

CONTEST

The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism

CONTEST The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism



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The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism

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by Command of Her Majesty

July 2011

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Foreword

Foreword by the Home Secretary

The UK faces a significant threat from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates, associated groups and terrorists acting on their own – so called lone-wolves. We also face an ongoing and serious threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism.

The aim of this new counter-terrorism strategy is to reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. To achieve this aim we have made significant changes.

Our most immediate priority is to stop terrorist attacks. The police, security and intelligence agencies work tirelessly to keep Britain safe. I pay tribute to them. We will develop our counter-terrorism powers to ensure they remain effective. A key priority will be to improve our ability to prosecute people for terrorist-related offences.

Most of the terrorist plots against this country continue to have very significant overseas connections. We must continue to work closely with other countries and multilateral organisations to tackle the threats we face at their source. This is challenging and will require close coordination across many Government Departments.

As well as catching and prosecuting terrorists, we must also stop people becoming terrorists in the first place. But the *Prevent* programme we inherited was flawed.

Following a comprehensive review we published a new strategy in June of this year. Greater effort will be focused on responding to the ideological challenge and the threat from those who promote it; we will also work harder to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support. We will work with a wider range of sectors where there are risks of radicalisation to achieve our aims.


We must continue to protect our national infrastructure and strengthen our border security. Our new National Crime Agency will better coordinate law enforcement work at the border. We will continue to improve aviation security.

Preparing for a terrorist attack remains a key priority for all of us. We have significantly enhanced police firearms resources and tactics to ensure the response to incidents, similar to the attack in Mumbai in 2008, is effective. We will also do more work to address the highest impact terrorist risks, such as the

risk of a terrorist attack which makes use of unconventional weapons, including biological, radiological, chemical or even nuclear materials.

The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be the largest peacetime security operation in Britain's history. Our security operation must cross all the strands of CONTEST. The challenge is unprecedented. Our efforts over the next year will be dedicated to making sure the Games pass off without incident.

The primary duty of Government is to protect the British public. This strategy gives us a more effective, better focused and more flexible response to the changing terrorist threat we face.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Theresa May', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Theresa May MP
Home Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

1.1 This is the third published version of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. This new strategy reflects the changing terrorist threat and incorporates new Government policies on counter-terrorism.

1.2 The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

Strategic context

1.3 Last year, over 10,000 people were killed by terrorists around the world. But international law enforcement and military collaboration are changing the threats we face.

1.4 The leadership of Al Qa'ida is now weaker than at any time since 9/11. It has played no role in recent political change in North Africa and the Middle East. Its ideology has been widely discredited and it has failed in all its objectives. Continued international pressure can further reduce its capability. But Al Qa'ida continues to pose a threat to our own security; and groups affiliated to Al Qa'ida – notably in Yemen and Somalia – have emerged over the past two years to be a substantial threat in their own right.

1.5 Al Qa'ida is responsible for only a small fraction of terrorist attacks. Other groups, independent from Al Qa'ida but broadly

sympathetic to its aims, continue to emerge and to conduct attacks around the world.

1.6 We judge that four factors will continue to enable terrorist groups to grow and to survive: conflict and instability; aspects of modern technology; a pervasive ideology; and radicalisation.

1.7 The threats we face here reflect global trends. Al Qa'ida, groups affiliated to Al Qa'ida, other terrorist groups and lone terrorists have all tried to operate in this country. Some have planned attacks here which we have disrupted. Others have recruited people for attacks overseas, spread propaganda and raised funds.

1.8 The threat level in the UK from international terrorism has been SEVERE for much of the period, meaning that we judge a terrorist attack in the UK to be 'highly likely'. Threat levels continue to be set independently by JTAC.

1.9 For much of this period the greatest threat to the UK has come from terrorist groups based in Pakistan. British nationals (amongst hundreds of other Europeans) are training or operating in Pakistan and some intend to travel to Afghanistan. But over the past 12 months, the threat to UK interests from terrorists in Yemen and Somalia has significantly increased. People from the UK are also travelling to these countries to engage in terrorist related activity; some are returning to the UK to plan and conduct terrorist operations.

1.10 Over the past two years the threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) has also grown: there were 40 terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland in 2010 and there have been 16 terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland up to 30 June 2011.¹ The threat from NIRT to Great Britain has increased.

1.11 Between January 2009 and December 2010 over 600 people were arrested for terrorist-related activity in the UK.² This is more than in any other European country. 67 people have been prosecuted and 58 people convicted for terrorist-related offences.

Our response

1.12 Our counter-terrorism strategy will continue to be organised around four workstreams, each comprising a number of key objectives

- **Pursue:** to stop terrorist attacks;
- **Prevent:** to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- **Protect:** to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and
- **Prepare:** to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

1.13 The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) emphasises the need to tackle the root causes of instability. This approach is reflected in CONTEST. For terrorism we need to address not only the immediate threat of attacks but the longer term factors which enable terrorist groups to grow and flourish. Some of these factors cannot be addressed within a counter-terrorism strategy and are much wider Government priorities. Coordination between CONTEST and other government programmes is essential. Working closely with other countries will remain a priority.

1.14 CONTEST will reflect our fundamental values and, in particular, our commitment not only to protect the people of this country and our interests overseas but to do so in a way that is consistent with and indeed advances our commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Our strategy will be proportionate to the risks we face and only engage in activity which is necessary to address those risks. It will be transparent: wherever possible and consistent with national security we will seek to make more information available in order to help the public to hold the Government to account over its policy and spending decisions.

1.15 We recognise that success has been achieved through international collaboration. That will continue to be the case in future.

Pursue

1.16 The purpose of *Pursue* is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible.

1.17 In 2011-2015 we want to:

- Continue to assess our counter-terrorism powers and ensure they are both effective and proportionate;
- Improve our ability to prosecute and deport people for terrorist-related offences;
- Increase our capabilities to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats;
- Ensure that judicial proceedings in this country can better handle sensitive and secret material to serve the interests of both justice and national security; and
- Work with other countries and multilateral organisations to enable us to better tackle the threats we face at their source.

¹ Data supplied by Northern Ireland Office covering period up to 30 June 2011.

² This figure includes Northern Ireland related terrorism arrests in the Republic of Ireland.

1.18 We have made a start with this work by reviewing some of the most controversial counter-terrorism and security powers which have been used in recent years. We have made significant changes – amending stop and search powers; reducing the length of time for which people can be held before charge for terrorist offences to 14 days; and replacing control orders with a package including Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures which provide security but also enable the collection of evidence which can lead to prosecution. This work will continue.

1.19 We are concerned that we continue to identify far more people engaged in terrorist activity in this country than we can successfully prosecute and convict. It therefore remains a high priority to improve prosecution rates further. We continue to consider the possible use of intercept as evidence. But we will now be looking at other options.

1.20 We believe that close dialogue between the police, security and intelligence agencies is the basis of successful counter-terrorism work. We intend to maintain arrangements largely as they are. But we need to make some changes to the Police Counter Terrorism Network to improve its capability. And we are monitoring new arrangements put in place by the security and intelligence agencies last year to improve coordinated investigations of threats to this country from overseas. We are concerned that in some areas technology is eroding our capability to obtain intelligence about terrorist related activity; we are committed to addressing this in forthcoming legislation.

1.21 We believe that as a matter of principle foreign nationals who have been engaged in terrorist-related activity here should be deported, where they cannot be convicted or after they have served a sentence. But, given our human rights obligations, we will deport only where we are satisfied that those concerned will not be mistreated on their return. We will continue to seek assurances in this regard from other governments to facilitate the deportation of more terrorist suspects in the future.

1.22 The objective of much of our counter-terrorism work overseas, as in this country, must

be the detention and prosecution of people planning terrorist operations. But operations overseas are significantly complicated by legal issues. Some countries rarely prosecute or convict terrorists. The treatment of detainees held overseas following counter-terrorist operations has been the cause of considerable concern for many years. Attention has also been focused on the UK's involvement in their detention and alleged mistreatment. We have already committed to holding an inquiry into allegations of UK involvement in mistreatment. We have also published the guidance which now exists on these issues for intelligence officers and service personnel.

1.23 Success in counter-terrorism depends on international collaboration. We will support key allies in building their capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorists overseas.

1.24 Success in *Pursue* will mean that:

- At home, we are able to disrupt terrorist-related activity in the UK and prosecute or deport more of those responsible;
- Overseas, we have seized the opportunity we now have to reduce further the threat from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and other terrorist organisations and we have disrupted attacks planned against this country; and
- Our counter-terrorism work is effective, proportionate and consistent with our commitment to human rights.

Prevent

1.25 In June 2011 the Government published a review of recent *Prevent* related work and a new strategy for the next four years. This section of CONTEST reflects our conclusions.

1.26 We regard *Prevent* as a key part of CONTEST. We do not believe it is possible to resolve the threats we face simply by arresting and prosecuting more people. We believe that this is the view of our key allies around the world and that *Prevent* needs to be an international effort as much as other parts of our counter-terrorism

strategy. But we also want to make *Prevent* more effective. And in particular we intend to now change both its scope and its focus.

1.27 Like CONTEST as a whole *Prevent* will now address radicalisation to all forms of terrorism. We will prioritise according to the risks we face and at present the greatest risk to our security comes from terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and like minded groups. We believe that *Prevent* work to date has not clearly recognised the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by apparently non-violent organisations, very often operating within the law. We will not change the law – we remain committed to protecting the freedom of speech which many of those same extremists set out to undermine. But preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism and also part of a terrorist narrative. Challenge may mean simply ensuring that extremist ideas are subject to open debate. But where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist as well as terrorist groups we will also use the Home Secretary's powers to exclude them.

1.28 Having widened the scope of *Prevent* we intend to narrow its focus. *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy, which establishes a stronger sense of common ground and shared values, which enables participation and the empowerment of all communities and which also provides social mobility. But integration alone will not deliver *Prevent* objectives. And *Prevent* must not – as it has in the past – assume control of funding for integration projects which have a purpose and value far wider than security and counter-terrorism. The Government will not securitise its integration work: that would be neither effective, proportionate nor necessary.

1.29 Our objectives will be to:

- Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
 - Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
 - Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.
- 1.30** Across all our *Prevent* work we will increase the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Counter-terrorism in general must provide value for money. *Prevent* in particular must not waste public funds on projects irrelevant to its objectives. Nor will we fund or work with extremist groups; we will carefully evaluate the credibility of those we support.
- 1.31** In all our *Prevent* work we must be clear about our purpose and our methods. The great majority of people in this country find terrorism repugnant and will never support it. Work to challenge ideology should not try to change majority opinion because it does not need changing. Our purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. We must mobilise and empower communities not give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong.
- 1.32** Success in *Prevent* will mean that:
- There is a reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in this country and in states overseas whose security most impacts on our own;
 - There is more effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared by terrorist organisations and used by terrorists to legitimise violence; and
 - There is more challenge to and isolation of extremists and terrorists operating on the internet.

Protect

1.33 The purpose of *Protect* is to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas and so reduce

our vulnerability. Our priorities are informed by an annual National Risk Assessment, a version of which we publish, which assesses the threats we face and the vulnerabilities we have.

1.34 We believe that significant progress has been made with our *Protect* related work in the past few years, notably in securing the Critical National Infrastructure, in assessing and managing down the risks to crowded places and in safeguarding hazardous materials which may be used by terrorists in an attack.

1.35 But much more remains to be done. We will devote more resources to border security, improving both the technology for identifying who enters and leaves this country and the coordination of our law enforcement response. We have announced the creation of a Border Command in the new National Crime Agency, intended to address the multiple chains of command across different organisations which operate at the border at present. We have already responded to recent threats to aviation security with new scanning technology, watchlisting and a no-fly procedure, intended to enable us to stop people boarding an aircraft bound for or leaving the UK who may intend to destroy it. We are working to address issues regarding cargo security.

1.36 We have received the report from the Coroner following the inquest into the 7 July 2005 London bombings. Our reply to that report will be published shortly; the recommendations of the Coroner touch on issues regarding *Pursue*, *Protect* and *Prepare*.

1.37 From 2011-2015 our *Protect* objectives will be to:

- Strengthen UK border security;
- Reduce the vulnerability of the transport network;
- Increase the resilience of the UK's infrastructure; and
- Improve protective security for crowded places.

1.38 We recognise that in all these areas our *Protect* work is becoming more complex. In many areas our own protective security depends on effective security measures in third countries. Aviation security must be an international endeavour or it will not succeed; the security of the UK border depends on international collaboration. Moreover, we also depend on close relationships with the private sector, who own much of the infrastructure and the systems that need to be protected. We will continue to be as transparent as we can in sharing our understanding of the threats we face and wherever possible will collaborate in the development of security solutions.

1.39 Success in *Protect* will mean that:

- We know where and how we are vulnerable to terrorist attack and have reduced those vulnerabilities to an acceptable and a proportionate level;
- We share our priorities with the private sector and the international community and, wherever possible, we act together to address them; and
- The disruptive effect and costs of our protective security work are proportionate to the risks we face.

Prepare

1.40 The purpose of our *Prepare* work is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end and to increase our resilience so we can recover from its aftermath. An effective and efficient response will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery.

1.41 We believe that it is right to build resilience in a coordinated way to all kinds of threats and hazards. This 'generic' approach makes best use of our resources and avoids needless duplication. Evidence suggests that generic resilience capabilities at a local level have improved in some areas in the past few years but we must do more to improve aspects of our response, including in particular communications between

emergency services and to the public during a civil emergency. There remain wider issues to resolve regarding what is known as 'interoperability' between the emergency services. We are also concerned that there is not yet sufficiently regular or comprehensive testing of all our emergency response plans.

1.42 The Coroner's report following the inquest into the 7 July 2005 London bombings made seven recommendations regarding the emergency response to those attacks. The recommendations also relate to information sharing between emergency services and incident training. Our response will address these issues.

1.43 Although generic resilience capabilities offer a sound basis for work to respond to a terrorist incident, there are types of terrorist attack which require a more specialised response. In the past two years considerable resources have been devoted to developing more effective responses to an attack of the kind that took place in Mumbai between 26-29 November 2008. Significant changes have been made to police firearms resources and tactics, and to the multi agency response that such incidents would require. We intend to continue this work.

1.44 We also intend to do more to address the highest impact terrorist risks set out in the National Risk Assessment. These include the risk of a terrorist attack which makes use of unconventional weapons, including biological, radiological, chemical or even nuclear materials. We emphasise that there is a low probability of these attacks. But their impact is so high that we judge preparations must be made for them. As in so many other areas of this strategy those preparations must wherever possible be coordinated with our allies overseas. A considerable amount of work has already been completed, in particular by the police, in developing a response in these areas.

1.45 Over the next four years we will therefore:

- Continue to build generic capabilities to respond to and recover from a wide range of terrorist and other civil emergencies;

- Improve preparedness for the highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment;
- Improve the ability of the emergency services to work together during a terrorist attack; and
- Enhance communications and information sharing for terrorist attacks.

1.46 Testing and exercising are vital to our resilience and preparedness. We have a National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme. We will maintain this and Ministers will participate in it. We will also place great emphasis on learning and absorbing the lessons from these exercises and will expect participating agencies to do this quickly and comprehensively. We will monitor their progress.

1.47 Success in *Prepare* will mean that:

- Our planning for the consequences of all civil emergencies provides us with the capabilities to respond to and recover from the most likely kinds of terrorist attacks in this country;
- We have in place additional capabilities to manage ongoing terrorist attacks wherever required; and
- We have in place additional capabilities to respond to the highest impact risks.

London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games

1.48 The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be the biggest sporting event in our history, involving 14,700 athletes from 205 countries at over 30 venues. There will be over 10 million spectators. The Government has guaranteed to the International Olympic Committee to take all financial, planning and operational measures necessary to ensure the safety of the Games.

1.49 Terrorism poses the greatest security threat to the Games. Experience indicates that global sporting events provide an attractive and high-profile target for terrorist groups.

1.50 We have conducted an audit and review of Games security planning and we are satisfied that appropriate arrangements have been and are being put in place. The UK has an excellent track record for safely and securely hosting major events. The sheer scale of London 2012 poses significant policing and security challenges.

1.51 Our attention will be increasingly focused on assuring the Games security strategy and in establishing that we have the right capabilities in place, that our plans are sufficient to address the challenges, and that security and safety are coordinated with the wider Games operation. We will focus on testing and exercising, coordinating with the wider National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme which is already in place.

Implementation

1.52 This section describes how we will ensure the accountability of this strategy, implement it effectively and monitor its progress.

1.53 The National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister, will have oversight of CONTEST and take regular reports on its progress. The Home Secretary will continue to be the lead Minister for domestic counter-terrorism work.

1.54 Implementation requires close cooperation and coordination in this country. We expect departments, agencies and the police to work closely together to a common set of objectives, with transparency and openness. They will be assessed accordingly. We will seek dialogue with the private sector, voluntary organisations, community groups and the general public. Our success will continue to depend on the quality of our international engagement with our close allies and with multilateral organisations.

1.55 We will continue to invest in a cross-government effort to coordinate science and technology in support of CONTEST. Our forthcoming White Paper will set out how we intend to use investment in defence and security technology and equipment to protect the UK against threats to our national interests, terrorism included.

1.56 The Spending Review 2010 set the budgets for each Government department from 2011/12 – 2014/15. The resources allocated to departments reflected the priorities in the SDSR. We have allocated funding to maintain and (as we have explained in this strategy) in some cases to enhance counter-terrorism capabilities, while still delivering efficiency savings.

1.57 We will assess the progress of CONTEST against a set of performance indicators, complemented by deeper evaluation of specific programmes. Evaluation will be supported by wider research and horizon scanning, vital if we are to remain ahead of new or changing threats and vulnerabilities. We are committed to publishing data where security classification allows. We will publish an annual report on our counter-terrorism work.

Conclusion

1.58 International counter-terrorism work since 9/11 has made considerable progress in reducing the threats we face. Al Qa'ida is now significantly weaker than it has been for ten years. There are significant opportunities for us and our allies to make further progress in the next few months and years.

1.59 But we recognise that the overall terrorist threat we face continues to be significant. The agencies and the police continue to disrupt terrorist-related activity here. The numbers of people arrested and then convicted for terrorist offences remains high.

1.60 The continued threat is reflected through this strategy. We are determined to maintain the capabilities we need to meet our aim – to reduce the risk to the UK and our interest overseas from terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

1.61 But we are also determined to have a strategy that is not only more effective but also more proportionate, that is better focused and more precise, which uses powers selectively, carefully and in a way that is as sparing as possible. These themes and this language also runs through this strategy – in *Pursue*, *Prevent* and in *Protect* and *Prepare* – and are reflected in its founding principles.

Introduction

Introduction

This is a revised edition of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Earlier versions of CONTEST were published in 2006 and 2009.

This new strategy reflects the changing terrorist threat and incorporates new Government policies on counter-terrorism. It follows the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, published in 2010, which identified terrorism as one of the highest priority risks to the United Kingdom.³

In 2009, CONTEST aimed to reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from international terrorism. The scope of this revised CONTEST strategy has been broadened to cover all forms of terrorism. This will provide a more flexible basis for the Government to respond to existing and emerging terrorist threats and reflects the fact that there is very often no clear distinction between international and what is sometimes called 'home grown' terrorism.

This version of CONTEST continues to be based on four workstreams: *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect* and *Prepare*. We regard this structure as effective and it has been incorporated into the planning and the work of many agencies and departments in the UK. It has been widely copied overseas. The purpose of *Pursue* and *Prevent* is to reduce the threats we face; the purpose of *Protect* and *Prepare* work is to reduce our vulnerabilities; together these four areas of work seek 'to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.' That remains our aim.

Publication of this strategy reflects the Government's commitment to transparency. While it is not always possible to be open about the specific threats we face or our response to them, we want to increase the amount of information which is available to the public on these issues.

The Home Secretary has responsibility for CONTEST and is supported by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. OSCT has led work to produce this strategy, with contributions from Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, the police and the security and intelligence agencies which are responsible for its implementation.

Part One of this document sets out the current threat from terrorism to the UK and our interests overseas and describes four strategic factors that are shaping the threats we face.

Part Two explains the Government's strategic framework for countering terrorism and the four workstreams that comprise the strategy. It sets out the Government's planning assumptions about the threat over the next four years. For each workstream we provide a short critical assessment of work since 2009, a set of objectives for the next four years, a description of programmes that will enable us to achieve those objectives and a vision for success in 2015. This section also outlines our preparation for the security of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Part Three of this document describes the implementation of the strategy in the UK and overseas and our relationships with key partners and institutions. This includes details on governance and funding arrangements as well as how the Government measures the impact of the strategy.

Part One

The Strategic Context

2.1 The CONTEST strategy published in 2009 included a detailed account of the development of the terrorist threat to the UK since the late eighties,⁴ reflecting the views of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). It emphasised the transformation of the threat in the 1990s, with the advent of Al Qaeda and other associated terrorist groups, intent on causing mass civilian casualties and determined to recruit significant numbers of people in this country and overseas.

2.2 In 2009 the strategy identified four main threats to the UK: the leadership of Al Qaeda and their immediate associates; terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qaeda, in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, Iraq and Yemen; 'self starting' networks or individuals, motivated by an ideology similar to Al Qaeda but with no known connections to it; and terrorist groups with their own identity, command structure and agenda.

2.3 This chapter briefly traces the development of the terrorist threat since 2009 with specific reference to the UK. It reflects on the planning assumptions which guided the earlier CONTEST strategy, and were used as a basis for the CONTEST response. In 2009 we judged that Al Qaeda was unlikely to survive in its current form; that its affiliates would develop more

autonomy; that terrorists would seek to use new technologies to conduct lethal operations; and that the threat to the UK was likely to diversify.⁵ These assumptions have proved to be substantially correct.

Global terrorism since 2009

2.4 In 2009 there were about 11,000 terrorist attacks around the world causing nearly 15,000 casualties. Attacks took place primarily in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.⁶ The victims of the attacks were mainly Muslim and the perpetrators primarily Al Qaeda linked terrorist groups.⁷

2.5 In 2010 over 11,500 terrorist attacks caused more than 13,000 fatalities;⁸ the vast majority of the attacks were still carried out by Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups. Most attacks continue

⁴ HM Government (2009) *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*. London: The Stationery Office. Available at <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7547/7547.pdf>

⁵ *Ibid* p.47.

⁶ National Centre for Counter Terrorism (2010) *2009 report on terrorism*. Available at http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report_on_terrorism.pdf p9.

⁷ Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, Muhammad al-Obaidi, (2009) *Deadly Vanguard: a study of al-Qa'ida's violence against Muslims*, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, pp2-3.

⁸ National Centre for Counter Terrorism, *Worldwide incidents tracking system* <https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>. Data obtained from searching for incidents and victims between 31 December 2009 and 31 December 2010.

NCTC Global Terrorism Database 2010 indicating worldwide victims of terrorism¹⁰



to take place in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq and the majority of victims are Muslims.⁹

Al Qa'ida

2.6 In the past two years the leadership of Al Qa'ida (based primarily in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas – FATA – of Pakistan) has been severely weakened by the operations of the Pakistani military and security agencies, the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The operational capability of Al Qa'ida's leadership is now less than at any time since 11 September 2001. Many have been killed, captured, or dispersed. Communications, training and planning have been significantly disrupted. Al Qa'ida's senior leadership has been forced to rely more on other terrorist groups for operational support and has increasingly called for extremists to conduct independent attacks without further guidance or instruction.

2.7 The death of Usama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 is a significant blow against Al Qa'ida. It has further disrupted Al Qa'ida operations and decision making and will leave a gap which it will not be possible for the Al Qa'ida leadership to effectively fill.

⁹ Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, Muhammad al-Obaidi, (2009) *Deadly Vanguard: a study of al-Qa'ida's violence against Muslims*, Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, p2. The paper estimates that only 15% of those killed by AQ between 2004-08 were Westerners.

¹⁰ The World Bank (2011) *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* p.55. Used with permission of World Bank and the National Centre for Counter Terrorism (NCTC).

2.8 Al Qa'ida has long sought to overturn what it has regarded as un-Islamic governments across the Muslim majority world, claiming that the only way to do so is through indiscriminate violence, against these regimes and those who support them. The 'Arab Spring' has again demonstrated that Al Qa'ida is wrong. Change has followed popular and largely non violent protest: terrorism in general and Al Qa'ida in particular have been irrelevant. Conscious of its marginal role Al Qa'ida has made a number of attempts to broaden its popular appeal: there is no evidence it has succeeded.

2.9 Throughout this two year period Al Qa'ida's senior leadership has continued to plan and attempt terrorist attacks in the West and in other countries. Hundreds of people from Europe (including the UK) have joined Al Qa'ida in Pakistan and the organisation has continued to try to send operatives back into western countries. Plots have been disrupted here and elsewhere in Europe. Above all, Al Qa'ida has continued to try to attack the US and its interests.

Al Qa'ida affiliates

2.10 The previous CONTEST strategy assessed that the disruption of Al Qa'ida in Pakistan was likely to be accompanied by a greater threat from Al Qa'ida affiliates, a small number of groups using the Al Qa'ida name but often operating without reference to the Al Qa'ida leadership.

2.11 The most significant of these groups has proved to be Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP), formed in January 2009 when members of Al Qa'ida fled Saudi Arabia and joined an Al Qa'ida network based in Yemen. Nine tourists

were kidnapped in Yemen by AQ-AP in June 2009. Seven, including a British citizen, were killed. AQ-AP attempted to assassinate the Deputy Interior Minister in Saudi Arabia in August 2009 and, since then, has conducted further attacks in Yemen.

2.12 On 25 December 2009 the group attempted an attack on an airliner travelling from Amsterdam to Detroit. The perpetrator was educated at university in the UK and via a number of different countries travelled to Yemen to volunteer his services (having read AQ-AP propaganda on the internet). The attack succeeded in penetrating airport security but the improvised explosive device did not explode. On 31 October 2010 AQ-AP tried to conduct two further attacks on commercial cargo aircraft en route to the US. They narrowly failed. The two devices were discovered before they detonated, one during a search at East Midlands Airport.

