



National Capital Region (NCR) Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN) of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions

Prepared for Exercise Forward Resolve 2010

Draft - October 12, 2010



FEMA



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Contents

Security Information and Handling Instructions	7
Introduction.....	8
Background	8
Purpose	8
Planning Process	9
Scope.....	9
About the National Capital Region	10
Overarching Assumptions and Common Findings.....	11
Evacuation of Federal Employees.....	11
Basic Assumptions.....	11
Common Findings	11
Summaries by Department/Agency	13
United States Congress	13
Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA).....	13
United States Capitol Police (USCP).....	15
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).....	16
Department of Agriculture.....	18
Department of Defense	19
Joint Forces Headquarters–National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).....	19
Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CapMed)	20
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).....	22
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	22
United States Coast Guard.....	23
USCG Sector Baltimore	23
Federal Protective Service (FPS)	24
United States Secret Service	24
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).....	25
Department of the Interior	27
United States Park Police.....	27
Department of Justice.....	29
Federal Bureau of Investigation.....	30
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)	30
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).....	31
Department of State	32
Department of Transportation (DOT)	34
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)	35
General Services Administration (GSA).....	36

Office of Personnel Management..... 37

Administration and Maintenance..... 39

Appendix A: Interview Guide 40

Appendix B: Authorities and References 41

 Federal Authorities 41

 State-Level References 41

 Nation Capital Region-Level References..... 41

Appendix C: Glossary 42

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Security Information and Handling Instructions

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Certain actions that federal departments or agencies may take following a catastrophic incident in the National Capital Region may be sensitive. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) have attempted to strike a balance between these security concerns and the objective of providing useful, practical information to NCR stakeholders. Some capabilities or planning assumptions listed in this document may be more detailed than others.

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1 **Introduction**

2 In the event of a catastrophic incident or threat to the National Capital Region (NCR), the significant
3 federal presence would both necessitate and complicate a robust response. In order to facilitate the
4 coordination that would be required for the integration of federal, state, and local response efforts, the
5 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination
6 (NCRC) have compiled this draft *NCR Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN) of Catastrophic Planning*
7 *Assumptions*.

8 For planning purposes, a catastrophic incident is defined in the National Response Framework as any
9 natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, which results in an extraordinary level of mass
10 casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment,
11 economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

12 Further discussion regarding the nature of catastrophic events, including risk analyses, limitations, and
13 critical assumptions, is provided in the NCR Catastrophic Incident Strategic Plan, finalized on January, 2,
14 2010.

15 **Background**

16 Coordination among federal departments and agencies in the NCR during a catastrophic event is critical
17 to protecting life and property; however, no single comprehensive policy exists to coordinate the
18 protective measures necessary to safeguard the federal workforce during such an event.

19 State and local jurisdictions within the NCR are responsible for developing emergency operations plans,
20 which include provisions for public safety. The NCR jurisdictions have developed various mechanisms to
21 coordinate emergency management activities, including a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan
22 (RECP), Regional Emergency Support Functions (RESFs), an NCR First Hour Checklist, and various
23 Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). (For more references, please see Appendix B.)

24 However, there was no established mechanism to coordinate and de-conflict the planning assumptions
25 and potential protective actions that federal agencies may implement following a catastrophic incident
26 in the NCR.

27 **Purpose**

28 The purpose of this CONPLAN is to identify the authorities, responsibilities, and potential actions of key
29 federal departments and agencies that may be relevant during a catastrophic incident in the NCR—
30 particularly an incident that may trigger the large-scale early release of federal employees or mass
31 evacuation of the region.

32 This CONPLAN represents the first effort to capture the planning assumptions, anticipated coordinating
33 mechanisms, and possible actions that federal departments and agencies may implement within the

34 NCR following a catastrophic incident. This information will then be shared among federal, state, and
35 local stakeholders in the Region to inform their own planning efforts.

36 This document is not an operational plan, but rather a collection of authorities and assumptions, which
37 will be made available to NCR stakeholders to inform other emergency planning efforts. Nothing in this
38 document supersedes or replaces any other existing plans, authorities, agreements, or responsibilities.

39 **Planning Process**

40 In December 2009, representatives from FEMA NCRC and OPM established a new subcommittee of the
41 Joint Federal Committee (JFC), called the NCR Federal Workforce Preparedness Subcommittee
42 (NFWPSC), which guided the development of this CONPLAN.

43 As part of this effort, FEMA NCRC and OPM staff interviewed representatives from a cross-section of
44 federal agencies to determine:

- 45 • Support needed from municipal, county, and state entities during a catastrophic incident in the
46 NCR, given that OPM or other appropriate authority has called for the early release of all federal
47 employees;
- 48 • External authorities or responsibilities that may affect the plans or operations of other
49 stakeholders;
- 50 • Protective measures or actions that might be taken to protect employees of each agency
51 (particularly measures that might impact other agencies);
- 52 • Communications with other agencies regarding the implementation of these actions;
- 53 • Information-sharing mechanisms; and
- 54 • How actions might be coordinated with state and local jurisdictions.

55 For the full interview guide, please see Appendix A.

56 Respondents were given an opportunity to review their interview notes for potentially sensitive
57 information and/or details that may not have been captured correctly. This revised product was then
58 combined with language summarizing department and agency responsibilities that commonly appears in
59 other federal planning documents in order to form the “Summaries by Department/Agency” section.

60 This draft version of the CONPLAN represents only a preliminary outreach effort to the federal
61 community in the NCR. As this effort progresses, planning assumptions and authorities from additional
62 departments and agencies can be included, and existing summaries can be enhanced.

63 **Scope**

64 Because this document is intended to facilitate coordination among NCR stakeholders, the scope of this
65 document is limited to those planning assumptions, authorities, potential actions, and coordination
66 mechanisms that impact other agencies, external partners, or the general public. Therefore, this
67 document does *not* address any plans, processes, or systems that are intended solely for the internal
68 use of one agency, such as an internal radio system or internal employee notification system. Similarly,

69 this document does not discuss internal shelter-in-place procedures for federal buildings or other
70 specific protective measures, except where those measures potentially could involve or interfere with
71 the operations or plans of other stakeholders.

72 **About the National Capital Region**

73 The National Capital Region (NCR) was created pursuant to the National Capital Planning Act of 1952, 40
74 USC 71. The Act defines the NCR as the District of Columbia; Montgomery and Prince George's Counties
75 in the State of Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties in the Commonwealth
76 of Virginia; and all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area bounded by the
77 outer boundaries of the combined area of said
78 counties. Today, the NCR includes the District of
79 Columbia and eleven local jurisdictions in the State
80 of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

81 The NCR also includes:

- 82 • The headquarters location of all three
- 83 branches of the federal government
- 84 (Executive, Judicial, Legislative)
- 85 • 271 federal departments and agencies
- 86 • 340,000 federal workers
- 87 • Over 5 million residents
- 88 • 2,500 square miles



89 **Overarching Assumptions and Common Findings**

90 **Evacuation of Federal Employees**

91 There is currently no comprehensive federal evacuation plan for the NCR. Under current law, only the
92 Governors of Maryland and Virginia, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia, may issue evacuation
93 orders for their respective jurisdictions.

