ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE
FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY
(COIN) –

AJP-3.4.4

FEBRUARY 2011
1. **AJP-3.4.4 - ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)** is a NATO UNCLASSIFIED Publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2611.

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   Cihangir AKSIT, TUR Civ
   Director, NATO Standardization Agency
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## RECORD OF CHANGES

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# RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

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## RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

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| GBR    | a. GBR does not agree with the incorrect use of the word “Neutrality” in Para 0344.  
b. GBR has reservations on the legal implications of the wording used in Para 0510; and also in Para 0541.  
c. GBR proposes an immediate re-write of AJP-3.4.4 once Edition One has been ratified and suggests that this may the opportunity to address minor reservations, detailed comments and future developments. |
| USA    | a. The United States (US) does not subscribe to the language in paragraph 0101 and footnote 2 that introduces a new term “wicked problems” (not NATO approved) to replace an acceptable term “complex operations”. Non-NATO approved terms should not be used in the lexicon of this AJP.  
Rationale. The US does not believe that a new term based on a book or article is sufficient reference to insert into a ratification draft. Also, since the term is rather colloquial in nature, it does not clearly describe the COIN operational environment. “Complex operations” is consistent with other uses of the term in this document.  
b. The US does not subscribe to the proposed definition of insurgency in paragraphs 0109, 0302 and the glossary, that defines an insurgency as “the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change in a region” versus “overthrowing or forcing a change of a governing authority”, or that it “focuses on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.”  
Rationale. Proposed definition is not consistent with nor appreciably improves upon approved definition for “insurgency” found in AAP-6(2010), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, i.e., “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” While the AAP-6 definition may not be perfect, the proposed definition in AJP-3.4.4 RD2 lacks concision and precludes those potential contexts where the focus of the insurgency may be on the government itself, and not the population. As such, an acceptable compromise would be to modify the AAP-6 definition to read: “an organized movement aimed at that seeks political change or the overthrow of a constituted government governing authority through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”  
c. The US does not accept the misuse of “effect” in paragraph 0419. At present the sentence reads, “The LOOs are the insurgency’s operational ways to cause effects to change the current conditions.” An acceptable solution would be to change the sentence to read, “The LOOs are the insurgency’s operational ways to cause generate effects to change the current conditions.”  
Rationale. Effects are created or generated to support the achievement of objectives. This proposed change harmonizes “effects” with AJP-01, “Allied Joint Doctrine”, and Military Committee Memorandum (MCM)-0041-2010, “Military Committee Position on the Use of Effects in Operations”.  
d. The United States does not subscribe to the terms and definitions in the glossary that deviate from AAP-47, “Allied Joint Doctrine Development”, for AJP lexicon. The United States specifically does not agree with terms and definitions included in the glossary that:  
(1) Are not in accordance with Military Committee Terminology Conference (MCTC) agreements: actor (definition should be in accordance with MCM-0041-2010).  
(2) Are definitions that are misquoted from Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6 or another proponent Allied joint publication: counterinsurgency and insurgency.  
(3) Are not AAP-6 approved: defeat, information activities, information operations, irregular activity and reintegration. |
References:

a. AAP-6 Glossary of Terms and Definitions  
b. AAP-15 Glossary of Abbreviations  
c. AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine  
d. AJP-2.5 Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents  
e. AJP-3 Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations  
f. AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations  
g. ATP-3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics  
h. ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks  
i. AJP-3.2.3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police  
j. AJP-3.4 Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations  
k. AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations  
l. AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations  
m. AJP-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations  
n. AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)  
o. AJP-9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) doctrine  

PREFACE

0001. AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) provides a common NATO doctrine to guide commanders and staffs of operational formations and units engaged in the conduct of COIN. The publication also informs a wide range of civil actors and organisations, involved in security and stabilisation of the full range of capabilities that the military may contribute to a joint, interagency and multinational response to the resolution of complex challenges, such as caused by an insurgency.

0002. AJP-3.4.4 has been developed for use at the operational and tactical levels and describes COIN as one of the predominant campaign themes. The publication provides a description of the complex operational environment, its actors and all important influencing factors. The publication describes insurgency as the most dangerous and challenging irregular activity that can occur in a failed or fragile state. The description of insurgency sets the scene for a comprehensive description of the attributes of counterinsurgency, the planning and the military contribution.

0003. AJP-3.2 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations’ provides the doctrinal underpinning for the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign theme and its relationship to the conduct of operations across the full range of military activities. AJP-3.4 ‘Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’ (NA5CRO) describes the considerations relevant to the successful conduct of various types of complex operation; insurgency being one of the identified irregular threats that the Alliance has to counter.

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1 The description of COIN as a separate campaign theme is evolving. In recent draft publications, such AJP-3B, the term countering irregular-activity (including counter insurgency as probably the most demanding variant) is now being introduced as one of the major campaign (sometimes called operational) themes.
COUNTERINSURGENCY

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Purpose

0101. AJP-3.4.4 provides a common NATO doctrine to guide commanders, staffs and forces engaged in the conduct of COIN. It also informs civil actors involved in security and stabilisation of the full range of capabilities that the military may contribute to a joint, interagency and multinational response to the resolution of such ‘wicked problems’.2

0102. AJP-3.2 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations’ provides the doctrinal underpinning for the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign theme and its relationship to the conduct of operations across the full range of military activities. AJP-3.4 ‘Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’ (NA5CRO) describes the considerations relevant to the successful conduct of various types of complex operations, insurgency being one of the identified irregular threats that the Alliance has to counter.

0103. This document aims to inform and guide the planning and conduct of NATO counterinsurgency. It is based on the assumption that a decision to launch NATO or NATO-led operations involving COIN will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law. It is also based upon the assumption that the conduct of COIN operations will have to conform to relevant international law. Any provisions, definitions or obligations in this AJP may not be interpreted or construed as state practice or a change in effective agreements on the law of armed conflict (LOAC).

0104. All statements and terminology regarding an insurgency and its organisational and operational patterns are not intended to convey any legal connotation or combatant status, but rather assist NATO commanders and staffs in understanding and describing their operational environment and planning and executing COIN operations.

0105. This document does not address such insurgencies as may occur within the territory of any NATO member state. It is fully understood that such situations will be governed by the affected state's domestic law.

Background

0106. The post-1945 international organisational architecture has struggled at times to cope with and adapt to the complexity associated with intra-state violence and instability. Organisations were designed to deal with inter-state conflict. Therefore, the approach has been based on applying the traditional norm of state sovereignty. In the current international strategic context, however, most of the major threats and risks emanate from failed or fragile states. The fragility of such states has the potential to destabilise entire regions. A characteristic of fragile states is the inability of their governments to discharge their responsibilities effectively. Insecurity and instability is likely to follow, caused by those with specific grievances and opportunists keen to

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2 A wicked problem is one that is difficult to resolve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognise and predict. When solving one aspect of a problem complex interdependencies may manifest themselves in unintended consequences. Rittel, Horst, and Melvin Webber; "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," pp. 155-169, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4.
exploit the vacuum of authority. Frequently the states do not have an effective monopoly on the use of violence, which inhibits their ability to prevent or resolve societal conflicts. NATO’s response to global instability, conflict and failed states in areas affecting Alliance interests will demand a wide range of intergovernmental activity, potentially including Allied military operations to assist a host nation (HN). This presents us with a new set of challenges distinctly different from those we have previously faced.

0107. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone significant transformation to enable it to meet global instability challenges. Alliance partners are routinely engaged in the conduct of complex operations beyond their own territory. To remain effective, NATO must maintain the ability to respond swiftly and decisively across the full range of intervention scenarios, a requirement that not only applies to the prevention and mediation of conflict but also extends to the stabilisation of environments emerging from, or still in, violent conflict, in order to support recovery and provide a platform for political, economic and social progress.

Structure of the Counterinsurgency Publication

0108. This publication is structured as follows:

a. Chapter 1 places COIN, as a campaign theme, in context describing the operational environment, the importance of developing a comprehensive approach, and the requirement to understand how the range of military activities relates to the conduct of COIN.

b. Chapter 2 describes the complexity of the operational environment and its constituent parts, including: actors, irregular activities and, within this, the role of the insurgent.

c. Chapter 3 describes insurgency and COIN and the prerequisites and favourable conditions that lead to insurgency. It focuses on the dynamics and vulnerabilities of an insurgency. The chapter also details “the attributes” of COIN, which should be used in concert with the principles of Allied joint and multinational operations.

d. Chapter 4 discusses those factors essential to the planning process within a COIN campaign.

e. Chapter 5 explains the military contribution to the COIN campaign aiming at the tactical level.

Understanding Counterinsurgency in Context

0109. Insurgency is defined as the actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. Conversely, COIN is defined as the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological

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3 This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6.
activities with the aim to defeat insurgencies and address any core grievances. However, efforts taken to counter an insurgency cannot ignore the destabilising effects of irregular activity. For the purpose of this publication, irregular activity is defined as the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. Insurgency and COIN are distinctly different but cannot be looked at in isolation; nor can countering an insurgency ignore the impact of irregular activity and its destabilising effects. Insurgents seek to force political change on those in political power, whereas counterinsurgents seek to check insurgent activity and its associated irregular activity, so fostering perceived legitimacy of the HN government.

0110. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents employ varied tactics and methods. These include political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure activities (ways), in an attempt to reach a favourable outcome (ends) and within the resources available, including time (means). If this broad array is generally categorised as political and military in nature, political considerations are of much greater importance than military considerations in a struggle for the consent of the population. Therefore, every action in COIN should support a political resolution to the problem. This is particularly important when considering those organisations that contribute to humanitarian assistance and economic development efforts, some of whom operate in an impartial and neutral manner. When viewed through the lens of an insurgent these activities are unlikely to be perceived as neutral because they promote the legitimacy of the HN government. This presents a dilemma to the HN and the Alliance and provides the insurgent an opportunity to exploit such vulnerabilities. Unity of purpose and unity of effort are essential for the multiplicity of actors engaged within a COIN environment and such a coordinated approach must be nurtured and safeguarded.

0111. Civil authorities should normally have the lead for delivering internal security and stabilisation. However, the lack of a permissive environment may require military forces to contribute more widely to security and capacity-building tasks. As a result the military contribution may dominate the early phases of a campaign during the contest to deliver a favourable security environment that protects the population. The aim of such activity is to foster HN government capacity and legitimacy, build human security and stimulate economic activity. Tasks that may fall to the military include: providing security for the population, restoration of essential services, support to economic and infrastructure development, establishment of interim governance and security of communication. This military contribution within a unified and comprehensive approach sets those decisive conditions that allow security and stabilisation to flourish and sits at the heart of the COIN campaign. Civil and military actors must work together in a coordinated and integrated manner.

0112. The success of both civil and military activities is determined in the cognitive realm and is a function of key target audiences perception, and the ability to match words

4 Definition of “defeat” in accordance with ST 2287: “(To) diminish the effectiveness of the enemy, to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfill his intention.”

5 This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6.

6 This term and definition is being staffed within the context of this publication for ratification and will be proposed as a modification to the existing term in AAP-6.
with the deeds. The synchronisation and coordination of information activities and public diplomacy are critical to the success of a COIN campaign. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents attempt to gain the support of the population and the population has a critical role to play in the outcome of complex operations. The support of the population must therefore be a key factor throughout the planning and execution of COIN campaigns. As an insurgency tends to be nested within regional complexity, characterised by instability and conflict, it is essential that both the political and military apparatus address the strategic context of the operational environment to ensure that any political settlement is both enduring and self-sustaining.