2.13 AQ-AP continues to conduct operations against both internal and western diplomatic targets in Yemen; terrorist attacks against all targets increased very significantly (more than 250%) over 2009 and 2010;¹¹ UK diplomats were attacked in April and October 2010. The breakdown of law and order in parts of Yemen and the departure to Saudi Arabia of President Saleh on 4 June 2011 enabled AQ-AP to seize territory and weapons from the Yemeni armed forces. The death of Usama bin Laden has made no difference to AQ-AP's operational capability: its internal and external operations have not been closely coordinated with the Al Qa'ida leadership.

2.14 Operational activity by Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQ-M) has been confined to the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa and has not extended to Europe or the US. But AQ-M has repeatedly taken western hostages, including many from Europe and in June 2009 seized and then murdered a British national. In some cases these operations have been coordinated with the Al Qa'ida leadership. Funds raised from ransom payments have significantly enhanced AQ-M's operational capability (people and new

equipment) and have enabled it to operate more widely through Mali and Niger. Recent instability in Libya has also enabled AQ-M to seize weapons from military sources.

2.15 Further south, AQ-M has established contact with the Nigerian terrorist group, Boko Haram and extended its reach into the volatile region of northern Nigeria. This area has long been of interest to the leadership of Al Qa'ida.

2.16 Since 2009, terrorist attacks in Iraq have decreased but casualties from terrorism remain very high. Although it no longer receives significant external support and appears to have little contact with the Al Qa'ida leadership, Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQ-I) has conducted more attacks and caused more fatalities than any other affiliate. AQ-I targets are primarily internal and sectarian. Since its formation in March 2007, a separate Al Qa'ida affiliate based in Iran and Iraq, the Al Qa'ida Kurdish battalions (AQ-KB) has established a foothold in some Kurdish areas. We judge that both AQ-I and AQ-KB aspire to conduct terrorist attacks in the West and will be prepared to conduct these attacks independently.

¹¹ National Centre for Counter Terrorism (2011) *Worldwide incidents tracking system*. Data obtained by searching for incidents in Yemen in 2009(56) and 2010(196).

Countries targeted by Al Qa'ida, affiliates and associated groups in 2010



Other terrorist groups

2.17 The Pakistan Taliban (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) meaning 'student movement of Pakistan'), has grown significantly in the past two years, (at one point seizing control not only of significant areas of the FATA but also areas closer to Islamabad) and collaborates on occasion with Al Qa'ida and other local militant groups. In May 2010 TTP claimed responsibility for the attempted detonation of an explosive device in Times Square, New York. In September the group made explicit threats against both the US and European Member States and, following the death of Usama bin Laden, led a wave of retaliatory attacks in Pakistan.


2.18 Many other terrorist groups remain active in the FATA and more widely in Pakistan. Some have a purely sectarian agenda; others regard the West, India and Indian administered Kashmir as priority targets. We judge that Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT, meaning 'Army of the Pure or Righteous') is the most capable. Although in theory banned since 2002 LeT has a front organisation (Jamaat-ud-Dawa) in Pakistan which engages in relief

work, social welfare and education programmes. It conducts attacks in Afghanistan. In the West, it recruits, raises funds and has also planned operations.

2.19 In Somalia, the clan-based militia, al Shabaab (meaning 'the Youth') continues to control significant parts of the south and centre of the country, conducting regular attacks against the African peacekeeping force (AMISOM). Parts of al Shabaab have adopted the global jihadist ideology associated with Al Qa'ida and have attracted hundreds of foreign fighters, including people from the UK. They have links to Al Qa'ida and to AQ-AP and operate more widely in East Africa. In June 2010 al Shabaab carried out its first terrorist attack outside Somalia, killing 74 people in suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda. We judge that further operations are likely and al Shabaab may formally affiliate to Al Qa'ida.

2.20 Boko Haram (meaning 'un-Islamic education is forbidden') emerged during 2009 from a group known as the Nigerian Taliban which had been active in the Muslim majority northern Nigeria since 2000. It has since conducted many attacks,

Timeline showing terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom and its interests overseas¹²



primarily against police officers, religious (mainly Christian) targets and politicians. In paragraph 2.15 we note its growing links to Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, (AQ-M).

2.21 Many Al Qaeda inspired terrorist groups continue to plan attacks across South, and South East Asia. India faces terrorist attacks not only from Kashmiri inspired terrorist groups but also from an increasingly active Maoist 'Naxalite' insurgency; terrorists and insurgents killed almost two thousand people in 2010.¹³ Jemaah Islamiya continues to operate in Indonesia and aspires to conduct attacks against local and western targets.

Lone terrorists

2.22 Al Qaeda and some Al Qaeda affiliates have increasingly encouraged acts of terrorism

by individuals or small groups independent of the Al Qaeda chain of command and without reference to, or guidance and instruction from, the leadership. The internet has enabled this type of terrorism by providing material which encourages and guides radicalisation and instructions on how to plan and conduct operations. In practice some attacks have been conducted or attempted by groups or sole individuals seemingly at their own initiative; in other cases they have had some contact with other terrorist networks.

2.23 Since 2009, one lone terrorist attack was conducted in the UK. There have been others elsewhere, notably the killing of 13 people by a US army officer at Fort Hood in November 2009. In both these cases the assailants had read propaganda on the internet from an Al Qaeda affiliate and (at Fort Hood) corresponded with an Al Qaeda member; but the attacks seem to have

¹² This diagram does not include all terrorist plots against the UK or our interests overseas disrupted at an earlier stage.

¹³ South Asia Terrorism Portal Database (2011). *India Assessment 2011*, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html>

been planned and conducted without guidance or instruction.¹⁴

The terrorist threat to the UK

2.24 Al Qa'ida, Al Qa'ida affiliates, other terrorist groups and lone terrorists have all been active in the UK over the past two years. They have tried to conduct attacks, recruit people in the UK to conduct attacks overseas, raise funds and distribute propaganda.

2.25 For much of this period the greatest threat to the UK has come from terrorist groups based in Pakistan. British nationals (amongst hundreds of other Europeans) are training or operating in Pakistan; some intend to travel to Afghanistan. But over the last year the threat to the UK and to UK interests from terrorists in Yemen and Somalia has significantly increased. People from this country are also travelling to these areas to fight; some are returning here to plan and conduct operations.

2.26 The threat level in the UK from international terrorism has been SEVERE for much of the period, meaning that we judge a terrorist attack in the UK to be 'highly likely'. Threat levels continue to be set independently by JTAC.

2.27 The extent of the threat we face is reflected in the number of terrorist plots in this country and in related arrests, prosecutions and convictions. We examine the data in detail below. It should be noted that UK arrest and prosecution data provides only a partial picture of the terrorist threat to our country.

2.28 Between January 2009 and December 2010, there were 650 arrests in the UK on suspicion of terrorism (this figure includes arrests on suspicion of Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) which were made in the Republic of Ireland). There were more terrorist-related arrests in the

UK than in any other European country over this period.¹⁵

2.29 The number of arrests made in the UK on suspicion of terrorism in 2010 was 6% higher than in 2009 (335 arrests in 2010 compared to 315 arrests in 2009).¹⁶ The number of arrests on suspicion of international terrorism¹⁷ in 2010 was 50% lower than in 2009 (down from 155 arrests in 2009 to 76 arrests in 2010); but the number of arrests in connection with terrorism-related activity in Northern Ireland in 2010 was 98% higher than in 2009 (up from 106 to 210). The number of Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) arrests in Great Britain was relatively small over the same period, dropping from six arrests in 2009 to one arrest in 2010.

2.30 Between January 2009 and December 2010, people arrested in Great Britain on suspicion of terrorism received a total of 49 charges for terrorism-related offences and 61 charges for other offences. Over the same period, people arrested on suspicion of terrorism in Northern Ireland received a total of 97 charges for terrorism offences.


¹⁴ Pantucci R, (2011), *A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists*, London: ICSR; and Lieberman J and Collins S (2011), *A Ticking Time Bomb*, A Special Report, Washington DC: US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

¹⁵ TE-SAT (2011) *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. Available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2011-449>.

¹⁶ Home Office Statistical Bulletin (June 2011): *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stop and searches: quarterly update to December 2010 Great Britain*.

¹⁷ International terrorism refers to activity by any proscribed terrorist group that is based outside the UK and operates in and from third countries. International terrorist activity in the UK is predominantly Al Qa'ida linked or inspired.

Arrests on suspicion of terrorism in the UK¹⁸




2.31 In a further 53 cases in Great Britain, action other than prosecution under terrorism legislation was used. This included cautions for non-Terrorism Act offences; transfer to the UK Border Agency for immigration offences; and bail awaiting charge. As of 10 June 2011, 12 people were subject to a control order. Since 2006, nine people have been deported for terrorism-related activity.

2.32 Since January 2009, 67 people have been prosecuted for terrorism-related activity in Great Britain.¹⁹ Of these, 73% (49 people) were convicted and 21% (14 people) acquitted. In the other trials there was a hung jury or no evidence was offered. 43 of the most serious terrorist-related convictions since 2009 (up to the first quarter of 2011) are shown on the diagram on page 28. Some of these trials relate to arrests made prior to 2009 and some of those arrested during this period for terrorist related offences have yet to come to trial. Most convictions were for the possession of materials (including explosives) or documents likely to be of use for committing acts of terrorism. Over the same period, nine people were convicted for terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.²⁰

¹⁸ Figures for non-NIRT related terrorism are taken from the Home Office Statistical Bulletin (June 2011). Categorisation of suspects is based on an assessment by officers involved in the case, or by the ACPO Counter Terrorism Co-ordination centre (ACTCC). These categories may be subject to change as details of cases come to light. Figures relating to arrests connected to Northern Ireland related terrorism supplied by the Northern Ireland Office (include arrests inside the Republic of Ireland).

¹⁹ Ibid Home Office Statistical Bulletin (June 2011). NIRT arrests taken from NIO figures and include NIRT arrests in the Republic of Ireland.
²⁰ Figures for 2010 remain provisional and may be subject to change.

Convictions in Great Britain for terrorist related activity since 2009²¹



²¹ This information has been drawn from public domain sources. It highlights 43 of the most serious convictions in 2009 and 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 in Great Britain, as drawn from public sources. It does not include all 49 people convicted of terrorist-related activity in 2009 and 2010 as recorded in the Home Office Statistical Bulletin (June 2011).

2.33 The following incidents since 2009 are indicative of the range of terrorist-related threats in, to and from the UK:

- In April 2009 the police and security and intelligence agencies disrupted a group assessed to be in contact with Al Qa'ida's senior leadership in Pakistan. Most of the group were students who had entered the UK on student visas and were working illegally. In this case the police and security and intelligence agencies intervened at an early stage to pre-empt any threat to public safety. Lack of evidence meant they were not prosecuted but, as foreign nationals, were transferred to the UK Border Agency for deportation. Their cases were considered at the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) which later judged the key figure posed a significant threat to UK national security. The US has since requested the extradition of one of those involved.
- In December 2009 a Nigerian national attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines flight 253 to Detroit. The device failed to detonate and the assailant was apprehended by passengers on board the plane. In December 2010 a Swedish-Iraqi citizen conducted a suicide attack in a central district of Stockholm. Two members of the public were injured in the attack and the assailant died before he was able to set off other devices he was carrying. Both of the people responsible for these attacks lived in the UK for some years.
- In February 2010 a British Airways employee was jailed for 30 years after supplying AQ-AP with information which could have been used to conduct a terrorist attack. The court determined that he deliberately set out to find a job (as a member of cabin crew) that would be useful to plan terrorist attacks. He also contributed to extremist propaganda and worked with associates to raise funds for terrorist organisations. He made contact with a senior member of AQ-AP in Yemen and also offered to begin recruiting other people. Arrested in February 2010, he was later convicted on four counts of preparing acts of terrorism.
- In May 2010 a university student attempted to murder a Member of Parliament at his constituency surgery in East London. The assailant was acting on her own, after reading sermons from an AQ-AP associate on the internet. She was convicted in June 2010 and sentenced to life.
- On 29 October 2010, two explosive devices concealed in air freight were discovered and intercepted following the receipt of specific intelligence. One device, concealed in a printer was found at East Midlands Airport on an inbound flight en route from Yemen to Chicago that had transited through Cologne. The other device was intercepted at Dubai International Airport also en route from Yemen to Chicago. Both devices were probably intended to detonate over the Atlantic or the eastern seaboard of the US. They may have then brought down the aircraft.

Northern Ireland Related Terrorism

2.34 The UK has a long experience of Northern Ireland Related Terrorism. Following the Good Friday agreement in 1998 many Northern Ireland terrorist groups agreed a ceasefire and subsequently decommissioned their weapons.

2.35 Despite the significant and continuing progress in stabilising the political situation in Northern Ireland, some republican terrorist groups continue to carry out terrorist attacks. Support for NIRT remains low and dissident groups do not represent mainstream opinion across Northern Ireland. But the frequency of these attacks has increased significantly, from 22 in 2009 to 40 in 2010. There have been 16 attacks to end of June 2011 including the murder of Police Constable Ronan Kerr in April 2011.²² Many more attacks have been successfully disrupted.

²² Figures obtained from the Northern Ireland Office. See Paragraph 2.28-2.36 for figures of arrests, charges and convictions in Northern Ireland.

2.36 Between January 2009 and December 2010, there were 316 arrests in connection with terrorism-related activity in Northern Ireland. Over the same period in Northern Ireland there were 97 charges for terrorist offences and nine people were convicted for terrorist activity.

2.37 In May 2011 a number of coded warnings were received which suggested a bomb had been left in a central London location. These were the first coded warnings related to Great Britain from Northern Ireland terrorist groups for ten years.

2.38 The terrorist threat level from NIRT in Northern Ireland is SEVERE. In Great Britain, the threat level relating to NIRT was raised in September 2010 from MODERATE to SUBSTANTIAL meaning that an attack is a strong possibility.

Extreme right-wing terrorism

2.39 In recent years, extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. There are 14 people currently serving prison sentences in this country for terrorism offences who are known to be associated with extreme right-wing groups, though none of these groups are themselves terrorist organisations. In 2010 two people motivated by extreme right-wing ideology were convicted for preparing a terrorist attack using a simple poison; another was jailed for 11 years for assembling one of the largest arms caches found in recent years in England; and another person was convicted for disseminating terrorist publications.

2.40 People involved in extreme right-wing groups have not received the same training, guidance or support as those who have engaged with Al Qa'ida or Al Qa'ida influenced organisations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct operations on the scale of those planned by Al Qa'ida.

Terrorism in Europe

Data from other European states provides further insights into the developing terrorist threat²³. It is however not always possible to compare like with like – different countries classify terrorism and terrorism offences in different ways; and not all countries submit data on every issue.

Terrorism related arrests across Europe²⁴



Over 200 terrorist attacks were reported in eight European Union Member States in 2010, compared to more than 300 in 2009. A key factor in the lower number of attacks was the ceasefire in Spain by ETA. 566 people were arrested in 14 other EU Member States for terrorist-related offences in 2010; 587 arrests were reported by 13 member States in 2009. In 2009 nine states reported 307 convictions for terrorist-related offences; in 2010 nine states reported 227 convictions.

Most terrorist attacks in Europe in 2010 and 2009 were conducted or attempted by separatist groups and since 2007 the majority of those arrested for terrorist offences in reporting countries have been from separatist organisations. But the vast majority of the attacks and the arrests were in Spain and France (and many of the attacks in France may have been related to criminal extortion).

During 2010, 179 people were arrested for offences linked to Islamist terrorism (as defined by Europol) in 14 reporting states, a significant increase on 2009. Nine states reported 72 convictions. Al Qa'ida affiliated terrorist groups carried out only one successful attack in Europe in 2009 (in Italy) and three in 2010 (two in Denmark and one in Sweden).

²³ TE-SAT (2011) *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. Available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2011-449>

²⁴ For indicative purposes only. UK data taken from Home Office Statistical Bulletin (June 2011) and Northern Ireland Office figures (for NIRT) which includes NIRT arrests in the Republic of Ireland. European data taken from TE-SAT report (2011). The different data sets classify terrorism offences differently and are not directly comparable.

Terrorism in Europe (continued)

Significantly more people were arrested in France and the UK for Islamist terrorist offences than in any other country. The data suggests that of the total arrested for Islamist offences in Europe about 20% had links to Islamist groups, including AQ-AP, AQ-M and al Shabaab. The remainder appear to have been unaffiliated.

Across eight states some 45 attacks were conducted by left-wing or anarchist groups in 2010, an increase of 12% over 2009. Six people were killed. Most attacks occurred in Greece and Spain.

There were no right-wing terrorist attacks in Europe in 2010 and in 14 countries only one reported arrest; there were four right-wing terrorist attacks in 2009 (all in Hungary).

Although not comprehensive these statistics indicate:

- More people were arrested for all terrorism-related activities in the UK than in any other European country between January 2009 and December 2010. In France and Spain more people were convicted.
- A range of terrorist groups continue to pose a significant threat to the security of countries in Europe; states face threats from separatist, anarchist, left-wing and Islamist organisations.
- Though significant number of people are engaged in Islamist terrorist related activity there continue to be very few successful attacks.
- There appears to be a significant threat from people unaffiliated to any Islamist group;

But some important and relevant points are not picked up in the European data summarised here:

- In countries which face the greatest threat from Islamist terrorism, threat levels have either stayed static in the past few years or have increased;
- The Islamist plots disrupted across Europe have been more ambitious than those of any other groups and have sought to kill more people.

Strategic factors


2.41 The last version of CONTEST, published in 2009, identified four strategic factors that in recent years have enabled terrorist groups to grow and then flourish: conflict and instability; ideology; technology; and radicalisation. These factors have had a continuing and important effect on the development of the terrorist threat since 2009. We judge they will continue to do so; we describe them as strategic factors because they are directly relevant to our overall counter-terrorism strategy and need to be taken account of if the strategy is to meet its aim.

Conflict and instability

2.42 Failed or fragile states provide an environment conducive to terrorism.²⁵ There is a continuing terrorist or insurgency campaign in eight of the top ten failed states featured on

²⁵ The OECD have defined a failed state as “‘when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’”.

Global stress zones



Source: DCDC Strategic Trends, 2007

the 2010 Failed States Index.²⁶ These states tend to be situated in 'stress zones',²⁷ geographical areas which suffer from poverty and very often from conflict – in many cases for tribal, ethnic or sectarian reasons.

2.43 Terrorists exploit conflict and instability in a number of ways:

- Fragile states can provide the space for terrorist groups to operate freely. Weapons are often widely available. Law enforcement agencies may have insufficient resources and capabilities and may be compromised by corruption; in some cases their abuse of human rights may cause resentment which encourages radicalisation. In the past two years

AQ-AP has taken advantage of lack of effective governance in Yemen to plan and direct attacks against local and international targets. Al Shabaab have flourished in Somalia because the writ of central Government barely extends through the capital, Mogadishu. The armed forces in Pakistan have been unable to control all the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

- In fragile and failing states terrorist groups can obtain support by providing essential services which can no longer be provided by government. Terrorist groups can create a crude judicial structure where the law of the state has broken down and cannot be applied. Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a front organisation for the terrorist group Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) (responsible for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008) was openly involved in the relief efforts following the floods in Pakistan in 2010.²⁸ The Afghan and Pakistan

²⁶ Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace (2011) *Failed States Index 2011*. The ten highest ranking states are as follows: Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Iraq and Cote d'Ivoire.

²⁷ Stress zones are regions likely to experience one or more of the following environmental stresses: demographic stress, water scarcity, crop decline or hunger.

²⁸ *Pakistan Charity is Blacklisted by US State Department* (25 November 2010); BBC News <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11833725>

Taliban have continued to attract support by offering a brutal legal system, which in some areas offers the only possible opportunity for redress: according to one recent poll one in five Pakistanis think that under Taliban rule the quality of their lives would improve.²⁹

- Terrorist groups use conflicts to develop global networks: so called 'foreign fighters' travel to conflict zones, receive training from terrorist groups and engage in operational activity. Some return to their home countries where they plan attacks against domestic targets, recruit more people to travel overseas and raise funds to enable them to do so.

Technology

2.44 Terrorist groups use technology to progress attack planning, communicate and spread their ideology, evade protective security measures and increase the effectiveness of attacks. A small number of terrorist groups continue to aspire to acquire or develop access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.³⁰

2.45 Some Al Qa'ida attacks over the last three years have been carried out using innovative improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to circumvent protective security. In August 2009, AQ-AP came close to assassinating the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister using a non-metal IED concealed on the would-be assassin's body. A similar device (probably designed by the same person) was used in the attempted attack on flight NW253 from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009; two devices, concealed deep inside printers, were deployed to attack cargo aircraft in October 2010. In Iraq and more recently in Afghanistan sophisticated IED technology has rapidly evolved and been passed from group to group in order to undertake attacks against NATO led forces.³¹

2.46 Terrorists are increasingly using online technology, including Google Earth/Street View for operational planning. The marauding attacks in Mumbai in 2008 were directed by people using off-the-shelf secure communications technology to stay in contact with each other. Software to encrypt mobile phone voice and SMS functions is widely available and improving. Peer to peer networks and torrents (i.e. files shared between individual computers on a network) can be used to distribute files and information rapidly and securely. Darknets (i.e. private internet communities which enable users to share content securely and anonymously) are likely to become more popular.³² Cloud computing offers new, potentially more robust means for storing, sharing and distributing material on line. It can be encrypted and configured to work with new generation mobile devices, leaving little or no trace of the data behind.

2.47 We continue to see no evidence of systematic cyber terrorism (i.e. terrorist attack on IT systems). But the first recorded incident of a terrorist 'cyber' attack on corporate computer systems took place in 2010.³³ The so called 'here you have' virus, (the responsibility for which was claimed by the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades for Electronic Jihad) was relatively unsophisticated but a likely indicator of a future trend. Since the death of Usama bin Laden, Al Qa'ida has explicitly called not only for acts of lone or individual terrorism (see para 2.22) but also for 'cyber jihad'.

2.48 Terrorists continue to use new technologies to communicate propaganda. While radicalisation continues to primarily be a social process involving contact between vulnerable people and radicalisers (not least because internet penetration in many countries with a high incidence of terrorism is still low) – the internet provides radicalisers with a vast range of materials to use

²⁹ Pew Research Centre (June 2011) *Global Attitudes Project, Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes* <http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Pakistan-Report-FINAL-June-21-2011.pdf>

³⁰ Brian M. Jenkins (2008) *Will Terrorists go Nuclear?*, RAND Corporation.

³¹ Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara A. Daly, Brian A. Jackson (2007) *Sharing the Dragon's Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies*, RAND Corporation.

³² Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, Bryan Willman, (2002) *The Darknet and the Future of Content Distribution*, ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management, Microsoft Corporation. Originally published at <http://www.cryptostanford.edu/DRM2002/prog.html>

³³ *Hacker Claims Credit for Here You Have Worm* (2010) The Register http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/13/hacker_claims_credit_for_here_you_have_worm/

once the process of radicalisation has begun. It allows for secure communication between private communities in which extremist ideas are shared and become normalised within that community. The internet also extends the reach of ideologues overseas, enabling them to preach to groups and reinforce messages of violence.

2.49 Use of social networking sites and video sharing is now commonplace. There have been a number of attempts by terrorist and extremist groups to ‘invade’ Facebook. Twitter will be used to repost media or forum articles enabling extremist content to be shared more quickly, widely and amongst people who would not normally search for extremist content. Estimates of the number of terrorism-related websites, made by experts in the field, range from several hundred to several thousand. It is clear that a few dozen are highly influential and frequented by terrorists.

Ideology

2.50 Central to the development of any movement or group is an ideological framework. Ideology offers its believers a coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for organised political action, whether it is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.³⁴ Ideology may also inform strategy and also acts as a binding factor in the absence of hierarchical organisational command structures or leaders.³⁵

2.51 Some terrorist groups have very detailed ideologies, allegedly based on extensive historic and contemporary literature. Other terrorist groups pay much less attention to developing a specific ideological position and rely instead on a few slogans and one or two key written texts.

2.52 Contemporary Al Qa’ida inspired terrorism belongs in the first category. It draws on and then reinterprets different theological traditions. It relies on key texts, some of which were written before

Al Qa’ida was established, by other prominent militant groups and their supporters. These texts circulate on the internet and in hard copy and, among members of contemporary groups, are studied and debated (the work of members of Al Qa’ida is not always as widely read or as influential).

2.53 In this country aspects of the ideology associated with Al Qa’ida (notably the view that the West is at war with Islam and that Muslims living in western societies cannot interact with other faiths or democratic structures) are also more widely disseminated by some extremist groups and speakers who deliberately and carefully stay within the law.

2.54 The ideology now associated with Al Qa’ida has been attacked from inside and outside the organisation. In 2007 a former associate of Ayman Zawahiri, published a detailed and influential critique of Al Qa’ida;³⁶ in 2009 the leadership of a Libyan group then affiliated to Al Qa’ida renounced terrorism and Al Qa’ida’s strategy. In 2008 Zawahiri resorted to a cumbersome internet based question and answer session to try to address some criticisms that had been made of him.

2.55 Debate in Al Qa’ida and associated groups has centred in particular on the legitimacy of killing Muslim civilians; on the value of and priority to be given to attacking western countries; and on the priority to be given to specific countries and causes (e.g. Afghanistan or Palestine). Collectively, these issues have further damaged Al Qa’ida’s reputation and that of the groups most closely associated with it. The leadership has repeatedly sought to clarify its thinking, rarely with success: when it has tried to set out new principles these have been undermined by the actions of its affiliates.

2.56 In an attempt to obtain support Al Qa’ida has increasingly attempted to link its ideology with wider issues that resonate within Muslim communities: in September 2010, Zawahiri issued a statement of support regarding Gaza and

³⁴ A. Heywood (2007), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 4th Ed, Palgrave.

³⁵ Change Institute for the European Commission – Directorate General Justice (2008), *Freedom and Security. Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives*.

³⁶ Lawrence Wright (2008), *The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda mastermind questions terrorism*. The New Yorker.

flooding in Pakistan; in October 2010 Usama bin Laden issued a statement on climate change and disaster relief. But these statements have lacked credibility: Al Qa'ida has found it impossible to show anything positive it has achieved for the people of Palestine or Pakistan.

