



ACC Threat Information Fusion Cell



Homeland Defense Information Summary - 25 November, 2009

Headquarters Air Combat Command
Langley AFB, VA. 23665

General Awareness/Safety Information



ROLL CALL RELEASE

In Collaboration with the ITACG



(U//LES) Radio Frequency Jammers Used to Disrupt Communication Devices, 23 Nov 09


(U//LES) Radio frequency jammers are devices designed to prevent communication devices from operating by deliberately broadcasting disruptive radio transmissions on the frequencies used by the targeted devices. Radio frequency jammers have been used to interfere with communications between law enforcement officers.

(U//FOUO) Characteristics of Radio Frequency Jammers

(U//LES) Originally created for law enforcement and the armed forces to interrupt criminal and terrorist communication, radio frequency jammers have been developed for civilian use and are sold illegally on the Internet.

(U) Unlike older radio frequency jammers, which broadcast noise on the target frequency to disrupt communications, newer jammers use more subtle techniques, in which no sound is heard on the targeted equipment.

(U//LES) In October 2008, police in Canada encountered a vehicle driven by supporters of a violent motorcycle gang. The officers noticed that they were unable to transmit radio calls to other officers. During a search of the vehicle, they discovered a radio frequency jammer that blocked their radio transmissions within five meters of the device.



(U//LES) Indicators that a radio frequency jammer is in use are:

- (U//LES) Users are unable to transmit on two-way radios.
- (U) Users hear faint music, electronic noises, or other recorded sounds on their designated frequencies.

(U) Portable radio frequency jammers can be concealed in cigarette packs, briefcases, luggage or laptop bags, and can be disguised as a key fob or cell phone car charger. Some jammers are small enough to be plugged into a vehicle cigarette lighter.

IA-0050-10

(U) Prepared by the DHS/I&A Domestic Threat Analysis Division, the FBI/Directorate of Intelligence, and the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, and private sector first responders in developing deterrence, prevention, preemption, or response strategies.

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Suspicious Activity/Possible Tests of Security**(U//FOUO//LES) Suspicious Activity at Shopping Mall, Joliet, Illinois**

Source: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center Daily Intelligence Report, 25 Nov 09; Tip Report Number: MDSA00001114

(U//FOUO) ACC TIFC BLUF: Questions regarding the demographics of a mall, specifically the busiest hours and busiest locations, could be motivated by nothing more than the development of a business plan (for example, where to open/locate a new business); however, given the fact malls are essentially large soft targets with a high density of potential victims, any suspicious activity is worthy of attention.

- On 24 November 2009 at approximately 6:00 p.m., the MCAC Watch received information regarding suspicious activity at a shopping mall located in Joliet, IL. The complainant stated that an identified witness stated that he had observed two unidentified subjects, of Pakistani descent asking **suspicious questions regarding the demographics of the mall, busiest hours and busiest locations.** The witness also observed a printed list of malls with their addresses and telephone numbers in the possession of one of the subjects. The vehicle that the subjects were driving was registered to an indetified Maryland subject who owns three businesses located in Baltimore, MD.

(U//FOUO//LES) Hazardous materials found in Pasadena

Source: 24 Nov JRIC Report

(U//FOUO) ACC TIFC BLUF: As noted above, any activity at a potential target as soft as a mall is worthy of mention, especially when that activity is occurring days before "black Friday."

- (U//FOUO) On November 20, Paseo Colorado Mall security discovered unusual items in a trash container located at 234 E. Colorado Boulevard. Pasadena HAZMAT and the LASD Bomb Squad were notified and responded. Pasadena HAZMAT disclosed that the items found included aluminium powder, iron oxide and potassium nitrate, along with other chemicals that if combined could create an explosive device. No witnesses were located.

(U//FOUO//LES) Suspicious Inquiry at Military Facilities in Wisconsin

Source: Wisconsin Statewide Information Center, Daily Intelligence Briefing, November 19, 2009; FBI-SIR, Milwaukee Division (17 November 2009)

(U//FOUO) ACC TIFC BLUF: Any unreasonable elicitation (per DTM 09-001: Elicitation of information is defined as suspicious questioning of personnel by any means about particular DoD structures, functions, personnel, or procedures at the facility or infrastructure) of information, especially when in the context discussed below, is suspicious. If nothing else this event should serve as an example of the types of suspicious phone calls one could receive while at work, and how to handle it.

- (U//FOUO) As of November 2009, unidentified persons telephonically contacted two identified military recruiting facilities in Grant and Oneida County, Wisconsin, to confirm they were military facilities. In one incident the caller claimed to be affiliated with a well known internet search engine and spoke with a foreign accent in a female voice. The caller stated military facility was going to be featured on their Web site (NFI) and needed to confirm the facility was designated as military. The correct address and the military status of the facility were confirmed; the call was terminated (NFI). In the second incident, the caller did not claim an affiliation and spoke with an East Indian accent. The caller requested to confirm the facility was 'Government Installation.' No information was given to the caller. (U//FOUO) WSIC Analyst Note: There are no known threats to military facilities in Wisconsin; however, potential threats cannot be discounted. Military facilities, in particular recruiting stations, are often the preferred target of terrorist attacks. A pretext correspondence may be an indicator of pre-operational intelligence. Recipients of this report should immediately report suspicious or criminal activities potentially related to the caption subject to their local FBI office.

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(U//FOUO//LES) LASD Deputy reports suspicious contact with subject

Source: 24 Nov JRIC Report

(U//FOUO) ACC TIFC BLUF: There are several suspicious aspects to the below story, not the least of which is the beauty supply store business card. We've seen some indications and traffic suggesting that DHS is currently drafting a product to discuss the potential threat from beauty supply products like acetone and hydrogen peroxide. We have seen incidents of late where there have been suspicious purchases of large quantities of beauty products. Although the reasons are either unknown or still under investigation, the potential threat is obvious.

- (U//FOUO//LES) On November 23, LASD responded to a call of a man slumped over inside a vehicle. The deputy made contact with the subject asleep inside a Ford police detective type vehicle that was purchased the prior day. The deputy conducted a vehicle search and discovered a note with possible code words, and high numerical figures on a list of several Middle Eastern countries including Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also found a new pre-paid phone in package, a beauty supply business card, and money (Manat) from Iran. Subject stated that he was born in Azerbaijan and was found in possession of a small amount of marijuana. The suspect was identified, cited and released.

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