TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 C3
A Soldier’s Primer to
Terrorism TTP
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in
Complex Operational Environments

TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
August 2012
Summary of Change

Change 3 (17 August 2012) to TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07 provides updated terrorism information, vignettes, and descriptions of extremist motivations and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Data reflects an understanding and situational awareness of terrorism in a “long war.”

Proponent Statement

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) is the proponent for this publication. Periodic updates will service institutional and operational requirements on terrorism.

August 2012
Foreword

As a U.S. Army TRADOC G2 handbook, this primer portrays an **Opposing Force** (OPFOR) model. Use of OPFOR in learning events is intended to support realistic training [live, virtual, simulations, gaming] through operations against a noncooperative and uncompromising opponent that uses tactics, doctrine, and equipment representative of a **composite** of forces that could be encountered in current or future military operations.

This **unclassified** resource uses **tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)** from actual adversaries in worldwide operational environments.

Gary Phillips
Director
TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity

August 2012
Preface

Use This Handbook as a ready-to-use reference for—
- Soldier-Leader Self Development
- Joint Professional Military Education
- Operational Mission Focus

Information is a “hip-pocket” primer of basic definitions, concepts, and actions concerning terrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Each topic is a resource for home station training, resident or distance learning classrooms, and live, virtual, and gaming exercise environments.

We must be prepared to anticipate and defeat myriad hybrid threats that incorporate regular warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminality.

General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

August 2012
Contents

Foreword .................................................................i
Preface ........................................................................ii
Introduction ..................................................................1

Nature of Islamic Extremist Terrorism ...............................9
  Defining the Issue

Islamic Extremist Examples ..........................................11
  AQ, Taliban, AQAP, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Others

Structure and Organization ...........................................21
  Hierarchies, Networks, and Critical Nodes

Capabilities and Intentions ............................................37

August 2012
Targeting U.S. Military Forces ................................................................. 46
   Deployed Forces
   In-Transit Forces
   Institutional-Installation Forces

Terrorism Vignettes: TTP ...................................................................... 50

Most Dangerous Threats: WMD ......................................................... 84

Trends and the Future ........................................................................... 88
   Intense Motivational Extremism
   Adaptive Organization
   Improved Operational Capabilities
   Expanded Transnational Associations
   Exploited Mass Media Marketing
   Increased Weapon System Lethality

Key References ..................................................................................... 96

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Introduction

This Soldier’s primer describes terrorism TTP threats in an operational environment (OE) and the likely impacts on military operations in a U.S. combatant command area of responsibility (AOR). The intent is to improve situational awareness and operational understanding of current terrorism capabilities-limitations, and complement the deliberate and intuitive processes of —

- Military Risk Management
- Protection of Friendly Forces
- Mission Orders Conduct, and
- Adaptive Leader Decisionmaking.

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Actions, not just words, determine the outcome of a war to actively counter the actions and ideologies of violent extremists that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Terrorism ranges from individual acts of wanton damage and destruction of property or person to simple or highly sophisticated operations supported by transnational networks in an OE. The most significant threats to U.S. security are terrorist organizations and groups with global reach capabilities seeking to acquire and use materiel for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The variables of PMESII-PT are a framework used to assess the complex operational environments that confront U.S. Army missions.

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To defeat the terrorist, the Army will capture or kill enemy leaders and cell members, deny or destroy training havens and financial resources, and disrupt terrorist plots and recruiting efforts as part of a whole of government approach with effective **offensive, defensive, and stability operations**.

**Operational Environment** is a composite of the—
- **CONDITIONS**, 
- **CIRCUMSTANCES**, and 
- **INFLUENCES**

That affects employment of military forces and bears on the decisions of the tactical unit commander, leaders, and soldiers.

Ultimately, **we are fighting to preserve fundamental democratic values and a way of life that promotes freedom of choice**.

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Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

This primer concentrates primarily on the CONDITIONS that U.S. Soldiers face against an enemy in the close combat and ground maneuver in complex operational environments. TTP definitions of this primer are:

**Tactics** -- the ordered arrangement and maneuver of individuals or cells related to their enemy, each other, and terrain in order to achieve mission success.

**Techniques** -- the general or detailed methods of using equipment and people to perform assigned missions and functions.

**Procedures** -- the detailed courses of action that describe how to perform a task.

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Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies.

Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.

Definitions vary. Terrorism is the premeditated politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.

Title 22 of the United States Code

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Terrorism in Insurgency and Other Complex Conflicts

The fundamental aim of terrorism is to cause a psychological effect on people and the decisions they make.

Know the Threat – Know The Enemy!

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations

Guerrilla warfare is military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations

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Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*

Unconventional warfare is activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*

Traditional warfare is a form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or
seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.

DOD Directive 3000.7, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*

In describing individuals and groups that support terrorist organizations—

- **Affiliates** are groups that have aligned with [a terrorist organization such as] al-Qa’ida.

  As adapted from *U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism*

- **Adherents** are individuals who have formed collaborative relationship with, act on behalf of, or are otherwise inspired to take action to further the goals of [a terrorist organization such as] al-Qa’ida—the organization and the ideology—including by engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its interests.

  As adapted from *U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism*

**Note.** DOD does not define terms: terrorist, insurgent, guerrilla, or criminal.

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Nature of Islamic Extremist Terrorism

The enemy is actors who use terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated violence that aims at subverting the rule of law with rule by fear.

