support of the CCIRs to allow the commander to plan, prepare, and execute operations to defeat the threat. The objective of HUMINT collection is to positively affect U.S. forces’ knowledge of the threat.

Note. Army HUMINT MSO can only be conducted by trained and certified military and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian HUMINT personnel (to include contract debriefers) assigned or attached to units with the authority, mission, and technical control to conduct such operations. In the Army this includes 35M enlisted Soldiers, 351M warrant officers, 35F HUMINT officers, select other specially trained MOSs, and their Federal civilian employee counterparts. These specially trained and certified individuals are the only personnel authorized to conduct HUMINT collection operations.

1-17. CI is threat focused. CI is a multifunctional discipline responsible for detecting, identifying, countering, neutralizing, and/or exploiting an adversary’s intelligence collection activities targeting U.S. and/or multinational forces. CI agents accomplish this through the conduct of investigations, operations, collection, analysis, and technical services and support. CI activities focus on detecting and identifying the known or suspected insider threat, foreign intelligence security services (FISS), international terrorist organizations (ITO), and adversarial collection targeting U.S. forces either for information, exploitation, or for potential targeting. The objective of CI is to negatively affect the adversary’s knowledge of the plans, intentions, and capabilities of U.S. forces.

Note. A CSO is the use of a person in the employ or under the control of an intelligence activity and responding to intelligence tasking. (Defense CI and HUMINT Center, Terms and Definitions of Interest for Department of Defense Counterintelligence Professionals, 17 March 2010.)

OFFENSIVE VERSUS DEFENSIVE

1-18. HUMINT and CI elements both draw from a wide variety of human sources in order to collect information to support mission requirements. Both use the same source operations cycle and TTP. The type of source is generally based upon the type of information required and the operational environment. However, the primary difference between the conduct of HUMINT and CI source operations is the focus of the operation.

1-19. HUMINT is offensively oriented and focused on satisfying the supported CCIRs to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities.
1-20. Although there are exceptions, CI is generally defensively oriented and focused on protecting the force (operations, personnel, facilities, systems, and technology) from the targeting, exploitation, and attack of FISS, ITO, insurgents, or other adversaries.

MILITARY SOURCE OPERATIONS VERSUS MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

1-21. Both HUMINT and CI have a tiered approach to conducting source operations based upon the range of military operations, echelon, and unit mission. From a mission perspective, both HUMINT and CI conduct collection operations of similar complexity, using similar tradecraft and TTP. Both HUMINT and CI require greater training to conduct increasingly sensitive activities. HUMINT has a defined categorization of source operations. From the CI perspective, there is not a clear categorization of CI collection activities similar to HUMINT MSO.

1-22. However, CI operations, especially at the tactical level, have remained decentralized to provide maximum flexibility and responsiveness to the supported commander. DOD Instruction S-5240.17 established Military Counterintelligence Collection (MCC) as an umbrella term for all DOD CI collection activities from tactical to strategic levels. Looking at the various U.S. Army MCC collection activities, and using the same categorization used by MSO, each has an equal capability that can support commanders from tactical to strategic levels. (See figure 1.)

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<tr>
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<th>Training</th>
<th>HUMINT MSO</th>
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<td>* OFCO</td>
<td>AFCITIC/JCITA</td>
<td>CAT 1 Controlled source operation</td>
<td>ASOC, AMSOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>* 1 ISO</td>
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<tr>
<td>* 2 DSO</td>
<td>Former USAIC CFEO, CICAC</td>
<td>CAT 2 Controlled source operation</td>
<td>SOCI, MAGTF-CI &amp; HUMINT Former USAIC CFEO,</td>
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<td>* 2 CFEO (recruited)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Politically sensitive activities requiring Executor Approval and USD(I) Concurrence</td>
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<td>Operationally sensitive activities requiring Executor Approval and USD(I) Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>* CFEO (non-recruited)</td>
<td>Former USAIC CFEO, CICAC</td>
<td>CAT 3 Overt MSO (non-recruited)</td>
<td>ASACO, HCC, DSDC</td>
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<td>* 3 debriefing</td>
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<td>* 4 Liaison</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Overt activities that require approval but do not require USD(I) notification</td>
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1 – ISO can be equivalent to a CAT 1 or 2 based upon the target, type of operation and training required to conduct the operation.
2 – CAT 2 MSO and MCC ISO/DSO/CFSO use the same operations cycle and TTP, the significant difference being the mission focus (CI or HUMINT) and targeted intelligence collection requirements. CFEO is only conducted during combat and contingency operations.
3 – General debriefing of leads, walk-in sources, military or non-recruited sources for the purpose of obtaining relevant information responding to intelligence collection requirements.
4 – Liaison – The contact or communication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (IP 3-08)
5 – HUMINT Collector Course, which is an Initial Entry Training course for the 35M MOS.

Figure 1. MSO versus MCC collection activities

CATEGORIES OF HUMINT MSO

1-23. The MSO category that an activity falls into will determine what qualification a HUMINT collector must have to carry it out; it will also determine the level of oversight, as well as frequency and detail of source validation required. While the utilization of certain types of sources requires an activity be placed in a certain category (see DOD Directive S-5200.37), Defense HUMINT Executors otherwise have at least some latitude to determine what category an activity falls into based upon existing guidance and their own capabilities and oversight mechanisms, as well as their situation and risk assessment. These three categories are—
Human Intelligence Collection Activities

- Category 1—Politically sensitive activities requiring Executor approval and Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) [USD(I)] concurrence and oversight.
- Category 2—Operationally sensitive activities requiring Executor approval and USD(I) notification.
- Category 3—Overt activities requiring Executor approval, but not USD(I) notification.

**Note.** For detailed descriptions of Categories, 1, 2, and 3 source operations, see DOD Directive S-5200-36 (S//NF) and DHE-M 3301.002 (S//NF).

