



THE VIGILANCE PROJECT:

**An Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases
Against the Homeland**

New York State Intelligence Center – December 2010

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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Preface

As we move closer to the tenth anniversary of 9/11, the need to enhance awareness of previous terrorist plots, to understand commonalities between actors and opportunities for law enforcement intervention is more important than ever. All of the successful counter-terrorism programs, training and outreach developed since the 9/11 tragedy depend on our collective efforts to identify pre-operational activities of a terrorist event. Echoed by many local, state and federal law enforcement executives, the opportunity for local police officers to discover and interdict possible terrorism activity is significant, regardless of whether the setting is rural, suburban or urban. Displacement of terrorist's pre-operational activities to locations outside target areas has been evident through our most recent cases involving Najibullah Zazi and Faisal Shahzad. These opportunities may be woefully underestimated or misunderstood by our police officers on the beat or in the patrol cars. In an effort to bring these opportunities to light we have developed the Vigilance Project.

As a living document, the Vigilance Project will update new terrorism events or plots within the Homeland and will also continue to add new categories of plotter's activities and backgrounds to provide the most comprehensive view of overall trends or specific intelligence that may assist local law enforcement. This first phase of the Vigilance Project offers a glimpse of just a few of the anticipated categories of analysis that may help keep our officers more aware, safer and certainly engaged in the fight against terrorism.

This project does not suggest law enforcement actions to be taken to combat terrorism. Rather, it is offered as a tool for agencies to utilize in support of their continuing efforts to deter, detect and report potential terrorist activity.

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Executive Summary

The Vigilance Project is a comprehensive, analytic report that examines major terrorism cases that have taken place against the Homeland since September 11, 2001. The report serves as a historical compilation of acts or attempted acts of terrorism against the United States, or its interests, and as a tool to identify trends and commonalities among the cases and the subjects involved. It is recognized that the threat environment is dynamic and potential threats are not limited to the findings contained in this report

As the title suggests, it is the duty of every citizen to remain vigilant in the face of terrorism. The findings of this report allow readers to gain an understanding of terrorism participants, their tactics and procedures, and become aware of similarities among the cases, in order to draw useful conclusions. The ultimate goal of the Vigilance Project is to provide useful information to law enforcement partners to support their role in preventing the next attack.

Key Findings

- **There is no definitive terrorist profile.** However, we were able to identify trends in basic pedigree information to suggest that these individuals are largely young males, between the ages of 18-33, who explicitly support or follow radical Islamic ideology.
- **The threat of ‘homegrown’ terrorism is real.** Over half of the individuals studied in this report were legal United States citizens at the time of their arrest, with 70% of them natural-born citizens.
- **U.S. Transportation systems and military facilities remain high-value targets.** Transportation systems and military facilities were the most frequently targeted in the cases analyzed in this report, accounting for two-thirds of all identified targets.
- **The use of explosives was the most common tactic in Homeland-based plots.** The most popular method of delivery for an explosive was a vehicle-borne

improvised explosive device (VBIED). Furthermore, plotters who trained overseas in a specific tactic tended to incorporate those skills into the operational planning, specifically when trained in explosives.

- **Groups likely form easily when members live in the same community.** Research shows four cases where members of the same group were born or resided in the same area during the time of their arrest or involvement in plotting their attack. This is probable since people with similar backgrounds, interests, and social circles are more likely to form common groups.
- **Post 9/11, New York State remains the primary target for terrorists.** One third of the cases represented in this report involved either a terrorist attack within New York State, or a terrorist cell based there.

This report is a first step in a continuing effort to identify and analyze commonalities among U.S.-based cases. Since the threat of acts of terrorism against our Homeland will likely continue—particularly terrorist plots targeting New York State—the collection and analysis of terrorism information that assists law enforcement and homeland security partners in preventing future attacks will be an ongoing effort at the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC).