The primary security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents.

Other threats include loosely affiliated terrorist cells to al-Qa‘ida or other militant-extremist interests that seek notoriety and power. The Haqqani Network is considered the most lethal insurgent group targeting Coalition and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 2012

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Describing Islamic Extremism

The next two to three years will be a critical transition phase for the terrorist threat facing the United States, particularly from al-Qa’ida and like-minded groups.”

During this transition, we expect leadership of the movement to become more decentralized…with “core” al-Qa’ida…. The movement will continue to be a dangerous transnational force.

Likely…
that regional groups, and to a lesser extent small cells and individuals, will drive the global jihad agenda both within the United States and abroad…
…execute smaller, simpler plots to demonstrate relevance…even as it aspires to mass casualty and economically damaging attacks.

DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment 2012

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Islamic Extremist Examples

al-Qa’ida (AQ)

Aim: To establish a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world.

Area of Operations: Transnational; affiliates in Middle East, Europe, Africa, Afghanistan, Central/South/East Asia, Pakistan’s FATA.

Description: Top terrorist threat to U.S.; develops affiliations and inspiration to terrorist groups-cells in U.S. COCOM areas of responsibility.


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Taliban

Aim: To establish an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan.

Area of Operations: Afghanistan and region

Description: Emerged from militants in Afghan-Soviet War (1979-1989) and overthrew Afghan government in 1996 to establish extremist rule; al-Qa’ida safe haven; Coalition forces removed Taliban from state power in 2001; Afghan insurgency continues with Coalition forces present in operations, training, and assistance to Afghanistan government.

Comment: Mullah Mohammed Omar is a key Taliban leader. Attacks include IED, VBIED, SVIED, mortars, small arms fire, kidnap-murder, assassination.

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Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Aim: To establish Islamic fundamentalist authority in the Arabian Peninsula region.
Area of Operations: Arabian Peninsula, Middle East, Yemen, and USA.

Description: Opposes Saudi monarchy and the “West.” Conducts and incites campaign of terror using local resources, decentralized training, deliberate high notoriety targets, and recurring attacks.

Comment: al-Wahayshi is AQAP leader; media exploitation with Inspire e-magazine; 2008 attack on U.S. embassy in Sana’a; 2009 suicide bomb attempt on U.S. commercial jet; 2010 package bomb attempt on commercial jet enroute to USA. Anwar al-Awlaki killed 2011.

August 2012
Al-Shabaab

Aim: To establish Islamic fundamentalist authority in Somalia and extend Sharia influence in the region.

Area of Operations: Primarily active in southern and central Somalia; targets “Western” interests inside and outside of Somalia.

Description: Emerged from Islamic Council (2006); aligned with al-Qa’ida (2008); clan politics and shifting internal alliances; terrorizes population; attacks transitional government, peacekeepers, NGOs; Internet recruits in U.S. and abroad.

Comment: Leader Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed; attacks include small arms, VBIEDs, SVIED, IEDs, mortars, beheading, assassination.

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al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Aim: To overthrow Algerian government and adversary African regimes; create regional Islamic caliphate;

Description: AQIM evolved from a merger of a Salafist terrorist group and al-Qa‘ida adherents to become AQIM in 2006. Attacks “Western” targets. Trained recruits for al-Qa‘ida.

Comment: Abu Mus‘ab Adb al-Wadoud is leader of AQIM. Attacks include ambushes, kidnapping, extortion, small arms, mortar, rocket, IED attacks, and suicide bombings. Although pledging to avoid attacks on civilians, numerous civilians have been killed in their attacks and hostage-murders.

August 2012
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)

Aim: To remove Indian presence from Kashmir area; support terror against coalition presence.

Area of Operations: Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), India, and Afghanistan.

Description: Militants fought Soviets in Afghanistan; terrorizes India; anti-U.S., anti-Israel, and others; front organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa for charitable projects; training-support, schools, and medical clinics to militants-terrorists.

Comment: Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is leader of LT front organization; terror attacks include Mumbai (2008), Bangalore (2005), New Delhi (2005).

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**Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**

**Aim:** To establish Islamic law throughout Pakistan; expel Coalition forces from Afghanistan; vows to attack USA-Europe.

**Area of Operations:** Region of Federally Administered Tribal Areas-Pakistan.

**Description:** Allegiance to Taliban; AQ ideological guidance to TTP; Afghan-Pakistani border TTP safe havens for AQ.

**Comment:** Attacks include suicide vest IED at Khost, Afghanistan (2009); suicide bombing at U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan (2010); kidnapping, beheading; armed assaults. Actions likely to continue against Coalition forces; Hakimullah Mehsud reported to be killed.

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Caucasus Emirate (CE)

Aim: To establish regional Islamic caliphate in Northern Caucasus and remove Russian regional influence.
Area of Operations: Caucasus-Russia

Description: Fundamentalist Islamic grouping of several militant regional organizations; Persian Gulf donation support; declares Russia, USA, UK, Israel, and “anyone who wages war on Islam” as an enemy.


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**Boko Haram**

**Aim:** To replace Nigerian government with a regime based on Islamic law.

**Area of Operations:** Northeast Nigeria and central Nigerian area.

**Description:** Social-religious-political militants, disenfranchised citizens, and criminals. Promotes sectarian violence to counter Nigerian governance.