94 However, OPM could call for the early release of all federal employees in the NCR, and the White House
95 could change the Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government Condition (COOP/COGCON Level)
96 for all executive departments and agencies, which, when combined, may have the same practical effect
97 as an evacuation of federal employees.

98 **Basic Assumptions**

99 These assumptions are accepted as true for the purpose of the development of the CONPLAN:

- 100 1. Each federal department and agency develops, maintains and, when necessary, implements an
101 Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) to protect life and property in federally-occupied space under
102 emergency conditions (41 C.F.R. § 102-71.20).
- 103 2. Federal departments and agencies within the NCR have current, approved plans that describe
104 the evacuation and/or shelter-in-place procedures for their facilities and personnel.
- 105 3. Such plans anticipate procedures that other agencies may implement that will impact the
106 evacuation of the general public from the NCR during a catastrophic event (e.g., the closure of
107 certain roads surrounding key facilities).
- 108 4. State and local emergency management agencies and other stakeholders have developed, or
109 are developing, coordinated plans for catastrophic incident response.
- 110 5. OPM develops, maintains and, when necessary, implements emergency dismissal or closure
111 procedures applicable to federal executive branch agencies within the NCR.

112 **Common Findings**

113 Most agencies interviewed:

- 114 • Have an Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) for their facilities;
- 115 • Have Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans and responsibilities, with an Emergency Relocation
116 Group (ERG) or other cadre of mission-essential personnel that must leave the NCR and relocate
117 to an alternate facility;
- 118 • Have principal officials with protective details, who may set up rolling roadblocks in order to
119 move their protectees;
- 120 • Use the National Warning System (NAWAS) and/or the Washington Metropolitan Area Warning
121 System (WAWAS), as well as other NCR situational awareness tools and technologies;

- 122 • Rely on reporting from the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), FEMA National Response
123 Coordination Center (NRCC), and the NCR desk within the NRCC;
124 • Maintain their own internal alert/notification systems for their own employees; and
125 • Defer to OPM for guidance on a decision to release federal employees.

126 Common coordinating mechanisms include:

- 127 • Communications among operations centers;
128 • NAWAS/WAWAS;
129 • DHS NOC blast calls; and
130 • National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) calls for public affairs contacts.

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131 **Summaries by Department/Agency**

132 The following section highlights the responsibilities and mission priorities, potential actions,
 133 coordination and support activities, and information-sharing mechanisms by department and agency,
 134 listed in alphabetical order by department.

135 **United States Congress**

136 **Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA)**

137 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

- 138 • As the chief law enforcement officer of the Senate, SAA is charged with
 139 maintaining safety and security in Senate areas of the U.S. Capitol and all Senate office buildings,
 140 as well as protection of the members themselves.
- 141 • SAA is responsible for immediate supervision of the Senate floor, chambers, and its galleries.
- 142 • SAA has the authorization to arrest and detain any person violating Senate rules.
- 143 • Decision-making power resides with Senate leadership.



144 *Coordination and Support*

145 In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the Senate Sergeant at
 146 Arms (SAA) would work closely with the House and USCP to coordinate a response. SAA has scenario-
 147 based processes in place to address specific threats. Typically, SAA and the Leadership Offices
 148 collaborate to come to a decision and present a course of action to Senate Leadership.

- 149 • The Senate is its own sovereign entity and has the authority to make decisions independent of
 150 OPM guidance.
- 151 • Each individual Senate office has the authority to make decisions independent of the
 152 recommendation of the SAA (e.g., Members may choose to release their own employees,
 153 activate COOP plans, etc.)
- 154 • SAA has the authority to work with USCP on protective details.
- 155 • SAA is a member of the Capitol Police Board.

156 During National Special Security Events (NSSEs), representatives from SAA participate in various
 157 emergency coordination centers such as the Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC), Transportation
 158 Security Operations Center (TSOC), etc.

159 Key Federal Stakeholders: U.S. Capital Police (USCP); U.S. Park Police (USPP); U.S. House of
 160 Representatives Sergeant at Arms; Architect of the Capitol.

161 *Potential Actions*

162 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list
 163 provides possible actions that could be taken by the SAA:

- 164 • In consultation with USCP, roadway barriers could be put up and would stay up until the
- 165 identified threat passes.
- 166 • Supporting barriers, outside of Capitol Square, could also be activated.
- 167 • Mutual aid agreements could go into effect with identified partners.
- 168 • Protective measures include:
 - 169 ○ Evacuation to an approved assembly area
 - 170 ○ Relocation to an “unknown-in-advance location” and/or
 - 171 ○ Internal relocation to a defined space with enhanced respiratory equipment.

172 ***Information Sharing***

173 SAA coordinates closely with USCP, who ultimately disseminates information to relevant agencies. The
174 information-sharing activities taken by the SAA are a derivative of the directions given by USCP. Various
175 means of communicating, such as fire alarms, the public address system, and alert messages to mobile
176 devices, and are used to disseminate information. SAA also has an automated accountability system –
177 ALERTS – that channels information on staff and OEP groups to USCP.



178 **United States Capitol Police (USCP)**

179 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

- 180 • USCP has exclusive law enforcement jurisdiction within the Capitol Grounds and extended
181 jurisdiction, abutting Capitol Grounds, shared with Metropolitan Police and United States Park
182 Police.
- 183 • The Chief of Police has the authority to make decisions regarding protective actions, and may
184 make such decisions independently of the Executive Branch or local government to insure the
185 security of the Capitol Grounds and Member of Congress.

186 ***Potential Actions***

187 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list
188 provides possible actions that could be taken by USCP:

- 189 • USCP could initiate a “lockdown” of the Capitol grounds to restrict entry to the Capitol or House
190 and Senate Office Buildings.
- 191 • Traffic barriers could be erected within the Capitol Grounds, including on Independence and
192 Constitution Avenues, to prevent access for all non-emergency vehicles during an emergency.
193 (The Metropolitan Police Department would be notified immediately.)

194 ***Coordination and Support***

195 In the event of a mass evacuation of the NCR, USCP would coordinate closely with key stakeholders (e.g.
196 Sergeant at Arms of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the Architect of the
197 Capitol), and federal and local law enforcement partners to facilitate the safe movement of evacuees
198 while insuring the security of the Capitol Complex.

199 ***Information Sharing***

200 The USCP Command Center is the nexus of information sharing and communication with the
201 Congressional community, key stakeholders, and government partners. Full-time liaison officers are
202 assigned to the USCP Command Center by the U.S. Supreme Court Police and the Metropolitan Police
203 Department to facilitate emergency communications and general operational awareness. A range of
204 internal notification systems are used to provide emergency action messages to USCP personnel,
205 stakeholders, the Congressional community, and visitors.



206 **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**

207 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

208 In the event of a mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the Security Protective
 209 Service would be responsible for coordinating protective actions for the CIA. In addition to their
 210 responsibilities as first responders, the Security Protective Service is also responsible for planning,
 211 preparedness, and coordination efforts in advance of any such response.

- 212 • The officers of the CIA Security Protective Service are a federal law enforcement officers and
 213 have law enforcement jurisdiction in the federal facilities under their protection.
- 214 • The Security Protective Service has established Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the
 215 NCR jurisdiction of Fairfax County to control roads and direct traffic in the areas immediately
 216 surrounding the facilities under their jurisdiction.

