
**Army Special Operations Forces
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**

November 2009

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***This publication supersedes FM 3-05.104, 2 February 2004.**

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Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.131 establishes Army special operations forces (ARSOF) doctrine for planning, coordinating, and executing noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) across the entire continuum of operational environments. NEOs are inherently joint operations. History demonstrates that joint forces conducted the vast majority of NEOs. This manual describes ARSOF operating within that context, thus the content of this manual mixes joint and Army terminology where appropriate. This manual does not duplicate or supplant established doctrine dealing with tactical or strategic operations, but it does provide a specific framework to apply that doctrine. Commanders tasked to conduct NEOs should ensure that their planning staff is familiar with referenced publications.

PURPOSE

This manual provides direction to ARSOF commanders and staffs charged with conducting NEOs. It clarifies procedures and terminology between the Department of Defense (DOD) and other government agencies (OGAs) that may interact for NEOs. It outlines the necessary considerations for conducting, planning, preparing, and executing NEOs. The considerations contained within this manual provide a doctrinal basis to assist commanders as they lead their unit's military decision-making process.

SCOPE

The manual reflects and supports ARSOF doctrine as stated in FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*. In addition, it reflects and supports the joint doctrine found Joint Publication (JP) 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* and provides an ARSOF-specific focus on that doctrine. This publication is not a stand-alone reference; rather, it is intended for use in conjunction with existing doctrine. Examples and graphics illustrate principles and doctrine—they do not serve as prescriptive responses to tactical situations.

APPLICABILITY

FM 3-05.131 provides guidance for ARSOF commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operations and logistics requirements necessary to prepare ARSOF to conduct their missions. It provides a reference for the staffs of ARSOF commanders to facilitate planning, preparation, and subsequent execution of NEOs. This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

This manual is unclassified to ensure Army-wide dissemination and to facilitate ARSOF in the planning, preparation, and execution of NEOs. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publication and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JACComments@soc.mil.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The DOD conducts NEOs to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from foreign locations to designated safe havens in the United States (U.S.) or elsewhere. NEOs primarily focus on evacuating U.S. citizens endangered by hostile environment or natural disaster. NEOs may also include the evacuation of U.S. military personnel and dependents, selected citizens of the host nation (HN), and third-country nationals (TCNs). NEOs begin with the swift insertion of a force and temporary occupation of a safe area and end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the evacuation. The operational environment, political implications, and interagency activity combine to make a NEO a unique military operation. Appendix A describes historical executions of NEOs.

NATIONAL POLICY

1-1. The DOS directs NEOs. During a NEO, the welfare of in-country U.S. personnel is the paramount consideration. However, the decision to evacuate the Embassy and the order to execute a NEO also affect political elements that may influence the timing of an evacuation. U.S. foreign policy objectives are the determining factor in the timing of an evacuation. The following paragraphs discuss the national policy concerning NEOs.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656

1-2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, the DOS is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

1-3. Every U.S. Embassy and Consulate must maintain an emergency action plan (EAP). One section of the EAP covers the military evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals. The appropriate geographic combatant commander (GCC) reviews the EAP to ensure it is accurate and adequate to allow military support. Evacuation operations differ from other military operations in that the senior DOS representative directs the operation at the time of evacuation. The DOS representative's order to evacuate is usually a political decision with extensive ramifications. The DOS or Ambassador may not give an evacuation order at the most opportune time. The representative may delay the order until the last moment to save political face by avoiding actions seen as a tacit admission of political failure. The DOS or the Ambassador may initiate the evacuation process or plan. Evacuation transportation options, in order of preference, are—

- Commercial transportation (already scheduled).
- Commercial charter.
- U.S. military charter.
- U.S. military transportation.

Note: Transportation options must be coordinated through the Washington Liaison Group (WLG).

EVACUATION GUIDELINES

1-4. The DOS or the Ambassador can order the following personnel to depart. These personnel are eligible for evacuation assistance. Once evacuated, the DOS and chief of mission (COM) must approve their return. Personnel in this category are—

- U.S. civilian employees of United States Government (USG) agencies, except mission-essential DOD employees of military commands.
- U.S. military personnel assigned to the Embassy, such as Marine security guards, defense attaché (DATT), and security assistance personnel.
- Peace Corps volunteers.
- USG contractors, if the contract provides for evacuation assistance.
- Dependents of those listed above.
- Dependents of other U.S. military personnel, including those assigned to military commands.

1-5. The DOS or Ambassador cannot order the following personnel to depart, but these personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance. They may return at their discretion and expense. These personnel are—

- U.S. employees of non-USG organizations.
- U.S. employees employed by or assigned to international organizations.
- U.S. employees that the host government directly contracts, even if the USG funds the contract.
- U.S. employees of private entities, such as relief organizations, even if the employer receives USG funding.
- Fulbright grantees and private U.S. citizens.
- Family members of private U.S. citizens, to include alien spouses, children, and other bona fide residents of the household.
- Other individuals the DOD designates eligible.

1-6. Legal, permanent U.S. residents (green card holders) are not entitled to any special assistance unless they fall into one of the above categories. As a rule, if the USG is controlling the evacuation, the priorities for assistance are as follows:

- **Priority I:** U.S. citizens.
- **Priority II:** Alien immediate family members of U.S. citizens.
- **Priority III:** TCNs and designated foreign-service national employees of the USG.
- **Priority IV:** Seriously ill or injured eligible non-U.S. citizens in imminent peril as determined by the DOS (but who do not qualify for a higher priority).
- **Priority V:** Other individuals the DOS determines eligible.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-7. GCCs plan and conduct NEOs in support of the DOS. Upon receipt of an execution order from the SecDef, the GCC orders assigned and or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of the DOS and the appropriate U.S. Ambassador.

1-8. The GCC can execute the NEO with forces from a single Service. However, the most common response is for the GCC to form and deploy a joint task force (JTF). By using a JTF, the commander takes advantage of all available Service's capabilities. Historically, JTFs for NEOs consisted of assigned or deployed in-theater forces. Special operations forces (SOF) are often the most available and best-prepared forces to conduct these operations. Forward-positioned forces may form the core of a larger force when the situation affords the time for other forces to flow into the theater or operational area.

1-9. NEO planners must prepare for the contingency of multinational operations. The HN's ability to support the operation influences the operational environments, as well as the development of courses of action (COAs). In addition, the situation prompting evacuation may prompt other countries to evacuate their citizens. For military or political expedience, the USG may choose to employ multinational forces for this reason. SOF are uniquely prepared to participate in and lead multinational operations. For this reason, combatant commanders often consider using them as the core or lead force for a JTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1-10. The rules of engagement (ROE) (Appendix B) for all NEOs should reflect the limited military objective Soldiers are to accomplish. ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to prevent violations of USG national policy. NEO ROE will be limited to the minimum military force needed to successfully complete the mission, provide for the self-defense of evacuation forces, and defend the noncombatant evacuees. Dissemination and enforcement of clearly defined ROE are critical. Planners must consider the use of crowd-control agents (FM 3-11.11, *Flame, Riot Control Agents, and Herbicide Operations*, gives policy on use) and the employment of Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams to assist in the extraction of evacuees or to discourage hostilities. During a NEO, objectives include preventing the destruction of adversaries and avoiding armed conflict whenever possible. These objectives are often difficult to achieve, but well-planned ROE facilitate the achievement of the objectives.

1-11. The environment may require that the evacuation force commander defend the evacuation from adversaries without first informing higher authorities. Thus, if given the opportunity, the commander must influence the ROE to allow for use of force where necessary. Upon arrival in-country, if practical, the commander discusses the ROE with the Ambassador. Dynamic situations may warrant modifications to the ROE. The appropriate authority, via the supported GCC, approves recommended modifications to the established ROE.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION ENVIRONMENTS

1-12. The military command conducting a NEO tailors its planning and action for evacuation assistance according to the anticipated situation. The three operational environments that the military may face in evacuation operations are permissive, uncertain, and hostile. These environments may exist because of an unfavorable political environment, a conflict, or a natural disaster in the HN. Typically, the more unfavorable the environment is in the HN, the larger the force necessary to conduct the NEO.

PERMISSIVE

1-13. In a permissive environment, the NEO force expects no resistance to evacuation operations. This type of environment requires little or no assembly of combat forces in-country. In a permissive environment, the host government typically does not oppose an orderly departure or U.S. military assistance. The U.S. military usually limits its assistance to medical, logistical, transportation, and administrative processing. Planners analyze both existing and potential threats and tailor the security force to give it the ability to counter both.

UNCERTAIN

1-14. In an uncertain environment, the host-government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not have total, effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of operations. Because of this uncertainty, the commander, joint task force (CDRJTF) may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with more security units or a reaction force. The JTF disseminates the ROE through subordinate commanders to ensure timely training of the force. In an uncertain environment, it is critical that unit commanders strictly enforce the ROE to keep Soldiers from taking actions that escalate hostilities.

HOSTILE

1-15. In a hostile environment, the NEO force may operate under conditions ranging from civil disobedience or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. The CDRJTF may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force. He may position a large reaction force either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base (ISB). The environment may require forced-entry operations and the establishment of defensive perimeters, escorted convoy operations, and personnel-recovery operations.

1-16. Regardless of the environment at the onset of the operation, the commander must plan for the possibility that it may change. The volatile situations that trigger NEOs can also cause spontaneous or organized violence. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens are often targets of this violence.

NOTIFICATION PHASES

1-17. How and when the United States notifies noncombatants of the need to evacuate are important aspects for military NEO planners. The Ambassador requests approval for evacuation from the DOS and, once approved, informs potential evacuees. The manner in which the evacuation is to take place is described in two notification phases, draw down and evacuation. The NEO force further breaks these down into subordinate phases.

DRAW DOWN

1-18. A draw down is less than a full evacuation of the post or Embassy, which is why it is the first phase of notification. During a rapidly developing crisis, the draw down phase may be extremely short. The decision to draw down requires the Embassy to develop a list of personnel who will remain at the post and assist with the evacuation

Authorized Departure

1-19. The Ambassador must request authorized departure status from the DOS. The Ambassador must grant approval for employees and family members wishing to leave. When the DOS terminates the authorized departure status, the official evacuees must return to the post.

Ordered Departure

1-20. If the situation significantly deteriorates, the Ambassador may order family members and certain employees to leave the post for their safety. If the Ambassador issues orders to these people, it is not optional; they must leave. When the Ambassador terminates ordered departure status, official evacuees must return to the post.

EVACUATION

1-21. USG leaders initiate the evacuation of personnel only after deciding to draw down. When feasible, notification of potential evacuees involves communicating through the established warden system. (Wardens are in-country personnel selected to prepare and maintain phone and address rosters of U.S. citizens.) GCCs should use written messages rather than oral messages whenever possible. As a rule, written messages are more reliable. The evacuation phase consists of four subordinate phases: stand fast, leave commercial, evacuation, and Embassy or post closing. Appendix C provides sample notices of each subordinate phase.

Stand Fast

1-22. Sometimes, the political or security environment deteriorates and the Ambassador perceives a threat to U.S. citizens but an evacuation either is not necessary or is temporarily impossible. In this situation, the Ambassador requests all U.S. citizens to stand fast. However, he does give preliminary instructions for evacuation preparation. The Embassy identifies the wardens and activates its emergency action

organization. Embassy personnel review the plans, options, and support requirements. At this time, the Ambassador may consider requesting military assistance.

1-23. The GCC may direct the deployment of a liaison or assessment team, activate crisis-action response or planning teams, and assign a subordinate joint force commander (JFC), as appropriate. Each GCC has different options available based upon his subordinate commands or forces. For example, in the United States European Command (USEUCOM), the theater special operations command (TSOC) forms the core of the European Command Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT). The ESAT is the favored choice for establishing a forward presence. The ESAT provides reliable and important information back to the command to aid planning and to advise the Ambassador as well.

Leave Commercial

1-24. In grave situations where adequate commercial transportation is available, the Ambassador orders nonessential U.S. citizens to depart using commercial transportation at the first opportunity. Simultaneously, he may improve the security situation for the remaining essential personnel by—

- Augmenting the Embassy's internal security force with additional Marine forces and DOS security personnel.
- Requesting the deployment of a small, military staff element to the Embassy to assist in evacuation planning in anticipation of an evacuation assisted by the U.S. military.
- Requesting military assistance in the form of additional military forces.

Evacuation

1-25. Once the deterioration of the political or security environment threatens the safety of U.S. citizens, the Ambassador, with DOS approval, will order the evacuation of those citizens, keeping only mission-essential members of the country team. The Embassy assembles, documents, and assists the movement of U.S. citizens, TCNs, and host-country nationals to designated safe haven sites. The situation may require a mix of commercial charter, private, and military transport, depending on the availability of scheduled commercial transportation. At some point in this phase, the Ambassador might request military assistance, either because of inadequate transportation means or because of the severity of the threat to the evacuees. Once requested, the GCC, upon direction from the SecDef through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), commences military evacuation operations. These operations may range from simple transportation support to the deployment of the JTF or JSOTF.

Embassy or Post Closing

1-26. The final notification phase occurs when the situation deteriorates to the point that the Embassy must close and all remaining U.S. citizens and Embassy employees (including mission-essential personnel) must evacuate. This does not include private U.S. citizens and dependents that desire to remain in the country. Personnel may not require assistance until this phase of the evacuation. Military operations could range from removing the remainder of the country team to full-scale evacuation operations.

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

1-27. ARSOF include Special Forces (SF), Rangers, special operations aviation (SOA), PSYOP, and CA—all supported by the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne). The attributes of ARSOF make them a preferred choice for executing NEO. ARSOF are responsive, versatile, agile, lethal, and capable of rapidly reversing human suffering. ARSOF units provide unique capabilities for GCCs. Language skills, cross-cultural knowledge, regional orientation, and contextual political understanding of operational environments make ARSOF unparalleled when operating in complex environments. As individuals, ARSOF Soldiers are adaptable, mature, innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, and self-reliant. Special skills enable ARSOF Soldiers to work effectively with civilian populations or agencies, as well as with other military forces. ARSOF execute their missions based upon the foundations established in their core

competencies and capabilities. They also execute their missions utilizing their unique skill sets. Special operations Soldiers are—

- **Highly trained.** ARSOF Soldiers provide the maturity, experience, and professionalism that politically sensitive operations, such as NEOs, require. Special operations Soldiers receive mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve special operations entry-level skills.
- **Culturally aware.** ARSOF units are regionally oriented. They possess linguistic capabilities. The personnel within ARSOF units have broad experience bases. These attributes enable ARSOF units to execute sensitive NEO tasks effectively.
- **Experienced in joint, interagency, and multinational operations.** Theater special operations experience, forward presence, and specialized training facilitate ARSOF units serving as the core or major subordinate component of a joint interagency task force or multinational organization executing a NEO.
- **Flexible, tailored responsive force packages.** The following characteristics of ARSOF units permit the rapid and precise tailoring that is unique to ARSOF:
 - ARSOF are modular.
 - ARSOF are able of conducting low signature, politically acceptable operations.
 - ARSOF are capable of lethal and nonlethal force.
 - ARSOF are capable of rapid deployment.

1-28. The combination of tactical proficiency, specialized skills, and strategic awareness makes ARSOF an ideal choice for politically sensitive NEOs. FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, as the Army's keystone publication for ARSOF, describes the ARSOF strategic landscape, fundamentals, core tasks, capabilities, and sustainment involved in the full range of military operations.

SPECIAL FORCES

1-29. The United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) consists of five Active Army Special Forces groups (SFGs) and two Army National Guard (ARNG) groups. SF are U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on UW capabilities. SF Soldiers make up a unique and unconventional organization. SF units possess an extraordinary degree of versatility and level of training. They can plan and conduct special operations across the range of military operations.

1-30. Language capabilities, unique force structure, regional orientation, cultural awareness, and interpersonal relations are the keys to the success of Special Forces in the field. Blending these skills and experiences enables SF Soldiers to navigate the political, social, religious, and humanitarian aspects of today's uncertain environments and provides a flexible option for NEO support. SF units have the ability to serve as any of the following:

- A core staff of a JSOTF.
- A component of a JTF.
- A primary extraction force.
- An assistance or planning team.
- A reconnaissance element.
- A security or extraction element of sensitive personnel.

1-31. SF units often have existing relationships with country teams that make them ideally suited to serve in an advisory or planning role in the Embassy or on the JTF staff. Soldiers should refer to current SF operations doctrine for more information on Special Forces capabilities and employment.

RANGERS

1-32. The 75th Ranger Regiment is ARSOF's light infantry force with specially trained, organized, and equipped Soldiers who stand ready to deploy a credible military force quickly to any region of the world.

The 75th Ranger Regiment, with three Ranger battalions and the Ranger Special Troops Battalion, performs specified missions with other SOF and conventional forces.

1-33. The regimental headquarters has the capability to exercise operational control of the logistics assets of conventional forces and other SOF for limited periods. The regimental support operations detachment (RSOD) plans and coordinates organic and external logistics support to assigned and attached units. The RSOD provides liaison elements for support integration within theater, host-nation, joint, and coalition logistics infrastructures.

1-34. Ranger units execute missions with a profound degree of risk and a requirement for precise, discriminate use of force, which differentiates them from conventional infantry units. Specialized equipment; special tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and training in multiple means of infiltration and employment make the Ranger regiment ideally suited to conduct forcible entry into hostile environments in support of a NEO. FM 3-05.50, *Army Special Operations Forces Ranger Operations*, contains more information on the capabilities and employment of Rangers.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT

1-35. The U.S. Army SOA unit, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), supports other SOF units with a regimental headquarters, a headquarters company, and four SOA battalions. The 160th SOAR provides SOA planning and support to SOF units at all planning and execution levels.

1-36. The specialized organization, training, and equipment of the 160th SOAR give them a unique capability for precision infiltration, resupply operations, and exfiltration. This capability makes the 160th SOAR an asset of particular use for a NEO requiring low signature, precision operations conducted by ARSOF. FM 3-05.60, *Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations*, contains more information on SOA capabilities and employment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1-37. ARSOF's PSYOP capability resides in the only Active Army PSYOP group, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Airborne (POG[A]). The 4th POG(A) consists of a research and analysis division, regional battalions, a tactical battalion, a dissemination battalion, and a headquarters and headquarters company. The research and analysis division and the regional battalions are geographically oriented to support each GCC. The 4th POG(A) provides PSYOP support that ranges from area and target analysis, product development, and media production, to information collection and product distribution and dissemination.

1-38. The ability to analyze and deal with complex politicomilitary problems characterizes PSYOP Soldiers. Their varied skills include techniques in persuasive, cross-cultural, and mass media communications; practical knowledge of social and behavioral psychology; cultural and situational awareness; and foreign language proficiency. The organic media capabilities of the 4th POG(A) enable a commander to bridge communication gaps caused by a loss or lack of infrastructure in the target country. PSYOP organization modularity allows the 4th POG(A) to provide rapid, viable support with a small footprint. These skills and unit attributes make PSYOP units a force of choice to support NEOs. FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, contains more information on PSYOP capabilities and employment.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1-39. ARSOF's CA capability resides in the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The brigade's four regionally aligned CA battalions are composed of CA generalists. The battalions provide the GCC with immediate operational access to CA assets and CA operations planning and execution at all levels. CA operations are military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces through, with, or by indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or OGAs to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations and other U.S. objectives.

1-40. The unique mission and specially trained forces of the 95th CA Brigade make it ideally suited to support NEOs. The brigade's core tasks of populace and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to civil administration, and civil information management ensure a capable force that can support many of the critical tasks a NEO requires. The brigade's subordinate units are capable of conducting initial and follow-up assessments of the area of operations in order to validate the commander's information and to collect NEO-relevant information. The brigade's core tasks facilitate minimizing population interference with operations and establishing and maintaining liaison with Embassy officials.

1-41. Liaison with Embassy staff is critical for effective interagency coordination. Effective interagency communication aids in identifying required and planned activities and delineating responsibility between and for military units and government agencies for those activities. Examples of these activities include obtaining civil or indigenous assistance to support the execution of the operation; identifying U.S. citizens and others to be evacuated; and receiving, screening, processing, and debriefing evacuees. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, contains more information on CA capabilities and employment.

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE

1-42. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) has two battalions, the Special Troops Battalion and 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion. The brigade plans, coordinates, and provides logistics and sustainment support to ARSOF; plans, coordinates, and provides operational and tactical communications for JSOTF commanders; and provides signal force packages in support of ARSOF.

1-43. The brigade has unique capabilities that allow it to support SOF. The brigade's knowledge of joint operations and ability to interface for logistics support throughout a theater make all SOF more viable and sustainable forces. The brigade's support to SOF multiplies the benefits that make ARSOF units a preferred choice for supporting and executing NEOs. FM 3-05.140, *Army Special Operations Forces Logistics*, and FM 3-05.160, *Army Special Operations Forces Communications System*, provide more information on the brigade's capabilities and employment.

Chapter 2

United States Organizations and Roles

A variety of government agencies, DOD elements, combined working groups, and military organizations support NEOs. It is through effective planning and coordination by these entities that ARSOF and other military units successfully complete these complex, sensitive missions. Figure 2-1 shows the chain of command for a NEO.




Figure 2-1. Noncombatant evacuation operation chain of command

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2-1. The DOS, acting on the advice and recommendation of the COM, decides when to initiate a NEO. Evacuation normally commences according to the Embassy EAP and requires scheduled commercial transportation, commercial charter transportation, or U.S. military transportation. The DOS Under Secretary for Management arranges charter transportation—civilian or military.

2-2. If evacuation requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission, the Secretary of State may request military assistance from the DOD. The need for military assistance may occur when the threat to U.S. citizens makes it impractical to wait for other means of evacuation or if military forces are necessary to actively protect U.S. citizens.

2-3. The CJCS, when directed by the SecDef, tasks this mission to the appropriate GCC. The GCC initiates appropriate military planning and coordinates with the DOS chair or his regional liaison group.

EMBASSY ORGANIZATION

2-4. The primary responsibility for NEOs lies with the DOS. The COM is the Ambassador. He is the ranking U.S. official in-country and is directly responsible to the President of the United States. In the absence of the Ambassador, the deputy chief of mission (DCM) becomes the chargé d'affaires. As the President's representative in-country, the Ambassador is the senior representative of the USG and is therefore ultimately in command. The COM, not the senior military commander, is ultimately responsible for successfully completing the NEO and safeguarding the evacuees. Embassy organization varies from country to country. Some embassies may be responsible for more than one country; some are fully staffed, while others have minimum staffing. DOS agency name and organizational changes affect Embassy organization as well. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, 22 January 2007, contains further details on Embassy organization.

2-5. The administrative officer (AO) is often the third in command in the Embassy hierarchy. In a small post with no security officer, the AO assumes the functions of the security officer. In this situation, the AO would then have operational control (OPCON) of the Marine security guard (MSG) detachment, if one is assigned to the Embassy. The AO is also responsible for the Embassy communications unit.

2-6. The general services officer (GSO) has many of the same functions as a logistics staff officer. The GSO is normally responsible for all buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance.

2-7. The chief of the consular section is responsible for many functions relating to U.S. personnel and is an appropriate point of contact (POC) for the intelligence and operations staff officers. Consular officers are, in general, responsible for protecting the welfare of all U.S. citizens visiting and residing in their country, knowing the whereabouts of U.S. citizens, and maintaining an estimated count of U.S. citizens in the area.

2-8. The chief of the security assistance office (SAO) may act as the senior military person at the Embassy. He maintains liaison with the HN's military forces. The law authorizes him to perform specific military functions with the HN that other Embassy staff members cannot. When an Embassy has no military personnel assigned to the Defense Attaché Office, the SAO is responsible for the activities associated with that office. Likewise, an Embassy may not have an SA assigned but has a staffed Defense Attaché Office.

2-9. The United States defense representative (USDR) is normally the senior military official assigned to the Embassy. The USDR is the representative of the SecDef, CJCS, and GCC. The USDR provides the conduit for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for DOD activities that are not the responsibility of another DOD agency or component. The USDR is responsible for coordinating administrative and security activity for DOD elements assigned to the Embassy that are not under the control of a combatant commander.