**Categories of MCC Source Operations**

1-24. The MCC program encompasses four different types of source operations. Each type of operation is distinct in the sensitivity and type of information being targeted, the source of the information, and the approval process required in the execution of the collection activity. MCC source operations include the following—

- Offensive counterintelligence operations (OFCO) and investigative source operations (ISO) activities support U.S. Army, theater, Army service component commands (ASCCs), and local intelligence requirements, as well as DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant command, joint task force (JTF), and multinational and national intelligence community strategic requirements to deter, detect, and neutralize espionage.
- Defensive source operations (DSO) activities are only employed by units with a CI investigative and operational mission. DSO will not be employed in combat theaters, but should be proposed through the submission of a counterintelligence special operations concept (CISOC) and approved by the commander, United States Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), or the single designee.
- Counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO) are source operations conducted during combat and contingency operations to collect information in support of force protection. The primary focus of CFSO is the collection of insider threat, FISS, ITO, and adversarial intelligence collection targeting U.S. forces personnel, operations, facilities, information, and resources. CFSO are also conducted to satisfy the CCIRs of the supported commander. CFSO are employed on the basis of a CFSO operation plan (OPLAN) approved by the supported commander or the coalition/joint/corps/division intelligence staff officer (C/J/G/S-2X) if approval authority has been delegated by the ASCC or JTF commander.

**Note.** For more information on MCC, see AR 381-20 (S//NF), AR 381-47 (S//NF), and FM 2-22.2.

**Types of Sources**

1-25. There are three types of sources in both MSO and MCC. Each type of source represents the amount of control the source handler has over the operation and its sensitivity. The three types of sources are—

- One-Time.
- Continuous.
- Recruited.

**One-Time Source**

1-26. The *one-time source* is a source of information of value that was, and will be, encountered only once (FM 2-22.3). HUMINT collectors will frequently encounter a source only once, particularly at lower echelons. This may be a local civilian encountered during a patrol, a detainee who is quickly questioned and then evacuated, or a refugee at a checkpoint. A one-time source cannot be tasked to collect. However, if a walk-in source provides information on activity in his neighborhood, the collector could highlight the importance of this information and indicate his interest in this information should the source become aware of it. The collector cannot tell him to get more information, but can indicate he would listen if the walk-in returned with more information on the topic. If the walk-in returns a second time, he must be handled as a continuous source.
Continuous Source

1-27. Continuous sources are individuals who have been identified as having more information than could be obtained through a one-time contact, and may have the potential to be used in a CSO. HUMINT collectors and CI agents do not task continuous sources. Information from a continuous source is obtained through debriefing and/or elicitation. All continuous sources are tracked by registering them in the Integrated Defense Source Registry System (IDRS). Contacts are documented in contact reports and reviewed by the responsible OMT. This registration process helps to prevent multiple agencies from talking to the same source, resulting in circular reporting.

Note. For more information on source registration, see AR 381-20 (S//NF) and DHE-M 3301-002 (S//NF).

Recruited Source

1-28. In FM 2-22.3, “formal contacts” was the term used for recruited sources. Due to changes in terminology since the publication of FM 2-22.3, the term is now “recruited source.” Recruited sources are individuals who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT collectors or CI agents, and respond to direction and control of the collector or agent for the purpose of providing information.

Note. For more information on the types of sources, see FM 2-22.2, FM 2-22.3, and DHE M 3301.002 (S//NF).

EVERY SOLDIER IS A SENSOR AND TACTICAL QUESTIONING

1-29. The Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) program allows all Soldiers to obtain combat information of immediate tactical value through surveillance, reconnaissance, patrolling, and interacting with the indigenous personnel in contingency and combat operations. ES2 allows all personnel to report combat information to provide commanders with as much detail as possible about the operational environment. Much of ES2 is specifically focused for Soldiers conducting patrols, performing missions at traffic control points (TCPs) or roadblocks, and other missions where Soldiers will interact with the local populace, including site exploitation and the conduct of tactical questioning (TQ).

Note. The use of informants, or any sort of passive HUMINT collection, involving noncertified personnel not only is in violation of DOD and U.S. Army policies but also is illegal and may be subject to punitive measures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

1-30. Tactical questioning is direct questioning by any DOD personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain time-sensitive tactical intelligence, at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent with applicable law. Captured or detained personnel or detainee refers to any person captured, detained, held, or otherwise under the control of DOD personnel (military and civilian or contractor employee) (DOD Directive 3115.09).

Note. Soldiers conducting TQ cannot employ any type of techniques that may be indicative of or perceived as an interrogation approach as defined in FM 2-22.3.

1-31. Soldiers routinely handle captured or detained personnel from the point of capture until the determination of the detainee’s disposition. Often the number of detainees resulting from daily operations requires properly trained Soldiers to conduct TQ in the absence of HUMINT collectors.
**Note.** TQ is not a substitute for interrogation, nor is it conducted once a detainee has entered the detention system. Commanders must anticipate, and coordinate for, the use of properly trained and certified interrogators to perform interrogation operations when detainees are anticipated to be captured.

1-32. Every Soldier can collect and report important combat information. HUMINT collectors in the BCT should integrate with subordinate battalions and companies to provide TQ training to all unit Soldiers. Training should include—

- How to structure and ask questions.
- What types of information TQ should attempt to obtain (CCIRs, tactically important, and time sensitive).
- How to report the information.
- When the Soldier must terminate TQ and transfer to HCT control.
- What types of information should be reported to the HCT.
- Potential source traits that should be noted and provided to the HCT.
- Recontact information on potential sources for the supporting HCT.

**Note.** For more information on ES2 and TQ, see FM 2-91.6 and DOD Directive 3115.09.
Appendix A

Supported Commander Considerations

HCTs are a valuable asset to the supported commander. HCTs can help answer CCIRs and support targeting. BCTs have organic HUMINT capabilities; however, the brigade commander will often provide HCTs in a direct support (DS) relationship to subordinate elements. Commanders who receive HCTs to support their mission have to understand how to employ them and the complexities associated with integrating and executing HUMINT activities in the unit’s operations.

MISSION COMMAND VERSUS MISSION COORDINATION

A-1. Organic and attached HUMINT elements conduct operations in support of the commander’s operational focus. However, due to the political and operational sensitivity and legal complexities involved in HUMINT activities, the commander must rely upon the guidance of the supporting 2X. This reliance ensures HUMINT activities are conducted in accordance with applicable Department of the Army (DA) and DOD regulations, U.S. law, and U.S. and host-nation agreements. OMTs ensure HUMINT elements conduct activities in support of the commander within the technical guidance the 2X provides.