217 ***Potential Actions***

- 218 • If there is an order to evacuate/release, the CIA Security Protective Service could station police
 219 officers at major intersections on and adjacent to the entrances and exits to CIA-controlled
 220 facilities to control the flow of vehicular traffic, according to established MOUs. Coordination
 221 with local jurisdictions (e.g., VDOT and Fairfax County) would take place during all actions.
- 222 • The CIA Security Protective Service could send a representative to the local NCR jurisdiction's
 223 EOC to coordinate actions requested by the agency. For example, the CIA Security Protective
 224 Service has a desk at the FFX EOC and have established relationships the FFX EOC personnel to
 225 facilitate more effective and timely coordination.
- 226 • The Security Protective Service could coordinate with the local and state jurisdictions to reset
 227 the timing of traffic lights to support increased traffic flow from their impacted facilities via
 228 established evacuation routes. The CIA Incident Management Team would depend on pre-
 229 existing protocols established with the local NCR jurisdictions and partner federal agencies.
- 230 • In the event of any direct impact to CIA facilities and personnel, the initial response would be
 231 taken by the CIA Security Protective Service. The relevant local jurisdiction would support any
 232 secondary response, such as the Fairfax County or College Park Fire and Police Departments.

233 ***Coordination and Support***

234 The CIA Security Protective Service has an established relationship with the Fairfax County Office of
 235 Emergency Management (FFX OEM), and the two agencies regularly coordinate and participate in joint
 236 exercises.

237 In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the Security
 238 Protective Service would coordinate with the local jurisdictions where CIA facilities are located through
 239 their emergency operations centers and with federal partners through established means of
 240 coordination. Examples include coordination with FFX OEM through the Fairfax Emergency Operations
 241 Center (FFX EOC) and the U.S. Park Police (USPP).

242 The CIA coordinates its emergency plans with the Virginia Department of Transportation, Virginia State
243 Police, Fairfax County OEM, Fairfax County Police and Fire Departments, and the U.S. Park Police. They
244 participate in area exercises with these entities.

245 Key Federal Stakeholders: U.S. Park Police

246 *Information Sharing*

247 The CIA Security Protective Service works directly with both federal and local partners. The CIA works
248 regularly with Fairfax County for information sharing, planning, and coordination between federal and
249 local jurisdictions. The primary means that the Security Protective Service would use to coordinate and
250 share information with their local jurisdiction partners during an emergency would be through the local
251 jurisdiction's EOC. The Threat Management Unit of the CIA Security Protective Service is directly
252 integrated with Fusion Centers and the CIA communicates via all available means (i.e. voice, data, text
253 messages, etc.) with the other D/As. Additional tools such as IronGate – a data terminal that federal
254 partners can use to monitor, match, and share information – are used to coordinate information and
255 provide situational awareness.

256 **Department of Agriculture**



257 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

258 The USDA does not have external actions or responsibilities during a catastrophic event that
259 will impact the NCR region.

260 The USDA relies heavily on the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to respond to incidents affecting their
261 facilities. However, approximately three-quarters of USDA security personnel are designated as special
262 police officers. The USDA special police hold warrants in D.C. to manage traffic and execute arrests.

263 ***Potential Actions***

264 USDA security guards will take initial action during an incident, but the D.C. Metropolitan Police
265 Department (MPD) and/or D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services (FEMS) will take over once they
266 arrive at the scene.

267 ***Information Sharing***

268 The USDA uses the following information-sharing tools:

- 269 • WAWAS
- 270 • Roam Secure
- 271 • FEMA NCR Watch Desk / NOC Watch Desk alerts
- 272 • WebEOC
- 273 • Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)

274 ***Coordination and Support***

275 USDA participates in exercises with neighboring agencies, to include the Smithsonian and the
276 Department of Energy. When releasing federal personnel, USDA relies on decisions from the Office of
277 Personnel Management.

278 Department of Defense



279 Joint Forces Headquarters–National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR)



280 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

281 Joint Forces Headquarters–National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) plans, coordinates,
282 maintains situational awareness, and as directed, employs forces for homeland defense
283 and defense support of civil authorities in the National Capital Region Joint Operations
284 Area to safeguard the Nation’s capital.

285 In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, JFHQ-NCR would review
286 force protection measures to perform an assessment or gather intelligence to determine if a
287 coordinated attack was taking place.

288 JFHQ-NCR has the following relevant authorities:

- 289 • Immediate response authority. (The Commander can immediately respond without Presidential
290 approval if the response prevents loss of life, suffering, or damaged critical infrastructure.)
- 291 • Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). In this capacity, JFHQ-NCR would respond in
292 accordance with the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management
293 System.

294 *Coordination and Support*

295 During an incident or National Special Security Event (NSSE), JFHQ-NCR has 13 locations where liaison
296 officers are stationed. Close coordination with DCHSEMA, USCG, and PFFA would also take place.

297 JFHQ-NCR would look for support from federal police escorts to move initial operational forces
298 downtown, enabling response teams such as the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) to
299 respond. State or Federal police escorts are preferred since they have the authority to move through
300 multiple jurisdictions.

301 Emergency plans, such as the base plan that exercises emergency preparedness within the NCR, are
302 tested during exercises such as Capitol Shield. JFHQ-NCR works with state and local entities on
303 exercising these plans.

304 Key Federal Stakeholders: USSS; FEMA; USCP; Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Federal
305 Aviation Administration (FAA); USPP; FBI; DC HSEMA; USCG Baltimore/DC.

306 *Potential Actions*

307 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list
308 provides possible actions that could be taken by JFHQ-NCR:

- 309 • Activate initial operational forces
- 310 • COOP to alternate site locations
- 311 • Implement protective measures, including:

- 312 ○ Raising force protection levels
- 313 ○ Increasing inspections, such as the inspection of every car, building, etc.
- 314 ○ Closing particular building(s)
- 315 ○ Closing installations
- 316 ○ Evacuating to an approved assembly area
- 317 ○ Deploying quick reaction forces (e.g., armed soldiers)

318 *Information Sharing*

319 JFHQ-NCR uses several systems to disseminate, receive, and share information. The Joint Operations
320 Center (JOC) performs 24x7 strategic watch and situational awareness of the NCR. The JOC maintains a
321 common operating picture and oversight for air, maritime, and land domain. Several forms of
322 communication are used to disseminate information, such as NAWAS and WAWAS. WebEOC, a web-
323 enabled crisis information management system, is used to share information real-time.

324 Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CapMed)



325 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

326 When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense through USNORTHCOM, JFHQ-
327 NCR transitions to the Joint Task Force-National Capital Region (JTF-NCR), assumes
328 command and control of military forces, and provides timely consequence management response in
329 order to assist civil authorities to establish control of the situation, save lives, mitigate human suffering
330 and facilitate recovery operations. JTF-NCR will respond to Requests for Assistance (RFA) in accordance
331 with the National Response Framework (NRF) and DOD policy and guidance. JTF CapMed will provide
332 direct support to JTF-NCR as the “Functional Medical Component.” JTF CapMed, J5 Plans Division
333 develops the plans to support the JTF-NCR in response to all-hazards in the NCR and JTF CapMed, J3
334 Current Operations implements these plans.

335 Key Federal Stakeholders: Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR), U.S.
336 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), U.S. Northern
337 Command (USNORTHCOM).