**Comment:** Attacks include ambushes, assassinations; IEDs; suicide VBIED (2011); VBIED at church (2011); indications al-Shabaab shares training and other resources; AQIM has permitted Boko Haram to use its media operation. Leader is Abubakar Shekau.

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Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

**Aim:** To establish *Islamic caliphate* spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and southern Philippines.

**Area of Operations:** Primarily Indonesia; probable cells in Malaysia and Philippines.

**Description:** JI ideological leader Abul Bakar Bashir in prison; capture or death of key JI leaders such as Mas Selamat Kastari has disrupted operations.

**Comment:** Attacks include bombing in Bali (2002), attacks in Manila, Davao (2004), Bali (2005), and Jakarta (2009). Plots include bombing U.S. Embassy and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore.

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Structure and Organization

Organizational Intent

Structure, membership, and resources indicate the degree of capability, resolve, and operational reach of a terrorist organization. Terrorist groups appear to gravitate to acts of terror with increased destruction and notoriety.

Components of organization can be assessed in general categories of ideology, functions, motivations, and affiliations that state:

- Group Vision
- Organizational Goals
- Long Term Objectives.

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Operational Intent

The global presence of the U.S. as a superpower makes an attractive target for terrorist groups. Terrorists challenge perceived weaknesses.

Techniques can threaten, demonstrate, feint, or attack. Terrorist perceptions may consider the USA as casualty adverse and a nation that will not sustain long conflicts. Terrorists know an economy can be fragile and if attacked at critical nodes can be easily disrupted. Terrorists attempt to influence public opinion and U.S. policy.

Terrorist action will attempt to cause mass casualties, damage economies, fracture U.S. alliances, coalitions, and partnerships, and break public resolve.
Levels of Participation

As a generalized concept, terrorist organizations may display four to five levels of participation. The image of a pyramid creates an appreciation of how many people may operate at each of these levels.

**Senior Leaders** conceive and state a philosophical or practical justification for actions by subordinate operational leaders and followers. These leaders announce strategic direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and provide overarching guidance for large scale operations.

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Operational Leaders command and control active networks. They include senior echelon leaders, spokespersons, political leaders, functional leaders, auxiliary leaders, and in some cases, leaders of individual cells.

Cadres are the active core members of a cell. They plan and conduct operations, and manage functions such as intelligence, recruiting, training, finances, logistics, media affairs exploitation, and communications.

Active supporters operate in activities such as politics, fundraising, and information activities of the group. Acting as a visible or tacit partner, they may conduct intelligence and surveillance activities, train recruits, procure materiel, or provide safe havens, medical assistance, and transportation for cadre members. Active supporters do not commit violent acts. Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals and intentions of an overarching agenda of a terrorist organization, but are not committed enough to take an active role guerrilla or insurgent actions or in terrorism.

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Hierarchical Structure

Hierarchical structures have a well-defined command and control system. Coordination flows along vertical and horizontal links. Specialized functions may be intelligence, support and services, training, operations, fiscal revenue, civil affairs, and media affairs.

Aspects to consider for strengths and weaknesses include:
- Unified command structure
- Functional support systems
- Linear communications systems

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Network Structure

**Networked structures** distribute responsibility for operations and provide redundancy for key functions and leadership.

**Cells** are the basic element of a network. A cell can be an individual, group, or series type-organization.

Aspects to consider for strengths and weaknesses include:
- Distributed planning-operations
- Compartmented intelligence
- Adaptive functional systems

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Three types of networked structure are: chain, hub, and all-channel.

**Chain** networks link to the next node in sequence and operate in a linear manner.

**All-channel** networks provide for hybrids among all nodes and distributed means of command and control.

**Hub** networks and variations operate with one central node as a director or decision maker.

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Identify Critical Nodes of a Network

Terrorists often use a broad system of networks with functional and cooperative linkages that provide key capabilities.

Identify critical nodes to disrupt or defeat network effects.

Networks can incorporate affiliates and/or adherents who connect means such as financing, recruiting, technical support, direct action cells, munitions, logistics, medical care, and transportation. Media affairs exploit information to promote an agenda and acts of terror.

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Know the Threat—Know the Enemy

Understand terrorist organizations and capabilities. Objectives can be evaluated for stated or likely targeting and activity selection that include specific people, sites, or functions.

What is the motivation?

Appreciate support factors such as political-diplomatic or ideological goals, financial support, popular and/or relevant population sympathy and sanction, recruitment, training, and demonstrated operational capabilities.

Know the overt or covert infrastructures of an enemy and how media affairs exploit terrorism in order to promote an agenda. For example, HAMAS is an elected entity in Lebanon governance and is also a direct actor in terror.

The “enemy” can and does operate in the U.S. Homeland and abroad.

August 2012
Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE)

...Individuals inside the United States become radicalized and motivated to conduct attacks against the U.S. Homeland.

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

A distinction separates “domestic terrorism” such as eco-terrorism or attacks against abortion clinics from “homegrown violent extremism” with (HVE) perceived as most often arising from radical Islamist ideology....

In the near term the threat in the United States from homegrown violent extremists (HVE) will be characterized by lone actors or small groups inspired by al-Qa’ida’s ideology but not formally affiliated with it or other related groups.

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International Terrorism Grouping

International terrorism is terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. Terrorist groups may operate in multiple countries but often keep a geographic regional focus.

Hizballah is an example of a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) that conducts international terrorism operations in the Mideast, has cells in other regions such as North America, and has conducted anti-U.S. attacks in the Mideast.