A-2. The 2X, as the principal advisor to the BCT commander on all matters pertaining to HUMINT, is responsible for providing mission coordination for all HUMINT elements within the area of operation (AO). Mission coordination includes—

- Technical control, which involves guidance and TTP to which all HUMINT elements must adhere during the conduct of HUMINT activities. Technical control ensures HUMINT activities are conducted in a manner to avoid operational compromise and to protect the collector or agent and source from physical harm.
- Oversight, which involves monitoring the conduct of HUMINT activities to ensure they are conducted in accordance with DA and DOD policy, U.S. law, and existing U.S. and host-nation agreements.

Note. Regardless of how a unit task organizes organic and augmented HUMINT assets—for example, providing HCTs or individual HUMINT Soldiers in a DS role to a subordinate unit or creating a company intelligence support team-type element—those assets require the technical control of the responsible 2X when conducting any type of HUMINT collection activity (MSO or interrogation).

A-3. HUMINT doctrine is based upon DA policy and U.S. laws to ensure HUMINT activities are conducted legally. HUMINT activities that are conducted in a manner inconsistent with doctrine, or that is illegal under U.S. law, can result in civil and/or criminal repercussions not only to the collector but also to the chain of command. Deviation from established policy and doctrine may result in a violation of law.

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

A-4. Although HCTs are organic to all BCTs, HCTs may be provided to lower echelons to support a battalion or the BCT may receive HCT augmentation from a higher echelon due to demand based upon operational pace. Regardless, HCTs being assigned to another unit other than their original parent unit require clear designation of the command and support relationships under which they are required to operate. The command and support
Supported Commander Considerations

The relationship between the HCT and the supported unit will be based upon an operation order (OPORD) established by the supported and supporting commanders.

A-5. The primary considerations for effectively employing the HCT are—

- Incorporating the HCT into the supported unit’s pace of operations.
- Establishing relationships with the supported unit as early as possible, preferably before attending a combat training center (CTC).
- Sustaining relationship with supported unit following CTC rotation until in-theater link up.

A-6. Incorporating the HCT into the unit’s pace of operations ensures HCT presence during all points in the commander’s decisionmaking process. HCT and OMT leaders use meetings or briefings to inform the supported unit commander and staff of the HCT capabilities, employment, and integration into the supported unit operations. HCT presence during these activities also enhances its situational awareness and aids its own internal planning. Events the HCT should attend are—

- Battle update briefings (aids overall situational awareness).
- Targeting meetings (provides detailed information of potential targets).
- Operations and intelligence workgroup (confirms HCT responsibilities within the supported unit’s intelligence operations).
- Military decisionmaking process (MDMP) events.
- Rehearsals.
- Orders briefings.

Note. For a discussion of command and support relationships for MI assets, see FM 2-0.

MISSION PLANNING

A-7. The HCTs use numerous tools, capabilities, and activities to support the commander. During mission planning, the commander, in conjunction with the supporting 2X and OMT, develops a balanced strategy to employ those tools, capabilities, and activities in the right mix and at the right time in order to support the commander’s situational awareness and decisionmaking. A balanced strategy has to consider the following—

- **Information requirements**—generally the CCIRs will drive the operational focus of HUMINT teams and assist the OMT in determining the most efficient or time-responsive type of HUMINT activity used to answer that requirement.
- **Operational methodology**—is the type of HUMINT activity that can be used to satisfy the commander’s requirement. Optimally, the 2X and OMT recommends to the commander an activity or combination of activities that will obtain the information in the most accurate and expedient manner with the least amount of risk to the collection element.
- **Operational environment**—often dictates, or at least impacts, the type of operational methodology that may be employed to answer the CCIRs. Operational environments with higher threat conditions require more resources and planning than low threat ones.
- **Source pools**—consist of the different demographics represented in the AO who may be potential sources of information. Various segments may have differing views, sentiments towards, or cooperativeness with U.S. forces. Additionally, HCTs may be restricted from talking to or using certain types of persons in intelligence operations based upon existing U.S. or host-nation agreements and U.S. law.
- **Geographic coverage**—the size of the AO, coupled with the number of HUMINT assets supporting the AO, will affect what types of activities may be feasibly conducted to support the commander. The larger the area or the denser the population, the more time is needed for the supporting HUMINT assets to effectively execute operations and respond to the supported CCIRs.
OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION OF HUMINT PERSONNEL

A-8. When it is not expedient to deploy HCTs independently, due to high threat condition levels or other restrictions, the teams can be integrated into other ongoing operations. HCTs may be employed as part of a combat or MP patrol or used to support infantry, engineer, or other operations. Doing so reduces the risk to HCTs while allowing a limited ability to collect information. It also has the advantage of placing the HCTs in contact with the local population and allowing them to spot, assess, and interact with potential source leads. However, this deployment method restricts collection by subordinating HCT efforts to the requirements, locations, and timetables of the units or operations in which they are integrated; it usually does not allow for the conduct of sensitive-source operations.

*Note.* When considering integrating HUMINT personnel into noncombat or humanitarian assistance missions, commanders must assess the potential for negative repercussions should intelligence involvement in those missions become public knowledge. Even though this type of integration is designed to maximize limited resources and to accomplish multiple operational requirements, it could be misperceived as an attempt to infiltrate intelligence assets during these types of missions (for example, disaster relief, medical or veterinary civic action programs, and others).

A-9. General support (GS) HCTs may also be required to operate in a commander’s AO based upon higher level authority and guidance. However, GS HCTs should coordinate with the command element of the AO in which they are operating to synchronize and deconflict operations with DS HUMINT elements. GS HCTs can often provide information that is collected in conjunction with their mission if they know the CCIRs of the AO in which they are operating.

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

A-10. Commanders rely upon their supporting HCTs to answer their CCIRs to obtain situational awareness and support targeting. HCTs conduct MSO and interrogation in support of the commander’s operational requirements. However, the operational environment security considerations, pace of operations, and the CCIRs impact what type HUMINT activity or combinations of activities are conducted to support the commander. The HCT should employ those activities which take the least amount of time to obtain the information with the least amount of risk to the HCT and with the highest degree of accuracy and validity.