2-10. The DATT is a military DOD representative attached to the Embassy in diplomatic status. He has access to the daily Embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written intelligence. The chief of station and DATT are ideal points of contact for the intelligence staff officer. They can provide information about HN civil and military capabilities, such as order of battle.

2-11. The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for media relations and approves all media contacts during a NEO. He is the POC for the JSOTF PAO.

2-12. The regional security officer (RSO) is a diplomatic security officer responsible for the security functions of U.S. Embassies and Consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. The RSO oversees the special security force (SSF) and contract security force at the post.

2-13. Embassies without an RSO have a post security officer (PSO) who has general security duties at a specific Embassy (or Consulate). The PSO is a special staff officer under the control of the AO. The PSO exercises OPCON over the MSG detachment assigned to the station. The SSF are DOS employees who

respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security for the COM, the DCM, and others as directed by the RSO.

2-14. The political officer reports on political developments, negotiates with the host government, and represents views and policies of the USG to his contacts. The political officer maintains regular contact with HN government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens and third-country diplomats. The political officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.

2-15. The economic officer analyzes, reports, and advises on economic matters in the HN. Economic officers negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues. They also work closely with relief organizations.

2-16. The medical officer is the senior medical person. He responds to emergencies and sets up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The medical officer can also advise the JTF on medical threats and preventive medicine measures necessary for in-country and incoming forces. However, this advice should not take the place of good medical intelligence by the evacuating force before the operation.

2-17. The MSG detachment has, at a minimum, a commander and watch standers. The MSG detachment missions and duties include—

- Exercising access control and providing stationary guard coverage of the principal buildings
- Conducting visual inspections of controlled access areas to detect possible physical or technical penetrations
- Performing other necessary duties that need immediate action and that the COM, chargé d'affaires, RSO, or PSO directs.
- Protecting the principal buildings as the EAP outlines or as the COM, chargé d'affaires, RSO, or PSO directs.

2-18. The MSG detachment commander is normally a member of the emergency action committee (EAC). The EAC is the interface between the Embassy and the DOS. The mission of the EAC is to brief, coordinate, and plan for the evacuation and protection of U.S. noncombatants and certain designated aliens. The EAC is a subset of the country team. It advises the Ambassador on security issues, emergency preparedness, draw downs, and evacuations. The EAC prepares the EAP.

COUNTRY TEAM

2-19. The country team is a council of senior officers, normally section heads, working under the direction of the COM to pool their skills and resources in the national interest of the United States. The country team system makes rapid interagency consultation, action, or recommendation possible from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. The organization of each country team varies, depending on the COM's desires, the specific country situation, the number and size of U.S. programs, and the qualifications of the senior officers representing the agencies. The country team normally consists of the following members:

- COM.
- DCM.
- Consular officer.
- Chief of station.
- RSO.
- Political counselor.
- Commercial attaché.
- Agricultural attaché.
- Legal attaché.
- Science officer.
- PAO.
- AO.
- Economics officer.

- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) attaché.
- Director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Director of the Peace Corps.
- DATT.
- Chief of the SAO.

OTHER AGENCIES

2-20. During NEOs, the JSOTF may need to coordinate with agencies outside the DOS. The following paragraphs discuss other agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2-21. The USAID is a quasi-independent agency that funds developmental projects representing the nationwide efforts of the country team. Administratively, it functions within the DOS and operates under an administrator who also serves as the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency. USAID—

- Carries out economic assistance programs designed to help people of developing countries advance their productive capacities, improve their quality of life, promote economic and political stability, and assist other missions in providing the HN with supplies and equipment to construct needed projects.
- Maintains liaison with all charitable organizations capable of conducting humanitarian assistance.
- Responds to virtually any disaster abroad, with emphasis on humanitarian relief in the form of equipment and funds.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

2-22. By law (Title 42, United States Code [USC], Section 1313, *Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries*) and Executive Order 12656, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The Embassy and DOS coordinate DHHS assistance for evacuees.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL

2-23. The Department of the Army (DA), Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is responsible for the reception and repatriation of all DOD family members, nonessential employees, and DOD contractors. The Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.14, *Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad*, provides guidelines for reception and repatriation.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES

2-24. If the safe haven is in the United States, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may meet evacuees at the port of entry. Embassy staff may include representatives from the Department of Homeland Security and ICE who can help identify the foreign nationals the United States will evacuate. Responsibilities of the USCIS include the following:

- Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as immigrants to the United States.
- Grant benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including those seeking permanent resident status or naturalization.

- Prevent unlawful entry into the United States.
- Apprehend and remove persons whose entry is illegal or not in the best interest of the United States.

2-25. In addition to the USCIS and ICE, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection may also be necessary to meet and process non-USG evacuees. The WLG is responsible for coordinating USCIS, ICE, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection support to the NEO.

Washington Liaison Group

2-26. A representative of the DOS chairs the WLG. Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military departments are members of the WLG. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities is the NEO coordinator for the DOD. The DOS invites other USG departments and agencies to participate as appropriate.

2-27. The WLG is responsible for coordinating, planning, and implementing DOS and DOD plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants abroad. The representatives of the WLG are the points of contact for their departments on all matters pertaining to evacuation planning and implementation. The WLG arranges transportation beyond what is routinely available to the Embassy. It designates the ISB, safe haven, and repatriation site. (Unless otherwise designated by the OSD, the ultimate safe haven for DOD employees and dependents is the United States.)

2-28. The WLG coordinates with the DHHS, INS, and the U.S. Customs Bureau. The WLG ensures the appropriate agencies meet all non-USG evacuees at the initial port of entry in the United States, process them into the country, and assist them in making onward travel arrangements.

2-29. The DHHS meets and assists evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The DHHS provides assistance only if evacuees are without adequate resources to resettle on their own, the Embassy and the DOS recommend assistance, and the individual desires assistance.

Regional Liaison Groups

2-30. RLGs are joint-monitoring and -coordinating bodies established by the DOS. Political advisors chair the RLGs to their GCC, with representation from the DOD.

2-31. RLGs ensure coordination exists between the various Embassies and military commands. RLGs ensure that Embassies (or posts) and GCCs coordinate NEO planning. They provide advice and guidance to diplomatic and Consulate posts and military commands in their areas by—

- Helping Embassies and commands plan evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens in case of emergency.
- Providing liaison between the WLG and the Embassy.
- Reviewing EAPs and forwarding them to DOS with comments and recommendations.
- Ensuring coordination exists between the various Embassies and military commands.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDERS

2-32. The DOS may task GCCs to assist in the event of imminent or actual hostilities, significant civil disturbances, or natural and manmade disasters. Geographic combatant commanders prepare and maintain contingency NEO plans to help the DOS protect and evacuate U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens.

2-33. The GCCs develop general contingency plans to support the DOS in case the SecDef orders such assistance. These plans include support for the evacuation of noncombatants. When a situation develops in which U.S. military assistance is necessary during a NEO, the CJCS designates the supported and supporting combatant commanders for planning purposes.

2-34. The CJCS warning order (WARNORD) provides guidance to the GCCs. This guidance normally covers areas of key concern to the President or SecDef and provides the GCC with an overview of the

political context within which the higher authority is considering the NEO. The scope and objective of U.S. involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response is often in general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate COAs. The CJCS warning order—

- Defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any planning constraints.
- Identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution. The CJCS may state that the GCC specify the forces, mobility resources, and timing as part of COA development.

2-35. Upon request by the Embassy, the GCC supporting the Embassy's area of responsibility (AOR) will dispatch a small advanced echelon (ADVON) team. The ADVON team will maintain contact with the Embassy and coordinate the initial military effort. The ADVON team has the communications equipment necessary to maintain effective contact between the GCC, subordinate JFC, and the Embassy.

2-36. Although each Embassy has an EAP, the information may not be accurate or current. Prior coordination and a site survey may not be possible. The GCC must deal with the situation as it exists at the time of evacuation. He may have to depend on information that Embassy personnel or other assets provide.

2-37. Evacuations may be politically sensitive. The highest levels of leadership monitor NEOs. The DOS determines the evacuation sites and timing of the operation. As a situation develops, the evacuation force secures assembly areas and an evacuation site, establishes defensive perimeters, and locates and escorts evacuees. Protecting the force and its charges may include establishing physical barriers to protect assembly areas and evacuation sites.

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

2-38. Higher authorities may task commanders of Army Service component commands (ASCCs) of geographic combatant commands to provide conventional army units in support of ARSOF-conducted NEOs. Coordination between the Army Service component command staff and the JSOTF or ARSOF should occur during preparation and planning (FM 4-93.4, *Theater Support Command*). Conventional Army, military police (MP), infantry, aviation, signal, and logistical units may be necessary augmentations to an ARSOF conducting a NEO.

SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

2-39. In nonemergency evacuations, the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM), and the Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), are the safe haven commanders for DOD repatriation in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition, CDRUSPACOM is responsible for repatriation operations in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. territories in the Pacific. CDRUSJFCOM has delegated the responsibility for repatriation to the Army component commander, who is the Commander, United States Forces Command (CDRUSFORSCOM).

2-40. Because of its reputation as a humanitarian Service, the Coast Guard may play a vital role in certain emergency evacuation situations. The relatively nonbelligerent nature of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft makes them an option in cases where a DOD presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile situation.

2-41. As a member of the WLG, the SOF representative coordinates with the DOS, the GCCs, and the Services to ensure the adequacy and timeliness of special operations planning and coordination in support of NEOs. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), prepares and provides SOF in support of NEOs conducted by GCCs.

Chapter 3

Contingency and Predeployment Planning

Evacuation operations differ from most other military operations. The direction of the operations may remain with the U.S. Ambassador at the time of evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is a political, rather than a military, decision with extensive ramifications. It indicates to the local population and other governments that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that the U.S. has lost faith in the ability of the HN to maintain control. Therefore, the Ambassador may delay the evacuation order longer than would normally be considered militarily sound. As a result, the evacuation, when it is ordered, is more urgent and dangerous.

EARLY ACTION PLANS

3-1. U.S. Embassies and Consulates are required to have early action plans for the area under their cognizance. The COM is responsible for the preparation of an EAP. The EAP should address, among other things, the evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country with military assistance. The supporting military commander is solely responsible for the conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of EAPs. EAPs (to include photographs) give details on—

- Evacuation sites.
- Number of evacuees (total and by area).
- Assembly areas.
- Command posts.
- Key personnel (names, location, and means of contact).

3-2. Geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations (GIBCO) products, formerly known as noncombatant evacuation operation packages (NEOPACKS), are electronic, tailored, geospatial and written products designed to support a NEO. These products can contain highly accurate terrain visualization, route analysis, site selection, weather effects, and other products to assist the NEO planner. Planners should include geospatial-intelligence contingency packages in the EAP.

3-3. The 12 FAH-1, *Emergency Planning Handbook*, by the DOS is a consolidated source of guidance for foreign-Service posts. The handbook provides information on planning for and dealing with certain emergencies. The handbook is the principal reference for posts preparing and revising the EAPs. Appendix D of this manual contains sample EAP checklists from the 12 FAH-1.

NOTIFICATION METHODS

3-4. Evacuation notification methods (Figure 3-1, page 3-2) involve various ways of communicating with potential evacuees. These methods include wardens, radios or telephones, and runners.

3-5. Wardens are usually volunteers who have agreed to notify a certain number of U.S. citizens when evacuation is possible. As a rule, the wardens prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers and addresses of U.S. citizens residing in their area. During an evacuation, each warden distributes messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation and other relevant information.

3-6. U.S. citizens and foreign nationals living outside of large population centers may require an alternate means of notification. Alerting personnel can use shortwave radio and commercial telephone to contact personnel living at great distances from the Embassy. However, because of the insecure nature of these

means, personnel can only transmit unclassified information through them. In some instances, communications outages may require runners to disseminate information to personnel outside the Embassy area.




Figure 3-1. Evacuation notification methods

MILITARY PLANNING AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE

3-7. Particular HN and DOS events create a probability of a NEO occurring. NEOs progress through five stages that require prior planning.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION TRIPWIRES

3-8. Possible events that may lead to a NEO are as follows:

- The issuance of DOS travel advisories (Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] Watch Condition [WATCHCON] III).
- The existence of threats against U.S. citizens or U.S. facilities.
- The DOS implementation of voluntary departure.
- The demonstration of mass protests directed at U.S. citizens, facilities, or policies.
- The implementation of DOS-authorized departure (DIA WATCHCON II).
- The deterioration of security conditions.
- The existence of rioting or general lawlessness.
- The presence of violence directed at U.S. citizens or facilities.
- The emplacement of limitation by the local government on the free movement of U.S. citizens.
- The closing of international airports or borders.
- The existence of an insurgency that may threaten U.S. citizens.
- The invasion by a third nation that may threaten U.S. citizens.
- The implementation of a DOS-ordered departure (DIA WATCHCON I).
- The evacuation of other country's citizens.
- The request by the COM for assistance.

3-9. As more events on the list occur, the probability of a NEO occurring increases. This list is not all-inclusive. It is not in sequential or chronological order. In addition, the list does not represent an escalating scale of probabilities culminating in the immediate necessity to execute a NEO.

PHASES OF A NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

3-10. A NEO assisted by the military usually consists of the following NEO phases:

- **Phase I.** Predeployment begins upon receipt of the CJCS WARNORD. It extends through the commencement of the deployment.
- **Phase II.** Deployment commences with the departure from home station. Deployment is complete upon linkup with the supported JTF, JSOTF, or Army special operations task force (SOTF).

- **Phase III.** Lodgment includes the establishment of assembly areas, departure airfield or port facilities, landing zones (LZs), and, if necessary, safe havens.
- **Phase IV.** Evacuation involves the collection, processing, preparation, and evacuation of desired personnel.
- **Phase V.** Redeployment includes the return of all forces to the home station after the evacuation is complete.

PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

3-11. Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JTF or JSOTF receives the WARNORD from the GCC. Predeployment planning continues until the evacuation force reaches the ISB or the evacuation site. Prior coordination between the GCC and the Embassy staff can greatly improve planning. The GCC can provide the JTF or JSOTF with information to begin the planning, such as the general contingency plans developed by the combatant command. During this period, the advance party may deploy. The GCC must request diplomatic support from the DOS. The GCC's request will result in the DOS requesting the necessary overflight agreements.

3-12. Time is often critical in planning. The JTF or JSOTF commander obtains necessary planning information from the combatant command. As a minimum, he must determine the following:

- The need for and the location of an ISB (if the WLG has not designated one).
- The number and general location of evacuation sites. The ports of embarkation (POEs), approximate number of evacuees, and the manner in which evacuees will leave the country.
- The location of the safe haven and any intermediate safe havens and the person responsible for establishing and operating these sites.

3-13. One of the first pieces of information that the combatant command provides the JTF or JSOTF commander is the operation plan (OPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN) for the emergency evacuation of citizens from the country or region in question. This is the GCC's baseline guidance for the operation. In most cases, this document contains an analysis of the AOR and valuable background intelligence about the geography and demography of the HN. In addition, it identifies the headquarters with responsibility for the operation. The combatant command develops the CONPLAN for each country in its AOR based on priority and resources. The combatant command reviews and updates the CONPLAN often to allow for expeditious planning should a NEO be necessary.

3-14. The Embassy provides the combatant command with a copy of its EAP, which the command provides to the JTF or JSOTF after analyzing it for mission direction. The plan contains much of the intelligence the task force and evacuation force commanders will need to plan the operation. The EAP includes a checklist for evacuations assisted by the U.S. military and intelligence on routes, assembly areas, and helicopter LZs. It also contains airfield and seaport survey data. (Appendix D contains samples of EAP checklists.) Other critical sources of intelligence available include the following:

- Geospatial-intelligence contingency packs.
- Regional survey team reports.
- Joint expeditionary support products—noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Contingency support packages (CSPs).

3-15. The combatant command staff and the Embassy must coordinate regularly to ensure the OPLAN and the EAP are consistent. Failure to coordinate and update either plan can cost precious planning time or, even worse, cause disaster. One such example is the evacuation of Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991. Although the Embassy in Mogadishu moved in 1989, the evacuation plan contained a map from 1969. Helicopters carrying the evacuation force spent an additional 20 minutes above hostile forces looking for the Embassy. In this case, the failure to update plans could have resulted in the loss of aircraft, personnel, and evacuees.

3-16. Other agencies may provide key intelligence for planning NEOs. When geospatial-intelligence contingency packages are not included as part of or as a supplement to an EAP, the unit conducting the NEO should request a package from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The NGA is a

Department of Defense combat support agency and a member of the national intelligence community. The DIA provides the DOS, selected Embassy DATT officers, appropriate military commands, and the Services with contingency support packages or U.S. diplomatic facility graphics for use in evacuation planning. Other intelligence products that may be available and applicable to the NEO include the gridded reference graphic and the contingency support study. In addition, the DIA is responsible for national-level evasion and recovery intelligence production.

JOINT TASK FORCE OR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

3-17. If a NEO involves military forces, they are usually comprised of units from more than one Service or country. Upon receiving orders, the GCC designates a CDRJTF to exercise overall control of the NEO operations. The CDRJTF is responsible for all activities, from initial planning and deployment to establishing an ISB, conducting the evacuation, and if necessary, operating the safe haven.

3-18. The GCC may elect to form a JSOTF. The organization of a JSOTF is similar to a conventional JTF. A higher or senior JFC normally establishes a JSOTF to plan and conduct special operations. The establishment of the JSOTF may be subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a GCC or subunified command. Likewise, a TSOC commander may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the operational area assigned by the GCC. In addition, the JSOTF could operate as a JSOTF afloat—at sea in a forward area. This option may be necessary when protection and security risks are a concern or the government will not allow a land-based JSOTF on its territory.

3-19. The JSOTF is a temporary, joint SOF headquarters. This SOF headquarters controls a JTF made up of SOF of more than one Service in a specific theater of operations. The GCC forms a JSOTF to carry out a specific operation or to execute special operations in support of the theater campaign or other operations. The JSOTF may have conventional units under its OPCON or tactical control to conduct assigned missions. Figure 3-2 depicts a typical JSOTF.




Figure 3-2. Typical joint special operations task force

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

3-20. If there is only one group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army special operations, the Army calls it a SOTF. The commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF), may establish multiple

subordinate SOTFs. The commander organizes each SOTF around the nucleus of an SF or a Ranger unit and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The CDRJSOTF assigns each SOTF an area within the joint special operations area or functional mission under the SOTF's OPCON.

3-21. The SOTF is a mission-dependent organization. The command may construct the SOTF of theater SOF assets and forces based in the continental United States (CONUS). Because of possible time constraints, ARSOF elements stationed in-theater may provide the nucleus that CONUS-based forces arriving in-theater build upon.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

3-22. NEOs involve managing large groups of people with little to no military training across a collapsing infrastructure with an ever-changing threat. The military forces have ultimate responsibility but little authority over the personnel that they are protecting. Because conventional intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) focuses on combat between two conventional military forces, the intelligence staff section must draw techniques from other sources to complement his analysis for NEOs. The methods of IPOE for urban operations are one supplemental source (FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*).

3-23. Accurate and timely intelligence is the key to a successful NEO. To provide useful intelligence, the intelligence staff officer must ensure full engagement of the intelligence effort at all times. Current military intelligence doctrine emphasizes the following five main considerations:

- **Consideration 1.** Initially, the commander drives the intelligence effort. He focuses on the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and mission requirements. He ensures that personnel fully employ and synchronize the intelligence effort. He demands that the intelligence effort provide the information he needs in the time frame and form in which he needs it.
- **Consideration 2.** The intelligence officer synchronizes intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination with operations. By synchronizing intelligence, the intelligence officer ensures the executing commander receives the information he needs for his decision-making process. Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process that keeps intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of operations.
- **Consideration 3.** Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is the simultaneous broadcast of near-real-time intelligence from collectors and processors at all echelons. It permits commanders and operational elements at different echelons to receive the same intelligence at the same time. This provides the commander, evacuation control center (ECC), Embassy intelligence personnel, evacuation teams, ISB personnel, and home-base or safe-haven personnel with a common picture of the mission area.
- **Consideration 4.** Split-based intelligence operations enable the commander to have top-driven, high-resolution intelligence, regardless of which organic intelligence-collection and production assets are currently in use and in-country. Split-based intelligence operations employ collection and analysis elements from all echelons, from national to tactical, in HNs, sanctuaries, or the CONUS. Collection elements typically operate in the HN while analysis occurs in a sanctuary or HN.
- **Consideration 5.** The intelligence staff officer tactically tailors ISR support for each phase of the operation based on the mission requirements and the availability of resources. He must decide which key intelligence personnel and equipment to deploy immediately to the mission area and when and if to phase in his remaining military intelligence (MI) assets. (FMI 2-01.301, *Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, provides more information.)

3-24. Uncertain and hostile NEO environments presuppose regime resistance to the operation or regime incapacity because of partial or full breakdown of law and order and partial or full breakup of the regime's defense and security establishments. With regime resistance, the threat profile consists of regime military and paramilitary (police) forces and auxiliaries. In this situation, order-of-battle analysis can derive unit strengths, types and amounts of weaponry and mobility assets, garrison locations, and so forth. With

regime incapacity, the threat-force profile may be even more diverse. The threat-force profile may consist of—

- Military or police mutineers.
- Political party or factional militias.
- Mobilized trade- or student-union groups.
- Street gangs.
- Enraged mobs.

3-25. Soldiers cannot consider civilian groups unarmed because they may loot arsenals or receive weapons from local power brokers, which makes it more difficult for Soldiers to obtain intelligence concerning the number of hostile forces.

3-26. Threat-force location is a critical factor. The nonconventional threat types noted above will not necessarily assemble at or near military installations. Therefore, personnel conducting intelligence analysis must note the presence of these threats at stadiums, parks, or other mass-assembly areas near the NEO site. As with the location of the nonconventional threat types, their tactics also merit special consideration. One key concern for task forces is the inclination of foreign threats to take U.S. citizens hostage. Another consideration is the inclination of foreign threats to resort to arson or infrastructure sabotage. In either case, such actions could jeopardize the NEO. A final key consideration is the identification of the key motivators of hostile action. If the government opposes the NEO, this task is easier than if antigovernment or nongovernment elements oppose it. Government leaders and spokespersons are much more likely than factional or mob leaders to function as known entities. In any case, it is essential for intelligence sources to identify those individuals who are most likely to incite opposition to the NEO.

3-27. ARSOF units use three techniques to collect intelligence—the bull’s-eye technique, the threat model, and the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) targeting matrix factors. Used in sequence, they allow the intelligence staff officer to focus the collection effort, characterize the threat, and predict possible COAs by analyzing friendly operations through an enemy perspective.

Bull’s-Eye

3-28. In the original bull’s-eye concept, the commander tailors his level of intelligence support to the geographic proximity an area has to a mission. The outermost ring consists of the country and region in which the operation is taking place. The middle ring represents the mission area analysis the intelligence staff section conducts, which provides area-specific intelligence for the team. The innermost circle covers the specific operational or target areas and provides mission-specific analysis.

3-29. Unlike an SF direct-action or special-reconnaissance mission, a NEO may include several locations at which key events will occur simultaneously, such as multiple concentrations of U.S. nationals and other potential evacuees. These places will shift as the operation progresses, for example, from the Embassy to the POE. Therefore, the intelligence staff section can have several bull’s-eyes to focus collection and analysis effort on, reallocating resources to provide predictive analysis during progressive phases of the operation.

Threat Model

3-30. In a NEO environment, the intelligence staff section faces a larger variety of threats than in a conventional scenario. In addition, these threats can change quickly as the physical and governing infrastructures continue to deteriorate. Personnel can use some aspects of conventional IPOE to analyze military forces and well-organized resistance groups. To accomplish this, however, the threat must possess a relatively stable organization and institutionalized tactics, which may not be the case in a NEO environment. To complement established IPOE techniques, the intelligence staff section can use the threat model, which allows it to look at a wider array of factors in the operational environment in terms of functional effects on the operation, rather than just those identified in terms of conventional warfare.