Scope

This first iteration of the Vigilance Project reviews thirty-two terrorism cases investigated post 9/11 that resulted in federal terrorism charges and arrests. Ninety individuals were associated with these cases, which comprise twenty-one thwarted attacks, six significant groups or cells, three failed bombing attempts and two successful attacks. All but one case involve individuals who expressed support for radical Islamic ideology, or had affiliations with foreign terrorist organizations and key terrorist figures. Additionally, most cases demonstrate the subjects' willingness or actual participation in pre-operational activities—such as explosives and weapons training, surveillance and overseas travel—in order to advance their plots and increase the likelihood of success.

Methodology

NYSIC staff conducted a thorough review of both open source and law enforcement material and identified approximately twenty-five variables for analysis. These variables represent the most common areas of interest for counter-terrorism case study

Variables for Analysis	
▪ Birth name	▪ Affiliations
▪ Aliases	▪ Interests
▪ Place of Birth (POB)	▪ Special Skills
▪ Residence	▪ Criminal background
▪ Date of Birth (DOB)	▪ Primary Type of Attack (Tactics)
▪ Age (Time of Plot)	▪ Target
▪ Citizenship	▪ Motive
▪ Education Level	▪ Role in Plot
▪ Family Status	▪ Overseas Travel
▪ Employment	▪ Known Overseas Travel for Terrorist
▪ Religion	▪ Plotting, Training and Funding
▪ Where Radicalized	▪ Use of IT/Internet
▪ Radicalized Influence	▪ Additional Significant Information

analysis. The Vigilance Project Supplement is a complete Law Enforcement Sensitive compilation of these variables for each of the ninety individuals analyzed in this report. A hyperlink to this document is located on page 22.

The variables selected for analysis best capture potential indicators of terrorist activity. For each variable, broad categories were assigned to organize and manage the data. For example, specific arrests are found under “Criminal Background” and pedigree information is found under “Demographics.” Summary statistics for each of the variables then provided the basis for analysis. Due to the relatively small number of cases, formal statistical modeling was not conducted. Furthermore, due to the volume of data and

varying degrees of relevance, a written analysis of all twenty-five variables originally considered for this paper is not included. Instead, we concentrated on information most likely to be useful for our law enforcement partners. The variables selected for analysis in this report are: demographics of individuals (e.g. age, citizenship and criminal history), plot targets and tactics. Additional variables will continue to be researched and the results contained in future reports.

The thirty-two cases are listed chronologically below.

Cases

- December 2001: “Shoe Bomber” Bombing Attempt
- May 2002: Jose Padilla, Dirty Bomb Plot
- August 2002: Columbus Shopping Mall Plot
- September 2002: The Lackawanna Cell
- May 2003: Brooklyn Bridge Plot
- June 2003: Virginia Jihad Cell
- August 2004: Financial Centers Plot
- August 2004: The Herald Square Plot
- August 2004: Albany Assassination Plot
- June 2005: Lodi, CA Cell
- August 2005: JIS Plot
- December 2005: Pipeline Plot
- February 2006: Toledo Cell
- April 2006: Atlanta Cell
- April 2006: PATH Tunnels Plot
- May 2006: Sears Tower Plot
- August 2006: Liquid Explosives Airliner Plot
- December 2006: The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot
- May 2007: Fort Dix Plot
- June 2007: JFK Plot
- August 2007: Goose Creek, South Carolina Traffic Stop
- January 2009: Long Island Railroad Plot
- May 2009: Bronx Synagogue & Newburgh Air Base Plot
- June 2009: Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting
- July 2009: Quantico Marine Base Plot
- September 2009: Denver/NYC Plot
- September 2009: Foundation Place Dallas Plot
- September 2009: Illinois Courthouse Plot
- November 2009: Fort Hood Shooting
- October 2009: Massachusetts Shopping Mall Plot
- December 2009: Christmas Day Bombing Attempt
- May 2010: Times Square Car Bombing Attempt

Analysis: Demographic Information

NYSIC staff collected and analyzed demographic information on the ninety individuals in this report including: age, place of birth, citizenship, level of education, and criminal background. Determining a typical profile of these individuals is a highly contested area of analysis in terrorism studies. Although it is difficult to paint a single portrait of individuals involved in such acts, having a baseline understanding of pedigree information is valuable. Moreover, debunking preconceptions and stereotypes of these individuals may be just as important as establishing a definitive trend toward a particular profile.