0113. Part of the military contribution is likely to involve countering a mix of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and disorder. For this reason, the threats to the security and stability of a state or region, and the variety of tasks the military may be called upon to perform, are wide-ranging. The military increasingly operates alongside a proliferation of multi-agency and multinational actors to deliver a secure and stable environment. Increased globalisation, changes in international systems, complex sovereignty issues, and the increasing number of transnational actors who seek to influence international outcomes and the governance of global affairs, demand a new approach. While stability remains the decisive condition, the platform without which the state cannot prosper, the provision of security is the key element in delivering an enduring political settlement. Within this context, COIN represents an important aspect of the overall military contribution at the tactical level and demands the employment of the full range of military activities\(^7\); the application and employment of which must be guided by the “attributes of COIN”\(^8\).

0114. The likelihood of success in a COIN campaign is a function not simply of the application of coherent military power against an opponent, but also of a range of wider factors, such as the uncertainties induced by unpredictable events, the interplay of chance and the vagaries of human nature. It is therefore crucial, in order to identify opportunity and risk, that commanders understand fully the context in which military power is to be applied and the type of campaign in which they are engaged. Only then can commanders shape the situation to their advantage, learning, adapting and anticipating as the campaign evolves.

**The Operational Environment**

0115. For this publication, the operational environment can be described as composite of the conditions, circumstances, influences, characteristics and actors which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander (and civil actors) and will differ with each military operation or campaign.

0116. This publication describes a generic operational environment that NATO forces may encounter when conducting COIN. The complexity of COIN requires commanders and their staffs to understand how non-military and potentially international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operate to achieve a stable and self-sustaining secure environment. A NATO military response towards any conflict or crisis must therefore be integrated into a wider overall framework, or

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7 AJP-3.2 describes military activities as - offensive, defensive, stability and enabling - all of which can be further broken down into land tactical activities.

8 The attributes of COIN are described in Chapter 3, Part II. Some nations refer to attributes as principles.
collective strategy. This collective strategy must be planned and executed in practice through a comprehensive approach with unity of purpose and effort.

0117. Although direct, open state-on-state conflict may be absent, the operational environment will continue to show a marked increase in the prevalence of irregular activities. The growth of ungoverned space, fuelled by perceived or actual grievance, deprivation and resentment affects the sentiments and sensibilities of the global population. Key drivers that may cause conflict include:

a. globalisation and global inequality;
b. urbanisation and changing demographic trends;
c. re-emergence of extremist ideologies;
d. access to technology, networks and cyberspace;
e. humanitarian crises (including natural disasters); and
f. competition for resources.

A Comprehensive Approach

0118. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today’s challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of NATO’s political and military instruments with the other instruments of power. This needs to be a broader cooperation and planning in accordance with the principles and decisions of relevant senior NATO bodies. NATO’s engagement in a comprehensive approach to crisis management is focused at three levels:

a. At the political and strategic level, NATO concentrates on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors.

b. At the theatre level, NATO force commanders must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination with indigenous local authorities and other international actors in the execution of operations.

c. At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required.

All 3 levels must function in a complementary manner to achieve success.9

0119. Within a complex operational environment there is a need to proactively coordinate the activities of a wide range of actors. A comprehensive approach seeks to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation. It should invigorate existing processes and strengthen relationships at the joint, inter-agency and multinational levels. A comprehensive approach should also consider actors beyond government, such as NGOs, IOs and others all conduct activities that have a bearing on the overall outcome. This is particularly relevant for land forces at all levels where they should expect to operate alongside these actors. It should be clearly understood that NATO military forces do not own, nor should they expect to lead, this comprehensive

9 This section on comprehensive approach is based upon AJP-01(D) RD1.
approach, but they should aim to foster and create those conditions where cooperation and collaboration support the campaign.

Counterinsurgency and the Range of Military Activities

0120. In general terms, armed forces operate through the use or threat of collective violence. However, while military forces must be prepared to conduct high-intensity conflict, they must also be adaptive organisations capable of performing a wide variety of other activities, including humanitarian assistance, peace support, deterrence, and helping to reconstruct failed states through capacity building. This last role has gained increased importance in the operational environment because the level of threat and violence frequently prevents civilian organisations from performing their development and capacity building tasks. This environment and the increasing use of armed forces for security, military support to stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts demand a re-examination of how we visualise the conduct of operations.

0121. The range of military activities provides a framework for understanding the complexity of the operational environment while analysing, planning, and preparing for, executing and assessing operations. Recent experiences have shown that campaigns and subordinate operations often require military forces to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict. Commanders cannot focus on a single activity or sequential progression. Rather, they must be able to effectively visualise how a campaign or operation is likely to evolve over time and in light of changing circumstances throughout their area of operations (AOO). Although they usually will not control civilian activities and may have limited influence upon them, commanders must nonetheless understand all military and civilian aspects of a comprehensive approach because of its impact upon the operational environment and resulting effects upon military requirements. Campaign success is likely to depend on understanding such simultaneity, how it evolves throughout the campaign, and how it affects the planning and execution of activities. All commanders, even at the lowest levels, must grasp this concept if military forces are to remain relevant and effective in the future.

0122. All types of military activities can be conducted simultaneously, although some may be sequential - such as attack followed by defence. The balance among the types of military activity employed gives a campaign its predominant character. A major combat campaign theme may consist primarily of offensive activities, while COIN requires the measured application of offensive, defensive, stability and enabling tasks, cognizant of the effect one type of activity may have on the relative success of another. Stability tasks must be planned for and resourced prior to the commencement of any campaign, as they represent an inevitable phase at a relatively early stage of any campaign, and its success will often require substantial lead time.
CHAPTER 2 - THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section I - Operating Context

0201. This chapter develops the understanding of the operational environment introduced in AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. For the purpose of this publication, the operational environment is described as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, influences, characteristics and actors which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander (and civil actors) and will differ with each military operation or campaign. This composite will consist of those elements found in a theatre of operations, such as the populace and their culture, and of some elements that will be imported such as the influence of transnational or international organisations, and Alliance forces themselves.

0202. Understanding the complexity and interrelationships between elements of the operational environment is fundamental to both insurgent and counterinsurgent operations. While this chapter addresses some of the generic aspects of the operational environment in isolation, the reader should be cognizant that the operational environment is truly dynamic, interconnected and constantly adapting to change. The operational environment may be shaped deliberately or unintentionally by external factors and provides those conditions that allow irregular activity to flourish if left unchecked. See Section II for additional information on the operational environment.

Elements of a Stable State

0203. It is important to examine the functionalities and norms that underpin a stable state, because it is the breakdown in these elements that generates state fragility and failure. Figure 2.1 introduces a simple model that illustrates the elements of a stable state: human security, economic and infrastructure development; governance and the rule of law. While these elements can be analysed individually, it is unhelpful and potentially distorting to view them as separate and discrete. The stability of the state depends upon the manner in which the elements interact and are mutually supporting. The three elements, underpinned by societal relationships, form the interdependent building blocks that make up a stable state.
0204. **Security.** Security is characterised by freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities such as water and food; broader environmental security; and the protection of private property, public assets and cultural values. The ability to protect itself against this range of threats, and extend this protection to the population, is a vitally important competence and function of a stable state. An inability to get produce to market, get children to school and to travel freely will have a direct impact on the confidence of the population. These concepts are not absolute - perceptions matter. Security can be broken down into human security, personal security, national security, and physical security.

a. **Human Security** is characterised by: freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.

b. **Personal Security** is that part of human security which ensures protection of an individual from persecution, intimidation, reprisals and other forms of systematic violence.

c. **National Security** is the traditional understanding of security as encompassing the safety of a state or organisation and its protection from both external and internal threats.

d. **Physical Security** is that part of National Security that relates to national assets and infrastructure.

0205. **Economic and Infrastructure Development.** The economic infrastructure, level of natural resources, degree of technological development, industrial base, communications network and level of government revenue will shape the ability of the state to provide stable governance. Collectively these meet the needs and expectations of the population. For members of the population, economic development determines their quality of life in terms of the ability to access jobs, basic commodities, health, education, adequate housing and reliable energy.

0206. **Governance and the Rule of Law.** The rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance. A stable state has a sustainable political structure that facilitates the peaceful resolution of internal contests for power. In a functioning state, government and the institutions of civil society are able to provide security as well as the fiscal and judicial functions that are prerequisites for basic public administration and service delivery.

0207. **Societal Relationships.** The three elements of a stable state encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also fundamentally determined by the societal relationships that underpin and are interwoven with these elements. In a stable state the social, cultural and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population. There will also be an enduring political settlement that frames the manner in which political power is organised.
State Instability

0208. Degradation of any of the elements of the state will lead to erosion of the others. This in turn creates a web of poor governance, economic breakdown and insecurity that stimulates and exacerbates conflict. This may cause, or be caused by, a collapse in the political settlement that regulates key societal and state relationships. Despite huge contextual variations - and every situation will be different - there will be a downward spiral of state stability. This can be characterised by decline or disintegration at the nexus where human security, economic development, governance and the rule of law meets and the consequent unravelling of the political settlement. Figure 2.2 illustrates this downward spiral.

![Economic Collapse Diagram]

Insecurity

Political Settlement

Weak Governance & Rule of Law

State Fragility State Failure

• Government ineptitude or corruption.
• Breakdown of social contract, legitimacy and mandate.
• Loss of Government monopoly on legitimate use of violence.

Societal Disintegration and National Fragmentation

Grievance increasingly finding expression in resurgent sectarianism. Rise of malign irregular actors.

Figure 2.2 - Fragile States: the Downward Spiral

0209. When states become unstable to the point where effective governance begins to break down, the effects can be felt not only locally, but regionally and even globally. Initially, the impact is felt by the local population, as the inability of the state to perform its core functions leads to the previously described downward spiral of insecurity, economic decline and weak governance. This instability is likely to have a regional impact if displaced persons flow across borders and become refugees and transnational criminal networks and other irregular activists flourish in the ungoverned spaces that arise. The existence of these ungoverned spaces are attractive to irregular activists as it potentially allows them to recruit, organise and plan their activities untroubled by state or international authorities.

10 "Ungoverned space" refers to areas that are not effectively governed by a state authority.
Vulnerabilities of Governance and Authority

0210. A state’s authority is dependent upon the successful amalgamation and interplay of the following four factors:

a. **Mandate.** Mandate refers to the perceived legitimacy that establishes a state authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, a recognised or accepted caste/tribal model, or an authoritarian rule.

b. **Manner.** Manner refers to the perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising that mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively.

c. **Support and Consent.** Support and consent refer to the extent to which factions, local populations and others comply with, or resist the authority of those exercising the mandate. The level of consent may range from active resistance, through unwilling compliance, to freely given support.

d. **Expectations.** Expectations refer to the extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or are met by those exercising the mandate.

0211. When the relationship between the governing and the governed breaks down, challenges to authority are likely. If a section of the population cannot achieve a remedy for a significant concern through established political discourse, it may resort to irregular activity. If successful, even on a small scale, this irregular activity might be able to garner increased popular support and develop into an insurgency.