3-31. The threat model is a color-coding system that allows the analyst to categorize aspects of the threat environment, which allows him to evaluate features normally not considered in conventional IPOE. White, red, blue, black, and green correspond to the operational environment, threat, friendly forces, physical objects, and local civilian population.

Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability Targeting Matrix

3-32. Originally, SF used the CARVER targeting matrix to determine the most effective and expedient means of identifying, selecting, and attacking targets. In a NEO, the military force commander can use this matrix as a method for evaluating key installations and critical points in the operation to reduce their desirability as red force targets. Within an installation, he could evaluate a critical subsystem, such as the electrical system, and within the operation, a key element, such as the egress route from the Embassy to the POE. The factors in the CARVER targeting matrix are as follows:

- **Criticality.** The importance of a system, subsystem, complex, or component. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on the output of the targeted system, subsystem, or complex.
- **Accessibility.** The ease with which a threat can reach a target, either physically or by fire. A target is accessible when an enemy action element can physically infiltrate or hit the target by direct or indirect fires.
- **Recuperability.** A measure of the time necessary to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage inflicted on the target. Recuperability varies with the sources and ages of targeted components and the availability of spare parts.
- **Vulnerability.** A measure of the ability of the action element to damage the target using available assets (both men and materials). A target is vulnerable if the enemy has the manpower and expertise to successfully attack it.
- **Effect.** The negative or positive influence on the population because of the action taken. The impact on the evacuee's comfort and safety because of electrical system failure is key.
- **Recognizability.** The degree to which individuals can recognize a target under varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions without confusion with other targets or components.

Note: FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, and current SF intelligence doctrine provide more detail on the intelligence process.

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Chapter 4

Deployment

The commander should form and request permission to dispatch an advance party to the HN early in the planning process. The advance party may consist of two elements: the forward command element (FCE) and the evacuation site party. The advance party should be small and inconspicuous to avoid drawing attention to it. Personnel must deploy with the necessary specialized equipment to accomplish the mission. Once the advance party deploys and sets up the ECC, the commander inserts the main body. Appendix E provides guidance for NEO planning.

PREPARATION AND PLANNING

4-1. Deployment of the advance party depends on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and support available—time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The least conspicuous method is for the advance party to arrive in the HN in civilian clothes and on civilian aircraft. This is possible only in a permissive environment and if the proper authorities can arrange the necessary passports and visas.

4-2. An uncertain or hostile environment may require forcible entry. Use of military aircraft allows the advance party to carry additional equipment that they may need to set up the evacuation site and establish communications and liaison. The advance party should accomplish the following tasks before deployment:

- Forward the number of members in the advance party to the Embassy for approval.
- Develop and brief a communications plan.
- Acquire and review appropriate maps.
- Review the Embassy EAP and the EAP checklists.
- Assemble and inspect necessary equipment.
- Develop and brief an advance party evasion and recovery plan.
- Obtain visas for the advance party.
- Determine whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes.
- Consider weapon and ammunition requirements.
- Examine the need for specialized equipment.
- Determine the medical requirements.
- Identify translator and linguistic requirements.
- Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO.
- Assess media interest in the situation, JTF or JSOTF activities, and JTF or JSTOF involvement in the evacuation.

FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT

4-3. Upon arrival in the HN, the FCE initiates liaison with the diplomatic mission as follows:

- Briefs DOS representatives on the capabilities and missions of the advance party and the JTF or JSOTF.
- Establishes a forward command post that can expand to incorporate the JTF or JSOTF headquarters staff.
- Provides a continuing presence for planning and ensures a complementary role with DOS personnel.

- Determines whether the operational environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile.
- Advises the CDRJTF regarding the size and composition of forces necessary. If specified in the initiating directive, determines whether the JTF or JSOTF is appropriate for the mission.
- Advises the CDRJTF regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival of the evacuation force.
- Determines existing political and sociological considerations.
- Determines attitude of and support available from the local population and authorities.
- Establishes communications between the FCE and the CDRJTF as follows:
 - Makes the communications link to NEO commander available to the senior DOS representative.
 - Maintains continuous communication for exchange of planning data and intelligence.

4-4. The FCE establishes communications between the evacuation site and the Embassy and provides a link with the evacuation force commander. The FCE provides the commander with updated SITREPs. The FCE may include the following personnel:

- Officer in charge.
- Intelligence representative.
- Operations representative.
- Logistics representative.
- Communications team.
- Medical representative.
- Air or naval representative.
- PAO representative.
- CA representative.
- PSYOP representative.
- Legal advisor.

EVACUATION SITE PARTY

4-5. The evacuation site party, the second functional group in the advance party, secures and establishes the ECC site. In some cases, it may be impossible for the evacuation site party to secure the ECC site without a supporting security force. In this case, the commander may consider augmenting the party or having the evacuation site party reconnoiter the ECC site and developing plans for occupying it when security forces arrive.

4-6. The evacuation site party may consist of the following personnel:

- Officer in charge.
- Operations representative.
- Intelligence representative.
- Communications representative.
- Personnel representative.
- Logistics representative.
- Security representative.
- CA representative.
- PSYOP representative.
- Legal advisor.

4-7. Upon arrival in the HN, the evacuation site party must accomplish the following:

- Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body.
- Provide direct liaison with the chief, Embassy consular office.
- Maintain liaison with civilian or local host-government agencies involved in the evacuation.

- Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches, helicopter LZs or drop zones, airports, and ports. Consider probable meteorological and oceanographic impacts on site selection.
- Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites, to include the following:
 - Collect essential planning intelligence.
 - Assist DOS personnel with news media.
 - Establish and maintain communications with the FCE and Embassy.
 - Coordinate additional security requirements that the HN police may provide.
 - During permissive NEOs, coordinate for overflight rights.

4-8. The desired advance party members listed previously for the FCE and the evacuation site party are unconstrained. Mission requirements or guidance from DOS may preclude the deployment of such robust elements. Consequently, commanders must be prepared to prioritize and to accomplish advance party requirements with smaller elements.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE

4-9. Use of an ISB during deployment provides many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station and the likelihood of hostilities increase. The ISB may be in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under U.S. control. Ideally, the ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is necessary. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces when forced entry is necessary. Support forces may include additional aircraft and personnel for unforeseen movement requirements or combat forces (such as air units capable of offensive attacks and airborne infantry units).

4-10. The advantages of an ISB are as follows:

- The commander can finalize evacuation plans.
- The staff can gather additional intelligence.
- The joint force can conduct rehearsals and briefings.
- The units can redistribute and finalize loads.
- The personnel can recuperate following the deployment from their home station.
- The reaction force or additional security personnel can stage for contingency operations.
- The ISB can function as the temporary safe haven for the operation.

COORDINATION

4-11. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the foreign government. If the ISB is an established U.S. base in a foreign country, using the ISB as a staging point for launching forces into another country can pose significant political issues. The CDRJTF should advise the DOS of the requirements for the ISB. The ISB should meet the following criteria:

- Be able to handle the aircraft or ships the GCC will use in the evacuation.
- Possess effective communication with JTF or JSOTF and combatant command headquarters, advance party, ECC, temporary safe haven, and the ISB Embassy.
- Have adequate facilities for shelter, food, and sanitation if the GCC will use the ISB as the temporary safe haven. Facilities should accommodate the evacuation force and evacuees.
- Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft or ships in use.
- Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical supplies; and ammunition.
- Be close to major medical facilities, if possible.
- Be located to provide maximum possible operations security (OPSEC).
- Have overflight rights.

- Have a public affairs (PA) contingency plan for any planned or unplanned media presence. Appendix F shows a PA plan for a NEO (HN).
- Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the evacuation can transit without refueling.
- Have adequate local and area security forces to protect U.S. personnel and equipment. HN or security forces from the deployed ISB support element can provide this protection.

INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE COMPOSITION

4-12. The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is necessary and what is already onsite at the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern facility requires substantially less support than at a lesser-developed location. Some considerations for the ISB force are as follows:

- Maintenance and service requirements for aircraft.
- Liaison with the Embassy and civilian agencies (police, military, customs, and others, as necessary).
- Interpreters.
- Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, and sanitation.
- Contracts for local services and supplies.
- Local security.
- Air traffic and movement control and weather impacts on air movements.
- HN medical infrastructure.
- Overflight rights.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE EVACUATION FORCE

4-13. After the advance party contacts the Embassy and establishes the ECC, the GCC can insert the evacuation force. There are three options to accomplish the deployment, and each option must consider potential weather impacts on the evacuation plan (for example, poor ceiling or visibility at an airfield can disrupt a carefully planned airflow). They are as follows:

- The evacuation force may land at the ECC and then deploy marshalling teams to the assembly areas.
- The evacuation force may deploy to the Embassy while the marshalling forces deploy directly to the assembly areas.
- The evacuation force may simply land at the ECC and wait for the evacuees to come to the location.

4-14. With the first option (Figure 4-1, page 4-5), the entire force lands at the ECC. The commander issues final instructions and dispatches the marshalling force to collect the evacuees. This is the best option when the situation is vague and the advance party is unable to provide the commander with adequate intelligence to disseminate to subordinate units. The commander and staff plan in detail after they arrive and receive the advance party or Embassy staff briefing.

4-15. The second option (Figure 4-2, page 4-5) allows the marshalling teams to deploy directly to their respective assembly areas. The evacuation force deploys to the Embassy. This option is more complicated than the first. The GCC implements this option when there is not enough time to plan for detailed execution or when the time available is so short that marshalling forces cannot be delayed at the ECC.




Figure 4-1. Option one, evacuation force lands at the evacuation control center




Figure 4-2. Option two, marshalling teams land at multiple assembly areas

4-16. The third option (Figure 4-3) is to deploy the force to the ECC where it evacuates only those citizens that make their way there. With this option, citizens who miss the notification also miss the evacuation and the deploying force only partially completes its mission.




Figure 4-3. Option three, single-point evacuation

4-17. Aircraft remaining on the ground with the military force are subject to sabotage or outright attack from hostile units or individuals. A large evacuation force increases the unit's security problems because the unit must guard more aircraft. If the aircraft do not remain with the evacuation force, the air component and evacuation force commanders coordinate to ensure enough aircraft return at the right time. Ideally, as soon as there are an appropriate number of passengers, one aircraft lands, picks up the passengers, and departs. Precise timing reduces waiting time for evacuees and ground time for aircraft. The evacuation force commander must find a suitable location for the aircraft to wait.

4-18. Naval evacuation is a likely alternative to aircraft evacuation. Naval operations could include any of the following:

- Loading ships at a seaport pier.
- Ferrying evacuees from seaports to amphibious ships.
- Transporting evacuees aboard helicopters to ships.
- Using landing craft and beach operations.

4-19. Beach operations (Figure 4-4, page 4-7) are ideal for moving large numbers of evacuees at one time. The use of Navy ships as intermediate safe havens allows a faster turnaround for tactical evacuation assets.

If the situation warrants, marshalling teams and search squads may deploy from and return to offshore ships, allowing the ECC to be shipboard. Crews of aircraft ferrying soldiers and evacuees to and from ships must maintain deck-landing qualification.



Figure 4-4. Beach operation

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Chapter 5

Evacuation Force Operations

As the main body of the evacuation force (Figure 5-1) deploys into the HN, the elements of the advance party will join with the related main body organizations. The number and state of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and tactical situation will determine the size and composition of the main body.

Note: Appendix G provides sample evacuee processing training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs).




Figure 5-1. Organization of evacuation force

MAIN BODY HEADQUARTERS

5-1. The main body headquarters directs and coordinates the evacuation operation. The headquarters consists of the FCE and the administrative team. The FCE, which is from the advance party, joins the headquarters and maintains effective liaison with the Embassy staff. The administrative team combines with the evacuation-site party from the advance party to ensure the smooth operation of the ECC.

MARSHALLING ELEMENT

5-2. The marshalling element moves to the designated assembly areas and secures them. It brings evacuees to the assembly areas and then escorts them to the ECC. The GCC bases the size of the marshalling element on the number of sites and evacuees supported.

5-3. A marshalling element may consist of multiple subordinate marshalling teams. The commander organizes the marshalling team to secure and support evacuations through a single assembly area as well as surrounding area. The marshalling team must be large enough to organize several search and security teams. Search teams may be unnecessary if the Embassy's notification plan successfully alerts evacuees to report to predetermined assembly areas. If the Embassy informs all evacuees, then search teams should not leave the assembly area except in emergency cases.

5-4. The search teams locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area. Each search team should have an interpreter or a SOF soldier capable of speaking the HN language and, if possible, a guide. A lost team in a potentially hostile environment can create significant problems for the evacuation force. Language-qualified personnel may be necessary to help the search teams move from the assembly areas and locate evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect.

5-5. A security team provides security to the search team during movement and in the assembly area. In addition, the commander may attach a tactical Psychological Operations team (TPT) to the marshalling teams. The TPT can use its organic loudspeakers to communicate with the local populace and noncombatant evacuees.

MARSHALLING ELEMENT OPERATIONS

5-6. The marshalling element locates evacuees at or near their homes and moves them to the ECC. In its most complete form, the operation has several marshalling teams under the control and direction of a marshalling element headquarters. Leaving the ECC, the teams—

- Proceed by designated routes to their respective assembly areas.
- Secure assembly areas to use as bases of operation.
- Dispatch elements to contact, identify, inform, and return the evacuees to the assembly areas.
- Escort the evacuees back to the ECC.
- Turn evacuees over to ECC personnel for transportation out of the country.
- Verify that there is enough transportation for the search or security teams and evacuees. Teams should prepare all evacuees to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or wheeled vehicles. The marshalling elements should also consider the following:
 - Use local drivers, if available, because of their experience and familiarity with the local road network.
 - Ensure there are enough mechanics available for emergency repairs.
 - Brief military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

5-7. Movement control requires the marshalling element to do the following:

- Issue local road maps to each driver.
- Plan for convoy control and security.
- Identify safe houses or areas in case vehicles breakdown or drivers become separated or lost.
- Ensure that adequate communications equipment is available for convoys.

- 5-8. Assembly area operations require the marshalling element to do the following:
- Establish perimeter security, even in a permissive environment.
 - Ensure there is enough transportation to move evacuees to the ECC.
 - Use, as needed, vehicles belonging to the evacuees to transport personnel to the ECC.
- 5-9. Search team operations require the marshalling element to do the following:
- Have a list of potential evacuees from the consular officer.
 - Obtain copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee.
 - Have copies of the “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” (Appendix C) readily available for evacuees who refuse to leave.
 - Brief each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the Embassy, identification requirements at the ECC, and items that the commander or the law restricts or prohibits from transport.
 - Record the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee.
 - Escort evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC. Evacuees may drive their privately owned vehicles directly to the ECC, although U.S. personnel should discourage this for security reasons. Search personnel should note the individual’s name and intent.
 - Identify evacuees not on the list provided by the Embassy.

ROUTE SELECTION

- 5-10. The marshalling element commander first obtains the information collected by the advance party. Significant information may include the following:
- Updated lists of names and addresses of evacuees.
 - Specific medical conditions that will affect the evacuation effort.
 - Current maps.
 - Current developments in the political situation.
 - Specific sources of help should a confrontation develop.

Marshalling teams then use the bulleted information to determine their routes and ensure transportation is available.

5-11. The evacuation force commander and his staff confirm the suitability of routes to and from each assembly area. They may have had insufficient intelligence available at the home station to plan routes in detail, and current, on-the-ground intelligence make some of the commander’s planned routes unusable.

5-12. The evacuation force commander considers several factors when selecting routes. Air movement of marshalling teams and U.S. citizens is best because it involves minimal confrontation and requires less time. However, the evacuation force commander must also plan an overland route to use should air operations be unsuitable.

5-13. Conducting the evacuation during darkness helps avoid unnecessary publicity and reduces the likelihood of confrontation. The HN government may have a curfew in effect during which the local citizenry are less active. With less vehicular traffic, marshalling force vehicles will likely avoid traffic congestion. The disadvantages to using darkness as a cover is that marshalling teams may get lost and they may have difficulty locating evacuees.

5-14. If the unit moves in daylight by vehicle, the unit should avoid routes through densely populated areas, on main traffic arteries, and through potential roadblocks (such as construction sites, railroad crossings, and narrow bridges). The operations center coordinates the routes so that vehicles from separate assembly areas do not intermingle. Again, the use of multiple routes enhances security and reduces signature.

5-15. Once the evacuation force commander selects the routes, the operations center staff informs the marshalling element commander. He, in turn, passes the routes to the marshalling teams on strip or topographical maps that exhibit enough detail to be useful. If possible, marshalling team commanders reconnoiter the routes by helicopter before movement.

5-16. If the evacuation force commander decides not to send out search teams, the marshalling teams remain in their respective assembly areas and the evacuees come to them. After waiting a suitable amount of time, the marshalling team escorts the evacuees to the ECC or sends out search teams to contact unaccounted for U.S. citizens.

TRANSPORTATION

5-17. Key planning for the marshalling force includes choosing the best method to transport the marshalling teams and the evacuees. Options for moving marshalling teams include helicopter, airborne insertion, vehicle, and foot. If volunteered, the force may use vehicles belonging to the evacuees to move the marshalling teams and evacuees to the ECC.

5-18. Marshalling teams moving on foot must reduce their vulnerability. A close tactical formation reduces the chance of separation and enhances the commander's control of his unit if someone tries to disrupt the march.

5-19. Vehicular movement requires more coordination but is preferable to foot movement. Drivers must become familiar with primary and alternate routes and accurate area maps. Commanders may use local drivers. In some situations, the experience of local drivers with the road network may aid timely evacuation. Movement by convoy requires security and sufficient radios to maintain control. A traffic circulation plan is necessary to identify main and alternate evacuation routes, critical points, and checkpoints. The traffic circulation plan will simplify reporting. The Embassy staff and evacuation force commander's staff identify safe houses or areas for drivers and passengers in case of vehicle breakdown.

5-20. Each team should have an attached mechanic with enough equipment to make emergency repairs. If a vehicle breaks down, the marshalling team commander decides whether to repair or abandon the vehicle. The mechanic can expedite repairs and provide the marshalling team commander with an expert opinion. The marshalling team commander must not allow anyone to remain with the vehicle without adequate security.

MOVEMENT CONTROL

5-21. The marshalling element monitors the progress of the teams and reports their locations to the operations center. Teams report their status to the marshalling element as they arrive at and pass through each checkpoint. Teams submit additional reports when they secure their assembly areas, when they are prepared to return with the evacuees to the ECC, and at any other time that the commander considers appropriate.

5-22. Team commanders use a similar reporting system to control the movement of their search teams. Such a system, properly prepared and coded, can add to the mission's OPSEC by reducing radio transmission time.

5-23. Using specially prepared, coded execution checklists is ideal. Doing so allows the team commander to pinpoint immediately the exact location of each team.

ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

5-24. The marshalling team has two basic functions once it arrives at the assembly area. It secures the area, assembles all evacuees inside the secured location, and begins processing them for evacuation.

Securing the Assembly Area

5-25. The marshalling team occupies the assembly area just as any tactical unit clearing and occupying any assembly area would. The marshalling team operates within the constraints of the tactical environment and according to the ROE. Once security is in place, they should allow no one inside the perimeter without an escort. Security personnel maintain contact with the command group by using short-range radios or telephones.

5-26. NEOs are tactical operations, even in a permissive environment. The team commander must remember that the population, or elements within it, may turn hostile, and he must be able to defend the assembly area if hostile elements attack. Consequently, the area must be defensible and security team and search squads must maintain defensible positions.

5-27. A member of the Embassy staff (PSO or RSO) generally chooses the assembly area. If the evacuation force cannot defend the assembly area, the team commander should direct evacuees to an appropriate place nearby. The team commander should attempt to get approval of the new location from an Embassy representative. If doing so proves impossible, the team commander is still responsible for protecting his force and its charges. As a minimum, the team commander should inform the marshalling element commander of his decision.

Dispatching Search Teams

5-28. Immediately after arriving in the assembly area, the marshalling team commander dispatches his search squads, assigning search responsibilities according to the Embassy's most current evacuee list. If the Ambassador and his staff implemented the evacuation plan successfully, most U.S. citizens know that the evacuation is necessary and they act accordingly. Inevitably, some people will not have heard of the evacuation, and search teams must locate and accommodate them. PSYOP assets may provide the capability to assist in locating personnel by communicating the search team's intent to the local populace. The marshalling team commander must weigh OPSEC and protection requirements against notification capabilities.

5-29. If the information reached all evacuees, the team commander may not need to dispatch search teams. If conditions allow for their free movement, evacuees may come to the assembly area on their own.

5-30. The search team proceeds to the addresses of potential evacuees. If the individual or family is not present, the team leader tries to determine their location by asking the neighbors. He may leave instructions in a visible place, but he must consider the effect these instructions will have if they fall into unfriendly hands. If the individual or family is present, the team leader follows the procedures described in the following paragraphs.

5-31. Each search team leader gives each individual a complete list of instructions. If possible, the Embassy advance party obtains enough copies of the instructions to supplement the team leader's oral briefing and gives a written copy to each potential evacuee.

5-32. Once he makes contact, the search team leader gets one of two responses. The individual decides to either evacuate or stay. If the individual decides to remain in the HN, the search team leader repeats the Ambassador's warning. The situation is extremely dangerous, and a closed Embassy cannot assist evacuees.

5-33. If the warning has no effect, the search team leader leaves the address of a POC (if available) and asks the individual to sign a waiver certificate (Appendix C). The waiver certificate shows that the USG provided the individual with the opportunity to depart under its protection and that the individual chose to remain. If the individual will not sign, the search team leader makes a note of the time, date, and circumstances surrounding the offer. He should also remind USG employees and their dependents that they must obey an evacuation order. (The evacuation force may locally produce certificates of waiver.)

5-34. If the individual chooses to accompany the search team, the search team leader explains the conditions of the evacuation. Again, if possible, he gives them a written document expressing these conditions.

5-35. Usually, the Embassy evacuation notice lists baggage limitations (usually one 66-pound bag per person). The marshalling team must use common sense in making allowances for evacuees with infants and for other special circumstances. The commander must thoroughly brief the search team leader on what to do with pets. If time and space allow, the evacuation force commander may authorize the evacuation of pets. If he does not, evacuees should leave pets with friends. The evacuation force commander may arrange for euthanasia as an alternative. If the task force is evacuating pets, owners should bring immunization records to speed processing.

5-36. Each evacuee must have documentation that provides positive identification. Normally, documentation includes any of the following:

- Passport.
- Consular report of birth.
- DOD dependent identification card.
- Seaman's papers.

5-37. Unless the Embassy specifies otherwise, the search team should not delay operations because of a lack of documentation. The search team should identify, segregate, and transport questionable individuals to the processing center with other evacuees. Processing center personnel may delay individuals or separate families if they cannot provide positive identification.

5-38. Evacuees wishing to go with the search team must act quickly. While evacuees are preparing their belongings for departure, the search team leader records their names so that the team has a record of evacuees returning to the assembly area.

5-39. U.S. citizens wishing to evacuate may travel without escort to the ECC. U.S. citizens that drive personal vehicles to the ECC will turn the keys over to an Embassy official. However, for security reasons, the search team leader should discourage evacuees from using personal vehicles. If an evacuee drives a personal vehicle, the search team leader notes the individual's name and indicates the evacuee's intent to report directly to the ECC. The search team commander reports this information to the processing center officer in charge (OIC) when the marshalling team returns to the ECC.

5-40. The search team leader asks each evacuee if he knows of other U.S. citizens in the area. If evacuees identify citizens who are not on the list the Embassy provides, the team leader notes the names and addresses and reports them to the marshalling team commander, who reports them to the operations center.

5-41. Evacuees may ask the search team leader or marshalling team commander to evacuate alien or HN personnel, such as servants or close friends. These requests may come from U.S. citizens speaking on their behalf or directly from the individuals seeking evacuation. Regardless of the source of the request, the marshalling team commander only has the authority to evacuate U.S. citizens or those on the Embassy list. The marshalling team commander must refer any questionable individuals to an Embassy official.