Age

This variable represents the age of the subjects at the time of their arrest for their involvement in terrorist planning and operations. Overwhelmingly, these individuals were young, with 82% falling between the ages of 18 and 33. This may suggest that younger persons are less established, more impressionable, and therefore more susceptible to radicalization. The Lackawanna Cell is a perfect example of how a group of young Muslim-American men, inspired by the global jihad phenomenon, became involved in terrorism. The men, after meeting with influential jihadists, became radicalized and eventually traveled to Afghanistan to engage in terrorist training. However, six members of the group left the al-Farooq training early and returned home instead of furthering their activities abroad. One remains overseas to date. This case clearly demonstrates how individuals can be influenced to engage in behavior where there was no previous indication that radicalization had occurred.

On the other end of the age scale, four of the ninety individuals were 50 years or older. Interestingly, they are four members of a single plot, the 2007 JFK Plot. Therefore, although the data depict the majority of these individuals as younger males, it is important to note that not all of these individuals come from a youthful demographic. A complete breakdown by age group is shown in the chart below.


Age 18-33 (82%)		Age 34-49 (13%)		Age 50 or older (4%)	
10%	18-21	4%	34-37	0%	50-53
32%	22-25	3%	38-41	1%	54-57
23%	26-29	2%	42-45	2%	58-61
17%	30-33	3%	46-49	1%	62-65

Place of Birth / Country of Citizenship

In order to differentiate “homegrown” terrorists from foreign actors, NYSIC staff analyzed the place of birth and country of citizenship variables. Although these pieces of identifying information can be sensitive in nature, law enforcement personnel can benefit greatly from having a baseline understanding of these individuals’ origins and legal statuses. When looking at certain diaspora communities and evaluating the need for building strong relationships and cultivating sources of information, it is valuable to know which communities may have an inherent vulnerability to terrorist exploitation (e.g. material support).

As current media reporting suggests, the “homegrown terrorism” threat is a growing problem and is illustrated by many cases in this report. NYSIC staff determined through open sources that fifty of the eighty-eight individuals were United States citizens at the time of their arrest; most of these statuses were confirmed by law enforcement sources. Of the fifty U.S. citizens, thirty-five were born in the United States, ten were naturalized, two obtained derived¹ U.S. citizenship, and one individual held dual U.S. and Jordanian citizenships. The remaining two individuals are U.S. citizens, but official checks could not ascertain how citizenship was obtained (see figure below).

¹ Derived citizenship is obtained when one or both parents are naturalized prior to a child’s 18th birthday, if legally present in the U.S.



The place of birth for thirty-one of the thirty-five individuals born in the United States was confirmed by official sources. The birth states varied among the individuals; however, most natural-born citizens were born in New York (11), California (8) and Florida (4). Many members of the same group or plot were born in the same state. For example, four out of the six members of the Lackawanna Cell are New York natives, and three of them were born in Buffalo. Similarly, four of the five natural-born U.S. citizens involved in the 2006 Sears Tower Plot were born in Florida. In the 2005 JIS (LAX) Plot, three out of the four members were natives of California. It is apparent that cells form more easily when members live in the same community, since they are attending the same schools, and are patrons of local businesses or places of worship.

The legal statuses of the eleven individuals from the remaining forty were identified: eight were U.S. legal permanent residents, two were legal U.S. immigrants, and one, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (2009 Christmas Day Bombing Attempt), possessed a valid U.S. visa. Analysis shows approximately two-thirds of the individuals in these cases were legally in the United States during the planning and pre-operational phases of the attacks. Furthermore, the most recent cases emphasize the continued threat posed by American citizens willing to conduct attacks against the United States and its interests. In the 11 cases that took place in 2009 and mid 2010, seventeen of the

nineteen defendants were legally in the United States at the time of their arrests, and ten are natural-born United States citizens. Based on this information, it is likely that the “homegrown” threat will remain a considerable challenge to our law enforcement partners in the future.