338 JTF CapMed has the following relevant authorities:

- 339 ● Immediate response authority. The Commander can immediately respond without Presidential
340 approval if the response prevents loss of life, suffering, or damaged critical infrastructure at the
341 request of civil authorities.¹
- 342 ● Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). In this capacity, JTF CapMed would support JTF-
343 NCR response in accordance with the National Response Framework and the National Incident
344 Management System.

¹ Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, February 18, 1997.

345 **Potential Actions**

346 The following list provides possible actions that could be taken by JTF CapMed in support of JFHQ-NCR in
347 response to a catastrophic event in the NCR:²

- 348 • All military medical units will be prepared to provide medical response to Chemical, Biological,
349 Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) event and/or Consequence Management
350 operations.
- 351 • The National Naval Medical Center (NNMC), Bethesda, MD, is the primary medical receiving
352 facility for CBRNE event casualties.
- 353 • JTF CapMed, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), the NNMC, and the DeWitt Army
354 Community Hospital (DACH) will establish and maintain a Tier II or Tier III-level Operations
355 Center, depending on the JTF-NCR Tier level, as directed by the JTF-NCR Joint Operations Center
356 (JOC).
- 357 • The WRAMC, NNMC, and the DACH will be prepared to provide medical response teams (the
358 number and type to be determined by JTF CapMed).
- 359 • Military medical forces will be prepared to provide advanced cardiac/trauma life support
360 (ACLS/ATLS) teams, as requested.
- 361 • Military medical forces will be prepared to provide ambulance buses with drivers and associated
362 medical personnel to provide expanded care to first aid sites in support and in the vicinity of a
363 CBRNE event site.
- 364 • JTF CapMed will be prepared to accept tactical control of additional aerial or ground medical
365 evacuation assets.
- 366 • Military medical treatment facilities will implement established Memoranda of Understanding
367 with civilian medical facilities as necessary.

368 **Coordination and Support**

369 JTF CapMed will provide liaison personnel at the JTF-NCR JOC to coordinate requests for military medical
370 support during a catastrophic incident. JTF CapMed uses telephone landlines, e-mail, and handheld
371 radios for communications and to maintain a common operating picture.

372 JTF CapMed conducts collective training and provides real-world Health Service Support (HSS) during
373 Exercise Capital Shield in support of JFHQ-NCR and DSCA.

² Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical Support Plan 3600, Emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region, 6 February 2009.



374 **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**

375 The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) maintains situational awareness 24x7, and
376 would monitor a significant developing incident and maintain connectivity with other
377 operations centers as necessary. The Secretary DHS, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
378 (HSPD-5), is the Principal Federal Official for National Incident Management. The DHS Crisis Action Team
379 (CAT) may activate to provide National-level crisis action planning, operations coordination and decision
380 support to the Secretary DHS.

381 The DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (DHS OPS) may coordinate federal information
382 sharing and reporting through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), via a new incident
383 tab in the Federal Operations (FedOps), Emergency Management (EM), and Law Enforcement (LE)
384 Communities of Interest (COI).

385 The DHS Office of Public Affairs may activate the National Joint Information Center (NJIC) at the DHS
386 Nebraska Avenue Complex (DHS NAC) and/or activate a National Incident Communications Conference
387 Line (NICCL) call.

388 **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**

389 FEMA is the lead agency responsible for emergency management, response and recovery planning, and
390 coordination in relation to a natural disaster or other emergency. FEMA may operate from the National
391 Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at FEMA Headquarters and/or the Region III Response
392 Coordination Center (RRCC) in Philadelphia, PA.

393 FEMA will be postured at the field, local, Regional, and National levels to provide an integrated response
394 to any potential Stafford Act declaration that would direct federal consequence management support to
395 the National Capital Region in response to an incident.

396 Nationally, FEMA will support information-sharing from the field, local, and regional levels to national
397 leadership via the NRCC watch desk to the DHS NOC.

398 The RRCC will provide the regional mechanism for federal technical assistance, resources, and
399 coordination on planning, response and recovery activities for incidents in the RIII area of responsibility
400 (to include the National Capital Region). A RIII Liaison as well as a RIII Defense Coordinating Element
401 Liaison may be deployed to the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management
402 Agency (DC HSEMA).

403 Mobile Emergency Response System (MERS) assets may provide direct communication support.

404 **United States Coast Guard**



405 In the event of a mass evacuation or release of the federal workforce within the NCR,
406 USCG would coordinate with DHS, the Military District of Washington (MDW) and OPM.

407 (Additional information to be added at a later date.)

408 **USCG Sector Baltimore**

409 ***Coordination and Support***

410 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Baltimore would have an operational role following a catastrophic
411 incident in the NCR.

412 Sector Baltimore has a small boat station with about 25 members assigned at Bolling AFB. In the event
413 of a mass evacuation, USCG Sector Baltimore will heighten the maritime security posture on the
414 Potomac River (MARSEC level) and possibly coordinate the use of cruise boats and other vessels of
415 opportunity to evacuate people by water to the south. USCG has domain over vessels crossing under
416 bridges on navigable waters.

417 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

418 USCG Sector Baltimore has COOP responsibilities for senior flag officers at Coast Guard Headquarters,
419 and if necessary, the Secretary of DHS. Upon request from USSS, Sector Baltimore would facilitate the
420 maritime evacuation of POTUS and any other official under USSS protection.

421 USCG Sector Baltimore also has the responsibility of establishing an Area Maritime Security Committee
422 (AMSC) which is a community of maritime security partners. The AMSC works together as a unified
423 team and membership is based on connection to maritime security. USCG Sector Baltimore has a
424 maritime search and rescue responsibilities during an event. USCG Sector Baltimore has limited COOP
425 evacuation role but provides support to DOD for higher-level government personnel.

426 ***Information Sharing***

427 USCG Sector Baltimore receives intelligence information via the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
428 AMSC members are subscribers to the Alert Warning System (AWS) which is used to communicate with
429 state, local, and other partners.

430 Federal Protective Service (FPS)



431 *Mission Priorities*

432 The mission of FPS is to deter, respond to, and investigate threats, crimes, acts of civil
 433 disobedience, and acts of terrorism directed at federal facilities or occupants and to support the lead
 434 agency in assuring the safety and security of federal employees. FPS has full law enforcement and
 435 security services responsibilities to for federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services
 436 Administration.

437 *Potential Actions*

438 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list
 439 provides possible actions that could be taken by FPS:

- 440 • DC HSEMA would be notified of the situation and forthcoming actions.
- 441 • District officers would be contacted to coordinate actions.
- 442 • Roads surrounding the perimeters of the incident could be shut down.
- 443 • Protective measures are dependent on the situation. A possible resource is the use of guard
 444 staff who act as a supplemental force that can be deployed as needed.

445 *Coordination and Support*

446 In the event of a mass evacuation of the NCR, FPS would look for support from various partners. For
 447 example, FPS works closely with the Metropolitan Police Department and the Metro Transit Police
 448 Department. Mechanisms are in place to coordinate actions through the Mega Center, a dispatch
 449 center that facilitates the FPS response to an incident.