Section II Variable Factors of the Operational Environment

0212. An assessment of the operational environment likely describes the conditions in which instability and a resulting insurgency can take place and may subsequently flourish. To enable a greater understanding of these conditions and to enhance assessment the operational environment is theoretically divided into six discrete environments: political, human, physical, security, information and economic (see Figure 2.3). In practice, however, these environments are dynamically interrelated. All aspects of the operational environment require careful consideration within the estimate process so that a military commander may maximise operational awareness and potentially influence the factors that impact on the strategy of a comprehensive approach. It is important to understand that these environments are formed, led and influenced by human beings, either individually or as a group (government, etc). These human beings and groups are addressed as actors. Partly they will occur within this section on the variable factors and partly they will be described in section III.
The Political Environment

0213. Political environments differ significantly from one region to another, and the difficulties of conducting operations in any one environment are likely to be unique for each situation. For instance, the political pressure on an HN government could take the form of internal political struggles, regional political pressures, religious and ideological issues, and traditional and/or cultural issues. It could be further complicated by the mere presence of NATO forces or by the consequences of actions by NATO-led forces in-theatre.

0214. NATO forces need to be aware of the political environment, and the perceptions of the populations living in these areas, in order to place military actions into a strategic context. An action taken against one state or region may generate reactions in other parts of the world. An awareness of these potential links will also help a commander and his staff to appreciate the implications of military actions throughout their area of interest. Mandate and legitimacy are essential in maintaining Alliance cohesion, because without these two important principles an alliance cannot enjoy the support of the HN and international community, and this will inevitably erode the level of support from respective home populations.

0215. Political oversight and even intervention in military matters is a reality, which means that virtually all military activity is subject to scrutiny by supporters and hostile groups. Decisions and actions rarely affect a single level of military operation; for example, an action at the tactical level may generate an effect (positive or negative) at the strategic level. Within COIN this is very evident. Nevertheless, a commander will need to be well informed of political developments, and to be ready for rapid changes in a political situation that may have serious consequences for military forces.

The Human Environment

0216. The human environment encompasses groups and potential actors, including the opponent that military forces will need to understand and/or influence if military forces are to operate effectively and support the HN in achieving success. At the same time, opponents will seek to exercise influence by both lethal and nonlethal public actions, propaganda, use of the international media and other suitable means to dominate the local population and use them to their cause.

0217. Groups. Potential alliances can form or change rapidly during the course of an operation or campaign. The nature and description of individual actors within the
operational environment are covered in Section III. Everyone present has the potential to influence the course of events in ways which may be positive or negative. The commander will strive to understand the full range of actors; their motivations, aspirations, interests and relationships. Actors can be divided into four categories based on their aims, methods and relationships, including positive, neutral, negative and hostile.

a. **Positive.** Those in this category will generally see the HN government as both legitimate and beneficial and will be supportive of their actions. They would be expected to include members of the HN government and its institutions, including the judiciary, the police, the armed forces and other internal security forces. These institutions are liable to infiltration by groups opposed to either the HN government or NATO intervention.

b. **Neutrals.** Neutrality covers those who may stop short of active opposition to the host government at the one end, through passive consent, to those who support it but with reservations at the other. The conflict produces uncertainty for neutral actors with the potential for both risk and reward. Groups in this category will often play a critical role in the campaign, especially if they constitute a large proportion of the population. Historically, the passive acquiescence of neutrals has proven to be vital to the success of an insurgency. This group cannot be expected to support the HN government until it has clearly shown that it is likely to prevail.

c. **Negative.** Those in this category oppose the HN authority but their day-to-day behaviour stops short of violence against that authority. Those who adopt a negative stance will do so for a variety of reasons. These will range from historical grievance, ideology or religion, to nationalism or animosity based on personal experience. They will seek to utilise the political settlement to achieve their aims. They are the element of the population from whom the more violent activists will attempt to draw their support base, but who will not automatically be prepared to provide that support. Guarding against these individuals becoming the next generation of insurgents will have as much to do with our behaviour as with that of the hostile groups.

d. **Hostile.** Those in this category are actively and violently opposed to the HN government and NATO forces. They will view violence as a legitimate means to their ends. However, even amongst those who are in this category there will be reconcilable and irreconcilable elements. Hostile groups may choose to utilise the political settlement in addition to violent means to achieve their aims.

0218. **Leadership and Authority.** The leading personalities, sometimes referred to as competing elites, within the human environment will differ from state to state or region to region depending on culture, education, religion and political beliefs. This results in a complex linkage by which authority and power may be exercised. This is of relevance, as the allegiance of a group may not be to a head of state but to someone else inside or outside the state borders. Respect for these elites, either chiefs or elders, for example, is traditionally maintained in many states. These elites may have been influenced or marginalised by other individuals such as insurgents, warlords or criminals. Nevertheless, a commander should endeavour to
discover who the elites are, as they are likely to have knowledge of and exert influence in the community.

0219. Cultural Awareness. It is necessary to respect cultural and religious differences, and every effort should be made to avoid causing offence. Consequently, adequate time needs to be allocated to cultural awareness training prior to deployment in the AOO. The consequences of cultural insensitivity are an increased risk of isolation of military forces by the local population and provide opportunities for exploitation by an adversary.

0220. The beneficial effect of service men and women being able to communicate using local languages, at all levels of competence, can never be underestimated. Linguists with high levels of competence may not normally be available on a routine basis, but low levels of linguistic competence are still useful because local interpreters may not always be available, and it demonstrates a measure of cultural appreciation to the local population.

0221. Cultural Structures. An understanding of what is termed the “key leader” culture is important and can bring together culture, education, history, religion and political beliefs. Societies which, at face value, appear less developed are very likely to have highly complex societal structures where role and position are reinforced from the very lowest family level to the highest tribal or clan level. The role of fathers and brothers within a family can be as important as that of tribal or village elders. A religious leader may also have as much respect and attention within a community or regional area as the titular leaders. However, it may be necessary to consider carefully the influence of religion in any particular community before being involved too closely with any religious group. Some extremists consider that there should be a rejection of modern lifestyle and the perceived decadence, corruption and promiscuity that can accompany it.

0222. Cultural Considerations within Planning. The cultural aspects of the human environment must be included in the planning of operations. A picture as clear as possible is required from government authorities to determine not just insurgent strengths but other cultural nuances and influences which can be brought to bear and have potential influence and effect to aid a military commander.

The Physical Environment

0223. General. The challenges posed by operating in any physical environment are different, with the geography and climate of each environment exerting an influence on the conduct and nature of military operations. Irregular activists and adversaries have demonstrated an understanding that open, unpopulated terrain favours a sophisticated military force by allowing it to employ its advantages in manoeuvre, reconnaissance and long-range, precision-guided weapons. Irregular activists attempt to reduce these advantages by adopting “interior lines” that are likely to take advantage of constraints on operating these weapons systems. This could be manifested, for example, by operating in more complex and close terrain amongst civilians. Urban areas offer the most complex terrain and provide the adversary with the capability to offset conventional military capability and to operate with more prospect of success both locally and by making use of international media facilities, normally located in urban areas.
0224. **Expansion of Urban Areas.** In many rapidly developing cities, the slums and shanty towns are growing twice as fast as the city as a whole. Operations in these areas can be made more difficult because of the transient populations and temporary structure. The conditions in urban areas will give rise to grievances and long-standing rivalries, and could well be the cause of future political instability. A commander will need to be cognizant of the possibility that COIN operations in urban areas may lead to increased collateral damage and the potential loss of goodwill and consent.

0225. **Climate and Seasonal Weather Patterns.** NATO forces will need to operate in all seasons, by day and night. An adverse change in the weather could add difficulty to all aspects of observation and movement, thereby increasing risk and encouraging the simplification of military activity. A sophisticated insurgent will monitor the responses to climatic variations and will seek to take advantage of any perceived weakness to either: support the local population through activities such as harvesting crops or to plan for offensives or pauses to correspond to the appropriate season.

0226. **Infrastructure.** Natural resources and infrastructure form part of the physical environment and vary significantly by region and state. Transport infrastructure will affect movement and provide a channelling effect which can be used by any side. Other national or regional infrastructures may be targeted to demonstrate offensive capability or to have a psychological effect on the population. Natural resources may also be targeted for destruction, or illicitly used for the creation of wealth to fund irregular activities. Existing HN infrastructure that enables a normal routine for the population will materially assist HN and NATO efforts to gain the support of the local population. If the infrastructure is vulnerable and subject to attack, it will be harder for consent to be obtained and legitimacy to be maintained.

0227. Commanders need to realise that a weak HN infrastructure brings vulnerability and many pressures to bear on the NATO force, because support for rebuilding and redevelopment can be complicated and resource consuming. Commanders have to realise that it is typically not their mission to reconstruct the country, but to support the re-establishment of basic services, and to contribute to the overall reconstruction by establishing and maintaining a secure and stable environment. In the short term quick-impact projects can be beneficial, but commanders should ensure that such efforts support a comprehensive approach to the overall reconstruction programme. If such a programme has not emerged, commanders should work within a comprehensive approach to generate one if possible.

The Security Environment

0228. The key element of the security environment is the security sector that is comprised of the individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and the population. This often includes the military and any state-sponsored paramilitary forces; national and local police; the justice and corrections systems; coastal and border security forces; oversight bodies; and militia and private military and security companies employed by the state. The security sector represents the foundation of effective, legitimate governance and the potential of the state for enduring viability.
Not all military actors, or perceived military actors, conduct themselves with the level of professionalism of NATO forces. Moreover, they do not always act in accordance with international law, particularly the LOAC, and the customs of war. The prior actions of armed, uniformed elements may make initial engagement with the local community quite difficult for many civilians because it is virtually impossible to distinguish between one uniform and another. Considerable time and patience may be required for on-scene NATO forces to build a workable rapport with the local community in order to gain a credible understanding of all issues that affect local inhabitants. Some of the key actors within the security environment are described as follows:

a. **Foreign Military Forces.** Foreign military forces are military elements of other nations influencing or operating within the borders of the HN and may be friendly or hostile to NATO forces. These forces may be present due to a request for intervention or assistance, or by aggressive military action.

b. **Alliance Force.** A NATO-led force, operating under a United Nations (UN) mandate, may be formed in order to respond to operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The Alliance objectives will be pursued and realised by the armed forces of two or more nations working towards an agreed end state. NATO-led operations may involve a large number of military forces with differing capabilities, each representing their own national interests and possibly having limited experience in their dealings with each other. National caveats can have a significant influence on the planning and execution of NATO-led operations.

c. **Embassy Military Staff.** Many embassies and high commissions have military staff. This staff has responsibilities that range from ceremonial duties to the development of closer bilateral military relations.

d. **Military Advisers to Host Nation.** Foreign military advisors may be operating within the HN. These advisers will be professional military from another nation that is providing training or other assistance under bilateral arrangements.

e. **Host Nation Security Forces.** HN security forces are those forces raised, trained and sustained by the HN to provide protection from external threats and maintain security and stability within the state. These forces comprise the HN’s security sector. These forces may include military services such as the army, navy, marines, coastguard and air force, as well as internal intelligence forces, border guards, customs officials and law enforcement personnel. Paramilitary forces may also be present, and they may or may not be considered part of the HN’s formal security sector. These paramilitary forces typically have responsibility for internal security and may focus on protecting a certain segment of the population or region. Depending on the circumstances, security sector reform (SSR) may be required to foster long-term security, stabilisation, legitimacy and the rule of law.

f. **Former Host Nation Military Forces.** In a post-conflict or fragile state situation, an HN may have to conduct disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for some security forces. DDR in COIN often focuses on former insurgents who have defected, sought amnesty and/or reconciled. DDR
may also focus on standing paramilitary forces that may challenge long-term HN government control or even sovereignty. Depending on the organisation of and the support for DDR efforts, former military personnel may have retained their uniforms, weapons and equipment. More importantly, they may still have significant grievances with the HN government or segments of the population.