Terrorist cells can employ murder, hostage-taking, kidnapping, assassination, bombings, extortion, and exploited media affairs with a regional focus.
Transnational Terrorism Grouping

al-Qaida’s regional affiliates—al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab—will remain committed to the group’s ideology, and in terms of threats to U.S. interests will surpass the remnants of core al-Qa’ida in Pakistan.

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Key terrorist leaders will continue to be captured or killed in order to disrupt and defeat designated terrorist organizations. Indoctrination of extremist violent beliefs spans terrorist training in camps, actions in failing or failed states and other geographic safe havens, and via the Internet.

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Terror and Nation-States

Nations and states may use terror to influence or coerce their own populations or they may support terrorist operations to advance agendas against their adversaries. An enemy of the U.S. could use terrorism to expand a conflict beyond a particular region and exploit any international intervention in a region to support its own strategic goals.

State terror demonstrates state policies to repress and control their own population. Official institutions such as courts, police, military, or other governmental agencies conduct actions to terrorize. Examples include Hitler’s policies and concentration camps during the Nazi regime, and Stalin’s purges and gulags during his Soviets regime.
State directed terror may come from a terrorist group operating as a direct agent of the government. Operations may include activities against other nations, its own population, or groups or individuals viewed as dangerous to the state. Although these actions may be approved by the state, no official recognition is normally acknowledged of financial, training, or materiel-logistics support.

Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism.

State supported terror occurs with a terrorist organization that operates independently but receives support from one or more governments. Support can include training, funds, or other forms of materiel such as safe haven, physical basing, intelligence, information technology, or fabrication of documents and identities. Syria support to HAMAS and Hizballah in Lebanon, August 2012.
or Iran support to terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of state supported terrorism.

Political parties may be elected into state government and exhibit clear associations to terrorism. Contemporary situations such as HAMAS in the Mideast may blur the distinctions between state-directed and state-supported terrorism.

**Non-State supported terror** notes a terrorist group that operates autonomously and receives no support from any state government. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan was an example of non-state supported terror. This cult was able to fundraise, develop a significant infrastructure, and manufacture and attack a civilian population with sarin agent and WMD intent.
Terrorism and Global Reach

Terrorists, in some instances, have developed a global reach capability for terrorism that uses modern communication, commerce, and travel to advance plans and actions. Terrorist organizations can affiliate with rogue states and/or non-state actors such as transnational criminal organizations (TCO).

As the United States acts to diminish the scope and capabilities of terrorist organizations, success will be realized with the demonstrated abilities to:

♦ **Protect the Nation** in an active layered defense.
♦ **Win the “Long War”** against violent extremist movements.
♦ **Promote Security** with international, cooperative relationships.
♦ **Deter Conflict** with whole of government capabilities.
♦ **Win the Nation’s Wars.**


**Capabilities and Intentions**

**Goals**

Terrorist goals vary; however, military forces or individual members of the U.S. Armed Forces are often a **terrorist target**. Rationales include:

- Demonstrate terrorist capability in a geographic area.
- Influence U.S. regional and domestic policy.
- Influence U.S. relationships with regional allies and partners.
- Reduce U.S. military capabilities.

Al-Qa’ida has identified **U.S. military forces** as one of its priority targets. Other terrorist groups have specifically targeted U.S. military forces and facilities on numerous occasions.

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Planning Cycle, Action, and Exploitation

Terrorist attacks use operating **principles** that key on the psychological impact on a target population. Seven phases can be used as a model to gain **situational awareness and Know the Threat**. Cycles from an initial concept to an attack may take years or can occur within weeks.

1. **Conduct broad target analysis and general intentions.**
2. **Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.**
3. **Select specific target and resources.**
4. **Refine target surveillance and intelligence.**
5. **Rehearse plan and contingencies.**
6. **Attack.**
7. **Exploit effects.**

Continuum of planning -- execution -- reapplication -- lessons learned -- evaluation

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Broad Target Selection

This initial phase is collection of information on potential targets. Open sources and other general information, operative recommendations, and terrorist group leader decisionmaking scopes the list of potential targets for refined collection.

New York City

Terrorist group objectives guide the value placed on a possible target and projected results will be assessed in a larger context of operational goals and organizational intent, and factors of economic impacts and psychological effects on a population.

Port of Los Angeles

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Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance

Vulnerabilities invite additional surveillance to collect target patterns and trends. Observers and researchers catalog routines in work habits and recurring procedures. Surveys include physical layout of facilities. Regular routes of travel and transportation add to the target assessment on probable attack success. Security measures consider physical barriers and sensors, guard forces, access procedures, and how to breach or bypass barriers.

Observing reaction time of security response units is of particular importance.

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Specific Target Selection

Deciding on a specific target considers a continuous flow of information and intelligence collection and analysis.

Issues for decision-making include—global or regional media value, physical target relationship to the target audience, consistency with terrorist aims, ability to demonstrate attack success, and cost in organizational resources in relation to the psychological impact on the target audience.

Multiple target selections for 911 were a deliberate long-term process by al-Qa’ida.

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Pre-Attack Surveillance and Planning

In this phase, operational terrorist cells appear that will be directly involved in the attack. **Detailed surveillance** confirms previous data collection and estimates, and maintains current **situational awareness** of the target.