450 *Information Sharing*

451 Communication is coordinated primarily through the Mega Center or by the Incident Commander. FPS
 452 also uses a Regional Intelligence Agent who shares intelligence products among federal, state, and local
 453 levels. During an incident, information is disseminated to the Mega Center, which informs the GSA
 454 Building Manager and security points of contact for the affected facilities. In addition, FPS would
 455 contact every person on the affected buildings' emergency contact list, and contact state and local
 456 entities with jurisdiction where the incident occurs.

457 United States Secret Service



458 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

459 In the event of a catastrophic incident within the NCR, USSS personnel would deploy to alternate work
 460 sites and other field offices. There are numerous mission-critical employees that would carry out
 461 Mission Essential Functions as Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) members. These personnel would
 462 need to travel to continuity sites or would ingress into the city to carry out the USSS mission of
 463 safeguarding designated protectees. Coordination would occur with various D/As in the jurisdiction(s) in
 464 which the incident(s) are occurring.

465 USSS has a responsibility to carry out their mission and ensure the well-being of protectees as well as
466 safeguarding the country's financial strength. In this capacity, USSS has the authority to travel into the
467 city even if an order has been issued to evacuate the NCR. Therefore, ingress procedures are critical and
468 the recognition of credentialing remains vital to secure the USSS mission and carry out their authorities.

469 *Potential Actions*

470 Unarmed USSS personnel would be released to go to their private residences or to move away from the
471 site of the incident. Armed personnel would be responding to the situation or would have other
472 mission-critical responsibilities.

473 To address USSS core mission requirements, the protection of protectees would remain the essential
474 goal, and potential actions would follow suit accordingly. USSS would work with the White House
475 Military Office and other federal, state, and local partners to ensure the safety and security of
476 designated protectees. USSS would also continue to secure facilities (e.g., the White House, Vice
477 President's residence, Embassy Row, etc.). Depending on the nature of the threat or incident, road
478 closures and motorcades could occur and could extend to every Department Head and Cabinet member
479 – necessitating coordination with various D/As.

480 *Coordination and Support*

481 During motorcades, close coordination would take place with the affected jurisdiction. For example, if
482 an incident happened near Baltimore Washington International Airport, coordination would occur with
483 Prince George's County Police Department, Maryland State Police Department, and United States Park
484 Police. The exact location and nature of the incident would determine the specific entities with which
485 USSS would coordinate.

486 It should be noted that it is important for emergency personnel to be educated on the process of
487 credentialing for road blocks. Vehicles driven by USSS personnel often do not contain markings;
488 therefore, it is critical that USSS credentials are recognized so that personnel are allowed to ingress
489 during an evacuation or critical incident.

490 *Information Sharing*

491 Communication between USSS and other D/As is done primarily through the Government and Public
492 Affairs office at USSS. The Operations Center is intelligence-driven and therefore does not communicate
493 with other D/A's operations centers on a daily basis for non-protective threat information. The Joint
494 Operations Center (JOC) at USSS directly supports the protectees and is utilized for specific areas of
495 operation.

496 *Transportation Security Administration (TSA)*

497 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the Nation's transportation systems to ensure
498 freedom of movement for people and commerce. The Transportation Security Operations Center
499 (TSOC), located at the Freedom Center in Herndon, VA, conducts routine steady-state operations on a
500 24x7 basis. The center provides domain and situational awareness, immediate notification, and initial

501 response actions, for threats and incidents involving the security of the transportation sector. TSA has
502 designated the TSOC as its incident management center.

503 Following a significant incident, TSA may deploy Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR)
504 teams, which may consist of Transportation Security Officers, Transportation Security Inspectors,
505 Behavioral Detection Officers, Federal Air Marshals, Explosives Security Specialists, and/or canine teams,
506 to the following transportation modes:

- 507 • Light Commuter Rail
- 508 • Heavy Commuter Rail
- 509 • Commercial Aviation Airports

510 TSA may deploy certified explosives detection canine teams with state and local law enforcement
511 handlers, at the request of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), through their
512 National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) to augment security in mass
513 transportation venues.

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514 Department of the Interior

515 United States Park Police



516 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

517 The mission of the United States Park Police is to provide law enforcement services to
 518 designated National Park Service areas within the National Capitol Region, and its two
 519 Field Offices in New York City and San Francisco, California. The USPP is the primary law
 520 enforcement agency in all of the National Parks in the District of Columbia and its environs.
 521 The USPP protects the Nation's Icons (to include the Statue of Liberty, the Washington Monument, as
 522 well as the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials); prevents and detects criminal activity; conducts
 523 investigations; apprehends violators of federal, state, and local laws; coordinates special events and First
 524 Amendment activities; and provides protection of the President and other government officials of the
 525 United States. Approximately 20-23% of Washington, D.C. is National Park Service property.



526 USPP has the following relevant authorities:

- 527 • D.C. Code Ann. 5-201: The U.S. Park Police has the same jurisdiction in D.C. as MPD and can
 528 execute the same authorities and/or work in conjunction with MPD.
- 529 • USPP has authority on National Park Service designated Reservations and Park areas across the
 530 country.
- 531 • USPP signed an MOU with Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) for the
 532 use of resources throughout the NCR.

533 *Potential Actions*

534 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list
 535 provides possible actions that could be taken by USPP:

- 536 • During events/evacuations, USPP primary responsibility is visitor and icon protection. The USPP
 537 will also partner with DC HSEMA, MPD, DDOT, VDEM, VSP, and VDOT to facilitate the evacuation
 538 of vehicles and pedestrians. During an evacuation, the GW Parkway initially would be used as
 539 an evacuation route; however, the USPP (with the assistance of the NPS and other partner
 540 agencies) would attempt to close the GWMP between I-495 and Memorial Bridge, which would
 541 then be used for emergency/authorized vehicles only. Memorial Bridge will not be designated
 542 as a walk-out option; however, self-evacuation is likely to occur.
- 543 • USPP has jurisdiction over the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, but that route is not anticipated
 544 to be closed during an incident.
- 545 • Rock Creek Parkway will be used as an egress route out of the city.
- 546 • During an incident, USPP cannot go below "minimum staffing" for critical infrastructure/key
 547 resources (Memorials, Monuments, etc.) because of the mandate to protect these areas.
- 548 • USPP will bring in staff from outlying districts to harden up the downtown areas.
- 549 • Memorials (excluding the Washington Monument) will become a safe haven during weather
 550 events; otherwise, resources will be used to move people away from the area.

- 551 • Certain landing zones for air support would be in use during a mass casualty scenario.

552 *Coordination and Support*

553 In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, USPP would work closely
554 with the National Park Service, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), District of Columbia Fire and
555 Emergency Medical Services (DC FEMS), Virginia State Police (VSP), and Virginia Department of
556 Emergency Management (VDEM). The USPP coordinates actions with MPD and DC FEMS on a daily
557 basis and directly, “dispatch to dispatch.” USPP will often coordinate with MPD and DC FEMS during an
558 event on federal property as they have shared jurisdiction. Officers from USPP frequently staff the Joint
559 Operations Center and DC HSEMA emergency operations center during major events. WMATA is
560 another key partner with which USPP routinely coordinates.

561 USPP works directly with the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) and the Virginia
562 Department of Transportation (VDOT) in planning for a walk-out of downtown D.C. and for the
563 appropriate use of bridges.