Education Level

NYSIC staff was able to determine the education levels of approximately three-quarters of the individuals and concluded that many of them are well-educated. According to the data, forty-two subjects (61%) attended some college, twenty-three completed a bachelor’s degree, three obtained a doctoral degree and the remaining individuals were still enrolled in a degree program. Twenty-seven (39%) had no more than a middle school or high school education.

NYSIC staff also identified the college majors studied by twenty-eight of the individuals who attended some college. Overwhelmingly, engineering was the most common area of study, which accounted for eighteen (64%) of the known majors. The individuals’ college education could not be definitively linked to their roles in the plots, and no positive recruitment factors were identified. However, similar to the age variable, one could argue that individuals attending college are impressionable, curious, eager and possess unique skills, making them highly attractive recruits. Supporting this notion, twenty-one of the thirty-two cases have at least one member of the cell with some level of undergraduate education.


The Virginia Jihad cell is an interesting case for analyzing education level. While most cases have at least one member with some type of college education, this case has an overwhelming number of individuals with college educations. Ten of 13 individuals in the cell have post-high school education (77%). One cell member has some undergraduate education, five have bachelor’s degrees, three have some graduate-level education and another has a doctoral degree.

Criminal Background

Criminal background information, from both law enforcement and open sources, was gathered and analyzed to determine if the subjects had prior contact with law enforcement and whether such contact may have contributed to detecting these terrorist plots. Therefore, the arrest data coded in this report represent incidents that occurred *prior* to arrests related to terrorism offenses. The data do not reflect any final disposition of the prior criminal arrests, nor does it include contacts from routine vehicle traffic stops resulting in minor charges (i.e. speeding tickets) unless this information was reported in open sources.

After reviewing the data described above, we identified twelve categories of criminal offenses including drug and weapons charges, assault/battery and robbery. The criminal activity categories chosen reflect the most common types of charges; the “unknown” category represents the 13 individuals whose prior contact with police could not be determined based on the resources available. Therefore, criminal histories of only 77 individuals were analyzed. The total number of charges (111) exceeds the number of individuals (77) because many individuals had repeated contact with law enforcement, and each contact was counted separately.


The most common offense was the possession or sale of illegal drugs. There were a total of thirty-seven charges, all but one involving marijuana. Assault or battery (17 charges) and weapons possession (12 charges) constitute the more serious offenses. Five of the individuals charged with drug offenses have also been charged with weapons offenses, albeit on separate occasions. Forty-three of the 77 individuals (56%) arrested for terrorism crimes did not have any known prior contact with law enforcement. (See figure below).



In summary, just under half (44%) of the individuals involved in these cases had contact with law enforcement prior to their participation in an attempted terrorism plot or planned attack on the United States. Assuming that criminal history information about these individuals is placed in appropriate law enforcement databases, each instance of contact with local law enforcement officers represents a possible opportunity for them to detect and deter an attack. It can also provide an opportunity to identify associates and links to foreign entities through subsequent investigation. As such, law enforcement can play a critical role in the counter-terrorism arena while performing routine duties.

Analysis: Targets

NYSIC staff analyzed target selection to determine the most commonly chosen location or asset type, and to possibly provide insight into why groups select certain assets. To present the most accurate count of targets, we separated the cases between plots which had clear or concrete targets, and cells, where members either had not yet chosen a target or where target selection was unclear. The three failed bombing attempts, 2001 "Shoe Bomber," 2009 Christmas Day and 2010 Times Square, and the two successful attacks, 2009 Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting, and the 2009 Ft. Hood Shooting were also included, since locations were actually attacked. As such, we analyzed twenty-six cases and grouped targets into five main categories: Transportation, Military/U.S. Government, Financial/Economic, Energy, and Religious Institutions. There were a total of thirty-two targets, as five of the twenty-six cases targeted more than one location.