2.57 But the most serious ideological challenge to Al Qa'ida has been what we term the Arab Spring. The uprisings were motivated by economic and political issues. The goals and aspirations of those taking part in the popular movements were very often freedom, respect for human rights and democracy; not the imposition of a militant aggressive state and a war against the West. Members of Al Qa'ida have subsequently tried to adapt to the developing politics of the region. But they continue to lack credibility and relevance.

2.58 It would be premature to conclude that because Al Qa'ida has comprehensively failed, its ideology has been widely or conclusively discredited. We continue to believe that aspects of that ideology will be more resilient than Al Qa'ida itself and can be a key driver for terrorism in the future. But the failure of that ideology has now been more visibly exposed to more people than at any time before: this represents a strategic opportunity for us and other countries around the world.

Radicalisation

2.59 Radicalisation refers to the process by which people come to support, and in some cases to participate in terrorism. We continue to regard ideology as one factor in the radicalisation process. But there are others and for that reason we have continued to draw a distinction between the two issues.

2.60 Since CONTEST was published in 2009 a great deal of work has been undertaken to understand the characteristics and drivers relevant to radicalisation.³⁷ As set out in the revised *Prevent* strategy, radicalisation in this country is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslims against

non-Muslims, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence. A network of influential propagandists for terrorism, in this country and elsewhere, make use of the internet and target specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.

2.61 The grievances upon which propagandists can draw may be real or perceived, although clearly none of them justify terrorism. They include a perception of foreign policy, in particular towards the Muslim majority world; a sense and experience of Islamophobia; and counter-terrorism powers, which have sometimes been regarded as discriminatory or disproportionate.

2.62 Polling in this country, notably the last Citizenship Survey, indicates that very small percentages (1-3%) among all faith groups support violence as a way of dealing with injustice.³⁸ This polling is largely in line with other surveying in this country since 9/11 which has tried to establish levels of support for terrorism here and overseas. The Citizenship Survey showed support for violence is significantly higher amongst young people and people from low socio-economic groups. It is important to emphasise that the aspirations of Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups to attract a mass following in this country have not been realised. They attract very low levels of support. There is no evidence that this support base is growing or has grown since 2009.

2.63 Overseas, there has been further polling to understand the level of support for Al Qa'ida in particular, for other terrorist groups associated with them, for the types of attack they conduct and for the political views they espouse. There is some evidence that support for Al Qa'ida is decreasing. But the trends are not consistent. Significant numbers in Indonesia (21%), Egypt (21%) Pakistan and Jordan (15%) continued to hold positive views of Al Qa'ida in April 2011, some time after the beginning of the

³⁷ HM Government (2011) *The Prevent Strategy*. London: The Stationery Office. Available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-Prevent-strategy/>

³⁸ Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), *Citizenship Survey: April–September 2010, England* p.26.

Arab Spring;³⁹ by the time of his death support for Usama bin Laden had dropped markedly over figures for preceding years but remained significant in Jordan (13%), Indonesia (26%), Egypt (22%) and the Palestinian territories (34%).⁴⁰

Conclusion

2.64 The UK continues to face a significant threat from terrorism. This is reflected in the number of people we are arresting and then convicting and in the number of plots which have been disrupted. The numbers are higher than in most other countries in Europe.

2.65 The threat we face is changing. Although Al Qa'ida is still capable of terrorist attacks in the UK it is weaker now than it has been since 9/11. It has failed to achieve its objectives. It has been marginalised by events in the Middle East and North Africa. This presents us with an opportunity which we and our international allies will wish to seize.

2.66 But persistent longer term factors – fragile and failed states, technology, radicalisation – will continue to sustain terrorist groups. We do not underestimate the resilience of Al Qa'ida. Other groups – some affiliated to Al Qa'ida – now pose a high threat to our security. The threat from lone terrorism is significant. Terrorism in Northern Ireland has increased in recent years.

2.67 Although we now have significant opportunities to reduce the threat to this country we continue to face challenges. The priority we attach to our counter-terrorism work will remain as high as it ever has been.

³⁹ Pew Research Centre. (May 2011), *Arab Spring Fails to Improve US Image*. <http://pewglobal.org/2011/05/17/arab-spring-fails-to-improve-US-image/>

⁴⁰ Pew Research Centre. (May 2011), *Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslim Publics in Recent Years*. In 2010 comparable figures for Pakistan and Nigeria were 18% and 49%. <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1977/poll-osama-bin-laden-death-confidence-muslim-public-al-qaeda-favorability>

Part Two

Our Response

3.1 Part One describes the terrorist threat to the UK. This section describes our strategy, explaining each workstream in turn. Each chapter provides an assessment of progress since 2009, objectives to 2015, and a vision of success.

UK national security

3.2 The National Security Strategy was published in 2010 and sets out the UK's security aims and priorities based on our understanding of the risks the country faces now and may face in the future.⁴¹ Terrorism is identified as one of the highest priority (Tier One) risks to the UK's national security.

3.3 The Strategic Defence and Security Review⁴² (SDSR) committed to maintaining and in some cases enhancing core counter-terrorism capabilities, whilst making savings to wider counter-terrorism budgets. Specifically this included:

- Maintaining counter-terrorism policing capabilities with efficiency savings from reorganisation and wider police reform;

- Continued investment in intelligence capabilities to identify, investigate and disrupt terrorist activity;
- Delivering a safe and secure Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012; and
- Supporting the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland and the Irish Government to counter the threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism.

3.4 The SDSR also committed to:

- Reviewing our most sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism and security powers, providing a correction in favour of civil liberties where possible;
- Reforming the *Prevent* workstream of CONTEST;
- Enhancing the firearms capabilities of police armed response units and supporting their work with specialist military units to increase the effectiveness of the response in the event of a terrorist firearms attack in the UK;
- Putting in place measures to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to terrorist use of unconventional materials; and
- Introducing a programme to preserve the ability of the security, intelligence

⁴¹ HM Government (2010), *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*. London: The Stationery Office.

⁴² HM Government (2010), *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*. London: The Stationery Office.

and law enforcement agencies to obtain communications data and to intercept communications within the appropriate legal framework.

3.5 In other sections of the SDSR the Government has committed to enhancing border and aviation security, cyber security and our ability to respond to civil emergencies. Progress in these and other areas is set out in the remainder of this chapter.

CONTEST: the UK's response to terrorism

3.6 The aim of this strategy is to reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. This strategy, unlike those before it, will address all forms of terrorist threat to this country and our interests, whether it originates here or overseas.

3.7 Responsibility for dealing with Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) rests with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Many of the policies and programmes for tackling terrorism long term are devolved to the Northern Ireland Executive. For that reason CONTEST does not extend to dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland but many of the issues dealt with under this revised CONTEST strategy and the principles it sets out are relevant to the threat we face there. The Government will continue to support the Devolved Administration as they respond to those terrorist groups which seek to undermine peace and prosperity. Operational organisations, notably the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), will also continue to work very closely with counterparts in the Irish Government.

3.8 The most significant terrorist threat to the UK as a whole continues to come from Al Qa'ida and those terrorist groups and individuals associated with it. The focus of this strategy will therefore be on tackling this form of terrorism. The strategy will continue to be organised around four workstreams: **Pursue** is intended to stop terrorist attacks; **Prevent** aims to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;

Protect will strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; and **Prepare** will mitigate the impact of an attack where it cannot be avoided. **Pursue** and **Prevent** address threats; **Protect** and **Prepare** address vulnerabilities.

3.9 **Protect** and **Prepare** are part of a wider Government programme led by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office to improve the UK's resilience to all major risks – including natural hazards such as flooding as well as threats such as terrorism.

3.10 The SDSR emphasises the need to tackle the root causes of instability. This is reflected in CONTEST. For terrorism we need to address not only the immediate threat of attacks but the longer term factors which enable terrorist groups to grow and flourish. We have identified four factors in Part One: conflict and instability, technology, ideology and radicalisation. Some of these factors cannot be addressed within a counter-terrorism strategy and are wider Government priorities. Coordination between CONTEST and other Government programmes is therefore essential. Working closely with other countries will remain a priority.

CONTEST principles

3.11 CONTEST must be:

- **Effective:** we will regularly assess the progress we are making and the outcomes of this strategy;
- **Proportionate:** we will ensure that the resources allocated to CONTEST, and the powers that are used for counter-terrorism work are proportionate to the risks we face and necessary to reduce those risks to a level we judge is acceptable;
- **Transparent:** wherever possible and consistent with our security we will seek to make more information available about the threats we face, the options we have and the response we have decided on;

CONTEST: Planning Assumptions 2011-2015

The planning assumptions for the future set out below are intended to inform our counter-terrorism strategy, including our objectives and the allocation of resources. They reflect our understanding of future terrorist intent, the political and economic environment, and trends in technology:

- The death of Usama bin Laden will further damage the operational capability of Al Qa'ida in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Continued international pressure will make it harder for the Al Qa'ida senior leadership to plan and conduct terrorist attacks. Al Qa'ida will try to exploit the withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan.
- Al Qa'ida affiliates may continue to grow, taking advantage of state fragility and failure. They will all aspire to attack western targets. The Al Qa'ida senior leadership will try to guide and direct its affiliates but will not exert close control: Al Qa'ida will continue to become less of an organisation and more of a movement.
- A wider range of Al Qa'ida inspired terrorist networks, groups and unaffiliated individuals will collaborate to launch attacks against the West, sharing resources and capabilities.
- Current political and social change in the Middle East and North Africa has undermined the credibility of Al Qa'ida and like minded terrorist groups and may continue to do so; but terrorist groups will try to adapt their propaganda and will exploit uncertainty and instability in the region.
- The process of radicalisation will continue: the ideology which has come to be associated with Al Qa'ida will be more resilient than Al Qa'ida itself. Extremist material on the internet will continue to motivate some people to engage in terrorism but will rarely be a substitute for the social process of radicalisation.
- Terrorist groups will use a range of attack techniques, both established and new. There will be more cyber terrorism. Groups will continue to benefit from off-the-shelf technology in planning and conducting attacks, making operations more secure and potentially more lethal. The internet and virtual space will be strategically vital.
- Organisations will seek to conduct attacks which cause mass casualties or otherwise have visible mass disruptive impact. Al Qa'ida and other groups will maintain their long-term interest in using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.
- Geographically, vital countries for our counter-terrorism work will continue to be Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria.
- Some states will continue to support terrorist groups to try to protect their own strategic interests.
- Terrorists in Northern Ireland will continue to conduct attacks in an attempt to reverse the peace process. Some groups will aspire to conduct attacks inside Great Britain.
- There will continue to be isolated individuals who engage in terrorist activity in the name of extreme right or left-wing views or other ideologies. They will not pose as high a risk to our national security as terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida.

- **Flexible:** terrorists will seek new tactics to exploit vulnerabilities in our protective security; we will regularly re-assess the risks we face and ensure that risk assessment is the foundation of our work;
- **Collaborative:** countering terrorism requires a local, national and international response. We will continue to work with foreign governments, the private sector, non-governmental organisations and the public; and
- **Value for money:** to deliver a counter-terrorism response that is sustainable over the long term we will continue to try to reduce costs while we maintain our core capabilities.

CONTEST prioritisation


3.12 To determine the ways in which we should meet our overall aim for CONTEST, the strategy draws on:

- Planning assumptions which describe how we expect the terrorist threat to develop over the next four years;
- Regular and more detailed classified assessments of the current terrorist threat to UK interests produced by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC): threat is assessed on the basis of both the intent and capability of an individual or group to commit a terrorist act; and
- A National Risk Assessment which identifies the specific disruptive events – including both terrorist attacks and natural hazards – which the UK could face over the next five years and considers their likelihood and impact. This confidential assessment is conducted annually and draws on expertise from a wide range of departments and agencies of government, including JTAC threat assessments. The National Risk Register⁴³ is the public version of the National Risk Assessment.

3.13 Based on these assessments, the Government will set objectives for each of the four CONTEST workstreams and, with further consideration for available resources, identify the capabilities needed to meet those objectives. We will develop programmes to ensure we have the capabilities in place.

3.14 The National Security Council will receive regular assessment of progress against CONTEST and will specifically consider the risks we face. We will report annually to Parliament on CONTEST.

3.15 Our approach is illustrated in the diagram below:



⁴³ Cabinet Office (2010) *Full National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 2010 Edition*. Available at <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/nationalriskregister-2010.pdf>

Pursue

Pursue

Summary

4.1 The purpose of *Pursue* is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible.

4.2 In 2011-2015 we want to:

- Continue to assess our counter-terrorism powers and ensure they are both effective and proportionate;
- Improve our ability to prosecute and deport people for terrorist-related offences;
- Increase our capabilities to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats;
- Ensure that judicial proceedings in this country can better handle sensitive and secret material to serve the interests of both justice and national security; and
- Work with other countries and multilateral organisations to enable us to better tackle the threats we face at their source.

4.3 We have made a start with this work by reviewing some of the most controversial counter-terrorism and security powers which have been

used in recent years. We have made significant changes – amending stop and search powers; reducing the length of time for which people can be held before charge for terrorist offences to 14 days; and replacing control orders with a package including Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures which provide security but also enable the collection of evidence which can lead to prosecution. This work will continue.

4.4 We are concerned that we continue to identify far more people engaged in terrorist activity in this country than we can successfully prosecute and convict. It therefore remains a high priority to improve prosecution rates further. We continue to consider the possible use of intercept as evidence. But we will now be looking at other options.

4.5 We believe that close dialogue between the police, security and intelligence agencies is the basis of successful counter-terrorism work. We intend to maintain arrangements largely as they are. But we need to make some changes to the Police Counter Terrorism Network to improve its capability. We are monitoring new arrangements put in place by the security and intelligence agencies last year to improve coordinated investigations of threats to this country from overseas. We are concerned that in some areas technology is eroding our capability to obtain intelligence about terrorist-related activity; we are committed to addressing this in forthcoming legislation.

4.6 We believe that as a matter of principle foreign nationals who have been engaged in terrorist-related activity here should be deported, where they cannot be convicted or after they have served a sentence. But, given our human rights obligations, we will deport only where we are satisfied that those concerned will not be mistreated on their return. We will continue to seek assurances in this regard from other governments to facilitate the deportation of more terrorist suspects in the future.

4.7 The objective of much of our counter-terrorism work overseas, as in this country, must be the detention and prosecution of people planning terrorist operations. But operations overseas are significantly complicated by legal issues. Some countries rarely prosecute or convict terrorists. The treatment of detainees held overseas following counter-terrorist operations has been the cause of considerable concern for many years. Attention has also been focused on the UK's involvement in their detention and alleged mistreatment. We have already committed to holding an inquiry into allegations of UK involvement in mistreatment. We have also published the guidance which now exists on these issues for intelligence officers and service personnel.

4.8 Success in counter-terrorism depends on international collaboration. We will support key allies in building their capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorists overseas.

4.9 Success in *Pursue* will mean that:

- At home, we are able to disrupt terrorist-related activity in the UK and prosecute or deport more of those responsible;
- Overseas, we have seized the opportunity we now have to reduce further the threat from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and other terrorist organisations and we have disrupted attacks planned against this country; and
- Our counter-terrorism work is effective, proportionate and consistent with our commitment to human rights.

Pursue

4.10 The purpose of *Pursue* is to stop terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible.

4.11 This section assesses how our response has evolved in the last two years and the challenges it has faced. We cover the nature of the threat and the detail of arrests and convictions in Part One.


Pursue work since 2009

4.12 The last CONTEST strategy identified the following *Pursue* objectives: to increase intelligence coverage of people engaged in terrorist related activity in or against this country, here and overseas; to improve the effectiveness of our prosecution process; to develop more effective non prosecution actions; and to ensure we can disrupt terrorist activity overseas where there is no alternative course of action.

4.13 Intelligence coverage of people engaged in terrorist related activity in this country has been maintained in the past two years. Collaboration between the police and the security and intelligence agencies has continued to provide an effective basis for the investigation and disruption of terrorist operations. Changes have been made to working arrangements between the security and intelligence agencies regarding threats to this country from overseas. These changes (noted by the then Prime Minister in a statement in the House of Commons on 20 January 2010) have included new joint agency teams to ensure a single set of operational priorities, a combined intelligence picture and a coordinated operational response.

4.14 There remain significant challenges to the investigation of terrorist-related activity in this country. The growing use of inexpensive but sophisticated communications technology has made the planning of attacks easier and more secure. Steps have been taken to keep pace

UK proscribed terrorist groups and their countries of origin



with these technological changes but this is necessarily a continuous process. Our ability to collect data regarding communications, travel and the movement of money remains vital. Although systems have been developed to provide that data in the investigation process (subject, where necessary to relevant legislation and oversight) the data is increasingly global and not always held in this country. For that reason both the collection of and access to it is increasingly subject to international agreement, notably through the EU and including in the European Commission and the European Parliament. This is changing the management of our counter-terrorism (and broader serious crime) work.

4.15 Counter-terrorism convictions as a proportion of total arrests and prosecutions are similar to convictions rates for other offences. There is some evidence that they compare well with figures in other European countries. But we continue to identify far more people engaged in terrorist-related activity in this country than we can successfully prosecute and convict. It therefore remains a priority to improve prosecution rates further and various ways to do so have

been considered. One of these is to use as evidence material acquired by the interception of communications (i.e. mobiles and fixed line telephony and internet based communications) in counter-terrorism and organised crime cases. This is possible in many other countries but is not currently provided for by UK legislation.

4.16 In 2007 a Privy Council group was established to consider the case for intercept as evidence. In December 2009 the Privy Council group reported back on the study into the legal model proposed and concluded that it was not legally viable and could be counter-productive. The Government wants to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept as evidence in court and in January 2011 extended the work of the Privy Council. We return to this below in paragraph 4.27.

4.17 Non-prosecution actions are essential in our counter-terrorism work. They include deportation and proscription (intended to act as a deterrent, though prosecution can follow breach of the terms and conditions). There are now 47 proscribed groups in this country (see map). We

continue to seek ways of deporting people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity in a way that is consistent with our obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. But despite considerable efforts, only a few people engaged in terrorism have been deported from the UK using assurances negotiated with other states to ensure that their rights are respected on their return to their country of origin.⁴⁴ Some people who we are seeking to deport have appealed to the European Court. We await its findings in a number of key cases.

4.18 Control orders have been used as way of dealing with the terrorist threat, usually in cases where prosecution has not been possible. The Government has already committed to repealing control orders following a review of counter-terrorism legislation. This is set out in detail in paragraph 4.23.

4.19 The majority of terrorist plots in the UK have overseas connections: in the last few years Al Qa'ida has planned attacks against this country from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Operations in countries overseas where Al Qa'ida is most active are significantly complicated by legal issues. Many of these countries seldom prosecute or convict terrorists: joint operations with a view to effecting the prosecution overseas of a person planning an operation here are rare. In some instances people who are well known to us have been planning terrorist operations here from other countries for years, seemingly invulnerable to judicial process. Joint operations have been further complicated (and in some countries are not possible at all) for human rights reasons, specifically regarding people who are detained by third countries in the course of counter-terrorism operations. All these issues pose major challenges for our national security.

4.20 In most countries where Al Qa'ida has a significant presence the law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies have capacity and capability gaps. They face the technical

challenges which confront us here but very often do not have the resources to deal with them as effectively. In conjunction with other countries and with multilateral organisations Government has invested in developing the capability and capacity of our overseas partners. There has been some success but the scale of this task will continue to outstrip the resources we have available; coordination of international assistance has been and will continue to be essential.

Pursue: 2011-2015

4.21 In 2011-2015 we will:

- Continue to assess our counter-terrorism powers and ensure they are both effective and proportionate;
- Improve our ability to prosecute and deport people for terrorist-related offences;
- Increase our capabilities to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats;
- Ensure that judicial proceedings in this country can better handle sensitive and secret material to serve the interests of both justice and national security; and
- Work with other countries and multilateral organisations to enable us to better tackle the threats we face at their source.

4.22 Success in *Pursue* will mean that:

- At home, we are able to disrupt terrorist-related activity in the UK and prosecute or deport more of those responsible;
- Overseas, we have seized the opportunity we now have to further reduce the threat from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and other terrorist organisations and that we have disrupted attacks planned against this country; and
- Our counter-terrorism work is focussed, proportionate, fair and effective and is consistent with our commitment to human rights.

⁴⁴ A person has a statutory right of appeal against deportation which means that the courts have the final say when it comes to deciding whether or not the assurances given in a particular case by another government provide adequate safeguards.

Counter-terrorism and security powers

4.23 In January 2010 the Government published the findings of a review into counter-terrorism and security powers.⁴⁵ The review addressed a number of widely held concerns that the balance between national security and civil liberties was wrong. The review concluded that:

- Control orders will be repealed. They will be replaced with a less intrusive and more focused regime that will still protect the public from suspected terrorists. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) will be imposed in rare cases to manage the terrorism-related risk posed by people who cannot be successfully prosecuted or, in the case of foreign nationals, deported. These new measures will be imposed by the Home Secretary with (other than in urgent cases) prior permission from the High Court. The measures will also be subject to a full review by the High Court. The Home Secretary would need to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support a 'reasonable belief' that a person is, or has been, engaged in terrorism-related activity, and be satisfied that it is necessary to apply measures from the regime to protect the public.
 - A TPIM notice will last one year, extendable for one further year up to a maximum of two years. It will only be possible to impose further measures, to extend restrictions beyond two years, if there is evidence of new terrorism-related activity after the original measure was imposed. Additional resources – intended to enhance investigation and evidence-gathering capabilities – will be made available to the police and security and intelligence agencies. The Government has also concluded that in the event of a very serious terrorist threat that cannot be managed by any other means more stringent measures may be required.
- Draft emergency legislation will therefore be prepared on this basis.
- The maximum period that a terrorist suspect can be detained before charge or release will be reduced to 14 days. As a contingency mechanism, this period may be temporarily increased to 28 days in exceptional circumstances subject to Parliament's prior approval of primary legislation. As a result of subsequent pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bills, a new order-making power to increase the maximum limit will be created for use only when Parliament is dissolved.
 - Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which enabled police officers to stop and search individuals without grounds for suspicion, will be repealed; it will be replaced by a more tightly defined power enabling stop and search only in response to specific intelligence or information about a suspected terrorist attack. A temporary "remedial order" under the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in March 2011, and has the effect of replacing the old section 44 powers with the new, significantly circumscribed provisions. These provisions are in place on a temporary basis and will be implemented in legislation when the Protection of Freedoms Bill comes into force in 2012.
 - The use of the most intrusive Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) powers by local authorities (e.g. surveillance) to investigate low level offences will end. Applications by local authorities to use any RIPA techniques will in future be approved by a magistrate. As far as possible, RIPA will be the only basis on which public authorities access communications data (which is information about a particular communication, for example the telephone number which has been dialled, rather than the actual content of the communication). This will ensure that the safeguards built into the RIPA regime are extended more broadly.
 - Bilateral agreements with third countries to deport people believed to have been engaged

⁴⁵ HM Government (2011) *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers Reviews Findings and Recommendations*. London: The Stationary Office. (Cm 8004) Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

here in terrorist-related activity will be extended consistent with our legal and human rights obligations.

- It would be disproportionate and possibly ineffective to widen the definition of terrorism or lower the proscription threshold to try to proscribe groups which incite hatred and violence. Where it is not possible to prosecute individuals or proscribe groups of concern, we will seek to tackle the problem through the Government's work on integration.

4.24 The powers contained within Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allow police officers to stop, search, question and detain individuals passing through ports and airports to determine if they are or could be involved in terrorist activity. Whilst the power is vital to securing our border, the Government recognises that the use of such powers can cause concerns among communities who may believe they are disproportionately affected. In the light of these concerns, and the successful legal challenge against the terrorism stop and search power provided by section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (which has some similarities to Schedule 7), the Government is considering the extent of the powers in Schedule 7 and how they are used and will be reporting on this later in the year.

Prosecution and deportation

4.25 Our priority is always to prosecute people suspected of terrorist-related activity in this country. Where we cannot prosecute foreign nationals – or where they have been prosecuted, convicted but then released – we will seek deportation. We will continue to consider how we can improve our prosecution rates, try to use existing arrangements for deportation to better effect and establish new arrangements where we can.

4.26 We intend to take the following steps to provide further scope for the collection of evidence to facilitate the prosecution of people suspected of terrorist related activity:

- Post-charge questioning will be allowed in cases where further substantial evidence emerges after charges have been brought. This will permit questioning of people about the offence for which they have been charged and enable prosecutors to build more robust evidential cases or explore further lines of inquiry in relation to an ongoing investigation. We believe that bringing in these changes was not given sufficient priority in the past. Amendments will now be made to the Codes of Practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to allow the police to continue the process of gathering information and evidence.⁴⁶
- Increased resources have been provided to the police, security and intelligence agencies as part of the package of measures announced in the review of counter-terrorism and security powers to replace the control order regime. (See 4.23). These resources may produce evidence for use in a prosecution.

Intercept as Evidence

4.27 The lawful interception of communications plays a critical role in protecting the British public. Intercept material (i.e. the records of conversations or other messages from communications which are being intercepted) is currently used to support investigations into terrorism, other threats to national security and serious crime. It helps direct police inquiries, supports other intelligence-gathering activities and facilitates the building of a criminal case, including the identification of viable evidence. Interception requires a warrant which is signed by a Secretary of State.

⁴⁶ We will work with Scotland and Northern Ireland to ensure that that these measures are compliant with their respective legal systems.

4.28 The Government wants to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept as evidence in court. But there are a number of critical issues to address, notably the legal viability of any model and the potential adverse consequences for the continued use of intercept as intelligence.

4.29 The Government has extended the work of the Privy Council review which began to look at the issue of intercept as evidence in 2007. The review is considering whether operational requirements for an evidential regime which were identified and agreed by the Privy Council group on 30 January 2008 can be reconciled with any legal framework for intercept as evidence; and if they cannot, what the balance of advantage, costs and risk of introducing a legally viable regime would be.

