PREFACE

The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Program is not an alliance nor has an ABCA force ever been employed under the program. However, the ABCA nations have served together in ad hoc coalitions on numerous occasions to pursue common objectives. The ABCA “Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook” focuses on operational level design through to tactical level execution. It provides an agreed compendium of ABCA SFCB approaches, the key operating considerations including basics of building partner capacity, ABCA SFCB training guidance, and types of capabilities required by ABCA nations to conduct SFCB operations.

Building the capacity of host nation security forces (HNSF) has become a key element of contemporary military operations today, exemplified in ongoing operations like Afghanistan. Coalition forces (CF) have recognized that conventional military action alone is not sufficient for enduring success. Success, in contemporary military operations will be determined in large part by how well and how quickly HNSF can assume the responsibility for security from CF. The goal of change to any HNSF is an accountable, self sustaining, capable and credible force able to meet the security challenges faced by the HN and looked upon as legitimate by the population. Achieving this may take years, but all activities should seek to achieve this aim from the outset. Ultimately, this legitimizes HN authority and enables the exit of CF.

The approaches discussed throughout the SFCB Handbook can be executed with all subsections of core security forces. Core security forces may include armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities and reserve or local security units.

ABCA nations conduct coalition operations to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that may pose threats to common national interests. While the ABCA program has achieved some levels of standardization in certain areas, no common doctrine exists between the armies. This handbook does not fill this gap, rather it assists the coalition commanders and staffs on how to understand and develop solutions to conduct SFCB. It incorporates selected information from ABCA products but does not reproduce these documents. The SFCB Handbook is not a doctrinal publication, nor does it include tactics, techniques, or procedures.

The SFCB Handbook is intended to assist ABCA nations serving in any coalition, whether the coalition consists of ABCA or other nations, and will prove useful to any other countries serving in a coalition.

The ABCA Security Force Capacity Building Handbook is supported by these ABCA handbooks and planning guides:

- Coalition Logistics Handbook (CLH) (ABCA Publication 323).
- Coalition Health Interoperability Handbook (CHIH) (ABCA Publication 256).
- Coalition Intelligence Handbook (CIH) (ABCA Publication 325).
- Coalition Engineer Handbook (CEH) (ABCA Publication 292).

These publications provide detailed information in their specific areas for assisting in the conduct of successful coalition operations. The COH, CLH, CHIH, and CIH can be found in electronic version on the ABCA Internet site at www.abca-armies.org/.

The masculine form used in this document also designates, when relevant, women as well as men. The masculine form is used to simplify reading of the text.

Each of the nations and the ABCA Armies Program maintain a database with lessons learned. These can be accessed over the Internet. Start at the ABCA Program home page at www.abca-armies.org/ under the Lessons, Exercises and Experiments.

# SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING HANDBOOK

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GLOSSARY

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Introduction

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands... It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them.”

“Tell me and I forget. Teach me and I remember. Involve me and I learn. “
Benjamin Franklin

Strategic Context

SFCB has come to play an increasingly important role in each of our armies over the last decade and will undoubtedly feature in operations spanning the spectrum of conflict in the future. Its affect on organization, training, equipping and doctrine has been felt to a greater or lesser extent by each of us and will help define recent conflicts and their effects. However, SFCB cannot be done in isolation. What must be borne in the military planner’s mind from the outset is that SFCB is a part of the wider SSR campaign and as a consequence must be part of a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, if coalition partners are present, an extra layer of complexity is present and must be planned for. Failure to take these two aspects into account runs the risk of failure at worst or a fragmented HNSF as a result, at best. This handbook aims to assist the military planner in their approach to SFCB. It is aimed at both commanders and staff officers, primarily on brigade and divisional staffs, although it also has utility for those charged with training, mentoring and advising HNSF forces at the tactical level.

Organization of the Handbook

To describe SFCB, this handbook is organized with several chapters progressing from planning and preparation through execution. Chapter 1 is a foundational chapter, describing the principles and framework for delivering the SFCB effect. Chapters 2 through 5 of this handbook then cover the planning and preparation for missions which include SFCB, understanding cultural and developing trust, analysis of the HNSF requirements, structuring or organizing SFCB forces, and training ABCA forces to assume the SFCB mission. Chapters 6 and 7 then build on these foundations and preparation in describing both the employment and sustainment of the SFCB force as well as the HNSF during mission execution. Measuring the effects of these SFCB efforts encompasses Chapter 8. Finally, three Annexes provide case studies from Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and Iraq, illustrating the topics of training, mentoring and augmenting.
CHAPTER 1

FOUNDATIONS: DELIVERING THE SFCB EFFECT

Introduction

1. Coalition Forces recent operational experiences have reaffirmed principles which provide a foundation for the design and execution of SFCB. These principles apply across the full spectrum of operations, for any echelon and for all personnel conducting capacity building. The principles as well as their descriptions are as follows.

Principles for SFCB¹

2. **Understand the Operational Environment.** An in-depth understanding of the operational environment—including available HNSF, opposing threats, and civil/cultural considerations—is critical to planning and conducting operations to build security force capacity. All personnel must clearly understand the theater, population, and HNSF with which they are working, especially current security force capabilities. There is also a requirement for an understanding of the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, geographic, cultural and educational aspects for building military capacity. It is clear that successful operations require the identification of friendly, hostile and neutral decision makers and those who wield influence, their objectives and strategies, and the ways they interact. The conditions of the operational environment can rapidly change, and those supporting these operations must anticipate these changes and exploit potential and possibly fleeting opportunities. CF at all levels should seize the opportunity to learn while conducting HN capacity building. HNSF are complex organizations likely to be operating in a demanding, unclear and volatile environment. Therefore, understanding second and third order effects are vital in guarding against unintended consequences.

3. **Create effective HN leadership.** The complexity of the operational environment places a premium on effective leadership at all levels. Effective leadership will depend upon achieving the right balance between cultural acceptance, ability-based selection and the training given.

4. **Build legitimacy.** Based on collective perception, the HN population and the international community will determine the government’s credibility and legitimacy. Legitimacy is a concept that transcends strict legal definition; it includes the moral and political legitimacy of a HN government or partner organization. Building capacity aims to develop security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the local populace. Every effort should be made to promote professional bearing, judiciousness in the application of force and transparency of purpose among HN security forces. Significant policy and legal considerations may apply to these activities. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining both internal and international support. HNSF cannot sustain long-term efforts without legitimacy.

5. **Achieve Unity of effort.** Building security force capacity often includes many actors making unity of effort essential for success. Demand for scarce resources reinforces the need for

unity of effort. Planners must consider this as a vital aspect or they will not achieve a comprehensive approach.

6. **Sustain the effort.** The CF must maintain its commitment to capacity building efforts throughout the campaign until HNSF are self sustaining and violence is reduced to levels that are acceptable to the local population or within normal levels for the society at issue. Programs including introducing techniques and procedures must not be started that are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capabilities of the HN to maintain without outside assistance. The desire to deploy HNSF early must be balanced against the effort to develop them so as not to hinder or jeopardize the long term viability of the HN force and transition of security responsibilities to the HN.

7. **Partner the HN.** Personal relationships and genuine empathy with HNSF are critical to establishing trust and mutual confidence. HNSF should have ownership of assets and activities transferred to them as soon as practicable. As such, risk will have to be taken and managed in order to achieve this imperative. A consistent approach within the CF and with the HN using appropriate and mutually accepted, Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) is essential. Transparency, honesty, realism and willingness to listen and acknowledge mistakes by the CF are essential. CF should avoid making promises and raising expectations that cannot be subsequently met. It is important that CF take into account the balance between HNSF capacity and the security forces’ relationship to HN society. The role of the CF in supporting the HN must be clearly explained and the benefits the CF brings must be practically demonstrated.

8. **Maintain flexibility of approach.** There is no universal template for SFCB. Approaches must be adapted to local/regional differences in culture, ethnicity, and operational tempo. Even within a given theater of operations local conditions may dictate different approaches to achieve a common end state. Advice from day to day practitioners will be critical in developing specific plans. CF are unlikely to enter an operation with complete or even sufficient understanding of the local situation and therefore, it is imperative that learning and adaptation are built into the plan from the start. CF must be willing and able to exploit their growing understanding and to adapt quickly to the inevitable changes in circumstances.

**Execution**

9. Recent ABCA nations’ operational experience and best practice has shown that the development of HNSF capacity occurs across several levels or stages. Although listed sequentially for the purpose of this report there is recognition that in practice the stages will almost certainly overlap. The likely stages are:

   a. **Resource.** The resource stage involves determining the resource requirements necessary to support the development of HNSF in accordance with the design. Assessment and planning alone are insufficient as resources must be sourced and practicable delivery timetables held to. The inflow of resources is likely to involve many different providers and therefore, is a complex activity that must be carefully managed and championed at the highest level. Coalition and international community cooperation and support during this stage are essential.
b. **Generate.** The generate stage involves the establishment of HNSF, including the forces, leaders, and functional capabilities based on the agreed end state. This should include the HN training institutions and civilian oversight organizations that will be needed to ensure self-sufficiency. This is likely to be the most resource intensive stage and requires detailed planning, consideration and consensus by stakeholders.

c. **Employ.** The employ stage involves HNSF progressing from force generation to mission employment. This is an incremental process. It does not rely on the maturity of the whole force or supporting institutions but rather is focused on the conditions required to use particular individual elements of the HN force. This stage is accelerated through the use of embedded CF to train, advise/mentor, partner or augment HN units. However, there is inherent risk of failure if HNSF are employed beyond their trained state or ability to sustain the commitment.

d. **Transition.** The transition stage defines the handover of responsibility from CF to HNSF and this again, is likely to be incremental. There are different types of transitions that will take place during a campaign. These can include the transition of command of HN tactical elements from CF to HNSF, a complete handover from CF to HN, a transition of primacy from HN military to police forces, and a transition of authority from either CF or HNSF to HN civilian governance. Transitions inherently involve friction as HNSF mature and take increasing responsibility and CF influence wanes. This friction must not be allowed to derail overall progress.

e. **Sustain.** The sustain stage describes the progressive development of institutional capacity of HNSF and is completed at the point that they achieve self-sufficiency. This stage may last for long after the bulk of CF troops have departed.

**Conduct**

10. **Types of operational assistance.** Types of operational assistance provided to HN SFCB can include training, advising/mentoring, partnering, and augmenting and can occur at all levels from operational headquarters down to the squad/section and individual. Monitoring will be undertaken as an integral part of all forms of assistance.²

11. **Training.** Formal training will be conducted as a structured activity with formal assessment in accordance with CF/HN agreed course training standards. Training continues under the auspices of advising/mentoring and partnering but in a less structured format.

12. **Advising/Mentoring.** Advising/mentoring is the most influential, interactive and versatile type of assistance that can be used to build HNSF capacity. Advising/mentoring is the use of influence to teach, coach, and advise while working by, with, and through HNSFs. This type of assistance relies on the ability of the advisor/mentor to provide relevant and timely advice to HN personnel. Advisors/mentors may also provide HNSF with direct access to coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery, medical evacuation, and intelligence.

13. **Partnering.** Partnering is a habitual relationship between CF and HN units at various levels often with a single purpose to gain leverage from the strengths of both forces. Operations are planned and executed jointly. As HNSF capabilities mature, partnering becomes possible; as it increases further, partnering can reduce. As HNSF conduct more autonomous operations, CF may still provide quick reaction forces and other assistance as appropriate.

14. **Augmenting.** Augmenting is a temporary arrangement where HNSF provide individuals or elements to combine with coalition units, or coalition individuals or elements combine with HNSF. Augmentation improves the interdependence and interoperability of coalition and HNSF. For example a CF element could provide a Joint Terminal Attack Controller capability to a HN force to provide non-organic air support.

**Challenges**

15. It is important to acknowledge that points of friction are inherent and inevitable when outsiders attempt to foster change even when change is demonstrably for the better. The most prominent areas highlighted by operational experience and historical study are shown below. A degree of mitigation will be achieved if the Principles for Building Security Force Capacity are adopted. From the outset, development of the plan must pay particular attention to the following issues in order to alleviate their detrimental effect.

16. **Variance in national approaches.** ABCA nations largely agree on the principles and methodology of SFCB. However, there will be differences in the application and conduct reflecting the variations in national approaches. The variances are potential friction points and influence the way in which SFCB is delivered. These are:

   a. **Unity.** The establishment of a clear and effective command structure that ensures the unified, coherent and cohesive delivery of SFCB that best suites the HN is required. Friction areas could include differing national agendas, national restrictions and dual command structures.

   b. **Standardization.** There will always be variations in standardization between national approaches to SFCB. Deploying ABCA forces typically adjust operating processes dependant on which nation has the lead or which standard is adopted in a given theater. Even if clearly established, a standard may not be delivered in the same way which can cause friction amongst various elements of the HNSF, since ABCA nations tend to base the design for delivery of SFCB on their own national practices.

   c. **Operational demand.** This friction is developed when the demand for operational employment outstrips the capacity and/or capability of the HNSF. Any premature operational employment, for whatever reason, runs the risk of interfering with the longer term delivery of SFCB.

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4 ABCA Report 111 – Structuring Forces to Deliver Host Nation Capacity Building, paras 40-41.
d. **Independent HN operations.** As a HNSF becomes more independent and self-sufficient they may initiate and conduct operations that are not necessarily aligned with the CF lines of operations or capacity building efforts. CF elements should be cognizant of this and understand the impacts on SFCB.

17. **Challenges between CF and HN.** Similar to the variances in the ABCA national approaches, there will exist differences between CF and HNSF. These differences could be categorized using the domains of DOTMLPF.

a. **Doctrine/Policy.** National caveats may restrict flexibility and produce disconnects between what the HN wants and individual members of the CF can provide. For example, contributing nations may have differing national ROE, competing priorities and political influences (internal and external), and constraints on the sharing of information and intelligence.

b. **Organization.** Ad hoc operational organizations and HN reluctance to accept formally imposed structures may also challenge CF.

c. **Training.** It may be difficult to strike a balance between CF training principles and methods and those of HNSF, such as work ethic, level of commitment, and level of relative experience and ability.

d. **Material.** Differing equipment capabilities such as night vision produces fundamental incompatibilities between CF and HNSF.

e. **Leadership and Education.** Disparate levels of leader training and education will produce challenges to CF ability to advise or partner with HNSF. Disparities such as the quantity or quality of leaders, low education standards, or low literacy rates, will need to be taken into account when addressing this challenge and strategies developed to address these challenges.

f. **Personnel.** Tribal alliances and politics, ethnicity, irregularity of salary, benefits, pension payments, personal security, corruption, language, continuity, tracking and recruiting difficulties need to be identified.

g. **Facilities.** Co-sharing facilities can impact on the freedom of access, cost versus requirement and HN/CF agreement of priorities.

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Website:

CHAPTER 2
UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AND DEVELOPING TRUST

Introduction

1. Failure to take culture and the building of trust seriously during SFCB could potentially lead to mission failure. For the purposes of this handbook culture is defined as the set of opinions, beliefs, values, and customs that forms the identity of a society. It includes social behavior standards (e.g., how men relate with women, children relate with adults), language (standard of speech), and religion (standards on how man relates with his mortality and creation). Trust is defined as that firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or unit. Trust is both an emotional and logical act, which in practice is a combination of both. In assessing the HN culture ABCA nations should bear in mind from the start other cultures’ perception of our predominantly Western lifestyle. In addition ABCA nations should beware not to fall into the trap of imposing their own culture, particularly their military culture, on HN forces where this may not be appropriate.

2. Recent Campaigns. Recent campaigns have seen ABCA forces repeatedly deploy to conduct SFCB in parts of the world quite different to their own. Not only do these nations often speak languages that are relatively rarely spoken or studied in ABCA nations, they also have very different cultures. These cultural differences include different religions, ethnic variances, tribal networks, or even comprehensive codes of practice, such as Pashtunwali1 in Afghanistan.

3. Implications of Cultural Issues upon SFCB. There are three major implications of conducting SFCB.
   a. Culture Shock. ABCA forces need to understand the cycle through which they may pass during training and deployment when confronted by a different culture. This self-awareness and suggested mitigating activity should serve to reduce the impact of culture shock on the overall campaign.
   b. Cultural Sensitivity in the conduct of SFCB. An understanding of the importance of cultural sensitivity, heeding local customs, values and norms, is vital when conducting SFCB. Even more important is the development of trusting relationships between ABCA and indigenous forces. Time and energy must be invested in these if they are to flourish.
   c. Improved operational effectiveness by leveraging HNSF Cultural Understanding. HNSF generally have an understanding, both of local culture and the broader human terrain that ABCA nations are unlikely ever to rival, even after repeated tours. HNSF therefore offer ABCA nations an opportunity to understand the human terrain in which they are operating that will otherwise be lacking. SFCB cannot be conducted in isolation.

1. Pashtunwali is a "code of life" practiced by the Pashtun people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a set of rules guiding both individual and communal conduct.
Culture Shock

4. Culture shock is “the feeling of disorientation experienced when suddenly subjected to an unfamiliar culture or way of life”. This can affect individuals, sub-units, units and formation HQs. The feeling of not knowing what to do or how to do things in a new environment; or not knowing what is appropriate or inappropriate. There are four distinct stages in the culture shock process which are shown below:

![Stages of Culture Shock Diagram]

Stages of Culture Shock

5. Firstly, it is important to be aware of this process. This self-awareness will allow individuals and teams to understand where they are in the cycle, and thus avoid either knee-jerk reactions, or disenchantment. Culture shock is a normal part of the adjustment process.

6. Secondly, culture shock can be mitigated. Awareness of this process will assist, but active management is also required. For example, the deployment of cultural advisors to units and sub-units at an appropriate time during the deployment, possibly during Stage 2 in Figure 1, will help reduce the depth and length of the dip of the Withdrawal Phase.

Cultural Sensitivity in SFCB

7. Some enduring principles. It is self-evident that different HNSF will have different cultures and so ABCA nations will invariably find themselves, unless the operation is enduring, learning about a new culture in the build up to a deployment. While these cultural norms will vary, however, there are a number of enduring principles that will stand an advisor or partner in good stead.