A-11. Using the joint concept of operational phasing provides an overview of the prevalent HUMINT activities. The five phases of the operation are discussed below.

**Phase 0 – Shape**

- HCTs conduct individual, collective, and mission-essential task list training.
- HCTs/OMTs/2X conduct integrated training with supported unit.
- HCTs/OMTs/2X conduct team or unit-level mission readiness exercises and evaluations.
- HCTs/OMTs research and analyze operational environment (culture, socio-economic factors, government or military structure and capabilities, threat capabilities, and others).

**Phase 1 – Deter**

- Unit receives order. The 2X assists in task organizing HCTs/OMTs for DS and GS.
- The 2X develops the HUMINT appendix to the OPORD.
- OMTs assist 2X in developing the Umbrella HUMINT Operations Proposal.
- HCTs/OMTs/2X conduct online collaboration with identified relief-in-place unit to obtain past and current intelligence reporting, source registry, and current and past source dossiers.
- The 2X coordinates with the combatant command HUMINT support element to identify a potential HUMINT target list.
- The 2X and OMTs conduct senior HUMINT leader predeployment site surveys when time and security considerations permit.
Supported Commander Considerations

Phases 2 and 3 – Seize Initiative and Dominate
- HCTs collect and report information to answer CCIRs.
- OMTs/2X conduct technical control and oversight of HCT activities.
- OMTs/2X support targeting process.

Initial Entry
- HCTs, and OMTs as appropriate, forward deploy to conduct contingency or combat operation.
- The primary effort of HCTs during initial entry operations focuses on screening, debriefing, and interrogation due to security considerations and pace of operations.

Relief-in-Place and Transition of Authority
- HCTs/OMTs/2X conduct MSO and interrogation hand off.
- HCTs/OMTs/2X conduct source review, and the 2X begins source validation.
- OMTs/2X perform liaison with higher and adjacent HCTs and other intelligence organizations to synchronize and deconflict operations.
- HCTs identify leads for potential CSO.

Phases 4 and 5 – Stabilize and Enable Civil Authority
- HCTs develop potential CSO.
- HCTs/OMTs staff individual HUMINT operational proposals to the 2X in order to recruit CSO sources.
- HCTs conduct source operational testing.
- OMTs coordinate with the HUMINT operations cell (HOC)/2X for source validation.
- OMTs/2X pass developed and recruited sources to higher agencies as required.
- HCTs/OMTs identify and report threat elements, through the intelligence staff officer (S-2) and 2X, to U.S., multinational, and host-nation agencies for targeting and neutralization.

Operational Profile
A-12. Commanders, with recommendations from the 2X, determine the operating profile for HUMINT collectors (for example, cover for action, type of vehicle, operational clothing, and grooming standards). There is not an automatic requirement allowing HUMINT collectors to wear civilian clothes, maintain relaxed grooming standards, or drive nontactical vehicles. HUMINT collectors must avoid the mindset of wanting to be viewed as “important, special, and different.” HUMINT collectors should always attempt to maintain a low profile and focus on executing the mission without being noticed. These capabilities are often provided as exceptions, on a case-by-case basis. The 2X is responsible for incorporating these exceptions and approval procedures into the OPORD. The use of these exceptions is only employed if it will enhance the security and safety of the HCT, source, any support personnel involved in the operation, and increase the likelihood of mission success.

Operational Responsiveness
A-13. Time must be allowed to identify, develop, and obtain information from sources. Writing, editing, and disseminating reports take additional time. Finally, associated mission coordination and oversight (before, during, and after collection operations) adds even more time to the overall collection process. Even if not engaged in these tasks, HUMINT collectors still have extensive background research to perform to support their respective operations. All of these factors must be understood, anticipated, and planned for by commanders, their supporting 2X elements, and OMTs.

A-14. Commanders need to understand that it can take weeks to establish an effective and responsive source network in any one AO. Even then, once the network is in place, it takes time for collectors to perform the following—

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Receive new or updated collection requirements or priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
- Analyze them.
- Identify which source or sources may be able to provide information in response to the requirements.
- Arrange to meet with the sources.
- Conduct the meets.
- Write the reports and have the reports edited.
- Disseminate the reports to the commander and/or analysts.

A-15. If the current source pool does not allow collection of the needed information, new sources must be developed.

Note. Whenever combat information is obtained that is of immediate tactical value and time perishable, the collector will transmit the information to the supported commander in the most expeditious manner possible.

A-16. One of the means of minimizing the impact of time required to establish effective and responsive source networks is integration of the 2X and HUMINT OMTs as early as possible in the planning process. Once the 2X understands the commander’s intent and requirements, the 2X/OMTs, along with the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3)/operations staff officer (S-3), can begin planning for and integrating HUMINT personnel as far forward as possible. This is in addition to identifying and providing access to the data the collectors need to conduct their background research.

A-17. The ideal situation would be for HUMINT personnel to be inserted into the AO ahead of the main body of the force, in order to identify sources and establish source networks, based upon METT-TC and operational environment security considerations. The earlier HUMINT collectors can begin their operations, the earlier they will be able to begin providing the commander critical information of intelligence value.

A-18. Depending on the permissiveness of the environment, HUMINT collectors may depend on maneuver elements for transportation and security when interacting with the local populace. The HCT must be afforded enough time during these combined activities in order to meet and obtain information from sources or during elicitation activities.

OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

A-19. Due to the political and operational sensitivity and inherently dangerous nature of source operations, there are numerous regulatory and legal requirements that must be met in order to execute these activities. Additionally, past abuses in the conduct of interrogation have led to increased emphasis on ensuring the safety and security of detainees and EPWs in U.S. and/or multinational custody.

CONTROLLED SOURCE OPERATIONS CERTIFICATION

A-20. CSO are conducted by HUMINT and CI elements using recruited sources that respond to direction and control of the collector or handling agent, and are tasked and provide information for which the source has placement and access. These operations can only be conducted by personnel who have received advanced training and certification.

A-21. Army HUMINT source operations will only be conducted by trained and certified military and DOD civilian HUMINT personnel (to include contract debriefers) assigned or attached to units with the authority and mission to conduct Category 3 MSO (liaison, screening, nonrecruited source operations, and debriefing). The conduct of Category 2 MSO requires additional training at the Source Operations Course (SOC). Category 1 MSO requires additional training at the Advanced SOC.