The Information Environment

0230. A globalised media and the proliferation of information collectors add an unavoidable transparency to all activities conducted during military operations. Reports of military actions are available to all who have access to the Internet, television, radio or global networks, and this information can be used by the adversary to great effect. Within the information environment NATO forces should seek to employ information activities within a comprehensive framework utilising the positive dominant narrative of the campaign. This narrative and associated themes enable NATO forces to maintain consistency and manage how the general public understands specific events. Adversaries and their supporters will exploit military mistakes and failures, no matter how minor, and fill any information gap between military action and supporting statements using propaganda and disinformation to persuade a local population to support their cause while undermining the HN government and military authorities in the area. Allowing irregular adversaries the upper hand in information activities creates significant difficulties for commanders when conducting operations amongst and in support of a population. In the process of taking action, it is essential that the military’s public response is accurate, truthful, timely and consistent with the dominant narrative.

0231. While adversaries may not support freedom of the media and other agencies, they will invariably make use of them for their own purposes. NATO forces will have to be aware of this and ensure that their actions are capable of withstanding subsequent intense and detailed media scrutiny. Even the most carefully planned and well conducted operation can be turned into a negative event by the adversary, when played out in the media.

0232. The Internet enables the widespread dissemination of religious, political and cultural doctrine and material, some of which has been extreme in nature, resulting in the recruitment of fanatical and dedicated followers across the world and also from the immediate theatre of operations. The Internet provides easy access to technical information on weapons design, employment and military tactical publications.

0233. Although access to modern communication technology has enhanced an adversary’s capability and flexibility for irregular activities, it also makes them vulnerable as reliance on this technology enables NATO forces to locate them and monitor their activities. In urban areas, less advanced and even primitive weapon systems, such as roadside bombs utilising precision-machined components, may still find effective uses. Technical information for the development of effective low-cost weapon systems is widely available and enables an insurgent to develop and adapt resources to match the activities of NATO forces.

0234. Irregular adversaries could exploit local knowledge and information more readily than NATO forces. As such, it is critical for NATO forces to acquire good local
knowledge to support tactical military operations, which is an inherently human activity requiring time and effort. Likewise, NATO forces need to use public affairs activities and information activities in the AOO and elsewhere with at least as much vigour as an adversary.

The Economic Environment

0235. States can move between stability and instability as economic and political conditions change. External influences can have a direct effect on a state’s ability to develop economically and, depending on the nature of the influence, this can increase competition with other states in the region. Within a state or region there will generally be an economic divide between those that “have” and those that “have not” resulting in additional tensions that could give rise to serious threats to stability. Global, regional or interstate competition for natural resources will increase friction: interruptions to the flow of natural resources or commercial supplies by one state may ultimately result in conflict with another. There may also be other direct consequences of such actions, including the inability of a state to farm effectively or of its industry to function competitively, resulting in a loss of trade and an increase in unemployment. States whose economies depend overly on one material or resource can be particularly sensitive to changes in supply, price or volatility in global markets.

0236. The economic superiority of a state, rather than its military capability, may be critical to regional dominance. In addition, a strong economic position allows a state or groups within the state to buy technology or to conduct more prolonged military operations. Economics directly influences the relationship between states and between individual state (and non-state) actors at the regional or global level. Such relationships can result in military or political assistance being offered, or conversely could lead to increases in tension which might result in conflict. Such tensions may also undermine any security environment established by military forces.

0237. Awareness of the economic environment may enable suitable actions to be taken by a military force in order to decrease tensions. There is a direct link between effective security operations and the promotion of stability, reduced crime, economic migrations and an increased sense of general assurance. The effects of such actions should be maximised through influencing suitable target audiences. External economic influences can also have a destabilising influence, just as external economic assistance can help develop and sustain a state. Successful operations may well depend more on improving local and national economies rather than on the force used to ensure a state’s security.

Section III - Actors

0238. General. In addition to actors such as the HN population, its security forces and NATO forces, it is appropriate to describe the various types of other actors\(^\text{11}\) that a commander is likely to interact with when dealing with irregular activities, and particularly insurgency. It is possible that some actors will have been in the theatre long before any military forces arrive and hence their views, opinions and concerns

\(^{11}\) Actor refers to all parties and stakeholders that are part of the operational environment and either directly or indirectly have a share, take part, or influence the outcome.
could be significant to a commander developing an understanding of the environment. The influence each actor has needs to be understood together with the parameters within which they operate. In particular, it is necessary to know the degree to which formal control and coordination can be achieved, the appropriateness of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and the levels required.

0239. Any situation where there is instability that spawns an insurgency is likely to have a multitude of HN participants, including security forces, other government agencies and NGOs including religious, charitable, social, and business groups. If not initially, then over time, external sponsors typically support one side or the other, especially as an insurgency grows. Inevitably there will be humanitarian issues or international concerns that can bring IO involvement. HN and third-party organisations (for example some NGOs and IOs) can have both public and private interests and objectives that are generally in accord with, but might conflict with, the accomplishment of national political and military objectives. Maintaining awareness of third-party activity will be challenging for NATO forces, as some organisations may not wish to have direct contact with military forces because it could compromise their own position and role. Military tasks may result from the links with third-party participants. Liaison with the other groups can lead to entry points for military activity; equally, information sharing can improve situational awareness.

0240. Host Nation Civil Authorities. HN sovereignty is potentially one of the most difficult issues for a commander during COIN operations, both in regard to forces contributed by other states and the HN. Often, in addition to traditional military command practices, a commander is required to lead through coordination, communication and consensus, where political sensitivities have to be acknowledged, understood and managed. It is important to remember that the two most important precepts of COIN are protecting the population and promoting the legitimacy of the HN government. When pursuing lesser or supporting objectives, commanders must be cognisant of the potential for undermining these two primary objectives. This may be particularly challenging if the HN is unable to provide protection and basic services to the population and is widely perceived as incompetent and/or corrupt.

0241. Legal matters need to be carefully considered and managed, as they have the potential to impede the development of important relationships with key personnel and organisations and may affect the actual or perceived legitimacy of the counterinsurgent force as well as its operations. Particular attention should be paid to such matters within the following areas:

a. ports and airports security control;
b. basing;
c. border crossings;
d. collecting and sharing information;
e. protection of the security forces;
f. jurisdiction over members of the Allied and multinational forces;
g. location and access;
h. operations in territorial waters, both sea and internal;
i. overflight rights;
j. transport systems and associated legal regulations;
k. policing and/or security activities - detection, detention, arrest and penal and justice authority and procedures;
l. enforcing compliance with the law of armed conflict and human rights law as well as supporting the prosecution of the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity; and
m. status of forces agreements (SOFAs).

0242. A commander should employ all aspects related to CIMIC in order to create coordinating procedures, such as establishing committees or providing liaison officers, to facilitate cooperation and build trust with the HN authorities, whose representatives should have leading roles in such arrangements for reasons that include bolstering the HN’s legitimacy. These organisations can facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings while removing impediments. National issues can be formally resolved with the HN by developing appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed SOFAs. In many cases, security assistance organisations, NGOs and IOs have detailed local knowledge and reservoirs of goodwill that can help establish a positive and constructive relationship with the HN. Building relationships takes time but, while confidence is being instilled, tolerance of a the presence of a NATO force can be used up if other measures are not put in place or are not seen to be effective.

0243. Coordination and support should be established down to local levels such as villages and neighbourhoods. A commander and his staff should be aware of the political and social structures in their AOOs. During many COIN efforts, evidence of national level governance will be weak or missing at the regional and local levels. Commanders should work to build linkages between the periphery and the central government and try to avoid becoming a long term surrogate for the HN. “Bottom-up” efforts should be joined to “top-down” efforts to the extent possible.

0244. **International Organisations.** IOs are described as organisations created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. They may be established on a global, regional or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes and are normally formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. The most notable example is the UN. Regional organisations such as the Organisation of American States and the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may be involved in some forms of stability operations. The UN in particular has many subordinate and affiliated agencies active worldwide. Depending on the situation and HN needs, any number of UN organisations may be present, such as the following:

a. The Office of the Chief of Humanitarian Affairs;
b. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
c. The World Food Programme;
d. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (known as UNHCR);
e. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and
f. The UN Development Programme.

0245. A commander will have to ensure that coordination, liaison and any collaboration with IOs is harmonised, where possible, to suit the strategic aims for conducting a COIN operation, because IOs are not a subordinate actor and need to be aware of
and included in any planning in the campaign. The opportunities to have the active assistance of IOs could pay handsome dividends in the international arena, and efforts to enlist their cooperation should not be overlooked. In its interaction with non-NATO actors, NATO will continue to act in accordance with the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (Ref p).

0246. **Alliance and Coalition Governments.** Other governments from Allied nations may also be in the operational area (OA). Allied governments are those governments which, for the purposes of the situation, have agreed to act together as Alliance or coalition partners. The aim of any alliance or coalition is to achieve unity of purpose and unity of effort which takes account of national priorities and constraints. However, it is important for a commander to note whatever the situation, it is usual to have some form of liaison or at least contact with each government or military force represented in the OA.

0247. **Non-governmental Organisations.** NGOs are legally different from UN agencies and international bodies. “NGO” is an official term used in Article 71 of the UN Charter to describe a wide range of primarily non-profit organisations motivated by humanitarian and religious values that are usually independent of governments, the UN and the commercial sector. The term “NGO” encapsulates a diverse group of interests, including thousands of very different organisations, varying in size, maturity, expertise, quality and mission. Increasingly, NGOs are used by national and international donors as effective and non-political agencies in any campaign area. The larger the NGO is in terms of staff and the resources available, the greater the need to deconflict military action with NGO activities.

0248. NGO tasks might range from a general remit to “alleviate poverty” to a specific mission to “support health care services in communities affected by insurgency”. An NGO’s mission is usually underwritten by values or principles that guide their conduct and which may be expressed in terms of human rights, emphasising that their work promotes rights to life, food, water, health and freedom of expression.

0249. The profusion of NGOs in an AOO means that coordination and cooperation are becoming increasingly complicated and have taken an increasing amount of time to resolve. In the early part of an insurgency some NGOs will generally form some kind of network umbrella group or consortium. As an insurgency escalates and the number of NGOs and donor funding potentially increase, there will be a commensurate increase in the need for better coordination, driven by the requirements of accountability and donor involvement. This has the potential to develop into competition for funding and other resources which can distort relationships and cause friction. The need to counteract such pressures places a practical emphasis on regular liaison and communication at all levels in as comprehensive a manner as possible.