5-42. U.S. policy is that no one may grant asylum within the territorial jurisdiction of another power. The on-site commander, regardless of grade, may grant temporary refuge under conditions of urgency to save a person from imminent danger. Because such an action may result in retribution against U.S. forces or citizens, he must weigh his decision to grant refuge against the potential danger the action may cause. U.S. Embassy representatives must assume responsibility for these individuals as soon as possible.

5-43. The search team proceeds, in turn, to each assigned location and then returns to the assembly area. To preclude infiltration at the assembly area, the search team leader vouches for each evacuee. He then turns the evacuee over to the marshalling team command group for in-processing. The commander may send the search team on another search mission or incorporate it into the perimeter security force.

Processing Evacuees

5-44. While the security force prepares positions and search teams deploy, the marshalling team command group prepares to take in evacuees. Members of the marshalling team command group must not spend significant amounts of time compiling administrative data. However, they must identify each individual entering the area and document and address evacuee medical problems (for example, administer first aid or arrange for medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]). Personnel conducting in-processing must provide evacuees arriving at the assembly area unaccompanied with the same information that the search teams provided their groups.

5-45. The marshalling team command group conducts the processing at the assembly area. A senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) and several assistants can easily accomplish this while the remainder of the marshalling team secures the area.

5-46. The security team must positively identify each individual from a passport or other official document. The security team should not allow anyone into the assembly area that does not have positive identification. The marshalling team commander resolves any discrepancies by having the individual provide reasonable proof that he is a U.S. citizen. U.S. Embassy personnel make the final decisions in disputes. Personnel must segregate individuals in question and return them to the ECC where the marshalling team commander turns them over to Embassy personnel.

5-47. Embassy-designated wardens can provide immense aid to the marshalling team commander. Wardens are personnel who have knowledge of the individuals in the area and can verify their status. To accelerate processing, the wardens may have already prepared processing packets for each evacuee. Unfortunately, the warden system is not foolproof. Wardens may arrive at the assembly area too late to be of help.

5-48. Personnel can avoid some problems with identifying U.S. citizens if each marshalling team has a complete list of the names of evacuees. The marshalling team commander can then check to see if an evacuee from another area reported to his location. The marshalling team commander must remember, however, that Embassy personnel must make the final decision to deny evacuation to anyone who is not on the list. The only exception will be someone posing a direct threat. Figure 5-2 shows a marshalling area.



Figure 5-2. Marshalling area

5-49. Evacuees must submit to individual inspections before entering the assembly area. This inspection ensures the safety of the evacuees and marshalling team. Personnel may provide amnesty boxes for evacuees. The marshalling team commander should avoid strip-searching or other physically intrusive forms of search unless he determines that such procedures are necessary for security and safety. He may want to use metal detectors (for personnel and baggage) and dogs (for baggage only) to speed up the

inspection, but the process should not demean the evacuees. All personnel should treat evacuees with the utmost courtesy.

5-50. Conflicts may occur between individual evacuees and members of the marshalling team. Disputes may arise over the amount of baggage, speed of the operation, confiscation of contraband, or deportment of specific individuals. Marshalling team members must remember they have no legal jurisdiction or control over U.S. citizens. They cannot force any civilian to do anything against his or her will unless the civilian is threatening them with bodily harm.

5-51. The relationship between the military escort and the civilian evacuees is one of voluntary cooperation. If a citizen becomes disruptive, the team commander gives him the choice of conforming to the rules or departing to fend for himself. The marshalling team commander should make allowances for the despair felt by the evacuees, but he cannot endanger the welfare of the other evacuees or his command. He should document all incidents and obtain written statements from witnesses.

5-52. The marshalling team command group should inform evacuees arriving with more than the allowed baggage of the baggage restrictions and that, depending upon the available transportation, the evacuees may have to leave some baggage behind. As long as enough transportation is available, the search team should allow evacuees to carry baggage with them to the processing center. At the processing center, the Embassy can arrange for the disposition of excess baggage. This would be an ideal time for the marshalling team command group to mark or tag all baggage for future identification. If personnel must separate evacuees from their baggage during transport, the marshalling team commander may want to inventory pieces and provide receipts to evacuees. One method to accomplish this is the simple two-piece tag system used by airlines. Unless an evacuee declares a high-value item in his baggage, the marshalling team commander should not be concerned about contents beyond inspections already discussed. Personnel should warn evacuees with high-value items that under no circumstances will the government assume responsibility for the items. The marshalling team commander may obtain a written statement to this effect.

5-53. The next step for inprocessing evacuees is to record the requisite information on each evacuee. A detailed history is not necessary, but the information personnel record must be scrupulously accurate. The marshalling team command group enters the individual's name, age, sex, citizenship, identification type and document number, and next of kin or permanent home address in an alphabetically tabbed logbook. Figure 5-3, page 5-9, shows a sample logbook. The marshalling team command group handwrites all entries accurately and legibly. The laptop or notebook computer is an alternative for inputting evacuee information into a database for quick retrieval upon return to the ECC. Computer users must back up information to ensure they can retrieve it later.

5-54. Once the marshalling team command group makes the proper entries in the logbook, the marshalling team commander briefs the evacuees by—

- Giving the evacuees an updated SITREP, the anticipated schedule for the remainder of the evacuation, and any other useful information.
- Cautioning the evacuees against distracting the security personnel by engaging them in conversation.
- Asking the evacuees to remain in the most protected portion of the assembly area.
- Portraying the team's intent to make the evacuees feel as comfortable as possible.

5-55. The marshalling team attends to evacuees with special needs first. Medical personnel determine if medical problems require immediate evacuation or special transportation. If so, the commander reports the emergency and acts to move the ill or injured evacuee to the ECC.

5-56. Once the marshalling team accounts for the evacuees on its list, its commander requests permission from the marshalling element commander to close out the assembly area and return to the ECC. When returning to the ECC, the marshalling team usually follows the same procedures that it followed when it conducted its earlier movement. Helicopter or vehicular transportation is more desirable than foot marches—especially with a large number of civilians with varying physical capabilities.

Name Last, First, MI	Age/Sex	Citizenship	Permanent Home Address City, State	Tab
				A
				B
				C
				D
				E
				F

Figure 5-3. Sample evacuee logbook

5-57. When the marshalling team arrives at the ECC, it moves directly to the processing center. The commander turns the evacuees and logbook over to the reception station OIC for final processing and embarkation. If JTF assigns the commander another assembly area, he obtains another logbook.

SECURITY ELEMENT

5-58. The security element has two missions. First, it secures the ECC perimeter, evacuation sites, LZs, staging or parking areas, and landing sites for naval craft. Second, it may serve as a reaction force in the event the marshalling element or other units require assistance. The following factors determine the size of the security element necessary to support the evacuation:

- The enemy threat to evacuation operations.
- The anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in and around the evacuation objective area.
- The crowd-control requirements at each site.
- The number of evacuees.
- The number of marshalling and search teams necessary to search for evacuees.
- The number of evacuation sites.
- The size of the ECC.
- The transportation available to cover the assigned areas.
- The personal security of the Ambassador.
- The type of resources personnel will use to evacuate individuals.

LOGISTICS ELEMENT

5-59. The logistics element should limit its support to the minimum essential support necessary for the evacuation. The logistics element commander should consider the following factors in determining requirements for logistical support to the JTF:

- **Characteristics.** The characteristics of the evacuation area.
- **Resources available.** What are the existing and potential facilities for support to the JTF, such as facilities for the storage and distribution of supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, medical facilities, medical supplies, and other facilities? What food, water, fuel, and consumables are available?
- **Environment.** What are the weather and terrain like?
- **Magnitude.** How many evacuees are there? What are their needs?
- **Threat identification.** What are the potential threats to the evacuation?
- **Threat level.** What is the adversary's or potential adversary's level of strength and activity?
- **Threat area.** What is the disposition and location of the threat?

- **Task force.** What is the strength and composition of the JTF?
- **Troops.** What is the total troop strength?
- **Task force composition.** What is the composition of the JTF in terms of ground, air, and naval combat forces, combat support, and combat service support units?
- **Logistical capability.** What are the logistical support capabilities of each component and separate unit?
- **Time.** What are the time constraints and duration of operation?
- **Logistical support.** What logistical support will the Embassy and evacuees need?
- **Host-nation support (HNS).** What is the availability and suitability of HNS as an alternative to deploying U.S. military logistical support?
- **HNS experience.** What experience does the HN have in conducting NEOs?
- **Support agreements.** What prearranged HNS or inter-Service support agreements, as appropriate, are in place?
- **Transportation.** What are the capabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to provide rapid evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties?

WITHDRAWAL OF THE EVACUATION FORCE

5-60. Once all marshalling teams return to the ECC and the ECC processes and departs all evacuees, the evacuation force commander notifies the tasking headquarters that the evacuation phase is complete. The evacuation force commander asks the senior DOS representative remaining in the HN if he may conclude the evacuation. Once the DOS representative grants permission, evacuation force commander conducts his withdrawal.

5-61. The situation in the HN may rapidly deteriorate. In addition, locals may know that U.S. citizens are withdrawing. These two factors, along with the possibility of looters, may heighten the possibility of an armed attack on the remaining U.S. forces. Once the civilians leave, the evacuation force adopts a defensive position until the last unit departs.

5-62. In a hostile or uncertain environment, support elements should depart first with all equipment not essential to the withdrawal. Once this is accomplished, the evacuation force commander moves his force to the least exposed portion of the airfield or port. He deploys a mobile security team to protect aircraft on final approach from any attempts by hostile forces to destroy the aircraft. Pilots should be aware of the danger and use deception tactics as long as possible before landing and as soon as possible after taking off.

5-63. The last security element to withdraw should be of a size that a single lift using available aircraft or ships could extract it. With this method, no unit remains on the ground without the capacity to temporarily withstand hostile action. Leaving a smaller force might tempt some unfriendly element to inflict casualties on the last group to leave.

5-64. If the situation deteriorates, the evacuation force commander can decide to leave nonessential items of equipment on the ground and evacuate the force. He must recognize the propaganda value this precipitous action has for forces that can accuse the United States of withdrawing in disorder. Because such an action might have awkward repercussions, the evacuation force commander takes this action only in dire circumstances.

5-65. In a permissive environment, the commander may reverse the withdrawal sequence for units. Initially, combat elements may withdraw while the support elements, along with a small security element, may remain in the HN and redeploy last.

5-66. Once the entire evacuation force departs, the JTF or JSOTF commander notifies the GCC that the evacuation is complete. He gives similar notification when the last aircraft or ship leaves the airspace or territorial waters of the HN.

5-67. During the initial planning process, the tasking headquarters determined the destination of the evacuation force. If there is no reason for the evacuation force to go to a safe haven, it returns to its home

base as soon as possible. If another mission exists for the evacuation force, the commander adjusts accordingly.

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER ORGANIZATION

5-68. The ECC staff, supporting the DOS, conducts processing and screening associated with NEOs. It also performs selected NEO logistical functions. However, the JTF or JSOTF should be prepared to perform or augment these functions, if necessary. The number of evacuees, environment of the evacuation, and location of the evacuation area will determine size and composition of the ECC.

5-69. The three guiding principles for any ECC are as follows:

- **Accuracy.** Every individual that evacuation personnel should account for are accounted for.
- **Security.** Personnel are safeguarding evacuees and the JTF from all threats.
- **Speed.** Personnel are processing evacuees quickly and efficiently.

5-70. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The ECC's purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven in another country or the United States. The ECC screens all evacuees to certify identification, ensure that documentation is accurate, and verify all information provided is current. Representatives from the consular affairs section should be in the ECC to help determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees. If an evacuee arrives without an escort, processing personnel should verify the identity and evacuation eligibility of the individual before allowing him to enter the ECC. The processing center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation. The processing center consists of the following:

- **Headquarters section.** Personnel in the headquarters section perform the following:
 - Plan, organize, and supervise the operation of the ECC.
 - Maintain liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation.
 - Advise the JTF on the progress of the evacuation.
 - Maintain communications with all elements of the evacuation force, to include ships, control aircraft, remote sites, evacuation vehicles, DOS personnel, and HN security.
- **Reception station.** Reception station personnel collect all available information from the marshalling teams that escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling team's logbook is valuable because it may reduce the processing time.
- **Security screening station.** Personnel assigned to the security screening station will search all evacuees and their baggage for restricted items. Personnel will separate and individually screen evacuees suspected of possible criminal or enemy agent activity.
- **Registration station.** Registration station personnel should complete all administrative paperwork before evacuees leave the country.
- **Debriefing station (optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation).** Human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel should staff the debriefing station. Personnel debrief each evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the evacuees, or other USG activities in the country.
- **Medical station.** Medical station personnel provide emergency medical treatment and immunizations required by the safe haven country. As necessary, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station to receive first aid and to identify medical conditions that may affect the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded individuals complete processing.
- **Transportation station.** Transportation station personnel prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles.

- **Comfort station.** Comfort station personnel provide a temporary waiting area for evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft.
- **Temporary refugee holding area.** While the OIC of the ECC cannot grant requests for asylum, he can provide temporary refuge for persons in imminent physical danger, if such measures do not compromise the security of the ECC, in a temporary refugee holding area. DOS representatives must handle all requests for asylum.

EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER PROCEDURES

5-71. ECC personnel process evacuees through the stations discussed above. The following paragraphs discuss each station's processing procedures.

RECEPTION STATION

5-72. Upon arrival at the reception station, personnel move the evacuees into a holding area. In the holding area, personnel receive and brief the evacuees. Senior officials should give the initial briefing. The briefing should provide enough information to ease fears about the evacuation process. The briefing should include the following:

- A summary of the reasons for the evacuation.
- The stations through which the evacuees will process.
- An explanation of the need for an inspection of personnel and baggage.
- The support evacuees can expect at the temporary safe haven.
- The general process evacuees will experience upon arrival in the United States.
- The support the repatriation center will provide the evacuees.

5-73. Reception station personnel will perform the following:

- Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity whenever possible).
- Maintain a roster of each evacuee. Roster information should include nationality; date of birth; evacuation classification; profession; destination; and name, address, or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.
- Collect evacuee information from marshalling and search teams.
- Ensure each evacuee proves his identify through, dependent identification cards, seaman's papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship. Check evacuee's identification against the list of potential evacuees provided by the Consulate.
- Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing center. The reception station should provide very important persons (VIPs) and emergency medical cases individual guides, if available.

SECURITY SCREENING STATION

5-74. Security screening station personnel search evacuees and their baggage for restricted items. Personnel separately screen evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals. Personnel should escort foreign diplomats, VIPs, and emergency medical cases and their families through the security station. Security station personnel will perform the following:

- Inspect for restricted items. Personnel should inspect each evacuee and bag at the conclusion of the briefing. They must also screen areas they are using for individual inspections. Handheld metal detectors can expedite the inspections. Security personnel must confiscate all restricted items. They must remember that many foreign countries sell drugs over the counter that the United States requires a prescription to obtain. Medical personnel on the inspection team can aid in identifying these drugs.
- Impound all weapons, excluding those of USG personnel, and issue receipts to the owners. Personnel should consult Embassy or customs officials about the disposition of these weapons. Unless the weapons are illegal in the United States, the USG will return the weapons to the owners at the repatriation center.

- Refrain from searching the persons, property, papers, and families of foreign ambassadors or diplomats without specific direction from the DOS.
- Refrain from searching diplomatic pouches.
- Prohibit searched evacuees from returning to the reception holding area and vice versa.
- Separate evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals and escort them to the screening and interrogation station. Personnel should ensure these individuals understand that the screening is voluntary and is a prerequisite to evacuation. At the conclusion of the interrogation, these evacuees will be allowed to continue the processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area.

Note: Security personnel can deny passage of personal baggage that they suspect of containing restricted items. Based on reasonable belief, the ECC OIC may refuse to evacuate any baggage suspected of containing weapons, explosives, or restricted items.

REGISTRATION STATION

5-75. At the registration station, foreign nationals must either be on the Embassy or post list of potential evacuees or be approved by the U.S. Embassy staff before they can continue processing. The Ambassador or designated representative is the final authority on the acceptability of evacuee identification. Personnel maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality; date of birth; evacuation classification; profession; destination; and name, address, or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification. Personnel complete this roster in duplicate. The Ambassador or designated representative is the final authority on acceptability of evacuee identification. If there are doubts about a person's identity, registration station personnel should turn the matter over to the DOS and evacuate the person.

5-76. Registration station personnel should ensure that there is supervision of all foreign nationals until they receive a clearance for evacuation or an escort outside the ECC. Security personnel should be available to react to any hostile incidents.

5-77. Each evacuee should do the following:

- Prove identity by using passports, dependent identification cards, seaman's papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship.
- Sign a Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity when refusing evacuation assistance.
- Provide information concerning background and personal history to the registration clerks. The DOS's *Emergency Planning Handbook* (EPH) provides for Optional Form (OF) 28, (Evacuation Documentation). The OF 28 is a standard one-page form that has three carbon copies. The form contains critical information, such as personal data, citizenship status, a privacy warning, and a promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC while the evacuees can use the copies as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in-processing at the temporary safe haven.
- Receive a copy of Department of Defense (DD) Form 2585, (Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet). Evacuees should complete the DD Form 2585 before they arrive at the repatriation center.

DEBRIEFING STATION

5-78. The debriefing station is optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation. Human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel should staff the debriefing station. Debriefing station personnel interview each evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, the evacuation force mission, the evacuees, or other USG activities in the country. Information that might be of interest to the debriefing station personnel includes the following:

- Locations of other potential evacuees.
- Changes in the political situation.

- Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might oppose the evacuation.
- Intent of a threatening third party, to include considering the following:
 - What is the capability and likelihood of the third party carrying out a threat?
 - Can the third party be influenced?
 - Can the potential threat be stopped or countered?

MEDICAL STATION.

5-79. As necessary, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for first aid (Figure 5-4) and identification of medical conditions that affect the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should—

- Determine if any evacuee requires emergency medical treatment or evacuation.
- Verify inoculations necessary for the safe haven country, if necessary.
- Prepare to treat trauma injuries should the situation deteriorate.
- Perform emergency treatment, as necessary.
- Isolate evacuees with infectious diseases.



Figure 5-4. Evacuee screening at a medical station

TRANSPORTATION STATION

5-80. Personnel assigned to the transportation station should—

- Prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles.
- Coordinate surface or air transportation (Figure 5-5, page 5-15) to include movement of personnel to the evacuation area, transportation of evacuees to designated aircraft or landing craft, and internal evacuation site requirements.
- Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard vehicles, aircraft, or landing craft.
- Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel, showing destination and identification information.
- Organize evacuees into transportation groups (chalks), issue boarding passes for aircraft, and verify baggage tags.

- Verify that information on the passenger manifest agrees with information on the evacuee register.
- Ensure there are enough transportation assets to transport evacuees and their baggage to the POE.



Figure 5-5. Evacuation by air transport

COMFORT STATION

5-81. The comfort station is a temporary waiting area for evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft. Comfort station personnel should make the evacuees' stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy.

5-82. If possible, comfort stations should provide evacuees with the following:

- Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies.
- Senior personnel, medical personnel, unit ministry teams, and assistants available to counsel evacuees, especially families with young children.
- Male and female personal items.
- Restroom or latrine facilities.

TEMPORARY REFUGEE HOLDING AREA

5-83. The USG can provide a temporary refugee holding area for personnel who are ineligible for evacuation but are in imminent physical danger. The ECC can choose not to provide this area if resources

are not available or if it might compromise the security of the operation. The temporary refugee holding area personnel will perform the following:

- Ensure the refugees are kept secure and separate from actual evacuees.
- Search all refugees for restricted items, especially weapons.
- Brief the refugees on the following items:
 - The temporary refugee holding area is only for individuals in immediate physical danger.
 - The qualifications for admission to this station do not constitute asylum.
 - The only agency that can consider and grant requests for asylum is the DOS.
 - The DOS handles requests for asylum on an individual basis.
 - The DOS will brief evacuees on the criteria for asylum.
- Release, retain, or evacuate the refugees in accordance with instructions given by the COM.

CLASSIFICATION, PRIORITIES, AND CONSIDERATION FOR EVACUEES

5-84. For organizational purposes, all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator. These categorizations are critical to the smooth execution and success of the operation. ECC personnel use them when identifying, moving, and locating evacuees. The staff should keep abreast of changes in the total numbers of potential evacuees through updates from the Embassy staff. These updates include the total number for all evacuees and a number for each evacuee category.

CLASSIFICATION

5-85. The evacuee classification system shown in Figure 5-6 governs priorities of evacuations. A priority designator includes a combination of a Roman numeral and a capital letter, indicating major and minor priorities of each individual. If the USG accepts responsibility for an alien, personnel afford him the same major and minor category consideration as other U.S.-sponsored evacuees.

Major Categories
I—American citizens.
II—Alien immediate family members of American citizens.
III—Foreign-service national and TCN employees of the USG.
IV—Eligible non-U.S. citizens who are seriously ill or injured or whose lives are in imminent peril (but who do not qualify for a higher priority.
V—Others eligible (as directed by the Ambassador of JFC).
Minor Categories
A—Pregnant women.
B—Unaccompanied children under 18.
C—Aged and infirm.
D—Adults with children.
E—Adults 18 or older.

Figure 5-6. Classification of evacuees

FIRST PRIORITY

5-86. In NEOs, the first priority is U.S. citizens. The USG evacuates individuals in the following order:

- Those with current identification, such as passports, birth certificates, DOD identification cards, seaman’s papers, and aircrew cards, and individuals the Ambassador designates as first priority, regardless of national affiliation. The Ambassador is the final authority.

- Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for less than 10 years.
- Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for over 10 years.

GUIDELINES

5-87. Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:

- Evacuees are not enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).
- Personnel should use the minimum force.
- Evacuation can be an unsettling experience—especially for separated children and families. As a rule, a patient, courteous, and professional attitude will calm both the situation and the evacuees.
- Personnel should exercise limitations on baggage dependent upon the situation.
- Personnel must ensure evacuees remain with their baggage.
- Personnel must search baggage for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or restricted items. ECC personnel should be considerate but firm; safety of personnel is paramount.
- JTF or JSOTF leaders should establish a policy concerning pets. Whenever possible, ECC personnel should allow pets to accompany evacuees unless doing so jeopardizes health or security conditions. If pets arrive for evacuation, ECC personnel should establish a pet-control facility.
- ECC personnel should not accept gifts, tips, or bribes. All personnel must be aware of this prohibition.
- Personnel should refer all questions pertaining to evacuees to the DOS representative in the ECC.
- Personnel should allow higher-priority evacuees elect lower-priority evacuation to avoid separating families. If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of a family, the USG will medically evacuate the entire family.
- Personnel must have well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance services.
- Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in identification.
- Medical personnel should provide patients with written instructions for medical care, when possible—especially for children.

REQUEST FOR ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE

5-88. International law and custom have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to any person, regardless of nationality, in imminent physical danger. It is U.S. policy to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to TCNs solely for humanitarian reasons when exceptional circumstances place their lives and safety in imminent danger. The OIC of an aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides what measures are prudent to take when providing temporary refuge.

5-89. ECC personnel will not release information to the media concerning requests for asylum until the DOS clears the information for release. ECC personnel must report any requests by foreign governments for the return of an individual to the DOS representative.

5-90. The ECC safeguards evacuees seeking refuge or asylum until the Ambassador makes a determination of status. ECC personnel should not release personnel against their will to a third-party force. ECC personnel must consider the safety of JTF personnel and the security of the unit. In addition, ECC personnel must—

- Grant temporary refuge to individuals in imminent danger, regardless of whether they ask for asylum or temporary refuge.
- Allow DOS representatives handle asylum requests through the appropriate channels.
- Establish procedures to notify the GCC of all actions relating to requests for asylum.

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Chapter 6

Temporary Safe Haven Operations

The DOS designates safe havens. A temporary safe haven is a location in an area or country that the USG can move evacuees to quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven is in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an intermediate or temporary safe haven.

TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN SITE

6-1. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. An intermediate safe haven may be a U.S. Navy ship; however, personnel should move the evacuees from the ship to land-based safe havens (in the United States or a third country) as quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is necessary, the DOS coordinates with the government where it will be located. Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is necessary.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAFE HAVEN SITES

6-2. The DOS considers the following factors when selecting a site:

- Presence of OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to ensure mission success and prevent undue pressure against the temporary safe haven government.
- Capability to communicate with the ECC, JSOTF headquarters, and local Embassy.
- Suitability of airfield or port capacity for the aircraft or ships the USG will use for both the evacuation and later the onward movement for the evacuees. The DOS considers the following suitability factors:
 - Capability of port or airfield for 24-hour operations.
 - Availability of HN controllers to staff the airfield and the requirement for JTF controllers.
 - Balance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of anticipated airflow.
 - Numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation and the total number of aircraft.
 - Condition of aircraft parking areas.
 - Dimension and condition of runways and taxiway.
 - Availability of logistical airfield search and rescue, security, fire fighting, and logistic support.
 - Availability of airfield maintenance support.
 - Capabilities of airfield facilities.
 - Channel and harbor depth.
 - Berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages.
 - Capabilities and types and of tugs.
 - Availability of equipment to load or offload ships, if necessary.
 - Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic conditions.
 - Proximity of major transportation hubs.
 - Availability of adequate billeting, rations, and potable water for evacuees and the temporary safe haven force.

6-3. Although temporary safe haven personnel operate under the authority of the host government, the local population may not extend their goodwill. The temporary safe haven may be a prime target for terrorism and riots. The JSOTF should plan for such situations to protect both evacuees and JSOTF personnel.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

6-4. The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC's processing section, operates under the control of the JSOTF. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following elements:

- Command group.
- Reception team.
- Processing team.
- Comfort team.
- Scheduling team.
- Security team.

COMMAND GROUP

6-5. The command group coordinates the overall operation. The command group consists of the commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), communications officer, family center staff, chaplain, liaison officers, and interpreters. The family center staff provides and coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The chaplain ministers to the spiritual needs of the safe haven force and evacuees and helps them deal with the stress and hardship created by the evacuation. The liaison officers and interpreters maintain contact with the U.S. Embassy and the host government. The command group is responsible for the following:

- Planning, organizing, and supervising the operation of the temporary safe haven.
- Maintaining liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies involved with the operation.
- Advising the CDRJTF on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations.
- Establishing procedures for government officials and TCNs, if not previously established by the JTF.
- Establishing provisions for searching women, children, disabled persons, and injured persons.

RECEPTION TEAM

6-6. This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section. The briefing section should brief the evacuees upon their arrival concerning the following:

- The current political situation in the HN.
- The description and operation of the temporary safe haven.
- The travel options and arrangements.
- The customs requirements in the temporary safe haven.
- The projected departure times for flights to the United States.

6-7. The PAO, working with HN personnel, releases accurate and timely information to the media. However, release of information on the NEO or temporary safe haven operations within each country is the responsibility of the Ambassador. Temporary safe haven PAO responsibilities are as follows:

- Advise the temporary safe haven commander on all aspects of PA.
- Coordinate and supervise all PA and command information functions to include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information media.
- Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA.

- Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its operations to the news media according to JTF policies.
- Escort civilian and military news media representatives.
- Prohibit the news media from entering evacuee billeting areas.
- Ensure that both the CDRJTF and the individual both give permission before the media conducts an interview.
- Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information to the public.

PROCESSING TEAM

6-8. The processing team should not duplicate the ECC processing, but the team should verify that all information from the ECC is complete and correct. The administration, transportation, intelligence, and medical sections are part of the processing team.

Administrative Section

6-9. The administrative section registers and tracks all evacuees and ensures that the appropriate sections collect all DOS- or JTF-required information. The administrative section should have legal personnel advise evacuees on claims procedures and assist in relations between evacuees, safe haven personnel, and host-country nationals. Appendix H provides legal considerations in the event of a NEO. The administrative section should—

- Receive and register incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives.
- Maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. The roster should list the following:
 - Nationality.
 - Date of birth.
 - Evacuation classification.
 - Profession.
 - Destination.
 - Name, address, or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.
- Provide escorts for groups of personnel. Very important personnel and emergency medical cases should receive individual guides, if available.
- Provide for the safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait for onward transportation to the United States.
- Provide assistance in locating separated family members.

Transportation Section

6-10. The transportation section is responsible for assisting in the onward movement of evacuees to their final destination. The USG does not provide for the movement of persons other than U.S. employees and family members. Nongovernmental employees evacuated by U.S.-funded charter, whether commercial or military, sign promissory notes to cover the cost of transportation. To ensure an orderly movement, the transportation section should—

- Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees to the United States.
- Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the joint reception coordination center.
- Provide loading-control personnel to supervise the loading of personnel aboard aircraft, ships, or vehicles.
- Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel. The roster should include destination and identification information.
- Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, or wounded.

Intelligence Section

6-11. The intelligence section may debrief each evacuee if the evacuees did not receive a debriefing at the JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a temporary ISB, intelligence section personnel should arrange to pass information gained from evacuees to those forces that are returning to a threat area for follow-on operations. Intelligence section personnel should also report information to the joint intelligence center.

Medical Section

6-12. The medical section provides support to the temporary safe haven force. In addition, if the ECC did not conduct medical screening, the medication section will need to conduct evacuee medical screening. Medical section services may include any or all of the following:

- Determining if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment.
- Performing emergency treatment or coordinating with a local hospital to perform the treatment.
- Advising the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine.
- Inspecting food and water obtained from local sources.
- Evaluating the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases.

COMFORT TEAM

6-13. The comfort team provides logistical support for the operation. It is responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food, and local transportation. The comfort team's contracting or purchasing officer coordinates services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:

- **Shelter.** Ideally, billeting is accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or contracted from the temporary safe haven country. However, the JTF may need to establish a tent city. In this event, the temporary safe haven force arrives early enough to accomplish this before evacuees begin arriving. The CDRJTF may consider contracting locally for the labor and sanitation facilities.
- **Food.** Because evacuees will normally leave the HN with little or no food supplies, the comfort team may use meals, ready to eat as a temporary solution to the evacuees' lack of food. However, the temporary safe haven OIC should be prepared to establish a food service section to provide special diets to foreign nationals or TCNs involved in the evacuation.
- **Climate.** If the climate of the country is substantially different from the evacuee's former area or residence, the team may need to provide adequate clothing.
- **Hygiene.** Evacuees may not have been able to pack personal, comfort, or hygiene items before arriving at the evacuation site. The following is a partial list of items the evacuees may need:
 - Baby formula.
 - Trash bags.
 - Baby food or juice.
 - Diapers.
 - Toilet paper.
 - Feminine hygiene supplies.
 - Toothpaste and toothbrush.
 - Soap.
 - Shampoo.
 - Razors.
 - Washing powder.
 - Sheets.
 - Towels.
 - Blankets.

- Candy.
- Wash bucket.

Note: Logistical support for NEOs has historically been the most prevalent challenge. Thousands of civilians, personnel, pets, babies, and elderly or ill evacuees complicate the logistical requirements for food and support. In addition, the military supply system does not provide for many of the types of necessary items that evacuees need.

SCHEDULING TEAM

6-14. The scheduling team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees from the temporary safe haven. The scheduling team should do the following:

- Coordinate with the transportation section for the turnover of the temporary safe haven upon embarkation of the final chalk.
- Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the POEs.
- Create a manifest for authorized passengers aboard military or commercial charter flights.

SECURITY TEAM

6-15. This team provides or arranges for adequate security at the temporary safe haven site. The security team should provide the following:

- Personnel to safeguard any aircraft located at the site.
- A processing team and related facilities.
- A perimeter security element to prevent unauthorized entry into the safe haven.
- A reaction force to respond to possible emergencies within the safe haven.

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Appendix A

Historical Noncombatant Evacuee Operations

The DOD has conducted NEOs to assist the DOS in evacuating civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel many times over the years. ARSOF or another Service's SOF participated in most of these operations in some manner. The study of past operations allows planners and operators to gain knowledge from lessons learned. This appendix provides a general composition of past NEO forces (Table A-1) and a summary of specific operations.

Table A-1. Past noncombatant evacuation operations

Operation		Forces	
1990 Liberia	Operation SHARP EDGE	JTF: 22nd MEU JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: USMC
1991 Philippines	Operation FIERY VIGIL	JTF: 13th USAF JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: Navy
1991 Somalia	Operation EASTERN EXIT	JTF: MAGTF* JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: SOF and USMC
1994 Yemen	Operation TIGER RESCUE	JTF: USAF JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: USAF
1996 Liberia	Operation ASSURED RESPONSE	JTF: SOCEUR JSOTF: SOCEUR	Supporting Forces: SOF, SETAF**, USMC
1996 Central African Republic	Operation QUICK RESPONSE	JTF: 22nd MEU JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: USMC
1997 Sierra Leone	Operation NOBLE OBELISK	JTF: MEU (SOC) JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: USMC
1997 Congo-Brazzaville	Operation FIRM RESPONSE	JTF: Unknown JSOTF: Unknown	Supporting Forces: Unknown
1997 Congo & Zaire	Operation GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL	JTF: SETAF JSOTF: SOCEUR	Supporting Forces: SOF & SETAF
1997 Albania	Operation SILVER WAKE	JTF: MEU (SOC) JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: USMC
1998 Eritrea	Operation SAFE DEPARTURE	JTF: MEU (SOC) JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: Navy and USMC
1998 Guinea-Bissau	Operation SHEPHERD VENTURE	JTF: SOCEUR JSOTF: SOCEUR	Supporting Forces: SOF
2002 Central African Republic	Operation SHEPHERD SENTRY	JTF: USEUCOM JSOTF: None	Supporting Forces: SOCEUR
2002 Cote d'Ivoire	Operation AUTUMN RETURN	JTF: USEUCOM JSOTF: SOCEUR	Supporting Forces: SOF and USAF
* Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)			
** Southern European Task Force (SETAF)			

NAMED OPERATIONS AND COMPOSITION OF EXECUTING FORCES

A-1. Operation FIERY VIGIL (Figure A-1) became the largest peacetime evacuation of active duty military personnel and family members in history. The USG diverted a strike group led by the USS Abraham Lincoln en route to the Indian Ocean in response to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to assist the humanitarian effort. The 23-ship armada sealifted nearly 45,000 people from the Subic Bay Naval Station to the Visayas Province port of Cebu.



Figure A-1. Children aboard the United States Ship Merrill during Operation FIERY VIGIL

OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE

A-2. In early April 1996, the fighting between two warring factions—the Patriotic Front of Liberia and the ethnic Krahn elements—tore Liberia apart. United Nations observers and the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were unable to stop the fighting. Over a 4-day period, 10,000 Liberians engaged in intense fighting and surrounded the U.S. Embassy. The Ambassador requested additional security and evacuation assistance. In this appendix, the History and Research Office of the United States Special Operations Command describes this particular NEO. Figure A-2, page A-3, shows the timeline of this NEO, and Figure A-3, page A-4, shows the organization of this NEO.

Timeline	
June-September 1990	Liberian rebels lay siege to Monrovia to oust President Samuel K. Doe. ECOMOG peacekeeping force enters Liberia to end the siege. Rebels break into ethnic warlord militias. Seven years of civil war begin.
August 1995	Leaders sign the 13th peace plan since 1989. This plan establishes a ruling council and mandates that the presidency rotate among council members until elections determine the president.
6 April 1996	Fighting erupts between warlord factions in and around Monrovia after the ruling council attempts to oust Roosevelt Johnson.
9 April 1996	Special Operations Component, European Command (SOCEUR) security elements secure the U.S. Embassy. United States Air Force (USAF) SOF helicopters begin evacuating the first of 2,200 personnel to Freetown, Sierra Leone.
11 April 1996	Elements of an Army airborne company based in Italy augment SOCEUR forces.
12 April 1996	CONUS-based ARSOF and Army special operation aviation begin air evacuation operations from Monrovia. Personnel are conducting air-refueling operations.
19 April 1996	Factions declare a cease-fire, but sporadic fighting continues. ECOMOG leaders meet to refocus the peace process.
20 April 1996	Approximately 250 Marines relieve SOF security, air evacuation elements, and Army security forces at the Embassy. The Marines begin evacuating the remaining 750 civilians. The Marine commander assumes command of the Operation ASSURED RESPONSE task force.

Figure A-2. Monrovia and Liberia timeline

A-3. On 7 April 1996, U.S. Ambassador William B. Milam requested additional security forces. Because of this request, the National Command Authorities officially notified the Commander, United States European Command (CDRUSEUCOM) to prepare for a NEO. The CDRUSEUCOM assigned this mission to the SOCEUR. The commander gave the mission the code name Operation ASSURED RESPONSE.

A-4. When the CDRUSEUCOM notified the SOCEUR of the NEO, the command was supporting ongoing operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recovery mission for personnel killed in the crash of a USAF CT-43. Fortunately, the SOCEUR staff and its components had previously developed NEO plans.

A-5. Limited options were available for the insertion of the evacuation force and for the removal of evacuees. Warring factions had surrounded the two existing airports in Monrovia. These airports were also in poor condition. The lack of airfields and time available affected the possible COAs. One possible COA involved an MC-130 flying off the coast of Monrovia US Navy SEALs (sea-air-land) and parachuting into the ocean. The aircrew would also drop two combat, rubber, raiding crafts into the ocean. The other COA involved deployed SOF helicopters reassembling at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and then inserting security forces at the Embassy (a 90-minute insertion flight). Both COAs involved the use of helicopters for the exfiltration of evacuees.




Figure A-3. Organization of Operation ASSURED RESPONSE

A-6. The USEUCOM operations director authorized the deployment of an ESAT to Monrovia. The ESAT would review the security situation and provide SOCEUR an evaluation of the situation. On 7 April 1996, NAVSOF and the initial forward command element departed on two MC-130 aircraft for the ISB (Freetown). The SOCEUR FCE established the Operation ASSURED RESPONSE JTF headquarters while the NAVSOF prepared to reinforce the Embassy.

A-7. The JTF headquarters element ran the ISB operation at Freetown. The ISB was responsible for the following:

- Conducting helicopter operations to and from the Embassy.
- Resupplying the Embassy with food, water, and medical provisions.
- Handling the aircraft bringing supplies, equipment, and personnel.
- Managing the transfer of evacuees to aircraft for the flight to the safe haven.

A-8. MH-53J helicopters deployed from Brindisi, Italy, and Mildenhall, England, by C-5 transport to the ISB. They arrived on 8 April. Personnel reassembled one of the helicopters on 9 April. The ESAT and 12 NAVSOF departed for the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. They were to provide the JTF with a situational update and the Embassy with increased security.

A-9. On 9 April 1996, a portion of the JTF staff, additional NAVSOF, and an element from 1-10th SFG(A) arrived in Monrovia (Figure A-4, page A-5). The JTF staff established the JTF headquarters in the Embassy while the 1-10th SFG(A) assumed responsibility for the ECC and Embassy security. Over the next two days, additional SF personnel arrived. On 10 April 1996, the ECC became operational.

A-10. Members of the 1-10th SFG(A) established and maintained reception, registration, medical screening, and transportation stations (Figure A-5, page A-5). From 10 to 14 April, the ECC processed around 1,800 evacuees. On 15 April 1996, elements of the 3-325th Infantry relieved the SEALs and SF, who returned to the ISB. The MH-53Js and MH-47s continued to support evacuation flights through 19 April 1996, completing 98 sorties and evacuating over 2,126 individuals (436 U.S. citizens) from 76 different countries.



Figure A-4. A helicopter landing at the Embassy in Monrovia



Figure A-5. Special Forces Soldiers escort evacuees from a transportation station

A-11. On 20 April 1996, the Commander, Task Force 62, (USS GUAM Amphibious Ready Group relieved the Commander, Special Operations Command, United States European Command (CDRSOCEUR) as the commander of the Operation ASSURED RESPONSE JTF. In only a few days, SOF successfully accomplished a complex mission using a variety of in-theater and CONUS units. Task Force 62 continued Operation ASSURED RESPONSE until it was relieved in late June. A Special Purpose Marine A-ground task force relieved the ARG and completed the mission in August 2006. A USSOCOM History and Research Office document contains more information on the operation including detailed tactical information, such as placement of security positions within the Embassy, lessons learned, and TTP for coordination of airframe flow into the evacuation area.

OPERATION AUTUMN RETURN

A-12. In the late 1990s, Cote d'Ivoire, a prosperous West African nation, began to unravel politically (Figure A-6, pages A-6 and A-7). In December 1999, the military overthrew the government for the first time in Cote d'Ivoire's history. In late 2000, Junta leader Robert Guei overtly rigged elections and proclaimed victory. Popular protest forced him to step down and placed Laurent Gbagbo in power. Ivorian dissidents and disaffected members of the military launched a failed coup attempt in September 2002. The political and military crisis led to fighting, which threatened hundreds of TCNs and a significant number of U.S. citizens, most notably students at the International Christian Academy located in Bouake. In response to the crisis, the U.S. Ambassador to Cote d'Ivoire requested an evacuation of U.S. citizens. From 24 September to 4 October 2002, USEUCOM directed the evacuation of over 300 U.S. citizens and TCNs.

Timeline
<p>1993 Henri Konan Bedie becomes president following the death of Houphouet-Boigny.</p> <p>October 1995 A disputed election puts Bedie back in power.</p> <p>July 1999 Alassane Ouattara leaves his job at the International Monetary Fund and returns to run for president. His plan to face Bedie divides the country along ethnic and religious lines.</p> <p>1999 The military overthrows Bedie in a coup led by Robert Guei. Bedie flees to France.</p> <p>October 2000 Guei declares that he won the elections and claims the presidency. Guei flees in the wake of a popular revolt against the alleged rigging of the election.</p> <p>January 2001 The attempted coup fails.</p> <p>March 2001 After Alassane Ouattara's party gains the majority at local polls, the public calls for new presidential and legislative elections.</p> <p>June 2001 Amnesty International criticizes the government's human rights record over the alleged killings of 57 civilians during the 2000 election campaign. However, in August, investigations clear eight gendarmes accused of the killings.</p> <p>October 2001 President Gbagbo sets up a national reconciliation forum. General Guei refuses to attend in protest against his aide's arrest.</p> <p>November 2001 Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara returns to the country, ending his yearlong exile in France and Gabon.</p> <p>1993 Henri Konan Bedie becomes president following the death of Houphouet-Boigny.</p> <p>October 1995 A disputed election puts Bedie back in power.</p> <p>July 1999 Alassane Ouattara leaves his job at the International Monetary Fund and returns to run for president. His plan to face Bedie divides the country along ethnic and religious lines.</p>

Figure A-6. Cote d'Ivoire timeline of events

Timeline (continued)	
1999	The military overthrows Bedie in a coup led by Robert Guei. Bedie flees to France.
October 2000	Guei declares that he won the elections and claims the presidency. Guei flees in the wake of a popular revolt against the alleged rigging of the election.
January 2001	The attempted coup fails.
March 2001	After Alassane Ouattara's party gains the majority at local polls, the public calls for new presidential and legislative elections.
June 2001	Amnesty International criticizes the government's human rights record over the alleged killings of 57 civilians during the 2000 election campaign. However, in August, investigations clear eight gendarmes accused of the killings.
October 2001	President Gbagbo sets up a national reconciliation forum. General Guei refuses to attend in protest against his aide's arrest.
November 2001	Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara returns to the country, ending his yearlong exile in France and Gabon.
August 2002	The forum grants Ouattara's party four ministerial posts in new government.
September 2002	A mutiny in Abidjan by demobilizing soldiers grows into a full-scale rebellion, with rebels from the Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement seizing control of the north.
October-December 2002	A short-lived cease-fire in October gives way to further clashes and a battle for the key cocoa-industry town of Daloa. Previously unknown rebel groups seize towns in the west.
January 2003	President Gbagbo accepts an invitation to peace talks in Paris. A peace proposal is made involving power-sharing.

Figure A-6. Cote d'Ivoire timeline of events (continued)

OTHER OPERATIONS

A-13. Operation AUTUMN RETURN is not the most well-known or well-documented operation. Operation NOBLE OBELISK is well-known in the ARSOF community and is often used as an example or case study in institutional training. After action reports at the JTF and operational detachment level, unit histories, and monographs written for these cover many of the operations listed in this appendix. Each of these operations can provide important operational lessons that aid in the successful execution of the next NEO that ARSOF supports.

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Appendix B

Guidelines for Rules of Engagement

NEOs are not strictly under the control of either the GCC or the CDRJTF. These commanders are responsible for the conduct of military operations in support of the NEO. The chief of mission is responsible for the NEO and the final ROE.

OVERVIEW

B-1. The ROE for NEOs should reflect the limited military objective that the USG wants to accomplish. The ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to prevent a commander and his Soldiers from violating the national policy of the USG or the law of land warfare. The ROE for NEOs limit the use of military force to the level necessary to complete the mission successfully, to provide for self-defense of the military force, and to defend evacuees. Figure B-1 shows a sample ROE card.

Rules of Engagement for Soldiers
<p>ROE Before Hostilities</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.2. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these ROE.3. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to—<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death. Do not use deadly force to protect yourself from the threat of mere harassment, such as someone throwing rocks at you, or minor injury.b. Defend other U.S. and multinational Soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack.c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment. Your leaders will point out critical areas and outline challenging procedures. <p>Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in the OPLAN or operation order (OPORD).</p> <p>ROE During Hostilities</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">4. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.5. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these ROE.6. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to—<ol style="list-style-type: none">a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death.b. Defend other U.S., allied, and coalition Soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack.c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment.d. Use indirect fire only when the task force commander approves the use of such fire.7. Avoid injuring innocent civilians or their property, medical personnel, and chaplains; they are protected targets. An individual attacking you is not a protected target. You should—8. Avoid firing into a crowd of apparent noncombatants because you may start a riot or injure innocent people.9. Refrain from firing automatic weapons into a crowd unless ordered to do so or unless doing so is absolutely necessary to save your life or the lives of other U.S., allied, and coalition Soldiers and U.S. citizens.10. Your leaders may change these ROE; follow their orders. <p>Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in OPLAN or OPORD.</p>

Figure B-1. Sample rule of engagement card for Soldiers

B-2. The commander may coordinate these ROE with HN authorities and disseminate them to the indigenous population as part of the CA and PSYOP programs. This will inform the population of the reasons for U.S. actions and help minimize civilian interference with the operation. Commanders and Soldiers have an inherent right to protect the force from attack. The ROE do not diminish this responsibility. However, the ROE do enable the commander to determine the line between aggressive or offensive actions and defensive actions.

B-3. Soldiers conduct defensive actions only as aggressively as necessary to protect U.S. lives, property, and equipment. Defensive actions may include pursuit only until the attacker is no longer in a position to inflict casualties upon U.S. personnel, property, or equipment. Subordinate commanders will thoroughly indoctrinate all personnel in the need for minimum force, humane treatment of evacuees, and good order and discipline when conducting NEOs. Commanders at all echelons will use the minimum force necessary for each situation and will take no action that the local population might interpret as initiating hostilities.

B-4. Ideally, the ROE should allow for centralized control at the JTF level and decentralized execution of fire support, close air support, and employment of riot control agents. If possible, the evacuation force commander should have the authority to employ supporting arms to ensure the safety of the force and the accomplishment of the mission. However, national strategic policy and political considerations are the usual basis for the ROE, not tactical considerations. If directed by the commander, the ROE may include prohibitions from The Hague and Geneva Conventions. The following are prohibitions from the Hague and Geneva conventions:

- Personnel cannot declare that they will give no quarter.
- Personnel cannot kill or wound an enemy who lays down his weapon or surrenders. If an enemy cannot defend himself, personnel cannot kill or wound him.
- Personnel will not shoot small arms, crew-served weapons, or artillery into undefended populated areas or buildings.
- Personnel will not fire on religious, social, civic, and historic monuments or facilities. Personnel will not fire on hospitals or places where the sick or wounded are, unless the enemy is using them for military purposes. In this instance, the definition of military purpose is a threat to the accomplishment of the NEO. Attack on any of the aforementioned facilities is only warranted if the enemy is using the facility to initiate hostile, aggressive acts; endanger the lives of evacuees or members of the task force; or prevent mission accomplishment.
- Personnel cannot loot.
- Personnel will not destroy or seize any property unless such destruction or seizure is operationally necessary within the above parameters. Personnel will not destroy medical supplies and equipment.
- In addition to the above, personnel will ensure that—
 - All money, effects, and articles of personal property, except arms, military equipment, and military documents, remain in the possession of the prisoners and detainees.
 - All captured or detained individuals are afforded humane treatment.