A-22. There are also regulatory guidelines on the types of personnel who can be used as a source.
Interrogations

A-23. Interrogation approaches and other procedures described in FM 2-22.3 must be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include U.S. law, the law of war, relevant international law, and relevant directives, including DOD Directive 3115.09, DOD Directive 2310.1E, DOD instructions, and military execute orders including fragmentary orders. U.S. policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with Geneva Convention (III) Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War and Title XIV of Public Law 109-163, also known as “The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.” Any inhumane treatment is punishable as a violation of international law, the UCMJ, and other U.S. law.

Risk Management

A-24. The employment of HCTs includes varying degrees of contact with the local population. As the degree of contact with the population increases, both the quantity and quality of collection increases. However, in many instances, there is a corresponding increase in risk to the HCTs inherent with increased exposure to the local population and the current threat conditions. The risk to the HUMINT collectors, and any supporting personnel, must be balanced with the need to collect against intelligence requirements (IRs) and to protect the force as a whole. Rules of engagement (ROE), status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), direction from higher headquarters, and the overall threat level may also restrict the deployment and use of HCTs outside the relative safety of bases.

A-25. Risks are also minimized through the situational awareness of HCT members. They plan and rehearse to react to any situation and carry the necessary firepower to disengage from difficult situations. If it becomes necessary to call for assistance, then adequate and redundant communications equipment is critical. These scenarios and actions should be continuously trained and rehearsed before deployment and during contingency and combat operations.

USE OF HUMINT COLLECTORS

A-26. All U.S. Army commanders, especially commanders of MI units, must understand the capabilities and how to employ their HUMINT Soldiers to avoid misusing and wasting a valuable asset. HUMINT Soldiers are limited and valuable resources providing singular capabilities no one else can. The 2X can greatly assist the commander in understanding the full range of HUMINT capabilities and how to employ them in a manner which best assists the commander in obtaining PIRs, greater situational awareness, and a better understanding of the operational environment.

A-27. HUMINT collectors are Soldiers and are expected to conduct additional duties (for example, guard duty, escort duty, and others) like all unit Soldiers. However, HUMINT activities require significant time to establish and develop to fully support the commander. Even during times between significant operational activities (for example, patrols, raids, cordon and searches, and others), HCTs should be identifying and developing potential sources of information. The commander must balance assigning additional duties with their need for information to support current or future operations.

A-28. HUMINT collectors interact with and question other human beings and will often be a qualified linguist in the target area language. Based upon these skill sets, commanders may assign HUMINT collectors missions similar to activities often associated with civil affairs, MP, criminal investigative command, or interpreters or translators. However, this may be a misuse and potentially illegal. Requiring, or allowing, HUMINT collectors to perform functions outside their MOS can substantially degrade the HUMINT mission and the overall intelligence mission. This significantly reduces the amount of intelligence the commander receives and limits the commander’s situational awareness and situational understanding of the operational environment.
COLLABORATION AND CUEING

A-29. HUMINT and CI elements routinely coordinate and work with both DOD and non-DOD elements and personnel, as well as multinational elements to effectively execute operations. This coordination involves both collaboration and cueing.

COLLABORATION

A-30. Collaboration is the sharing of knowledge, expertise, and information which may impact the missions of individual organizations. Collaboration allows intelligence personnel, analysts, and other partners to freely exchange information to accomplish a broader objective.

CUEING

A-31. Cueing is the use of one or more sensors to vector the collection of another sensor. Reconnaissance and surveillance complement each other by cueing the commitment of collection assets against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units. An airborne surveillance asset may discover indicators of enemy activity that cue a reconnaissance mission. In some cases, surveillance assets may also be tasked to answer specific questions. For example, if a Soldier reports the absence of normal activity in a normally active market area, the staff could recommend redirecting an unmanned aircraft system to monitor that area for a potential threat.

A-32. HUMINT elements routinely cue each other, or cue other intelligence disciplines, in order to develop source leads, pass potential source leads, corroborate information provided by sources, and support source validation.

A-33. HUMINT and CI collaboration and cueing includes, but is not limited to—

- National:
  - Central Intelligence Agency.
  - National Security Agency.
  - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
  - Department of State.
  - Defense Intelligence Agency.

- Joint Forces:
  - J2X
  - Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority.
  - Defense HUMINT.
  - Joint Debriefing and Interrogation Facility.
  - Joint Exploitation Forensics Facility.
  - United States Marine Corps CI/HUMINT.
  - Air Force Office Special Investigations.
  - Naval Criminal Intelligence Service.

- Army:
  - Military Police.
  - Criminal Investigation Division.
  - Security Guard Force.
  - Unit security managers.
  - Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officers.
  - Base Defense Operations Center staff.
  - Adjacent 2X/OMT elements.
  - Other HUMINT and CI teams.
Supported Commander Considerations

- MFTs.
- Multinational, including host nation:
  - Military forces.
  - Security and intelligence agencies.
  - Law enforcement.
  - Transportation authorities (land, sea, air).

INTELLIGENCE FINANCIAL SUPPORT

A-34. HCTs have financial support available which can be used to execute their collection activities in support of their commander. This support includes—
- Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF).
- Source Incentive Program.

Intelligence Contingency Funds

A-35. ICF are a part of the Secretary of the Army emergency and extraordinary expense funds and are governed by AR 381-141 (C). ICF include monies expended for worldwide intelligence activities of such a confidential, extraordinary nature that they must not be accounted for in detail outside intelligence systems. ICF are used instead of conventional funding if the use of conventional funding would—
- Compromise the security of intelligence operations.
- Delay timely accomplishment of intelligence operations.
- Jeopardize the safety or cover of intelligence personnel.

A-36. There are strict rules on the use and accountability of ICF. ICF will not be used—
- To compensate for a lack of planning.
- If other funds are available.
- In support of normal contracting.
- In support of MP operations or criminal investigations.
- In support of meetings and liaison with representatives from U.S. agencies, departments, and organizations.
- In support of weapons buy-back programs.
- In support of rewards programs.

A-37. Misuse of ICF can result in punitive measures under the UCMJ.

Note. For more information on ICF, see AR 381-141 (C).