564 FPS is a partner of USPP, and has jurisdiction inside DOI agencies, which is the parent agency of the
565 USPP.

566 *Information Sharing*

567 All USPP dispatchers have access (read only) to WebEOC, but there is some hesitation to post law
568 enforcement sensitive information on this tool. USPP relies on CAPWIN to obtain and share
569 information. Additionally, USPP uses the following information-sharing mechanisms:

- 570 • RICCS
- 571 • HSIN
- 572 • LEO
- 573 • FBI JTTF and NJTTF



574 Department of Justice

575 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

576 Duties of the U.S. Department of Justice during a catastrophic incident include:

- 577 • Advising the President and department and agency heads on legal issues relating to government
578 operations during the incident, and representing the Executive Branch when it is a party to legal
579 proceedings. More generally, providing legal guidance and oversight in matters requiring a
580 federal law enforcement response.
- 581 • Protecting and providing security for federal court personnel and designated Executive Branch
582 officials.
- 583 • Where appropriate, initiating actions to investigate, prevent, disrupt, contain, and prosecute
584 criminal acts presented by an incident.
- 585 • Overseeing federal law enforcement support to state and local governments in responding to
586 civil disturbances, including oversight of the use of federal military personnel pursuant to the
587 Insurrection Act, when invoked by the President.
- 588 • Conducting federal law enforcement activities and coordinate the federal law enforcement
589 response as needed with state and local partners.
- 590 • Providing federal law enforcement assistance to state and local law enforcement organizations
591 when requested to aid in the enforcement of state law.
- 592 • Approving requests submitted by state governors pursuant to the Emergency Federal Law
593 Enforcement Assistance (EFLEA) provisions of the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, 10 U.S.C. §
594 10501, for personnel and other federal law enforcement support.
- 595 • Coordinating ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security) functions of the National Response Framework
596 through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

597 Key offices in the NCR (judicial districts):

- 598 • U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
- 599 • U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
- 600 • U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland

601

602 Federal Bureau of Investigation



603 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

604 The FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for domestic intelligence, terrorism investigations,
605 hostage rescue, and counterterrorism actions. During a significant incident, the Combined Tactical
606 Operations Center (CTOC) and multi-agency Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) at the FBI Washington
607 Field Office (WFO) may be utilized, in addition to the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC)
608 at FBI Headquarters.

609 During an incident, the FBI will focus on its lead agency responsibilities for crisis response,
610 counterterrorism, intelligence, investigative and crime scene operations where jurisdiction exists, and
611 related aspects of the event for which the FBI has jurisdiction.

612 WFO personnel will respond to incidents as required, and other agencies with operational roles in safety
613 and security related to the event may be represented in the CTOC. District of Columbia Joint Terrorism
614 Task Force (JTTF) special agents and task force officers will investigate any terrorism incidents or
615 criminal acts requiring an FBI investigative response. WFO Special Agent Bomb Technicians, HAZMAT
616 Response Team, Evidence Response Team, SWAT assets, and WMD countermeasures assets may
617 respond to any incidents requiring their capabilities.

618 [Additional information to be added at a later date.]

619 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)



620 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

621 ATF protects our communities from violent criminals, criminal organizations, the illegal
622 use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use and storage of explosives, acts of arson and bombings, acts
623 of terrorism, and the illegal diversion of alcohol and tobacco products. During a critical incident, ATF will
624 provide support to lead agencies, or serve as a lead agency, as appropriate. ATF will work cooperatively
625 to provide assistance to prevent, mitigate or resolve an incident. Further, ATF serves as the
626 Department of Justice agent to coordinate assistance to law enforcement under the National Response
627 Framework (NRF) Emergency Support Function 13 (Public Safety and Security).

628
629 ATF's Joint Support Operations Center (JSOC) will maintain situational awareness following a significant
630 or catastrophic incident. The JSOC is ATF's 24/7 operations center that provides coordination and
631 communication support for ATF's national law enforcement functions. The JSOC monitors critical and
632 catastrophic incidents, provides emergency and executive notifications, and serves as a round-the-clock
633 access point for ATF assistance. Incidents in the National Capital Region will receive initial responses
634 from Washington and/or Baltimore Field Divisions, with back-up support from national assets. All
635 requests for assistance for ATF resources may be made through the JSOC or field division contacts.

636 ATF personnel will respond to assist federal, state and local agencies, as required. Assets may include
637 Special Agent (SA) investigators, SA Certified Explosives Specialists, SA Certified Fire Investigators,
638 Explosives Enforcement Officers, Special Response Teams (SWAT), National Response Team (multi-
639 disciplinary post-fire/post-blast investigative assets), and canine teams.



640 **U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)**

641 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

642 The United States Marshals Service (USMS) is responsible for several protection missions involving
643 selected government officials. The USMS would augment other law enforcement agencies in the event
644 of an ESF #13 activation.

645 The USMS maintains the USMS Communications Center, which is a 24/7 operations facility that
646 maintains contact with all USMS districts and divisions as well as providing full field support with critical
647 law enforcement databases and other mission support.

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648 **Department of State**

649 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

650 The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is responsible for the protection of the
651 Secretary of State, other high-ranking State Department officials, and is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA)
652 for protection of foreign dignitaries below the rank of head of state. DS also has protective coverage for
653 the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, designated as a Cabinet-level position.

654 The Department of State has the following responsibilities:

- 655 • Responsibility for protection of all State Department facilities and staff.
- 656 • Shares authorities with the U.S. Secret Service – Uniformed Division for protective measures for
657 foreign officials and embassies.

658 ***Coordination and Support***

659 In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the State Department
660 would work closely with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Federal Protective Service (FPS), and
661 Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

662 There is close coordination with several nearby federal departments and agencies, including the Federal
663 Reserve, Pan American Health Organization, U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and the
664 Institute of Peace, as well as nearby buildings that house non-governmental organizations (e.g., the
665 American Red Cross and American Pharmacists Association). There is a process of notification from the
666 Department of State to these stakeholders if an incident occurs.

667 If State Department facilities need to be evacuated, the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and
668 FPS would protect the perimeter of the facilities, and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) would
669 protect the streets surrounding the facilities.

670 The Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security has coordinated with some of the individual embassies
671 within the District of Columbia; however, no overall coordinated effort for joint planning or exercising
672 with foreign embassies is in place.

673 Key Federal Stakeholders: U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division; Federal Protective Service (FPS).

674 ***Potential Actions***

675 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list
676 provides possible actions that could be taken by the Department of State:

- 677 • Diplomatic Security uniformed officers (contractors) have Special Deputy U.S. Marshal (SDUSM)
678 status when performing State Department protective missions – to include expanding the
679 security perimeter and potentially closing streets in the vicinity of the main State Department
680 complex.

- 681 • During an incident, the Department of State may request that streets surrounding foreign
682 embassies be closed off; however, they do not have the authority or assets to implement this
683 and would rely on the USSS – Uniformed Division and MPD to implement this action.
- 684 • The Department has the authority to close off International Place; however, they do not have
685 the assets to implement/enforce this and would rely on the USSS – Uniformed Division and MPD
686 to implement this action.
- 687 • The Department coordinates the movement of visiting dignitaries to and from State Department
688 facilities.