The most frequently targeted sectors were Transportation and Military/U.S. Government, which together, accounted for two-thirds of all identified targets in this analysis. Ten cases targeted the transportation sector: five specifically targeted an airliner or an airport, four targeted subways or railways and one targeted the Brooklyn

Bridge. With the exception of airline travel, transportation systems fall into the classification of a “soft target” due to their ease of access, high concentrations of people, and the inherent security challenges of hardening such substantial systems. These vulnerabilities are in part why transportation systems remain one of the most highly attractive terrorist targets.

While terrorists often target “soft” locations, they still consider attacking hardened targets. In fact, the largest category was Military/U.S. Government, accounting for 37% of case targets. Interestingly, seven of the eleven targets in this category were against military bases. Military bases are a classic example of a hardened target with seemingly stringent security protocols, yet the 2007 Fort Dix case exposes the vulnerabilities of these locations.

The Fort Dix case highlights the notion that individuals may choose a target based on their familiarity with the community in which they live. For example, four of the six individuals in this case were family members, business partners and natives of Cherry Hill, NJ, a township located approximately thirty miles southwest of the Fort Dix military base. All six subjects lived in New Jersey during the planning and pre-operational phase. One cell member’s family owned a local pizzeria, which served as a “safe haven” to plan their attack. The pizzeria, which frequently delivered to the base, was located just outside of Fort Dix. Serdar Tatar, son of the pizzeria owner and the most radical of the group, claimed to know the base “like the back of his hand” due to years of delivering pizzas there. As such, he was able to provide a map of the base’s layout to the other cell members for logistical and planning purposes. Court documents state the group had conducted surveillance on other targets, but ultimately settled on Fort Dix.

The Financial / Economic sector was targeted eight times. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center towers was intended as a symbolic strike on the financial center of the world with a goal of producing global economic instability, particularly in the United States.

The 2004 Financial Center Plot is an example of the continuing desire of terrorists to strike a blow at U.S. economy and global financial stability. Dhiren Barot, the main conspirator in this case, was arrested by British authorities in August 2004. Barot and conspirators were planning to use VBIEDs to attack the New York Stock Exchange and Citigroup Center in New York City; the International Monetary Fund World


Headquarters and World Bank in Washington, D.C.; and the Prudential Plaza in Newark, New Jersey. Barot intended to kill as many Americans as possible and hoped to further Osama bin Laden's goal of "bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy."

As terrorists have historically chosen their targets based on symbolism, convenience, familiarity of the target, or perceived importance to Americans, awareness of target selection may assist local jurisdictions in better understanding critical infrastructure and key resource vulnerability, and offer suggestions to prioritize the protection of critical infrastructure in their areas.

Analysis: Tactics


NYSIC staff analyzed the twenty-six cases with identified tactics to determine the preferred method of attack, why individuals chose a certain tactic, and what tactics may be used against a particular target. The analysis shows a strong preference toward the use of explosives, followed by small arms. Improvised chemical explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and gas-based explosives were the most prevalent types of explosives used. The most popular method of delivery for an explosive was a VBIED. Not surprisingly, plotters who trained overseas in a specific tactic tended to incorporate those skills into their operational planning, specifically when trained in explosives. The use of small arms tends to be used by those not skilled in explosives and with little resources.

The tactics were organized into four main categories: explosive, small arms, other, and unspecified (see graph below). Three of the twenty-six cases involved more than one tactic, thus 30 tactics were analyzed. Some cases involved cells that had not defined a tactical method and were thus excluded from the analysis.



Explosive Devices

Eight plots involved the use of an improvised chemical explosive or a gas-based explosive, such as propane or acetylene. The plotters also planned to use ammonium nitrate, radiological materials, grenades and C-4 plastic explosives. In seven cases the specific explosive type was not specified in open sources, and was thus excluded from the graph below.



Based on the collected data, terrorist plotters in the Homeland may prefer to construct explosives devices from material that is readily available and acquired without much scrutiny. Components of such explosives are available in many retail shops, including beauty supply or hardware stores.