SUGGESTED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-5. In permissive and uncertain environments, unarmed hostile forces may attack or threaten U.S. personnel. The on-site commander may reduce or overcome the threat with the following:

- **Verbal.** The commander may issue warnings to the demonstrators.
- **Show of force.** The commander may demonstrate a show of force, including the use of crowd or riot control formations.
- **Force.** The commander may order additional force, as necessary, to meet and overcome the threat. Commanders may authorize additional force to prevent the loss of life or major damage to property and equipment. Firing on unarmed personnel is a last resort. The commander will discontinue the use of force when it is no longer necessary to accomplish its immediate purpose.
- **Riot control agents.** The commander may authorize riot control agents. The commander only utilizes these after authorization by the President and the GCC. Use of riot control agents is

subject to the effective ROE. Personnel may only use riot control agents defensively to protect U.S. personnel and installations. If the GCC has not previously granted use of these agents, the CDRJTF should request approval for use during the NEO planning phase.

B-6. If an armed, hostile force attacks U.S. personnel in a hostile environment, the following rules govern the on-site commander:

- Use adequate force to control the situation.
- Respond to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. personnel or equipment with timely fire directed only at the source of the hostile fire. Exercise restraint to avoid escalation. If possible, use sniper or marksman fire to reduce the threat.
- Use air attack only when it is the only means of protecting U.S. personnel.
- Return fire across the boundaries or territorial waters of a third country only if a hostile force continues to commit hostile acts after crossing that boundary.
- Discontinue the use of force when it is no longer necessary to accomplish its purpose. After hostilities cease, institute necessary measures to control the situation and assist the injured.

B-7. For aircraft operations, suggested ROE in permissive and uncertain environments are to report any threatening actions to the higher authority by the fastest means available. Threatening actions include—

- Small arms aimed at or following the aircraft.
- Medium-caliber or antiaircraft weapons aimed at or following the flight path of the aircraft.
- Electronic indications that fire-control radar is tracking aircraft.
- Low passes or simulated gun runs by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.

B-8. In a hostile environment, suggested ROE for aircraft operations are as follows:

- Limit actions to those necessary to reduce the threat to an acceptable level.
- Report any fire to the next-higher authority. Personnel may return fire to reduce the threat to acceptable levels and to protect the aircraft and aircrew.
- Return fire immediately to protect the aircraft and aircrew if fired upon by radar-controlled guns or missiles.
- Report threatening action by fixed-wing aircraft against helicopters immediately.

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-9. The current instructions from the CJCS apply to all U.S. forces responding to all military attacks within the United States and to all military operations outside the United States, with limited exceptions, the most prominent being for multinational force operations.

ORGANIZATION OF STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-10. The standing rules of engagement (SROE) are organized as follows:

- **Enclosure A (SROE).** This unclassified enclosure includes classified appendixes and details the general purpose, intent, and scope of the SROE, which emphasize a commander's right and obligation to use force in self-defense. Enclosure A also addresses critical principles, such as unit, individual, national, and collective self-defense; hostile act and intent; and the determination to declare forces hostile, as foundational elements of all ROE.
- **Enclosures B through H and M through O.** These classified enclosures provide general guidance on specific types of operations, such as maritime, air, land, and space operations; information operations; NEOs; counterdrug support operations; and operations conducted in US territories.
- **Enclosure I (supplemental measures).** Classified supplemental measures found in this enclosure enable a commander to obtain or grant those additional authorities necessary to accomplish an assigned mission. Supplemental measures are divided into actions requiring SecDef approval, actions requiring GCC approval, and actions delegated to subordinate

commanders (though the delegation may be withheld by higher authority). Supplemental ROE relate to mission accomplishment, not self-defense, and never limit a commander's inherent right and obligation of self-defense.

- **Enclosure J (ROE process).** This unclassified enclosure provides guidelines for incorporating ROE development into military planning processes.
- **Enclosure K.** This unclassified enclosure contains ROE references.
- **Enclosure L (Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. forces).** This unclassified enclosure covers standing rules for the use of force for U.S. forces and includes classified appendixes. The unclassified portion covers purpose and scope and provides content that cancels previous CJCS instructions and the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), and supersedes DODI 5210.56. It requires unit commanders at all levels to teach and train personnel how and when to use nondeadly and deadly force in self-defense.
- **Enclosure P.** This unclassified enclosure describes the rules for the use of force message process.
- **Enclosure Q.** This unclassified enclosure lists rules for the use of force references.

Appendix C

Notification Forms

This appendix contains NEO notification forms. Figures C-1 through C-5, pages C-1 through C-3, provide samples of NEO notification forms.

Stand Fast Notice
<p>NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____</p> <p>Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that U.S. citizens remain in their homes. U.S. citizens should only conduct essential outside activities, and they should avoid public areas until the situation improves. Since there is always the possibility that the situation will deteriorate and U.S. citizens will need to relocate, this office recommends that U.S. citizens take the following precautions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) of food, water, and fuel.2. If you have a personal automobile, ensure it is ready for immediate use. Fill the gas tank, and check the oil, water, tires, and battery.3. If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, contact us immediately at telephone _____.4. Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, marriage, divorce, and naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance policies; bankbooks; and U.S. and local currency.5. Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in duplicate.6. Prepare one suitcase (66 pounds or less) for each family member. The suitcase should contain, as applicable, warm clothing (regardless of season), eyeglasses, supplies for babies and children, and special medications.7. Listen to the local media, Voice of America, U.S. Armed Forces Radio, or the British Broadcasting Company closely for announcements from the local government or this office. <p>Your warden is _____. You can reach your warden at _____.</p> <p>This office is monitoring the situation. It will provide further guidance when necessary. Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.</p>

Figure C-1. Example stand fast notice

Leave Commercial Notice
<p>NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____</p> <p>In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends that nonessential U.S. citizens depart by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If adult U.S. citizens have compelling reasons for remaining in the area, this office suggests that their dependents depart with their pets while commercial facilities are available.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. U.S. citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid passports or visas should not come to this office for travel arrangements. Rather, they should make their own arrangements directly with transportation companies or travel agents.2. Departing individuals should inform this office by telephone (_____) or mail of their departure plans, providing their name, date, and place of passport issuance; probable date and mode of transportation; and names and addresses of next of kin; other POC in the United States; and travel agents.

Figure C-2. Example leave commercial notice

Leave Commercial Notice (continued)

3. This office cannot accept personal or real property for protection. This office will accept copies of inventories of property left in the country and attempt to arrange for protection of such property through the local authorities.
4. U.S. citizens without valid passports or those unable to arrange transport for themselves or their dependents because of financial or other reasons should report to this office as soon as possible. They should bring the following items with them:
5. U.S. passports or other proof of U.S. citizenship.
6. Passports or identification cards for non-U.S. spouses and dependents and proof of relationship (birth or marriage certificates).

Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.

Figure C-2. Example leave commercial notice (continued)

Evacuation Notice

NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____

Because of the situation in this country, the Ambassador is recommending the evacuation of all U.S. citizens. This office may terminate operations with little or no advance warning. U.S. citizens wishing USG assistance should immediately contact their wardens or this office telephone (_____). The Embassy or Consulate is arranging chartered transportation to the United States or another safe haven. The issuance of tickets is not feasible. All evacuees will sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation. The DOS will bill evacuees later for the costs evacuees incur. (USG personnel and their dependents travel on official orders; therefore, the DOS will bill their respective agencies.) To provide proper protection and to help citizens leave safely, this office asks evacuees to note the following:

1. Your warden is _____. You can reach your warden at _____.
2. Your assigned assembly area is at _____. The following apply:
3. ____ Arrive at the assembly area at _____.
4. ____ Remain alert because this office will inform you when to report to the assembly area.
5. ____ Refrain from bringing your vehicle to the assembly point.
6. ____ Bring enough food for each family member to have meals.
7. ____ Bring ready-to-eat food (canned items, sandwiches, and so on) because the assembly area does not have cooking facilities.
8. ____ Bring an unbreakable container with _____ quarts of water per person.
9. ____ Bring pets to the assembly area for transport. The DOS is allowing pets the transport of pets during this NEO.
10. ____ Refrain from bringing pets to the assembly area. The DOS is not authorizing the transport of pets during this NEO. Make arrangements for the care of your pets during your absence.

Note: Only checked items apply.

11. Bring important personal papers (passports, inoculation cards, cash, credit cards, and checkbooks) and one suitcase (66 pounds or less) per person containing clothing suitable for the local climate and a change of climate. Remember eyeglasses, special medicines, and any supplies for infants or children needed. Do not bring firearms or liquor. If authorized by the DOS, bring your pets.
12. Family members should consider the possibility of temporary separation. Adults can avoid problems by exchanging data concerning bank accounts, addresses, and telephone numbers of relatives in the United States, and powers of attorney.

Figure C-3. Example evacuation notice

Embassy or Post Closing Notice
<p>NAME OF POST: _____ DATE: _____</p> <p>The situation in this country is such that the USG is closing its offices here effective _____.</p> <p>The Embassy located at _____ will protect U.S. interests until further notice. This office recommends that U.S. citizens leave the country immediately. Until this office ceases operations, it will make every effort to assist U.S. citizens wishing to depart. Citizens planning to remain should provide their names, addresses, and next of kin to this office so that it can pass the information to the DOS and to the Embassy. Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.</p>

Figure C-4. Example Embassy or post closing notice

Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity
<p>Agreement made, this _____ day of _____, 20__, between _____ and the military forces of the United States.</p> <p>Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate _____</p> <hr/> <p>Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding that the offer will not be repeated.</p> <p>Evacuee Signature: _____</p> <p>Evacuee Signature: _____</p> <p>Evacuee Signature: _____</p>

Figure C-5. Example waiver of evacuation opportunity

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Appendix D

Emergency Action Plan Checklists

This appendix contains sample checklists (Figures D-1 through D-5, pages D-1 through D-5) from 12 FAH-1 EPH. Embassy EAPs normally contain checklists similar to these. The U.S. Department of State Bureau of Administration Web site contains additional information on this topic.

Checklist for Evacuation Assisted by the United States Military
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. What is the name and title of the U.S. official in charge of the evacuation?2. What are the names of U.S. officials remaining behind? (Attach a list with names and means of contact.)3. What are the names of post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation? (Attach list of officials. See DOS Emergency Planning Handbook, Exhibit 120. Update the list to show name, probable location, means of identification, and contact information of officer performing each relevant function).4. What are the locations of the number of military screening stations for evacuees? How many are there? What groups will assist the military?5. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?6. What are the security need for the perimeter, assembly areas, and embarkation points?7. What security will the host government or controlling authority provide?8. Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available? Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available? Where are the GIBCO products located, and who has custody of them?9. Could unauthorized individuals forcibly join the evacuation? If so, what action does the post OIC recommend?10. What action does the post OIC propose if someone asks for political asylum?11. Will the post OIC of the post vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacuees or should the evacuation force search for weapons and explosives?12. Does the post OIC want the military to conduct a physical search of the evacuees that the post cannot vouch for?13. Which personnel can conduct physical searches of female evacuees if such a search is necessary?14. What is the modified priority if the evacuation priority is different than the one stated in the post plan?15. Will food be necessary? If yes, what is the total number of meals?16. Is potable water available? What quantity of bottled water is necessary?17. Does the post anticipate any U.S. citizens refusing evacuation?18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? If the DOS authorizes evacuees to transport pets, has the evacuation force commander considered the requirements, such as customs and quarantine restrictions, to ensure the pets can enter the safe haven? If pets the DOS disallows the transport of pets, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with them to the evacuation processing centers?19. Does the post OIC anticipate that military personnel will need to search for missing evacuees? If so, where will evacuees be likely to be located? (Personnel should give radio call sign frequencies, if known.)20. What is the likelihood that search operations will meet armed resistance?21. Will post personnel need assistance destroying sensitive materials or equipment?22. Will portable radios be available to assist in the assembly, movement, and control of evacuees? How many sets? What frequencies? Additional needs?23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees, post personnel, and military personnel?

Figure D-1. Example checklist for evacuation assisted by the United States military

Checklist for Evacuation Assisted by the United States Military (continued)			
24.	What are other items that may affect the NEO?		
25.	What are local travel restrictions, curfews, and roadblocks?		
26.	What are local military activities?		
27.	How will local political or security factors affect the evacuation?		
28.	Public affairs considerations?		
29.	Can the Embassy provide interpreters if necessary?		
30.	Can the post OIC provide updated copies of the post's—		
31.	Emergency Planning Handbook, Section 1540, with exhibits?		
32.	Communications annex?		
33.	Logistics annex?		
34.	Transportation annex?		
35.	F-77 Potential Evacuees Report?		
36.	GIBCO products?		
37.	What is the number of—		
	• Litterbound wounded, injured, or ill evacuees?		
	• Ambulatory wounded, injured, or ill evacuees?		
	• Pregnant evacuees?		
38.	What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will evacuees need?		
39.	What is the breakdown of evacuees?		
	_____ 0-7 years	M	F
	_____ 8-16 years	M	F
	_____ 17-20 years	M	F
	_____ 21 years and older	M	F
40.	Will there be doctors and nurses among the evacuees?		
41.	Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees?		
42.	What is the weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation by pounds and cubic feet?		
Note: Personnel must attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.			

Figure D-1. Example checklist for evacuation assisted by the United States Military (continued)

Checklist for Assembly Area	
Location:	Date:
Assembly Area:	Primary: Alternate: Embarkation Point:
1.	Grid coordinates:
2.	Reference points:
3.	Size:
4.	Estimated capacity:
5.	Shelter:
6.	Water:
7.	Cooking facilities:
8.	Food stocks:

Figure D-2. Example checklist for assembly area

Checklist for Assembly Area (continued)		
9. Estimated people and days on hand:		
10. Latrine and shower:		
11. Control point:		
12. Telephone:		
13. Radio call sign:		
14. Access and choke points:		
15. Alternates:		
16. Nearest police station:		
17. Nearest medical facility:		
18. Distances to embarkation points:		
19. Identify helicopter LZ (if applicable):		
This report prepared by:		
Sketch attached:	Video attached:	Photo attached:

Figure D-2. Example checklist for assembly area (continued)

Helicopter Landing Zone		
Location:	Date:	
1. Designator:		
2. Locations:		
3. Grid and latitude and longitude:		
4. Reference point(s):		
5. *Dimensions:		
6. Surface:		
7. Obstacles:		
8. Recommended air approach(es):		
9. Recommended ground approach(es):		
10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s):		
11. Comments:		
Sketch attached:	Video attached:	Photo attached:
*The minimum size for an MH-47 LZ and MH-60 is 100 feet by 100 feet.		

Figure D-3. Example checklist for helicopter landing zone

Airfield Survey	
Location:	Date:
1. Name of airfield:	
2. Location (map coordinates):	
3. Fuel (type and availability):	
4. Materials-handling equipment:	
5. Elevation:	
6. Runway length:	

Figure D-4. Example checklist for airfield survey

Airfield Survey (continued)		
7. Runway width:		
8. Surface composition and estimated single-wheel loading factor:		
9. Available parking area:		
10. Largest aircraft accommodated:		
11. Instrument approach facilities and navigation aids:		
12. Aircraft obstacles:		
13. Runway and taxiway lighting:		
14. Communications (frequencies and call signs used):		
15. Physical security:		
16. Airfield control: Civilian Military		
17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue:		
18. Airfields status according to International Civil Aviation Organization standards for signs, markings, and other applicable requirements:		
19. Availability of FAA-certified air traffic controllers:		
20. Key contacts:		
21. Distance from assembly area to airport:		
Primary:		Secondary:
22. Conditions of roads leading to airport:		
23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports:		
24. On-site assembly areas and capacity:		
25. Latrine and shower facilities:		
26. Feeding facilities and capacities:		
27. Text or copy of description in Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World.		
Report prepared by:		
Sketch attached:	Video attached:	Photo attached:
Note: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during an evacuation.		

Figure D-4. Example checklist for airfield survey (continued)

Seaport Survey	
Location:	Date:
1. Name of seaport:	
2. Location (map coordinates):	
3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage:	
4. Channel depth, depending on season:	
5. Tide, depending on season:	
6. Pilots necessary or available:	
7. Navigational aids:	
8. Port or beach obstacles:	
9. Wharf (description and capabilities):	
10. Materials-handling equipment:	

Figure D-5. Example checklist for seaport survey

Seaport Survey (continued)		
11. Fuel (type and availability):		
12. Physical security available and in use:		
13. Distance from post to seaport:		
14. Conditions of roads leading to seaport:		
15. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to seaport:		
16. On-site assembly areas and capabilities:		
17. Dining facilities and capacities:		
18. Latrine and shower facilities:		
19. Location of nearest medical facility:		
20. Key contacts and key personnel:		
Report prepared by:		
Sketch attached:	Video attached:	Photo attached:

Figure D-5. Example checklist for seaport survey (continued)

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Appendix E

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Staff-Planning Considerations for Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Guidance

This appendix provides questions that personnel may use for evacuation planning and operations. These questions may serve as focus for the detailed planning and operational dialog between diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful evacuation operation.

PERSONNEL STAFF QUESTIONS

E-1. The personnel staff section should consider the following questions:

- Who will screen the evacuees?
- Will the Embassy assign its personnel to screen?
- Are there any evacuees (for example, wardens) who can help process and screen evacuees?
- What are the JTF requirements for screening?
- Has the appropriate authority verified the screening and processing areas?
- Do personnel know what actions to take if an evacuee seeks political asylum?
- Will personnel need to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees for weapons or explosives?
- Who will physically search female evacuees?
- What proof of U.S. citizenship is acceptable?
- Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation?
- Will the U.S. Embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it schedules the evacuation?
- What animals (pets) are prohibited from traveling on the designated transportation? Has the appropriate authority identified restrictions concerning animals at the safe haven location?

INTELLIGENCE STAFF QUESTIONS

E-2. The intelligence staff section should consider the following questions:

- What is the current situation in the country, in the Embassy, and near the U.S. citizens?
- Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available, who have been in the HN recently?
- Is there any immediate intelligence that the JTF needs from the evacuees?
- What discipline problems can the JTF expect from the evacuees? Who are the potential troublemakers?
- Is there any sensitive equipment or material the JTF will need to evacuate or destroy? Will personnel with requisite clearances need to help evacuate or destroy sensitive equipment or material?
- Who are the key HN personnel, and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation?
- Where are the HN police forces located? Are they available and capable? Are they loyal to the host government? Are they hostile to the United States? Is there factional infighting?
- What is the location of HN fire services? Are they available and capable?

- What is the location of HN military forces? Are they available and capable? Are they loyal to the host government? Are they hostile to the United States? Is factional infighting present?
- Will the host government provide any security for the assembly areas of evacuation sites? What are the locations of the assembly areas? Which unit will provide security? What will be the size of the security force?
- What is the potential threat? What are the strength, composition, disposition, weapons capability, and probable tactics of the potential threat?
- Will the Embassy or HN provide interpreter support?
- What organization will provide the JTF with country studies that contain requisite evacuation information, such as landing zones, concentration of U.S. citizens, port facilities, and landing beaches? By what method will that organization transmit this information to the JTF?
- Who will provide the JTF with climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic information?
- Are map products of the joint operations area and the Embassy compound available? What are the sources?
- Who is in control of and ensures familiarity with GIBCO products and other geographic information?

OPERATIONS AND PLANS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-3. The operations and plans staff section(s) should consider the following questions:

- Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO? If the evacuation is permissive, should the JTF expect unarmed hostilities? If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, will the JTF need pursuit forces? What is the likelihood of terrorist activities?
- What multinational forces will be operating in the area? Will the CDRJTF integrate multinational forces into the JTF plan? If the JTF is not incorporating multinational forces, how are the separate forces deconflicting separate plans?
- Who is the senior U.S. official in charge of the evacuation operation?
- Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the evacuation site?
- What is the chain of command for U.S. military forces?
- What is the relationship between the CDRJTF and the Ambassador?
- Will all U.S. mission or Embassy officials be leaving? If not, who will remain? What action should the CDRJTF take when an Embassy official refuses evacuation?
- Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting before final evacuation departure?
- Is the Embassy's EAP available? Is it current?
- Who is the CDRJTF's primary POC at the Embassy for details of the operation?
- What steps are being taken by the Embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation?
- Has the JTF verified and surveyed the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and routes?
- What is the total number of U.S. personnel the JTF will evacuate?
- What actions should personnel take with individuals not on the list of evacuees (for example, TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs the JTF will evacuate, and what is their total number per priority category? What identification is necessary for TCNs?
- What is the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of those listed in the EAP?
- What action should the JTF take if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees?
- Will the CDRJTF send search teams after missing evacuees?
- What are the ROE for the JTF?
- What is the guidance on the use of PSYOP?
- What is the role of CA in NEO?
- Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors?

- Has the appropriate party sent all requirements for the strategic transportation system to the United States Transportation Command center or crisis action team?
- What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel? Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying U.S. military assets? Has the JTF commander identified air requirements for units and equipment in the Joint Operation Planning Execution System? Are U.S. naval assets readily available to stage off the coast?
- What are the appropriate command and control arrangements if the JTF conducts the NEO as a combined operation?
- What support is available from other U.S. sources?
- What support is necessary by other U.S. agencies?
- What support is available from other participating nations?
- What support is necessary by other participating nations?
- Are trained explosive ordnance disposal personnel available through the HN?
- Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support capabilities?
- Will the Ambassador allow an FCE to deploy?

LOGISTICS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-4. The logistics staff section should consider the following questions:

- What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Where should the JTF locate evacuee housing? How much housing will the evacuees need? If necessary, what type and quantity of clothing will evacuees need? What type and quantity of food evacuees need? Will evacuees be in the area long enough to need food? Will evacuees need protective clothing?
- Are there procedures to handle claims against U.S. civilians?
- Who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party, if necessary?
- Will the Embassy or HN be available to provide transportation support? Where is transportation located, and what condition is it in? What type of transportation will the JTF need, and what type is available? How many people can the available transportation carry? Are operators needed?

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-5. The civil-military operations staff section should answer the following questions:

- What is the attitude of the local population toward U.S. personnel? Will the local population help or hinder U.S. operations?
- What support is available from HN civil authorities?
- What support is available from international organizations represented in the area?
- What cultural nuances and customs should the JTF evacuation force know to avoid confrontation?

COMMUNICATIONS STAFF QUESTIONS

E-6. The communications staff section should consider the following questions:

- What communications support will the Embassy provide, and how will the communication architecture be constructed to support the operations (that is, networks, frequencies, secure equipment, or relays)?
- Can the JTF send portable communications equipment to the Embassy in advance to create higher quality, secure communication?
- How will outstations (safe haven site, marshalling elements, and security elements) talk to headquarters JSOTF?

MEDICAL QUESTIONS

E-7. The medical officer should consider the following questions:

- Will the Embassy and HN provide medical support? Has the Embassy or JTF coordinated MEDEVAC procedures with the HN? Where are HN health services? What are the capabilities of the HN and Embassy health services?
- What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? Should the JTF give them precedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical condition of all evacuees? Are aeromedical evacuation assets necessary? If so, does the CDRJTF need to pre-stage those assets nearby? What are the MEDEVAC procedures?
- Which evacuees have special medical needs, such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional family member, or pediatric health care problems?