0250. There can be an inherent tension between NGOs and military forces due to organisational misunderstandings and different cultures. NGOs will generally try to provide impartial support to the HN population, but may unintentionally provide material support to insurgents. Military forces will be eager to prevent insurgents from taking advantage of NGO support for material gain and may control access or transportation networks critical for NGOs to fulfil their mission. Using a cooperative approach will greatly enhance the ability of NATO forces to understand NGOs, develop mutual understanding, share information and
coordinate activities. However, some NGOs by way of conscience will not wish to be seen with, or perceived as cooperating with military forces. Commanders should develop an understanding of their position, and some means should be developed by which activities are deconflicted through a third party such as the UN.

0251. **Commercial Organisations.** Multinational corporations are often engaged in reconstruction, economic development and governance activities under contract from supporting governments. These companies are, or could become part of the redevelopment of the state and should be part of the HN’s overall plan for development. As a minimum, military commanders should know which companies are present in their AOO and where those companies are conducting business. There are also many businesses that sell expertise in areas related to supporting governance, economics, education and other aspects of civil society. Providing capabilities similar to some NGOs, these firms often obtain contracts through government agencies.

0252. **Private Security Companies.** Increasing threats from insurgent forces and/or criminal elements against civil actors have created a demand for private security companies. These companies may act in support of IOs, NGOs, multinational corporations, the media or others who are prepared to pay for protection. The standards of contract security are extremely diverse, from former highly trained special forces to untrained armed thugs. Contract security personnel uniform and arm themselves as they deem fit for their task. This has resulted in contract security personnel wearing uniforms and carrying military-style weapons, and thus obscuring the distinction between contractors and the military. Guidance should be issued that provides instructions and advice on the provision of facilities, including medical care, the sharing of information, the coordination of operations and oversight. This will require some adaptation of military procedures.

0253. **Media.** In as much as all military activities are open to public scrutiny and may be misrepresented by the media, commanders should ensure that adequate public affairs coordination with the media is conducted to maintain a working relationship and to not compromise current and future military operations. Appropriate media guidelines should be issued and control measures in place. Commanders must plan for media interaction and consider embedding media representatives at applicable levels, conducting regular press conferences and investing time and resources into developing a military-media relationship beneficial to both parties. Understanding that the media can influence operations by shaping public opinion and perhaps adversary perceptions is critical in COIN. All public affairs information should be timely and must be accurate.

**Section IV - The Relationship between Insurgency and Irregular Activity**

0254. For the purposes of this publication the term “irregular activity” is defined as: “the use or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.”

0255. As explained in Chapter 1, insurgency is considered an irregular activity, carried out by an organised group or movement. Terrorists, especially transnational terrorists, and criminal enterprises may align with an insurgency to take advantage.
of the unstable situation, or an insurgency may include some forms of terrorism and major criminal activities to reach its desired end state. Chapter 3 gives a more detailed explanation. This section discusses the relationship between the various irregular activities, the special place of insurgency and also extra attention for terrorism, because of the strong links between these two types of irregular activities.

0256. Irregular activities become significant when they challenge authority or assume proportions that normal law enforcement cannot contain. From that point they form the basis for irregular threats in all parts of the operational environment that may include not only a state, but perhaps other regional partners. The threat of vulnerable states and regions may trigger multinational intervention (e.g. NATO forces). Irregular activities may be divided into:

a. **Insurgency.** The essentials of insurgency and COIN are the main focus of the remainder of this publication and are therefore not addressed here.

b. **Terrorism.** Terrorism is defined as the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives$^{12}$. Terrorist attacks generally create disproportionate effects on target population. Terrorist tactics may range from individual assassinations to mass murder bombings, and some terrorists have avowed to obtain and employ weapons of mass destruction. As stated in MC 472 NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism (26 September 08), NATO's military contribution to defence against terrorism will be in the form of Antiterrorism (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism), Consequence Management (providing military support to national authorities in dealing with the consequences of the terrorist attacks), Counterterrorism (offensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism) and Military Cooperation (interaction with other nations and international organisations as well as national civil authorities).

c. **Criminality.** Criminality pervades those states where governance is weak to nonexistent, and it seeks monetary gains unhindered by authority. It may coexist with other types of irregular activity. Trafficking in narcotics, arms, and human beings, as well as piracy are significant forms of criminal activities in unstable regions. The more blatant the criminal activity, such as piracy, the greater the requirement for an unstable haven from which to operate. A careful analysis of major criminal activities will need to be made and incorporated into any theatre assessments.

d. **Disorder.** Civil disobedience is the refusal to obey civil laws in an effort to induce change in governmental policy or legislation. It seeks to disrupt or challenge authority, or draws an issue to the attention of the authorities as a result of some form of discontent or perceived injustice. Civil disobedience is characterised by the use of passive resistance or other nonviolent means such as protest marches and sit-ins. If the authorities mishandle or overreact to the situation, it may lead to rioting and more violent forms of protest. Such

$^{12}$ This definition is from AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
emotions and demonstrations of disorder may provide excellent recruiting grounds for insurgents and extremists, especially when authorities overreact.

c. **Subversion.** Subversion undermines the military, economic, psychological or political strength or morale of a governing authority. Subversion is most effective when consistently conducted over a long period. Non-violent subversive efforts include the use of political fronts, propaganda, agitation, infiltration of government agencies, and non-violent civil unrest. All wilful acts that are intended to be detrimental to the best interests of the government but do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage are generally considered as in the category of subversive activity.

0257. Unlike common banditry, crime, or recreational brigandage and hooliganism, insurgent groups need popular support. For an insurgency to mobilise and grow, it has to have a core grievance which is viewed as legitimate and which often has a source of ideological inspiration but could also be founded in criminal ambitions.

0258. Many forms of other irregular activities enjoy a symbiotic relationship with insurgency. Nonetheless, insurgents may well appear to conduct perfectly legitimate/legal activities whilst dissociating itself from irregular activity, undertaking such functions through a proxy. Insurgency, like irregular activity, is not constrained by the rule of law, but is likely to share a common centre of gravity (COG) with those prosecuting COIN, namely, the consent and support of the population.

0259. As such, insurgents take full advantage of the operational environment, seeking political change through persuasion and coercion of the population, focused on highlighting and exacerbating perceived or real core grievances, while both insurgents and other irregular activists fix the authorities through irregular activities such as terrorism, criminality, disorder, piracy and others. It can be challenging to determine whether, in countering irregular activity one is dealing with a group motivated by an ideology or simply a tactic employed by groups, as criminality, disorder and terrorism may simply be a tactic employed by an insurgent.

**Section V - The Capability of Irregular Activists**

0260. **General.** The intellectual, physical and moral components of fighting power provide a useful framework for understanding the capabilities of insurgents and other groups engaged in irregular activities.

0261. **Intellectual.** It would be naïve to believe that irregular activists do not develop, espouse and practise their own doctrine. They have become astute practitioners of the propaganda of the deed and implementers of a strategy of provocation. Moreover, there are examples of insurgents applying doctrine and operational lessons from other insurgents, military organisations (even NATO), and sources available on the Internet.

0262. Irregular activists have also demonstrated a sound knowledge of the use of information to achieve wide-area and local objectives with selective targeting, in time and space, issuing communiqués, videos and bulletins via websites and mobile telephones, in some cases from their own media sections. This propaganda
is intended to undermine the legitimacy of the government and is also designed to penetrate sub-cultures and communities within developed states, which are fertile grounds for support and recruits, especially in unassimilated, marginalised and resentful immigrant groups.

0263. Networks of friendship, kinship and acquaintance stretch worldwide and are based on common cultural influences, ideologies and shared experiences. They are sometimes reinforced by specialised training, financial requirements and mutual obligations. Many individuals move across ideologically mutually sympathetic organisations and increasingly move from conflict to conflict, taking with them experience in conducting operations.

0264. **Physical.** Irregular activists will not generally prevail against disciplined regular forces through physical means alone and have to seek to exploit asymmetric opportunities by applying their strengths against their opponent’s weaknesses at a critical time and place. They do not necessarily seek tactical victories, but maintain a strategic long-term perspective and often aim simply to outlast or wear down their adversaries. Common interrelated themes have been identified as follows:

a. Physical means for irregular activists include weapon capabilities which range from the sophisticated to the primitive, and which offer the potential for sensational effect and impact in the face of sophisticated defence, the ability to deploy a broad base of activist support and the use of asymmetric tactics to create shock and surprise as well as physical destruction. The urban environment provides a concentration of targets for the irregular activist and insurgent: plenty of cover, a vulnerable population and a media presence. This heightens the effect of the use of explosives, especially in the case of suicide bombings and other attacks directed at the civilian population.

b. Irregular activists use a variety of conventional and informal channels to fund their activities through banking networks, often facilitated by the Internet, charities and NGOs. There is also an element of private patronage and sponsorship, by individuals seeking vicarious involvement or states employing irregulars for proxy activity. Evidence shows that irregulars frequently fund and support each other’s activities, often as a business arrangement, despite little ideological common ground.

c. Irregular activists operate in groups, cells or networks. Of the irregular activists, insurgents and terrorists have traditionally adopted a compartmented cell structure and have tended to operate in terrain that facilitates concealment of their presence and activities. Irregular activists are keenly aware of the tactical advantages of an urban environment that provides underground facilities for protection, and a civilian populace for logistical and financial support, communication and “manoeuvre”. Transnational terrorists can seek and gain sanctuary in either ungoverned space, in weak states or supportive states, and enter into ad hoc alliances with ideologically aligned organisations. From these sanctuaries, activists may either operate openly or remain passive and operate covertly as “sleeper cells” while planning future operations and maintaining a low profile, except for an occasional foray or communiqué. Some groups employ a version of “mission command” based on intent, ideas and ideology being passed both through cyberspace and by word of mouth.
Transnational terrorists have used their alliances to franchise irregular activity to both regional and local operators who are able to influence the local population, or an extremist element, to do their will. In some cases, because of cultural similarities or tribal loyalties they resemble an extended family rather than a militaristic organisation.

0265. **Motivation.** The motivations for irregular activists are based on the desire to effect or prevent change, for either personal or collective reasons. They are characterised by a refusal to abide by the conventions of the global market and the rule of law, as well as by the readiness to threaten or employ violence as a means of persuasion or control. The motivation is often complex and diverse, but will always relate to an insurgent’s cultural background and the context within which they choose to operate. An irregular activist will seek to achieve the following:

a. change the status quo for ideological motives by replacing the established authority through the threat or use of violence, offering an alternative basis for authority and allegiance, and promising physical and economic security for the community; and

b. gain and retain control over power and resources unhindered by authority. Often these groups will wish to maintain a state of instability and disorder to facilitate their activities and reinforce the dependence of the population. As such, they would generally oppose any re-establishment of state authority or control by intervening forces.
CHAPTER 3 - INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

0301. This chapter is divided into two parts. Part I gives an overview of insurgency, insurgent groups and their vulnerabilities. Part II develops a possible response to insurgency and analyses and establishes the attributes and criteria required for conducting a successful COIN, allowing military commanders to efficiently face an insurgency. It is aimed at serving as a guide on “how to think” when addressing this phenomenon.

PART I - INSURGENCY

Section I - Overview

0302. Definition. For the purposes of this publication “insurgency” is defined as “the actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion”. This publication also employs the term “insurgent” to describe those actors that plan and execute insurgency actions.