Source Incentive Program

A-38. Incentives, relating to intelligence, are those items intended to promote cooperation between sources and collectors. The choice of what to use as incentives is cultural and practical. There are those who may be tempted to look at these as rewards, but their purpose is to foster a cooperative environment, not reward expected behavior.

A-39. While these items are usually purchased in bulk, there is a provision to purchase incentives in single units. Incentives are recorded in the intelligence property book until issued, at which time they become expended and are no longer accounted for. Incentives include cigarettes, telephone cards, and other such items.
Appendix B

Human Intelligence Operations Management

The commander should rely on the supporting 2X and OMTs to ensure HUMINT activities are conducted in accordance with applicable DA and DOD regulations, U.S. law, and U.S. and host-nation agreements. In most cases, the 2X does not “own” the collectors, but is responsible for providing technical oversight, tasking, and oversight of HUMINT activities.

TECHNICAL CONTROL AND MISSION COORDINATION

B-1. The 2X technical guidance and support is primarily the supervision of HUMINT TTP, requirements management, and execution of supporting technical databases for the purpose of deconfliction. The 2X staff assists OMTs in translating HUMINT executable tasks from intelligence requirements.

THE 2X

B-2. At the battalion and brigade levels, there probably will not be a robust 2X staff; however, the functions described in this section must be accomplished in all 2X elements. The 2X is the HUMINT and CI manager who is authorized to coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize all HUMINT and CI missions in the AO. The 2X is subordinate to the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2)/S-2 (as appropriate) and is the primary advisor to the G-2/S-2, and the commander, on the employment of all HUMINT collectors and CI agents.

B-3. The 2X is the primary advisor to the G-2/S-2 and commander on laws, policies, and regulations that guide and impact HUMINT and CI operations. As such, it is important for the commander to ensure the 2X coordinates closely with, and seeks advice from, the appropriate staff judge advocate (SJA), who should be well versed in operational intelligence law. The 2X is the principal representative of the supported G-2/S-2, and the commander when coordinating and deconflicting HUMINT and CI activities with national agencies.

B-4. The 2X—
- Advises the G-2 and commander on all HUMINT and CI matters.
- Facilitates, coordinates, and deconflicts the missions of all HUMINT and CI assets within their AO.
- Coordinates with the MI unit concerning HUMINT and CI activities conducted by unit personnel.
- Recommends task organization and allocation of HUMINT and CI assets in the brigade and subordinate units based upon the mission.
- Provides technical control and oversight for all HUMINT and CI activities of assigned and/or attached HUMINT and CI elements to ensure their activities are conducted in accordance with applicable policies and law.
- Provides operational focus to HUMINT and CI elements based upon the CCIRs and the best type of activity or combinations of activities used to answer the CCIRs in the quickest and safest manner possible and with the most accuracy and validity.

HUMINT OPERATIONS CELL

B-5. The mission of the HOC is to manage, coordinate, and synchronize all HUMINT activities in the designated AO. The HOC exercises technical control over all HUMINT entities and deconflicts HUMINT activities with higher, lower, and adjacent HUMINT elements. The HOC accomplishes all responsibilities through coordination with the operational units and other 2X staff elements.
B-6. The HOC—

- Exercises technical control of all HUMINT entities and coordinates all HUMINT activities in the AO.
- Coordinates with MI unit commanders who possess HUMINT collectors executing HUMINT activities in the AO.
- Serves as the single focal point for all matters associated with MSO conducted by all assigned or attached HUMINT elements. The HOC tracks all HUMINT activities and keeps the 2X informed.
- Coordinates with the analytical element to identify and refine requirements for HUMINT collection.
- Develops and disseminates requirements, orders, and requests for information to HUMINT collectors in the AO.
- Ensures registration of all HUMINT sources.
- Evaluates HUMINT operations to ensure proper handling by HUMINT collectors, source ability to satisfy requirements, and to determine value of continuing the operation.
- Conducts source validation for all assigned and attached HUMINT elements conducting CSO.
- Establishes quality control and executes release for all HUMINT reporting.
- Participates in the operations staff targeting process to provide input on the placement, access, motivations, availability of sources, and reporting reliability of HUMINT sources supporting targeting.
- Conducts liaison with host-nation, multinational, and U.S. national level HUMINT organizations.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CELL

B-7. The mission of the operational support cell (OSC) is to serve as the administrative manager for the 2X section. The OSC is not resourced in force structure; however, during operations, the 2X often task organizes the 2X staff to establish this function.

B-8. The OSC—

- Provides a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week watch for the 2X section and serves as the central communications hub for the 2X section when deployed.
- Serves also as the primary point of entry for all reporting from all outside echelons and elements.
- Receives and tracks responses to all requests for information from higher and lower echelons.
- Manages and accounts for intelligence property book, ICF, and source incentive items used by HUMINT and CI personnel.

Note. Army regulations require separate individuals to manage the ICF and Source Incentive Program, unless the Army G-2 grants an exception.

- Manages source-directed requirements and release of intelligence information reports (IIRs).
- Maintains the consolidated source registry and reports databases and assists the CICA and HOC in deconflicting source operations.
- Coordinates with the Linguist Support Section regarding linguist support to HUMINT and CI entities.
- Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 Operations Section and G-3/S-3 regarding release of fragmentary orders, as required.
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT TEAM

B-9. The OMT is the first element, directly above HUMINT collectors at the individual team level, which manages HUMINT operations. The OMT normally controls the activities of two-to-four HCTs. The size of an OMT and the actual number of teams each OMT controls depend on the assigned mission and operational pace.

B-10. The OMT—
- Provides guidance and technical control of operational activity serving as the channel for the MI unit commander to exercise command.
- Provides quality control and dissemination of reports. It receives, edits, and provides feedback on all reports (for example, resource status reports), technical reports (for example, contact reports), and intelligence reports (for example, IIRs) provided by subordinate teams.
- Coordinates directly with the brigade operational legal team for operational legal support.
- Provides HUMINT intelligence reporting to the 2X so the reports can be fused into the G-2/S-2’s all-source assessment, as appropriate.
- Conducts limited, initial, and operational HUMINT analysis to focus collection based upon intelligence gaps and the supported unit’s mission.
- Performs liaison with host-nation, multinational, and U.S. national level intelligence and security organizations.
- Acts as a conduit between subordinate HCTs, the HOC, and the supported unit headquarters.
- Educates the supported commander on the capabilities of subordinate teams.
- Integrates subordinate HCTs directly into the maneuver commander’s mission planning.
- Develops and staffs HUMINT operational proposals with the 2X and designated approval authority.