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE QUESTIONS

E-8. The PAO should consider the following questions:

- Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will the responsible party update it? Who is the lead PA director? Will the PAO evacuate media representatives?
- Are there that the PAO will restrict media access to? Is there a media support plan?
- What coordination has PAO made with the HN media to support the NEO or the NEO PSYOP plan?
- Will the HN media provide support for the NEO or the NEO PSYOP plan?

POSSIBLE DILEMMAS

E-9. Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. The CDRJTF should brief personnel and prepare them to deal with the following:

- Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given situation.
- Use of deadly force.
- Interpretation of the ROE.
- Hostile detainees who present themselves to the JTF or who the JTF capture.
- Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence.
- Terrorism.
- Bomb threats.
- Snipers.
- Nonambulatory evacuees.
- Language problems.
- Religious problems.
- Evacuees that do not appear on the Embassy list but appear to be bona fide evacuees.
- Deaths of evacuees and the evacuation of their remains.
- Evacuees (listed or unlisted) with unknown IDs.
- Evacuees carrying contraband and the disposition of the contraband.
- Civilians in overwhelming numbers coming to assembly areas or evacuation sites to request evacuation.
- Evacuees on the Embassy list refusing evacuation.
- Evacuees trying to give bribes to gain favor.
- Inaccurate evacuation lists.
- International journalists converging on the area in large numbers.

Appendix F

Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs Plan for a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (Host Nation)

This appendix includes a sample notional combatant command PA plan for a NEO (HN) that provides PA guidance. Figure F-1, pages F-1 through F-8, shows a sample plan.

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security

A. Situation.

1. General. This plan provides specific PA guidance, PA tasking, and overall concept of operations for in-theater U.S. military PA activities conducted in support of the evacuation of U.S. citizens, TCNs, and selected host-country nationals from a foreign nation. The COM has authority over media coverage of the NEO in the HN. He may authorize coverage contrary to the desires of the commander.
2. Policy. Leaders should pursue a vigorous PA program to keep U.S. and international audiences informed of NEOs to the maximum level possible that is also consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. The mission of PA is to allow the CDRJTF to conduct the mission in a manner that safeguards personnel and OPSEC while using the media to keep the U.S. public informed.
3. Assumptions.
 - a. News media pools will not deploy for this operation.
 - b. Media coverage and PA notification is authorized.
 - c. Open media coverage in HN is possible.

B. Mission.

1. To contribute to public confidence in U.S. procedures for the operation by providing the media access to unclassified, timely, and accurate accounts of the operation.
2. To describe the operations accurately as the effective use of flexible U.S. military force for an evacuation of noncombatants endangered by a hostile environment.
3. To characterize U.S. military involvement in the operation as nonconfrontational and humanitarian.
4. To illustrate the capabilities, readiness, and professionalism of U.S. forces.
5. To promote accurate media coverage of NEOs.

C. Execution.

1. Concept of operations. This plan outlines PA support for any COA. Because the situation can rapidly deteriorate from a permissive to a hostile environment, the command must prepare to support each COA separately, sequentially, and concurrently.
 - a. General. A PAO deploys with theater military forces and serves as the CDRJTF's spokesperson when there is on-scene media coverage of the operation.
 - b. Media coverage and opportunities. Commanders can anticipate that initial media coverage will focus on evacuees and their reaction to departing individuals. The media will eventually shift its focus to the effectiveness of a military NEO to the treatment of evacuees. The senior on-scene DOS PA representative will authorize all access to and interviews of evacuees. The JTF PAO and commanders will authorize any interviews with U.S. military personnel. The following media opportunity list is not exhaustive. The list should not limit additional coverage in any way. Leaders should anticipate additional opportunities under each COA.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs plan for noncombatant evacuation operation

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security (continued)

- (1) Media opportunities for permissive and uncertain evacuation include—
 - Interviews, as appropriate, and photo opportunities of evacuees awaiting transport from assembly areas to the ECC and POE.
 - Interviews and photo opportunities with military personnel at ECC and POE.
 - Photo opportunities of evacuees departing assembly areas en route to and arriving at the ECC, preparing to depart and departing, and arriving at the safe haven.
 - Photo opportunities of aircrews conducting NEOs and interviews with aircrews about the operation and their preparations for the operation.
 - Photo opportunities of military personnel as they prepare to secure and secure the assembly areas or the ECC and POE.
 - Photo opportunities of U.S. Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing the Embassy and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons or officials.
 - (2) Media opportunities for hostile evacuation include—
 - Interviews and photo opportunities with the military personnel that secured assembly areas and the POE.
 - Interviews and photo opportunities with evacuees at assembly areas, awaiting transport to the ECC and POE while en route to, arriving at, and departing the POE, and en route to and arriving at the safe haven.
 - Photo opportunities of Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing the Embassy and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons or officials.
 - (3) The commander will provide the media with the opportunity to cover all aspects of the NEO. The commander will not exclude the media from areas of ongoing operations for reasons of their personal safety. The commander's goal, as far as possible, is to treat reporters as members of the units, allowing them to move with the units without recklessly exposing them to hostile fire. Security at source applies. Personal safety and OPSEC for U.S. forces and evacuees are paramount.
 - (4) All forces participating in the operation will cooperate with media representatives on a not-to-interfere basis to keep the U.S. public informed of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces. This will include reasonable access to key command and staff personnel for briefings and interviews.
 - (5) If feasible, the CDRJTF will give media representatives needed military support to facilitate reporting on the operation. He will help media representatives file their stories and products, including granting access to military communications facilities, where feasible, when commercial facilities are not available.
- c. SITREP requirement. JTF PAO will provide daily PA input, as appropriate, to the JTF SITREP and ensure combatant command PA, Secretary of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA), Joint Staff, and component PAs are in the message plain language address dictionary (PLAD). SITREP should include assessment of media coverage, number of news media representatives present, text of communiqués, and any other significant issues or events.
 - d. After-action report. The combatant command PA submits a written after-action report with lessons learned to the OASD-PA within 60 days of completion of the operation. This report outlines successful, defines problem areas, and provides proposed solutions.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security (continued)

2. Tasks. The commands and agencies indicated will complete the following tasks:
 - a. OASD-PA will do the following:
 - (1) Confirm that information and combat camera visual documentation release authority resides with combatant command PA.
 - (2) Provide ongoing changes to approved PA guidance to combatant command PA.
 - b. Combatant command PA will do the following:
 - (1) Retain theater PA responsibility for NEOs.
 - (2) Carry out an active PA program, in collaboration with the HN Embassy and DOS representatives, consistent with personnel safety and OPSEC.
 - (3) Coordinate initial announcement, questions, and answers with appropriate the U.S. Embassy representatives and the OASD-PA.
 - (4) Provide the JTF PAO.
 - (5) Provide the combatant command PA representative to direct and coordinate PA operations at the POE.
 - c. Component commands will implement the internal information program in support of this operation.
 - d. Component PA will provide PA and VIDOC support to combatant command PA representatives, as necessary, to facilitate media coverage of evacuees arriving at the POE.
 - e. The HN Embassy will provide coordination and assistance to the JTF PAO, as feasible and appropriate.
 - f. JTF PA will do the following:
 - (1) Provide comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for media representatives in the HN if operationally feasible.
 - (2) Direct local JTF PA activities in coordination with the HN Embassy press officer.
 - (3) Provide copies or text of unclassified PA news releases or operational summaries to the combatant command PA.
3. Coordinating instructions for release of information.
 - a. The HN Embassy, combatant command PA, and at their discretion, appropriate national authorities in Washington, D.C., will make the initial public release of information.
 - b. Until the appropriate offices make the initial release, no military command is to release information about the operation. Unless the GCC or combatant command PA directs otherwise, all supporting commands involved in the NEO forward all queries and proposed responses to the combatant command PA or the JTF PAO for clearance before public release. The combatant command PA or the JTF PAO may delegate release authority to subordinate commands, if requested.
 - c. Security classification of information will be in accordance with current DOD and DOS security directives. All interviews are on the record.
 - d. If the GCC delegates release authority, component commanders may issue statements and news releases within the context of approved PA guidance and information previously released. The GCC may delegate original release authority to the JTF. The JTF PA maintains records of releases, press conferences, and responses to queries and provides significant information to the GCC by the fastest available means. Personnel will record news conferences and interviews on tape.
 - e. Personnel will protect the right and privacy of individuals according to applicable directives. The media will not interview or photograph any evacuee without the evacuee's consent.
 - f. The media will coordinate all requests for interviews with military personnel through the combatant command PA, its representatives, or the JTF PAO.
 - g. Personnel will forward transcripts or accurate accounts of news conferences and interviews to the combatant command PA and the OASD-PA by the fastest available means.

**Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs
plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)**

Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security (continued)

D. Security of Operations and Personnel.

1. Hostile evacuation. In a hostile evacuation, implementing the PA plan may present a variety of problems. It may be difficult for personnel to maintain a balance between security and release of information to the public. This does not preclude providing all possible assistance to the media to support their coverage of the operation.
2. Guidelines to follow in the presence of correspondents.
 - a. Personnel must not allow media access to intelligence centers or other classified areas or information.
 - b. Personnel must not make off the record statements in briefings or discussions with members of the media. Public or media knowledge of any classified activity associated with an operation does not imply that the information is unclassified. It also does not imply that personnel may release or confirm it.
 - c. Personnel must apply security at the source.
3. OPSEC. All PA activities will comply with OPSEC.

E. Combat Documentation (COMDOC) or VIDOC. COMDOC and VIDOC are operations functions.

1. During an operation, COMDOC or VIDOC is necessary for use in official briefings, for service to visual and audio media that are not in the area, for internal information programs, and for later PA use, such as stock footage. The following guidelines apply to providing coverage of the operation:
 - Combatant command operations arrange to deploy a combat camera team before executing NEOs.
 - The JTF PAO provides the VIDOC team guidance on PA VIDOC requirements.
 - The VIDOC team dispatches its material in a timely manner to the combat camera center (CCC) at the POE.
2. The deploying teams ensure all personnel adhere to the following dispatch procedures:
 - Personnel must address shipments containing videotape, unprocessed film, and audiotapes with captions to the CCC. Personnel must ship VIDOC products to and from the POE via military transport. Initial VIDOC products must be on the first and fastest transport.
 - The CCC will quickly process, edit, and reproduce VIDOC products and then forward them to the combatant command PA representative. The combatant command PA representative releases the VIDOC products locally and forwards copies to the OASD-PA, as appropriate. The JTF PAO ensures that an aircrew member, by name, is responsible for the material en route for delivery to the combatant command PA representative. The shipment must be marked "EXPOSED FILM—DO NOT X-RAY." Complete caption data is included.

- F. Internal Information.** Commanders and PA officers make maximum use of command information resources to explain the NEO within the bounds of what is releasable to the external public.

Section II. General Ground Rules for the Media

G. General.

1. PAO personnel are to follow the principle of maximum information flow to the public, consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. However, situations may arise where correspondents gain possession of information not yet officially released under the rules of this section. Personnel must not allow members of the media to transmit or publicly release such information until the JTF PAO officially coordinates and clears the information for release.
2. At certain times and in certain areas, personnel will restrict the movements of correspondents. While the JTF or PAO will keep these restrictions to a minimum, he will apply them when the security of the operation warrants. The JTF PAO will advise correspondents of restrictions.
3. The JTF or PAO will regard any violation of the conditions or ground rules by a correspondent as a basis for withdrawal of support.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

Section II. General Ground Rules for the Media (continued)

H. Ground Rules.

1. Releasing authority. The GCC's PA or JTF PAO will make available information concerning the protection and evacuation of noncombatants cleared for official release to the media through one of the following means:
 - a. Press releases.
 - b. Press briefings or conferences.
 - c. Special press handouts.
 - d. Interviews.
2. Categories of releasable information following initial official release.
 - a. Confirmation that U.S. forces are participating in the emergency protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens, TCNs, and selected HN nationals.
 - b. Confirmation of evacuation vehicles, ships, or aircraft plainly visible to the media.
 - c. Nonsensitive, unclassified details of the operation.
 - d. Approximate number of noncombatant evacuees.
 - e. Approximate friendly force strength figures.
 - f. Casualty figures, if any. Personnel will not release the names of casualties or fatalities until confirmation of next of kin notification.
3. Categories of unreleasable information.
 - a. Information regarding classified aspects of the NEO plan or the operation.
 - b. Information on the vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls of operational command, control, personnel, or support.
 - c. Details of ROE for military and civilian security personnel assigned to the operation.
 - d. Information on intelligence-collection activities, methods, targets, and results.
 - e. Information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while the command is planning or conducting search-and-rescue operations during hostile action.
 - f. Listings of all U.S. elements involved in the operations.

Section III. Media Statements for COAs

- I. **Proposed Statements, Questions, and Answers.** Proposed statements, questions, and answers for each COA are outlined below. The USG declassifies statements, questions, and answers upon public release.
- J. **COA 1 PA Guidance.** PA guidance for COA 1 includes the statement for release in paragraph A concurrent with initiation of the COA and OASD-PA approval.
 1. "In view of the military coup and continued unrest in this country and the potential danger to U.S. citizens, the USG has authorized evacuation of U.S. and other third-country personnel desiring to leave the country. To assist with the evacuation, the combatant command has dispatched military aircraft and personnel at risk. As a result of the unrest, voluntary evacuation at this time is prudent."
 2. Questions and answers for overall use are as follows:
 - Q1. How many people is the United States evacuating?
 - A1. Because it is a voluntary evacuation, assessing exactly how many people may desire to leave is difficult. There are approximately (to be determined [TBD]) private U.S. citizens, TBD USG employees, and TBD USG dependents living and working in the country. There are also TBD Peace Corps volunteers. The United States plans to evacuate other people as well, including personnel from other countries.
 - Q2. Are there any indications of threats of violence specifically directed against U.S. citizens in the country?

**Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs
plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)**

Section III. Media Statements for COAs (continued)

- A2. No, there are not. The situation is strictly an internal matter that is not threatening any citizens of other countries now living in the country.
- Q3. Are U.S. military personnel supporting the government forces?
- A3. No, U.S. military personnel are only supporting the evacuation of U.S. and third-country personnel.
- Q4. Are U.S. military personnel armed?
- A4. U.S. forces are prepared to defend themselves. They carry arms to provide security to evacuees and assembly and departure points, such as the airport.
- Q5. How are U.S. forces evacuating U.S. citizens?
- A5. U.S. forces are flying evacuees out on military aircraft from the TBD airport near TBD.
- Q6. Where are the evacuees going?
- A6. Evacuees flying on C-141 aircraft will relocate to airport TBD. Evacuees flying on C-130 aircraft will first fly to the TBD airport in TBD and then to TBD.
- Q7. Was the action coordinated with the government of this country?
- A7. TBD by the DOS.
- Q8. Why has the USG issued a travel advisory for this country?
- A8. TBD.
- Q9. Is this an evacuation?
- A9. Yes.
- Q10. Is the local airport open?
- A10. The airport is closed to regular traffic.
- Q11. Are you taking private U.S. citizens out with the diplomats?
- A11. Yes. The staff at the U.S. Embassy in this country will assist private U.S. citizens in this country who wish to leave. We are urging U.S. citizens in this country to contact the Embassy. We are using our warden system to advise all U.S. citizens in the country to consider leaving and to apprise them of all developments.
- Q12. What about TCNs?
- A12. Obviously, our first obligation is to U.S. citizens and their immediate family members. We have asked other embassies to coordinate efforts on behalf of their own citizens.
- Q13. Have you received any requests from other countries to take their people out?
- A13. We have received a few requests.
- Q14. Is the United States coordinating with other countries?
- A14. Yes. The United States is in close contact with other embassies in this country.
- Q15. What happens to private U.S. citizens once they get to TBD?
- A15. We will help evacuees make onward travel plans to their final destination.
- Q16. Are they on their own from there on?
- A16. Yes.
- Q17. Who pays for the departure of private U.S. citizens and TCNs?
- A17. As in all such evacuations, evacuees will need to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation.
- Q18. What about Peace Corps members? Is the United States ordering them out, too? Would they leave with our diplomats and dependents?
- A18. Yes. The Peace Corps volunteers will depart with other U.S. citizens.
- Q19. Is this a one-time effort or are there contingency plans if further needs arise?
- A19. We are planning to evacuate all U.S. citizens who desire to depart the country. The United States has no plans at this time for future contingencies. We urge all U.S. citizens to depart now.

Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

Section III. Media Statements for COAs (continued)

- Q20. How many Embassy employees will remain in the country?
A20. Approximately TBD Embassy employees will remain.
- Q21. What is the U.S. Ambassador's name?
A21. The Ambassador's name is TBD.
- Q22. Does this operation have a nickname?
A22. Yes, it is operation TBD.
- Q23. Do you anticipate any problems removing the U.S. citizens from this country?
A23. No.
- Q24. Who is the commander of the JTF?
A24. The commander of the JTF is TBD.
- Q25. What units are conducting the NEO?
A25. Elements from TBD.
- J. COA 2 PA Guidance.** PA guidance for COA 2 includes the following statement for release concurrent with initiation of the operation.
1. "Seizure of the airfield is necessary to allow for evacuation of U.S. citizens and third-country noncombatants from this country. Rebel and government forces in this country have not specifically targeted U.S. citizens. However, fighting has prevented those desiring to leave from doing so. The USG ordered this military action to save lives, protect endangered U.S. citizens, and ensure evacuation to safe havens."
 2. Additional questions and answers to COA 2 are as follows:
Q26. Why is the USG using SOF in this country?
A26. These forces provide the combatant commander with the flexibility needed to provide security for U.S. citizens during this unstable situation.
Q27. How long will the deployment of U.S. forces be?
A27. Only as long as necessary.
Q28. Were any additional combat forces brought from TBD?
A28. No.
Q29. Can the media accompany the SOF or interview individuals?
A29. The command will take requests on a case-by-case basis and, if possible, accommodate them.
- K. General.** This section outlines the responsibilities of the JIB during the employment of a U.S. JTF or other major U.S. force to conduct contingency NEOs within the combatant command AOR.
- L. Objectives.** The objectives of the JIB are—
- To provide a balanced PA program that supports the policies and objectives of the USG.
 - To coordinate PA activities at all levels under the guidance of the GCC.
 - To keep the public informed of contingency NEOs by providing the media with timely, unclassified information to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety.
- M. JIB Responsibilities.** The responsibilities of the JIB are—
- To verify media correspondents' credentials and operate a badging system.
 - To support the on-scene commander's briefings and press conferences, as necessary.
 - To escort media to PA activities, such as photo opportunities, briefings, and press conferences.
 - To request official still photo and video COMDOC coverage of evacuation operations for PA purposes.
 - To serve as a clearinghouse for news releases, photographs, and audiovisual and visual information products.

**Figure F-1. Example Notional Combatant Command Public Affairs
plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)**

Section IV. Joint Information Bureau (JIB)

- To produce news analyses and summaries and to issue consolidated reports to the OASD-PA, combatant command, and appropriate COM, as necessary, and to produce transcripts of all media briefings, interviews, press conferences.
- To quickly respond to media queries (the goal is within 2 hours) and maintain logs of media queries and responses.
- To ensure all speakers or briefers are fully informed on PA policy and guidance.
- To provide guidance concerning PA requirements to assigned military audiovisual and combat camera teams.

N. Service Component Tasks. The JIB provides public information personnel, as requested.

O. JTF PAO and JIB Director Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JTF PAO and JIB director are—

- To review, update, and prepare appropriate plans for the employment phases, including the request for PA augmentation, if necessary.
- To deploy with the CDRJTF or ADVON.
- To establish the JIB in the final staging or forward operating area and conduct an active information program based on guidance from the DOD, DOS, and GCC.
- To serve as the principal PA advisor to the CDRJTF.
- To coordinate PA matters with the appropriate U.S. diplomatic or U.S. information service representative in the HN.
- To supervise all military PA activities in the area of operations and schedule, as appropriate, press briefings and news conferences. Support an active command or internal information program.

Section V. Principles of Information for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations

P. Coverage.

1. Open and independent reporting is the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. However, they may provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation.
3. Pools should be as large as possible. Pools should disband at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 35 hours, when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or in which space is limited.

Q. Combat Zone. The U.S. military will provide journalists in a combat zone with credentials. Journalists must abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make every effort to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to familiarize them with U.S. military operations.

R. Access. The commander will provide journalists with access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases. Military PA officers should act as liaison but should not interfere with the reporting process.

S. Transportation and Facilities.

1. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military is responsible for the transportation of pools.
2. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. When government facilities are unavailable, journalists will file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news media organizations, but electromagnetic OPSEC in operational environments may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

Note: The principles discussed in Section V also apply to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.

Figure F-1. Example notional combatant command Public Affairs plan for noncombatant evacuation operation (continued)

Appendix G

Evacuee Processing Training and Evaluation Outline

This appendix contains evacuee processing training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) for ECC processing (Figures G-1 through G-4, pages G-2 through G-11). The following T&EOs are a composite of NEO evacuee processing T&EOs that the 1-10th SFG(A), 2-3d SFG(A), and 75th Ranger Regiment produced. These organizations produced the evacuee processing T&EOs to support critical collective tasks of ECC operations. Evacuee processing T&EOs are the foundation of collective training. Units tasked to conduct a NEO should also consult their unit METL, training documents, and SOPs. The evacuee processing T&EOs in this appendix are listed in Table G-1, page G-2.

STRUCTURE

G-1. Evacuee processing T&EOs include training objectives for collective tasks necessary to perform evacuee processing. Each evacuee processing T&EO contains the following:

- **Element.** This identifies the unit that performs the task.
- **Task.** This is a description of the work or action the unit is to perform. The task number is in parentheses following the task title. The number identifies the task throughout the mission training plan.
- **References.** The references for each task are in parentheses following the task number. The primary reference is underlined. The underlined reference contains the most information concerning the task. If there is only one reference, it is not underlined.
- **Iteration.** This identifies how many times the unit performs the task and the trainer evaluates the task during training.
- **Commander/leader assessment.** The unit leadership uses this to assess the proficiency of the unit in performing the task to standard. Leaders circle a rating each time they assess the task and then use the ratings to establish future training strategies for that task. The ratings are as follows:
 - **T—Trained.** The unit's training is sufficient. The unit proficiently accomplishes the task. Sustainment training every 6 months is a sufficient training strategy for units at this rating.
 - **P—Needs practice.** The unit's training is not yet sufficient. The unit achieves the standard with some difficulty or fails to perform some of the task steps to standard. Practicing the task is the training strategy for units at this rating.
 - **U—Untrained.** The unit's training is not sufficient. The unit cannot demonstrate an ability to achieve proficiency. The commander should include the task in the next quarter training program and develop a comprehensive strategy to address the deficiency as a training strategy for the unit.
- **Condition.** This statement describes the contingency environment in which the unit performs the task. It also lists the equipment, manuals, or supervision necessary to perform the task. The condition begins with an initiating cue.
- **Training notes.** This statement informs the unit that in some cases conditions can significantly change the way the unit performs a task (night, day, or limited visibility).
- **Task standard.** This statement prescribes the overall task criteria the unit must meet to receive credit for successful task execution.

- **Task steps.** Task steps are actions or events that the unit performs sequentially. Each task step identifies the leader, individuals, unit, or element responsible for performing that step. An asterisk identifies leader task steps.
- **Performance measures.** Performance measures identify how well the unit must perform the task for the desired outcome. Each task step lists detailed measures.
- **GO and NO-GO columns.** The commander or evaluator uses these columns to record the results of each task step.

USE

G-2. The unit commander can use an evacuee processing T&EO to train a single task. However, he can use a single evacuee processing T&EO in sequence with other evacuee processing T&EOs to train and evaluate a larger group of tasks, such as a field training exercise or situational training exercise.