0303. An insurgency is normally characterised by a protracted struggle based on political, economic, social or religious ideology, using violence and subversion. Insurgents normally feel they cannot, or will not, attain their goals through their country’s established governing process. They seek to undermine a HN government’s authority while reinforcing the legitimacy of the insurgency. Key to undermining the HN government’s authority is gaining and retaining popular support through influence - using both persuasion and coercion. Insurgents may achieve their goals through the use of tactics such as violence, subversion and propaganda. An insurgency uses violence - the “armed struggle” - as well as economic and social influence, as a tool to apply political pressure (see Annex B). Typically, an insurgency operates from its strengths and avoids the strengths of the government (e.g. direct armed confrontations). Insurgents typically seek concealment and support within the population. Insurgents will use subversion, propaganda and measured violence against the government and possibly the population. Violence against the government will act to destabilise, reduce the perception of legitimacy, and potentially cause the HN government to overreact, further isolating it from the population, measured violence against the population may coerce it to remain neutral or provide tacit or material support. However, violence against the population may backfire. Terrorists, especially transnational terrorists, and leaders of major criminal enterprises may align with an insurgency, but not necessarily the ideology of the insurgents to take advantage of or foment instability. It is important to distinguish between the true insurgents and their cause and the pure terrorists and their ideals (or the ardent criminal elements). It should be noted that, in principle, the insurgents have the initiative, since they can select which sections of the population and the security forces against which to act.

0304. Every insurgent movement is unique. An insurgent organisation is usually a network of semi-autonomous cells, led at the local level and unified through a common purpose and/or ideology. Typically insurgencies both learn and adapt quickly, as
they are constrained by neither hierarchical levels of command nor organisational complexity. They may also appear to undertake legitimate activities under the guise of economic and political activities.

0305. Figure 3.1 helps contextualise and provide an understanding of the nature of insurgency. Insurgencies are not constrained by regional or national boundaries and may be local, national, transnational or even international (global) in nature. In the national scope, within the normal functioning of a state, a series of activities takes place, some of them irregular (as described in Chapter 2) and others regular. The insurgency that emerges within a state will employ any activity (regular or irregular) to help achieve its goals. Insurgents might employ irregular activities (criminality, terrorism, disorder and/or subversion) in order to obtain funds to inhibit the opposing population, disseminating instability and insecurity over the country, so that the state’s government cannot control it. On the other hand, insurgents might also use certain regular activities (political, diplomatic, social, economic, religious, etc.) with the aim of gaining legitimacy and financing, spreading its ideology, recruiting supporters, mobilising certain sectors of the population, and obtaining external support. But, for an insurgency to reach its ultimate goal, its actions need to extend to the international scope in order to gain external support and to legitimise the insurgents’ objectives and actions in the international environment. Figure 3.1 illustrates the generic interconnection between regular and irregular activities and insurgency.

Figure 3.1 - Nature of Insurgency

0306. The size of the overlapping parts of the different circles and shapes in Figure 3.1 does not categorically reflect the extent of the different interconnections between
insurgency and other activities. Insurgents will reach their political objectives through the mastering of the specific art of mixing, according effective proportions to all the enabling fields: regular and irregular activities in national, international and transnational circles.

0307. **Will, Time and Space**. Insurgents seek to achieve their political aims by using will, time and space. They normally accept temporary setbacks with respect to time and space in order to reach their long-term goals.

a. **Will**. The ideological nature and core grievances of insurgency often result in insurgents having a strong collective will. This sense of collective will is often relatively much greater than that of the governments of fragile states. The insurgent thus seeks to make the struggle a protracted “contest of wills”.

b. **Time**. Due to their relative strong will, insurgents can afford to be patient. When their relative weakness requires it, insurgents can erode their opponents’ will through various means, such as subversion, terrorism and propaganda. Thus, effective and capable insurgents manage time as a resource at all levels, especially the strategic level.

c. **Space**. Similar to their use of time, insurgents can use space to wear down their opponents’ will. As occurs in conventional operations, they may seek to attack relatively weak areas. However, capable insurgents will be fluid. They will fight on ground of their choosing and wear down their opponents, yet avoid becoming decisively engaged or destroyed. In this fashion, they will seek to force their opponents to react to their efforts. Sanctuaries and porous border regions also offer insurgents transnational lines of communication (LOCs), escape routes, and havens in which to recuperate, train and plan future operations.

**Section II - Key Conditions for an Insurgency**

0308. An insurgency usually requires two key conditions in order to flourish: core grievances and prerequisites.

0309. **Core Grievances**. Core grievances are causes of distress affording reason for complaint or resistance from the point of view of some of the population. These grievances may be real or perceived. Some or all may fuel insurgency to varying degrees. The importance of core grievances, or even their existence, can change over time. Additionally, insurgents can be adept at manipulating or creating core grievances to serve their purpose. The following represent common core grievances:

a. **Identity**. Many factors impact a person’s sense of identity, but identity is socio-cultural in character. Strong feelings based on identity can be in conflict with the views of the HN government, potentially leading to insurgencies aimed at secession, border changes, or political overthrow. External actors with similar identities to the insurgents may assist.

b. **Religion**. Religious extremism can become a core grievance of an insurgency. External groups with similar extremist religious views to those of the
insurgents often provide support.

c. **Economy.** Pervasive and desperate poverty often fosters and fuels widespread public dissatisfaction. Young people without jobs or hope are ripe for insurgent recruitment. Additionally, a perceived disparity in people’s means can be an economic core grievance, for example, a gap between a large poor majority and a small wealthy minority.

d. **Corruption.** The corruption of national politics, the HN government, or key institutions or organisations can be a core grievance. Institutional corruption is unfair or illegal actions or policies. Political corruption is the dysfunction of a political system. For example, corruption in government development programmes can cause resentment within the aggrieved group. Corruption leads to a loss of HN legitimacy and is often a key core grievance.

e. **Repression.** Repression can take many forms, such as discriminatory policies, rights violations, police brutality or imprisonment. Like corruption, repression can lead to popular dissatisfaction with the current government and leads to the reduction of HN legitimacy.

f. **Foreign Exploitation or Presence.** The perception of outsiders exploiting the HN, or of the HN government excessively pandering to foreigners, can be a core grievance. For example, if foreign businesses dominate critical portions of the local economy, some of the population may feel that they or their country are being exploited by outsiders. A foreign military presence or military treaty may also offend national sentiment. Finally, the mere presence or specific actions of foreigners may offend local religious or cultural sensibilities.

g. **Occupation.** Foreign military forces’ occupation of another state is often a core grievance. If groups within the population have the will to fight on after a regime change or occupation, they may form a resistance movement.

h. **Essential Services.** Essential services provide those things needed to sustain life. Examples of these essential needs are the availability of food, law enforcement, emergency services, water, electricity, shelter, health care, schools, transportation, and sanitation (trash and sewage). Stabilising a population requires these basic needs to be met. People pursue essential needs until they feel they are met, at any cost and from any source. People support the source that meets their needs.

0310. **Prerequisites.** For a root cause or core grievances to be sustainable there have to be specific prerequisites or conditions. Without these conditions the insurgency will likely wither and die. When a number of these conditions coexist, an insurgency can manifest and develop, gaining the support of the population, and become entrenched over time. The prerequisites are as follows:

a. **Vulnerable Population.** The greater the expectation of the population, the more vulnerable it will become to alternatives for change. Insurgents can exploit political, economic or social dissatisfaction with the HN or local government and offer the population hope for change.
b. **Leadership Available for Direction.** Exercising leadership in an insurgency is a complex issue and can be centralised or decentralised. There may be a transition from one form of leadership to another. Insurgency leadership has traditionally been perceived as centralised around a charismatic, persuasive and politically astute figure following a single narrative. Contemporary leadership in a globalised environment, with increased use of information technology, has enabled greater decentralised execution.

c. **Lack of Government Control.** If insurgents operate with little or no perceived interference from security forces or other agencies, the population may feel the government lacks control and fear the potential for chaos, both undermining legitimacy of the government. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success. The success of a government ultimately depends on the acquiescence, if not the active support, of the population. The aim of both sides is to secure this, and here the insurgents’ task is easier, because they can choose the time and place for their actions and can orchestrate actions, including propaganda and measured violence, that will undermine the government more than they alienate the population. Notwithstanding, some insurgents are prepared to use brutality and terror to meet their needs.

### Section III - Dynamics of Insurgency

0311. Each insurgency has different dynamics depending on the country in which it develops, the actors and their cause; however, insurgencies will usually build around a perceived sense of relative deprivation. Although each insurgency is unique, there are common dynamics or characteristics that can be used in assessing an insurgency and determining its strategy, as follows:

a. ideology,
b. cause,
c. internal support,
d. objective,
e. leadership,
f. environment and geography,
g. external support,
h. the phasing and timing of an insurgency, and
i. organisational and operational patterns.

0312. **Ideology.** Ideology typically is the cornerstone of an insurgency. Gaining and updating knowledge of this ideology is essential for understanding the rationale for insurgent actions. Ideology provides psychological and political cohesion among the insurgents. The central mechanism through which ideologies are disseminated is the narrative. Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history also may provide an explanation for insurgent actions and their consequences. They often base their strategy on ideology. An ideology has the capacity to affect a country’s domestic/foreign politics and public opinion through the use of violence and propaganda. Ideology normally also provides the justification for violence, and this is particularly true for transnational terrorists. If
the ideology within an insurgency is conflicted, a counterinsurgent can potentially exploit this conflict to divide and defeat the insurgents.

0313. **The Cause.** Insurgent leaders try to adopt attractive/persuasive causes in order to mobilise population support. These causes often stem from the unresolved contradictions existing within any society or culture. Although contradictions are based on real problems, insurgents may create artificial contradictions using propaganda and misinformation. By selecting an assortment of causes and tailoring them for various groups within society - political, religious, professional or social - they disseminate convincing ideas to which the population is most receptive. Without an attractive cause, an insurgent movement might not be able to sustain itself. But a carefully chosen cause is a formidable asset; it can provide a fledgling movement with a long-term, concrete base of support. Any country ruled by a small group without broad popular support provides a political cause for insurgents. Exploited or repressed social groups - be they entire classes, ethnic or religious groups, or small elites - may support larger causes in reaction to their own narrower grievances. Economic inequities and racial persecution can nurture insurgency.