Deportation of foreign nationals engaged in terrorism

4.30 We believe that as a matter of principle foreign nationals who have been engaged in terrorist related activity here should be deported, where they cannot be convicted or after they have served a sentence. The previous Government sought to reach bilateral agreements ('assurances') with some other states regarding the treatment of people who we wish to deport and who we believe to have engaged in terrorist related activity in this country. This programme has been criticised by some human rights groups, who argue that the use of assurances can be unreliable and undermine the universal prohibition on torture. Our review of counter-terrorism and security powers considered these claims but was satisfied that assurances received have been upheld. Our review also recognised the role of courts – both domestic and European – in delivering additional scrutiny over the Government's policy.

4.31 The Government remains committed to strengthening its ability to deport foreign national terrorists in a manner that is consistent with our legal and human rights obligations. The Government will:

- Extend the use of bilateral assurances to more countries, prioritising those whose nationals

have engaged in terrorism-related activity here, or are judged the most likely to do so;

- Seek assurances for specific individuals, reducing sole reliance on over-arching assurances from receiving countries which can be complex and politically difficult to agree;
- Increase the provision of independent, specialist advice to the courts to improve our ability to defend decisions against legal challenge; and
- Engage actively with other countries, international organisations and NGOs to increase understanding of, and support for, this policy in the context of the UK's work to promote and improve human rights around the world.

Management of terrorist offenders

4.32 Prosecution is the key strategy for the disruption of terrorist activity. We recognise that successful prosecution does not eliminate risk as terrorists can continue to pose a threat after their release and even whilst imprisoned (see paragraph 5.75 on radicalisation in prisons).

4.33 Over the next four years, 34 terrorist-related prisoners may reach their release dates. It is vital that the transition of these individuals into the community, and their subsequent supervision manages the risks they may pose. We will ensure continuing joint activity between the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), the police and other agencies to ensure that risk is effectively managed. Terrorist and terrorism-related offenders will continue to be subject to Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), a statutory set of arrangements in which the police, prison and probation services are required to work together to assess and manage high risk offenders. As of February 2011 there were 36 terrorist offenders managed under MAPPA.

4.34 To support the management of terrorist offenders, NOMS in co-operation with partner agencies will replace local prison information and intelligence systems with a national system networked across the prison estate. This will significantly enhance prison information and intelligence management. NOMS will also identify best practice and processes across prisons, probation, police and other partners to share information on non-terrorist offenders of potential national security concern.

The detection, investigation and disruption of terrorist threats

4.35 We continue to believe that a close working relationship between the Security Service (responsible for intelligence operations against suspected terrorists in this country) and the police (responsible for disrupting or responding to terrorist incidents in the UK with the support of the Security Service) is the basis for successful counter-terrorism work. We intend to maintain the Police Counter Terrorism Network largely as it is, subject only to changes to reflect the nature and the distribution of the threat and efficient use of resources. We will consider whether the police counter-terrorism network should and can be placed in the new National Crime Agency (NCA) only after the London 2012 Olympic Games.

4.36 Some further changes in the Police Counter Terrorism Network are required to maintain and improve its capability. The police and Security Service will continue to improve their ability to work locally, nationally and with our international partners to counter the threat. The police and Security Service have developed a joint intelligence handling model which will enable UK agencies and our partners to assess and respond to intelligence even more efficiently. We intend to implement the new model across the counter-terrorism network by December 2011, so that we are better placed to deal with the likely rise in the number of intelligence leads in the run-up to London 2012.

4.37 Our planning assumptions and assessments indicate that we shall continue to face threats from terrorist organisations based overseas and from unaffiliated individuals acting on their own here. Coordination of our international, national and local effort will continue to be vital. We will closely monitor the arrangements developed in 2010 to ensure that security and intelligence agencies are delivering a seamless, coordinated response to a clear and common set of priorities and a common strategy. In relation to the threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism, the Government has already committed significant additional funding to the Police Service of Northern Ireland to build its capabilities to investigate and disrupt terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland over the next four years. A significant percentage of Security Service operational resources will remain devoted to this area.

The collection and use of data

4.38 We regard the selective, regulated and proportionate use of data as essential to the investigation and disruption of threats in and to this country. Data can identify people engaged in terrorism-related activity, quickly and effectively identify their associates, and tell us their location. It enables appropriate action to be taken against the right people at the right time. The data that matters most to us concerns communications, travel and money transfers.

4.39 Some of this data (notably movements across our border) is already held by Government which is responsible for its collection. But other data (e.g. financial transactions or communications) is held by the private sector. In every case some data relevant to our investigations will also be held by third countries (both public and private sectors). Establishing a legal basis for developing access to data, and developing appropriate collection and storage technology are vital but complex. Data concerns people: its collection and use must be subject to proper oversight to ensure individuals' privacy is protected and be both necessary and proportionate to the crime which is being investigated.

4.40 Communications data is an important tool for investigators and provides an invaluable means by which the police and law enforcement agencies can better safeguard the public. But our current capability was not designed to deal with the growth in the use of internet-based communications. The ability of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to use internet-based communications data will decline unless action is taken. As we set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) the Government will therefore introduce a programme to preserve the ability of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to obtain communications data and also to intercept communications within the appropriate legal framework. Legislation will be brought forward to put in place the necessary regulations and safeguards to ensure that the response to this technology challenge is compatible with the Government's approach to information storage and civil liberties.

4.41 We are continuing to move forward with the implementation of the internet related aspects of the European Data Retention Directive (which requires Communication Service Providers to retain communications data) and with means for better communication and knowledge sharing between experts in law enforcement agencies and communications service providers.⁴⁷

4.42 Under the e-Borders system (described in further detail in the *Protect* chapter) the Government continues to collect data about people travelling to and from this country. This data includes what is commonly known as Advanced Passenger Information (API) and in some case more detailed Passenger Name Records (PNR).

4.43 In December 2009 the European Commission determined that the UK cannot as a matter of course collect API on people travelling from Europe with an EU country passport. In

February 2011 the Commission produced a draft directive on the collection of PNR. This accepted the importance of PNR to law enforcement and national security but limited its collection to routes into Europe from outside the European area. In this respect, the Government is seeking to change this directive and now has the support of a majority of member states. Negotiation of the draft Directive is continuing and the UK will work with our European partners to secure a directive that best serves UK interests. In order to minimise the amount of data collected, the Government intends to take a proportionate approach and to collect data only on routes of high risk.

4.44 Since 2002, the US Treasury has used financial data carried on the "SWIFT" payment system for its Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). This has been a useful counter-terrorism tool and it has contributed to successful counter-terrorism investigations. An EU-US Agreement, finalised in July 2010, allows SWIFT data stored on EU territory to be shared with the US Treasury under the auspices of Europol and subject to specific rules and regulations. As part of this agreement the European Commission committed to bring forward proposals on how an EU version of TFTP could operate by 1st August 2011. It is not clear at this stage what form or design an EU TFTP could take but the UK will work on this with the Commission and other Member States.

Terrorist finance

4.45 Supporters of Al Qa'ida raise relatively small amounts of money in the UK. The money is usually sent to support people training or fighting in jihadist theatres such as Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

4.46 Supporters of terrorist groups with a regional, nationalistic agenda may be able to raise larger amounts of money in this country by drawing on donations from large diaspora communities.

⁴⁷ The Directive is currently being reviewed by the European Commission. The UK is clear that data retention provides a valuable addition to the ability of law enforcement in the UK to prevent and detect crime, and to our ability to protect the public.

4.47 Many UK-based donors are unaware their money is funding terrorism. It is therefore vital that we work with the communities and institutions most vulnerable to abuse in this way, including money service businesses, charities and faith institutions. Where necessary, we will supplement awareness-raising efforts with disruptive action by the police and the Security Service.

4.48 Overseas, we know that donors in the Gulf provide significant funding for a number of terrorist groups. We will focus capacity building and lobbying efforts on countries which are a key source of, or transit hub for, terrorist funding.

4.49 Kidnapping for ransom has become an integral part of Al Qa'ida's fundraising strategy. AQ-M alone has raised tens of millions of euros in the last few years through kidnapping operations and these are now the group's main source of income. We will continue to seek to prevent ransom payments to Al Qa'ida and its affiliates, including by working with international partners to demonstrate the consequences of ransom payments. We will work to ensure that the new UNSCR 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011) sanctions regimes against, respectively, the Taliban and Al Qa'ida are effective in countering terrorism and that any tensions between EU and UN sanction regimes are minimised.

The use of sensitive material in judicial proceedings

4.50 In recent years there has been an increase in the number of judicial proceedings which have considered the actions and decisions of the security and intelligence agencies and which have a bearing on our national security. Many of these proceedings are civil rather than criminal. In some, it has not been possible to establish the relevant facts without reference to sensitive and secret material. Some court proceedings have no mechanisms to allow the consideration of sensitive material without risking serious damage to national security. This means cases cannot be decided on a full examination of the facts.

4.51 On 6 July 2010 the Prime Minister announced that the Government would publish a Green Paper in 2011, examining and making proposals to improve the use and protection of sensitive intelligence material in non-criminal proceedings. The Green Paper will seek views on a range of options, designed to ensure that sensitive information can be better taken into account in non-criminal proceedings. This will make proceedings fairer for all parties, but in particular it will ensure that the Government can rely on sensitive material in court to justify its decision-making whilst ensuring that such material is properly protected from disclosure, where that would cause harm. At the same time the proposals will ensure fair access to justice, in accordance with our international legal obligations, including the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Green Paper will make proposals to enhance the existing oversight arrangements for our security and intelligence agencies to ensure that they are as robust and effective as possible.

The treatment of detainees overseas

The objective of much of our counter-terrorism work overseas must and should be the detention and prosecution of people planning terrorist operations against this country, our interests and those of our allies.

The treatment of detainees held overseas by other countries following counter-terrorism operations has been the cause of considerable concern for many years. Attention has also been focused on the UK's involvement in their detention and alleged mistreatment.

On 6 July 2010 the Prime Minister announced that:

- The Government would seek to mediate civil claims brought against the Government by British nationals and British residents who were detained at Guantanamo Bay;
- An inquiry would be set up to examine whether, and if so to what extent, the UK Government and its intelligence agencies were involved in improper treatment of detainees held by other countries in counter-terrorism operations overseas, or were aware of improper treatment of detainees in operations in which the UK was involved;
- The Government would publish consolidated guidance for intelligence and military personnel on how to deal with detainees held by other countries;
- A Green Paper would be published setting out the Government's proposals for the future handling of sensitive material in non-criminal judicial proceedings.

Mediation with the claimants in the Guantanamo Bay civil cases was successfully concluded in November 2010. The allegations and issues that came to light during these cases will be examined by the independent Inquiry announced by the Prime Minister in July 2010.

The Inquiry, headed by Sir Peter Gibson, a former Court of Appeal judge and Intelligence Services Commissioner, will examine whether the UK was involved in the improper treatment of detainees held by other countries after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The Inquiry will have access to all relevant papers and will be able to take evidence from UK Government officials, including members of the intelligence agencies. The Prime Minister asked the Inquiry to report within a year and has invited Sir Peter to include any lessons learnt and recommendations for the future.

The Inquiry has yet to formally launch because related police investigations continue. The Inquiry has begun preliminary work and on 6 July 2011 published its Terms of Reference and Protocol.⁴⁹ While the Gibson Inquiry will examine historic issues, the Government is committed to being as clear as possible about the standards under which intelligence officers and service personnel now operate. The Government published "Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees" in July 2010.⁵⁰

The document makes clear that the Government and its armed forces and intelligence agencies will not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment for any purpose. The Guidance emphasises that there are no circumstances in which we would authorise action in the knowledge or belief that torture would take place at the hands of a third party. If such a case were to arise we would do everything we could to prevent torture occurring. It makes clear that we act in compliance with our domestic and international legal obligations and our values as a nation.

⁴⁸ <http://www.detaineeinquiry.co.uk>.

⁴⁹ HM Government (2010) *Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Services Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees*. From the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Home Secretary, and Defence Secretary.

Developing the counter-terrorism capacity of international partners

4.52 We have already noted that terrorist groups gravitate to and emerge from fragile and failed states. We have also noted that the absence of the effective rule of law not only encourages terrorism, but makes counter-terrorism operations significantly harder. In some cases, terrorists who we know and who are planning operations in this country have been able to do so without hindrance for many years. Building the capacity of failed and fragile states is therefore vital to our national security. This will be delivered through political and diplomatic engagement; funding specific counter-terrorism projects in key countries; and by ensuring we make the most of our wider international development programme.

4.53 Specific counter-terrorist projects are principally funded by the cross-Government Counter-Terrorism Programme, which is managed by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. These projects are delivered by and with a range of Departments and agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, Department for Transport, Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police Service. Spend is tightly aligned with addressing the highest risks to the UK and UK interests. Priority areas include: Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan.

Prevent

Prevent

Summary

5.1 In June 2011 the Government published a review of recent *Prevent* related work and a new strategy for the next four years. This section of CONTEST reflects our conclusions.

5.2 We regard *Prevent* as a key part of CONTEST. We do not believe it is possible to resolve the threats we face simply by arresting and prosecuting more people. We believe that this is the view of our key allies around the world and that *Prevent* needs to be an international effort as much as other parts of our counter-terrorism strategy. But we also want to make *Prevent* more effective. And in particular we intend to now change both its scope and its focus.

5.3 Like CONTEST as a whole *Prevent* will now address radicalisation to all forms of terrorism. We will prioritise according to the risks we face and at present the greatest risk to our security comes from terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and like minded groups. We believe that *Prevent* work to date has not clearly recognised the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by apparently non violent organisations, very often operating within the law. We will not change the law – we remain committed to protecting the freedom of speech which many of those same extremists set out to undermine. But preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism

and also part of a terrorist narrative. Challenge may mean simply ensuring that extremist ideas are subject to open debate. But where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist as well as terrorist groups we will also use the Home Secretary's powers to exclude them.

5.4 Having widened the scope of *Prevent* we intend to narrow its focus. *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy, which establishes a stronger sense of common ground and shared values, which enables participation and the empowerment of all communities and which also provides social mobility. But integration alone will not deliver *Prevent* objectives. And *Prevent* must not – as it has in the past – assume control of funding for integration projects which have a purpose and value far wider than security and counter-terrorism. The Government will not securitise its integration work: that would be neither effective, proportionate nor necessary.

5.5 Our objectives will be to:

- Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and

- Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

5.6 Across all our *Prevent* work we will increase the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Counter-terrorism in general must provide value for money. *Prevent* in particular must not waste public funds on projects irrelevant to its objectives. Nor will we fund or work with extremist groups; we will carefully evaluate the credibility of those we support.

5.7 In all our *Prevent* work we must be clear about our purpose and our methods. The great majority of people in this country find terrorism repugnant and will never support it. Work to challenge ideology should not try to change majority opinion because it does not need changing. Our purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. We must mobilise and empower communities not give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong.

5.8 Success in *Prevent* will mean that:

- There is a reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in this country and in states overseas whose security most impacts on our own;
- There is more effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared by terrorist organisations and used by terrorists to legitimise violence; and
- There is more challenge to and isolation of extremists and terrorists operating on the internet.

Prevent

5.9 The aim of *Prevent* is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. A previous *Prevent* strategy was published in 2007 and included in the last version of CONTEST in 2009. In November 2010 the Home Secretary announced a review of work to date and

confirmed a new strategy would be developed. This chapter draws on the *Prevent* review and strategy which was published in June 2011.⁵¹

Prevent since 2009

5.10 The 2007 *Prevent* strategy was based on our understanding of radicalisation at that time. For each cause it proposed a response. The key objectives were to: challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who promoted violent extremism and support the places where they operated; support people vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists; increase the resilience of communities; and address grievances exploited in the radicalisation process.

5.11 With some exceptions we continue to believe that the analysis made in 2007 of the causes of radicalisation in this country was broadly correct – radicalisation is being driven by ideology, by a number of people who set out to disseminate these ideologies and by vulnerabilities in people which make them susceptible to a message of violence. Radicalisers exploit grievances; which (where Al Qa'ida inspired terrorism is concerned) include a perception of our foreign policy, the experience of Islamophobia and a broader view that the west is at war with Islam itself. These grievances may be real or perceived although none of them should provide justification for the use of terrorism. We now also know more about who is being radicalised here and about their age and socio-economic profile than we did in previous years.

5.12 The early *Prevent* strategy made most progress in understanding the issue of vulnerability and in developing interventions to support vulnerable people. These interventions were modelled on initiatives elsewhere in Europe and on other crime prevention and support programmes. After two pilot schemes, a programme in key cities was developed using police, local authority and community resources. Over one thousand people have been through these programmes: we have seen no indication that any have reverted to terrorist related activity.

⁵¹ HM Government (June 2011). *The Prevent Strategy*.

5.13 Progress was also made in developing *Prevent* programmes in key sectors and institutions, most of whom had no knowledge of, or engagement with, *Prevent* prior to 2007. Some schools and colleges have absorbed material provided by the Government and by police on *Prevent* related issues and have developed ways of using this material to safeguard children. Some universities have developed a dialogue with police about the risks of radicalisation and the NUS has worked to provide support to students. There have been discussions with the internet industry to develop products which can filter out harmful extremist and terrorist websites in public places where it is appropriate to do so (including schools and libraries); an internet referral unit has encouraged the public to identify extremist material on line and then to refer it to service providers for action. There has been significant progress in developing counter-radicalisation programmes in prison. Counter-terrorism policing has itself seen a very significant change, away from an approach dominated by *Pursue* and *Protect* to one in which *Prevent* related work plays an important part.

5.14 Much less work has been done in the past few years to challenge terrorist ideology. The Government has already taken steps to ensure the exclusion from this country of people intending to come here to engage in activity which foments, justifies or glorifies terrorist violence or fosters hatred which might lead to inter community violence. Some work has been done to provide community based organisations with better capability to challenge the ideology we associate with Al Qa'ida. Departments have allocated more resources to communicating their work to audiences in this country, in part to address some of the claims made about them in terrorist and extremist propaganda. The police have made significant changes to their operational practice to better engage communities during and after counter-terrorism operations.

5.15 The cross-departmental Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) has had a central role in developing counter-ideological or counter-narrative work. We believe that their track record has been mixed. Research

has enhanced understanding of audiences here and the impact of specific messages. But RICU's counter-narrative work has not always been successful. Some projects struggled to have an impact and were difficult to evaluate. Insufficient work has been done to understand how to rebut the more complex texts circulating in this country which justify terrorism. Government has a key role to play here in providing information about what those texts are. Communities and theologians have a role to play in explaining why they are wrong.

5.16 The Government is determined to do more across all these areas. Specific priorities are identified in the *Prevent* strategy and outlined below. The new strategy will not simply be more of the same: it will also address broader issues which have emerged during the implementation of previous *Prevent* work. They include in particular, the relationship between integration and *Prevent*; non violent extremism; evaluation and monitoring; and the direction of our *Prevent* work overseas.

5.17 Evidence suggests that there is an association between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a society where ethnic and faith groups mix easily and trust one another – a society which is cohesive and integrated. Communities who do not (or in some cases feel they cannot) participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation; a stronger sense of belonging and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology.

5.18 But work on integration and *Prevent* should not be merged together; combining the strategies means using counter-terrorism funds and delivery structures for activities which have a much broader purpose and whose success will be jeopardised by being given a security label. Moreover, although *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy, that strategy itself will not deliver *Prevent* objectives.

5.19 The focus of *Prevent* to date has been on violent extremism and terrorism. It has not

explicitly considered non violent extremism.⁵² However a significant percentage of people who engage in terrorism have previously been associated with extremist groups; some terrorist organisations – of all kinds – also share and make use of ideas which are popularised by extremists. In some cases extremist groups carefully operate within our laws, deliberately avoiding open support for violence but knowingly creating an environment in which people can be drawn into terrorism itself. We believe that *Prevent* work therefore necessarily has to deal with some aspects of extremism and this is clearly reflected in our new strategy. We emphasise here that we have no intention of labelling particular faith groups (and orthodox faith in particular) as inherently extremist. That is neither our view nor our purpose.

5.20 The *Prevent* review makes clear that in some areas monitoring of the many (over 1800) *Prevent* projects funded from Government in the past few years has been inadequate. This partly reflects the pace at which agencies and departments developed the earlier strategy; the fact that it was new and unfamiliar work; and the numbers of projects. But the effect has been that funding for some projects was ineffective; in a very few cases funding inadvertently reached organisations that had extremist connections or held extremist views.

5.21 In much more general terms we also want to ensure that the *Prevent* strategy is proportionate and transparent as well as effective. It must not imply a need to change the attitudes of most people in this country, because the great majority find terrorism repugnant and will never support it. Nor should it appear to pass judgement on faith in general or to suggest that only a particular faith is appropriate or acceptable. Quite the opposite: *Prevent* should bring different communities together around a set of commonly

agreed values and empower them to isolate and marginalise those who advocate killing and murder. The strategy must be implemented in conjunction with communities here and overseas, who are often better able than Government to disprove the claims made by terrorists and to challenge their views.

The new *Prevent* strategy

5.22 Our objectives for the revised *Prevent* strategy will be to:

- Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- *Prevent* people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
- Work with a wide range of sectors (including in particular education, faith, health, the internet and criminal justice) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

5.23 *Prevent* is based on the planning assumptions (see page 41) that the process of radicalisation will continue: the ideology which has come to be associated with Al Qa'ida will be more resilient than Al Qa'ida itself. We also assume that although extremist material on the internet will continue to motivate some people to engage in terrorism it will rarely be a substitute for the social process of radicalisation, involving radicalisers seeking out and engaging with vulnerable people.

5.24 In common with the CONTEST strategy as a whole *Prevent* will address all forms of terrorism, but continue to prioritise resources according to the risks to our national security. At this stage its principal (but not its only) focus will therefore remain terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and related groups.

5.25 *Prevent* needs to deal with extremism where extremist and terrorist groups share common views; and where people who are extremists are being drawn towards terrorism-related activity. We

⁵² Extremism is defined as the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. HM Government (2011) *The Prevent Strategy*.

will not work with or fund extremist organisations and we will challenge extremist ideology and expose it to scrutiny.

5.26 *Prevent* will depend on wider Government programmes to strengthen integration and should be carefully coordinated with them. Other than in exceptional circumstances, *Prevent* should not fund these programmes and should be distinct from them.

5.27 The relationship between *Prevent* and *Pursue* – (work to investigate and disrupt terrorist activity) must be very carefully managed. *Prevent* is not a means for spying or for other covert activity.

5.28 We intend that agencies, Departments and Devolved Administrations work to a common set of objectives in this area. But we look to local authorities and in particular to communities to consider how those objectives can best be implemented: they will have the expertise and the understanding of local context which in this, as in many other policy areas, is vital.

5.29 Funding for local authority projects will be closely monitored to ensure it is used for the purposes for which it is intended. But central Government should not seek to micro-manage decisions about local delivery which are properly the responsibility of local partners.

5.30 Public funding for *Prevent* must be rigorously prioritised at home and overseas to offer value for money. The balance of investment within domestic *Prevent* work and between that work and *Prevent* overseas needs to be regularly assessed. All our *Prevent* programmes need to be relevant to *Prevent* objectives. The evaluation of *Prevent* work is critical and will significantly improve. Data collection will be more rigorous.

5.31 Success in *Prevent* will mean that:

- There is a reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in this country and in states overseas whose security most impacts on our own;
- There is greater and more effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared by terrorist organisations and are used by terrorists to legitimise violence;
- There is more challenge to and isolation of extremists and terrorists operating on the internet.

Challenging terrorist ideology

5.32 Ideology is one of the key characteristics of terrorism and a central factor in the radicalisation process (see Part One). Challenging that ideology is therefore an essential part of a preventative counter-terrorism programme.

5.33 In addressing ideological issues, we need to be clear that our purpose is to reach the small number of people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. The Government must help mobilise communities and empower them to challenge terrorism, not give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong.

5.34 We will continue to communicate clearly our policies overseas, in particular to the Islamic world. Departments and agencies will have a key part to play in explaining why we need to address the terrorist threat here and how we intend to do so. The Government has also already moved to change the legal foundation of our counter-terrorism work to ensure it is proportionate and necessary to address the challenges we face.

5.35 The new *Prevent* strategy will identify more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system which enable people to effectively challenge terrorist ideology. In each case we will want to demonstrate that, either directly or indirectly, the projects have tangible impact.

5.36 We will not want to engage in matters of theology but we recognise the imperative for theologians, academics and communities to do so. We will support their efforts and will want to ensure that their work is widely circulated and in a form that reaches as many people as possible.

5.37 Wherever possible, we will also encourage and seek to work with the many mosques in the UK who have already taken a leading role in challenging terrorism. We recognise and want to support the key role of imams in reaching young Muslims and being able to engage with them on these issues.

5.38 We will continue to work with other countries to mobilise informal non-Government networks who can best challenge terrorist propaganda. We must do better at understanding and evaluating the projects to ensure that they are having an impact.

5.39 RICU's counter-narrative work has not been as successful as we want. RICU must do more to identify credible partners and to develop powerful and specific narratives across a range of communications channels, especially on the internet. In the future we will expect much sharper and more professional counter-narrative products. Much greater emphasis will also be given to measuring the impact of RICU's programme. More cost-effective programmes are already being developed that will engage a wider range of credible civil society partners, deliver tightly-focused projects able to tackle specific local threats in the UK, and link overseas and UK diaspora audiences to greater effect.

5.40 It is important that, where required, we continue to invest in communication research and retain the capacity to innovate and experiment with counter-narrative campaigns, making best use of emerging information and communications technology. To ensure value for money, there will be independent scrutiny of RICU's projects and the help they provide to non-Government organisations.

5.41 Taking action against propagandists and radicalisers requires careful coordination between work in the *Pursue* and *Prevent* areas of CONTEST. We believe that there is scope for more work to identify and take action against propagandists for terrorism in this country and overseas. In some cases that may lead to prosecution. But propagandists for terrorism and for ideologies used by terrorism to justify killing

should not be permitted to make use of publicly owned venues: we will not amend the law to ban extremists but nor will we permit them to operate unchallenged at taxpayers' expense. Local authorities and others must be ready to take appropriate action. Where conferences and speaker meetings involving propagandists are taking place in communities and privately-owned locations, authorities, including the police, should be ready to brief the owners and ensure they understand what is taking place.

5.42 The Government has already moved to ensure robust application of the unacceptable behaviours exclusion criteria, taking steps to improve the processes that support identification and assessment of potential exclusion cases and the implementation of decisions to exclude.