REPORTING

B-11. Reporting is the culmination of HUMINT operations. If the collected information is not reported accurately, in a timely manner, in the proper format, and to the correct recipient, it cannot become part of all-source intelligence or affect operational decisions. Furthermore, information supporting targeting must be reported by the fastest means possible.

B-12. To achieve this goal, commanders must rely on their 2X to ensure reporting; its associated quality control and oversight is continuously emphasized to subordinate OMTs and HUMINT collectors. The 2X must communicate the CCIRs clearly, succinctly, and on an almost daily basis, to subordinate OMTs and HCTs.

B-13. The 2X is the primary conduit of all HUMINT and CI reporting to the supported command. Therefore, conducting quality control of reports for responsiveness to requirements, timeliness, proper format and dissemination, is one of their inherent functions. Reporting is the major basis for evaluating collectors. Since the 2X is the commander’s advisor in matters of HUMINT and CI, it is imperative for the 2X to have a good situational understanding of the entire battlefield, from all perspectives, but especially through HUMINT. Fostering good reporting habits in their HUMINT collectors is one way of helping the 2X, and the supported commander, attain this situational understanding.

B-14. Within HUMINT, there are three different categories of reports—
- Operational reports.
- Technical reports.
- Intelligence reports.

B-15. Examples of the different categories of reports are shown in Figure 2. Each category of reporting has different functions, formats, and routes of dissemination.
Operational Reports

B-16. This reporting is a broad category encompassing all reports that do not contain information collected in response to intelligence requirements or the reporting of the technical, and usually sensitive, aspects of HUMINT collection. It includes, but is not limited to, all administrative and logistical reports. These are reports that are handled in administrative and command channels. They cover topics related to the internal functioning of the unit. While the reports may be sensitive in nature, they are not usually classified.

Note. Unit standard operating procedures and directives from higher headquarters establish operational reporting requirements, formats, and procedures.

B-17. Operational reporting—
- Tells the commander where and when the unit or subordinate units are conducting operations.
- Describes unit mission capability.
- Responds to administrative and logistical requirements.
- Describes support requirements.
- Includes, but is not limited to—
  - Unit status reports.
  - Mission status reports.
  - Equipment status.

B-18. Operational reporting provides commanders information pertaining to the employment of their HUMINT collectors. These reports help inform commanders, and the 2X, if collectors are being utilized correctly. Commanders can determine this by assessing the risk versus gain of a particular mission, pace of operations, or

Operational:  
Weekly Activity Reports  
Daily Activity Reports  
Situation Reports  
Resource Status Reports
- Track personnel and equipment.
- Used to deploy collectors and focus support.

Technical:  
ICF Subvouchers  
Basic Source Data Reports 1-3  
Operational Review Reports  
Contact Report  
Detainee Screening Reports  
Knowledgeability Briefs  
Interrogation Plans  
Post Interrogation or Summary  
Interrogation Reports  
Casing Reports  
Screening Reports  
Operational Proposals  
Transfer Messages  
Source Termination Requests
- Provide nonintelligence information.
- Have limited distribution.
- Used to—
  - Manage personnel and provide guidance.
  - Develop operations and sources.
  - Propose actions and describe missions.

Intelligence:  
Intelligence Information Reports  
Tactical Intelligence Information Reports  
SALUTE (Spot) Reports
- Answer requirements at any level.
- Are widely disseminated (through classified channels).
- Provide decisionmakers with information.

Figure 2. Categories of reports
whether or not the collectors are being correctly employed. When determining risk versus gain, the commander, through the 2X, ensures the teams are not taking unnecessary risk due to the low density or high demand of the collectors. When determining the operational pace, the commander, through the 2X, must consider the number of missions teams are conducting on a daily basis, to ensure collection teams are not over tasked.

**Technical Reports**

B-19. This reporting is used to propose operations, develop sources, and report investigative and operational actions. These reports should not contain any intelligence information.

B-20. Technical reports have very limited distribution as they often include information concerning sources and methods (modus operandi), which needs to be very tightly protected. OMTs and S-2X elements normally handle most technical reporting. Some technical reports are passed up through higher 2X channels. The minimum classification of these reports is CONFIDENTIAL.

*Note.* The 2X is the approval authority for the release of technical reports outside technical channels.

B-21. Technical reporting includes the forwarding of source information and technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher echelons and the passing of tasking specific details, source information, technical control measures, and other information from higher to lower echelons. Technical reporting is conducted through the technical chain that extends from the collection teams through the OMT and OSC, if applicable, to the C/J/G/S-2X.

**Intelligence Reports**

B-22. All HUMINT collection is requirement driven. The reporting generated from collection activity should answer, partially or wholly, collection requirements or the supported commanders’ PIRs. Intelligence reports are the means by which to provide this information to the supported commanders, other decisionmakers, and analysts. They are widely disseminated and can answer requirements at any level.

B-23. Intelligence reports are classified up to TOP SECRET. In theaters where tactical intelligence information reports are utilized, they are used to quickly disseminate information only within the theater in which they were generated; they are not used to disseminate information outside of it. Some are converted to IIRs and distributed to national level consumers. In accordance with the DHE-M 3301.001 (S//NF), the intent is to convert all tactical intelligence information reports to IIRs.

B-24. Figure 3 shows the flow of HUMINT reporting.
SOURCE VALIDATION

B-25. Source validation is the systematic vetting of sources to determine if they are who they claim to be, if they are free of external control, are capable of behaving in a secure manner, and possess placement and access consistent with tasking. HUMINT and CI personnel must assess all DOD human sources according to National HUMINT Manager Directive 0001.08 (S//NF) and Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 2006-300-1 (S//NF). (For additional information, see DODI 5-3325.07 (S//NF).)