0314. **Internal Support.** Insurgencies are fragile in their infancy, and elements of the population must be mobilised to provide practical internal support and maintain momentum if an insurgency is to survive. There are four groups within a population during an insurgency: those that support the government; those that are neutral; those that oppose the government without the use of violence and those that support the insurgency. It is the neutral centre that usually is the tipping point that both sides target. The government will attempt to gain the support of the neutral centre against the insurgency, while the insurgents will attempt to either gain their support or have them remain neutral and not support the government's legitimacy. Support considerations are as follows:

a. **Level of Popular Support.** The reality of countering insurgencies is that neither side will ever enjoy the support of the entire population. The support of the population will fluctuate due to many factors, and attempting to quantify why the populace favours the government or the insurgents is difficult. Measuring the population's support is important, and asking the population directly or using surveys can produce valuable insight into popular support and attitudes. However, it is important to remain cognizant of the fact that who conducts the surveys is as important as the questions asked. Some people will tailor their responses based on who is asking the question. Figure 3.2 depicts a simplified model of an insurgency’s range of popular support.

b. **Types of Popular Support.** Popular support can be either active or passive, and may come from only a small segment of the population or from a broad base of the population. Support for an insurgency may also be open or hidden, depending on the overall situation. Local insurgents normally exploit local grievances when recruiting. Normally insurgents link their messages with tangible solutions and actions. There are five common methods used to mobilise popular support: persuasion, coercion, reaction to counterinsurgent abuses, foreign support and apolitical motivations. These methods can be used individually or in various combinations. For more information see Annex C.
0315. **Objective.** Effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its objectives; this analysis must be from the insurgent’s perspective, rather than that of the counterinsurgent. It is often difficult to identify the objectives of an insurgency. Insurgent objectives may be vague or ill-defined, or there may be multiple insurgent groups with differing objectives. Analysis of insurgency objectives requires consideration of many factors from the insurgents' perspective. Insurgents’ use physical or psychological effects to connect strategic and operational objectives to tactical actions. Insurgents create effects through lethal or non-lethal actions. For instance, to achieve the strategic objective of discouraging support for the government, insurgents may conduct operations to assassinate government officials, or delegitimize the HN in the eyes of the population by damaging or seizing a key facility. Understanding the insurgents’ objectives and identifying direct and indirect effects of insurgent actions within the operational environment is key to countering insurgent operations. The insurgent’s overarching objective is to force a political change and often to implant an alternative state. The supporting objectives are normally driven by the insurgent’s strategic approach (see Annex A). There are generally four types of supporting insurgent objectives, including:

a. **seize power, overthrow existing social order and redistributing power within a state, be it through a revolutionary process or not;**

b. **to undermine state control and create an autonomous entity or a space beyond government control - an independent territory based on religious and ethnic factors and the like;**

c. **to undermine or destroy government legitimacy and its ability to rule. This is one of the main motives driving the insurgent movement, and it is present in all its development stages;**

d. **to gain popular support. One insurgency objective is to persuade or intimidate a wide portion of the population to accept the changes proposed. This is an essential aim for insurgents. In fact, all their strategic plans will be focused on influencing public opinion, whether it is friendly, hostile or neutral. In the case of neutral individuals or wavering, insurgents will use a combination of fear and hope, trying to persuade them as to the many benefits of supporting the insurgency, and the uncertain future if they support the other factions. They will use terror to shape public opinion. They will execute symbolic actions, which will be widely publicised, and will be persuasive about the impossibility of winning the conflict, the devastating consequences of a protracted conflict, and even the unfairness of the cause defended by the government. At the same time, they will present an apparent solution to the problem, and thereby an opportunity to end the conflict.**
0316. **Leadership.** Leadership is essential to any insurgent group or movement, especially in instilling and indoctrinating the insurgent ideology in its members. It is easier to disseminate a cause when it is embodied by a leader who can inspire their followers, convert the uncommitted, and command the respect and certainly the fear of those who support the government. Insurgents’ key tasks are to break the ties between the population and the government and to establish credibility. They have to possess the sharpness of intellect to define political and strategic aims, and the nimbleness of wit and wisdom to adjust the immediate requirements and implement tactics to meet them. They require the strength of character to impose decisions taken, especially when the insurgency is in its early stages. Their education, familial/social ties and prestige can promote organisations and the recruitment and motivation of personnel.

0317. **Environment and Geography.** Although the operational environment is applicable to an insurgent and has already been described in Chapter 2, there will be specific environments that can be exploited by insurgents. This knowledge could enhance their operations, especially in the early stages of an insurgency. Contemporary insurgencies are conducted in rural and urban environments and their interfaces. In order to achieve their political objectives, insurgents must ultimately control and have influence on the territory in which the target population resides. Insurgent strategies are often based on the specific features and intricacies of specific environments.

0318. **External Support.** Access to external support enhances an insurgency’s effectiveness, capabilities and capacities. Many insurgencies have received some degree of support from foreign powers or non-state groups. Such support may involve the training of cadre staff, the use of facilities, financial support, and the provision of overt and covert military assistance, including intelligence and armaments. Neighbouring states supporting insurgencies may also provide sanctuary in the form of resting, re-equipping and training. The forms of external support can include:

a. **Moral Support.** The acknowledgement that insurgents or their cause are just and admirable can be vital for success. Moral support often leads to political, resource and sanctuary support. Support may come from the press, celebrities and politicians in foreign countries.

b. **Political Support.** Of importance to an insurgency is gaining international and/or political recognition for its cause. Political support for insurgents in international forums such as the UN and the instigation of political discussion and support within some NATO countries could provide some adverse influence on COIN efforts by NATO. However, failing to garner political support for the insurgency likely will lead to international support for the COIN effort.

c. **Logistic Support.** Logistic support is vital to the effectiveness of an insurgency. Initially, equipment, arms, and ammunition may be acquired from external sources. The populace may provide food. As the insurgency grows in strength, money and more sophisticated weaponry and equipment that cannot be provided from internal sources will be required.
d. **Personnel Support.** Without the support of personnel, an insurgency would have little hope of success. Insurgents trained externally can provide expertise in sophisticated weaponry. From external sources come replacements for casualties and additional personnel to augment the existing force. A neighbour state also can provide sanctuary.

e. **Sanctuaries.** Historically, sanctuaries have provided insurgents with a place to rebuild and reorganise without fear of interference. Sanctuaries may be local “safe” areas (e.g. neighbourhoods), or an area across the border outside the country.

0319. **Sources of External Support.** External support comes from other nation states, emigrants, refugees and other non-state actors, as follows:

a. **Support from Other States.** State support for insurgencies is generally the most significant source of external support and may consist of military, financial, logistic, and political support. There are a variety of reasons why states may choose to support an insurgency:

1. **Regional Influence.** The main reason for states’ support of insurgencies is regional politics. The particular aim may be to ensure the security of a border or to increase influence over a rival nation or area critical to the national interest.

2. **Destabilisation.** Support for an insurgency provides a state with an opportunity to wage war without resorting to conventional forces. This is usually referred to as a “proxy war”.

3. **Regime Change.** State support may be provided for the purpose of overthrowing a rival government.

4. **Retaliation.** A state’s support for an insurgency in another state may result in an adversary supporting an insurgency by the other state’s enemies.

5. **Influencing Insurgent Objectives.** States may support an insurgency in a neighbouring country to ensure that the insurgent movement does not adopt goals or policies that are not in that state’s interests.

6. **Support to Similar Ethnic or Related Groups.** A further reason for state support of insurgencies is a national affinity with ethnic groups beyond their borders.

7. **Reclaiming Territory.** A state may support an insurgency in a neighbouring state in order to reclaim territory held by that state.

8. **Acquisition of Wealth.** States may support an insurgency in another country in order to gain access to particular markets or natural resources.
b. **Emigrant Communities.** Emigrant communities abroad are sources of support in areas such as funding, political influence, intelligence, weapons, recruitment and equipment and are therefore an important part of sustaining an insurgent movement. However, in order to gain support from emigrant communities insurgents may use one or a combination of the following:

1. **Religious or Ethnic Affinity.** Claiming religious or ethnic affinity is a popular means of gaining support.

2. **Loyalty to the Homeland.** Insurgents will exploit an emigrant’s sympathy for their homeland nation and its population. The inability of emigrants to integrate with their resident country can facilitate recruitment or support. External regimes or groups may use the insurgency as a means to take control of territory claimed by that external source. Active support of the insurgency can assist with that objective.

3. **Second-generation Emigrant.** They present two factors: on the one side, they have not integrated into the host nation society. On the other hand, due to the generational change, they do not feel linked to their parents’ country of origin. This feeling makes them potential recruiting objectives for the insurgent.

4. **Success.** Military and political success for insurgent movements often brings a wave of support from expatriate communities. However, the opposite is also true: when insurgencies suffer defeat and humiliation in the theatre of operations, support can quickly diminish, as expatriates begin to view the insurgency as a lost cause.

5. **Coercion.** Due to the closeness of most immigrant or expatriate communities, insurgents can often coerce an entire community into supporting their campaign if they target specific individuals or community leaders.

6. **Political and Social Pressures.** Social and political pressures may be exerted, legal constraints or detentions may be imposed by the government among the emigrant population. Similarly, emigrants collaborating with an insurgency can be camouflaged in this environment.

c. **Refugees.** Refugee camps provide insurgents with security and the opportunity to rest, plan, train and recruit, as well as to gain control of the refugee community. There are a number of reasons why a refugee community may choose to support an insurgency:

1. a desire to return to their previous status and life in their own homeland;

2. the need for protection. Local bandits frequently operate in refugee camps;
(3) a conviction that military action and violence is the only way to get their grievance noticed and addressed; and

(4) coercion.

d. Other Non-state Groups. Other non-state groups include:

(1) Other Insurgent Groups. Other insurgent groups can be a valuable source of support and advice to an insurgent movement.

(2) Influential Individuals. Wealthy and influential individuals motivated by religious, moral or ethnic considerations can be a source of funding and support.

(3) Aid agencies and human rights organisations. Commanders must understand that due to the impartiality and neutrality of aid agencies and human rights organisations, these organisations will make no distinction between actors in the conflict.

(4) Religious Organisations. Religious organisations outside the state have often been a source of financial and intellectual support. Their spiritual support, disseminated through the modern global media, has been an important contribution in inspiring recruits and insurgent activists. These organisations also provide a channel for their members to carry out their charitable obligations, allowing donations favouring insurgent movements.

(5) Criminal Organisations. Insurgencies attract criminal organisations and mercenaries. Kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery and drug trafficking are very lucrative for insurgents in support of strengthening their financial resources, but also as a means to put pressure on HN authorities and the population. Criminal organisations may use insurgents as their blanket, or their cover to support the achievement of their specific objectives, which may be various (money making, the attractiveness of having power in a region). Criminal organisations will benefit from a persisting unstable situation.

Phasing and Timing of an Insurgency

0320. Mature insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine or reorganise - they are dynamic and adaptive. Most insurgencies pass through three common phases of development: strategic defensive, strategic equilibrium and strategic offensive. The constant feature in all phases of an insurgency is adhering to their strategic COG - gaining the support and consent of the population. The phases of development are further described in Annex A.

0321. Within their phases of development, insurgencies may evolve through radicalisation, popular unrest, civil disobedience, a variety of irregular activities and conventional armed conflict. Alternatively, they may wither away to dormancy if effectively countered or if they fail to capture sufficient popular support. Not all insurgencies
experience a phased or neatly evolving development, and linear progression is not required for insurgent success.

0322. Moreover, a single insurgency may be in different phases in various parts of a country simultaneously. Insurgencies may revert to an earlier phase when pressured and resume activities when conditions are favourable. This flexibility is the key strength of a phased approach in that it provides fallback positions. Movement from one phase to another does not end the operational and tactical activities typical of earlier phases; it incorporates them. The phases in the protracted popular war model may not provide a complete template for understanding contemporary insurgencies; however, they do explain the shifting mosaic of activities usually present in some form.