Supporting vulnerable people

5.43 This area of *Prevent* will continue to be based on the premise that people being drawn into radicalisation and recruitment can be identified and then provided with support. The purpose of that support is to dissuade them from engaging in and supporting terrorist related activity. This support is sometimes described as 'deradicalisation', a term which is used to refer to cognitive or behavioural change and sometimes to both. There are analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention.

5.44 In many areas, programmes are now delivered through 'Channel', a police-led, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels. In Scotland, the police service has created the Prevent Professional Concerns process, for a similar purpose.

5.45 Channel is about stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It must not be confused with a strategy to deal with extremist organisations. Where people holding extremist views appear to be moving towards terrorism they clearly become relevant to Channel multi-agency boards. Otherwise they do not.

5.46 In common with the rest of *Prevent*, Channel needs to deal with all types of terrorism. We note that in practice this is already happening at the initiative of the police and local authorities. We welcome this and it should continue.

5.47 Channel programmes should be prioritised around areas and places of higher risk, defined as those where terrorist groups and their sympathisers have been most active.

5.48 During the consultation to the *Prevent* review we found that the attraction of community cohesion work appears to have sometimes steered people towards Channel who may have been perceived as potentially vulnerable in some broader sense, rather than specifically at risk of being drawn into terrorism. We have also noted the extent to which the nature of intervention capability available locally has determined the kinds of cases that are being dealt with through the programme. These trends need to be corrected.

5.49 Channel has facilitated local multi-agency partnership working between police and local statutory partners. Some sites have recognised the synergies between Channel and other local safeguarding mechanisms and frameworks and have worked locally to include *Prevent* indicators in the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) and safeguarding policies.⁵³ We welcome this though we note differing views about the utility of CAF as a tool for *Prevent*: it may not have the flexibility to assess people who are vulnerable to radicalisation.

5.50 It is essential in this area, more even than in other areas of *Prevent*, that data collection is improved against a standard set of criteria. A key next step will be the development and implementation of a new Case Management

Information System (CMIS) and more robust consistent risk assessment framework for Channel coordinators. This will also enable better performance monitoring of all intervention providers, whether they are funded locally or centrally by OSCT.

5.51 Intervention providers are in a position of great influence over vulnerable people. They must be credible and able to reach and relate to people who will very often be alienated and separated from mainstream society and Government. Some of these people may have been in prison. It is clearly vital that we select intervention providers carefully, understand how they work and are completely clear about the results they obtain. *Prevent* will not fund intervention providers who promote extremist ideas or beliefs.

5.52 We are considering possible changes to the governance of Channel. But we believe it is vital that the risk assessment stage and development of support intervention continue to be led by local multi-agency panels in conjunction with the police.

5.53 From the Home Office, OSCT has commissioned three Rapid Evidence Assessments to help develop our understanding of research on radicalisation and de-radicalisation.⁵⁴ There is little empirical evidence underpinning intervention work in this area here in the UK and internationally. Further research may be needed in future but we are also clear that valuable learning and best practice is more likely to come from intervention providers and the Channel process. Subject to data protection it is essential that this learning is identified and shared.

5.54 It is harder to focus limited overseas resources on supporting vulnerable people – the FCO's *Prevent* work overseas has generally targeted projects and programmes at groups.

⁵³ The CAF is a shared assessment and planning framework for use across all children's services and all local areas in England. It aims to help the early identification of children and young people's additional needs and promote coordinated service provision to meet them. Further details can be found at <http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/strategy/integratedworking/cafa0068957/the-caf-process>

⁵⁴ Munton, T. et al (2010), *Vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa'ida influenced violent extremism – Learning from the gang, cult, political activism and violent extremism literature*. London: Home Office, Disley, E. et al (2010), *Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups – A Rapid Evidence Assessment*. London: Home Office Publications; Bouhana, N. & Wikström, P. (2010), *Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment guided by Situational Action Theory*, London: Home Office

The FCO and Department for International Development (DFID) will now consider how they can contribute further to this objective. DFID's wealth creation programmes, aimed at reducing poverty and facilitating growth, will help to create jobs and economic opportunities, including access to financial services and skills development. These programmes will also help to address the lack of employment opportunities which may increase the chances of vulnerable people being attracted to terrorism.

Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation

5.55 In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government funded but have considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run.

5.56 As part of this strategy we will work with these sectors and places to ensure that there is an awareness of the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalisers work and to develop an effective response. This objective complements and supports the previous objectives.

Schools and children

5.57 The youngest person convicted of terrorism related offences in this country in recent years was just 16. He was 15 at the time when he was recruited by a terrorist group. At least three separate Al Qa'ida related operations in this country (in 2003, 2005 and 2006) have involved people who, to varying extents, became involved in extremism whilst they were still at school.⁵⁵ Of the 119 people conviction for terrorism related offences associated with Al Qa'ida, 11 have been committed by people in the age range 15-19.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Taylor: P (2010), *Talking to Terrorists: A Personal Journey from the IRA to Al Qaeda*. London. Harper Press.

⁵⁶ Convictions recorded between 1999 and 2009. Simcox, R., Stuart H and Ahmed, H. (2010) *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, p.229.

5.58 *Prevent* work with children and with schools is therefore an important part of the strategy. But this work needs to be proportionate. It must not start from a misplaced assumption that there is a significant problem that needs to be resolved. There is some evidence of very limited radicalisation of children by extremist or terrorist groups. There is also further evidence that some schools – and some supplementary schools (centres offering out of school hours educational opportunities for young people) – have used teaching materials which may encourage intolerance. And we know that some extremist or terrorist organisations have held positions of influence in education or in other organisations working closely with children. But these issues must be kept in perspective.

5.59 Over the lifetime of the strategy the Department for Education will ensure that teachers and other school staff in England know what to do when they see signs that a child is at risk of radicalisation.⁵⁷ We would like to see schools connected to local *Prevent* teams and to be sharing learning with them. Schools can help protect children from extremist and violent views in the same ways that they can help to safeguard children from drugs and gang violence.

5.60 We are particularly concerned not to encourage or create an environment where children are referred to a Channel programme unless there is very clear evidence that they are being radicalised. But where appropriate, we will help children's services work with schools and other agencies, including Channel, to identify children at risk of radicalisation and take necessary steps to protect them from harm.

5.61 As part of the planned changes to the inspection arrangements for maintained schools, due weight will also be given to schools' activities in support of our shared values, and for any concerns to be reflected in the report. The Independent School Standards will be strengthened and DfE is working to establish a

⁵⁷ The Devolved Administrations have different school systems. There are about 1,900 state schools offering free education to more than 470,00 pupils in Wales. Scotland has 2,722 state schools serving around 700,000 pupils.

new set of standards for teachers which clarify obligations regarding extremism.

5.62 The Government's vision for the English school system is set out in *The Importance of Teaching: Schools White Paper 2010*.⁵⁸ Teachers, parents and other members of the public will be able to apply to set up Free Schools where there is demand. To minimise the risk that those with unacceptable views can set up Free Schools or gain control of Academies or other publicly-funded schools, we will ensure effective financial and non-financial "due diligence" and work with the Charity Commission to ensure that schools that are charities and under their jurisdiction comply with charity law.

Higher and Further Education

5.63 More than 30% of people convicted of Al Qa'ida associated terrorist offences in the UK between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or a higher education institution. Another 15% studied or achieved a vocational or further education qualification. About 10% of the sample were students at the time when they were charged or the incident took place.⁵⁹ Some students were already committed to terrorism before they arrived at university; others were radicalised when they were there but by people operating outside the university itself; a third group have been attracted to and engaged in extremist activity at university and have then gone on to commit acts of terrorism after they have left.

5.64 Universities and colleges promote and facilitate the exchange of opinion and ideas, and enable debate as well as learning. The Government has no wish to limit or otherwise interfere with this free flow of ideas, and as we made clear in our review and new strategy on *Prevent*⁶⁰ we must be careful to balance the need to preserve national security with protecting our

civil liberties. But universities and colleges also have a legal and moral obligation to staff and students to ensure the place of work and study is a welcoming and safe environment. Universities and colleges have a clear and unambiguous role to play in helping to safeguard vulnerable young people from radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations.

5.65 The department of Business, Innovation and Skills will lead the delivery of *Prevent* in these sectors by helping universities and colleges better understand the risk of radicalisation on and off campus and by securing wider and more consistent support from institutions of most concern. We look to these institutions to recognise their duty of care to students and to protect them from the consequences of becoming involved in terrorism.

5.66 The Government will support local police forces in working with those institutions assessed to be at the greatest risk and will work with the police and other partners to ensure that student societies and university and college staff have the right information and guidance to enable them to make decisions about external speakers: we know that some extremist organisations set out to target specific universities and colleges and try to hold closed meetings where extremist ideas are developed and go unchallenged. This must stop.

5.67 We will fund the National Union of Students (NUS) to undertake a programme of work to ensure that their sabbatical officers and full time staff are fully trained and equipped to manage their responsibilities under charities legislation and are able to implement the NUS guidance on external speakers.

5.68 As with schools, we look to universities and colleges of further education to develop constructive dialogue with local *Prevent* groups and community organisations. At present this is rare.

Faith institutions and organisations

5.69 Historically, many terrorist groups have tried to legitimise their actions by reference to theology.

⁵⁸ HM Government (2010) *The Importance of Teaching: Schools White Paper* <http://www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationdetail/page1/CM%207980>

⁵⁹ Simcox, R., Stuart H and Ahmed, H. (2010) *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, p.227-232 and 237-245.

⁶⁰ HM Government (2011) *The Prevent Strategy* p72.

It follows that faith institutions and organisations can play a very important role in preventative activity. They can lead the challenge to an ideology that purports to provide theological justification for terrorism. They will often have authority and credibility not available to Government. They can provide more specific and direct support to those who are being groomed to terrorism by those who claim religious expertise and use what appear to be religious arguments. They can also play a wider and no less vital role in helping create a society which recognises the rights and the contributions of different faith groups, endorses tolerance and the rule of law and encourages participation and interaction.

5.70 The Government will seek a dialogue with faith institutions which are under threat from extremist and terrorist organisations, irrespective of the faith concerned. It is essential to work with faith institutions and organisations to deal with the challenge of terrorism in general and *Prevent* in particular. We will continue to support the dialogue between local policing and faith groups that has already significantly improved the handling of counter-terrorism issues. This must continue to be a two-way dialogue and it must not be dominated by a narrow focus only on *Prevent*.

5.71 Where it is appropriate to do so, the Government will support capacity-building proposals that better enable faith organisations to reach people who are vulnerable to grooming by terrorists. Where faith groups or institutions are supporting terrorism we will take law enforcement action. Where they are expressing views we regard as extremist those views will be subject to challenge and debate.

Andrew Ibrahim

Andrew Ibrahim was arrested in April 2008 after members of the Muslim community in Bristol alerted the police. In his flat the police found two homemade suicide vests, homemade explosives, a quantity of ball bearings and air gun pellets. On the 17th July 2009 he was given an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum of ten years for terrorist offences.

The Conviction project is a twenty minute DVD with supportive learning materials and was produced this year as a direct result of the Ibrahim case. It aims to highlight the importance of early intervention work, illustrate how quickly a vulnerable person can be adversely influenced by extremist rhetoric and raise awareness of the issues around violent extremism and radicalisation. Access to the Conviction film can be found at www.convictionfilm.co.uk.

The work of this project has been supported by Andrew Ibrahim and his mother who has made the following comments:

"I feel there is a need to help individuals at risk of radicalisation and guide them. Views should be challenged to prevent incidents like the one that affected Andy happening again. If only others who had become aware of his increasing radicalisation had taken action earlier, then Andy might not have been allowed to continue along his route as far as he did." (Mrs Vicky Ibrahim, mother of Andrew Ibrahim).

Health

5.72 The National Health Service spans primary care, acute hospital care, community care, dentistry, pharmacy and delivery of services such as prison health. Healthcare professionals may meet and treat people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. People with mental health issues or learning disabilities (such as Nicky Reilly and Andrew Ibrahim (see boxes), separately convicted in 2009 for terrorist-related offences) may be more easily drawn into terrorism. In some cases we know that people being drawn into radicalisation have spoken openly to doctors about their views. In such circumstances health care professionals must know what to do: we believe doing nothing is not a credible way forward.

5.73 Over the next year, the Department of Health (DH) will aim to deliver *Prevent* briefings through those local organisations who manage

mental health and offender health, prior to covering wider health communities such as primary care and hospitals⁶¹. In particular DH will raise awareness of the parallels between *Prevent* and other types of safeguarding to promote gradual mainstreaming of *Prevent* across the health service. DH will also ensure that the relationship of trust and confidence between patient and clinician is balanced with the clinician's professional duty of care and their responsibility to protect wider public safety. Clear guidelines will be needed for all healthcare managers and healthcare workers to ensure that cases of radicalisation, wherever among staff or patients, are given the attention and care they deserve.

5.74 DH will work with regional and local health organisations to expand support to Channel groups and other key partners to ensure that they have access to appropriate advice and support through healthcare interventions.

Nicky Reilly

Just after midday on the 23rd May 2008 a small explosion took place in a café in Exeter. A 22 year old British male, Mohamed Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed-Alim (previously known as Nicky Reilly) was arrested under the Terrorism Act, and subsequently charged with possession of explosives, and engaging in the preparation of a terrorist act⁶². Early in 2009 he was sentenced to life imprisonment of no less than 18 years.

Saeed-Alim suffered from Aspergers syndrome – a form of autism. He had been involved with a range of different health and social service professionals, both as a child and as a young adult, and had fixated on a range of subjects. By 2002 he had become a practising Muslim, but also became obsessive about terrorism. On several occasions over the next six years Saeed-Alim made comments to different health care professionals about his support for extremism. Without access to all of the relevant information, and in the absence of the joint agency intervention processes that now exist, there was no clear assessment of the risk he posed to himself or others.

This incident showed the importance of introducing a referral process and greater awareness of the *Prevent* agenda across a wider range of partners and professions; the need for improved information sharing (in keeping with obligations to client confidentiality and data protection); and the need to increase joint-agency intervention activity to support those who appear vulnerable to radicalisation.

⁶¹ Health is a devolved matter in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, this programme covers England only.

⁶² Engaging in conduct in preparation of terrorist acts contrary to Section 5(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, Possession of an explosive substance with intent contrary to Section 3 (1) (b) of the Explosive Substances Act 1883, Possessing explosives contrary to Section 4 the Explosive Substances Act 1883

The criminal justice system

Prisons and probation

5.75 We know that some people who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related offences have sought to radicalise and recruit other prisoners. We also know that some people who have been convicted for non terrorist related offences but who have previously been associated with extremist or terrorist networks have engaged in radicalising and recruitment activity whilst in prison. It is not yet clear the extent to which radicalisation which takes place in prison will endure beyond the confines of the prison environment. Careful judgments are therefore required to accurately assess the extent of radicalisation in prisons and then to find ways to mitigate it.

5.76 In co-operation with other agencies, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) will significantly scale up their targeted counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions in prisons and in communities during the licence phase of a sentence. In doing so, there will need to be continued coordination with wider and more generic interventions to support vulnerable people. In parallel, NOMS will develop research about measures which can mitigate radicalisation, and extremist and terrorist offending.

5.77 NOMS will also implement screening tools, and extremist assessment guidance, designed to assist staff to better assess and prevent extremist and terrorist offending and identify suitable interventions.

Young offenders and youth justice

5.78 Work to support young offenders and people vulnerable to offending is critical to the long-term success and credibility of *Prevent*. Future work will ensure that front-line members of staff are trained to recognise the signs of radicalisation and are aware of the support available to them. This should include a robust understanding of the referral process and of interventions that may be available through a range of providers, including Channel. The Youth Justice Board (YJB) and the Ministry of Justice will work to ensure that any

high risk young person that comes to the notice of the youth justice sector will be identified and offered appropriate support.

5.79 A greater emphasis on localism and a reduction in control from the centre has changed the nature of the youth justice landscape. Future work in this area will therefore need to be focused on supporting Youth Offending Teams to develop their services locally according to local need.

Prevent policing

5.80 Central to the police contribution to CONTEST has been a network of *Prevent* coordinators, supported by *Prevent* Engagement Officers (PEOs). PEOs connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood policing and communities. They have been instrumental in developing community contacts and an understanding of community issues. Their work helps to identify *Prevent*-related risks in the community and generates *Prevent* projects and information sharing with *Prevent* partners to support strategic objectives.

The charitable sector

5.81 Charity law contains provisions for how a charity raises and uses funds. These are important to countering terrorism, and *Prevent* more specifically, as they help to ensure that funds raised by charities go towards charitable purposes and are not misused.

5.82 The Charity Commission will continue to investigate individual charities where there are indications of terrorist-related activity. It is vital to the Charity Commission's credibility that their relationship with wider law enforcement bodies is seamless and effective.

5.83 The wider role of the Charity Commission in *Prevent* is also important. Charitable status provides the basis for good governance in many other sectors, including faith institutions, schools, student unions and (indirectly through the Higher Education Funding Council EFCE) universities. Good governance will determine how effectively

institutions and sectors address the risks of extremism and terrorism. Charities, by definition, are outward facing and inclusive, not inward looking or for private benefit. They should not be exclusive clubs that only a few can join against strict membership criteria. If a charity runs a debate or forum that excludes people of certain faiths or views this could breach charity law requirements. We will be looking at this further with the Charity Commission.

Overseas

5.84 It is clear that some sectors overseas – notably education and faith – can have a significant impact on radicalisation (positive and negative) not only in third countries but also here: universities or madrassahs overseas attended by many UK students are examples. Many of the sectors in this country which we want to support and where radicalisation may be taking place will have their own links overseas.

5.85 More work is needed to understand these connections and their relevance to and impact on *Prevent*. It will now be led by the FCO with input from DFID wherever possible.

5.86 DFID makes an important contribution to counter-terrorism objectives by addressing longer term factors that can allow terrorist threats to develop in fragile states. DFID programmes will help to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism, address the drivers of radicalisation and develop the rule of law which is critical to our effective counter-terrorism effort.

5.87 Tackling poverty and building a stable, prosperous and democratic Pakistan is a top priority for the UK Government. The UK's single largest development investment in Pakistan, which will also contribute to counter-radicalisation, will be through support to education reform. The education programme will not only support improved access, but the quality and content of mainstream education. It will help 4 million more children attend school and will target young adults to receive better technical and vocational training. DfID will work across Pakistan, but concentrate in the two provinces with the greatest number

of poor people – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Punjab.

5.88 DFID's poverty reduction work in Pakistan and in other fragile and conflict-affected States is consistent with CONTEST. As set out in the SDSR, the UK will use 30% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by 2014/15 to support conflict-affected and fragile states, including countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. This spending supports both poverty reduction and UK national security.⁶³

⁶³ For DFID spend figures see HM Government (2010) *Bilateral Aid Review Annex F*: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/News-Stories/2011/The-future-of-UK-aid/>


Counter-terrorism and the internet

6.1 As we set out in Part One, the internet has transformed the way in which terrorist organisations operate, providing them with an international communications platform previously available only to states. It has enabled the concept of global jihad. Without the internet, terrorists would find it much more difficult to reach a global audience and to plan specific operations.

The threat

6.2 Terrorists use the internet for:

- **Propaganda:** Recognising the limitations of traditional media, terrorists have used the internet to reach a much larger audience than has ever been possible for them before and with a broader and more dynamic series of messages. Because many parts of the internet are largely ungoverned, extremists have been able to circumvent censorship laws and host material on sites which are unlikely to be removed. In some cases terrorists have made specific use of laws permitting freedom of speech to call for the murder of innocent people.



- **Radicalisation and recruitment:** Radicalisation is usually a social process, involving not just virtual space but direct face to face meetings between vulnerable people and propagandists for terror. However, the internet provides a limitless source of material for radicalisers to use once individuals are engaged in this process and creates insular, private communities to share and discuss extremist ideas. It also provides the means for ideologues overseas to reach into the UK, either to preach to groups, or reinforce a commitment to violence.
- **Communication:** The internet allows for instant communication between geographically disparate groups via email, web fora, social networking sites or by using the internet to make voice calls.
- **Attack planning:** The internet gives terrorists the ability to research both targets and techniques quickly, easily and anonymously.
- **Cyber attack:** At present we believe the threat of a terrorist cyber attack is low but as the tools and techniques needed for cyber attack become more widely available and the success of criminal cyber operations becomes more widely known (notably through the prosecution of some of those responsible).

6.3 Given the range of different activities for which terrorists use the internet for, our response must span across different CONTEST workstreams.

Our response

6.4 Our aim is to make the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists. We need to:

- Identify, investigate and disrupt terrorist use of the internet;
- Make it harder for terrorists to exploit the internet for radicalisation and recruitment;
- Counter-terrorist propaganda and narrative on-line; and
- Make it harder for terrorists to conduct cyber attack.

6.5 Much of this work to counter-terrorist use of the internet, particularly around the first and last objectives set out above is sensitive and cannot be described in full in this document.

6.6 Our policy decisions must be informed and driven by evidence. We must increase our understanding of how terrorists use the internet. We need to be aware of changing trends, have the agility to respond to them and then to measure the impact of the actions we have taken.

6.7 Any response to terrorist use of the internet must be international. Law enforcement action to remove terrorist material hosted in the UK has been effective but we know that the same content can simply relocate to foreign servers, where it is immune from UK legislation. Our most important single relationship is with the US which is by far the biggest provider of internet hosting services in the world. We are engaged with the

CONTEST overseas priority countries – internet usage data⁶⁴

Country	Population	Internet users	Penetration %
Pakistan	177,276,594	18,500,000	10.4%
Yemen	23,495,361	420,000	1.8%
Somalia	10,112,453	106,000	1%
Afghanistan	29,121,286	1,000,000	3.4%

⁶⁴ Internet World Stats (2011) *Internet Users and Population Statistics*. Available at www.internetworldstats.com

US Government in this area and with the internet community in the US.

6.8 But governments cannot and should not tackle this problem alone. Action against terrorist use of the internet will only be effective if the public understand the nature of the threat online and act to protect themselves. Our role will be to encourage and facilitate public involvement in making the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists.

Investigation and disruption

6.9 Our primary focus is to identify individuals involved in attack planning and to disrupt their operations, whilst gathering evidence against them. Much of this work is conducted by the police, security and intelligence agencies as part of their routine operational activity.

6.10 In addition to identifying and disrupting terrorists we want to make it more difficult to use the internet to plan attacks. This means making it harder for terrorists to locate material that is useful for attack planning; it also means making it harder to use the internet to raise and transfer funds for operational purposes.

6.11 Being able to investigate internet driven attack planning is dependent on constant evolution of our own technology. The pace of technological change continues to present a challenge to the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Government will introduce a programme to preserve the ability of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to obtain internet-based communications data and also to intercept communications within the appropriate legal framework (see paragraph 4.40).

Radicalisation and recruitment

6.12 There are a number of internet-specific measures which we need to take to address the threat of radicalisation online. They include steps to: limit access to harmful content online in specific sectors or premises and ensure that action is taken to try to remove unlawful and harmful content from the internet.

6.13 We want to ensure that users in schools, libraries, colleges and Immigration Removal Centres are unable to access unlawful material. We will continue to work closely with Department for Education, Business Innovation and Skills, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), Devolved Administrations, Regional Broadband Consortia and the filtering industry.

6.14 The legal framework for work to remove content from the internet is provided by Sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which creates the offences of encouragement of terrorism (s.1) and the dissemination of terrorist publications (s.2); Section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), which makes it an offence to possess an article for terrorist purposes; and Section 58 of TACT, which makes it an offence to collect, record or possess without reasonable excuse, information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. Section 3 of TACT provides that those served with notices who fail to remove, without reasonable excuse, the material that is unlawful and terrorism-related within a specified period are treated as endorsing it.

6.15 Where material crosses the threshold of illegality and is hosted in the UK, CTIRU (see box for more detail) will work with the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute wherever possible and work with the internet industry to remove it. If the material is hosted abroad, the CTIRU will try to work with international law enforcement and the private sector to effect its removal.

Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit

Established in 2010 the CTIRU is a specialist UK police unit which is responsible for enforcing the removal of unlawful terrorist material online. Online content which is publicly referred through the www.direct.gov.uk/reportingonlineterrorism website is assessed by the CTIRU against Terrorism Act 2006. The CTIRU also works closely with international law enforcement agencies and the international internet industry in order to deal with unlawful material hosted overseas. The CTIRU has removed material from the internet on 165 occasions over the last 12 months.

6.16 We want CTIRU to become a model of international best practice and expect it to continue to develop its technical, investigative and international capabilities. OSCT in the Home Office will work with the CTIRU, international law enforcement and industry to foster an environment of mutual assistance to further the removal of terrorist material. We will also continue to work closely with the US, EU and EU Member States to explore self-regulatory measures to tackle terrorist use of the internet.

6.17 The public has a key role in identifying harmful and illegal content on the internet. The Directgov Terrorist web tool helps the public refer unlawful or offensive material to web hosting companies, whose contractual terms of use may be breached by the material, and who will then remove it. YouTube's independent decision to introduce a 'promoting terrorism' referral flag is also intended to facilitate this process.

6.18 We will continue to engage with the internet industry and encourage corporate social responsibility. We will encourage clearer and more visible acceptable use policies and stronger enforcement of user referrals.

Countering terrorist propaganda on-line

6.19 Most terrorist propaganda online goes unchallenged. The vast majority of people reject it: for that reason they will never visit a terrorist website, have no interest in what these websites say and no inclination to respond to their claims. Extremist and terrorist websites aim to speak only to those who are like minded and often succeed in doing so. But we do need to make positive messages easier to find on the internet and ensure greater challenge wherever we can.

6.20 We will continue to work with civil society groups to advise how best to use the internet to communicate, project their messages and challenge terrorist ideology. We will seek to support civil society groups to plan and manage their digital communications. We endorse and will facilitate the development of international online media hubs for the distribution of material that counters terrorist propaganda.