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a. **Humility, respectfulness and a willingness to listen.** Mentoring HNSF is likely to be far more effective if those forces are treated with respect and listened to by mentors that know that they do not have all the answers. An indigenous culture of ‘saving face’ and honor has pervaded recent campaigns; a failure to recognize or pay heed to this can be disastrous. A humble approach and a willingness to listen to and learn from local culture will carry considerable weight in developing the right relationships to conduct SFCB.

b. **Professionalism.** While demonstrating cultural sensitivity is important, the mission is to build the capacity of the indigenous force. This will be delivered in a number of ways, not least through formal and informal instruction and shared experience on operations. It is also important to remember that impressions are likely to be set through personal example. Professionalism should pervade every action of every mentor; this goes beyond appearance, bearing and manners to the whole approach at all times.

c. **Humor.** It is a near universal trait of soldiers on demanding operations that they have a keen sense of humor. It is not difficult to identify common ground among soldiers employed together in the same task at the same time. The appropriate use of humor at an early stage is a vehicle for building relationships and thus trust.

d. **Patience.** There must be an innate understanding that change and improvement take time. Patience must be exercised, not in a patronizing and superior way, but in a manner that shows objectivity and a professional approach to the relatively slow process that is SFCB. However, patience should not be used as an excuse to tolerate incompetence.

e. **Making promises.** Heightened but unmet expectations among indigenous forces (and the broader population) are particularly damaging to the campaign. Commanders should not promise what may not be delivered. An emphasis upon building trust by keeping smaller promises is likely to be more fruitful.

8. **Establishing trusting relationships.** Commanders will need to use their judgment in the development of trusting relationships with HNSF. The presence of trust allows honest and frank discussions which may not otherwise take place. The development of trust and rapport with the HNSF will greatly increase SFCB effectiveness. Although every culture is unique, following considerations have proven useful in recent campaigns in establishing trust.

a. **Cultural understanding as a catalyst for relationship building.** Significant benefit will be gained by learning about and understanding HNSF culture prior to deployment. HNSF will recognize any effort to respect their culture. Small actions, such as gift exchanges or sharing meals or down time, can have a beneficial effect. Deploying CF troops at every level should develop a positive view of the indigenous culture which will help to set the conditions for a respectful working relationship with HNSF.

b. **Respectful inquisitiveness.** Respectful inquisitiveness fosters trust. CF troops should continue to develop their cultural understanding of both indigenous forces and the
wider society of which they are part. This is an excellent vehicle for engaging with partners, developing mutual affection, identifying common ground and maintaining trust. Commanders should be mindful that asking to ‘see’ something of interest (or complimenting the owner) will often result in it being offered as a gift, with an attendant expectation of reciprocity. This should not prevent commanders from being interested in their HNSF partner but they should be prepared for the requirement to reciprocate.

c. **Understand cultural variations in the concept of time.** Indigenous cultures can have a different understanding of the concept of time and thus be unpunctual or unconcerned with specific times. The temporary nature of CF deployments must be seen in the context of HNSF permanence and not used to generate unrealistic and counterproductive timeframes. Rather than becoming frustrated, commanders should learn to use opportunities to interact with HNSF as a vehicle to develop trust by framing efforts as a genuine concern for their welfare and effectiveness.

d. **Share information and intelligence.** Sharing information and intelligence is central to a trust based military relationship. Both stakeholders have valuable collection assets, each of which will provide a different perspective, which, when combined, will increase situational awareness. It will also provide a more comprehensive information base from which to generate actionable intelligence. Not only will the sharing of information and intelligence boost operational effectiveness, the process of sharing itself will increase cohesion between partners. It creates a virtuous circle.

9. **Maintaining trust over the duration of the campaign.** Indigenous forces will be asked, time and again, to build relationships with rotating CF commanders and soldiers. This uneven relationship requires additional investment from those commanders and soldiers at an early stage of their tour. Commanders should consider the following when taking over a partnered role:

a. **Consistency.** Consistency breeds trust, so even subtle changes between successive units implemented insensitively can erode indigenous forces’ trust in mentoring units. If a unit highlights the shortcomings of a previous unit it also infers that the indigenous force’s trust in the previous unit was misplaced. This means that indigenous commanders may be reluctant to trust a new unit even if the new unit feels that its standards are higher. It will increase the time required to generate a strong personal relationship when a reduction in the tempo of operations could be exploited by enemy forces. Standardized and current predeployment training can mitigate against inconsistencies between units. Deploying with high standards of discipline and appearance can also offset HNSF perception of differences.

b. **Moral courage.** Doing what is right on a consistent basis requires moral courage, particularly in complex circumstances. Nevertheless, without the consistency that moral courage generates partners may become uncertain about likely responses by their partner. This uncertainty will breed mistrust and affect the relationship.
c. **Intra-CF trust and respect.** CF commanders must demonstrate the same levels of trust and respect between each other that they aspire to generate between themselves and their partners. The critical trust based relationship, in this regard, is between successive commanders. This creates three stakeholders in the partnership; the indigenous forces commander, the incumbent CF commander and the succeeding CF commander, who represents continuity.

10. **Language, interpreters and the use of English.** CF should develop the most sophisticated ability in the indigenous language practicable in the time available. This is the case for all soldiers because even the most basic language ability can be used to build rapport. In addition to basic language training for all CF soldiers, care should be exercised in the use of interpreters. It is also important to consider the cultural background of any given interpreter, since language proficiency does not necessarily equate to cultural understanding. If the interpreter is not trusted by an indigenous commander this is likely to be a barrier to developing personal relationships. Also, an interpreter with undue influence may be disruptive to the overall effort. Finally, CF should recognize that they all have a skill that many indigenous forces value: the ability to speak English. Teaching English can be a useful way of building rapport and one that CF of all ranks are well-placed to deliver.

11. **Understanding Cultural Norms.** Some HNSF may show evidence of an indigenous military culture that could impair military efficiency. Some military cultures can be overcome through training however others will be deep rooted and require innovative solutions. The relationship between religious, tribal and ethnic ties can influence and/or disrupt linear military power structures and rank. Codes of honor, hospitality and revenge, can all distort conventional viewpoints. For example, seemingly competent officers are ignored; the credit for heroic leadership can be attributed to the tribe (rather than the individual) and long forgotten feuds can surface at the most inconvenient times. Attempts to modify this type of behavior should be a balance between the desires of the CF elements and the HN. This will ensure that the HNSF is not developed in a manner that would make it unsustainable or indeed unwanted. The HNSF that is developed must be relevant to the society in which it will remain, if not it will be irrelevant and deteriorate.

12. **Instruction.** Cultural sensitivity should pervade methods of instruction. It is particularly important that the potential lack of educational opportunities for indigenous forces is recognized and that commanders and subordinates should not see them as ignorant or slow learners. This understanding should be reflected in instructional methods; if CF instructors are failing to get their message across it is they, rather than the indigenous forces, that need to adjust their techniques.

13. **Discipline.** Discipline should be exercised with extreme caution in the SFCB environment. First, any administration of discipline of CF is likely to be observed closely by indigenous forces. Perceived failure to follow up in responding to CF indiscipline, particularly if the case also involves indigenous forces, is likely to damage the reputation of CF professionalism as well as setting the wrong example. Ideally, indigenous forces should be dealt with by their own chain of command. This ensures discipline is culturally sensitive and builds the capability and reputation of the indigenous commanders in the eyes of their soldiers. The
responsibility still exists, however, for CF to understand the discipline procedures that indigenous forces are subject to in order to mentor their discipline system.

**Leveraging Indigenous Forces’ Cultural Understanding to Improve Operational Effectiveness**

14. Western military forces can find it hard to reach across the cultural divide to indigenous people. Operations conducted with indigenous forces can bridge this gap in the following ways:

a. **Understanding the human terrain.** Operating with indigenous forces offers an opportunity to reach across the cultural gap; they know the ground, the people and the relationship between the two. They can engage with the local population, identifying genuine power brokers and key leaders with surety, unhindered by interpreters and knowing which levers to pull and do so in accordance with cultural norms. This is because the indigenous force, by virtue of ethnicity, upbringing, culture, language, faith, local knowledge and continuity in theater are a living part of the human terrain. Each indigenous soldier is a sensor, with an innate ability to identify what is important and what is not. This better understanding of the human terrain should, in turn, deliver better integrated planning, guide behavior on the ground, including better situational awareness, and improve the ability to measure effectiveness. While the HNSF being a part of the human terrain will provide great advantages to CF, it is also important to develop an understanding of the HNSF as part of the human terrain.

b. **Integrated intelligence.** In addition to identifying the needs of the population, indigenous forces routinely collect and receive excellent HUMINT. Indigenous forces may not be forthcoming with intelligence of this sort until trust develops or they may assume that CF already know what information when they do not. Working together and integrating intelligence systems should smooth this process.

c. **Protect the population.** Population security provided by HNSF supported by mentors is more legitimate in the eyes of the population than security provided by the CF unilaterally. It can also be more effective, with the HNSF ability to provide an enduring presence and identify the absence of the normal and the presence of the abnormal is superior to CF.

d. **Guidance to operations.** Operating closely with HNSF should allow operations to be conducted with greater cultural sensitivity. Indigenous forces are likely to be able to advise, for example, about the best time and manner to organize engagement with key leaders. They are likely to be able provide guidance on the implications of operating over certain culturally sensitive periods. It is also necessary to try to understand how these sorts of occasions will impact upon the motivation of HNSF to conduct operations.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

Pre-deployment

General Themes in Cultural training:

- Has a comparison of cultural values and social structures between the CF and those of the HN been made?
- Has an assessment of local customs and traditions been made?
- Has an assessment of geopolitical history been made?
- Has the role of religion and gender in daily life been considered?
- How can acceptance and trust be generated?
- Has consideration been made as to how to maintain a neutral perspective? (For example, avoiding stereotyping and being aware of bias).
- Has guidance been given as to how to avoid embarrassing or potentially dangerous situations?
- Has training been given on how to recognize and mitigate culture shock?
- Have guest speakers native to the country of interest (for example, NGO staff, foreign students, recent immigrants, or selected refugees) been used during cultural training?
- Have SMEs who have worked in or studied the mission area (for example, SOF personnel, diplomats, and scholars) had the opportunity to speak during the training to give alternative perspectives?

Cultural understanding:

- Has every effort been made to draw upon the wide variety of sources that can lead to an understanding of the indigenous culture? (For example, intelligence organizations might leverage academic research, aid projects, behavioral scientists, private security companies, or other government departments).
- Which framework would be a useful starting point (e.g., ASCOPE / PMESII)?
- Has the importance of cultural understanding to the mission been passed on to the chain of command and deploying personnel?
Cultural sensitivity:

- Have areas of particular cultural sensitivity been identified (e.g. treatment of women; attitude to children; use of dogs; implications of compound searches; ethnicity; attitudes towards corruption) and has clear direction on them been issued to all ranks?
- Has this direction been understood and properly tested during training?
- Has every effort been made to develop skills in the use of interpreters?
- Has every effort been made to develop language skills, even the most rudimentary ones, to allow the force to begin to foster trust with indigenous forces?

Mentors suitability:

- Have mentors, wherever practicable, been vetted for suitability for the role? Not every soldier excels at SFCB and some may be counter-productive. If this is the case they should be reassigned to other appointments whenever possible.
- Is the requirement for humility, professionalism, humor and the development of trusted relationships properly understood across all ranks in the SFCB force?

Consistent approach:

- Are the necessary protocols in place to allow the incoming force to take over from incumbent SFCB unit, if it exists, in a consistent manner?
- Have policies been established and implemented in order to ensure a consistent approach?
- Have instructional techniques been revised to give CF military instructors the necessary skills to teach indigenous forces? Have these been disseminated to all ranks?
- Are indigenous forces rules and discipline procedures, including critical areas like the law of armed conflict covering prisoner handling and so forth, understood by mentors?
- Do mentors understand their responsibilities if they witness transgressions?

Planning

Indigenous forces’ view of the operation:

- Does the operation have the buy in of indigenous forces?
• Has it been conceived by them or imposed upon them?
• Do the indigenous forces believe that the operation is worthwhile?
• Do they believe it will have the same effect that CF believe it will?
• Have indigenous forces been involved in the planning from the start, with the right commanders present, or has planning been done superficially through liaison teams?
• Are the indigenous forces aware of similar operations conducted in the past? If so, what was the outcome?
• Have indigenous forces been involved in the assessment of human terrain?
• Has an integrated intelligence picture, based both upon CF and HNSF assessments, been developed and is it forming the basis for planning?
• Have the indigenous forces identified what elements will be necessary to secure the population?

Indigenous forces own role in the human terrain:

• What part do indigenous forces play in the local human terrain?
• Are they recruited from the area?
• What is their relationship with the local population like?
• Is there reason to treat their assessment of the human terrain with caution?
• Are there any factors that might lead to unexpected behavior (increased absenteeism; rough handling of elements of the population) from the indigenous forces in this area?

Execution

Indigenous forces’ guidance to operations:

• Have the details of the operation been properly discussed with indigenous forces?
• Are indigenous forces aware of the posture and profile that CF intend to assume and do they agree that they are appropriate?

• Have indigenous forces been questioned about any cultural sensitivities that may apply to the specific operations? These could include religious sites, tribal dynamics, recent incidents that have skewed popular opinions.

• Do the indigenous forces have views about the time and place of the operation? For example, will a suggested meeting be held at a time when most farmers will be in the fields or at religious services?

• Have the following been thought about to mitigate culture shock?
  o Seek those with previous experience in the area?
  o Exercise patience, the process of adaptation to new situations takes time?
  o Learn to be constructive. If you have an unfavorable encounter, learn from it and don’t put yourself in that position again.
  o Accept the new culture; do not waste time and energy criticizing it. Focus on getting through the transition. Try to think of one thing each day that is interesting or likeable about this new environment.
  o Maintain confidence in yourself, your organization, and your abilities.
  o Avoid judging things as either right or wrong; regard them as merely different.
  o Accept the difficult challenge of learning to live and function in a new cultural setting. Believe that you can learn the skills to make a satisfactory transition.

References:


CHAPTER 3
ANALYZING THE HNSF REQUIREMENTS

Introduction

1. Building HN security force capability and capacity should begin with an overarching analysis of requirements, existing capabilities, capacity and constraints, including a thorough consideration of cultural, political and economic factors.

2. Each situation will differ depending upon the level of conflict in the Host Nation and the existing capabilities and capacity of their security forces. The complexity and difficulty of conducting SFCB increases dramatically when working in a failing or failed state. Under such conditions, the key operational level security sector organizations, particularly Defense and Interior ministries, may not be present or effective.

3. Analysis must start from an understanding of the operational environment, the required end-state and taking into account the region’s needs and concerns. Analysis should determine the requirements for force development, training, sustainment, unit and logistical distribution, deployment of forces, and equipment acquisition for each type of security force.

4. In the absence of a Joint Interagency Multinational process, the application of the military estimate or decision making process may serve as a useful start point. However, it is important that this is not carried out in isolation and is part of a comprehensive approach.

HNSF Assessment

5. Assessment of the HNSF is critical to determining what problems the HNSF must resolve. Conducting a thorough HNSF assessment reduces the risks of identifying the wrong problem or focusing on factors that do not actually affect the HNSF problem(s). The HNSF assessment enables the SFCB organization to establish the right developmental objectives and then allows for the alignment of developmental tasks (OTERA\(^1\)). The HNSF assessment provides a comprehensive understanding of HNSF capability requirements relative to their environment.

6. The HNSF assessment looks at four elements: organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional. Together this provides a holistic perspective of HNSF capability, capacity, and proficiency levels in relation to security environment they must operate in.

Organizational Assessment

7. The organizational assessment looks at the designed or intended capabilities and capacity, and the effectiveness of the HNSF in performing its assigned tasks. To determine what the organization is designed to do, the organizational assessment answers the three following questions:

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1. Organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise/assist.
a. What are the roles of the HNSF?

b. What is the HNSF Mission? (HNSF Mission Analysis).

c. What are the HNSF own developmental goals and objectives?

8. **What are the HNSF roles?** The role of a HNSF should identify its designed and/or intended operational or institutional purpose(s). A HNSF may have multiple roles and, at times, it may perform roles for which it is not specifically designed or configured to do. Regardless of declared or stated roles, the tasks and functions the HNSF unit is actually performing determines what role the unit is filling. Roles will be operational or generating, although some HNSF units may have both operational and generating roles.

   a. **HNSF operational role.** HNSF having an operational role operate and execute within the Joint/Warfighting functions. These functions enable the organization to conduct mission tasks and to execute other mission related requirements.

   b. **HNSF generating role.** HNSF having a generating role have supporting functions (e.g. administrative, resource management, planning, operations, etc) that allow the organization to carry out institutional tasks (e.g. recruiting, training, doctrine development, human resource, medical support, acquisition and procurement activities, etc). HNSF must be able to recruit, organize, train, and equip its own personnel to operate as members of teams and provide logistics and other support.

9. **What is the HNSF mission?** The SFCB staff should conduct mission analysis through the eyes of the HNSF commander in order to provide an operational perspective of the HNSF mission. This analysis allows SFCB planners to consider how they would execute the mission if they were the HNSF within its constraints, limitations and culture. Ideally they could compare and contrast their analysis with the analysis of the HNSF unit, but this is not often possible.

10. **What are the HNSF own development goals and objectives?** HNSF may have formal methods of identifying and developing capabilities within their own forces. As such, an SFCB organization should fully understand the HNSF development process and synchronize SFCB developmental efforts within the HN process. As development within the HNSF occurs, the ability of the HNSF to sustain progress in development and the ability to recognize its own capability gaps is of paramount importance.

**Operational Assessment**

11. A clear understanding of a HNSF operational or institutional mission serves as the starting point to base the operational assessment. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the HNSF ability to perform its assigned missions, roles, or functions. It answers the question as to how well the HNSF can conduct its assigned tasks.

12. **How well can the HNSF conduct its assigned tasks?** HNSF with an operational role will execute missions by employing the warfighting functions. For example, a unit that failed to
properly conduct a cordon and search may have failed because they lost communication with part of the cordon force (command and control) or they may have gone to the wrong location (intelligence). A generating unit may have failed to produce sufficient basic training graduates because it did not recruit enough soldiers or too many of the trainees quit because they were not receiving pay (resource management). Be careful not to arrive at conclusions prematurely. In the example of the operational unit losing communication with its cordon, it could be because of old and worn out equipment, poor maintenance of equipment, insufficient training, poor leadership, lack of standard operating procedures or a number of other causes.

Environment Assessment

13. The HNSF environmental assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on specific HNSF organization. The environmental assessment should validate the suitability of a HNSF organization’s assigned tasks. This may also reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities and/or capacities in the HNSF beyond those normally associated with a similar type security force. The environmental assessment answers the questions:

a. What capabilities and how much capacity does the HNSF really need?

b. How proficient does the HNSF actually need to be?

14. **What capabilities and how much capacity does the HNSF really need?** Establishing what capabilities the HNSF really needs as it relates to the environment has precedence in all developmental activities. The environment determines requirements immediately placed on a HNSF. SFCB planners must determine what tasks the HNSF units must perform to meet objectives within their environment. These HNSF required capabilities should provide the basis for development. As HNSF units operate and conditions change, SFCB planners should adjust accordingly. As an example, an infantry battalion assigned to provide security for a large rural area might need different capabilities in order to cover large distances quickly and communicate over extended distances than an infantry battalion that is working primarily in a small section of a city.