Improvised chemical explosive


All three cases targeting commercial aircraft involved the use of this type of explosive: the 2001 “Shoe Bomber” Attempt, the 2006 Liquid Explosives Plot, and the 2009 Christmas Day Bombing Attempt. The perpetrators in all cases trained in explosives with al-Qa’ida or an affiliate prior to being tasked with their respective plan of attack. The “Shoe Bomber” Richard Reid and the Christmas Day attacker Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab smuggled small amounts of explosives in their shoes and underwear,

respectively. They used a combination of PETN and TATP to create the explosive devices, and both used syringes on board the aircraft to mix the explosive chemicals.

In summer 2009, Najibullah Zazi attempted to build TATP explosives for three simultaneous suicide attacks on the New York City subway system. He purchased the precursor materials, hydrogen peroxide and acetone, from beauty supply stores in the Denver, Colorado area. He also researched stronger acids, specifically muriatic acid, which he planned to purchase from a home improvement store in Queens, NY. These purchases are consistent with notes Zazi made while attending explosives training with al-Qa'ida in Pakistan.

Delivery methods

Delivery method was also analyzed and separated into VBIED, stand-off IED, and suicide bomber (see below graph). In six cases, the plotters planned to detonate VBIEDs, the most popular method of delivery. In the 2009 Bronx Synagogue & Newburgh Air Base Plot, the 2009 Fountain Place Dallas Plot, and the 2009 Illinois Courthouse Plot, the members acquired cell phones to use as detonators in their VBIEDs. Suicide bombing and stand-off IEDs were used in four plots each, as shown in the graph below. All suicide bombings in the analysis targeted the transportation sector.



Terrorists often chose the best tactic for their target after conducting detailed surveillance. For example, while planning an attack against New York-area financial targets in 2004, Dhiren Barot concluded that VBIEDs would be used against the Citigroup Center, Prudential Plaza, and possibly the World Bank Headquarters. He then detailed how to build a limousine-based VBIED to minimize scrutiny, using readily available items including propane, acetylene, and oxygen cylinders with time-delay devices. For two additional targets – the New York Stock Exchange and International Monetary Fund Building—he thought the use of arson would be more effective because of the additional security measures present, including metal and concrete security barriers. Similarly, Faisal Shahzad visited Manhattan prior to attempting to detonate his explosive-laden Nissan Pathfinder in Times Square on May 1, 2010.

Small Arms

The small arms tactic was chosen in nine of the twenty-six cases. Small arms were considered in the majority of attacks against shopping malls and military targets, likely because of a perceived likelihood of success over VBIEDs. Considering these targets, the small arms tactic best matched the stated goal of the attack: to kill as many individuals as possible.

In three of the nine cases involving the intended use of small arms, the individuals involved performed military-type training in preparation for the attack. The men involved in the 2006 Atlanta Cell², the 2006 Sears Tower Plot, the 2007 Fort Dix Plot, and the 2007 JFK Plot, all visited paintball facilities to train in weapons use. The 2007 Fort Dix Plot conducted target practice on several occasions at a location in rural Pennsylvania.

² The Atlanta Cell was not counted in the tactics data because the members did not have a defined target; however, the cell was highlighted in the small arms analysis section since the members participated in paintball training.

Conclusion

As highlighted in this report, terrorists often spend time conducting pre-operational activities such as the surveillance of targets, acquisition of materials or training to increase tactical skills in advance of an attack. These activities place them in the public domain and underscore the critical importance of institutionalizing the New York State Operation Safeguard program into policing protocols. Operation Safeguard is an outreach program designed to generate public awareness by providing citizens and private sector businesses with a list of potential terrorism indicators to look for, along with information on how and where to report suspicious activity. Law enforcement outreach efforts to the public play a crucial role in this program's success. The Vigilance Project illustrates how terrorists often conduct some type of pre-operational activity out in the public eye; therefore, the more people who are aware of what to look for, the greater the opportunity for the potential detection and deterrence of a future terrorist attack.