Cyber terrorism

6.21 The Government has already committed to a significant enhancement of work to address the risks of cyber attack. The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), based in the Cabinet Office, is overseeing a programme to improve our national cyber security. The National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) will, amongst other things, raise our level of capability to detect and defend ourselves from cyber threats, building on existing work across government. The NCSP will reduce our vulnerability to cyber attacks regardless of their source. Further detail will be contained within the National Cyber Security Strategy when it is published later this year.

6.22 CPNI will work with industry to identify and address cyber vulnerabilities and review whether minimum telecommunications security standards have been successfully applied. In the Government Sector, future priorities include ongoing work to assess the vulnerability of critical government systems and networks – principally those enabling Departments to interact online with citizens and make financial transactions – and to enhance their security against cyber attack.

Protect

Protect

Summary

7.1 The purpose of *Protect* is to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas and so reduce our vulnerability. Our priorities are informed by an annual National Risk Assessment, a version of which we publish, which assesses the threats we face and the vulnerabilities we have.

7.2 We believe that significant progress has been made with our *Protect* related work in the past few years, notably in securing the Critical National Infrastructure, in assessing and managing down the risks to crowded places, and in safeguarding hazardous materials which may be used by terrorists in an attack.

7.3 But much more remains to be done. We will devote more resources to border security, improving both the technology for identifying who enters and leaves this country and the coordination of our law enforcement response. We have announced the creation of a Border Command in the new National Crime Agency, intended to address the multiple chains of command across different organisations which operate at the border at present. We have already responded to recent threats to aviation security with new scanning technology, watchlisting and a no-fly procedure, intended to enable us to stop people boarding an aircraft bound for or leaving the UK who may intend to destroy it. We are working to address issues regarding cargo security.

7.4 We have received the report from the Coroner following the inquest into the 7 July 2005 London bombings. Our reply to that report will be published shortly; the recommendations of the Coroner touch on issues regarding *Pursue, Protect and Prepare*.

7.5 From 2011-2015 our *Protect* objectives will be to:

- Strengthen UK border security;
- Reduce the vulnerability of the transport network;
- Increase the resilience of the UK's infrastructure; and
- Improve protective security for crowded places.

7.6 We recognise that in all these areas our *Protect* work is becoming more complex. In many areas our own protective security depends on effective security measures in third countries. Aviation security must be an international endeavour or it will not succeed; the security of the UK border depends on international collaboration. Moreover, we also depend on close relationships with the private sector, who own much of the infrastructure and the systems that need to be protected. We will continue to be as transparent as we can in sharing our understanding of the threats we face

and wherever possible will collaborate in the development of security solutions.

7.7 Success in *Protect* will mean that:

- We know where and how we are vulnerable to terrorist attack and have reduced those vulnerabilities to an acceptable and a proportionate level;
- We share our priorities with the private sector and the international community and, wherever possible, we act together to address them; and
- The disruptive effect and costs of our protective security work are proportionate to the risks we face.

Protect

7.8 The purpose of *Protect* is to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas. It aims to reduce not the threat of terrorism (which is the task of *Pursue* and *Prevent*), but rather our vulnerability to terrorist attack.

7.9 *Protect* priorities must be informed by an assessment of what terrorists are trying to do, and in particular what targets they have, and by a further assessment of the vulnerabilities in those areas. This work is brought together in the National Risk Assessment (NRA); a version of the NRA is publicly released in as the National Risk Register (NRR).⁶⁵ Priorities in this area are always likely to include strengthening our border security, protecting the transport network, safeguarding the national infrastructure and reducing the vulnerability of crowded places. For security reasons, it is not always possible to explain publicly, including in this strategy, exactly where and how vulnerability has been reduced and where it remains.

Protect since 2009

7.10 In 2009, *Protect* set out to reduce further the vulnerability of:

- The Critical National Infrastructure (CNI);
- Crowded places;
- The transport system; and
- The UK border.

7.11 The strategy also included new programmes to improve the security of hazardous materials (e.g. hydrogen peroxide) which might be used in terrorist attacks.

7.12 The majority of national infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector and most protective security measures are achieved by Government working with industry to provide advice and secure voluntary cooperation. The exception is transport where protective security is regulated by the Secretary of State for Transport. Protecting the CNI is often long-term and expensive, with costs borne by the operators and passed on to consumers. Lead Government Departments are responsible for setting the security approach for the sector for which they have the policy lead.

7.13 Since 2009, significant progress has been made to build on established programmes for CNI protection across all nine essential service sectors (Energy, Water, Finance, Communications, Transport, Health, Food, Emergency Services, and Government). There has been an increase in the level of armed police protection at a number of key sites across the UK. Measures have also been developed to identify and address cyber vulnerabilities. Personnel security work plans have been adopted by all essential service sectors.

7.14 Crowded places include shopping centres, sports stadia, bars, pubs and clubs which are easily accessible to the public and attractive to terrorists. They are owned and managed by private businesses or local authorities, who are responsible for considering what steps should be

⁶⁵ Cabinet Office (2010) *Full National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 2010 Edition*. Available at <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/nationalriskregister-2010.pdf>

taken to protect them, based on advice available from the Government and the police. In March 2010 the then Government published guidance on protecting crowded places.⁶⁶ Police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) have provided protective security advice to thousands of sites and prioritised them in terms of risk. Action is being taken in high risk places.

7.15 Aviation security has become an increasingly high priority since 2009. Two recent attempted attacks by Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (see paragraph 2.12) have shown that terrorists can evade some aviation security systems.

7.16 Following the attempted attack over Detroit, the then Government commissioned a review of passenger security, coordinated by the Home Office. For security reasons this report has not been published. In response to the review recommendations, the airport security regime for passengers flying from UK airports was strengthened with the introduction of more searching, screening and explosive trace detection.

7.17 The review also recommended improvements to counter-terrorism watchlisting, to better identify people who pose a terrorist threat and where necessary stop them flying to or from the UK. Significant progress has been made in implementing these recommendations.

7.18 Following the discovery of an explosive device concealed in air cargo at East Midlands Airport in October 2010, the Transport Secretary announced several immediate enhancements to cargo security, including suspension of unaccompanied air cargo to the UK from Yemen and Somalia, and restrictions on the carriage of particular items by air. A review of all aspects of air cargo security was commissioned; and completed earlier this year. Like the report into passenger security following Detroit this report has not been published for security reasons.

7.19 A new mandatory process for planning airport security and agreeing airport policing was

introduced in the Policing and Crime Act 2009 and took effect on 1 April 2011. New EU aviation security legislation came into effect in April 2010.

7.20 Work has continued on reducing the vulnerability of the national rail and London Underground systems to attack. This includes protective physical measures, selective screening and better security for transport infrastructure, including underground carriages and station design.

7.21 The corner stone of the Government's work to track people arriving and leaving this country continues to be the e-Borders programme managed by UK Border Agency (UKBA). In July 2010, the Government terminated its contract with the primary supplier of e-Borders; the services provided by that contractor have been successfully transferred to alternative providers. The Government remains committed to extending the coverage of the e-Borders programme. We return to this below.

7.22 Some work has been completed during this period to enhance collaboration at the border on all issues between the UKBA and the police. However, the Government does not believe that the outcomes of this work are consistent with the challenges we face and has announced that a Border Command will be created in the new National Crime Agency.

7.23 Radiological and Nuclear (RN) detection capability screens traffic, people and goods to detect and deter the illicit importation of radioactive and nuclear material, reducing the risk of a terrorist RN attack in the UK. Fixed and mobile RN detection capability is now operational at many major ports of entry across the UK.

7.24 Since 2009 we have studied the security controls across the entire lifecycle of six specific hazardous substances and taken action to improve those controls through awareness raising measures, the provision of advice, voluntary schemes, and through the introduction of regulation where necessary.

7.25 *The Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005* by The Rt. Hon Lady

⁶⁶ HM Government (2010) *Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues*, <http://www.continuityforum.org/sites/default/files/images/ct-protective-security.pdf>

Justice Hallett DBE (see page 89) raised concerns about the ease with which the people involved were able to obtain a particular hazardous substance, hydrogen peroxide, to build explosive devices. Since 2009, measures have been taken to reduce the accessibility of hydrogen peroxide for terrorist purposes. This has included identifying areas of vulnerability, awareness-raising and advice about suspicious transactions. We are working with the EU to regulate access to chemicals including hydrogen peroxide, (see page 86).

7.26 This detailed *Protect* work reflects four broader trends:

- The systems we need to protect are increasingly part of an international and sometimes global network;
- They are often owned and operated by the private sector;
- International collaboration and a public/private partnership are therefore essential; and
- We also need to connect our work to protect sites from terrorist attack with work to promote resilience to other threats and hazards.

Protect 2011 – 2015

7.27 The Government intends to:

- Strengthen UK border security;
- Reduce the vulnerability of the transport network;
- Increase the resilience of the UK's infrastructure; and
- Improve protective security for crowded places.

7.28 The Government will prioritise aviation security, implementing specific improvements to strengthen air passenger and cargo security. We will also increase the scope and capability of the e-Borders programme and improve coordination between Government Departments, security and

intelligence agencies and law enforcement at the UK border:

7.29 Work will continue to reduce the vulnerability of the national infrastructure, especially the most critical parts, and the Government will take a wider focus on strengthening protective security for civil nuclear and hazardous sites as well. We will ensure that high quality advice on protective security is available to those responsible for crowded places; implementation will be for local authorities and business owners.

7.30 Success in *Protect* will mean that:

- We know where and how we are vulnerable to terrorist attack and have reduced those vulnerabilities to an acceptable and proportionate level;
- We share our priorities with the private sector and international community and wherever possible collaborate to address them; and
- The disruptive effect and cost of our protective security work is proportionate to the risk.

Strengthening the UK border

7.31 The Government completed the transfer of the e-Borders services to alternative contractors in April 2011. We are now working to ensure the resilience of the current e-Borders systems and to increase its operational capability ahead of the London 2012. In the longer term, we will develop e-Borders to automate pre-departure checks which will stop people who pose a terrorist threat from flying to or from the UK.

7.32 Increasing the scope and capability of e-Borders depends on being able to collect, in advance, details of passengers and crew travelling in and out of the UK. This is necessary for journeys within the EU, where coverage is currently lower, as well as those from outside. The Government will continue to work with our EU partners and their national Data Protection Authorities to ensure that Advanced Passenger Information (API)

data collected by other Member States' carriers can be transferred to the UK. This can then be checked against counter-terrorism watchlists and used by UKBA and the police to identify and target people who pose a terrorist threat before they enter or exit this country. We have indicated in the *Pursue* section of this strategy (see para 4.42) that the data remains vital for the investigation and disruption of terrorist activity.

7.33 In February 2011 the European Commission published a draft Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The Government has decided to opt-in to the Directive with the aim of securing the collection of PNR data on targeted flights between Member States and from flights to and from outside of the EU.

7.34 Over the lifetime of this strategy we will ensure that we can better identify people of counter-terrorism interest coming to the UK from outside the European Economic Area. This will include investment in cutting-edge technology to strengthen biometric checking capability; by May 2012 Biometric Residence Permits will be issued to all those from outside the European Economic Area granted entry or leave to remain in the UK for more than six months. By the end of 2011, UKBA will use facial matching as well as fingerprint matching capabilities and will introduce a biometric watchlist.

7.35 During 2011, delivery of the initial Radiological and Nuclear (RN) detection capability to major ports of entry to the UK will be completed. Over the next four years, the Government will also invest in developing enhanced technologies for RN detection, working with UK industry, academia and international partners.

7.36 The Government will also strengthen collaboration between agencies operating at the UK border and deliver a single, coherent strategy for border security through a Border Command within the new National Crime Agency (NCA). This will be operational from 2013. The Border

Command will task NCA's own operational officers and wider resources including Special Branch.

7.37 An important tool in securing our border are the powers contained within Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The Government is considering the use of these powers. (see para 4.24)


Protective security across the transport network

7.38 The Government will work with industry, the Devolved Administrations and other countries to reduce vulnerability across the transport network. But measures to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack must be proportionate and minimise disruption to the public and to the transport networks they are designed to protect.

Aviation security

7.39 Reducing vulnerability to terrorist attack in the aviation sector is a priority. The global aviation network transports huge volumes of passengers and goods around the world every day (see picture). The UK's security depends in part on strong global aviation security arrangements – there are some 465 last points of departure to the UK (places overseas where direct flights depart to the UK) and 200 million passenger journeys through the UK each year; by 2030 that figure is forecast to rise to around 390 million.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Department for Transport (2010) *Forecasts of terminal passengers at United Kingdom airports, 2004-2030*. Available from <http://www2.dft.gov.uk/pgr/statistics/datatablespublications/aviation/activity-airports/avi0104.xls>

World Aviation Routes:⁶⁸

7.40 Work continues to implement the recommendations of the review into passenger security following the Detroit incident in December 2009. We will use secondary legislation to deny airlines authority to carry to the UK foreign national passengers who are included on our no fly list. We are exploring options for formally preventing watchlisted British nationals from flying to the UK until it is established they pose no threat to the aircraft.

7.41 The Government will continue to implement the recommendations of its review into air cargo security. They touch on the roles and responsibilities of UK agencies overseas, the better analysis of threat and vulnerability and the more effective use of cargo data.

7.42 The Government will work bilaterally and multilaterally to raise global standards of cargo security. The UK is playing a leading role in International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and EU negotiations to agree measures to strengthen the global air freight system which will reduce the risk of explosive devices and other terrorist materials entering the global freight network. We continue to believe that in this

area the role of the EU is vital. We will continue capacity building work to provide security equipment and training around the world. Where international standards, practice or compliance are insufficient to mitigate the risk to the UK and UK aviation, we will require more demanding standards, where necessary through agreements with other countries and with cargo carriers.

Rail and Underground

7.43 Work under the National Railways Security Programme continues to reduce the vulnerability of rail and underground systems. This includes: the installation of permanent vehicle barriers at major stations; incorporation of security features into the redevelopment of stations, and identifying new types of technology that could be deployed to screen passengers.

7.44 If an armed presence is required at rail or underground stations this is currently provided by local police: in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 bombings, armed patrols were provided by the Metropolitan Police at central London mainline stations and the London Underground. The Government has now agreed that, when required, British Transport Police (BTP) should also provide these patrols in future. BTP officers are

⁶⁸ Patokallio, J (2011) *World Aviation Routes*. Available from <http://www.OpenFlights.org>

undertaking firearms training for this purpose, and could be deployed in these roles later this year.

Maritime

7.45 The Government is progressing with the implementation of the port security directive on enhancing the security at EU ports.

7.46 A multi-agency National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) opened at Northwood in April 2011. The NMIC brings together intelligence and monitoring carried out by HM Coastguard, the police, the Royal Navy and the UK Border Agency and will provide a comprehensive picture of potential threats to UK maritime security, including terrorist threats, whether in UK waters or globally.

The protection and resilience of UK infrastructure

7.47 We will build on progress already made to strengthen protective security for the UK's national infrastructure, in particular those parts of it which are defined as Critical National Infrastructure. The Government will also focus on the protection and security of hazardous sites and civil nuclear facilities: these are not formally part of the Critical National Infrastructure (because of the relatively lower level impact that disruption would have on essential services in the UK). But hazardous and civil nuclear sites must be protected because an attack could lead to significant damage and public harm.

7.48 The Northern Ireland Office will continue work to improve protection and resilience of infrastructure in Northern Ireland from attack. This work will be taken forward in conjunction with local partners, the Centre for Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Essential services and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

7.49 We have a programme in place to continue to upgrade the security of the energy and water sectors. Across all the other sectors, the rolling programme of CNI site security reviews

will continue with CPNI, lead government departments and infrastructure operators working closely to reduce vulnerability to the terrorist threat.

7.50 Improving cyber security will be a priority. The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office will work with lead departments to coordinate the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) across Government. The NCSP will increase cyber security capabilities, building on work by CPNI.

7.51 A comprehensive range of good practice guidance for personnel security has been produced and is available to CPNI's trusted partners. It includes tools and techniques to identify and manage employee risk, encourage effective security cultures, and protect sites from external attack through establishing well motivated guard forces. Work will continue to ensure that high quality and accessible information is provided to national infrastructure organisations to reduce their vulnerability to the 'insider threat'.

Civil nuclear sites

7.52 The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is working with OSCT and other partners to ensure effective security of the UK civil nuclear sector. The Government continues to make improvements to physical, personnel and cyber security.

Hazardous sites

7.53 OSCT is working with CPNI and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack at hazardous sites including research laboratories and chemical installations. The aim over the next four years is to ensure work is prioritised on the basis of the risk posed to the site and to consider a wider range of sites than hitherto.

7.54 CTSAs will advise lower risk sites on low to no cost changes to policies and procedures and CPNI will provide advice and guidance to sites at higher risk.

Crowded places

7.55 Over the next four years, the Government will ensure that businesses owning crowded places and local authorities continue to have access to high quality protective security advice so they know what steps to take to reduce vulnerability

to terrorist attack. The Government will also promote security at sites at higher risk e.g. those with particular cultural, historical, economic or national significance. Existing guidance will be reviewed and updated.

Denying terrorists access to hazardous substances

The Government works with other states and multilateral organisations to deny terrorists access to CBRN materials. The UK is committed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires the adoption and enforcement of controls for this purpose. The UK is also a lead participant in other international conventions, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions (BTWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to ban the production, transfer and use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. It is active in global initiatives to prevent nuclear terrorism.

The UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) is our contribution to the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The GP was launched at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis in Canada. G8 leaders pledged up to \$20 billion over 10 years to support co-operative programmes addressing non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. The G8 also provides assistance to enable countries to meet their international commitments, including UNSCR 1540, BTWC and CWC, through improving the physical protection of vulnerable material and better security procedures.

The GTRP is the UK's largest cooperative counter-proliferation programme. The UK pledged up to \$750 million and by March 2011 had spent £344 million. We coordinate closely with other key donors and international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. To date some 23 countries have contributed to the GP.

There is a continuing cross-government programme in place to reduce the risk of terrorists gaining access to chemical, biological, radiological and explosive (CBRE) substances within the UK. OSCT works with CPNI and NaCTSO to control access to hazardous substances while protecting legitimate use. For example, 'Know Your Customer' campaigns are being used to encourage suppliers of specific chemicals to report suspicious transaction attempts to the anti-terrorist hotline. Awareness-raising events for specific areas such as schools, specialist industries and farms will also continue.

We are also working with EU counterparts to regulate access to a range of precursor chemicals, including hydrogen peroxide. This will limit the ability of terrorists to purchase these precursors and increase our ability to monitor illicit procurement attempts within the European Union.

Work is also underway to identify and advise transport operators handling hazardous materials, to ensure they are aware of and follow the best protective security practice.

People at specific risk from terrorism

The UK continues to provide personal protection to high profile people who may be targeted by terrorists. Protective security measures can include armed personal protection officers, static armed policing, mobile patrolling, technical measures, home protection measures, and advice on best practice.

The Government is committed to ensuring that personal protection is efficient and cost-effective, in line with risk and staying ahead of any emerging threats. Protection arrangements are kept under review and importance is placed on the need to respond quickly and effectively to any changes, including the delivery of technical protective security measures and advice which reflects best practice and the latest technological capabilities.

Providing advice to British citizens overseas

FCO travel advice helps British citizens visiting or working abroad make informed decisions about their personal safety and security. The Government and its agencies continue to work closely with a range of international partners and organisations to ensure that we have the fullest picture of the terrorist threat. JTAC constantly reviews the threats to UK citizens and interests overseas. This information is reflected in an up-to-date description of the terrorist threat in every country on the FCO travel advice website (www.fco.gov.uk/travel). During a terrorist attack this is updated several times a day if necessary. In 2010 alone, there were over 5.5 million hits on the site. The FCO continues to develop new ways of delivering information through mobile and digital technology including Facebook and Twitter. In addition, Overseas Business Risk (www.ukti.gov.uk/export) provides UK business with additional information about the security-related risks of operating overseas.

The London Bombings: 7 July 2005

The London Bombings: 7 July 2005

On 7 July 2005 fifty two people were killed when four explosive devices detonated on the transport system in London.

Four reports have considered the circumstances leading up to and after these attacks:

- *Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* by the Intelligence and Security Committee, May 2006;
- *Report of the 7 July Review Committee* by the London Assembly June 2006;
- *Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* by the Intelligence and Security Committee, May 2009; and
- *Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005* by The Rt. Hon Lady Justice Hallett DBE, May 2011.

The main themes of these reports fall into two areas: **preventability**; and the **emergency response**:

The first Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report considered the preventability of the attacks, focusing on: what was known prior to 7 July, the intelligence held by the Security Service and, their assessment of the information, and the scope of their coverage. The ISC made a series of recommendations regarding the threat level system, the 'home grown' terrorist threat, and cooperation between the police forces and Security Service.

The ISC follow-up report, published in May 2009 looked in more detail at the preventability of the attacks by considering issues which came to light as a result of the trial (March 2006 – April 2007) of the suspects in the 'Operation CREVICE' case, with whom two of the 7/7 bombers had been in contact. The report concluded that there was no evidence to support allegations that the Security Service missed vital clues or ignored warnings. The Committee recommended improvements in exploiting information held by the police and the intelligence agencies and in maintaining statistics on terrorist-related convictions.

The report by the London Assembly considered the emergency response and made 54 specific recommendations. The London Assembly has since reported on their implementation.

The inquests into the London bombings considered both **preventability** and the **emergency response**. The Coroner, Lady Justice Hallett delivered unlawful killing verdicts in each of the 52 deaths. She concluded that the 7/7 attacks were not preventable and that on the balance of probabilities each of the deceased would have died whatever time the emergency services had reached and rescued them.

Lady Justice Hallett's report made nine recommendations, two on preventability and seven on the emergency response where she believed there were circumstances creating a risk of deaths occurring in the future.

Preventability. Lady Justice Hallett recommended that the Home Secretary and the Director General of the Security Service consider improving Security Service procedures so that 'human sources' who are asked to view photographs of suspected terrorists see copies of the best possible quality; and establish if improvements can be made to the Security Service procedures for recording decisions relating to the assessment of their targets.

Emergency Response. Lady Justice Hallett made seven recommendations to the Secretary of State for Health, London Resilience Team, Transport for London (TfL), the London Ambulance Service and Barts and London NHS Trust respectively. These recommendations covered: inter-agency major incident training for frontline staff; the protocols for sharing emergency alert information between TfL and the emergency services; the establishment and manning of rendezvous points; procedures for confirming and communicating information that traction current is switched off on the London Underground; provision of first aid equipment and stretchers on Underground trains and stations; procedures for multi casualty triage; and emergency care of the type provided by the London Air Ambulance and Medical Emergency Response Incident Teams.

Lady Justice Hallett also made a number of observations that stopped short of formal recommendations. She noted that there had been inaccuracies in the Security Service evidence to the earlier ISC reports and expected that procedures would be reconsidered.

The Coroner also referred to: regulation of the supply of hydrogen peroxide; effective inter-agency liaison; good communications and information sharing; AIRWAVE base radio stations and their capacity in the event of a major incident; and transparency between different emergency responders.

The Government has provided its response to the Coroner and, in accordance with the Coroner's Rules, it will be published shortly.

Prepare

Prepare

Summary

9.1 The purpose of our *Prepare* work is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where that attack cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end and to increase our resilience so we can recover from its aftermath. An effective and efficient response will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery.

9.2 We believe that it is right to build resilience in a coordinated way to all kinds of threats and hazards. This 'generic' approach makes best use of our resources and avoids needless duplication. Evidence suggests that generic resilience capabilities at a local level have improved in some areas in the past few years but we must do more to improve aspects of our response, including in particular communications between emergency services and to the public during a civil emergency. There remain wider issues to resolve regarding what is known as 'interoperability' between the emergency services. We are also concerned that there is not yet sufficiently regular or comprehensive testing of all our emergency response plans.

9.3 The Coroner's report following the inquest into the 7 July 2005 London bombings made seven recommendations regarding the emergency response to those attacks. The recommendations also relate to information sharing between emergency services and incident training. Our response will address these issues.

9.4 Although generic resilience capabilities offer a sound basis for work to respond to a terrorist incident, there are types of terrorist attack which require a more specialised response. In the past two years considerable resources have been devoted to developing more effective responses to an attack of the kind that took place in Mumbai between 26-29 November 2008. Significant changes have been made to police firearms resources and tactics, and to the multi agency response that such incidents would require. We intend to continue this work.

9.5 We also intend to do more to address the highest impact terrorist risks set out in the National Risk Assessment. These include the risk of a terrorist attack which makes use of unconventional weapons, including biological, radiological, chemical or even nuclear materials. We emphasise that there is a low probability of these attacks. But their impact is so high that we judge preparations must be made for them. As in so many other areas of this strategy those preparations must wherever possible be coordinated with our allies overseas. A considerable amount of work has already been completed, in particular by the police, in developing a response in these areas.

9.6 Over the next four years we will therefore:

- Continue to build generic capabilities to respond to and recover from a wide range of terrorist and other civil emergencies;

- Improve preparedness for the highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment;
- Improve the ability of the emergency services to work together during a terrorist attack; and
- Enhance communications and information sharing for terrorist attacks.

9.7 Testing and exercising are vital to our resilience and preparedness. We have a National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme. We will maintain this and Ministers will participate in it. We will also place great emphasis on learning and absorbing the lessons from these exercises and will expect participating agencies to do this quickly and comprehensively. We will monitor their progress.

9.8 Success in *Prepare* will mean that:

- Our planning for the consequences of all civil emergencies provides us with the capabilities to respond to and recover from the most likely kinds of terrorist attacks in this country;
- We have in place additional capabilities to manage ongoing terrorist attacks wherever required; and
- We have in place additional capabilities to respond to the highest impact risks.

Prepare

9.9 The purpose of our *Prepare* work is to mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident where it cannot be stopped. This includes work to bring a terrorist attack to an end, and to recover from its aftermath. An effective and efficient response will save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery.

9.10 *Prepare* has evolved to reflect the priorities in the National Security Strategy which emphasised the need to promote both local and national resilience and to ensure that the public is fully informed of the risks that we face. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) confirmed that it would be a priority task to prepare 'for all kinds of emergencies and to be

able to recover from shocks and to maintain essential services'. The SDSR noted that this would require a resilient infrastructure, effective crisis management and emergency response, and enhanced central Government and Armed Forces planning.