15. **Establishing the “How Well” a HNSF Unit Must Perform a Task.** How well a HNSF unit performs its required tasks will normally serve as the basis for the development of measures of effectiveness (MoE) for SFCB organizations. Determining how well a particular HNSF is or is not performing a specific task or achieving an objective depends directly on the conditions it must deal with. For example, if an infantry battalion is succeeding in defeating the enemy when coming into direct contact, they do not need to improve their marksmanship to make every soldier a sniper. If the enemy then changes tactics and begins engaging at longer ranges, the unit may have to improve its marksmanship capabilities.

16. SFCB planners must confirm where there are shortfalls or gaps between existing capacity and required capacity to succeed in the environment. Capability gaps can be traced to deficiencies in one or more of the development constructs such as DOTMLPF-P\(^2\) (US), DLODs\(^3\)


\(^3\) Defence Lines of Development
(UK), PRICIE⁴ (CA and NZ), FIC⁵ (AS) as they relate to required or desired capabilities. These gaps form the basis for SFCB developmental objectives.

17. The environmental analysis must consider an understanding of current conditions that affect or influence specific HNSF units. Variables such as political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) influence development and may have a positive or negative impact on development. For example, if a commander is perceived to be corrupt, his unit may be denied resources which would hamper development of the unit. Units with a strong political or social connection may receive priority for new equipment.

**Institutional Assessment**

18. The institutional assessment evaluates HNSF capabilities by examining DOTMLPF-P or a similar construct in order to close existing capability gaps. The institutional assessment answers the questions:

a. Why is the organization performing at its current level?

b. What can be done to improve its performance?

19. **Why is the organization performing at its current level?** This question seeks to identify institutional and other causal factors as they relate to capability gaps or factors that are impeding development.

a. **Doctrine.** Is there a need to help develop HN doctrine? If so, what domains will it cross, e.g. Armed Forces/Police/Intelligence/wider security forces? Does the organization have standard operating procedures (SOPs)?

b. **Organization.** C2, Size/Sustainability/Composition and Ethnicity considerations.

c. **Training.** Duration/Level/Depth, Capacity for training/throughput and sustainability.

d. **Material.** Availability of equipment, standardization of equipment, loan of equipment and sustainability of equipment.

e. **Leadership and Education.** Key Leader development through training programs in CF countries and morals and ethics.

f. **Personnel.** Personnel administration, effective recruiting system, career progression processes including promotion, demobilization and reintegration. Effective and timely pay system including pensions and disability payments. Linkage to HN

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⁵ Fundamental Inputs to Capability
identification process, i.e. vetting. Discipline procedures and personnel welfare including family support.

g. **Facilities.** C2, barracks, operational e.g. force protection measures and permanent check points. Logistics and training facilities. Coordinated basing plan which requires long term development and sustainment.

h. **Policy.** Written or standing practices that affect the organization, such as a leave policy, promotion boards, selections for schools.

20. **What can be done to improve its performance?** Underlying conditions within the domains of the varying capability constructs are where developmental problems can normally be traced. Knowing what is impeding development enables SFCB planners to determine SFCB requirements (i.e. what the SFCB organization must do) to enable development in the HNSF. For example, if the HNSF is unable to conduct command and control because its radios are worn out, a solution could be to acquire new radios, develop better maintenance procedures, or obtain repair parts to fix the existing radios.

21. Through these assessments, the commander is able to characterize the HNSF in terms of their level of development (resource, generate, employ, transition, or sustain) and determine how forces should be aligned to accomplish the developmental tasks of (OTERA) in support of SFCB objectives.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

Organizational Assessment

- What is the current state (size, training, equipment, methods and morale) of existing HNSF?
- Are there other forces in the HN that maintain military capabilities? (paramilitary, Gendarmerie, etc).
- Do HNSF remain as cohesive units under the control of their leadership?
- Is the leadership of the HNSF a professional corps or were positions of reserved only for a political or ethnic faction of the former regime?
- What actions are required to integrate and include all ethnic groups or forces retaining military powers in the new HN security regime?
- Does the organization have an operational or generating role or both?
- What tasks does the unit normally perform?
- What is the organization designated?
- Does it have a list of authorized equipment?
- What percent of this equipment is on hand?
- Is there an authoritative basis in the HN rule of law, constitution or other source that creates the structure, roles and responsibilities of the HNSF?
- Will pre-conflict HNSF structure serve to meet post-conflict capabilities and requirements?
- What CF are available to support or direct the SFCB operation?

Operational Assessment

- Has the organization performed its assigned mission recently?
- Has the organization trained as a unit?
- Does the HN have a maneuver training center?
• Are there training assessments or after action reports available that identify unit strengths and weaknesses?

• When is the next time the unit will be deployed? Can the SFCB unit observe operations, or training?

Environmental Assessment

• How much area does the HN unit secure?

• Were HNSF involved in maltreatment, torture, abuse of power, corruption?

• Are political party affiliations important to the armed forces?

• How does the population perceive its security forces?

• Where do most of the HNSF come from? Social, tribal affiliations, distance from their point of employment?

• How well are HNSF paid compared to other forms of employment?

• What is the literacy rate in the HN unit?

Institutional Assessment

• Does the unit have doctrine? Do they follow it? Will it be adequate in the post conflict environment?

• What are the quantities and types of leaders required to guide and direct the post conflict HNSF? What are the selection criteria?

• What regional training resources are available to support post conflict HNSF training?

• Are they a unique organization? What is the commander to subordinate ratios?

• Do they have an annual training schedule? How do they train replacements?

• How old are their weapons? Are their weapons suited for the tasks required? How do they procure new equipment or get repair parts?

• Do HNSF leaders receive professional military education? Is it done in country at a central location or decentralized?
• How do they recruit their personnel? What are the requirements for retention? Who determines when personnel are reassigned? Who keeps records on soldier qualifications?

• Are the facilities adequate to house all the personnel of the unit? Do mess facilities meet health and safety standards?

References:

CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURING FORCES TO DELIVER HOST NATION CAPACITY BUILDING

Introduction

1. Based on the requirements identified during analysis, a program to build security force capacity can be designed. The program must link tactically important actions with strategically important outcomes developed in consultation with the HN government. The program must be supported by the Coalition, and be able to withstand external stakeholders’ scrutiny. Approaches to program design can be either top-down or bottom-up and should be guided by internationally accepted norms, Coalition objectives, cultural requirements (Chapter 2 refers) and, significantly, resource constraints. A top-down approach starts with ministerial-level considerations (e.g., enabling legislation, command and control modalities force structure considerations). A bottom-up approach starts with tactical-level considerations (e.g., training programs, equipment, training facilities and essential logistic considerations). Whichever approach is adopted planners must understand that there will be effort across all levels simultaneously.

Campaign Planning Considerations

2. The campaign plan should be shaped by a comprehensive approach. The SFCB effort should be seen as a Line of Operation (LOO) within the CF campaign plan. The HN SFCB program, nested within the campaign plan, consists of a number of mutually supporting activities. Each activity will have associated decisive conditions which, taken as a whole, will achieve the LOO objective and contribute to the end state. Measuring progress along clearly defined and agreed lines of development is key to operationalizing SFCB. These should include capability milestones against which progress can be measured, assessed and communicated to stakeholders. Figure 1 depicts this relationship.
Primacy of the Host Nation

3. The concept for building security force capacity should focus on working by, with and through the HNSF to support their needs. The key tenet is that the HN has absolute primacy. Understanding legitimacy, what creates it and how it is sustained within the HN, are also key considerations. For long-term success, the HN population and the International Community must perceive the new or enhanced security force to be legitimate, appropriately resourced, and subject to appropriate oversight. Those assisting with the development of security force capacity must understand that the military is only one part of a comprehensive approach. Other stakeholders will have their own perspectives and must be given the opportunity to engage with, and potentially take the lead on, specific lines of development.

Force Structure Design Considerations

4. Typically, forces given the task of delivering SFCB are made up of appropriately selected and trained personnel, who will, in some form, interact with HNSF units. As explored in Chapter 2, personnel should have a deep cultural understanding of the HN and will need to build robust working relationships with them in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Personnel are likely to work in demanding, often austere conditions away from immediate support. In order for them to be effective, the commander must ensure that he or she has the appropriate force protection and risk mitigation measures in place for what are often small, detached and isolated groups. Notwithstanding, personnel and units should be capable of ensuring an element of their own force protection. They must also be trained, equipped and resourced to carry out their primary function as trainers, advisers and augmentees in both permissive and non-permissive security environments. As part of their mission, they may also be required to augment HNSF by coordinating key enablers that are lacking in the HNSF (e.g., close air support, offensive support, medical support and communications). The following are some key considerations that will
impact on the force structure design adopted by the Coalition elements tasked with SFCB program delivery.

a. **Type and Level of Support Required.** At the heart of SFCB is a desire to develop and build enduring capability. Based on an understanding of what can and cannot change developed during the analysis phase, CF determine how best to affect change and the level of resources required to achieve a measurable and sustainable step-change in HNSF capability. The planning staff develops the coalition force package and structure of advisors, trainers, augmentation, and partnering units which will deliver the required SFCB outcome.

b. **Threat Issues.** Force protection measures should be appropriate to the threat and scalable according to the prevailing security situation. As SFCB planners identify force protection measures, such as security of SFCB elements, bases, and sustainment operations, they will have to consider whether additional forces and resources are required. Since perception matters, however, planners will have to balance additional forces with potential negative perceptions produced by a large or inappropriately postured CF presence.

c. **Sustainability.** SFCB missions are inherently rank and specialist heavy; particularly among junior officers and NCOs of all ranks. Planners must understand the impact such missions have on the raise, train and sustain function as it pertains to CF. Such impacts will include, but are not limited to, the continuing effort required to affect change, the likelihood that specialist personnel will conduct multiple rotations, the duration of rotations to achieve the desired effect, and the impact on soldiers’ physical and mental health as a result of sustained periods on operations.

d. **C2 Arrangements.** Planners must consider the C2 arrangements that will govern the activities of CF and HNSF. These arrangements must be understood by all stakeholders, particularly the HN. The requirement for a coherent, logical command chain is essential – particularly if those providing the support are operating in a high-threat environment or multiple actors are present in the battlespace. Critical to effective program delivery is the establishment of a Joint, Inter-Agency and Multi-National (JIM) HQ. A key role of this HQ is to standardize all aspects of program delivery, since multiple actors will be involved across the entire SFCB LOO.

**Transition Considerations**

5. Transition from stage to stage within the overall plan for SFCB occurs as HN security forces gain in competence, capability and experience. The main effort will change over time as capability milestones are met and the focus of effort changes from basic program delivery to more comprehensive development of the force. In essence, CF elements will change their focus of effort across the various types of training assistance and, as a result, structures will need to be modified to conform to the changing priority of effort. Determining what structure best supports both the CF and HN security force is a shared, collaborative decision. Agility and flexibility is key to ensuring that structures support and underpin program delivery. The transition stage falls
into three broad phases, intervention, stabilization, and steady state, each of which is discussed below.

a. **Intervention.** During the intervention phase, the underlying purpose is to begin the building process which will eventually lead to enduring capabilities. The focus is to organize, train and equip HN security forces so that the HN’s vital national interests are assured now and into the future. Therefore, CF structure during the intervention phase will normally consist of organizations which are capable of organizing, training, and equipping HNSF. If HNSF are severely degraded or absent, CF will also consist of operational forces to conduct security missions until a HNSF can be developed. Planners must ensure that extraneous, non-core activities are minimized. For most developing nations the tactical level has primacy; HN security forces need to be able to deliver near-term defense and security outcomes. The trade-off will often be higher level capabilities (e.g., collaborative planning, joint and combined operations, and operations above sub-unit level).

b. **Stabilization.** During this phase, the focus continues on generation and shifts toward employment of HN capabilities. Practice makes perfect and builds confidence. As the HNSF assume more and more responsibility for their own training, the emphasis of CF elements should correspondingly shift from being a trainer to being an advisor/mentor, and ultimately a partner. As the HNSF gains experience it will begin to work with CF on a more equal footing and assume the lead. The onus on planning during this phase is to develop force structures which allow the smooth transition from training through to partnering. Invariably, this will require risk management and engagement with the wider efforts of the SSR community.

c. **Steady State.** During this phase, the focus of CF shifts to the ability of the HN security force to achieve a sustainable level of capability. As the HN security force becomes more independent and autonomous in its abilities and assumes increasing responsibility for security, CF elements will shift to more of an augmenting role providing key enablers not resident within the HN. As the security situation normalizes within the HN, the intent is for CF to withdraw from active participation in operations (although the training function will remain and at times may be strengthened). The planning effort will see a shift to drawdown and redeployment issues, maintenance of augmentation and over watch forces and resources, and the corresponding adjustment of the CF force protection forces and footprint.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

C2 Arrangements

- What type of C2 construct is to be adopted? Examples include a lead (or framework) nation supported by other nations, two or more nations providing discrete (often geographical) program delivery, or an integrated/hybrid model.

- What is the chain of command, and what are stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities?

- What roles, responsibilities and resourcing implications are there in establishing the Joint, Inter-Agency and Multi-National (JIM) HQ?

- What interoperability issues could be anticipated?

- What battlespace management implications could be anticipated?

- What situational awareness implications could be anticipated?

- What national restrictions are there in terms of the conduct of operations, force protection measures, Rules of Engagement and national caveats?

- Is there an element currently conducting the SFCB mission, and if so, what is its force structure? In what areas should the relieving force replicate the force structure of the current force to provide continuity in transition, and in what areas is this infeasible or undesirable?

Type and Level of Support Required

- What are the motivations of the HNSF personnel and how can these motivations be used by those conducting SFCB?

- What is the level of education of HNSF personnel?

- Given HN soldiers’ level of education, what training modalities and methods will need to be adopted to ensure learning outcomes are met?

- What is the dominant HNSF military culture and how close is this from the desired or acceptable CF standard?
• What development assistance can those conducting SFCB provide to HN security force leadership?
• What is the most appropriate type of operational assistance? For example, Train, Mentor, Partner or Augment.

• What HN specialist equipment will be employed, and to what extent will those conducting SFCB need to be trained on non-Coalition specialist equipment?

• What other programs are underway or planned and what is the impact of those programs on the conduct of SFCB?

• What elements of the SFCB program could be run by OGAs, NGOs, other partner nations, the HN government or civil society?

• What measures of effectiveness will need to be developed to ensure the SFCB program will be implemented on time and in the manner prescribed?

**Threat Issues**

• What, at a high level, is the threat to the HN?

• What are the major threats to security?

• What is the HN relationship with the threat groups?

• What familial, tribal, religious and economic issues are in play?

• What kinetic and non-kinetic effects are being employed?

• What specific threats does CF face?

• What Force Protection measures will need to be employed?

• What Coalition assets are available for Force Protection?

• What is the impact of Force Protection measures on HN perception?

• What equipment is necessary to provide the necessary Force Protection?
What restrictions do Coalition partners have with respect to Force Protection? For example, freedoms for local commanders to relax FP measures, MEDEVAC timelines, numbers of vehicles in convoys, vehicle capabilities, etc.

What size security force is necessary to provide the requisite Force Protection?

**Sustainability**

- Is the requirement for specialists sustainable?

- What is the impact such missions have on the raise, train and sustain function of your own forces and how can it be mitigated?

- What is the dwell time of personnel involved in SFCB? What percentage of the force has already deployed, and how many times? What is the national policy for individuals who have recently returned from a deployment?

- Is there a requirement to ask for variation to tour duration?

- What mechanisms are in place to safeguard SFCB personnel from physical and mental health ill effects and are they appropriately located? What are the requirements to pre-screen personnel?

- Is there enough time to regenerate the unit’s equipment set? What equipment shortages exist from the unit’s last deployment?

**Reference:**

CHAPTER 5

PREPARING AND TRAINING ABCA FORCES

Introduction

1. Having analyzed the mission and structured the force, the next step is to train and prepare it. Only limited components of an ABCA nation’s military structure are likely to be optimized for the demands of SFCB; therefore, it is important that as much time as possible is invested in preparation and training. SFCB force preparation and training should be conducted in accordance with a clear, standardized, systematic and realistic approach focused on analysis of the operational environment. This will allow those undertaking SFCB to understand why and what they are training, and provide a forum for informed change as necessary.¹

2. Tailored SFCB preparation and training must develop familiarity and proficiency in operating with HNSF and where appropriate other CF, resulting, as far as possible, in cultural understanding, interoperability and procedural alignment. Trainers and advisors must be thoroughly trained in the tasks they will train HNSF to conduct, many of which may be unique in nature and theater-specific. Training should be developed and tailored with recent and relevant operational experience to ensure currency. This will require careful individual selection and training as well as mission-specific preparation.

Personnel Selection²

3. SFCB by its very nature relies on relationships and trust, which in turn require certain individual traits. Therefore, the selection or assignment of personnel is important if CF are to carry out SFCB effectively. The key qualities of personnel required to conduct effective SFCB are below. If personnel selection is limited, these qualities should developed during force preparation and training.

   a. **Self confidence** and motivation to act in the absence of frequent and explicit direction from his commanders.

   b. **Humility** to accept a different culture and its customs as the norm, and pay deference to HN commanders whether they have earned that respect or not.

   c. **Patience** and perseverance to accept and impose small, steady developmental steps, whilst robustly accepting repeated and frequent setbacks.

   d. **Humor** to build relationships and stave off frustration.

   e. **Interpersonal skills** to quickly build working relationships.

   f. **Adaptable** to compensate for the lack of available specialists.

¹ US FM 3-07.1
² ABCA Report 111, 8-10.
g. Competence, both technically and tactically, is essential in demonstrating credibility with the HN counterparts.

Individual Training

4. A comprehensive individual training program and package will be needed to develop the unique attributes of those selected for SFCB missions. This individual training should focus on three key areas: cultural awareness, enhanced military skills, and the skills necessary to train, advise, mentor, and partner with the HNSF soldier.

a. Cultural awareness. As discussed in Chapter 2, developing the HNSF demands more than awareness of the culture. Any CF element must be able to use the HN culture to his advantage in order to achieve missions and tasks.

(1) HN culture. Techniques need to be developed and taught that enable a CF member to encourage good performance based on cultural understanding. Therefore, culture subject matter experts should be employed throughout all aspects of pre-deployment training.

(2) Language training. Ideally, all those training a HNSF should achieve a basic proficiency in the language of that army. When this is impossible, greater emphasis should be placed on ensuring that CF soldiers can employ a few phrases, including local slang, in their lessons and interaction. Ideally, language training is delivered by personnel who understand both the language and the culture to enhance training value and context.

(3) Use of interpreters. The use of interpreters is a skill and they are a channel through which to communicate. Care must be taken not to allow the interpreter to dominate the conversation and be seen as the CF representative; this must be trained for.


(1) Situational awareness. Detailed information on the security situation and relevant factions, organizations, etc must be understood by all. Pre-deployment training must include personal security, particularly in ensuring the thorough understanding of the rules of engagement.