B-26. The 2X is responsible for ensuring HUMINT collectors develop and maintain sources with access to information responding to established CCIRs. The 2X must establish processes which frequently review the information obtained from a source. This is a continuous and never-ending process. Not only must the 2X conduct source validation but also reinforce to the HUMINT collectors that they must honestly review the reporting and evaluations of the information provided by their sources to make a determination on the value of each source.

B-27. The 2X and the collectors cannot do this independently of one another; it must be a collaborative process. The 2X provides objectivity in the assessment and validation of each source. Collectors have first-hand contact
with each source and best understand what information each can and cannot provide, as well as each source’s motivation and concerns.

B-28. Conducting source validation allows the 2X to identify those sources who may be collecting on U.S. forces. In addition to identifying the threat, the 2X can also determine how the threat or enemy is targeting U.S. forces. Additionally, identifying these sources may also identify vulnerabilities of U.S. or multinational forces. This information is incorporated into threat and vulnerability assessments and used to increase the security of U.S. and multinational forces, as well as to determine what friendly forces’ information may have been compromised.

Note. For more information on source validation, see DHE-M 3301.002 (S//NF) and TC 2-22.307 (S//NF).
Appendix C

Interpreter Support

CONTRACT LINGUIST CATEGORIES

C-1. The G-3/S-3 has primary responsibility for coordinating contract linguists. When requesting civilian contract linguists, the commander and staff must identify requirements by category. All commands must comply with the U.S. Army CI screening policy for contract linguist support. The contract linguist categories are—

- **Category I.** CAT I linguists are locally hired personnel with an understanding of the English language. These personnel undergo a limited screening and are hired in-theater. They do not possess a security clearance and are used for unclassified work. During most operations, CAT I linguists are required to be rescreened on a scheduled basis.

  *Note.* For more information on linguist screening and use in support of HUMINT activities, see DA Memorandum (U), Subject: *Personnel and CI Screening Policy for Army CAT I Linguists to be Utilized by HUMINT Collection Teams.*

- **Category II.** CAT II linguists are U.S. citizens who have native command of the target language and near-native command of the English language. These personnel undergo a screening process, which includes a national agency check. Upon favorable findings, these personnel are granted an equivalent of a SECRET collateral clearance.

  *Note.* CAT II is the minimum requirement for the use of contract linguists in support of HUMINT operations. Linguists supporting HUMINT operations are exposed to classified methodologies and information, which require a minimum SECRET clearance.

- **Category III.** CAT III linguists are U.S. citizens who have native command of the target language and native command of the English language. These personnel undergo a screening process, which includes a special background investigation. Upon favorable findings, these personnel are granted an equivalent of a TOP SECRET clearance.

USE OF LINGUISTS—ADVANTAGES

C-2. The most obvious advantage of using a linguist is that, if a HUMINT collector does not speak the same language as their sources, the use of a linguist allows them to perform their missions. If the linguist is properly trained, briefed, and assessed, the interpreter can become a valuable assistant to collectors. The linguist—

- Normally has a greater knowledge of the local culture and language usage than could be developed by the collectors or agents.
- Can identify language and culturally based clues that can help HUMINT collectors confirm or refute the veracity of their sources’ statements.
- Can interpret not only the literal meaning of a statement but also the intent and emotion of a sentence.
USE OF LINGUISTS—DISADVANTAGES

C-3. There are, however, several significant disadvantages to using a linguist. Disadvantages may include—

- A significant increase in time to conduct the collection. Since the interpreter must repeat each phrase, the time for a given questioning session or meeting is normally at least doubled.
- Since there is a third person in the communications loop, the potential for confusion or misunderstanding increases significantly. This is especially true when the linguist is deficient in command of either language.
- The establishment of rapport and the use of some approach techniques are made difficult or even impossible when working through a linguist.
- The ability of the collectors to interpret their sources’ veracity through the analysis of word usage, nuances of speech, and body language is curtailed.
- The linguist will have his own set of biases that could influence the manner in which the dialogue is interpreted.
- The source may be culturally biased against the linguist. This is especially likely if the linguist was locally hired or is of a different ethnic, social, or religious group than that of the source.
- The linguist may be culturally biased against the source and intentionally misinterpret the source’s words or meaning to obtain a desired effect.
- If the only linguist available does not have a high enough security clearance, the linguist may not be allowed to participate in a particular mission or associated with a particular project.

Note. For more information on language support, see FM 2-0, appendix B.
**Glossary**

**SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>2X</td>
<td>human intelligence and counterintelligence staff element</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>analysis and control element</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCITC</td>
<td>Advanced Foreign Counterintelligence Training Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMSOC</td>
<td>Advanced Military Source Operations Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOIR</td>
<td>area of intelligence responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army service component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASOC</td>
<td>Advanced Source Operations Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/J/G/S-2X</td>
<td>coalition/joint/corps/division intelligence staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>category</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFISO</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CICA</td>
<td>counterintelligence coordinating authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISAC</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Special Agents Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFISO</td>
<td>counterintelligence force protection source operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISOC</td>
<td>counterintelligence special operations concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIST</td>
<td>company intelligence support team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>controlled source operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>combat training center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSDC</td>
<td>Defense Strategic Debriefing Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>defensive source operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>ES2</td>
<td>Every Soldier is a Sensor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISS</td>
<td>foreign intelligence security service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>general support</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>HUMINT Collectors Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>HUMINT collection team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>HUMINT operations cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICF</td>
<td>Intelligence Contingency Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDSRS</td>
<td>Integrated Defense Source Registry System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>intelligence information report</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. States Intelligence and Security Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>intelligence requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>investigative source operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDSRS</td>
<td>Integrated Defense Source Registry System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITO</td>
<td>international terrorist organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCITA</td>
<td>Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDEF</td>
<td>Joint Debriefing and Exploitation Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDIF</td>
<td>Joint Debriefing and Interrogation Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>military counterintelligence collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decisionmaking process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (mission variables)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFT</td>
<td>multifunctional team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>military source operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIS</td>
<td>Naval Criminal Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFCO</td>
<td>offensive counterintelligence operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other governmental agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMT</td>
<td>operations management team</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>operational support cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>intelligence staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Source Operations Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>traffic control point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFCICA</td>
<td>Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>table of organization and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQ</td>
<td>tactical questioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAIC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAICoE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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