689 *Information Sharing*

690 The State Department depends on its operations centers for sending and receiving incident related
691 information. There are several operations centers:

- 692 • Security Control Center – domestic focus for facility security and protection
- 693 • Diplomatic Security Command Center – international focus
- 694 • Emergency Management Center – manages day-to-day situational awareness for domestic
695 facility operations and safety, and is the central location for managing emergencies impacting
696 domestic facilities

697 Additionally, the Department's centers use the following information-sharing tools for for external
698 information-sharing:

- 699 • NAWAS/WAWAS
- 700 • WebEOC
- 701 • Domestic Events Network (DEN)

702 Department of Transportation (DOT)



703 The Department of Transportation Crisis Management Center (CMC) is staffed 24x7 and
704 will serve as a first point of contact for federal transportation inquiries.

705 *Responsibilities and Mission Priorities*

706 DOT has authority under the direction of the President to exercise leadership in transportation matters,
707 including matters affecting national security and national or regional emergencies.

- 708 • DOT has the authority to waive certain safety regulation during emergency situations.
- 709 • The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can stop, redirect, or exclude any movement in the
710 navigable airspace of the United States.
- 711 • Any movement by a rail carrier in the United States, including commuter rail, but excluding
712 urban rapid transit not connected to the general system of rail transportation, can be stopped,
713 redirected, or limited by the combined authority of the Surface Transportation Board (STB) and
714 the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
- 715 • Upon declaration of a regional or local emergency, either by the President, designated Federal
716 Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA) officials, or appropriate state or local officials,
717 FMCSA regulations automatically provide temporary relief from specific safety regulations to
718 any motor carrier or driver operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) to provide direct
719 emergency assistance during the emergency regardless of the commodity involved.
 - 720 ○ This regulatory relief includes hours of service requirements; driver qualification
721 requirements; CMV operation, inspection, repair and maintenance requirements; and
722 employee safety and health standards.
 - 723 ○ This does not provide relief from the requirements for a Commercial Drivers License
724 (CDL), controlled substances and alcohol testing, or motor carrier financial
725 responsibility/insurance. However, the CDL regulations themselves include a number of
726 exceptions, which apply at all times, not just during emergencies.
- 727 • For pipelines, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration has authority to issue
728 an administrative order suspending or restricting operation of a gas or hazardous liquid pipeline
729 facility without prior notice and hearing if it determines that continued operation of the pipeline
730 facility is or would be hazardous, and failure to issue the order expeditiously will result in likely
731 serious harm to life, property or the environment.

732 *Coordination and Support*

733 In the event of a mass evacuation of the NCR, DOT would coordinate with DC HSEMA and the Public
734 Safety Transportation Operations Center (PSTOC). In lieu of direct support, DOT would look to those
735 agencies to gain a common operating picture and to maintain situational awareness. Crowd control,
736 road safety, first aid, and traffic control would also be addressed.

737 When drills are being performed by NORTHCOM, emergency coordinators inform DOT and share
738 information on the drills. During National Special Security Events (NSSEs), a DOT liaison is often sent to
739 DC HSEMA. DOT also works closely with the various state departments of transportation.

740 ***Information Sharing***

741 DOT uses several systems to disseminate, receive, and share information. The primary means to
742 disseminate information is by e-mail and telephone. In the near future, WebEOC, a web-enabled crisis
743 information management system, will be used to share information real-time. The Washington
744 Metropolitan Area Warning System (WAWAS) is tested every day for operational accuracy.

745 **Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)**

746 The FAA staffs the Air Security Operations Center (ASOC) at the Freedom Center with other interagency
747 members and will coordinate and manage aviation and airspace security incidents via the Domestic
748 Events Network (DEN). The DEN is a 24x7 controlled-access unsecured conference call between FAA Air
749 Traffic Security Coordinators, major air traffic control facilities, NORAD, and other entities associated
750 with the national aerospace system and airspace security matters.

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751 **General Services Administration (GSA)**



752 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

753 During an emergency, the GSA National Capital Region primary function is to provide reconstitution
754 services to the Federal Executive Branch, and the Legislative and Judicial branches when requested, in
755 the form of real estate, work space, and acquisition of supplies and services. GSA NCR offers a wide
756 range of products and services including vehicle/fleet management, procurement, real estate,
757 communications and information technology. GSA NCR owns or leases over 750 buildings in the
758 National Capital Region.

759 The GSA NCR area of responsibility encompasses all of Washington, D.C., the Virginia cities of Alexandria
760 and Falls Church, the Virginia counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William, and the
761 Maryland counties of Montgomery and Prince George.

762 GSA is also the co-lead with FEMA on Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and
763 Resource Support.

764 ***Coordination and Support***

765 In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, GSA-NCR would work
766 closely with GSA headquarters and the Federal Protective Service (FPS). They would seek to maintain
767 real-time situational awareness via the GSA headquarters Emergency Operations Center and access to
768 various local and national information sources such as WAWAS. GSA-NCR would also be in close
769 communication/coordination with the FPS Mega Center.

770 GSA-NCR is open to interagency or neighborhood coordination and planning efforts and has been
771 involved in some regional interagency activities, including the Eagle Horizon exercise series.

772 Key Federal Stakeholders: Federal Protective Service (FPS); all federal departments and agencies with
773 GSA-owned or leased building space.

774 ***Potential Actions***

775 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list
776 provides possible actions that could be taken by GSA:

- 777 ○ Possible staggered release of GSA personnel (situation dependent).
- 778 ○ If necessary, GSA has the authority to shut down GSA owned/leased buildings with a federal
779 presence.

780 The decision to take any of these actions would be made by the GSA NCR Senior Emergency Response
781 Team (SERT).

782 ***Information Sharing***

783 GSA NCR coordinates closely with GSA headquarters and FPS for situational awareness. GSA uses Law
784 Enforcement Online (LEO) for situational awareness and collaboration.

785 **Office of Personnel Management**



786 ***Responsibilities and Mission Priorities***

787 OPM is the “personnel manager” for the federal government. In the event of the mass
 788 release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, OPM would be involved in a National Capital
 789 Regional coordination call, similar to the “snow call,” on which regional stakeholders would discuss the
 790 potential release of the federal workforce as a result of an incident. Prior to this call, OPM leadership
 791 would gather information to inform the decision of the OPM Director about a potential release. The
 792 coordination call would finalize the decision. Options for the federal government operating status
 793 during an incident include: closure, release, and delay.

- 794 • The OPM Director has the authority through the Closure and Dismissal Policy to provide
 795 guidance to executive level departments and agencies regarding the status of federal
 796 government operations for closure, release and/or delay.
- 797 • During an incident, the OPM Director has the authority, along with the Incident Commander, to
 798 make the decision regarding the operating status of the federal government.

799 OPM does not have the authority to order an evacuation of the federal government, but works closely
 800 with the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the respective governors of Virginia and Maryland (and
 801 local infrastructure), when an evacuation of the federal workforce is necessary.

802 ***Potential Actions***

803 In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list
 804 provides possible actions that could be taken by OPM:

- 805 • OPM Director makes the decision regarding the operating status of federal government, to
 806 include: closure, release, and/or delay.
- 807 • Hosting a “coordination call,” similar to the “snow call,” with regional stakeholders to finalize
 808 the decision of the federal government operating status.
- 809 • Communication of the decision of the federal government operating status to the federal
 810 workforce, general public, and the media.