(2) Procedural training. Where the CF is responsible for advising or augmenting HNSF with additional capabilities (CAS, Airlift, CASEVAC etc.) its personnel should be trained, at the very least, in those procedural aspects which allow them to do so.

(3) Self preservation. All CF personnel who are likely to be forward deployed must have highly developed personal skills to enable them to fight for
their survival in isolation. Training topics such as weapons (CF and HN), ECM, medical, communications, actions on contact, driving, and the ability to call for and direct fires all need to be included in the CF pre deployment training package. All of these CF personnel must be familiar with and capable of operating and providing basic maintenance for the vehicles, weapons, and equipment they are likely to be employing.

(4) **Methods of operations.** SFCB personnel must have a complete understanding of the methods of operation and structures of the CF, the SFCB force and civilian actors appropriate to their HNSF level of command.

(5) **Liaison.** Personnel tasked to perform liaison functions with HNSF and CF should be trained accordingly in procedures, communications systems and language.

(6) **Detainee operations.** Personnel operating with HNSF are likely to become involved in the detainee handling process, whether it is to instruct or monitor this type of operation. Humane treatment of all detainees is mandatory regardless of their legal status under the Geneva Conventions. Soldiers must treat all detainees in accordance with applicable domestic and international law, national policy, and the law of armed conflict. When conducted properly, detainee operations set conditions for success by demonstrating the CF’s genuine commitment to justice, human rights, fundamental fairness, and respect for all people. When detainees are abused or mistreated, it does significant damage to CF credibility, moreover, mistreatment of detainees by CF or HNSF personnel substantially undermines the legitimacy of CF forces and, if it occurs in the context of stability operations, the HN government.

c. **Trainer, Advisor, Mentor, Partner Skills.** Soldiers assigned SFCB missions should receive training on the requirements of developing HNSF. This training must emphasize the following:

(1) Sustaining training and reinforcing individual and team skills.

(2) Using the smallest possible student-to-instructor ratio.

(3) Developing host-nation trainers.

(4) Training to standards—not to time.

(5) Providing immediate feedback; using after action reviews.

(6) Respecting the culture but learning to distinguish between cultural practices and excuses.

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3 US Army FM 3-07.1.
(7) Developing training plans which use the organizations, equipment, operating methods of the HNSF, and comprehensively include not only main forces such as maneuver forces or police, but also specialist supporting organizations such as maintenance as well.

(8) Although they will respect HNSF culture, advisors and trainers have to strive to reduce how dysfunctional social practices affect the foreign security force’s ability to conduct operations. CF trainers and advisors must have enough awareness to identify and stop inappropriate behavior, or at least report it to the appropriate chains of command.

**Collective Training**

5. After individual training has been completed various specialist groups will conduct their own force preparation activities. It is desirable that a deploying force will gather its disparate parts (OMLT, HQ, CS, CSS etc.) to conduct final mission rehearsal exercises that incorporate specific SFCB training scenarios. Those groups delivering SFCB with tactical HNSF elements should be capable of participating in full spectrum operations.

6. **In country training.** After deployment to the host nation and before commitment to operations, the unit may receive in country training at host-nation training centers or at designated training locations. This training helps personnel become psychologically and physically acclimated to the host nation. This training also allows commanders and staffs some time to coordinate and plan within their own command and with civilian and military joint and multinational organizations.

**Evaluation**

7. Evaluations can be either internal or external. Internal evaluations occur at all levels, and they must be inherent in all training. External evaluations are usually more formal and should be conducted by an organization external to the training unit. Every training exercise provides potential for evaluation feedback, and every evaluation is also a training session. Emphasis is on direct, on-the-spot evaluations, supported by after action reviews at frequent, logical intervals during exercises. This technique allows the correction of shortcomings while they are still fresh in everyone’s mind. The after action review eliminates reinforcing bad habits. The outcome of this evaluation should be fed directly into the preparations of the follow-on SFCB force.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

General Questions

- Has the scope of training been identified?
- Has the delivery of formal training been standardized and coordinated among all CF elements?
- Does the CF have the resources to replicate the operational environment?
- Has training been prioritized against the time available?
- Have previous SFCB elements and theater subject matter experts been involved in the design and planning of your training?
- Have you engaged appropriate external agencies to assist in the delivery of your training?
- Have measures been put in place to replicate the Operating Environment? As a minimum to provide cultural understanding, interoperability and procedural alignment in order to develop cohesion?
- What unique tasks are CF likely to train HNSF on (i.e. if HNSF are equipped with former WP equipment) and what training is required by CF trainers as a result?

Personnel Selection

- Have you identified the roles for which personnel selection is critical?
- Have the right personnel been selected for these roles? Do they possess the right attributes, such as self confidence, humility, humor, interpersonal skills, adaptability, competence?
- Have training elements been identified and tasks given?
- What HN culture issues will influence the makeup of the SFCB team?
- Equipment is identified and sources?
- Do the CF elements understand the SFCB Commander’s intent?

Individual Training

- Has the style of approach been identified?
• Are we training SFCB personnel on the appropriate tasks which they will train HNSF to perform, and doing so under the conditions the HNSF will be required to perform them?

• Have you conducted a training needs analysis for the specialist individual skill sets required?

• Are the CF force protection measures understood and resources allocated?

• Are there measures in place to allow continuity of effort in the long term?

• Is there a clear understanding of the command and control relationships between the CF and HNSF?

• Have all appropriate individual training subjects been covered, such as cultural awareness, language training, use of interpreters, cultural norms, situational awareness, procedural training, self preservation, liaison, detainee handling, methods of operations, knowledge of HN equipment?

Collective Training

• Are all aspects of the training covered or going to be covered in the MRE?

Evaluation

• What are the shortcomings or weaknesses of your organization, and what is the best training plan to mitigate them?

Reference:

ABCA Project Report:

Report 111 – Structuring Forces to Deliver Host Nation Capacity Building, 2 June 2010.
CHAPTER 6

USING THE FORCE

Introduction

1. After completing its preparation and training, the CF is prepared to execute its SFCB mission. Employment considerations must include the coalition as a whole, will cross several stages of HNSF development, require the execution of several SFCB or developmental tasks, and involve four types of assistance to HNSF. This applies equally to Police Capacity Building\(^1\) (PCB).

Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) and Host Nation Criminal Justice System (HNCJS)

2. HNSF might include an array of organizations delivering military, paramilitary and police effect. The police in turn form one part of a criminal justice system (CJS) which also includes; the legal, the judicial and penal elements. Ideally the HNSF and HNCJS would develop in parallel. As part of the comprehensive approach, other Government Departments maybe best placed to take the lead in the PCB and the overlapping CJSCB.

3. The HNSF and HNCJS, together with other services and infrastructure, should be examined as part of the analysis of HNSF requirements process covered in greater detail in Chapter 3.

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\(^1\) ABCA Report 126 Security Force Capacity Building - Host Nation Police Supporting PCB as part of HN SSR Paras 1-7 and 15-16.
Stages of HNSF Development

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Table 1 - The Elements of SFCB

Stages of HNSF Development

4. NSF capacity builds across five stages. Although listed sequentially like phases, the stages of development will be different at any given time for different HNSF units, and different areas within the theater will be in different stages of development at different times. Additionally, the stages may also occur in a different order, occur iteratively, or blend over time as HNSF units are employed, then resourced with greater capabilities, or re-generated into larger and more sophisticated organizations. HNSF, including the HNCJS in relation to PCB, should develop in line with the intent of the Director of Operations (if appointed), the Strategic Reform Plan, other Lines of Operation and other development activities.

The five stages are:

Resource

5. The Resource Stage involves acquiring and delivering the resource requirements necessary to support the development of HN security forces in accordance with its design. In relation to PCB each ABCA nation has a different approach. An early essential consideration is to identify the right nation for the task\(^2\) including those outside the ABCA organization, who may historically have a tradition of paramilitary policing such as a Gendarmerie. The sequence of resourcing is critical to ensure the sustainable development of HNSF. For example, if CF resource the HNSF with equipment without resourcing the corresponding maintenance facilities, tools, or spare parts, the equipment would quickly become inoperable. Additionally, if complex or sophisticated equipment is resourced before the HNSF level of proficiency allows its effective employment, the effort may be counterproductive. For example the international community provided the Iraq Police Service with high performance police patrol cars in 2004. The sophisticated engines needed specialist servicing and clean fuel neither of which was available,

whilst the suspension was unable to cope with the local roads. More appropriate pick-up trucks were provided and proved more resilient to local servicing, fuel and road conditions.

**Generate**

6. The Generate Stage involves the establishment of HN security forces, including the forces, leaders, and functional capabilities based on and assessment and design of HNSF. This is likely to be the most resource intensive stage, requiring detailed planning and consensus by stakeholders.

7. Just as in resourcing HNSF, the sequence is critical to generating its organization and capabilities. Although temporary capability gaps can be mitigated with augmentation, over the long term the generation of HNSF units and institutions must be self-sustainable. For PCB these temporary gaps will mean going from complete military security and control (where there is no police, indigenous or otherwise) to Police providing all security and control with no military presence both from the Host Nation and CF. The sequence must produce a balance between the generation of operating forces and supporting forces or functions and also strike a balance between these operational forces and institutional organizations. If it is to be seen as legitimate, the organization being generated must also be representative of HN civil society, contain elements of democratic oversight and have a recognizable complaints procedure.

**Employ**

8. The Employ Stage involves HN security forces progressing from force generation to mission employment. Employment is a necessary stage in the development of a HNSF capacity, allowing it to gain the requisite experience and confidence to build upon toward even greater capacity. This is an incremental process. The decision to employ HNSF must balance the material and training readiness of the HNSF with the operational requirements of the HN security situation. At times, the security situation may demand the acceptance of risk and early employment of HNSF. Police employment must match identified role and tasks; where possible CF should resist the urge to misemploy police in offensive or defensive, non-law enforcement, security tasks such as guarding, local defense, or search and destroy counter insurgency operations. These tasks are best performed by HN military, local militias or specially designated public order troops. Misemploying Indigenous Police in such tasks undermines their credibility and legitimacy, especially if they live and have ties within the local community.

9. The risk with accelerating the employment of HN security forces includes the possibility that they may be employed beyond their trained state or ability to sustain the commitment. Even a minor tactical setback could produce disproportionate consequences if the HNSF loses confidence in itself or its leaders, or even worse, begin to lose the confidence of the HN population. However, this risk can be mitigated and the stage accelerated by partnering the HNSF with a coalition unit, embedding advisors, and augmenting its capabilities with CF enablers. CF may also employ the HNSF with simple or low risk mission initially, such as

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5 US Army FM 3-07.1.
supporting a more experienced partner unit, to allow it to gain experience and confidence. Partnering and advising also provides CF the opportunity to monitor the HNSF progress as well as facilitate or encourage an AAR process. To allow time and energy for this training, CF must control the HNSF operational tempo during employment.

**Transition**

10. The Transition stage defines the handover of responsibility from CF to HNSF and this again, is likely to be incremental. There are different types of transitions that will take place during a campaign. It is difficult to determine when a transition should occur and friction will be experienced when trying to decide on which method should be used. The two approaches to determining the commencement of transition are time-based or conditions-based. Transitions inherently involve friction and risk as HN security forces mature and take increasing responsibility and CF influence wanes. CF staffs must not allow this friction to derail overall progress.

11. Transitions can be complex, requiring close staff integration and a clear understanding of the evolving command and support relationships, shifting responsibilities between CF and HNSF, and handover criteria. An assessment of the risks and benefits associated with transitioning is fundamental before executing this stage. CF should pay special attention to the timing of transitions. Ideally, the CF is able to sequence transitions to avoid multiple overlapping transitions that will produce complexity, confusion, and potential gaps in responsibilities or capabilities.

12. A key method in mitigating the inherent risk during transitions is Overwatch; this is a monitoring function to determine if the CF needs to intervene if the security situation deteriorates. This could be achieved through the employment of CF combat forces or by addressing HNSF training and operating deficiencies. For PCB it is important to take into account the separate command structures and differences in institutional culture and operational philosophy between military and CIVPOL mission elements. This can be resolved by through a comprehensive approach and the promotion of mutual, common understanding through joint study and conferences. There are transferable skills between the military and the police; however it must be recognized that they are fundamentally different organizations serving differing needs; systematic and conceptual separation from the military is required. The HN police should have its’ own, distinct and specialised education and training programmes. Regardless, as the HN becomes more competent and confident the level of Overwatch provided by CF should steadily decrease.

13. The following diagram represents possible trends in relationships between the CF and the HNSF as the security situation changes. It demonstrates how the CF priority of effort will change over time, across the three operational phases of intervention, stabilization, and steady state operations.

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Figure 1 - Transitional Trends

a. **Intervention.** During this operational phase the primary focus of SFCB is likely to be on building capability. In essence the primary role of the CF is to organize, train and equip the HNSF but limited advisory roles can be undertaken. Training assistance for HNSF at the tactical level will be at a premium in order to provide employable HN units.

b. **Stabilization.** During this phase SFCB will focus on the generation and employment of HN capabilities in an effort to create a stable environment. As the HN assumes responsibility for its own training the emphasis of CF elements will shift from being a trainer to an advisor. As the HNSF gains more experience it will begin to partner with CF, initially at lower levels followed later by higher levels.

c. **Steady State.** Focus during this phase is on the ability of the HNSF to achieve sustainability. As the HNSF becomes more independent in its abilities and assumes increasing responsibility for security, CF elements will shift to more of an augmenting role providing key enablers not resident in the HNSF. As the situation normalizes within the HN, the intent is for CF to withdraw from active participation in operations. Relations between HN and CF will transition to one of peace time engagement, typically through diplomatic engagement.

**Sustain**

14. The Sustain Stage describes the progressive development of institutional capacity of HNSF and is completed at the point that they achieve self sufficiency. This stage may last for long after the bulk of CF troops have departed. At that point, SFCB may continue through
combined exercises, educational opportunity exchange, intelligence sharing, and foreign military sales.

**SFCB Tasks**

15. Throughout the HNSF development stages, CF performs several SFCB or developmental tasks. These can include those tasks that support the HN security forces to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise/assist (OTERA). Drawing from the HNSF assessment and identified capability gaps, SFCB organizations identify HNSF developmental objectives from which they can align specific developmental tasks to resolve, mitigate, and or shape conditions so that development of HNSF takes place. The CJS, and within that PCB operations, are not principally a military task and draw much of their framework from their civil context.

**Organize**

16. The organize task encompasses all measures taken to assist HN security forces to improve its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. SFCB aims to create an efficient organization with a command, intelligence, logistics, and operations structure viable for the HN. Organizing should comprehensively address HNSF at all levels as well as both operational and institutional organizations. PCB is more complex because there are additional parties involved with a mix of different cultures requiring special care in understanding. Doctrine and standing operating procedures are unifying factors and should apply across the force, as should as far as possible, standard unit structures.

17. CF should accept that organizational structures of the HN may be far from the recognizable, orderly ones they are used to. The imperative is to establish structures that work acceptably well for the local conditions. The organize task also involves issues such as:

   a. **Recruiting.** Recruiting is critical when establishing HNSF. The recruiting program assimilates local culture and themes that resonate with the populace. The program ensures that HNSF have members from all major demographic groups, including former security personnel or even previously hostile groups. Literacy along with basic attributes such as honesty and integrity are key considerations.

   b. **Promotion Screening and Selection.** Selection for promotion must stem from proven performance and aptitude for increased responsibility. Objective evaluations ensure promotion is by merit and not through influence or family ties.

   c. **Pay and Benefits.** Appropriate compensation precludes a culture of corruption in HNSF. Spending the money needed for adequate wages and producing quality security

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9 JCISFA.
forces is less costly than ending up with corrupt and abusive forces that alienate the populace. Payroll procedures and systems are also vitally important. They must be transparent and accountable, so HNSF members receive their full pay and entitlements.

d. **Leader Recruiting and Selection.** Officer candidate standards should be high. They should have good health and pass an academic test with higher standards than the test for enlisted recruits. Many HNSF lack a professional non commissioned officer corps, requiring adjustments such as temporarily placing more responsibility on commissioned officers. Non commissioned officers should be selected from the best enlisted HNSF members.

e. **Personnel Accountability.** HN leaders should carefully track and account for HNSF. Personnel failing to report for duty can indicate possible future attacks, low unit morale, or enemy and militia influences on the HNSF.

**Train**

18. This task assists HN security forces by developing programs and institutions to train and educate their personnel\(^\text{13}\). This task includes the establishment of training facilities, resources, training plans, and standards; developing HN trainers; and the actual execution of individual and collective training of HN security forces. It also includes leader development and education for leaders, commanders, and staffs. Training programs should be culturally acceptable to the HN and support the longer term objective of ownership of the training process. Training must also be based on the current security environment, the organization and equipment of the HNSF as well as the tasks the HNSF will be required to perform\(^\text{14}\).

19. **General Considerations.** Training with HN forces can be a challenge. This is especially true in states with very different cultures and capabilities. The following factors have emerged as useful when preparing for training HNSF\(^\text{15}\).

   a. Culture and local customs must always be taken into consideration. Degrading behavior and embarrassment of the less capable members of the partnership is a recipe for failure.

   b. Train-the-Trainers. By developing local trainers, CF assist in developing a professional cadre who will have far greater influence on developing a capable force much faster than coalition partners ever can by doing it for them.

   c. Encourage HN leadership by teaching them to do it right and letting them garner all the success gained by the results of CF participation.

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\(^{13}\) ABCA Report 098 Military Contribution to Capacity Building Analysis and Design.


\(^{15}\) USMC Partnering.
d. Develop a professional school environment as much as possible and be prepared to alter training techniques based on literacy issues. This should include supporting presentation of awards and training certificates by HN commanders to enhance morale.

e. Suggest formalization of training to the HNSF in order to validate certification of the training by other levels of command so that the unit and student receive credit that is transferable to other HNSF units or institutions as well as to the civil sector.

20. **Establishing Training Standards.** Effective training programs require clear, detailed individual, leader, and unit performance standards. These standards take into account cultural factors that directly affect the ability of the individual or unit to operate. Setting realistic measures for HNSF and following through on training plans consume time. The pressure is strong to find training shortcuts, employ quick fixes, or train personnel on the job. Trainers should resist such approaches. Such approaches often create more problems than they solve. However, trainers should also avoid the temptation to create long, complex training programs based on unrealistic standards. Effective programs account for the HN culture, resources, and short-term security needs. As security improves, training programs can expand to facilitate achievement of the long-term end state.