9.11 The SDSR also set out the Government's intention to focus on building community resilience, to give support to small and medium sized enterprises to prepare for disruption, and to enhance cooperation between public and private sector providers of national infrastructure to improve their resilience.

9.12 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), part of the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, leads cross-government work on many aspects of *Prepare* as part of its broader remit to coordinate strategic planning and response to all kinds of civil emergency.⁶⁹ In building resilience to terrorist attacks under *Prepare*, the CCS reports to the Home Secretary, who has lead ministerial responsibility for terrorism, as well as to the Minister for Cabinet Office, who has lead responsibility for resilience.


9.13 The CCS is responsible for:

- Coordinating the National Resilience Capabilities Programme⁷⁰ to make sure we are ready to deal with consequences that are common to a wide range of emergencies. The programme currently consists of 22 work streams run by Government Departments with lead responsibilities for aspects of emergency response. This is a 'generic' approach to building resilience that is not specific to particular kinds of threat or hazard. Programmes and lead Government Departments are summarised in the graphic overleaf.

⁶⁹ Devolved Administrations are engaged in this work, where civil contingencies is largely a devolved matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Although civil contingencies is not a devolved function in Wales, the Welsh Government plays a key coordinating role and has responsibility for fire, health and local government.

⁷⁰ See <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience> for more information.

Workstreams of the UK Resilience Capabilities Programme



NRPA: National Resilience Planning Assumptions

- Leading specific programmes to respond to the UK’s highest impact terrorist threats as set out in the National Risk Assessment, which require contingency planning and capabilities going beyond those that are needed for most kinds of emergency.

9.14 *Prepare* also means being ready to deal with an ongoing terrorist attack. The attacks in Mumbai in 2008 showed how terrorist attacks have become so complex and at times protracted that they require very specialised response. Responsibility for coordinating programmes in this area falls to the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office.

Prepare since 2009

9.15 In 2009, CONTEST set out to ensure that:

- Emergency services can respond effectively to most kinds of terrorist attack, both during and after any incident;
- Plans are developed and capabilities improved to respond to a terrorist incident and to deal with the consequences of the UK’s highest impact terrorist threats as set out in the National Risk Assessment;
- Central, regional and local crisis management structures are appropriately equipped, competent and trained; and
- The UK’s critical national infrastructure can deliver essential services following a terrorist incident; or, where services are disrupted, recovers as quickly as possible.

9.16 We judge that preparedness for the types of terrorist attack considered in the National Risk Assessment has improved since 2005, but there are some areas where further work is needed.

9.17 This judgment is based upon the results of a National Capabilities Survey (a biennial confidential survey of the frontline organisations most directly involved in preparing for emergencies); progress reports from the relevant work streams in the National Resilience Capabilities Programme (see para 9.13); and an assessment of the lessons identified from major national exercises that include a response element and from real life emergencies.

9.18 Our capability to deal with mass casualties has improved steadily, with more health responders having plans to provide additional capability and capacity to handle casualties. The Ambulance Service's programme of introducing Hazardous Area Response Teams which began in 2007/8, for example, is near completion. This provides training, equipment and vehicles for ambulance staff to enable them to work in hazardous areas.

9.19 The majority of local areas have plans in place for evacuation and shelter, including of town and city centres. Hospitals, schools, and prisons, have been engaged in this process. Further work on training and on specific plans needs to be developed, for example in the evacuation of hospitals.

9.20 There is now a high level of engagement by local responders in major incident planning for fatalities, and improved provision of capability at national level, under the Home Office led mass fatalities programme.

9.21 Communications between emergency responders have improved, but there is still more work to do. Two-thirds of eligible emergency responders have protected access to mobile networks during emergencies. Around 500 organisations can now share classified information with each other, using the National Resilience Extranet which also enables web-based planning and crisis management.

9.22 Major improvements have been made in building the capability of emergency responders to alert the public to an impending or actual emergency. Capabilities now in place depend heavily on the media, networking arrangements, and public web-sites. Emergency responders are less confident that they would be able to provide information and advice to the public within the first hour after an emergency; and take-up of subscriber and non-subscriber based SMS and e-mail alert systems, which would start to fill this capability gap, is still low.

9.23 Over 75% of local responder organisations have exercised emergency response plans over the past two years and 77% say that their plans have been tested through a multi-agency exercise. But we judge there is still room for improvement; as the Coroner's report on the 7 July London bombings observed, there is still insufficient exercising of inter-agency cooperation in emergency response.

9.24 The highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment are of a terrorist attack using biological agents, and of a radiological or even a nuclear device. These risks require contingency planning and capabilities going beyond those that are needed for most kinds of emergency, and work spans both *Protect* and *Prepare*. The likelihood of terrorists obtaining effective mass impact biological agents or a functioning radiological or nuclear device remains low, and *Protect* is prioritising efforts to stop terrorists gaining access to the technical expertise and the specialist materials they need to deliver attacks of this nature.

9.25 But if terrorist groups were able to use such devices successfully their potential impact on the UK population and national infrastructure would be severe and significantly greater than a conventional terrorist attack. Under *Prepare*, the Cabinet Office has led work to update our contingency planning for these risks. Measures have been taken by UK health departments to build up stocks of medical supplies to protect and treat members of the public who fall victim to such attacks.

Implications of the Mumbai attacks for *Prepare*

In early 2009 the then Government set up a programme under *Prepare* to improve the police and military response in the event of a Mumbai-style attack. Following a review by the Government in 2010 the programme was significantly expanded and accelerated; the following improvements are now in place:

- Firearms officers have access to higher calibre weapons, with new tactics and training to deal with this kind of incident;
- There is additional police firearms capacity in major cities and improved procedures to provide rapid back-up from neighbouring areas;
- Specialist Olympic-related training for police firearms officers has been brought forward;
- Unarmed police officers are now trained to identify and respond to the initial stages of a possible terrorist attack involving firearms; and
- With MOD, we have worked to deliver a faster military response to a terrorist attack in the UK.

There has been a programme of joint exercises between the police and military, culminating so far in a major national counter-terrorism exercise in February 2011 which tested our overall response to a 'marauding' terrorist firearms attack.

The exercise identified important lessons for our response to a fast-moving, high-impact incident which we will build into our planning.

National guidance is already in place to ensure a coordinated multi-agency response to a range of major incidents, including terrorist attacks. Where appropriate this guidance is being updated to reflect the challenges that emergency services may face in responding to an attack involving firearms. Some initial firearms awareness training and personal protective equipment has been rolled out to small teams of volunteer ambulance and fire crews in key areas; this is a long term programme of work and in the coming months there will be further improvements to joint tactics and training.

9.26 The national Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) response centre, run by the police but available to other emergency services, has delivered a range of CBRN response equipment and has met its target of having over 10,000 police officers trained to respond to CBR incidents by 2010. A good level of preparedness is now provided at local and regional level through 18 'model response' teams. The remaining issues are the pace of scene assessment and the response in the first critical hour or two.

9.27 National crisis management is based around the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR). COBR has recently been upgraded

and further work is underway. Regional Crisis management has been based on resilience teams within the Government Office network which have proved effective in recent non-terrorist civil emergencies in recent years; following the abolition of the Government Office network, successor arrangements are being put in place by the Department for Communities and Local Government. At local level, the multi-agency Local Resilience Forum⁷¹ brings together front-line emergency responders to plan and rehearse for the local risks they face: 80-90% of Category 1

⁷¹ Strategic Coordination Groups fulfil the role of Local Resilience Forums in Scotland.

emergency responders⁷² now say that they are engaged in multi-agency planning to handle mass casualties and fatalities and chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) incidents.

9.28 Infrastructure resilience plans have been developed for the most critical infrastructure. These plans focus on flooding and other natural hazards, in response to the independent review by Sir Michael Pitt after floods in 2007. But some capabilities (alerting systems, mechanisms for cooperation with emergency responders, contingency and business continuity) will also help prepare critical infrastructure to respond to terrorist attacks.

Prepare 2011-2015

9.29 For the next four years we want to:

- Continue to build generic capabilities to respond to and recover from a wide range of terrorist and other civil emergencies;
- Improve preparedness for the highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment;
- Improve the ability of the emergency services to work together during a terrorist attack; and
- Enhance communications and information sharing for terrorist attacks.

9.30 Success in *Prepare* will mean that:

- Our planning for the consequences of all civil emergencies also provides us with the capabilities to respond to and recover from the most likely terrorist attacks in this country;
- We have in place additional capabilities to manage ongoing terrorist attacks wherever required;
- We have in place additional capabilities to respond to the highest impact risks.

⁷² Category one responders are local authorities, the emergency services, health bodies and others identified in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as having duties to carry out contingency planning for emergencies in their area.

Building generic capabilities

9.31 The Government will continue its work to build preparedness for the consequences – such as injuries, illness, contamination and fatalities – that are common to a wide range of emergencies.

9.32 This means taking forward the National Resilience Capabilities Programme, the cross-government programme led by the Cabinet Office to improve all aspects of preparedness for civil emergencies (see page 95). Of the twenty-two work streams in the programme, particular attention will be placed on:

- National and local emergency planning and crisis management arrangements. At national level, the government will establish a strengthened crisis management capability within the Cabinet Office, bringing together civilian, police and defence specialists to enhance capability to prepare, plan and manage the response to security crises. Arrangements will be put in place and tested by the Department for Communities and Local Government DCLG to sustain the essential work of the resilience teams that were formerly embedded in the Government Office network.
- Mass casualty planning. This workstream will continue to improve the health sector's overall response and resilience to the (mass) casualty consequences of terrorist incidents and emergencies. The roll out of an additional three Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) teams will be completed by the end of 2011. Further analysis of National Risk Assessment casualty figures will provide a more comprehensive evidence base for future development of mass casualty capabilities. This more detailed understanding of the impacts of specific risks and the associated response capacity and capability requirements will inform continuing work on preparedness within the NHS.
- Mass fatality planning. This workstream will continue its work to build and maintain national capability for disaster victim

identification, and to provide forensic imaging and other equipment. Building on the national emergency mortuary arrangements, and local capacity for handling fatalities, contingency plans will be produced for providing additional capability to deal with the highest impact events in the National Risk Assessment.

9.33 The Home Office will continue to coordinate programmes to improve our response to a fast-moving, ongoing terrorist attack. Learning the important lessons from the exercise in February this year, OSCT will continue to work with the Department of Health, the DCLG and the Cabinet Office, and with police and ambulance and fire and rescue services to help emergency responders to deal with the particular challenges of evacuating casualties during a firearms incident. Building on work to improve joint procedures for identifying this type of attack, mobilising resources and managing risk at the scene, the next stage will look at the need to adapt existing procedures to reach and treat casualties in a higher-risk environment where it is safe to do so.

9.34 Within the next four years we are aiming to have specialist fire and ambulance teams in place in each of the highest priority areas in the UK, trained and equipped to respond to the consequences of a range of terrorist attacks, including dealing with casualties during a marauding terrorist gun attack. Their ability to save lives will always depend on the circumstances on the day, but the aim of our work is to create a fully interoperable emergency service response that is regularly exercised against a range of scenarios in the national risk assessment.

9.35 *Prepare* programmes focus mainly on the public-sector emergency response community. They are supported by programmes led by the Cabinet Office to help private, voluntary and community sectors improve their resilience, by providing better information on the risks of emergencies of all kinds and, in the case of small and medium sized businesses, by providing tools to aid their security and business continuity planning.

9.36 The FCO will work with foreign governments to support their planning and exercising for terrorist emergencies, and implement the findings of a review of evacuation arrangements in crises overseas, to be published later in the year, learning from the evacuation of 1,600 British and other nationals from Libya in February 2011.

The highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment

9.37 The Government will continue to prioritise programmes to reduce the threat and mitigate the potential consequences of mass impact attacks using biological agents, and of radiological or nuclear devices. Work under the *Protect* workstream is explained in the previous chapter.

9.38 Through *Prepare* the Government will continue to build capabilities us to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack involving a biological agent or improvised nuclear device. We will focus on those measures that would be likely to have the greatest effect in reducing deaths and illness and, where possible, the widest utility for other kinds of emergency. We will therefore:

- Build the Department of Health's stocks of antibiotics and vaccines, and emergency distribution arrangements to increase the capacity of the health service to provide supportive care in the event of a bio-terrorist attack.
- Improve the capacity of the emergency responder community to detect, monitor and track bio-terrorist and radiological hazards.
- Update our operational response planning, ensuring that contingency planning for shelter and evacuation is adapted to the scale and nature of these kinds of disaster, and that command and coordination arrangements are clear.
- Update plans to provide information and advice to the public, in the event of an emergency or impending emergency.

9.39 In support of this work we will continue to deliver specialist CBRN training to emergency responders in the UK through the Police CBRN Centre at Ryton. This CBRN training facility will become an integral part of the new national police structures during the next two years thereby ensuring that CBRN skills will continue to be embedded in our national police response capabilities.

9.40 We will ensure the scientific and forensic expertise is sustained and made available both through the existing National Network of Laboratories (NNL) which provides CBRN support to the UK emergency services and through other specialist MOD laboratories at Atomic Weapons Establishment and Defence Science and Technology Laboratories. We will also maintain the MOD Technical Response Force to provide specialist surge support to the UK police in the event of a CBRN emergency. We will also continue to invest in research and development projects that offer us opportunities to build more effective and robust CBRN defences and medical counter-measures.

9.41 We will seek to strengthen cooperation with other nations who share our assessment that the risk of bio-terrorism and nuclear terrorism is a high priority. We will continue to exercise our national CBRN capabilities jointly with our American, Australian, Canadian, French, German and other EU counterparts, sharing best practice and engaging in joint research and development. We will also work to support implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan which seeks to raise European capability and capacity for handling CBRN terrorist incidents. As part of that broad effort we will engage with international partners, industry and academia on horizon scanning to ensure we understand future developments in science and technology that may have an impact on our ability to protect the UK from a CBRN attack and mitigate the impact of such an attack. And we will work closely with our US and European partners to improve on existing bio-detection capabilities and medical counter-measures over the coming period.

Emergency services interoperability

9.42 The blue light services have adopted the military term 'interoperability' to refer to effective joint working within and between the emergency services. Interoperability requires a standardised approach *within* an emergency service and improved cooperation on the ground *between* first responders.

9.43 The SDSR set out our commitment to improve the ability of the emergency services to work together in a crisis. Emergency responders – in particular the police, fire and rescue and ambulance services – must be able to work effectively with one another where an incident poses a threat to life, is protracted or complex, and where the consequences dictate that a single agency response is inadequate. In these demanding scenarios, the need for speed, efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency service response is at a premium. Joint working, within and between the services and with other key partners such as transport operators – must be embedded in training and operational doctrine.

9.44 Within counter-terrorism policing, ACPO (TAM) leads an interoperability programme for the police service, to improve communications, and command and control when forces work together across force boundaries.

9.45 This programme has been delayed but we are now more satisfied that it is on track. We regard it as a priority.

9.46 To support wider interoperability, the Government will:

- Ensure responders engage in and support multi-agency exercising across all tiers of command;
- Coordinate a wider review of how multi-agency issues feature in single-service training;
- Promote the use by all key responders of standardised terminology produced by the Cabinet Office in 2007 and revised this year.

The National Counter Terrorist Exercise Programme

The Home Office works with the police, security and intelligence agencies, other Government Departments and the Armed Forces to devise, maintain and regularly exercise capabilities and responses which would be used in the event of a terrorist incident.

The National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme reflects the changing nature of the terrorist threat we face, and aims to improve the ability of the police service and other key partners to prepare for, respond to, and manage terrorist investigations and incidents.

The National Counter Terrorism Exercise Programme delivers a mix of exercises, usually including three major national counter-terrorism exercises each year. In recent years major exercises have been completed in most regions of the UK. Since 2009 major exercises have been conducted against scenarios which feature responses to aviation, CBRN, marauding gunmen, maritime and hostage-taking threats. Some exercises practice the ability to disrupt an imminent attack; others test the response to an attack in progress or to an attack that has occurred. A key element of exercising is to periodically test both the command chain (from the level of Government down to the lowest level of police command) and coordination between emergency services during an incident.

Ministers regularly participate in national counter-terrorism exercises and this ensures that the highest level strategic decision-making is exercised through the government's crisis organisation (COBR).

National counter-terrorism exercises are the culminating event in a structured series of smaller scale preparatory exercises, which may include live or simulated activity, and which are aimed at developing greater counter-terrorism preparedness. These exercises help to mitigate the risk that participants in a national counter-terrorism exercise may not have recent training or experience in their counter-terrorism roles.

Learning from exercises is taken forward either through existing or new programmes; progress is assessed through CONTEST structures and at the Police Counter Terrorism Board (including senior police officers and Home Office Ministers).

- Promote better communication and sharing of information between the emergency services (see below).

Communications and information sharing during a terrorist incident

9.47 Reliable communications and the ability to share information are essential for an effective response. Over the next four years we will:

- Complete the roll-out of the strategic emergency communications (High Integrity Telecommunications System – HITS) programme enabling multi-agency crisis centres to use military (Skynet 5) communication satellites in an emergency;
- Roll-out of the National Resilience Extranet to Category 1 and Category 2 responders. The NRE has been adopted for use in the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games as the main information sharing facility for resilience and physical security purposes. We will also evaluate a 'Direct Electronic Incident Transfer' between key responders, which will enable faster identification of major incidents and the automatic sharing between the emergency

services of information from 999 calls from the public.

- Complete and test the Mobile Telephone Preferential Access Scheme, which enables mobile phone traffic to be managed in an emergency to ensure that the emergency services have priority; and the continued development of Telecommunications groups within each local resilience forum to ensure that their telecommunications plans are up to date;
- Enhance interoperability in the Airwave tactical radio system used by the emergency services following guidance by National Police Improvement Agency and Cabinet Office.
- Enhance the ability of local responders to fulfil their warning and informing duties under the Civil Contingencies Act by ensuring new and emerging technologies, including 'cell broadcasting'⁷³ and social media are tested for use by responders.

9.48 The Government will continue to give further consideration to the most appropriate mechanisms for putting information on terrorism threats into public domain.

⁷³ Cell Broadcasting is a system of emergency communication being introduced in a number of countries. It targets mobile phones in geographic areas rather than people, so does not require the telephone numbers of members of the public to be known. Such a system could be introduced for use by the police, in a terrorist attack or other wide-scale emergencies where lives are at risk.

London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Security

London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Security

10.1 The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be the biggest sporting event in UK history. Starting with the torch relay in May and running through to 9 September, the Games will involve 14,700 athletes from 205 countries at over 30 venues in London and across the UK. The Games will take place in front of over 10 million spectators in the UK alone and alongside other regular and planned events in the summer of 2012 such as Wimbledon, the Notting Hill Carnival and Her Majesty the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations.

10.2 The UK has an excellent track record of hosting major events safely and securely. However, the sheer scale of London 2012 poses significant policing and security challenges; and UK authorities and Games partners will be under considerable domestic and international scrutiny to deliver effective but unobtrusive safety and security arrangements.

The Government safety and security commitment

10.3 The Government is committed to delivering "a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit".⁷⁴ The UK has guaranteed to the International Olympic Committee to "take all financial, planning and

operational measures necessary to guarantee the safety and the peaceful celebration of the Games."⁷⁵ The Home Secretary is responsible for the successful delivery of this guarantee.

10.4 Funding for Olympic safety and security was prioritised within the 2010 Spending Review to ensure the safety of all those participating, watching and visiting the Games. Building on the substantial wider investment in counter-terrorism and policing in the period leading up to the Games, the Government is confident it can deliver its full programme for around £475 million, although if required a £600 million funding envelope is available for additional policing and wider Games security. A further £282m will be made available to London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) to contribute to venue security costs – a substantial investment to ensure that the 2012 Olympics are safe and secure. About £335 million already is being spent by the Olympic Development Authority on security at the Olympic Park and other venues.

Threats to the Games

10.5 Games safety and security threats fall into four categories: terrorism; serious and organised crime; domestic extremism and public disorder; and hazards (such as extreme weather and crowd management).

⁷⁴ HM Government (2011) *Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy*. <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/olympics/olympic-safety-security-strategy>

⁷⁵ Prime Minister's Guarantee to the International Olympic Committee, November 2004.

10.6 Terrorism poses the greatest security threat to the Games. Experience from previous Games and elsewhere indicates that global sporting events provide an attractive and high-profile target for terrorist groups, particularly given the potential for malicious activity to receive enormous international publicity. London 2012 will take place in an unprecedentedly high threat environment. Threat levels can change rapidly but by planning against a threat level of SEVERE we have maximised our flexibility to respond to a range of threats.

10.7 Specific threats to the Games are scrutinised alongside vulnerability and impact factors to help us understand the safety and security risk profile of the Games. Threats to the Games – including the terrorist threat – are regularly assessed in the Olympic Strategic Threat Assessment. This is produced by the Olympic Intelligence Centre, which has cross-agency input and representation and reports to the National Olympic Security Coordinator. It is informed and underpinned by the assessments of existing bodies with specialist expertise, such as Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre for the terrorist threat and Cyber Security Operations Centre for the cyber threat. The principal security risks to the Games are set out in the Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment, which underpins our security planning and is reviewed regularly against available intelligence.

10.8 While our Games security planning is focused on Games sites, infrastructure, participants and spectators, we recognise that any successful attack against the UK during the Games period is likely to be seen as an attack against the Games. Games-specific security planning is therefore dependent on and coordinated with the capabilities developed through the broader CONTEST strategy.

Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy

10.9 The Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy sets objectives and provides a framework for programmes and projects run by

LOCOG, the Olympic Delivery Authority, the police service and all other key delivery agencies.

10.10 The Strategy is risk-based and intelligence-led, and has flexibility to respond to changes between now and 2012. It is modelled on and integrated with CONTEST but covers the full range of safety and security risks to the Games, not just terrorism.

10.11 The five workstreams within the Strategy are:

- **Protect** Olympic and Paralympic venues, events and supporting transport infrastructure, and those attending and using them;
- **Prepare** for events that may significantly disrupt the safety and security of the Games and ensure capabilities are in place to mitigate their impact;
- **Identify and Disrupt** threats to the safety and security of the Games;
- **Command, Control, Plan and Resource** the safety and security operation; and
- **Engage** with international and domestic partners and communities, to enhance our security and ensure the success of our strategy.

10.12 In Autumn 2010 the Government carried out a review of Games Security planning, which concluded that effective plans are in place.

Policing the Games

10.13 Policing the Games is the biggest policing challenge in a generation. On behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers and Metropolitan Police Service, the National Olympic Security Coordinator is responsible for: overseeing planning, development and implementation of policing for the Games; and coordinating operational delivery across partner agencies. At Games time he will work through and be supported by the National Olympic Coordination Centre.

10.14 All police services across the country are making significant changes to deployment patterns to meet the challenge of Games time policing. Enhancements are being made to national police mobilisation processes and complementary work is also underway to ensure the effective integration of officers on mutual aid arrangements (i.e. seconded duty) with host forces. The strategic approach to counter-terrorism and domestic extremism policing for the Games will build on the principles set out in CONTEST.

Assurance

10.15 A significant programme of assurance activity is underway to ensure that the Government's guarantees to deliver a safe and secure Games will be met. This is addressing three areas:

- **Assurance of capability:** will new and existing capabilities be adequate to mitigate the strategic risks to the safety and security of the Games?
- **Assurance of operational plans:** will our operational plans deliver the required operational outcomes?
- **Assurance of Games-wide readiness:** is the delivery of Games safety and security compatible with the broader Games operation?

10.16 A range of review, testing and exercising activities will ensure that we can answer these questions. At the local level, individual processes and capabilities are being assured – for example, we are working with the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure and LOCOG to review venue security issues such as search and screening, and the emergency services are leading local exercises of their operational plans, coupled with scrutiny of these plans by senior representatives of the emergency services. The way in which all these plans and capabilities integrate will be assured through a national testing and exercising programme.

10.17 Independent assurance of safety and security preparations is an important element of our approach. A group of 'critical friends' – senior people with a range of relevant and diverse expertise and background – meets regularly to scrutinise and challenge our plans. Police forces have had their operational plans scrutinised through a series of peer reviews, led by the police co-ordination team with HMIC and the Home Office Olympic and Paralympic Security Directorate. We will continue to use HMIC and similar bodies to provide this independent element of assurance.

Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games

10.18 The UK Government is committed to the successful delivery of the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games. Where appropriate, lessons on safeguarding and securing London 2012 will be factored into planning for Glasgow 2014.

Part Three

Implementation

Summary

11.1 This section describes how we will ensure the accountability of this strategy, implement it effectively and monitor its progress.

11.2 The National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the Prime Minister, will have oversight of CONTEST and take regular reports on its progress. The Home Secretary will continue to be the lead Minister for domestic counter-terrorism work.

11.3 Implementation requires close cooperation and coordination across the UK. We expect Government Departments, agencies and the police to work closely together to a common set of objectives, with transparency and openness. They will be assessed accordingly. We will work closely with the Devolved Administrations. We will seek dialogue with the private sector, voluntary organisations, community groups and the general public. Our success will continue to depend on the quality of our international engagement with our close allies and with multilateral organisations.

11.4 We will continue to invest in a cross-government effort to coordinate science and technology in support of CONTEST. Our forthcoming White Paper will set out how we intend to use investment in defence and security technology and equipment to protect the UK against threats to our national interests, terrorism included.

11.5 The Spending Review 2010 set budgets for each Government Department from 2011/12 – 2014/15. The resources allocated to Government Departments reflected priorities in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). We have allocated funding to maintain and (as we have explained in this strategy) in some cases to increase counter-terrorism capabilities, while still delivering efficiency savings.

11.6 We will assess the progress of CONTEST against a set of performance indicators, complemented by deeper evaluation of specific programmes. Evaluation will be supported by wider research and horizon scanning, vital if we are to remain ahead of new or changed threats and vulnerabilities. We are committed to publishing data where security classification allows. We will publish an annual report on our counter-terrorism work.

Governance

11.7 The NSC will regularly review progress of this strategy, consider specific risks and agree the appropriate response and resources. The Home Secretary is a member of, and is accountable to, the NSC as the lead minister for counter-terrorism. The Home Secretary also has oversight of the Security Service and is accountable for the activities of the police service in England and Wales.