811 ***Coordination and Support***

812 In the event of a catastrophic incident, OPM would work closely with the Federal Protective Service
 813 (FPS), DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DC FEMS), Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), DC
 814 Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (DC HSEMA) , and the Metropolitan
 815 Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG).

816 Key Federal Stakeholders: Federal Protective Service (FPS); FEMA.

817 ***Information Sharing***

818 OPM depends on its Situation Room for sending and receiving incident-related information. The
 819 Situation Room monitors several different state, local, regional, and national systems for the latest

820 incident-related information. The Situation Room has several standard operating procedures (SOPs)
821 addressing a wide range of potential incidents (all hazards).

822 Additionally, the Situation Room uses the following information-sharing tools:

- 823 • NAWAS/WAWAS
- 824 • WebEOC
- 825 • FAA Domestic Events Network (DEN)
- 826 • RICCS

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827 **Administration and Maintenance**

- 828 FEMA NCRC and OPM, in conjunction with key planning partners in the NCR Federal Workforce
829 Preparedness Subcommittee, will test and validate the CONPLAN through an exercise process. Based on
830 the results of the exercise(s), the CONPLAN will be revised.
- 831 The CONPLAN will be maintained and updated by FEMA NCRC with the assistance of OPM.

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Appendix A: Interview Guide

Background

In the event of a catastrophic incident or threat to the NCR, the significant federal presence would both necessitate and complicate a robust response. In order to facilitate the coordination that would be required for the integration of federal, state, and local response elements, OPM and NCRC are compiling an “NCR Federal Concept Plan of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions.” The purpose of this CONPLAN is to identify what authorities key federal departments and agencies (D/As) have and what general protective actions these D/As might take in order to inform the emergency plans and response of the state and local jurisdictions. The scope of this particular CONPLAN is to identify the overlap between federal, state, and local agencies in the event of a large-scale early release of federal employees or mass evacuation of the NCR.

It is understood that the specific and detailed actions that each agency would undertake during such a scenario may be sensitive. With this in mind, OPM and the NCRC would like your assistance in striking a balance between these security concerns and providing useful information to the state and local emergency management and first responder agencies to inform their EOPs to better facilitate a coordinated response. Examples of the kind of information that could be included in the CONPLAN: federal agency authorities to close roads or restrict public access or resources, key federal/state/local partnerships, critical information that your agency would require or need disseminated to state/local first responders, critical support that your agency might require from state/local first responders, etc.

Sample Questions

- What support from municipal, county, state entities would your D/A require during an NCR catastrophic incident, given that OPM or other appropriate authority has ordered the early release of all Federal employees and/or mass evacuation of the NCR?
- What External Authorities / Responsibilities relevant to this situation does your D/A have?
 - What actions would you take based on these authorities/responsibilities?
- Are there any additional protective measures or actions you would take to protect employees of your D/A?
 - Who has the authority to implement these actions?
- Information-Sharing Mechanisms
 - In general, would your agency communicate with other federal D/As regarding the implementation of these actions? How?
 - In general, would your agency coordinate these actions with the state and local jurisdictions? How?
- Does your D/A coordinate and/or exercise emergency plans with other Federal D/As? How about State, County, and/or Municipal Agencies?
 - With other federal D/As?

Appendix B: Authorities and References

Federal Authorities

- Homeland Security Act 2002
- 29 C.F.R §1910.38 (2003)
- 44 C.F.R. (2007)
- 5 C.F.R.§ 230
- 5 C.F.R.§ 550
- Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62
- Department of Defense Directive 5111.13 - Defense Support to Civil Authorities
- Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)
 - HSPD 5 – Management of Domestic Incidents: National Response Framework and National Incident Management System
 - HSPD 7 – Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection
- Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) 1 and 2 (February 2008)
- National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS)
- Washington, D.C. Area Dismissal or Closure Procedures (OPM; Nov. 2009)
- Human Resources Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal Government (OPM; Jan. 2008)
- OPM Memorandum: Human Resources Flexibilities Available to Assist Federal Employees During Emergencies (5 May 2009)
- OPM Memorandum: Pandemic Influenza 2009: Additional Guidance dated (31 July 2009)

State-Level References

Emergency Management Laws and/or Code

- D.C. Code Ann. §7-2331 et seq. Emergency Management Assistance Act
- Maryland Code, Ann. § 14 Emergency Management
- Virginia Code § 44-146.13 Chapter 3.2 - Emergency Services and Disaster Law, Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 2000

State Plans

- District of Columbia Response Plan (April 2002)
- Maryland Emergency Operations Plan (March 2002)
- Virginia Emergency Operations Plan (March 2001)
- Emergency Management Assistance Compact (Public Law 104-321, October 1996)

Nation Capital Region-Level References

- Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (September 2010)
- Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the District of Columbia, State of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of Virginia
- National Capital Region First Hour Checklist

Appendix C: Glossary

AHC	All Hazards Consortium
ARC	American Red Cross
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CIR	Critical Information Requirements
COG	Continuity of Government / Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
COGCON	Continuity of Government Condition
CONPLAN	NCR Federal Concept Plan of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions
COOP	Continuity of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
D/A	Department/Agency
DC	District of Columbia
DC DHS	District of Columbia Department of Human Services
DC DOH	District of Columbia Department of Health
DC FEMS	District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
DC HSEMA	District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency
DDOT	District of Columbia Department of Transportation
DEN	Domestic Events Network (FAA)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	United States Department of Defense
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPS	Federal Protective Service (DHS)
FY	Fiscal Year

GSA	General Services Administration
HHS	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HSIN	Homeland Security Information Network
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
JCC	Justice Command Center
JFC	Joint Federal Committee
JFHQ-NCR	Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region
JFO	Joint Field Office
LEO	Law Enforcement Officer / Law Enforcement Online
MD	State of Maryland
MD SHA	Maryland State Highway Administration
MEMA	Maryland Emergency Management Agency
MPD	Metropolitan Police Department
MWCOG	Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
NAWAS	National Warning System
NCP	National Continuity Programs (FEMA)
NCR	National Capital Region
NCRC	Office of National Capital Region Coordination (FEMA)
NFWPSC	NCR Federal Workforce Preparedness Subcommittee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NOC	National Operations Center (DHS)
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)
NRF	National Response Framework
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NVOAD	National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters
OEP	Occupant Emergency Plan
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PA	Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

RCPGP	Regional Catastrophic Planning Grants Program
REC/RWG	Regional Executive Working Group / Regional Working Group
RECP	Regional Emergency Coordination Plan
RESF	Regional Emergency Support Function
RRCC	Regional Response Coordination Center (FEMA)
SIOC	Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI)
TSOC	Transportation Security Operations Center (Freedom Center)
TTX	Table-Top Exercise
USAO	United States Attorney's Office
USCP	United States Capitol Police
USPP	United States Park Police
USMS	United States Marshals Service
USSS	United States Secret Service
VA	Commonwealth of Virginia
VDEM	Virginia Department of Emergency Management
VDOT	Virginia Department of Transportation
VIPER	Virginia Interoperability Picture for Emergency Response
VOAD	Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster
WAWAS	Washington Metropolitan Area Warning System
WH EOP	White House Executive Office of the President
WMATA	Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
WV	State of West Virginia