21. **Training Assessment.** The training assessment should cover all aspects of leadership, training, sustainment, and professionalization. To support an assessment, the advising organization should analyze the following specific considerations:

a. The organization’s mission and mission-essential task list (METL) and capability to execute them.

b. Staff capabilities.

c. Personnel and equipment authorization.

d. Physical fitness.

e. Any past or present foreign influence on training and combat operations.

f. Operational deficiencies identified during recent operations or exercises with CF personnel.

g. Functional capabilities, for example, sustainment or intelligence.

h. Internal training programs and personnel.

i. Training facilities.

j. Level of professionalism.
22. **Training Plan.** After completing the training assessment, advisors develop a training plan. The training plan should address the deficiencies identified in the training assessment. It should also identify those in the HN able to help train HNSF and to strengthen the legitimacy of the process. Finally, the training plan should consider the organization’s eventual self-sustainment of its own training. As the HNSF gains sufficient capacity and capabilities to perform independently, advisors transition from developing, to mentoring, to merely advising HNSF on its training plan.

23. **Training Methods.** An effective method of training used by CF forces is the crawl-walk-run method of teaching individual tasks, with paramilitary forces this would include battle drills, collective tasks, and field exercises or in the case of the police, environmental and scenario based training. During all phases, the CF must include the mission of the unit in the context of the higher organization’s mission to assist with the practical application of the training. Identifying the higher commander’s mission and intent, as well as the tasks and purposes of other units in the area, also adds context to the training. This method of progression also applies to differing levels, building from individual training and leader training to collective training.

24. **After Action Review.** To identify the requirements for continued training or retraining, CF advisors or partner organizations should help encourage, teach, and facilitate an AAR process within the HNSF. To do this, advisors or partner units must take into account cultural norms and potential resistance, since they may resist candid feedback or assessment of operations, particularly between higher and lower ranking personnel. Initial instruction may be allowing the HNSF to observe the AARs of the partnered CF. Advisors may also serve as observes, providing input to help facilitate AARs. Based on cultural norms, however, the advisors may have to provide their input indirectly by providing their observations to the senior HN commander and allowing him or her to take ownership. By influencing the HNSF to conduct AARs following operations, the CF will promote an atmosphere of continuous improvement within the organization and will allow it to translate its experience into lessons learned and increased confidence and capability.

**Equip**

25. The equip task encompasses all efforts to assess needs and assist HN security forces with the procurement, fielding, and sustainment of equipment. The requirement to provide equipment may be as simple as assisting with maintenance of existing formations or as extensive as providing everything from shoes to communications and investigation kits. The principle of sustaining the effort is a vital consideration for the equip task. Primary considerations should include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment costs. Forces must be able to train on the equipment. Interoperability may be desired in some cases. A central consideration includes the host nation’s long-term ability to support and maintain the equipment.

26. Appropriate equipment should be affordable, fit the nature of the operational environment, and be effective against potential threats. Since potential enemies adapt rapidly and situations change, commanders must continually assess the direction and progress of developing HNSF. If the enemy uses heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, then

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HNSF need comparable or better equipment. This especially applies to other security forces, which are often lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed enemies.

**Rebuild/Build**

27. The rebuild and build task involves assessing and rebuilding the existing capabilities and capacities of HNSF, or building new capabilities, including their supporting infrastructure. While existing assets may be adequate and are always the start point, there may also be a requirement to build anew. It requires an in-depth analysis of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the desired end state of the HN and is guided by the overall strategy adopted for the capacity building effort.

28. Construction takes time; the CF and HN need to invest early in such facilities if they are to be available when needed. In some circumstances, it may be highly desirable to give tactical CF units access to discretionary funds to meet short term and local operational and institutional needs. This assists in increasing rapport between the HNSF and CF. If security threats exist, forces may have to plan to protect or harden key infrastructure or build bases, which in turn requires a long-term force-basing plan. This task is intimately linked with the resourcing and generating stages mentioned earlier.

**Advise/Assist**

29. Advising is the task in which coalition personnel work with HN security forces to improve their capability and capacity. It establishes a personal and professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the advisor will be able to influence HN security forces. Assisting is providing support or sustainment capabilities that the HN security force requires to meet their objectives. Advising will occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical or operational levels, and in support of individuals or groups. The level of advice and assistance is based on conditions and should continue until HN security forces can establish required systems or until security conditions no longer require it. Although this must drive transition, conditions can regress as well as progress. CF must therefore, be prepared to return to increased levels of engagement which can be politically difficult and underlines the importance of establishing clear and agreed criteria and shared understanding of risk. Nevertheless, the unexpected will happen and —transition gaps may occur and this element of risk requires careful management. Leaders cannot permit HNSF to fail critically at a point that would undermine the overall effort.

30. **Institutional and Governance Assistance.** To build HNSF capacity effectively, CF personnel will in many cases have to advise and assist government organizations, at times even at the ministerial level. Institutional and ministerial assistance relies upon the analysis and design considerations previously discussed. A comprehensive SSR approach provides the basis for ministerial assistance. The skills required for the institutions/ministries are not likely to be found within military formations; therefore adoption of a comprehensive approach is essential if

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19 This is discussed further in ABCA Reports 039 and 071.
the required skills are to be found. Possible skills and experiences should include legislative liaison, procurement, financial regulatory systems, budgeting, programming, and policy development. A HN government may also be facing issues in reintegration, resettlement, repatriation, and reinsertion of segments of its society.

31. **Assistance to Non-Military Security Forces**

Responsibility for implementing the non-military elements of building security force capacity (particularly those related to law enforcement) will normally reside with the appropriate civilian agencies and civil law enforcement organizations, whether of the HN, intervening external stakeholders, or a combination of both. However, in instances where HN civilian security agencies are not functioning or external civilian partners are not present, military forces may take on a limited role for the implementation of these typically non-military areas. The military role may consist of substituting, supplementing, assisting and facilitating the operations of HN civil agencies. CF is best suited to provide discrete capabilities to these HN civil agencies so that they may operate effectively in the environment. The PCB requirement will change as the campaign continues. To illustrate: at the start there may be much work in building armed police units of a light infantry nature. As progress is made this will change as more normal policing is required thus reducing the size and nature of CF support. Ultimately the measure of effective PCB is the Host Nation being able to perform alone.

32. **Assistance to Law Enforcement.** In the event that coalition forces are deployed to an area of operations with a limited or failed policing system, coalition forces may be required to initially establish and maintain a secure environment. In the long term, it is critically important to establish host nation police forces to assume law and order duties as soon as possible. Coalition forces and the host nation should institute a comprehensive program for police force development.

33. **Host nation police development** (linked with the HNCJS) must be simultaneously conducted from the most senior administrative levels to the ground-level police patrols. The conduct of an effective host nation police development program requires consistency and synchronization in the application of training, policy directives, and logistical support.

**Host Nation Police Development Program**

34. An effective host nation police development program requires coalition forces to:

a. Have an awareness of the Principles of Policing:

(1) **Preservation of Life** – Human Rights Act – right to life and in states with a death penalty the right to a fair trial.

(2) **Protection of Property** - Human Rights Act – right to a private life.

(3) **Prevention of Crime** – Prevention is preferable to detection.

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20 Non-Military security forces may include police, gendarmeries, paramilitary guards, intelligence and security services, coast guards, border guards, customs authorities and reserve or local security units.
(4) Detection of Crime.

(5) Preservation of the Peace – Where the law is respected by all and broken by none.

b. Assess police roles, responsibilities, structures, management, and practices.

c. Determine existing and required police capabilities and capacities to include logistical and administrative support required for police operations.

d. Understand the traditional role of police within the host nation and develop training strategies to change the institutional culture of the police force, if required, to one that emphasizes public service, humane treatment and the established principles of policing.

e. Build intra- and interagency linkages to ensure police activities complement the other key functions within the criminal justice system (legal, police, judicial and penal).

f. Ensure that effective and consistent police training capabilities are present within the host nation police infrastructure.

g. Train and develop investigative processes, including the gathering, handling, and preserving of evidence (to include maintaining a viable chain of custody) to support ongoing prosecutions.

h. Enhance the ability of police services to plan and develop police intelligence analysis skills.

h. Develop and strengthen policies and mechanisms for police accountability.

Types of SFCB Assistance

35. As CF execute the various developmental or OTERA tasks, they employ four different types of operational assistance. These types of operational assistance provided to HN security force capacity building include training, advising/mentoring, partnering, and augmenting. Each type can occur at all levels from operational headquarters down to the squad and individual. Monitoring will be undertaken as an integral part of all forms of assistance.

Training

36. As discussed in Chapter 1 and in the train task above (see Paras 18-24), training is one of the most fundamental types of assistance CF can provide to HNSF.
Advising/ Mentoring

37. Advising HNSF presents a number of challenges. Employing advisors entails several key considerations, such as the advisors role, force protection, HNSF training proficiency, culture, equipment, and command and control.

a. **Role.** Consider the type of tasks that are going to be undertaken by the advisors and resource the team accordingly.

b. **Force Protection.** Advising typically requires distributing personnel and teams among the advised HN organizations. This situation, along with possible national caveats for CF members, can add complexity when planning force protection measures.

c. **HNSF Training Proficiency.** Analysis of HNSF training gaps and requirements will identify the priorities by which the advisory team will be structured.

d. **Culture.** The culture of the HN will influence the makeup of the advisory team. Issues such as rank, gender, religion, and linguistic ability will have a direct impact on its structure.

e. **Continuity of Effort.** The continued deployment of an advisory team should be approached holistically to allow the HNSF to understand its roles, structure and abilities rather than changing the structure after every CF rotation. In essence the advisory team needs to be viewed as a long term commitment and potentially regenerated, with the same skill sets, over numerous rotations.

f. **Command and Control.** The distributed nature and the mixture of military/civilian advisors also challenges effective C2 in terms of achieving standardization and coordination.

g. **Equipment.** The force protection measures and role of the advisory team will dictate the type of equipments to be used; this in turn will determine the skills and numbers of personnel required in the team. Additionally equipment availability may also affect the structure of the team.

Partnering

38. Partnering is a habitual command arrangement between a CF force and a HNSF in which both forces operate together to achieve mission success and to build the capacity and capability of the HNSF. Partnering is not an end, but a deliberate process, a means to an end. The ultimate goal is to have the HNSF assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability of their own country under the full cognizance of the HN government. When joined as partners, organizations will teach and learn from each other, and ultimately un-partner. Both organizations must recognize the mutual benefit of sustaining and growing the relationship. This
trust-based relationship is built by living, training and conducting combined operations together.\textsuperscript{21}

**Augmenting**

39. The type of force element utilized under this arrangement should be self contained and limited to providing a specific effect. An example of this could be a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) capability to provide non-organic Close Air Support (CAS) for a specific operation. Key considerations for CF elements tasked with augmenting a HNSF include command and control, skills sets, understanding of the effect, and continuity of support.

a. **Command and Control.** Both CF and HNSF must acknowledge and understand the supported/supporting relationships. Once this is established CF elements need to understand the HN commander’s intent, the desired effect of the CF augmentation, and the termination criteria.

b. **Skill Sets.** Augmentation should be based on a capability that is not readily available in the HNSF and should ideally be provided by a CF element that understands the nuances of interacting with the HNSF.

c. **Understanding the Effect.** CF augmenting elements need to ensure the supported HNSF has a precise understanding of the augmentation, including the type, scope, duration, and employment considerations. If an embedded training or advisor team exists, it can explain and coordinate the CF effects.

**Summary**

40. The various types of assistance of training, advising/mentoring, partnering, and augmenting are employed by CF throughout the stages of HNSF development. Also employed throughout these stages are the SFCB tasks of organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise/assist. These stages of development take the HNSF from resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain. As HNSF progress, the CF adjusts its tasks and types of assistance to match the developing situation in terms of HNSF capability as well as the HN security situation.

\textsuperscript{21} USMC Partnering.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

Resource

- What is the specific source of all resource requirements identified during the assessment of HNSF?
- What is the movement and integration plan for each of these resources?
- Does the sequence of arrival support the generation and employment of HNSF?
- Is the HNSF prepared to sustain each of the resources at the time it is received, or will the appropriate sustainment be provided later?
- Is each resource within the current training proficiency of the HNSF? For PCB, who in the CF is best suited to help the Host Nation?
- What training or advising will be required to support the HNSF integration of each new resource?
- Does the HNSF require augmentation to assist in its integration of a resource initially?

Generate

- What design is planned for generation based on cultural and historic norms?
- What is the schedule to generate and organize the HNSF?
- Are there any cultural implications for the current design or schedule for generating HNSF organizations?
- Does the generation plan recruit a workforce that is representative of all ethnic, religious, tribal, and regional groups within the HN civil society?
- Is this schedule balanced between operational elements, supporting functions, and institutional supporting organizations?
- What tasks must the HNSF perform?
- What is the best training plan for these tasks?
- What training resources or institutions are required and does CF have them on hand?
• What is the plan to teach the HNSF to plan, resource, and manage its own training?

Employ

• Has the HNSF been adequately equipped and trained to begin operations?
• Does the security situation demand the acceptance of risk and the early employment of HNSF despite capability gaps or limitations?
• What missions or mission profile should the HNSF be assigned initially to avoid high risk and build its confidence?
• What operational tempo should the HNSF have in order to avoid exhaustion and allow continued training and retraining?
• What capability gaps exist which may require augmentation?
• What units can partner with the HNSF to provide overwatch and produce complimentary effects?
• What type of AAR process will the HNSF’s culture admit and how can CF facilitate or teach it?

Transition

• What type of transition are we approaching, or what type is appropriate based on the material and equipment readiness of the HNSF and the security situation?
• Has the HNSF gained the requisite material and training readiness and experience to transition to a greater level of responsibility?
• What responsibilities should be transferred?
• Is the HNSF prepared for independent or semi-independent operations, or is partnering with a senior CF unit still necessary?
• How should CF adjust the command relationships and battlefield geometry or boundaries to reflect and enable the transition?
• How should CF adjust unit partnerships, training plans and responsibilities, advisors, or augmentation during the transition?
• How should CF mitigate risk to the security situation during the transitional period? What additional actions should CF take, or what additional resources might the higher headquarters provide during the transitional period?
• How do we synchronize the transition of rotating CF units with the transitions between CF and HNSF to avoid or mitigate the high risk of simultaneous transitions?

• What is the best sequence of RIP/TOA to maintain continuity and momentum?

• What is the battle handover criterion when control of the area of operations will pass from one headquarters to another?

Sustain

• What is the long term plan to continue SFCB efforts after CF have departed?

• What additional capabilities should HNSF acquire through programs such as Foreign Military Sales?

• What combined exercises or exchanges might continue the development of HNSF capacity?

References:

ABCA Report 111, Structuring Forces to Deliver Host Nation Capacity Building, 2 June 2010, 10-12.
CHAPTER 7

SUSTAINING THE FORCE

Introduction

1. Sustainment operations in support of SFCB consist of two major components: the ability of the CF to sustain the SFCB effort throughout the campaign, and the operations by the CF to develop the ability of the HN security forces to ultimately sustain their operations independently. This chapter focuses upon the latter and should be read as an adjunct to the other chapters in this handbook, not in isolation thereof.

2. From the outset, it is important to understand that the HNSF and its supporting institutional structure must eventually be self-sustaining. They must be appropriately equipped and organized so that the HN can sustain SF capability both economically and technically. This requires that forces are developed in ways that suit their infrastructure and that doctrine and procedures do not create a dependence on systems that will not be available to the HN in the long run.

3. The provision of Combat Service Support (CSS) and Health Service Support (HSS) to the HN, leading into the integrated development of organic HN sustainment capacity and capability, is vital to the success of SFCB. In a large scale capacity building endeavor, it is likely that a number of different nations and organizations will contribute to the overall process. While this effectively spreads the responsibility, different approaches may create friction. It is essential that CSS/HSS capability is planned and developed in parallel with combat capability.

Core Logistic Capabilities

4. Regardless of whether the sustainment activity is focused upon sustainment of the CF or enabling HNSF, the core logistic capabilities in SFCB provide a framework to facilitate and integrate decision making, synchronize and allocate resources, and optimize logistic processes. The challenges associated with support cut across all the core logistic capabilities, including supply, maintenance, distribution and HSS, services and contracting.

5. Supply. Supply operations include identifying requirements, selecting supply sources, receipting, storing and issuing supplies (all classes) and authorizing supplier payment. To provide responsive supply operations in SFCB to both the advising organization and the HNSF, logistic planning requires a collaborative environment that includes operations planning, maintenance operations and the distribution system.

6. Maintenance. In SFCB, advisors and their HNSF counterparts require maintenance (repair and recovery) capacity for their freedom of action. Force movement and maneuver depends on sufficient readiness levels of transportation and weapon systems. In SFCB,
maintenance encompasses both intermediate and organizational levels and includes maintenance supporting the supply chain.

7. **Distribution.** The distribution capability moves forces and logistic support. By sharing information, units create unity of effort among diverse distribution organizations. This unity of effort enhances HNSF support efforts and provides end-to-end support to satisfy deployment execution and sustainment operations for advisors and HN forces.

8. **Health Service Support.** HSS covers a wide spectrum of capabilities including combat casualty care, medical, dental and other clinical services, medical evacuation, force health protection, and medical logistics.

9. **Logistic Services.** Logistic Services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the provision of force support. Included in this area are food services, welfare support, base camp infrastructure and contract management.

10. **Movements.** The movements capability covers three main functions. These are: Movement Control (of personnel and freight through and between transportation nodes); Terminal Operations (including stevedoring and port management); and Aerial Delivery (the rigging of loads for carriage by strategic and tactical airlift).

11. **Personnel Support.** Personnel Support comprises all functions necessary for the administration and management of deployed personnel. Included in this area are Personnel Services, such as Finance, Postal and Legal Support, and Personnel Management, such as Information Management (Registry), Service Conditions including pay and allowances, Casualty Reporting, Discipline and Honors and Awards.