**Specialized operatives** may be recruited and trained in this phase. Bases of operations such as bombmaking sites or safehouses and caches will be activated.

Planning weapon delivery will be refined. If part of the operation, escape routes will be planned and coordinated.
Attack Rehearsals

Rehearsal is the practice of each aspect in the terrorist attack plan. Evaluating each step will confirm planning assumptions to the degree possible, determine the readiness of cell members and systems, and consider contingencies for opportunities or setbacks that may occur during the operation.

Observing security force reaction to a ruse or demonstration provides valuable information on their state of alert, size and capability of response force, probable routes to the attack site, and any expectation of security force reinforcements. Adjustments to the plan are rehearsed and finalized. The terrorist leader approves the conduct of the attack.

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Actions on the Objective

Given secrecy of plans and preparations leading to the conduct of an attack, this phase uses initiative in its surprise and violent execution.

Recording with video-audio-camera coverage can support Terrorist—

♦ Lessons learned for recruiting-training-fund raising.
♦ Motivation-inspiration-radicalization.
♦ Mass media exploitation-notoriety.

Actions on the objective may be a single focused purpose or linked activities. Attacks may be multiple or complex nearly simultaneous actions in several—Assaults—Ambushes—Raids.
Escape and Exploitation

Escape tasks are a significant phase of an attack mission. Suicide-homicide operations should not minimize the expectation that many terrorist groups seek to expand their capabilities in terror with recurring attacks by experienced group members. Suicide-homicide missions often have support members, observers, or handlers who require the means to escape or evade and exfiltrate from the attack site.

Exploitation uses the damage and destruction of the attack to incite anxiety and fear in the target audience. Unsuccessful attacks may be disavowed when possible by the terrorist group.

August 2012
Targeting U.S. Military Forces

The terrorist threat is ever-present as U.S. military forces conduct their duties in the U.S. Homeland and throughout the world.

Terrorist actions can occur during operational missions, at force projection installations, and in other institutional locations that support of the U.S. Armed Forces.

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Deployed Forces

U.S. military forces remain a regular presence in many areas of the world. As such, these organizations, activities, and individuals offer a prime target to terrorists. Base camps or other semi-fixed locations and routes among them can provide a lucrative target.

Urban terrain is a popular haven and operating area for terrorists.

Hiding and observing within a native population provides a degree of security. Actions prior to an attack can be masked to preclude detection. Sites that concentrate military members near forward operating locations, or deployment and redeployment points can be targets too.

Mosul Dining Facility Bombing

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In-Transit Forces

Movements as part of deployment and redeployment operations can be susceptible to terrorist attack. Whether intra-theater or inter-theater in scope, methods of transportation have critical points to embark, trans-load, refuel, refit, assemble, and debark.

Sustaining U.S. military forces may also have single points of failure in equipment, system capabilities, or technical skills. These types of critical nodes, if attacked, may delay or disrupt the in-transit flow and power projection capability of U.S. military forces.

A Soldier’s Primer to Terrorism TTP

USS Cole Attack 2000

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Institutional-Installation Forces

U.S. military forces require a **sustaining base**. This support can be a localized permanent U.S. installation, operating base or post, or a forward deployed activity.

Routine operations, places, organizational celebrations, and special days with **high densities of people** or **critical infrastructure** can be selected for attack. Single points of failure in support systems could become prime targets.

**Critical logistics flow and transportation routes and means** can be a vulnerable target.

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Terrorism Vignettes: TTP

Vignette Titles

Threat-Hoax
Small Arms Fire: Moving Target
Small Arms Fire: Moving Vehicle Shooter
Small Arms Fire: Moving Motorcycle Shooter
Antitank Grenade Launcher (RPG): Stationary
Mines: Antitank and Antipersonnel
Mines: IR Beam Detonated
IED Bomb: Decoy and Primary
IED Bomb: Multiple Bombs
IED Bomb: Letter-Package
SVIED: Stationary Target
SVIED: Recon and Return
IED: Aerial Target
IED: Overhead Attack
VBIED Bomb: Single Stationary

LEGEND:

- Enemy
- Friendly
- Neutral-Unknown
- Enemy Vehicle
- Friendly Vehicle
- Bomb or IED
- AT and AP Mine
- 3x Concertina Wire
- Manmade Structure
- Ambush
- Support by Fire

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VBIED Bomb: Park and Go
VBIED Bomb: Stop and Ram
VBIED Bomb: Strike and Detonate
VBIED Bomb: Breach and Ram
VBIED Bomb: Swarm and Multi-Ram
Ambush: Residence IED
Ambush: Moving Target
Ambush: Move to Contain and Attack
Raid: Fixed Facility
Snipe: Decoy and Stop
Snipe: Portable Shooter
Assassinate: Small Arms and ATGL Fire
Assassinate: Bomb
MANPADS: Volley Fire
Sabotage: Infrastructure
Hijack-Hostage-Concession
Hijack-Seizure: Aerial Suicide Bomb

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A terrorist group can use threats or a hoax to **coerce**, or preclude actions by a targeted person or population.

**Recurring threats** can erode capability of security forces and agitate a population. Extortion can support terrorist operations.

Hoaxes can **observe reaction** to threats and identify gaps and weaknesses in security measures.
Small Arms Fire (SAF): Moving Target

Observer alerts shooter of approaching targets. **Shooter** selects aim point for most likely success such as a target of **vehicles slowing** along a route.

Shooter fires and quickly disengages, hides weapon, and blends into population.