Table G-1. Noncombatant evacuee processing training and evaluation outline tasks and task numbers

Task Title	Task Number
Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center	NEO-001
Establish and Operate a Reception Station	NEO-002
Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station	NEO-003
Establish and Operate a Registration Station	NEO-004
Establish and Operate a Medical Screening/Treatment Station	NEO-005
Establish and Operate a Transportation Station	NEO-006
Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional)	NEO-007
Establish and Operate a Holding Area	NEO-008
Establish and Operate a Temporary Refugee Holding Area	NEO-009
Establish and Operate a Comfort Station	NEO-010
Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center	NEO-011

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center
<p>ELEMENT: Evacuation Control Center (ECC)</p> <p>TASK: Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (NEO-001) (FM 3-05.131)</p> <p>ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (Circle)</p> <p>COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle)</p> <p>CONDITIONS: Given an order from higher headquarters requiring establishment of a processing center within a specified time and provided a designated center location with or without permanent facilities.</p> <p>TASK STANDARDS: The element establishes an operational reception station, registration station, medical screening/EMT station, transportation station, and security element within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. The element establishes requisite outer security measures. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.</p>

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (continued)		
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO
<p>*1. The processing team OIC develops the plan for the layout of the processing center. The schematic below shows a generic processing center. Each processing station is positioned to support an orderly and logical flow similar to the preboarding procedures of a civilian airline. The plan includes the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Reception station (NEO-002). b. Security screening station (NEO-003). c. Registration station (NEO-004). d. Medical station (NEO-005). e. Transportation station (NEO-006). f. Debriefing station (NEO-007). g. Holding areas—hostile, unknown, and evacuees (NEO-008). h. Temporary refugee holding area (NEO-009). i. Comfort station (NEO-010). j. Security element (NEO-011). 		
Processing Center Schematic		
<p>The schematic diagram illustrates the layout of a processing center. It features a central vertical column of stations: Reception Station, Registration Station, Medical Station, Security Screening Station, Transportation Station, and Comfort Station. To the left of this column are three holding areas: a top 'Holding/Briefing Area', a middle 'Holding Area for Hostiles or Unknowns', and a bottom 'Temporary Refugee Holding Area'. To the right are three more holding areas: an 'Amnesty Box' (represented by a black square), a 'Latrine', and two stacked 'Holding Area' boxes. A legend on the right side identifies symbols for 'DOS Representative' (a black oval) and 'HN Representative' (a white oval with a black border).</p>		

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center (continued)

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (continued)		
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO
<p>*2. The ECC OIC orders stations to establish a processing center. Personnel at the stations perform the following tasks before processing:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Physically secure the ECC. b. Erect physical barriers. c. Implement crowd-control measures. d. Establish linkup with the ECC tactical operations center (TOC), security element, and marshalling force. e. Prepare signs to identify routes and stations. f. Mark station boundaries (using engineer tape, for example). g. Check and ready equipment for processing. h. Brief processors and escorts on the responsibilities and responses to possible dilemmas (see Possible Dilemmas below). i. Establish amnesty boxes and sites. j. Place control or guards at all access point to the center. k. Ensure a female is available, if possible, for searches of female evacuees (MPs or USAF security forces are recommended). l. Assign guards or guides for evacuee latrine usage. m. Locate an explosive ordnance pit near the inspection area. n. Ensure an interpreter or language cards at are each station. o. Ensure refreshments and food are available. p. Ensure handcuffs and restraints are available. q. Ensure the public address system is operational. r. Ensure limited comfort items for evacuees (for example, supplies for women and children (are available). s. Ensure travel comfort items (for example, motion sickness bags, antinauseants, and hearing protection) are available. t. Establish a special holding area for persons requiring thorough inspections, special handling, detention, and so on. u. Establish and monitor secure frequency modulation (FM) voice communications with the ECC and the TOC. 		
POSSIBLE DILEMMAS		
<p>When is deadly force authorized? Review the following situations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of weapon system (Mark-19 or mortar). • Hostile detainee who presents himself or is captured by the evacuation force. • Civil disturbance from passive resistance or civil disobedience through violence. • Terrorism. • Snipers. <p>How will the force handle the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nonambulatory evacuees. • Evacuees with special medical needs, such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional family members as pediatric health care problems. • Evacuees suffering from trauma resulting from the current situation. • Language problems. • Religious problems. 		

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center (continued)

Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (continued)							
POSSIBLE DILEMMAS							
<p>How will the force handle the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The absence of the names of what appear to be bona fide potential evacuees the Embassy list. • The deaths of evacuees, and the removal of their remains. • Evacuees carrying contraband, and the disposition of contraband. • Pets. • Overwhelming numbers of civilians arriving at the assembly areas or evacuation site to request evacuation. • Listed evacuees refusing evacuation. • Listed non-U.S. Government evacuees refusing to sign waivers. • Classified couriers requiring segregation. • Treatment of VIPs versus other evacuees, both U.S. and HN. • Disruptive evacuees. • Evacuees attempting to give bribes to gain favor. • Inaccurate evacuation lists. <p>Note: Dilemma response will be mission-specific.</p>							
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES						GO	NO-GO
<p>*3. Processing team OIC orders stations to conduct processing. The following tasks are accomplished during evacuee processing:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Establish and operate a reception station (NEO-001). b. Establish and operate a security screening station (NEO-003). c. Establish and operate a registration station (NEO-004). d. Establish and operate a medical station (NEO-005). e. Establish and operate a transportation station (NEO-006). f. Conduct security element activities in support of a processing center (NEO-011). g. Protect force and evacuees from direct and indirect fire. h. Complete prioritized roster of all evacuees. i. Treat all evacuees with courtesy—maintain strict control, high military appearance, and a nonaggressive attitude to evacuees but maintain a strict military bearing. <p>Note: The DOS representative or the representative from the Embassy's consular affairs office must be prepared to decide what to do with unauthorized evacuees (for example, turn custody of them over to HN police or paramilitary forces).</p>							
TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK							
ITERATION	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL	
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED							
TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO"							
TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO							
*Indicates a leader task step.							

Figure G-1. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation processing center (continued)

Establish and Operate a Reception Station		
<p>ELEMENT: Reception Station, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Reception Station (NEO-002) (FM 3-05.131) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (Circle) COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle) CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion headquarters requiring establishment of a reception station within the processing center within a specified time and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The reception station is operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.</p>		
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes a sheltered reception station. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Clearly marks area, including boundaries and routes. b. Establishes and mark holding and briefing area(s). 2. Processing team receives evacuees from the ECC security team, from the marshalling force, or as walk-ins. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ensures evacuees are on an approved list or are authorized by a representative from the Embassy's consular affairs office or the DOS. b. Performs initial search of evacuees, if not previously searched by the marshalling or recovery team, before allowing the evacuees to enter the processing center. 3. Processing team moves evacuees into a holding area. 4. Processing team welcomes and briefs evacuees. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Gives a brief summary of reason for evacuation. b. Stresses the need for and benefits of evacuee cooperation during processing. c. Briefly outlines processing stations. d. Explains purpose of and procedures for latrine use. e. Explains purpose of and need for personnel and baggage inspection. f. Notifies evacuees that the USG will not allow pets. g. Notifies evacuees that they may bring one bag. h. Notifies evacuees the NEO force will confiscate all weapons. i. Ensures that evacuees with authorized weapons sign the weapons in and turn them over to a representative from the Embassy's consular affairs office or the DOS. j. Describe contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal drugs), and provide an amnesty box/area (screened, if possible). k. Briefly describe the support evacuees can expect at the temporary refugee holding area. l. Describes what refugees can expect in the United States. m. Describes what the repatriation center will provide. n. Provides the evacuees with an opportunity to ask questions. 5. Processing team provides water and any other immediate comfort items. 6. Processing team establishes and operates a security screening station. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Clearly marks the area, including boundaries and routes. 		

Figure G-2. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation reception station

Establish and Operate a Reception Station (continued)						
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO				
b. Establishes and marks holding and individual inspection areas. c. Screens off all individual inspection areas. d. Inspects all evacuees and their baggage for restricted items. e. Confiscates all restricted items. f. Impounds all weapons, excluding those of USG personnel, and issues receipts to the owners. g. Refrains from searching the persons, property, papers, or family members of foreign ambassadors or diplomats unless directed by the DOS. h. Refrains from searching diplomatic pouches. i. Separates suspected enemy agents or criminals and escorts them to a separate screening and interrogation station. This screening should be voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation. j. After their interrogation, continues processing evacuees, sets them free, or places them in the detainee area. 7. Processing team visually inspects each individual in a rapid manner, looking for weapons, contraband, and excess baggage. 8. Processing team separates evacuees into manageable groups for processing; however, the team maintains family integrity. 9. Member of processing team security element escorts groups through the stations.						
TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK						
ITERATION	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED						
TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO"						
TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO						
*Indicates a leader task step.						

Figure G-2. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation reception station (continued)

Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station		
ELEMENT: Security Screening Station, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (NEO-003) (FM 3-05.131) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (Circle) COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle) CONDITIONS: TASK STANDARDS:		
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO
*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes a sheltered station. a. Ensures area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes. b. Ensures search areas (personnel and baggage are marked). *2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose. a. Notifies evacuees that personnel will confiscate all weapons.		

Figure G-3. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation security screening station processing center

Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (continued)							
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES						GO	NO-GO
b. Ensures evacuees sign for authorized weapons and turn the weapons over to the Embassy's consular affairs office or DOS representative. c. Uses a DA Form 3161, <i>Request for Issue or Turn-In</i> , or like form. d. Describes contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal drugs) and provides an amnesty box or area (screened, if possible). 3. Security screening personnel conduct a detailed inspection of the individual and baggage before allowing the evacuee to enter the processing center. The marshalling/recovery team(s) or the reception station must conduct an initial search before an evacuee can enter the processing center. a. Personnel must not use electronic wands for searches. Wands miss too much. In addition, wands are difficult to hear in NEO these types of environments. b. Personnel should use hand searches, which are quick, provide better results, and allow better control of the person being searched. c. Personnel should try to have a female searcher (MP or USAF security forces) available to search female evacuees. d. Personnel should try to use three searchers per evacuee, if adequate numbers of personnel are available. There should be two dedicated searchers for each side of the person being searched and another moving dedicated guard that will move to keep from flagging the searchers. e. Personnel should dedicate one searcher to controlling the gun and one searcher to controlling the gun-bearer if they find a gun during a search. 4. Security screening personnel tag all bags, one per evacuee, with the evacuee's name and control number. 5. Security screening personnel confiscate all weapons. 6. Security screening personnel confiscate all contraband or prohibited items. 7. Security screening personnel confiscate excess baggage and turn it over to the Embassy's consular affairs office or a DOS representative. 8. Security screening personnel confiscate all pets and turn them over to the Embassy's consular affairs office or a DOS representative.							
TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK							
ITERATION	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL	
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED							
TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO"							
TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO							
*Indicates a leader task step.							

Figure G-3. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a security screening station (continued)

Establish and Operate a Registration Station	
ELEMENT: Security Screening Station, ECC	
TASK: Establish and Operate a Registration Station (NEO-004) (FM 3-05.131)	
ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 5 (Circle)	
COMMANDER/LEADER ASSESSMENT: T P U (Circle)	

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station

Establish and Operate a Registration Station (continued)							
<p>CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion headquarters requiring establishment of a registration station within the processing center within a specified time and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities.</p> <p>TASK STANDARDS: The registration station is operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.</p>							
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES						GO	NO-GO
<p>*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes a sheltered registration station.</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">a. Ensures area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes.</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">b. Ensures registration tables/points are established and marked.</p> <p>*2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose.</p> <p>3. Registration personnel ensure each evacuee proves his identity by using a passport, identification card, or anything that unquestionably establishes his identity. The COM or his representative must make the final determination not to evacuate a person.</p> <p>4. Registration station NCO ensures each evacuee provides his information in duplicate in an evacuee register (see below). The transportation station uses the evacuee register for final manifesting purposes.</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">a. Sends one copy to the TOC.</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">b. Provides the escort to the transportation station with the second copy.</p> <p style="margin-left: 20px;">c. Ensures all evacuees sign the evacuee register.</p>							
EVACUEE REGISTER							
Waiver of Claims for Damages and Injury by Non-USG Employees							
CONTROL NUMBER	NAME (LAST, FIRST, MI)	PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS	EVACUEE PRIORITY	ID NO (TYPE)	CITIZENSHIP	SIGNATURE	
Shown smaller than actual document.							
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES						GO	NO-GO
<p>5. Registration personnel post a sign by each registration point that states that any evacuee who is not a USG employee waives any claims for damage and injury against the USG and that he does so by signing the evacuee register.</p> <p>6. The registration NCO fills out the following evacuee information card.</p>							
EVACUATION INFORMATION CARD							
NAME		CITIZENSHIP		AGE/SEX		CONTROL #	
PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS							
MEDICAL PROBLEMS							
EMERGENCY NEXT OF KIN (NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE)							
LOCATION OF REMAINING HOUSEHOLD GOODS						PRIORITY	

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station (continued)

Establish and Operate a Registration Station (continued)						
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES					GO	NO-GO
a. Color-codes these cards according to evacuation priority. b. Affixes the evacuee information card to the evacuee so that it can be easily seen.						
EVACUATION PRIORITY CRITERIA AND COLOR CODES						
CATEGORY (Left to right.) (Subcategories A, B, C, and D only help in accountability.)	I AMERICAN CITIZENS (AMCITs)	II Dependents of AMCITs	III TCN and Designated Foreign Service National Employees of the USG	IV Eligible Non-AMCITs (Injured/ill or in imminent danger.)	V Others Determined Eligible	
A Male Adult (Age 18+)	I-A (White)	II-A (White)	III-A (Blue)	IV-A (Green)	V-A (Yellow)	
B Female Adult (Age 18+)	I-B (White)	II-B (White)	III-B (Blue)	IV-B (Green)	V-B (Yellow)	
C Male Child (17 and Under)	I-C (White)	II-C (White)	III-C (Blue)	IV-C (Green)	V-C (Yellow)	
D Female Child (17 and Under)	I-D (White)	II-D (White)	III-D (Blue)	IV-D (Green)	V-D (Yellow)	
Note: Personnel will use red to identify evacuees in categories I, II, or III that require immediate medical care and select VIPs. These will take priority over all others.						
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES					GO	NO-GO
7. Registration personnel ensure individuals that do not wish to evacuate sign a waiver of evacuation opportunity.						
WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY						
1. Agreement made this _____ day of _____, 20____, between _____ and the military forces of the United States. 2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate 3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding the offer will not be repeated. 4. Evacuee Signature _____ Evacuee Signature _____ Evacuee Signature _____ Evacuee Signature _____						
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES					GO	NO-GO
8. Depending upon the situation, registration personnel provide each evacuee with a DD form 2585, which they must complete before arrival at the repatriation center. 9. Registration personnel place all unknowns or problem cases in the holding area.						

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station (continued)

Establish and Operate a Registration Station (continued)						
TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO		NO-GO			
10. Registration personnel should ensure foreign nationals are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC.						
11. SA security element member should be stationed inside the ECC to react to any hostile incidents.						
TASK PERFORMANCE/EVALUATION SUMMARY BLOCK						
ITERATION	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL
TOTAL TASK STEPS EVALUATED						
TOTAL TASK STEPS "GO"						
TRAINING STATUS GO/NO-GO						
*Indicates a leader task step.						

Figure G-4. Example evacuee processing training and evaluation outline for establishing and operating a noncombatant evacuation operation registration station (continued)

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Appendix H

Legal Considerations

International law and ROE govern personnel participating in a NEO. Because of the complexity of domestic and international law, commanders must include legal advisors in the planning process for NEO.

GENERAL

H-1. The JSOTF commander and subordinate commanders must ensure that JSOTF personnel abide by the standards of international law, as well as the provisions of the operation's ROE. The JSOTF commander should establish procedures and policies for immediately reporting and investigating violations. The JSOTF must report all suspected violations in accordance with applicable DOD and Service regulations. The JSOTF should notify the Embassy of a suspected violation within 24 hours of its occurrence.

ROLE OF THE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE LEGAL ADVISOR

H-2. The JSOTF legal advisor will provide guidance on legal issues involving NEOs, in coordination with higher headquarters, DOS agencies, NGOs, IGOs, foreign governments, and the HN government. The JSOTF's legal advisor will focus on the interpretation of and compliance with applicable U.S. laws and regulations; relevant international agreements, including any pertinent status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs); and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements affecting NEOs.

LEGAL IMPERATIVES

H-3. Commanders must navigate the many legal imperatives of the U.S. Constitution, domestic law, international agreements, and customary international law when planning and conducting NEOs. In view of this governing framework of laws and regulations and the complexity of legal issues relating to NEOs, commanders must obtain legal guidance at all phases of NEO planning and execution. Legal guidance is particularly important during the early planning stage.

LEGAL INPUT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING

H-4. Commanders should ensure that legal advisors at all levels are full participants in all aspects of NEO planning, operational guidance and decisions, and national policy directives. The JSOTF legal advisor should systematically review OPLANs, WARNORDs, commander's estimates, ROE, OPORDs, executive orders, and other operational documents. By reviewing these documents, the JSOTF legal advisor ensures compliance with international and domestic law.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND TERMINOLOGY

H-5. The following paragraphs discuss terminology and guidance related to the legal aspects of a NEO.

FOREIGN DIPLOMAT

H-6. A foreign diplomat of an Embassy staff authorized to go to the United States for evacuation is entitled to special treatment in accordance with international law. Ideally, personnel are not to search, detain, or seize the individual or his personal effects or papers. Personnel should extend the same immunity to the foreign diplomat's family members unless they are U.S. citizens. The pouches of diplomatic couriers

of states that the United States recognizes are also immune from any search, inspection, detention, or seizure by U.S. personnel.

POLITICAL ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE

H-7. CDRJSOTF may not grant political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any person. The CDRJSOTF should refer all requests for asylum to the available Embassy or senior DOS representative.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

H-8. The CDRJSOTF and the JSOTF legal advisor should review any SOFA between the HN to determine how it applies, if at all, to the current NEO situation. If time permits, the Embassy should modify the SOFA, as necessary, before the arrival of the JSOTF. If no agreement exists, the Embassy may negotiate a temporary agreement with the HN, if time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement, customs, and other legal matters. Given the emergency nature of the NEO, however, it is unlikely that the Embassy will negotiate special SOFA provisions.

STATUS OF DETAINEE

H-9. The Embassy should determine the status of a detainee in advance of the JSOTF deployment. In the absence of this determination, it is U.S. policy to treat a hostile detainee humanely and in accordance with international humanitarian law. U.S. forces will accord any individual they actively detain for attempting to deter or for participating in a hostile action the rights of an enemy prisoner of war (EPW), even though the individual may not be an EPW within the context of the Geneva Convention. The Embassy, with the HN, will negotiate the disposition of the detainee.

CLAIMS

H-10. The JSOTF legal advisor or designated claims officer shall develop a plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States. The plan will be coordinated with the appropriate Embassy staff member.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

H-11. The JSOTF legal advisor or designated claims officer should consider the following in reference to international law:

- **Law of Armed Conflict.** Traditional legal issues associated with the law of armed conflict will not normally arise in the context of a NEO, since NEOs typically occur during times of escalating confrontation short of armed conflict. However, the protections afforded civilians, as well as the sick and wounded, under the law of armed conflict are almost universally accepted humanitarian norms that are respected in many cases despite the absence of international armed conflict. NEO planning and execution should consistently adhere as closely as possible to the principles of international humanitarian law.
- **National Sovereignty.** Commanders must ensure that the NEO does not violate the sovereignty of foreign nations other than the HN. NEO planners and operators must consider the potential impact of operations on relations with other nations and of all relevant international agreements, including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements.

LEGAL ASSISTANCE

H-12. Implementation plans should include preventive law programs designed to avoid sudden and overwhelming demands for emergency legal assistance immediately before or during the implementation of a NEO. To the extent practical, the United States will make legal assistance and advice available at safe haven and collection processing points in coordination with the U.S. diplomatic mission.

MILITARY JUSTICE

H-13. The U.S. military will administer justice in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*.

REPORTING VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

H-14. Commanders plan and provide for the reporting, investigating, and initiating of appropriate disciplinary disposition of allegations of law of armed conflict violations as follows:

- With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict committed by or against members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, their commands, promptly investigate, collect, and evaluate evidence and report in accordance with applicable DOD and military department guidance. In addition, immediately forward reports through operational command channels.
- With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict committed by or against allied military or civilian personnel, conduct an appropriate preliminary investigation to determine involvement of JSOTF personnel and report through U.S. operational channels. If the appropriate authority determines that there was no JSOTF involvement, do not investigate further without direction to do so by the combatant commander.
- With respect to all violations of the law of armed conflict, personnel should immediately send message notification to the appropriate combatant commander.

Note: Service component commanders should provide notification of reported law of armed conflict violations as soon as the tactical situation permits, rather than waiting for a complete investigation. Commanders can provide additional details through supplemental reports.

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

H-15. When planning and executing NEOs, commanders must consider applicable basing rights and the status of U.S. forces within the country. Commanders must procure the necessary landing, embarkation, and transit rights required to support a given operation in advance.

H-16. In addition, commanders must consider the changing political and military situation before relying on previously negotiated HNS agreements. Commanders must accomplish liaison in a timely manner with DOS officials responsible for the particular NEO site.

LEGAL REVIEW OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

H-17. When the use of force is a possibility, planners must involve legal advisors in the planning phases before execution of the NEO to determine the legal basis for the use of force. Legal advisors must—

- Review the proposed ROE.
- Assess the legal risks or potential liabilities entailed under international law.

APPLICABLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

H-18. Commanders at every level must ensure all personnel understand the ROE. Commanders must handle requests for supplemental ROE in accordance with CJCS instructions.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENTS

H-19. Consistent with Title 50, USC, Chapter 33, *War Powers Resolution*, Congress may require consultation with or reporting to in the conduct of NEOs. The DOS will initiate these reports as required.

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Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADVON	advanced echelon
AMCIT	American citizen
AO	administrative officer
AOR	area of responsibility
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
CA	Civil Affairs
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
CDRFORSCOM	Commander, United States Forces Command
CDRJSOTF	commander, joint special operations task force
CDRJTF	commander, joint task force
CDRUSEUCOM	Commander, United States European Command
CDRUSJFCOM	Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
CDRUSPACOM	Commander, United States Pacific Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
COMDOC	combat documentation
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
CSP	contingency support package
DA	Department of the Army
DATT	defense attaché
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DD	Department of Defense (form)
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
EAC	emergency action committee
EAP	emergency action plan

ECC	evacuation control center
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
EPH	emergency planning handbook
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ESAT	European Command Survey and Assessment Team
FCE	forward command element
FM	field manual, frequency modulation
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GIBCO	geospatial intelligence base for contingency operations
GSO	general services officer
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
IGO	intergovernmental organization
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JIB	joint information bureau
JP	joint publication
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
LZ	landing zone
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, and civil considerations
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MI	military intelligence
MP	military police
MSG	Marine security guard
NAVSO	naval special operations forces
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NEOPACK	noncombatant evacuation operation pack
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	nongovernmental organization

OASD-PA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
OF	optional form
OGA	other governmental organization
OIC	officer in charge
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PIR	priority intelligence request
PLAD	plain language address dictionary
POC	point of contact
POE	port of embarkation
POG	Psychological Operations group
PSO	post security officer
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
ROE	rules of engagement
RSO	regional security officer
RSOD	regimental support operations detachment
SAO	security assistance office
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SF	Special Forces
SFG	Special Forces group
SITREP	situation report
SOA	special operations aviation
SOAR	special operations aviation regiment
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command, United States European Command
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOTF	special operations task force
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SSF	special security force
T&EO	training and evaluation outline
TALCE	tanker airlift control element
TBD	to be determined
TCN	third-country national

TOC	tactical operations center
TPT	tactical Psychological Operations team
TSOC	theater special operations command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.S.	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASFC	United States Army Special Forces Command
USC	United States Code
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USS	United States ship
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VIDOC	visual information documentation
VIP	very important person
WARNORD	warning order
WATCHCON	watch condition
WLG	Washington Liaison Group

References

REQUIRED REFERENCES

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

None

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

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Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, 18 November 1988
OF 28 (Evacuation Documentation)

USC, Title 42, Section 1313, *Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries*,
3 January 2007

USC, Title 50, Chapter 33, *War Powers Resolution*, 3 January 2007

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FM 3-05.131
16 November 2009

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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