**Combat Service Support (CSS)/Health Services Support (HSS) SFCB Activities**

12. **CF CSS/HSS structures and priority of effort will evolve as the SFCB activities progress towards HN self-sustainment.** The initial SFCB activities will be more reliant upon CF CSS/HSS force element (FE), transitioning to greater self reliance upon HNSF CSS/HSS resources. Table 1 describes the key activities, although listed sequentially for the purpose of this chapter; in practice CSS SFCB activities are likely to overlap.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>Force Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>Determine the CF resource requirements necessary to support the development of HNSF. Physical sustainment of HNSF to set the conditions enabling establishment of a HNSF CSS/HSS Capability</td>
<td>CF</td>
<td>CF CSS/HSS Force Elements(FE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate</td>
<td>Establishment of HNSF CSS/HSS capability, including the forces, C2, and functional capabilities based on the agreed end state.</td>
<td>CF</td>
<td>CF providing individual training and development in supply, transportation, maintenance and recovery, movements, medical/dental/clinical, support services including catering, personnel support including administration, and support engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ</td>
<td>Collective training and employment of CSS/HSS capability in support of HNSF activities</td>
<td>CF</td>
<td>HNSF organic force structure in place partnered with CF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Handover of responsibility of CSS/HSS to permit independent HNSF CSS/HSS ops and permit progressive development of institutional capacity</td>
<td>HNSF</td>
<td>HNSF CSS/HSS FE supported by CF advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustain</td>
<td>Maintain HNSF CSS/HSS capability</td>
<td>HNSF</td>
<td>HNSF with limited CF advisors</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Table 1 - Activities of CSS/HSS SFCB**

**Structuring CF CSS/HSS Forces**

13.  A number of considerations listed below should be taken into account when structuring CF CSS/HSS capabilities for SFCB.

a. **C2 arrangements.** The provision of CSS/HSS to the HNSF is likely to involve other CF, government and non-governmental organizations (NGO), and contractors. Therefore, C2 arrangements will need to consider all these stakeholders. A key element of the CSS/HSS C2 will be shared situational awareness between the CF and HNSF and these other stakeholders; in particular, stocking levels, distribution and evacuation. This will require consideration of the development and integration of appropriate logistic and health information systems.

b. **Type and level of support.** An understanding of the core logistic and HSS capability requirements is necessary; including an understanding of HN specialist equipment, use, support and maintenance. An appreciation is required of the HNSF key
logistic and HSS nodes where CF presence will be required to guide HNSF logistic development; this will include an understanding of the likely lines and levels of HNSF support. Consideration should also be given to the support requirements of other government, non-government agencies and contractors that the CF may have responsibility to support during the mission. CF CSS/HSS structures must cater for own force, HNSF and any other approved support requirements. Provision of sustainment to all forces can significantly detract from training or mentoring tasks. Ideally, where this is to be provided, additional dedicated personnel should be allocated.

c. **Sustainability.** An understanding is required of the breadth of sustainment in support of the CF and HNSF in addition to the development of CSS and HSS capabilities of the HNSF.

14. To ensure continuity of support to both CF and HNSF as well as develop HN logistic capacity, CSS/HSS structure should aim to be as consistent as possible as the transitional and operational situation allows. Changes between rotations should be avoided where possible.

**Preparation and Training of CF CSS/HSS Forces**

15. **Doctrine.** Every effort should be made to integrate HNSF doctrine where it exists. CSS/HSS training and supporting staff should be familiar with it prior to deploying. This will compliment the system which is in place and prevent the imposition of the CF methods and processes.

16. **Information Systems and Processes.** HNSF may not have the sophisticated logistic information management systems to conduct and control logistic functions relied upon by the CF. This may necessitate the adoption of manual logistic management systems. This will require CF to be trained and conversant in the operation and management of such systems.

17. **Knowledge of HN Equipment.** Subject matter experts who have intimate knowledge of HNSF equipment will need to be developed. Of particular importance are the relevant qualifications required to teach and operate each equipment type; and specialist maintenance instructors who can teach and mentor all aspects of equipment support.

18. **Clinical Skills.** Personnel employed in training and/or mentoring or clinical positions must ensure that they are familiar with the HN medical standards and practices and course material. The ability of HSS personal to transfer their skills will be a significant factor in achieving HN HSS self-sufficiency. HSS mentors and advisors will require training in how to transfer their skills.
19. HSS specialist mentors should possess a comprehensive understanding of allied health professions\(^1\) in order to support the learning activities of all HN clinical personnel. Prior to deployment it is recommended that the clinical team practice working as a team to coalesce as a high functioning team.

20. **Tactical Medical skills.** In semi- or non-permissive environments, the development of tactical medical skills should be included. Tactical medicine, or care of the battle casualty, incorporates development of soldiering skills and pre-hospital care skills in a simulated battlefield environment. The use of simulations as well as live tissue in a simulated combat environment combining fatigue and stress is seen as the best way to develop these skills. Provision of pre-hospital care in the “Platinum 10 Minutes”\(^2\) followed by rapid evacuation to definitive medical care has proven as essential to saving life and limb. First responders, or soldiers with advanced medical skills, should be included in the training.

**Types of Coalition Force Assistance**

21. The sustainment needs of HNSF organizations must be factored into CF demand planning. Increased demand will result from the requirement to provide sustainment in addition to CSS training, partnering, advising/mentoring or augmenting. As HNSF CSS capability and capacity is generated, the dependence upon CF CSS will decrease and the relationship will move through to one of self sufficiency. CF should be prepared to generate forces to conduct any one of four types of assistance as detailed below.

22. **Training.** Typically formal in nature, training assistance would follow on from basic recruit and officer training and include specialist CSS trade training, focused echelon training, and train the trainer training. There is also a requirement for logistic staff training and programs to increase logistic awareness for non-logistic staff. Of note, training may be delivered in locations other than the HN.

23. CSS/HSS training should be developed and coordinated centrally to ensure the decentralized execution is consistent across the HNSF. It is particularly important to ensure that individual CF doctrine and procedures do not skew the overall development of the HN CSS/HSS capability.

24. **Partnering.** CSS partnering is a relatively immature concept and CF may need to task organize to conduct this type of mission. A key consideration for partnering is logistic

\(^1\) In this context the term ‘allied health professions’ refers to clinical and administrative health care professions distinct from medicine, dentistry, and nursing, rather than the medical services of other Armies.

\(^2\) “The Platinum 10 asserts that a critically injured Soldier stabilized in the first 10 minutes has an excellent chance of survival provided the Soldier makes it to definitive care soon thereafter--the Golden Hour”. Craig W. Bukowski, The Platinum 10: 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne improves medical training to help save lives, Infantry Magazine, July-August, 2006.
complexity. Partnering will increase demand upon logistic capacity as the force is likely to be highly dispersed in small austere locations and there will be greater demand, in terms of range and scale upon classes of supply.

25. **Augmenting.** HNSF may initially lack robust specialist CSS or HSS capabilities. Therefore, CF must be prepared to augment their capability until such capabilities mature.

26. **Advising / Mentoring.** Some key considerations for advisor / mentoring teams follow.

a. **Mentor the person and the chain.** Many of the problems experienced in recent HN capability building operations of a CSS nature were due to a lack of continuity of mentoring throughout the entire logistic process. This does not necessarily mean that every HN soldier requires individual mentoring, however, mentors should be placed where a decision is made, or at a prominent logistic node. This will allow training of the individual soldier as well as ensuring the process is matured as well.

b. **Develop mentoring battle rhythm.** Experience from recent HN CSS capability building operations indicates that a simple but stringent battle rhythm is a most effective way to ensure that the supporting and HN maintain contact. This will allow a close contact between staff is maintained, even if HN staff are rotated or reallocated.

c. **Mentoring and training approach.** It may be necessary to reinforce that mentors are there to assist and provide guidance and some specialist CSS, not to do the work of, nor provide any material support that should be provided by HN. The emphasis must always be on the HN finding the solution.

d. **HSS Mentoring.** HSS mentoring can be divided into two distinct areas – mentoring in the field and mentoring in a fixed treatment facility. In many cases, the people delivering health care in those environments possess different training and skills. Personnel working in the field are focused on the provision of pre-hospital care, and the preservation of life, until the patient can be brought to a fixed treatment facility.

(1) **Field operations:** HN medics must be provided with a level of training which provides the skills to save lives. The basic skill set of a combat medic is focused on the first 10 min and rapid evacuation timeline and is heavily focused on catastrophic hemorrhage, airway management and multiple casualty situations. Key to this is command and control of the incident, preparing the casualty for evacuation and using the request for medical evacuation. Care must be taken to keep the training within the scope of practice for the HNSF soldier, or medic.

(2) **Fixed Treatment Facility Operations:** HSS personnel employed as mentors in fixed treatment facilities must be conversant with the broad and
diverse aspects of managing health facilities in addition to their specialist health field.

Key Considerations in Building HN Sustainment Capacity

27. **Planning.** CF forces determine the HN logistic and reconstruction requirements based upon their internal defense and development strategy; they develop a sustainment end state to support the plan. Rebuilding the HN infrastructure and industrial capacity supports the building of trust and legitimacy in the CF, HNSF, government and partner organizations. When planning for sustainment capacity building, planners must thoroughly understand the logistic systems to identify causes that lead to functional deficiencies. CSS/HSS planning needs to address the causes and not just the symptoms.

28. **Supplies.** Generally a HN country will have a concept of the combat supplies (water, rations, ammunition, POL) required for combat operations. The other classes of supply may be at varying levels of understanding and capability which will need to be ascertained prior to, or in the initial stages of HN CSS capability building.

29. Essential to the development of a HSS capability is the provision and maintenance of medical equipment and supplies. Medical equipment provided must be commensurate with the level of training and capabilities HNSF health personnel. Health personnel should also be trained on the basic preventative maintenance and testing to ensure integrity of the equipment is maintained and the HN must have a means to maintain the equipment.

30. A supply chain for medical supplies must be established and HN stores personnel must be trained in control of medical supplies, particularly controlled medications and cold store requirements.

31. **Principal items/delivery methods.** Once the type and quantity of HN supplies are determined an assessment of their principal items focusing specifically on methods of delivery and distribution should be conducted. This will tie into serviceability issues, movement space constraints and other specific to HN regulation which may exist.

32. **Do not develop a capability the HN cannot sustain.** If CF develop a HNSF CSS/HSS operating method or system which rely upon unsustainable capabilities, the likelihood is collapse when CF withdraw. Operations and CSS/HSS planners must look to second order effects.

33. **HSS.** Key specific considerations in the delivery of HN HSS capacity:

   a. **Health care professional training standards and employment.** HN training for health professionals may not align with standards developed within CF nations. For example Medical training programs may be shorter in duration and graduates may be
employed as a ‘doctor’ regardless of their level of training or the health field they may have been trained in.

b. **Standard of health care.** Standards of health care differ widely between countries. CF HSS personnel must develop standards which are appropriate and practical for the situation, and sustainable in the long term. Health facilities, practices and procedures may challenge the contemporary understanding of the delivery of health care amongst ABCA Armies.

c. **Education.** Low literacy rates and a lack of formal education can create significant hurdles to developing a basic standard of medical competence.

d. **Culture.** Local religious and cultural beliefs may result in differing expectations of health outcomes, as well as the comparative value of human life. These differences need to be understood by personnel in training or mentoring roles and the ethical dilemmas they may pose.

34. **Provision of Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP).** A decision to provide MEDCAP, or similar medical outreach programs, needs to be considered as a component of the analysis of the SFCB requirement examined in Chapter 3. Planners must consider the benefits and risks to providing local MEDCAP as well as MEDCAP planning considerations.

35. **Develop Measures of Effectiveness.** CSS/HSS specific milestones and measures of effectiveness (MoE) will need to be developed from the very start of the mission. These should be done in consultation with the HN doctrine review with the end state being the complete independent operations of the HN CSS/HSS component. The MoE and milestones will depend on the HN and will drive the campaign plan from the development of CSS/HSS perspective.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

General

• Is the size, location, expected duration and national construct of the SFCB operation stated?

• What is the concept of support?

• Have any national caveats or constraints been specified?

• What are the national, role specializations, and CF and HN responsibilities?

Concept of Logistic Support

• How will the core logistic functions be provided?

• Are there known logistic constraints and limitations?

• Will the CF have any responsibility for equipping the HNSF?

Planning

• What is the anticipated duration of the SFCB operation?

• What are the sustainment information requirements and who will find the information?

• What is available in lessons learned databases for unique requirements, planning factors and potential problem areas?

• What are the sustainment requirements for the CF?

• What will be the division of responsibilities between CF, HN and other (government, non-government and contracted) agencies?

• What provisions are made for sustainment support of CF, HN and other (government, non-government and contracted) agencies?

• What other capacity building or aid programs are underway or planned and what impact that they will have on the sustainment of SFCB.
Where are the HNSF logistic nodes currently established and are they adequate to meet HNSF needs?

- Which nodes will require CF presence for the purposes of delivering SFCB?
- Which nodes will require CF mentoring and training presence?

When determining the structure of the CF with regard to HN specialist equipment:

- How will CF personnel be familiarized on it?
- How will CF train HNSF elements in its use, support and maintenance?
- How will HNSF incorporate it as a capability?

Are there any cultural or religious issues that impact upon the provision of health care, rationing and other life support services?

What is the medical and evacuation plan for the CF, HNSF and other agencies?

Have mission essential task lists specific to CSS and HSS been developed?

What is the plan for the handover of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities and personnel to the HN?

What is the support plan for the redeployment of forces?

**Sustainment C4I**

- Have coordinating cells been established for distribution, HSS, contracting, infrastructure and logistic operations?
- Have command and support relationships between the CF and HN logistic elements and other agencies been clearly defined?
- Have logistic reporting procedures been established throughout the force?
Host Nation Support (HNS)

- What policies and agreements are required to prioritize HNS and contracting requirements?

- Has HNS been evaluated to determine the logistic support available: sanitation, health services, facilities, storage, distribution and materiel?

- What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure: communications, health services, water treatment plants, power stations, bulk and retail fuel storage and distribution?

- What medical directives or SOP exist?

Logistic Core Capabilities

- What is the current method and status of supply by the HNSF?

- Are there any Classes of Supply that will require supplementation from the CF?

- Are stocking levels identified and adequate?

- Do current HNS doctrine and procedures meet the needs of the developing HNSF?

- How are the HNSF logistic and HSS trades organized and how do they align with CF trades for the purposes of training and mentoring?

- What equipment repair and recovery procedures are in place?

References:

ABCA Project Reports:

Report 095 - Health Service Support Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) Review.
Report 092 - Health Service Support to Security Sector Reform (Military Capacity Building).
Report 114 - Structuring Combat Service Forces to Deliver Host Nation Capacity Building, 7 July 2010.
CHAPTER 8
MEASURING THE EFFECT

Introduction

1. Knowing when HNSF are capable enough to allow transition of responsibility to occur will ultimately depend upon the ability to measure and assess their effectiveness at providing for their own security needs. Such measurements and assessments are best determined and conducted in partnership with the HN, but ultimately, the responsibility for carrying them out honestly and objectively rests with the CF.

2. It is difficult to assess ongoing operations without a clear theoretical understanding of stability operations, including how diplomatic, military, economic, social, and political initiatives can be harnessed to produce stability. Without a theory to inform strategy, it is difficult to generate meaningful benchmarks to assess progress toward restoring normalcy and governance.

3. Measuring performance has traditionally focused on the quantifiable aspects of assessment. What is more challenging is the ability to measure effectiveness in delivering on all other less tangible aspects, which constitute the desired objective. For example, the number of troops passing through the training system is tangible but whether they imbue or respect the philosophy of an accountable and legitimate force is intangible. A balance is therefore needed that integrates the tangible and intangible aspects required for a comprehensive assessment of performance and effectiveness. This chapter provides a common methodology for assessing the effectiveness of SFCB. Further, this chapter will propose a common approach for assessing HNSF effectiveness and planning considerations for commanders.

Assessment Methodology

4. **Common Approach.** Assessment is the measurement of quantitative and qualitative progress based on both subjective and objective evaluation in order to guide decision making. The process inevitably must combine both science and art. Specific metrics should be designed, collected and subsequently analyzed - the **science.** Interpretation demands judgement, intuition, imagination and insight - the **art.**

5. **Capability Milestones (CM).** The recommended means of measuring HNSF progress is through the use of CM levels. Progress along the established lines of development may be tracked using four CMs levels, defined generically below:

   a. **CM 4** - The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). It may be capable/available/directed to undertake portions of its operational mission but only with significant assistance from, and reliance on, IC support. Capability in terms of DOTMLPF-P, objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at <50%.

   b. **CM 3** - (Initial Operational Capability - IOC) - The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but still
requires assistance from, and is reliant on IC support. Capability in terms of DOTMLPF-P, objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at 50-70%.

c. **CM 2** - The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine assistance from, or reliance on, IC support. Capability in terms of DOTMLPF-P, objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at 70-85%.

d. **CM 1** - (Full Operational Capability - FOC) - The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition/IC. Capability, in terms of DOTMLPF-P, objective proficiency, or other applicable measure is defined at >85%.

6. The CM levels form part of an assessment methodology through which the validity of the Campaign Plan itself and progress made against it can be measured. There are three elements to the methodology:

   a. Task assessment - are we doing the right things?

   b. Effects assessment - are we doing things right?

   c. Campaign assessment - are we achieving our objectives?

7. Iterative assessment allows affirmation of the validity of the Campaign Plan and where necessary, how to adjust it. It also measures performance against objectives for which measures of effectiveness and/or of performance (MoE/MoP) are helpful. It also enables timely identification and addressing of important issues affecting delivery. Assessment is a continuous process and an integral element of any decision cycle.

8. However, determining the achievement of a CM is comparatively straightforward where the criteria are overwhelmingly quantitative; it is more difficult where subjective or qualitative judgment is necessary. Often, this is captured as commanders’ comments against a DOTMLPF-P or similar construct.

9. Meeting DOTMLPF-P (or similar construct) CM does not necessarily imply that an organization is functionally or operationally proficient – i.e. that it can deliver the ends for which it is intended. DOTMLPF-P only indicates that it has the ways and means to do so. Hence, a further evaluation must be made to determine whether the organization can fulfill its role. This may be done through continuous assessment against a set of core competencies, or periodic tests against a Mission Essential Task List (METL).

**Assessment Categories**

10. The method of assessment should produce answers to the following three key questions: First, did we do properly, the things we set out to do? Second, was what we set out to do the right thing? Finally, is the combination of things we are doing getting us to where we want to be
overall? The following three categories of measurement within the assessment process will assist in addressing these key questions:

a. **Measure of Performance (MoP)** - A measure used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. This quantitative analysis determines whether the task or action was performed. Examples of what should be measured could include: The number of HNSF independently planned and executed operations. The use of performance based CM as employed on current operations is a real world example of MoP.

b. **Measure of Effectiveness (MoE)** - A measure used to assess changes in system behavior, capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of a decisive condition, achievement of an objective or creation of an effect. A measure of effectiveness provides a benchmark against which progress toward accomplishing the mission can be assessed. The number of incidents and level of violence against the population or security forces is an example of one such measure.

c. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment (CEA)** - CEA is the evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making. These are derived from an appreciation of the accumulative results of the MoP and MoE, set against the wider contextual analysis of the environment. The relationship between MoP, MoE, and CEA are depicted in Figure 1 below.