**Observer** records success or failure of SAF.

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Small Arms Fire (SAF): Moving Vehicle Shooter

Driver follows targets and approaches firing point. Shooter selects specific target and fires at **turn point**. Driver speeds along escape route to hide position.

Variants include firing as vehicle **passes** targets, or fires just as vehicle is near **exit** to main road or next alley or side street.

Suspicious Vehicle

August 2012
Small Arms Fire (SAF): Moving Motorcycle Shooter

Driver follows targets and approaches firing point. Shooter selects specific target and fires as motorcycle speeds past target. Attack team uses preselected escape route to a safehaven.

Variants can include throwing hand grenade into target vehicle or group as motorcycle passes. Attack can use multiple vehicles.
Observer warns of approaching vehicle. RPG gunner may use **hasty approach** or a **preplanned** firing position. Target may include soldiers, vehicle, or building.

SAF may **draw attention** of vehicle crew while ATGL gunner moves from **flank** or **rear** and fires. Gunner quickly moves to a hide position nearby.
Mines: Antitank (AT) and Antipersonnel (AP)

Surveillance records that a route has been demined. A decoy IED is replaced on route and antitank and antipersonnel mines and IEDs are emplaced on probable alternate route.

Improvised explosive devices (IED) are configured from artillery shells or other munitions. Mine fields are covered by small arms and antitank grenade (RPG) fire.
Infra-red initiated mines may be used along **primary or secondary avenues** of approach. Hizballah has used passive infra-red initiated mines since the late 1990s. Other initiating systems such as **pressure plate** or **command detonation** may augment an ambush.

**SAF** and other weapons will cover mines to engage targets in ambush or deliberate attack to slow advance of an enemy.

August 2012
**IED Bomb: Decoy and Primary**

Improvised explosive devices (IED) are often set with a decoy bomb to focus attention, while an active bomb is located for blast effects against expected congregation areas or other targets in a nearby kill zone.

An observer often works as part of a cell to alert another terrorist to trigger the IED.

Other techniques include use of range stakes or selected marker point of when to detonate the IED. Triggers can be remote or command controlled for IED detonation.

August 2012
IED Bomb: Multiple Bombs

Improvised explosive devices (IED) can be emplaced as a group or series of IEDs to cause simultaneous or nearly simultaneous blasts to achieve the most effective damage against a target area.

Linear or area IEDs can be detonated at the same time or in a sequence to improve blast effects. Observers can assess damage and reactions to improve subsequent attacks.

Videotaping an attack can provide lessons learned for future attacks too.
IED Bomb: Letter-Package

Letter or package bombs can be very disruptive to normal commerce, civil administration, or official and personal mail handling.

Weapons can range from explosive material to the distribution of various lethal biological agents, chemical agents, or radiological contamination.

August 2012
**SVIED: Stationary Target**

An individual terrorist can counter normal security procedures and enter an area of many people in order to commit **suicide-homicide**.

Individuals can volunteer or be coerced into being a suicide bomber. A cell leader may have an individual unknowingly deliver an IED to a target site with the intention to command detonate the IED as the individual arrives at target. **A vest or underclothing bomb** is a common delivery method.
Suicide bombers with IED vests can approach as an individual or as a group to identify critical target – a patrol leader in this case.

Having established a presence with the target, the individual goes away temporarily to acquire a suicide bomb vest.

The individual moves back to the target and detonates the SVIED. Children, women, and men have used suicide techniques.
IED: Aerial Target

IEDs can be positioned to counter expected routes of low flying aircraft. Canalized urban areas or other natural terrain along air routes could shape a kill zone.

Observer alerts the triggerman who detonates IEDs as the target crosses a decision point. SAF and RPGs add to an attack.

August 2012
IED: Overhead Attack

Overhead obstacles can be used to hide an IED that detonates from the roof of the overpass, or an IED can be dropped from the overpass on a passing vehicle. Observer alerts the attack cell.

The IED detonates by a trigger. Other IEDs may be near site for follow-on attack of any response unit or recovery action.
A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) can be positioned in a kill zone to attack people or passing vehicles.

Previous terrorist ruses identify norms in adversary reactions to a possible IED. The normal **stand-off distance area** can be the actual target kill zone for an IED.

Techniques include **abandoned vehicles** on a roadway or a vehicle that appears to be inoperative with **passengers attempting repairs**.
A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) can be parked in a kill zone to attack a concentration of people or damage military facilities.

In 1996, Saudi Hizbollah bombed Khobar Towers and killed-wounded military members and civilians with much damage to military facilities.

Khobar Towers Crater
(Person:Crater Comparison)
**VBIED Bomb: Stop and Ram**

A *vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED)* can be used against a fixed or moving target. **Two or more vehicles** position themselves in the local traffic pattern. One vehicle causes an incident to concentrate security forces and **diverts attention** in immediate area. Second VBIED accelerates rapidly and attempts to **ram and explode**.

August 2012
A **vehicle borne** improvised explosive device (VBIED) can use a motorcycle to more easily navigate through urban traffic to monitor and select a point of attack.

The VBIED can blend into normal traffic flow and go to the target or can wait in a hide position to observe an attack point. In one case, VBIED can avoid security details. Attaches an IED with a **magnetic tag** and evades -- IED **detonates**.