In addition, The Vigilance Project revealed that many of the individuals involved in the cases were involved in prior criminal activity and had prior arrests by law enforcement. This underscores the importance of law enforcement remaining vigilant and not allowing themselves to become complacent while performing their daily duties. Law enforcement must always be observant for any signs of terrorist activity, whether conducting a traffic stop, affecting an arrest, or responding to a citizen's complaint. Each encounter provides the potential for providing valuable information that could ultimately lead to the disruption of a terrorist plot.

Eleven of the thirty-two cases in this iteration of the Vigilance Project take place in 2009 and mid 2010 alone; this acceleration in acts or attempted acts suggests that it is likely we will continue to encounter individuals willing to engage in the plotting or carrying out of attacks against the Homeland, particularly New York State. As these acts continue to unfold, NYSIC staff will update the Vigilance Project Supplement, which serves as a historical reference document of these significant cases.

This analysis, and future iterations of the Vigilance Project, aims to provide an understanding of individuals who are willing to conduct attacks, what they are targeting, and how they plan on doing so. Conclusions drawn from this report will ideally provide

our local law enforcement with new and vital information to augment their capability of preventing future attacks.

To view the Vigilance Project Supplement click here: 

Appendix A

The chart below is a modified version of the ‘Terrorist Attack Cycle’ and includes pre-operational activities conducted by at least one individual in each case. The individuals may have engaged in further pre-operational activities—such as training camps overseas—however, this chart only depicts activities that place the terrorists in the public domain and could present an opportunity for detection by alert citizens and law enforcement.

Case	Planning/Research			Training			Action			
	Intelligence Gathering & Surveillance	Acquisition of Materials	Funding	Tradecraft	Weapons	Paintball	Pre-attack (physical) Surveillance	Rehearsal /Dry Run	Execution (attempts: fail / success)	Escape & Exploitation
December 2001: "Shoe Bomber" Bombing Attempt	x		x	x			x	x	x	
May 2002: Jose Padilla, Dirty Bomb Plot	x			x						
August 2002: Columbus Shopping Mall Plot	x	x	x	x			x			
September 2002: The Lackawanna Cell										
May 2003: Brooklyn Bridge Plot	x			x			x			
June 2003: Virginia Jihad Cell						x				
August 2004: Financial Centers Plot	x			x			x	x		
August 2004: The Herald Square Plot	x			x			x	x		
August 2004: Albany Assassination Plot	x	x	x							
June 2005: Lodi, CA Cell			x							
August 2005: JIS Plot	x	x	x							
December 2005: Pipeline Plot	x	x	x	x		x				
February 2006: Toledo Cell	x	x	x	x	x					
April 2006: Atlanta Cell	x			x		x	x			
April 2006: PATH Tunnels Plot	x			x						
May 2006: Sears Tower Plot	x	x	x			x	x	x		
August 2006: Liquid Explosives Airliner Plot	x									
December 2006: The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot	x	x	x	x			x	x		
May 2007: Fort Dix Plot	x	x		x	x	x	x			
June 2007: JFK Plot	x		x	x		x	x			
August 2007: Goose Creek, South Carolina Traffic Stop	x									
January 2009: Long Island Railroad Plot	x									
May 2009: Bronx Synagogue & Newburg Air Base Plot	x	x					x	x	x	
June 2009: Little Rock, Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting	x	x			x		x	x	x	
July 2009: Quantico Marine Base Plot	x	x	x	x	x		x			
September 2009: Denver/NYC Plot	x	x	x	x			x	x		
September 2009: Foundation Place Dallas Plot	x	x					x	x	x	
September 2009: Illinois Courthouse Plot	x	x		x			x			
November 2009: Fort Hood Shooting	x	x					x	x	x	
October 2009: Massachusetts Shopping Mall Plot	x	x		x						
December 2009: Christmas Day Bombing Attempt	x			x			x	x	x	
May 2010: Times Square Car Bombing Attempt	x	x	x				x	x	x	x