![Figure 1 - Measurement Relationship](image)

**Preparation**

11. Having considered the general assessment methodology the following considerations should be incorporated where possible into preparing to undertake evaluation of SFCB:
a. **Clearly Defined Goals.** Progress can only be realistically measured against clearly defined objectives. For measures of assessment to be useful at a working level, achievable and relevant goals must be set for each specific area of capacity building.

b. **Clearly defined Priorities.** Defining which aspects must be measured and which are less important will assist in focusing where the weight of evaluation effort should be directed. It should be kept in mind that what is easy to measure may not be important and what is important may not be easy to measure. Prioritization requires command direction and should be cognizant of the comprehensive approach.

c. **Cultural Dimension.** When measuring the effect of HNSF it is essential to remain cognizant of the cultural divide often separating western standards and the cultural norms of a HN. Failure to consider cultural differences may potentially disrupt progress and obscure results when assessing capability. What is perceived as being inadequate by western standards may be perfectly acceptable or even superior for local conditions. For example, pausing operations for observance of religious rituals or even taking a tea break would seem inefficient for most CF but could be essential for maintaining legitimacy, morale and hence effectiveness of a indigenous force.

d. **Qualitative and Quantitative.** Ideally, MoE and MoP should be definable and quantifiable. However, the realities of complex human systems are that behaviors, attitudes and cognitive performance are not easily defined in empirical terms and require subjective judgment. Any holistic assessment of performance must therefore seek to include both qualitative and quantitative data.

e. **Consistency and Continuity.** A common approach or methodology to developing and implementing MoE will ensure a uniform baseline from which to consistently track progress. Continuity is important in order to see trends and progress. A common, consistent database also allows drawing on the experience of predecessors and passing on experience to successors. Common, precise and well understood definitions of what constitute measures will aid continuity. Operations may last a number of years thus the selection of, and continuity of measurements should be regularly reviewed. If no longer relevant they should either be amended or discarded. Conversely, badly explained, inconsistently defined or incoherently applied measures are divisive and sap commitment.

f. **Duration.** While assessment can help to achieve short-term effects, its main value is in the long term. When selecting measures consideration of how quickly change is to be expected is essential. This is particularly so with the less tangible qualitative aspects of change such as desired changes in attitudes and beliefs which may take a long time to inculcate and become observable. In this case measurement should be enduring with effects monitored beyond the executed life of the task or action.

g. **Qualities of a Good Measure.** Measures must always be mission specific, must measure progress or relapse and in addition should be:
(1) Mapped to a desired objective or effect.

(2) Measurable or have the ability to be evaluated.

(3) Sensitive to change.

(4) Bounded by time and space.

(5) Comprehensive yet understandable.

(6) Cost and time efficient.

(7) Not too burdensome.

Planning

12. Measurement should be considered early in the planning process and at the same time as the desired effects and courses of action are determined. If it is not clear how a measurement will demonstrate achievement of the desired effect, then it is probably not well selected. Making definition of measurement an integral part of the planning process has the following additional benefits:

a. Data collection activities can be integrated into courses of action including possible before and after data collection (OPSEC permitting) to assess changes induced by specific actions.

b. It may prompt staff to tailor actions to articulate desired outcomes such as to be easier to observe and measure. This is particularly important if the impact of actions in the cognitive and social domains is to be understood.

c. Allows for integration of measurements with other Joint Interagency Multinational actors as part of a comprehensive approach

Other Planning Considerations:

a. Determine who is going to use the measure and how.

b. Measure effects and not just effort. The mix of input and output measures is likely to change over the course of the campaign (i.e. more MoP at the beginning) but one should strive to develop outcome measures from the outset.

c. Information management and exploitation is key to assessment. Good analysis conducted on poorly measured data produces misleading results, leading to ill-informed decisions.
d. Consider where the data source is, how reliable the data is likely to be and how much effort will be required to collect and store it.

e. Consider who should have access to what data. What protective measures need to be applied since the performance of HN security forces is likely to be an important and sensitive issue.

f. The effectiveness of the measurement effort itself needs to be periodically assessed and reviewed.

**Execution**

13. Current approaches to delivering a comprehensive strategy employ the development of specific lines of operation (LOO) which span all facets of HN building. These LOO provide a conceptual framework for the conduct of operations and are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Thus the SFCB LOO cannot be considered in isolation. Actions in the other lines of operation will have second and third order effects in the SFCB arena and the reverse is also true. For example, the level of commercial activity within an area may be indicative of both the economic development LOO and the success of the SFCB effort.

14. Additionally, there are many stakeholders within the SFCB LOO that contribute to capacity development and each will have their own assessment methods and reporting requirements. In addition to these internal assessment requirements, each stakeholder should seek to share their information to identify and resolve matters of mutual interest and to improve the coordination of their efforts. This is an area that has been identified as having scope for improvement by sharing best practice and better integrating assessment. The current approach reflects the challenge of balancing multiple assessments to promote a comprehensive approach.

**Security Lines of Development**

15. The complexity of the security LOO requires that this domain be broken down into a series of agreed lines of development that can be monitored and progress tracked. Suggested lines of development include: personnel, command and control, leadership, training, equipment, logistics and legitimacy. This list should not be considered finite and other relevant areas could be developed in unison.

16. These lines of development could be developed further to include qualitative aspects of performance in addition to the quantitative, such as the perception amongst the population of HNSF legitimacy, key leadership competency and the willingness of security force elements to adopt change. These would provide greater fidelity with which to better assess the capability of HNSF. At all times it must be recognized that these lines are inextricably interlinked and ultimately mutually dependent. Although critical elements (and a critical path) can probably be determined a system for assessing overall progress must be developed. The following suggested checklist will assist in the development of MoE specific to each line of development.
## Proposed Checklist for Developing SFCB MOE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE OF DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>QUANTITATIVE</th>
<th>QUALITATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
<td>Attendance record.</td>
<td>Soldiers are satisfied with their welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vetting of personnel exists.</td>
<td>State of morale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries are paid on time.</td>
<td>Presence of family in the AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fairness (i.e. merit based assessment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C3I</strong></td>
<td>Number of independent ops planned and executed.</td>
<td>A standardized command philosophy is taught and used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ staffed to full establishment.</td>
<td>Planning is conducted IAW with a process not ad hoc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree of span of command.</td>
<td>Application of the intelligence process to planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition of the need to apply policy and doctrine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to conduct combined arms operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to integrate non-military assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Absence and Sickness rates.</td>
<td>Level of trust in the chain of command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retention.</td>
<td>Motivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment.</td>
<td>Shows initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requisite positions filled.</td>
<td>Organized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Literacy.</td>
<td>Interacts with non-military organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requisite education standard.</td>
<td>Can communicate effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military academy graduation rates.</td>
<td>Self develops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff college admissions.</td>
<td>Trains and empowers subordinates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International engagements.</td>
<td>Willingness to adopt change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection is merit based vs. position/influence.</td>
<td>Meets the requirements of the force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
<td>Relevant to METLs.</td>
<td>Recognition of the importance of training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>METLs and training objectives are achieved.</td>
<td>Integrated system exists that includes a curriculum.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Validation is conducted.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lessons are learnt.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delivered on time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resourced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment</strong></td>
<td>Basis of provisioning achieved in weapons, vehicles and communications.</td>
<td>Is there confidence in the equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to problem solve issues arising from equipment failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
<td>Able to supply the requisite level of supplies.</td>
<td>Control measures exist to account for the material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support mechanisms exist to care for and maintain material.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Legitimacy</th>
<th>Supplies delivered in a timely manner.</th>
<th>Response to standard and non-standard demands.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supplies delivered in a timely manner.</td>
<td>• Supplies delivered appropriate to the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Number of useful intelligence reports provided by the local population.</td>
<td>• Response to standard and non-standard demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local population seeks HNSF assistance.</td>
<td>• Supplies delivered appropriate to the task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Number of incidents reported.</td>
<td>• Response to standard and non-standard demands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Campaign Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

17. The previous discussion has focused on developing measures of assessment for application across the tactical and operational spectrum. Assessing overall progress at the campaign level to understand whether the accumulative effects of our actions are indeed contributing to campaign success are just as important. As outlined earlier CEA is derived from an appreciation of the accumulative results of the MoP and MoE, set against the wider contextual analysis of the environment. Being able to monitor and track progress at this level requires a method for mapping a complex range of variables which contribute to a secure environment. Figure 2 is a suggested means with which to track overall progress made in the delivery of a security effect through HNSFCB.

18. Clearly security capacity in the upper end of the scale would be ideally matched with a high level of community confidence thus representing a viable security condition. Risk Zone A would represent a high level of security confidence among the target community but with low security force capacity. This might be indicative of regions which have been typically calm and relatively unaffected by the adversary - the risk being that this could change. Risk Zone B is high security force capacity but low security confidence and may point to other factors as the cause of poor security confidence, perhaps corrupt security force leadership. Clearly low capacity and low confidence is an unviable security condition.
19. Reading results from this graph must be tempered by consideration of factors external to the security line of operation that may indirectly skew the results. Therefore, this tool is not intended to be a definitive measure of success or failure rather an indicator of risk. A review of both the qualitative and quantitative factors is still required to determine the real impact of external factors on progress.

20. Populating the Graphic. Determining the relative level of confidence communities have in the security being provided by the HN security forces would rely, at best, upon an assessment of qualitative information. This would have to utilize trend polling of target communities collected by civil-military teams and/or other agencies, to provide the following types of information needed to populate the capacity and confidence graphic described above:

   a. A summary rating of HN perceptions of security and levels of violence and intimidation affecting the population. Of note, the reporting only of significant acts of violence as a measure is next to useless in this regard.

   b. Summary ratings of HN population perceptions of the HN security forces.

   c. Comparisons of perceptions of the threat posed by violence from actions of the HNSF versus from those of violent factions. CF perceptions of legitimate actors and actions may not be shared by the local population.

21. Measuring coalition effectiveness in developing the capacity of HN security forces is an essential component of the military force contribution to SSR. Without the tools to effectively

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measure success and how this translates into the provision of a secure environment the conditions for transition and withdrawal cannot be achieved with any degree of confidence.
CONSIDERATION QUESTIONS

- What method will be used by CF to measure the effect of HN SFCB?
- What should be measured to achieve your part of the campaign objectives?
- What are your current HN SFCB tasks?
- What effect must you achieve for each task? This should be in statement form.
- What are the objectives of each task?
- What friendly actions need to be developed that will be used to measure each task accomplishment (MoP)? This quantitative analysis determines whether the task or action was performed and can be tracked by the use of organic/campaign CM.
- What list of measureable criteria will be used to assess changes in systems behavior, capability or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of a decisive event, achievement, objective or effect (MoE)? IED incident levels within your AO, or violence against local population is an example of MoE.
- What reporting method will be used to inform the Campaign Plan?

References:

ABCA Report:


Miscellaneous:


British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 – Counter Insurgency (Draft 2009)

Mr Rolf Sartoris, of *Social Impact Inc* uses the acronym CREAM: Clear, Relevant, Economical, Adequate and Monitorable.

SIERRA LEONE - TRAINING

Background

1. The United Kingdom provided a small number of personnel to help train the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) from 1997. This mission was expanded in early 1999 when President Kabbah regained control of the capital Freetown, by the creation of an International Military and Advisory Team (IMATT). The commitment became more substantial in May 2000 when Operation Palliser was launched.

2. As the situation stabilized a decision was made to establish a Short Term Training Team (STTT). This team was to conduct emergency retraining of the SLA in order to enable it to fight the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The British Army STTT established a series of six week infantry training programmes to train the SLA using different infantry battalions for each course. By September 2001 8500 SLA soldiers had completed the course.

Operation Basilica

3. Operation Basilica was launched in 1999 with the objectives of:
   a. Rebuilding the SLA resources and infrastructure.
   b. Bolstering UNAMSIL in order to avoid its failure.
   c. Coordinate pro Government forces against the RUF.

4. Rebuilding the SLA necessitated a start from a very low base. It was achieved by a combination of specialist trainers provided largely from the formation of the STTTs and partnering with British units for collective training. It also covered the structural and institutional reform of the armed forces, its training organization, command structure, administration, supply, maintenance and personnel management systems.

5. The British recognized that rebuilding the armed forces as an accountable instrument of democratic power was a vital part of nation building and would lead to the defeat of the RUF. In addition the army had a low reputation amongst the people of Sierra Leone because of its participation on a series of military coups and therefore it needed to raise its reputation amongst the civil population from where it was recruited. The most difficult part of the operation was the development of leaders both at NCO level and officer level as most of the officer corps was either dead or in exile.

Case Study: 1st Battalion, The Light Infantry (1LI)

6. 1LI deployed to Sierra Leone in the beginning of April 2001 until the beginning of June 2001 to conduct STTT 7. They deployed direct from Exercise Grand Prix in Kenya and were thus acclimatized and had gained some experience in operating alongside African Soldiers.
7. 1LI’s predecessors 2 RGR had set up a system of concurrent Phase 1 and Phase 2 training and by adapting a version of the British recruit training system.

8. 1LI’s mission was to perform the following tasks:
   a. Train soldiers, sub units and units of the SLA as directed.
   b. Provide security for British Training teams in the area of operations.
   c. Provide a platoon plus for security of BRITFOR in FREETOWN.
   d. Provide escorts to IMATT advisors deployed in Sierra Leone.
   e. Be prepared to support sub-units temporarily deployed to Sierra Leone.
   f. Be prepared to execute contingency plans.

These tasks were conducted to achieve the purpose of creating an effective interim military capability for Government of Sierra Leone and to ensure the protection of BRITFOR.

9. Training was divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2 training, Phase 1 training was based at Benguema Training Centre (BTC) whilst Phase 2 training, which was a collective training phase, was located at Newton Battle Camp (NBC).

10. In Benguema, the Phase 1 training was further divided into four sub-phases: induction, assessment, basic infantry training and collective platoon training. In addition, a ten-day Senior Officer Leadership Course and a seven day Junior NCO Leadership Cadre was run.

11. At NBC, the Phase 2 training consisted of an assessment phase, a collective training phase at platoon and company level and a battalion field training exercise (FTX). Phase 2 Training was undertaken by 3 Bn SLA and 3 independent companies who had completed Phase 1 training with STTT 6. In addition, there was a heavy focus on training the CO 3 Bn SLA and his staff in order to give them the capability of deploying and administering their companies.

12. The aim of the basic infantry training during both phases was to concentrate on shooting, battle and unit discipline and physical fitness ensuring that the SLA soldiers could react aggressively and instinctively to ‘effective enemy fire’ and subsequently defeat the enemy. It was felt that the achievement of this standard would lay an effective foundation for further training in tactics leadership and all arms training.

13. 1LI’s intention was to establish a relatively simple system of training which the SLA could adopt. Simultaneously steps were being taken to formally establish an Armed Forces Training Centre at Benguema, which would be responsible for the ongoing training of the SLA supported by the IMATT.
14. On completion of STTT 7 it was assessed that 14 Bn SLA was capable of operating in a limited manner up to platoon level and was ready for Phase 2. 3 Bn SLA was considered to be capable of limited offensive and defensive operations for a short period and over limited distances.

**Follow Up Training**

15. In 2002, following the end of the war and disarmament of the rebels an IMATT was re-established under British Leadership with strength of 115 the team includes members from Britain, Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Ghana, Jamaica, Nigeria, Senegal and the USA.

16. The mission of the IMATT (SL) was to develop the RSLAF into a democratically accountable, effective and sustainable force to fulfill the security tasks required by the Sierra Leone Government. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the STTTs, the IMATT completed the training of a 14,000 strong army and a small naval contingent. Thereafter it continued to conduct follow on training.

17. In 2004 Sierra Leone opened the Africanus Horton Armed Forces Academy just outside Freetown which provides basic officer training, company commanders, battalion commanders and senior officers training and is assisted by the IMATT.

**Lessons**

18. The STTT identified a number of lessons:

   a. All ranks involved in the delivery of training had to operate within the spirit of mission command because of the number of SLA being trained. Sergeants were effectively acting as company commanders and some privates as platoon commanders.

   b. Delivery of training was found to be extremely tiring for the training staff because of running ranges in humid temperatures in excess of 40 degrees Celsius and of the need to continually repeat messages. Therefore provision needs to be made to ensure there are enough instructors to ensure rest days are taken.

   c. Care needed to be taken to ensure that the SLA NCOs and officers did not overly rely on their British instructors. This was helped during Phase 2 by the presence of SLA instructors who were able to concentrate on aspects of operations in West Africa.

19. The IMATT identified a number of lessons:

   a. There was a problem with short-termism and lack of continuity due to the many personnel being assigned for short tours. This resulted in a loss of institutional memory.

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1 Jane’s World Armies Sierra Leone searched on Janes.com 08 04 2010
b. There was a need for members of IMATT to be aware of cultural issues and the need for sustainability.

c. Each commander of the IMATT arrived with a set of specific aims and objectives. Many came from different backgrounds in the military and had a variety of personal styles.

Conclusion

20. The process of retraining needs to be a long term programme. The principle adopted is:

a. Take over the process of training and do it.

b. Show the RSLAF how to do it.

c. Do it with them.

d. Watch them do it.

e. Let them do it themselves
TIMOR LESTE – MENTORING

Background

1. New Zealand’s (NZ) commitment to the Timor Leste (TL) Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) (Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL)) provides a good example of smaller scale approach tailored to the indigenous military’s needs. The NZ commitment consists of five personnel: two logistics officers, two personnel officers and one small arms instructor, deployed to support the F-FDTL Office of Defence Force Development based in Dili.

2. The NZ CSS SFCB commitment is conducted as part of its Mutual Aid Program (MAP). One NZ logistics officer (a major or equivalent) works as the J-4 Advisor and an Army WO works as a logistics advisor to the F-FDTL force commander. The NZ commitment is at the low end (being individuals deployed to augment F-FDTL capability) of the SFCB continuum, but the principles of SFCB development are equally applicable throughout.

3. These appointments are for one to two years duration to allow mutual trust and respect to be thoroughly developed between NZDF and F-FDTL personnel.

Lessons Learned

4. The NZ lessons learned from over ten years assisting and mentoring the developments of F-FDTL SF CSS capability follow.

5. Campaign Planning. It is critical that CF have a clear, synchronized (between the CF and HN) and graduated plan that is achievable and affordable by both the CF and HN. The campaign plan must assign responsibilities, accountabilities, lead and milestones CF mentors/advisors to work towards and for the HN Security Forces (HNSF) to see themselves achieving results against the plan to which they have committed.

6. This plan needs to be tailored to the specific CSS requirements of the developing HNSF and reflect the limitations of the local environment (both physical and cultural) within the country. CF must understand that they cannot impose their doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) on HNSF. By way of example, there is little to be gained by equipping the F-FDTL with heavy transport as the infrastructure cannot support it.

7. Expectation Management. CSS SFCB campaign plans must be developed in collaboration with HNSF. Ownership, even in part, ensures HNSF commitment to achieving outcomes, and early advice from HNSF will shape CF planning as to what is doable and affordable. In addition, HNSF involvement in CF planning provides early experience for HNSF
planners. The campaign plan must be supported by the HNSF leadership as well as the HN government. Without this support, implementation will be stifled.

8. CSS SFCB plans need to reflect the budgetary constraints of the HN. There is little point in providing and introducing equipment capabilities that the HN cannot afford to support or build infrastructure for. As a result, plans must be long term and flexible because the budgetary constraints may not allow for rapid development especially since military logistics infrastructure may not be a priority.