August 2012
**VBIED Bomb: Breach and Ram**

A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) can be used against a fixed or moving target. Two or more vehicles may position themselves to **assault** and **breach** physical security and allow passage of follow-on VBIEDs to attack a target.

Lead vehicle **breaches**. Other terrorists **support by fire** and assist follow-on assault primary target.

The second **vehicle detonates** in the collected group of people, equipment, or target area.

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**August 2012**
A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) can be used against a fixed or moving target. Multiple vehicles may attack various locations to overwhelm local physical security measures, and allow follow-on VBIEDs to attack a target.

Support by fire elements and local security assist attack elements in the kill zone or may dismount to raid objectives.

Individual terrorists will exfiltrate from the target area along planned routes.

August 2012
Ambush: Residence HBIED

Buildings can be configured as a large multi-IED. An observer will note how a house is searched.

Houses can be rigged with pressure plates or trip wires to detonate daisy-chain of IEDs once targets enter house.

A rapid pursuit into a house may be a trap.

August 2012
Ambush: Moving Target

An attack on a moving target may attempt to separate elements of a march unit and attack vehicles in individual kill zones.

An observer alerts the attack cells. SAF and RPG cells will split the column. Escape route obvious to the convoy leader is actually the primary kill zone.

Route Security

August 2012
Ambush: Move to Contain Target and Attack

An attack on a moving target may involve **multiple vehicles** to **contain** and attack a selected target.

Cells drive past the target and **block** forward movement while rear cell **contains** any withdrawal. **SAF** and **RPGs** attack targets and evade before forces arrive.

Moving Shooter

August 2012
Raid: Fixed Facility Target

Armed attacks on facilities or locations may intend to gain access to a specified capability at the site, kill or take hostage people, damage or destroy key assets or infrastructure, demonstrate ability. The attack on the compound in Riyadh aimed to discredit the capabilities of government.

Housing Compound Riyadh Attack 2003

August 2012
Snipe: Decoy and Stop

Observer records action when children appear near or in road. Cell *coerces* or *pays* children to stop patrol and ask for food or candy. Sniper *selects target* and shoots.

Sniper cell hides in the urban area.

Psychological *stress* accents uncertainty in operations.

Possible Decoy for Sniper
Snipe: Portable Shooter

Surveillance will confirm static location and **choke point**. Range to target will be measured or estimated. Driver **positions vehicle**.

Video cell may record the shooting. Shooter confirms specific target from **camouflaged** platform viewport and **shoots**.

Vehicle moves calmly into traffic pattern and **departs** area.

August 2012
Assassinate: Small Arms and ATGL Fire

Assassin studies target to identify vulnerability. Telescopic sights, night vision devices, and silencers improve a probability of kill. Red Army Faction used RPGs and SAF to attack U.S. general in armored sedan on a regular car route.

Attempt on General Kroesen by RAF in Germany 1981

August 2012
Assassinate: Bomb

Assassination is normally associated with **killing a prominent person**. Targets may be **symbolic** or they may provide critical **leadership**. Extensive target surveillance precedes an assassination.

Weapons and technique vary. In 1979, Red Army Faction terrorists in Belgium attempted to assassinate a U.S. general with a **road bomb** as his sedan traveled a regular route. The simple detonator was a group of small batteries activated by a household switch.

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Car Bomb in Somalia

General Haig

August 2012
**MANPADS: Volley Missile**

Attack cell will position to fire where **aircraft heat-infrared source** is most likely to be acquired for a missile sensor lock-on.

Fixed wing aircraft landing and take-off patterns have limited maneuver space. Observers cue the **man-portable air defense system** MANPADS shooters. Shooters gain a missile lock-on and fire. Volley fire can bracket an aircraft. **SAF** and **RPG** can add a **cone of fires** to the attack.

August 2012
Sabotage: Infrastructure

The terrorist intention to **destroy or damage infrastructure** of an adversary indicates the inability of the opponent to protect its people, facilities, and security.

Sabotage creates **psychological and physical impact** on the target audience.

**Arson**, the act of setting fire to property, is one of several types of criminal act and sabotage.

August 2012
Hijack-Hostage-Concession

Hostage taking is an overt seizure of one or more individuals. The terrorist intention is to gain notoriety, gain concessions based on demands, or ransom.

Hostage taking involves significant risk for the terrorist due to the known location of the crisis situation and bid for wide publicity.

Hostages can be normal citizens or members of the U.S. Armed Forces. The 1985 hostage taking and hijacking of TWA Flight 847 resulted in the murder of a U.S. military member. The incident of multiple airport stops in the Mideast obtained worldwide attention for terrorism.

August 2012
Hijack-Seizure: Aerial Suicide Bomb

Hijacking involves **forceful commandeering** of a conveyance and people that may be in the immediate vicinity. Airplanes have often been the scene of hijacking, but other means of travel such as ships, trains, or buses can be targets too. **Intentions** for hijacking vary based on the terrorist group, but can be catastrophic in results as experienced on **911 attacks**.
Most Dangerous Threats: WMD

Scenarios that cause greatest concern are terrorist operations with multiple attacks, conducted nearly simultaneously, and geographically dispersed from each other.

Contamination and area exclusion create additional issues for short, mid, and long term physical and mental health of victims and economic productivity. The possibility of additional attacks, delayed intentionally, may occur too.

August 2012
Terrorism and WMD

Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons – or the production technologies and materials necessary to produce them – may be acquired by states that do not now have such programs; and/or by terrorist or insurgent organizations, and by criminal organizations or individuals acting alone or through middlemen.

The specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has existed since the term arose in the mid-twentieth century. Radiological weapons, often called radiological dispersion devices (RDD), add to a grouping of weapon capabilities as chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN).

Recognition of explosives with devastating effects adds a category to a contemporary acronym of CBRNE.
Chemical agent sarin used in the 1995 attack by terrorists on citizens in the Tokyo subway system intended to kill and maim thousands of people. Toxic industrial chemicals can be released with disastrous results.

Biological agents can be used to incapacitate or kill people and animals, and damage or destroy food supplies and materiel. Evidence of an attack may not occur until days after the weapon release. The anthrax attacks in the U.S. shortly after the 911 attacks resulted fortunately in few casualties, but caused significant disruption to economic systems and caused much psychological stress.

Radiological contamination and fear of health issues is a practical threat from a “dirty bomb.” Explosives could disperse radiological material over a wide area and cause long-term evacuation of affected areas.

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Nuclear scenarios include terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear weapons or fabrication of a nuclear device to damage infrastructure, contaminate a target and cause mass casualties.

Low and High Yield Explosives have been used by foreign and domestic terrorists with horrific results. Bombing of Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal Building, and World Trade Center demonstrate the devastating effects of simple IEDs.

Some terrorists state the intent to acquire and use of WMD against the USA. Today, some terrorist groups see WMD as weapons of choice.

August 2012
Trends and the Future

Indications and Symptoms

Adaptive behavior is one indication of a learning organization.

Extremist motivations glorify wanton mayhem to promote an organization’s agenda.

Psychological impact and sensational reaction from a relevant population and key leaders are critical components of terrorism.

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Intense Motivational Extremism

Fanatical viewpoint, whatever its origin, may compel action to satisfy a psychological need. A more rational model may compare and contrast the relative costs and benefits of terrorism in order to decide on action to achieve an intended objective.

Extreme misinterpretation of religious covenants incites some contemporary terrorism. However, motivation to embrace terrorism may emerge from individual utopian goals and elitism, charismatic leaders and group-think membership, or disenfranchised social and political participation.

Moments before suicide bomber [lower left] assassinates Ghandi

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Adaptive Organization

Networked structures flexibly adapt capabilities of cells, affiliations and adherents in ways. This local insurgent organization example shows allegiance to a—

♦ Higher insurgent organization with affiliation and cooperation to:

♦ Guerrilla (Battalion) and

♦ Transnational Criminal Organization.

Individual adherents volunteer or are contracted to assist terrorist actions.
Improved Operational Capabilities

**Terrorist groups learn** from collective experiences and use the Internet to improve their training, and study emerging techniques and procedures to quickly counter actions intended to deny or dissuade them.

Support from state sponsors, whether direct or indirect, improves the ability for terrorist groups to plan and act. Some groups are more self-sufficient in their operations. They have greater independence in their decisions and actions than when external sponsors provide them the primary means to conduct terror.

The terrorist learns –

The terrorist adapts.
Expanded Transnational Associations

Terrorists groups and other illegal sub-state organizations are often indistinguishable from each other. Terrorism can approach global reach through international or transnational affiliations that openly announce their plans or purposely retain a low or covert profile.

Activities such as drug trafficking and smuggling expand revenue. Other techniques include tax evasion and fraud, counterfeiting currency, money laundering, extorting, human trafficking, or extra-legal funding ways to gain resources and revenue.

HAMAS and Terrorism?

Larger networks provide potential access to capabilities such as material and technology to produce WMD.
Increased Weapon System Lethality

Terrorists recognize that sensational events normally achieve the most media attention. Choice of weapon will consider the disruption or destruction that occurs at a point location such as a critical oil transfer facility, or an area damaged and contaminated with CBRNE effects.

A complement to lethality is the degree of capability degradation an attack can cause. Cyber-enabled terrorism is a zone of action that ranges denial of services, hijacking, breach of confidentiality, corruption of databases, or physical destruction of systems.

Weapons can be as simple yet as destructive as an improvised fuel oil fertilizer bomb or a USB flash drive used to corrupt an electronic database.
Exploited Mass Media Marketing

Terrorists plan, operate, and exploit near-instantaneous media coverage with to create psychological trauma on the target audience.

Supporting interviews announce an ultimatum, grievance, or explanation for an action. Disinformation manipulates perceived vulnerabilities of a relevant population and key leaders. Terrorists use—

- Global news media.
- Videotape and audio outlets.
- Message encryption and couriers.
- Steganography.
- Internet applications.

—to terrorize with threats or attacks on infrastructure, symbolic icons, or people.

August 2012
U.S. Army Asymmetric Advantage

U.S. Army Soldier-Leader Team.

Leaders at the lowest echelons are especially critical to success. They see and act on immediate opportunities with the enemy and population. The Army’s core competencies of wide area security (WAS) and combined arms maneuver (CAM) will occur in uncertain operational environments (OEs).

Army leaders must concurrently develop subordinates to meet these complex security challenges; professionally educate to learn, think, and adapt; decide with a moral and ethical compass; and encourage prudent risk-taking in an increasingly complex strategic era.

August 2012
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TRADOC G2 *Operational Environments to 2028* (2012)

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TRISA wants your ideas on how to improve this –

Soldier’s Primer on Terrorism TTP

Send comments and recommendations to:
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