11.8 The CONTEST Board is responsible for developing and monitoring implementation of the strategy. The Board includes officials from key Government Departments, the police, security and intelligence agencies and the Scottish and Welsh Governments to ensure that all those involved in countering terrorism are included in decision making. To ensure effective oversight of the strategy sub-Boards are responsible for *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect* and *Prepare*. There are also separate oversight boards for a range of cross-cutting issues, including the Overseas CONTEST Group (OCG), the Police Counter Terrorism Board and the Internet Strategy Group.

Delivery and partnerships

11.9 Countering terrorism requires an international, national and local response.

International

11.10 Some of the greatest challenges to implementing the CONTEST strategy are overseas, in particular in states such as Yemen where the threat from terrorism is high, but where the Government lacks the institutional capacity to tackle the threat. In other areas, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, the reach and authority of government institutions is very limited. Our approach must use the full range of our diplomatic, development, economic, defence and intelligence efforts to address threats at their source. This effort is coordinated by the cross-government OCG.

11.11 The OCG sets priorities and the allocation of resources based on a rigorous assessment of the risks to the UK and UK interests overseas, as agreed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Resources are matched to those countries where the highest risk emanates from: Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.

11.12 In addition to the work of the OCG, international development efforts led by the Department for International Development (DFID) make an important (if indirect) contribution to counter-terrorism. DFID's work focuses principally on longer term factors, including poverty alleviation,

governance and education which can help increase the resilience of communities to terrorism, and addresses the grievances which may help drive radicalisation or wider support for terrorism. The Ministry of Defence helps build the capacity of other countries' counter-terrorism capabilities, through conflict prevention, peace support operations and specific training requirements.

11.13 The US remains our closest ally on counter-terrorism. Intelligence sharing and collaboration on law enforcement ensures that we are able to make best use of one another's resources to deliver a coordinated response to the threat. But reflecting the shared threat from terrorism, we continue to work very closely with European partners and with many states across Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

11.14 Multilateral organisations, notably the EU and UN, are increasingly important to our counter-terrorism work. They can set frameworks which enable specific counter-terrorism measures (for example in connection with terrorist finance or aviation security). They provide security assistance and advice to third countries. They can govern the exchange of some data between Member States.

11.15 We will work with the EU, across CONTEST workstreams, to ensure a common understanding of the threat. In *Pursue*, we will maintain close operational agency and law enforcement engagement with EU partners. We will also seek to secure favourable outcomes on the data issues which the EU is currently considering. We will share our experience of the *Prevent* strategy to inform the 'EU Strategy and Action Plan to combat Radicalisation and Recruitment' and learn from the experience of European counterparts.

11.16 In *Protect* we are currently supporting an EU proposal to introduce minimum screening standards for inbound air and mail cargo. We continue to work closely with EU Member States on aspects of *Prepare* notably regarding chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive matters.

National

11.17 CONTEST involves 16 Departments of State⁷⁶ the three security and intelligence agencies, the Police Counter Terrorism Network and police forces across the UK. It also depends on the close collaboration with the Devolved Administrations. Their responsibilities in CONTEST are summarised at Annex A.

11.18 The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), in the Home Office has overall responsibility for coordinating the CONTEST strategy. OSCT's primary responsibilities are to:

- Support the Home Secretary and other Ministers in developing, directing and implementing CONTEST across Government;
- Deliver aspects of the counter-terrorism strategy directly e.g. legislation, policing (in England and Wales), UK border and protective security policy;
- Facilitate oversight of the Security Service, its operations and police counter-terrorism operations;
- Coordinate counter-terrorism crisis management;
- Ensure a safe, secure and resilient Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012.

11.19 Tactical coordination of CONTEST is conducted at the Weekly Security Meeting chaired by the Home Secretary with senior representatives from the security and intelligence agencies, the police and key Government Departments. The meeting provides updates on the latest threats to the UK and the international aspects of the terrorist threat from the security and intelligence agencies and the police.

11.20 In the event of a terrorist attack in Great Britain, the Home Office is the lead Government department charged with responding to the

incident (the Foreign & Commonwealth Office leads on overseas incidents). The Home Office works with the Cabinet Office in running the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) to enable the Home Secretary to set the strategic direction of the response and ensure that those responding to the incident have all the necessary support from central government to allow them to effectively manage the incident on the ground. In the case of NIRT attacks in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) is the lead UK Government Department – in these circumstances, the NIO works with the Devolved Administration in Northern Ireland.

11.21 The operational response to a terrorist attack is led by the police, who are operationally independent of Government. Other Government Departments provide wider support as required.

11.22 Whilst counter-terrorism remains a national priority for Government, reforms in other parts of the public sector, and in particular the devolution of power and responsibility from central Government Departments, will shape how some aspects of CONTEST will be delivered in the future. Whereas policy coordination and implementation of the strategy would have taken place through a limited number of Government Offices, Strategic Health Authorities (in England) and regional offender management bodies, the abolition of regional tiers of government will mean that this now takes place at a more local level.

11.23 CONTEST is a UK-wide strategy and counter-terrorism policy is a reserved or an excepted matter (meaning that powers relating to counter-terrorism are retained by the UK Parliament). But many of the local delivery mechanisms, such as the policing and justice in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and health, education and local government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, are devolved. Managing the tension between implementing a reserved/excepted policy with devolved delivery mechanisms requires close cooperation between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations.

⁷⁶ BIS, CO, DfE, DECC, DEFRA, DfID, DfT, DoH, FCO, HMT, HO, MoD, MoJ, Northern Ireland Office, Scotland Office and Wales Office.

- **Pursue** – The Senior National Coordinator Counter Terrorism coordinates all UK counter-terrorism police activity. However, responsibility for policing and justice in Scotland is devolved to the Scottish Government. Responsibility for policing and justice functions is also devolved in Northern Ireland, although the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland remains responsible for national security matters within Northern Ireland.
- **Prevent** – Many *Prevent* programmes are devolved, such as in health and education (and policing and justice in Scotland and Northern Ireland). The Scottish Preventing Violent Extremism Unit is a joint initiative between the Scottish Government and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) whereas the Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU) – a joint initiative between the four police forces in Wales – works with the Welsh Government to implement *Prevent* in Wales.
- **Protect** – Responsibility for protecting crowded places is devolved, which allows the Devolved Administrations to set the approach to security. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure provides security advice together with the network of police Counter Terrorism Security Advisers, who work under the guidance of the police National Counter Terrorism Security Office. Similarly, the delivery of certain essential services is also devolved requiring cooperation to assure the protection of Critical National Infrastructure.
- **Prepare** – The Devolved Administrations are responsible for coordinating wider consequence management within their territories.

Local

11.24 The Government recognises the value of local partnership working between the public, communities and professionals. While counter-terrorism is a national responsibility, local knowledge and links are vital particularly in establishing

relationships between communities and working with the private sector to promote resilience.

11.25 *Prevent* is primarily a local strategy and while the Home Office will retain overall responsibility for the strategy, it will largely be implemented in prisons, colleges, and universities by our partners in the Devolved Administrations, local authorities, the police and community organisations. This local work will be coordinated by a network of local managers, within local authorities and docked with existing safeguarding and crime reduction partnerships. Further detail is contained within the *Prevent Strategy*.⁷⁷

11.26 Close working at the local level is well established in the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) strand of the *Protect* workstream which is delivered through partnerships between UK Government security advisers at the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), infrastructure operators at the local level from both the private and public sectors and local police Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAAs). In *Prepare*, the Government's approach to planning for, responding to, and recovering from, terrorist incidents is built on the principle of subsidiarity, with decisions being taken at the lowest appropriate level and co-ordination at the highest necessary level.

Working with industry

11.27 The private sector plays an important role in counter-terrorism in both implementing and funding protective measures and in science and technology. The principles for Government engagement with industry will be set out in the forthcoming White Paper on Equipment, Support and Technology for UK Defence and Security.

11.28 The Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community (RISC) is the mechanism by which Government communicates with industry about its counter-terrorism science and technology needs. Advising business and industry about the threat and how to respond increases the resilience of the UK to a terrorist attack. Most CNI sites and crowded places are owned by the

⁷⁷ HM Government (2011) *The Prevent Strategy*.

Science and technology in counter-terrorism

Al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups have a track record of using technology to defeat our protective security. Wider access to modern technology is a challenge for our counter-terrorist work. To counter these threats we invest in a cross-government effort to coordinate science and technology in support of CONTEST. This work includes horizon scanning, developing innovative counter-terrorism capabilities with industry and academic support, and ensuring close collaboration on counter-terrorism related science with international partners.

Horizon scanning to identify technology trends and potential new technologies that could change the balance between threat and response is essential. This is a shared responsibility across UK departments. Through shared horizon scanning we seek to stay one step ahead of the terrorists who are trying to attack us.

We share our counter-terrorism science and technology requirements with industry and academia and work closely with them to develop new counter-terrorism capabilities, exploiting both the physical and social sciences. Since 2009 we have invested in science and technology in aviation and transport security, CBRNE detection capabilities, behavioural aspects of terrorist activity, data exploitation and provision of improved equipment to emergency responders. OSCT also works with industry and academia to lead the INSTINCT programme which encourages innovation in the security market.

The White Paper on Technology, Equipment, and Support for UK Defence and Security (due for publication in 2011) will set out how the Government intends to use investment in defence and security technology and equipment to protect the UK against threats to our national interest, including those from terrorism.

International collaboration is essential to our science and technology effort and we exchange research and burden-share the counter-terrorism challenges with many international partners. We enjoy extensive engagement with the US and EU, but we also have bilateral and multi-lateral engagements with a wide variety of like minded international partners.

Working across Government is a key feature of CONTEST science and technology. In addition to the CONTEST Science and Technology Board, a new science and technology sub-committee to the NSC, chaired by the Government's Chief Scientific Advisor, brings together Departments that have responsibility for science and technology in support of national security.

private sector and responsibility for security at those sites falls to the owner/operator.

Funding

11.29 The Spending Review 2010 announced by the Government on 20 Oct 2010 set the budgets for each department from 2011/12 – 2014/15. The resources allocated to departments reflected the assessment of priorities in the SDSR. The prioritisation of terrorism as a Tier One risk in the National Security Risk Assessment meant that

the decision was taken in the SDSR to maintain counter-terrorism capabilities, while still delivering efficiency gains, in spite of the need to reduce government spending in other areas.

11.30 There will continue to be specific funding for counter-terrorism policing. The budget for counter-terrorism policing in England and Wales will exceed £560m per annum for the next four years. The Home Office has worked closely with the police to identify areas for savings whilst

ensuring that core capabilities are maintained. Efficiency savings will be achieved by greater prioritisation of policing efforts, the reorganisation of headquarters and wider police reform. The police have already been able to drive significant savings which has enabled them to fund priority workstreams such as the recent uplift in police firearms capability without requiring additional funding. The police are currently undertaking work to identify further areas for savings in the Police Counter Terrorism Network.

11.31 Extra funding has been provided to deliver a safe and secure Olympic Games in 2012. The Government is confident it can deliver the full programme for additional policing and wider Games security for around £475 million, although if required a £600 million funding envelope is available. The majority of this money will be made available to the police for their work on safety and security.

11.32 Intervening early to address threats when they are at an early stage is a more effective way of tackling them than waiting until they have developed fully and require more costly interventions. We are therefore investing in our capability to tackle terrorist threats upstream while they are developing in unstable areas of the world, rather than after they have reached our shores. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) will increase to 0.7% of Gross National Income by 2013. 30% of this will be used to support fragile and conflict affected states, thus contributing to poverty reduction and UK national security.

11.33 In some areas it will be necessary to sustain investment in order to maintain our counter-terrorism and law enforcement capabilities to keep the public safe. As set out in the *Pursue* chapter we will fund a programme to maintain our communications data and interception capabilities and legislate to put necessary regulations and safeguards in place. Protective security measures at oil, gas and civil nuclear sites will continue to be kept under close review and upgraded as necessary. Preparedness for a terrorist attack using unconventional materials will also improve.

11.34 The Government will continue to support the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland. For example, the Government has recently guaranteed an additional £200m to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to ensure that it is equipped to tackle the threat posed by terrorists in Northern Ireland.

11.35 This public expenditure is supplemented by considerable private sector expenditure, particularly by owners and operators of national infrastructure. For those sectors subject to economic regulation we work closely with the regulators to facilitate proportionate expenditure and ensure it is incurred efficiently.

Planning and performance

Business plans

11.36 Government Departments set out their CONTEST commitments in their business plans.⁷⁸ Reflecting the Government's commitment to greater transparency, these business plans are updated and published annually: business plans for 2012/13 will include commitments made in this strategy.

11.37 The Home Office, as lead Government Department for countering terrorism, includes commitments to 'protect the public from terrorism' and 'protect people's freedoms and civil liberties' in its 2011/12 business plan.⁷⁹ Under these commitments there are nine counter-terrorism actions with milestones setting out publicly what the Government aims to achieve by when. Every month the Home Office publishes a progress report⁸⁰ on our progress towards

⁷⁸ HM Government (2010) *Departmental Business Plans* <http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/transparency/srp/>

⁷⁹ *The Home Office Business Plan (2011-2015)* sets out in detail the reforms that the Government is undertaking. They are designed to make the Government more accountable for putting policies into practice, giving members of the public a greater level of detail on the work of Government. The Home Office Business plan is available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/corporate-publications/business-plan-2011-15-november/>

⁸⁰ HM Government (2010) *Home Office Structural Reform Plan* <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/corporate-publications/structural-reform-plan/>

Counter-terrorism policing

Counter-terrorism policing in England and Wales is delivered through the Police Counter Terrorism Network. The network, which consists of four Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) and four smaller Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs), was established to complement the work of local force Special Branches and the London-based Counter Terrorism Command – it links frontline police officers with regional counter-terrorism hubs and thereby national counter-terrorism policing. The Police Counter Terrorism Network and Special Branches have close and effective working relationships with the Security Service which is the result of joint working and joint intelligence assessments. In Scotland, the ACPOS Coordinator Counter Terrorism coordinates all police counter-terrorism related duties to ensure that Scottish Police counter-terrorism capability is effective and remains an integral part of the UK Police CT Network. Coordination is delivered by CTIU (Scotland), which is broadly similar in capability to CTIUs in England and Wales.

Counter-terrorism policing contributes to all four workstreams of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST by:

- **Pursue:** identifying and disrupting terrorist activity;
- **Prevent:** working with communities and local authorities to identify and divert those involved in or vulnerable to radicalisation;
- **Protect:** policing the UK border, Critical National Infrastructure, civil nuclear sites, transport systems and the public; and
- **Prepare:** leading the immediate response after or during a terrorist attack, including responding to CBRNE incidents.

Counter-terrorism policing requires oversight because of the large budget and significant police powers. The Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament for the provision and funding of counter-terrorism policing in England and Wales, and is responsible for setting strategic priorities. Currently, each police force is accountable to their local Police Authority for the delivery of an effective and efficient service. From May 2012, it is the Government's intention that Police Authorities will be replaced by new locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales.

Given the unprecedented budget deficit, it is vital that all public resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible. Following an HMIC Value for Money inspection of counter-terrorism policing in 2010, ACPO's Terrorism and Allied Matters business area is working to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the Network to enable the best use of resources to meet current and future demands. The police are currently undertaking a detailed piece of work to drive value for money by sharing best practice across the Police Counter Terrorism Network.

The Government has also announced the National Crime Agency will be established in 2013 to strengthen the operational response to organised crime and better secure the border through more effective national tasking and enforcement action. The Government is clear that counter-terrorism policing already has effective national structures, and is considering how to ensure these strengths are maintained and enhanced alongside its new approach to fighting crime. Any review of the current counter-terrorism policing structures will be undertaken after the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games and the establishment of the NCA.

As outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, the Government is committed to exploring opportunities for collaboration between organised crime policing and counter-terrorism policing in order to ensure both threats are policed as effectively and efficiently as possible, without diluting the focus or impact of either.

meeting these actions so that the public are able to judge how successfully we are achieving our goals.

Assessing performance

11.38 CONTEST will rightly be judged by its impact on the risk to the UK and UK interests from terrorism. But assessing the direct impact of our programmes is challenging; the threat from terrorism and the UK's vulnerability to this threat are difficult to quantify; and they are influenced by a wide range of factors which cannot always be identified and over which we do not always have control.

11.39 But we intend to develop a more effective and better-targeted performance assessment and evaluation programme. Over the lifetime of the strategy, this programme will help us to understand what is working and to give the public greater oversight of our work to implement the strategy.

11.40 The programme will rely on a small number of performance indicators (page 117) supported by the evaluation of selected CONTEST programmes.

Assessing progress

11.41 As well as assessing the overall performance of CONTEST against objectives, we also monitor progress in delivering key improvement activity that will help to support delivery of our overall objectives. Every workstream of CONTEST has a set of priority deliverables – key commitments in the strategy against which progress is monitored on a quarterly basis by the relevant sub-Board and CONTEST Board.

Assessing value for money (VfM)

11.42 VfM is the method used across Government to assess activities based on the outcomes they achieve in relation to their cost. VfM is about achieving as much as we can with the resources available to us. In CONTEST, the strategic risk model ensures we are able to match resources to the areas of greatest priority.

11.43 CONTEST, programme boards agree on priority deliverables, ensure the adequate allocation of resources and hold departments to account for delivering on key priority areas. These boards regularly receive reports on implementation, including an assessment of the financial health of our key improvement activities.

Measuring our Impact

In line with the Government's Public Services Transparency Framework,⁸¹ indicators will be based where possible on data which is already collected and valued by contributing organisations.

Indicators will not be the sole criteria by which performance will be judged. In order to be meaningful, they will need to be accompanied by an explanation of the wider context and what the data is showing. We intend to use indicators covering the following:

Pursue

- *Intelligence coverage of priority operations*
- *Disruption of terrorist activity*
- *Proportion of terrorism-related arrests which lead to prosecutions and convictions; and the number of terrorism-related deportations*

Prevent

- *Public support in the UK and overseas for terrorism*
- *Proportion of the 25 priority local areas in which implementation of the Prevent programme is on track*
- *The numbers participating in Prevent programmes to support vulnerable people, and the proportion assessed to be at lower risk of supporting or engaging in terrorism-related activity after completing the programme*
- *Popularity of terrorism-related websites and the impact of our work to disrupt terrorist content*
- *Radicalisation in prisons*

Protect

- *Counter-terrorism watchlist alerts actioned at the UK border*
- *No-fly alerts actioned*
- *Vulnerability of the UK's infrastructure, transport systems and crowded places to terrorist attack*

Prepare

- *Generic resilience capabilities*
- *Preparedness for highest impact risks*
- *Ability of emergency services to work together effectively in responding to terrorist attack and natural crisis*

These indicators are illustrative. Others may be developed and the indicator set is likely to be revised over the lifetime of the strategy.

In parallel, we will commission a small number of stand-alone evaluations of key programmes. We will prioritise for evaluation the programmes which we judge to be most important to achieving our mission and which attract the greatest investment.

⁸¹ The PSTF is an internal Government document which sets guidance for departments on how to assess performance and value for money of policy objectives.

Conclusion

Conclusion

International counter-terrorism work since 9/11 has made considerable progress in reducing the threats we face. Al Qa'ida is now significantly weaker than it has been for ten years. There are significant opportunities for us and our allies to make further progress in the next few months and years. Seizing these opportunities will be vital to our security.

But we recognise that the overall terrorist threat we face continues to be significant. The security and intelligence agencies and the police continue to disrupt terrorist related activity in the UK. The numbers of people arrested and then convicted for terrorist offences remains high.

The continued threat is reflected through this strategy. We are determined to maintain the capabilities we need to meet our aim – to reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

But we are determined to have a strategy that is not only more effective but also more proportionate, that is better focused and more precise, which uses powers selectively, carefully and in a way that is as sparing as possible. These themes and this language also runs through this strategy – in *Pursue*, *Prevent* and in *Protect* and *Prepare* – and are reflected in its founding principles.

Annex A: Departmental Roles and Responsibilities in CONTEST

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Cabinet Office: supports the National Security Council and the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) oversees the Single Intelligence Account and also services the Joint Intelligence Committee, which sets strategic intelligence gathering priorities and delivers strategic intelligence assessments. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office leads cross-Government work on many aspects of *Prepare*.

Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI): provides integrated protective security advice (covering physical, personnel and cyber security) to businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure aimed at reducing vulnerability to terrorism and other threats.

Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): the Government Department responsible for prosecuting criminal cases investigated by the police in England and Wales.

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS): In connection with CONTEST provides guidance and support to higher and further education sectors on tackling violent extremism.

Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG): sets policy on supporting local government, communities and neighbourhoods; regeneration; housing; planning, building and the environment; and fire. As part of

its work on the Big Society, DCLG is developing a new approach to integration.

Department for Education (DfE): has responsibility for ensuring that young people are protected from exposure to extremism and extremist views in or outside schools.

The Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC): contributes to the *Protect* and *Prepare* strands of CONTEST as lead Government Department for energy. DECC is responsible for ensuring the security of the nation's energy supplies (electricity, gas, and oil) and civil nuclear sites from all risks, including malicious attack. The Department's work also includes contributing to the UK's policy on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation issues; sponsoring the Civil Nuclear Police Authority and Civil Nuclear Constabulary; and managing the nuclear and radiological elements of the UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA): responsible for dealing with the impact of a terrorist incident on the natural environment, plant and animal health, food and drinking water supplies, waste management (excluding radioactive waste), farming, fisheries and rural communities. DEFRA has lead Government Department responsibility for the recovery phase of a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incident.

Department for International Development (DFID): manages Britain's aid to developing countries. DFID uses its resources for the purpose of poverty reduction overseas. Its activities can contribute to CONTEST by addressing underlying social and economic issues, helping governments in key countries to improve governance and security, economic stability and employment opportunities, and access to basic services.

Department for Transport (DfT): the security regulator of most of the transport sector including aviation, maritime and rail. It aims, to protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those employed in the transport industry from acts of terrorism.

Department of Health (DH): oversees the health sector's commitment and contribution to CONTEST. The sector's key priorities include improving, protecting and maintaining the health of the population by ensuring the country's ability to respond to and cope with threat-derived mass casualty emergencies, including catastrophic acts of terrorism (CBRN). Its activities contribute to the crowded places and hazardous substances work; and with Health designated one of the nine national infrastructure sectors, it also contributes to the UK's Critical National Infrastructure programme.

Devolved Administrations: responsible in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales for the functions which have been devolved to them according to their different devolution settlements. All three Devolved Administrations are responsible for health, education and local government. Policing and justice are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): has overall responsibility for coordinating the delivery of CONTEST overseas, and chairs the cross-Government Overseas CONTEST Group (OCG).

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ): has two important missions, Signals Intelligence (known as SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA). SIGINT work provides vital information to support Government policy-

making and operations in the fields of national security, military operations, law enforcement and economic well being. Information Assurance is about protecting Government data – communications and information systems – from hackers and other threats.

Government Office for Science (GO-Science): headed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser; is responsible for ensuring that all levels of government, including the Prime Minister and Cabinet, receive the best scientific advice possible. GO-Science is engaged across CONTEST to ensure it is underpinned by robust science, including peer review.

HM Treasury: leads on asset freezing and is the joint lead with OSCT on terrorist financing. In 2007, HM Treasury set up a dedicated Asset Freezing Unit to handle counter-terrorist and other asset-freezing work. HM Treasury's Financial Crime Team, with OSCT, coordinates the delivery of our strategy for tackling terrorist finance.

Home Office: the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), has overall responsibility for coordinating the CONTEST strategy. OSCT's primary responsibilities are to: support the Home Secretary and other Ministers in developing, directing and implementing CONTEST across Government; deliver aspects of the counter-terrorism strategy directly e.g. legislation, policing (in England and Wales), UK border, protective security policy; facilitate oversight of the Security Service, its operations and police counter-terrorism operations; co-ordinate counter-terrorism crisis management; and ensure a safe, secure and resilient Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012.

Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC): the UK's centre for the all-source analysis and assessment of international terrorism. JTAC sets threat levels and issues analytical reporting to Government Departments and agencies.

Ministry of Defence (MOD): contributes to CONTEST using its military capability. It supports *Pursue* through its capability to disrupt terrorist groups overseas, as well as through intelligence

collection counter-terrorism capacity building for partner nations, and support to overseas law enforcement and security agencies. Its support to conflict prevention work also contributes to CONTEST objectives. In the event of a terrorist attack that exceeds the capability or immediate capacity of the UK civilian response, the MOD can provide support to *Prepare* through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities.

Ministry of Justice (MoJ): responsible for ensuring there is sufficient capacity in the criminal justice system to deal with terrorism cases, and that they are dealt with efficiently, effectively and securely. The National Offender Management Service (an agency of the MoJ) manages the risks posed by terrorist offenders, in partnership with the police and security and intelligence agencies. The Youth Justice Board is a Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) which is sponsored by the MoJ and is responsible for delivering a range of prevention programmes designed to support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists. (Plans for the abolition of the YJB have been announced and, subject to legislation, it is anticipated that key youth justice functions will be absorbed into the MoJ with effect from 1 April 2012).

National Security Council (NSC): brings together key Ministers, and military and intelligence chiefs, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The NSC ensures a strategic and coordinated approach across the whole of government to national security issues.

The National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO): is a police unit co-located with CPNI. NaCTSO's work is divided into three areas: protection of crowded places; protection of hazardous sites and dangerous substances; and assisting the CPNI to protect the Critical National Infrastructure.

Northern Ireland Office (NIO): is the Government Department that supports the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Police: the police service is responsible for disrupting or responding to terrorist incidents in the UK.

Scotland Office: is the Government Department that supports the Secretary of State for Scotland.

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS): collects intelligence overseas to promote and defend the national security and the economic well-being of the UK. It supports Security Service work in the UK.

Security Service: is responsible for protecting the United Kingdom against threats to national security. Notably terrorism (where it leads the investigation of terrorism in the UK), espionage and sabotage, the activities of agents of foreign powers, and actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.

UK Border Agency (UKBA): An agency of the Home Office. The UK Border Agency is responsible for securing the UK border and controlling migration in the UK.

Wales Office: is the Government Department that supports the Secretary of State for Wales.