9. Unity. CF SFCB must be synchronized and united. If the SFCB effort is multi-national, HNSF must understand which nation they approach for what support. Failure to assign lead in a multi-national SFCB effort may mean that CF efforts may conflict, thus undermining the effort overall and the outcome.

10. A clear command structure is required with commanders at all levels empowered to make timely decisions. Generally HNSF want to see quick results and will lose patience if chains of command are excessively bureaucratic. This can result in the loss of CF credibility.

11. Training. HNSF may not possess the requisite educational levels necessary to do courses of instruction in languages other than indigenous languages. The setting up of an English as a Second Language (ESOL) program initially to provide a base English language capability can significantly contribute to longer term SFCB objectives, including strengthening relations with the HNSF.

12. HNSF generally prefer to receive CSS training from local nationals so the most effective way to deliver training is by means of a train-the-trainer approach. CF personnel deploy to the theater and train and supervise the initial cadres who then train further cohorts. These initial personnel can then form the HQ structure of the logistics units and the logistics school.

13. Courses need to be delivered in a style and pace that suits HNSF learning. Where literacy levels of the target audience are low, the use of visual aids, demonstrations and training aids will assist the HNSF assimilation of information but will impose a higher instructional overhead.

14. If HNSF cannot complete a formal course in a foreign nation often a tour of duty or exchange where there is no testing requirements can be a better option. They can observe and draw lessons from what they see without the need for formal coursing, like observing the basic CSS courses but not participating so they can attend the lessons but not need formal testing.

15. Where possible HN educational assets need to be involved in delivering CSS training to encourage development of HN educational capability and capacity.
16. **HN SOP/TTP.** A HN will often have some existing or previously referenced SOP/TTP. These should be reviewed by mentors and wherever possible and appropriately incorporated into developing HN capability documentation.

17. **Log Adviser in smaller HN.** In smaller HN building traditionally the position of Log Advisors is not to provide tactical advice but to support the J4 and branch in developing strategic log policy and advising the J4 accordingly. There is overview of developing and training in terms of log SOP but normally this is to ensure coordination with the policy being developed.

18. **Levels of Embedding.** CF personnel embedded with the HNSF must be at all levels to allow a better exchange and flow of information. Where possible, contributing CF mentors establish a robust mentoring presence throughout all levels of the HN command structure at each echelon and across each function with the proper expertise. Cultural issues in Timor Lestè dictate that some HNSF enlisted men (and women) are not permitted to talk to an officer and vice versa.

19. **Robust influence of mentors.** A mentor may not necessarily be in a position to fix finance, or resource issues at their level; however they should be capable of identifying the problem and influencing its solution. Pervasive presence in HN command structure and not the size of mentoring contribution is seen as a vital enabler.

20. **Personnel Selection.** Personnel selection is fundamental to success of a mentoring approach to CSS SFCB. Personnel should be proficient in military and technical CSS skills and be flexible and innovative in their application. Personnel also need to have innate interpersonal qualities that allow them to interface with HN CSS personnel at all levels. These qualities include:

   a. The patience to accept slow but steady progress, accepting a series of wins rather than large scale, rapid development. Progress towards CSS self sufficiency will mean recurring setbacks and commensurate frustration.

   b. The self confidence to take action in the absence of specific direction.

   c. A sense of humor.

   d. A sense of humility that allows tolerance of a different culture including regard for HN personnel whose personal qualities may not necessarily engender respect.

   e. Strong social skills that allow the forging of personal relationships with HN CSS personnel (superiors, peers and subordinates).
f. An ability to assimilate the indigenous languages if only to be able to meet and greet and use jargon, slang or vernacular.

21. **Gender.** Gender discrimination is not often a major problem; however, females deploying onto such missions need to be made aware up front that some HN officers may behave in such a manner as to make them feel uncomfortable.

22. It is recommended that females deploying to SFCB missions be reminded to anticipate and be prepared to respond appropriately to unacceptable behavior by CF standards. This should not be an issue if appropriate briefings are given and individuals are properly prepared to deploy. Inclusion of pre-deployment training equity briefs should assist in this process. Area of highest risk is likely to be in cases of female personnel deployed or operating in isolation from other CF personnel, e.g. nurses or UN Military Observers. Psychological debriefs could perhaps include enquiry on gender issues, both cross culturally and within the deployment.

**Summary**

23. The NZ commitment to CSS SFCB in Timor Lestè has been at the individual mentor level rather than formed force elements. Notwithstanding, the principles to be applied are common throughout the Resource-Generate-Employ-Transition-Sustain continuum, regardless of the context.

24. In the Timor Lestè context, development of a robust and self sustaining, as opposed to self sufficient, CSS capability is vital to the overall success of SFCB.
IRAQ – AUGMENTING

Background

1. By 2009, the security situation in Iraq began to improve steadily. This was the cumulative result of several factors, including the surge of U.S. forces, the shift in strategy from an emphasis on combat to an emphasis on population security, political settlements among various Iraqi factions, and a turning of Iraqi opinion against external actors such as al-Qaeda. Additionally, by 2009, tribal or ethnic hatreds and ethnic cleansing had largely played out, resulting in a lessoning of violence. Also during this time, security force assistance (SFA) efforts began to take effect, with the Government of Iraq (GOI) and its security forces achieving a level of capacity which allowed them to begin assuming more and more responsibility for their country’s security. This led to the current Security Agreement signed by the U.S. and GOI on January 1, 2009, which makes the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) responsible for security in their assigned area of operations and places U.S. forces in a supporting role. As a result of this progress, Iraq was able to avert civil war and begin to stabilize itself.

2. Meanwhile, as the security situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate, the U.S. President issued a directive to reduce the level of U.S. forces in Iraq from over 140,000 to 50,000 by 31 August 2010, initiating a process of responsible drawdown. This meant a continuation of the ever-changing force structure and forces available that had begun as U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) lost the surge brigades and began redeploying forces as part of the drawdown.

3. This draw down presented planners with the challenge of redeploying forces while continuing to execute stability operations and SFA with a continuously diminishing pool of available forces and resources. As a result, U.S. forces placed additional emphasis on supporting the ISF. This support profile or model continued to evolve as ISF continued to gain capability and as implementation of the Security Agreement continued, focusing on continuing SFA to build ISF capacity; continuing operations by, with, and through the ISF; monitoring Iraqi progress; and augmenting ISF to cover gaps in enabler capabilities. This augmentation typically included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), aviation, sustainment, and special capabilities such as military working dogs.

4. One example of such augmentation occurred in 2010 at Ubaydi, one of the most remote combat outposts in western Iraq. There, Paratroopers from the 1/504th Parachute Infantry

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3 Ibid.
Regiment (PIR) partnered with elements of the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) to secure the Iraqi border with Syria. The U.S. unit augmented Iraqi border patrol forces by providing access to ISR platforms such as J-STARS, UAV, and attack aviation in an armed reconnaissance and close combat attack role. This augmentation enabled the Iraqi border patrol forces to conduct surveillance over a much greater area of the border than normal, immutably and dramatically improving its ability to detect and curb illegal border activity.\(^4\)

5. In this case, the opportunity to augment the Iraqi DBE presented itself when one of the largest U.S. bases in western Iraq, al Taquaddam, was closed and transferred to the Iraqis. USF-I was then able to transfer the unit to assist the Iraqi border forces to curb the infiltration of weapons and foreign fighters. One concern, however, was what the Iraqis and the DBE would do once U.S. forces withdrew from the area. Both Iraqi and American leaders prepared in their partnership for this inevitable outcome, with the U.S. continuing to train the Iraqis on basic and advanced skills in border operations, such as basic patrolling, optical sight scanning techniques, and observation post techniques. By supplementing augmentation with this training, the 1/504\(^{th}\) PIR enhanced the Iraqi skills and mitigated against the eminent departure of the U.S. enablers by better enabling the ISF to perform their border patrol mission without them.

6. Another example of augmentation occurred in April 2009 during a combined raid involving Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army units, and the U.S. 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. Occurring across several villages near Kirkuk, CF and the ISF conducted the raid to detain several criminals who were suspected of engaging in insurgent activity and various other crimes based on outstanding warrants. During the raid, IA provided the inner cordon to allow IP to execute the warrants. In a supporting role, U.S. forces executed an order cordon and provided enablers, including aviation and military working dogs.\(^5\)

7. USF-I also demonstrated this pattern of ISF leading operations with U.S. augmentation during the 2009 Iraqi election.\(^6\) While ISF planned and executed its own security for the elections, U.S. forces provided the ISF with aviation transportation support, particularly to assist the GOI with the transportation of international election monitors. Additionally, U.S. forces

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\(^4\) Jones, Jeff, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, “News From the Front: 1/82 (AAB) Paratroopers Conducts Border Patrol Operations with Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement,” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL Theater Observation Detachment, draft prior to publication.


provide specific enabler support or technical augmentation, such as ISR platforms, military working dog teams, and x-ray imaging Backscatter Vans to help the ISF search vehicles.\(^7\)

8. Even though the drawdown refocused support toward partnering with and augmenting ISF, there were many examples of augmentation prior to the Security Agreement or even the surge. In 2006, for example, soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 8th Iraqi Army Division and 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, conducted a combined air assault and cordon and search of all homes in Samra and detained several suspected terrorists.\(^8\) At the time, Samra was a village of approximately 300-400 people which had seen very little ISF or CF presence, and intelligence sources had identified the town as a possible safe-haven for bomb-making cells. To ensure the interoperability and equivalent mobility of both forces, U.S. units augmented the IA units with aviation lift support. This augmentation, however, required that the U.S. forces also provide the ISF with training, including aircraft loading and unloading procedures and static load-training.

9. In another example, Battalion Task Force (TF) 2-1 of the 172\(^{nd}\) Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) augmenting ISF as both forces conducted counterinsurgency operations against al-Qaeda and Ansar al Suna insurgents in eastern Mosul, Iraq. TF 2-1 provided emergency logistic support when the newly formed internal support systems of the ISF failed, or when contracts failed to resupply critical classes of supply for items like fuel and barrier material. One of the most significant types of emergency support given to the IA was to resupply the ISF with bulk fuel in May-July 2006, as the Iraqi Ministry of Defense reconstituted its contracts for fuel.\(^9\) Occasionally, the TF conducted these emergency resupply missions to the IA combat outposts, but typically coached the ISF staffs through the embedded training teams to forecast their fuel requirements and to pick up the fuel from a nearby U.S. combat outpost. Although risking dependency on CF, in this instance, the 172\(^{nd}\) SBCT decided that maintaining momentum towards the ISF leading security operations in Mosul made it necessary to bridge the fuel gap and provide support until the contracts were in place.

**Augmentation Lessons Learned**

10. **General.** The types and levels of support must evolve to reflect changes in the HN and HNSF capability, the security situation, and the CF available.

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\(^7\) DOD News Briefing from Baghdad with Maj. Gen. Terry Wolff, commander, 1st Armored Division and United States Division - Center, March 10, 2010.


\(^9\) CALL Newsletter No. 08-25 July 08, *Battalion Task Force in COIN Stryker TF 2-1 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL, 25 July 2008), 70.
11. As HNSF increase capabilities, partnering typically transitions from lower levels to higher, and CF transition from a leading role, to equality, to a supporting role, requiring commensurate adjustments to other types of support such as augmentation.

12. Changes in force structure or forces available will also require adjustments or evolution of the supporting structure, including augmentation. This situation may be dynamic, challenging staffs to continually re-assess and adapt augmentation structures and relationships.

13. CF should plan augmentation as part of a comprehensive operational and support plan, employing augmentation in concert with other forms of support. Partnering CF units may have or have access to certain capabilities, making them available to augment partnered HNSF.

14. Augmentation has the advantage of providing a critical capability will preserving the HNSF ownership of operations. This places a HNSF face on the operation, enabling it to gain experience and confidence and build legitimacy.

15. Typical forms of augmentation are sustainment and enabler support, including aviation, ISR platforms, military working dogs teams, and other specialized equipment such as x-ray emitting Backscatter Vans to search vehicles.

16. **Purposes of augmentation**. CF can augment HNSF to fill gaps in HNSF capabilities, provide limited interoperability with CF, and produce complementary effects between HNSF and CF.

17. Augmentation may be required to fill gaps in HNSF capabilities. These gaps may be the result of a basic lack of a certain capability or a temporary loss or degradation of a capability. These gaps may also result from changes in the operational environment, such as a surge of disorder or insurgent violence, or a critical event, such as an election, during which near term requirements exceed HNSF capabilities. In each of these cases, CF augment HNSF until the HNSF can provide the capability for itself or until the situation no longer requires it.

18. Augmentation can enable interoperability between CF and HNSF. This can involve the provision of C2 and communications technology through embedded liaison teams, as well as vehicles or aircraft transportation support to enable compatible mobility.

19. Augmentation can produce complementary effects between CF and HNSF. Augmentation can combine HNSF strengths such as cultural and regional familiarity, language ability, legitimacy, and sheer number of soldiers, with CF enablers such as ISR and aviation. This takes advantages of the strengths of both forces to create a synergistic effect.

20. **Augmentation Considerations**. Successful augmentation requires several considerations.

   a. CF which augment HNSF must ensure HNSF have a precise understanding of the augmentation capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations. CF must also ensure the HNSF understands the duration or amount of support the CF will provide.
This is often achieved through conducting combined planning and rehearsals, leveraging embedded advisors or trainers, or employing liaison teams.

b. Providing augmentation to HNSF may require training, such as aircraft loading and unloading procedures and static load training when augmenting with aviation lift support, or clearance of fire or coordination procedures for fire support, attack aviation, or close air support.

c. CF providing HNSF with augmentation must plan for continuity of augmentation across unit rotations or re-stationing. A unit transition or mission handover must include the plan to either handover its augmentation profile or account for its termination. Sustaining the relieved force’s augmentation at least initially can mitigate the inherent risks of transition. The relieved unit’s augmentation and support structure is a key point of coordination during the pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) of the incoming unit.

d. Augmentation of HNSF risks creating dependency. CF must weigh this risk with the potential benefits of augmentation, such as maintain momentum through a critical period. Additionally, CF can mitigate this risk of dependency by HNSF by viewing it as ultimately temporary, and either developing HN capacity to eventually provide the capability for itself, or continuing to train HNSF on more basic TTPs to use when the augmented capability is no longer available.

Summary

21. Augmentation can play a vital role in SFCB. It can mitigate a critical gap in HNSF capability as well as produce complementary effects and interoperability between CF and HNSF. Either the gap will be temporary, or the augmentation will be temporary. CF must take care that HNSF fully understand the augmentation they are receiving along with its employment considerations, often enlisting embedded advisors to assist. CF providing augmentation must take care not to create dependency, preparing HNSF for when the augmentation will end, either by producing the capability or adapting systems to go without it. It must be conducted in concert with the other forms of support, such as partnering, training, and advising, to produce a comprehensive effect.

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## Glossary

### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American-British-Canadian-Australian, New Zealand Armies Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>campaign effectiveness assessment</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil military cooperation</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>coalition forces</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>capability milestones</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<td>DLOD</td>
<td>Defense line of development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, material, leader development, personnel, facilities, and policy</td>
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<td>FE</td>
<td>force element</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>FOC</td>
<td>full operational capability</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host nation support</td>
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<td>HNSF</td>
<td>host nation security force(s)</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations; international organizations</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>initial operational capability</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
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<td>LO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>medical civic action program</td>
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<td>METL</td>
<td>mission essential task list</td>
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<td>MoE</td>
<td>measures of effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
OTERA  Organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, advise/assist
PA   public affairs
RIP  relief in place
SF   security force
SFA  security force assistance
SFCB security force capacity building
SOF  special operations forces
SSR  security sector reform
TOA  transfer of authority
TOR  terms of reference
UAV  unmanned aerial vehicle
UK   United Kingdom
UN   United Nations
US   United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development

**TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

advise/assist  advising is an SFCB task in which coalition personnel work with HN security forces to improve their capability and capacity. Assisting is providing support or sustainment capabilities that the HN security force requires to meet their objectives.

augmenting  a temporary arrangement where HN security forces provide individuals or elements to combine with coalition units, or coalition individuals or elements combine with HN security forces.

capacity building  the comprehensive approach to increasing a host nation's ability to achieve self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital, development and reconstruction.

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)  the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies

comprehensive approach  cooperative planning and execution by a range of actors, both national and international – militaries, other departments of state, non-governmental organizations and host nation government entities or agencies.

demobilization  the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups (UN Integrated DDR Standards 2005).

disarmament  the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants
and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs (UN Integrated DDR Standards 2005).

**disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)**

a stability activity that involves the handing over of arms and equipment, the disbanding of military structures, and the return to civilian life of military and paramilitary personnel.

**employ**

a HNSF developmental stage or level which involves the establishment involves HN security forces progressing from force generation to mission employment. Employment is a necessary stage in the development of a HNSF capacity, allowing it to gain the requisite experience and confidence to build upon toward even greater capacity.

**equip**

the SFCB task which encompasses all efforts to assess needs and assist HN security forces with the procurement, fielding, and sustainment of equipment.

**generate**

a HNSF developmental stage or level which involves the establishment of HN security forces, including the forces, leaders, and functional capabilities (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, C2 and protection) based on and assessment and design of HNSF.

**host nation security forces**

**human capital**

the skill sets, personnel structures, and relationships that a nation’s populace needs to assume the roles and responsibilities related to its governance and the general advancement of its society.

**organize**

the SFCB task which encompasses all measures taken to assist HN security forces to improve its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure.

**partnering**

a habitual relationship between CF and HN units at various levels often with a single purpose to gain leverage from the strengths of both forces

**rebuild/build**

the SFCB task which involves assessing and rebuilding the existing capabilities and capacities of HN security forces including their supporting infrastructure.

**reintegration**

the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income (UN Integrated DDR Standards 2005). Note: The reintegration aspect of DDR is the future employment of demobilized soldiers either in the security sector or back into a regenerated civilian economy.

**resource**

a HNSF developmental stage or level which involves acquiring and delivering the resource requirements necessary to support the development of HN security forces in accordance with its design.

**security force capacity building (SFCB)**

a comprehensive approach to the generation, employment, and sustainment of local, host-nation, or international security forces in support of a legitimate authority.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>security sector reform (SSR)</strong></th>
<th>the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a fragile state undertakes to reform, or establish security institutions that are effective, legitimate, and accountable and provide both internal and external security.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>sustain</strong></td>
<td>a HNSF developmental stage or level which describes the progressive development of institutional capacity of HN security forces and is completed at the point that they achieve self sufficiency.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>train</strong></td>
<td>the SFCB task to assist HN security forces by developing programs and institutions to train and educate their personnel.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>transition</strong></td>
<td>a HNSF developmental stage or level which defines the handover of responsibility from CF to HN Security Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>whole of government</strong></td>
<td>an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of a Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.</td>
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