Organisational and Operational Patterns

0323. Although each insurgency organisation is unique, there are often similarities, and being aware of general patterns and structures assists in predicting an insurgency’s methods of operation. Other considerations include the operational environment, the level of success of the insurgency, and the length of time the insurgency has been operating. Insurgent movements adopt a changing structure that evolves parallel to the changes within the insurgency. In the initial stage there is no need to establish a detailed organisation. In later stages it may be necessary for an insurgent movement to organise itself into groups, cells or networks in order to provide security to the members and resources. Once an insurgency has obtained enough popular support, a well-functioning and flexible organisation will be essential for coordinating and executing insurgent activities, and for establishing a credible alternative that replaces the established power. Organisational patterns reflect the following:

a. Types of Insurgency Members. An insurgency normally consists of six types of members. The proportion of every element will depend on the objectives, development, capability and success of the insurgency. The six types of members are:

(1) Leaders. Leaders provide direction and command an insurgency. They can exercise leadership through the power of revolutionary ideas as well as charisma. In some insurgencies a leader’s position may be as a result of religious, clan or tribal authority.

(2) Armed elements. Armed elements conduct operations, execute orders and actions, and maintain local control. Armed elements also protect training camps and networks that facilitate funding, instruction and the recruitment of local and foreign fighters.

(3) Cadres. Cadres form the political core of an insurgency and are engaged in the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. They can compose a political party and implement guidance and procedures provided by the movement leaders.

(4) Auxiliaries. Auxiliaries are active members and sympathisers who provide services that support an insurgency and do not participate in

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13 For purposes of this publication the term “auxiliaries” refers to insurgents. It does not include any friendly forces, such as paramilitary forces.
direct actions. Their activities may be:

(a) to operate and maintain safe houses,

(b) to store weapons and supplies,

(c) to act as couriers,

(d) to provide passive intelligence collection,

(e) to give early warning of counterinsurgent movements,

(f) to provide funding from lawful and unlawful sources, and

(g) to provide forged or stolen documents and access or introductions to potential supporters.

(5) **Underground.** The underground is a cellular organisation of active supporters of the insurgency which may contain an element that works in the HN government. Keeping the nature of their work for the insurgency secret is often paramount. They are more engaged than the auxiliaries and may at times act as an armed element, if they use weapons or conduct operations. They operate in all areas; especially in areas denied to and not suitable for standing armed elements. They conduct clandestine, covert, and overt operations, sometimes infiltrating the HN government. Members of the underground often continue in their normal positions in society, but lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Some insurgencies are unique in that they conduct most of their political activities inside the underground while a different section trains recruits, maintains the propaganda campaign, and helps in population control.

(6) **Mass Base.** The mass base consists of the members of the population who support the insurgent movement. These members are often recruited and indoctrinated by the cadre. Mass base members continue in their normal positions as legal members in society as they develop clandestine activities and may, over time, become permanent members of the insurgency.

b. **Functioning in Operation.** The following are essential to the operational functioning of an insurgency:

(1) **Network.** Although networks are not an element of insurgency, insurgencies will often use them. They will try to be resilient through the division of responsibilities into networked and compartmented cells. With this type of structure, the compromise of one cell will not greatly affect the operational security of the organisation as a whole. Compartmentalised organisations are difficult to destroy; they tend to heal, adapt and recover rapidly. Such organisations are often represented within the local, regional, national and even international spheres. There are groups with little physical presence in their target countries which
exist almost entirely as compartmented networks.

(2) **Learning and Adapting.** All successful insurgencies are adaptive. Insurgency is not necessarily a tactic of choice, but a necessity of relative weakness. Insurgents must be agile in order to circumvent the many obstacles they will encounter. The path to a successful insurgency involves adaptation and learning, and insurgents who do not manage this will perish.

(3) **Recruiting.** The main recruiting sources are the disaffected segments of the population. It is necessary to incorporate new personnel not only in the early stages but also during the development process, as the insurgency expands its efforts and loses members due to casualties or arrests. In recent times, recruiting, among other activities, has taken place through the Internet, using virtual forums, websites and “blogs”. The general proliferation of news, information and commentary, coupled with increasingly responsive audiences, can provide a ready source for potential recruits.

(4) **Training.** In order to maximise their members’ competence, insurgent organisations need training on such subjects as weapons, communications, logistics, explosives and small-unit tactics, among others. Although this is often provided by the insurgent organisation itself, trainers with operational training skills are not always available. Secure places in which to conduct training are difficult to find, particularly in urban areas. On some occasions, insurgents have to rely on external support. In the early days of a conflict, an insurgent group may lack a cadre of skilled, experienced fighters who can pass on their knowledge to new recruits. This problem must be solved as the insurgency matures. In addition, training is often required for more complex weapon systems, such as missiles and man-portable air defence systems.

(5) **Resources.** In order to maintain momentum and sustain operations, insurgents require constant and reliable access to supplies, weapons, ammunition and money. Internal logistical support is vital, especially in the early stages of insurgency when external support may be limited. As an insurgency develops and expands, the reliance on logistical support also increases, with more support being sought from external sources. If an insurgency develops a conventional capacity, this external support normally increases in scope and importance. The various resources required by insurgents are:

(a) **Weapons and Ammunition.** Insurgents will readily improvise weapons and explosives to increase their lethal effects. Weapons, ammunition and explosives can be purchased on the black market, captured from government forces, or supplied and smuggled across porous borders by a sympathetic third party.

(b) **Funding.** Funding for an insurgency is essential and can be obtained through many sources and in today’s globalised and
internet connected, electronic world. While funding is often shipped to insurgents just like other supplies, it may also be moved and held by local financial institutions. However, funding greatly influences an insurgency’s character and vulnerabilities. Local supporters or international front organisations may provide donations. Sometimes legitimate businesses are established to furnish funding. In areas controlled by insurgents, confiscation or illegal taxation might be utilised. Another common source of funding is criminal activity, especially the illegal trade of drugs.

(c) **Supply Lines.** To maintain momentum and meet the requirements of conducting all activities, insurgents require a system of internal and external supply lines, means of transportation and storage facilities. These supply lines can provide vital information on insurgent forces and support, and can be detected and interdicted.

(d) **Bases.** Insurgents adapt easily and can use a variety of bases from which to operate. Two such bases are safe houses and base camps. Safe houses are used to temporarily hide insurgents and are often part of a large system to secretly move members and materiel along selected routes between safe houses. Like any other armed force, insurgents have requirements for command and control, rest, resupply, refit, and training. The larger and more active the insurgent force, the more they will need established bases, both semi-permanent and temporary. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure in areas where insurgents can rest, plan and train. In rural areas, base camps tend to be in remote areas characterised by rough, inaccessible terrain. In urban areas, base camps tend to be located in areas where the insurgent has popular support.
Section IV - Insurgent Vulnerabilities

0324. Insurgents face numerous challenges in the course of their activities. The following is a description of the common insurgent vulnerabilities:

a. Security. Any group operating from a position of weakness that intends to use violence to pursue its political aims must initially adopt a covert approach for its planning and activities. This practice can become counterproductive once an active insurgency begins. Excessive secrecy can limit insurgent freedom of action, reduce or distort information about insurgent goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency. Furthermore, as an insurgency grows the number of potential informants increases. There is an inherent tension between the need to grow popular support and the need to maintain organisational security.

b. Decentralisation. The decentralised nature of the cells that provide the insurgent operational security can also be a weakness, because information is passed very slowly. The ability for insurgents to receive encouragement from superiors and members of the political wing, and direction in the face of counterinsurgent pressures, together with their lack of ability to openly call for reinforcements and logistics due to their operational security plan, can make the insurgents feel isolated, alone, confused and unsupported.

c. Inconsistencies in the Insurgent Narrative. The core logic of the narrative must remain consistent. For example, if an insurgent movement continually changes its political objectives, the population will be less likely to be convinced.

d. Insurgent Propaganda. The frequent use of wrong, fake and distorted information by insurgent propaganda can be exploited to undermine the insurgents’ credibility and effectiveness, especially when offered with a clear proof of the correct information. In the early stages an insurgency may be tempted to go to almost any extreme to attract followers. During this process, insurgents use a combination of propaganda and intimidation, which may not achieve popular support and will ultimately lead to the population rejecting their legitimacy in favour of that of the constituted government.

e. Need to Establish a Base of Operations. Insurgents can experience serious difficulties in finding a viable base of operations. A base too far from the major centres of activity may be secure but risks being out of touch with the populace. It may also be vulnerable to isolation. A base too near centres of government activity risks exposing the insurgency to observation and perhaps infiltration. Bases close to national borders can be attractive when they are beyond the reach of counterinsurgents yet safe enough to avoid suspicion on the part of neighbouring authorities or populations.

f. Reliance on Support. Insurgencies usually cannot sustain themselves without substantial external support. LOCs which require freedom of movement are then vulnerable. In addition, finances are vulnerable to electronic interdiction, or the source of the funds may be unreliable. An inability to gain external support may drive an insurgency to look inwards, which may impact on the
insurgents’ ability to sustain the campaign.

g. **Economic and Financial Weakness.** All insurgencies require funding. Criminal organisations are possible funding sources. However, such cooperation may attract attention from security forces and become a target to be exploited through counterinsurgent information-based activities. Controls and regulations that limit the movement and exchange of materiel and funds may compound insurgent financial vulnerabilities, especially when they receive funding from other countries.

h. **Internal Divisions.** Internal discontent may undermine an insurgency’s unity of effort, leading to factionalism within the leadership. A key vulnerability relates to the unity of an insurgency as its operations are concluded, or prior to completion, as divisions may emerge or violence can occur among different groups while vying for power. Thus, nothing is more demoralising for insurgents than to realise that people inside their movement or trusted supporters are deserting the insurgency or providing information to government authorities.
Section V - Overview

0325. **Definition.** Counterinsurgency is defined as “the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances”. This publication also employs the term “counterinsurgent” to include the set of actors executing COIN actions, whether they are part of the HN or members of the supporting countries or agencies.

0326. **Mindset.** Conducting successful COIN operations requires its practitioners to have an adaptive and flexible mindset. First and foremost, the population is the critical dimension of successful COIN. Understanding the population is to successful COIN what understanding physical terrain is to successful conventional land operations. A key part of understanding the population is have an intimate knowledge of what causes and perpetuates insurgency. Cultural awareness plays a key role. A second aspect of the counterinsurgent mindset is being able to think like an insurgent - to think like capable insurgents in order to stay ahead of the actual insurgents’ decisions and actions. Thirdly, successful counterinsurgents must understand that it is essential to establish an enduring presence within the population in order to provide continuous security and development efforts, which is vital to assuring the population’s sense of security and long-term outlook. Finally, counterinsurgents must understand that the military instrument is only one part of a comprehensive approach for successful COIN, although the security situation may require the joint force to execute tasks that other organisations are better suited to conducting.

0327. The aim of COIN is to defeat the insurgents and address any core grievances. All insurgencies are unique in their political, social and historical contexts, and they demand that the counterinsurgent adapt with skill and knowledge to meet specific socio-political and military conditions. COIN is a politically motivated, intelligence-driven activity. An appropriate and proportionate application of military force is required.

0328. The strategic goal of the counterinsurgent is to promote legitimate governance by controlling violence and enforcing the rule of law. As such, a comprehensive approach needs to be applied to coordinate all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, information and economic aspects and, when required, the military effort. Priority should be given to addressing the political dimension of insurgency in which the military force of the counterinsurgent plays a vital but essentially supporting role.

0329. Theories, strategies and tactics employed to counter insurgencies have evolved throughout history by adapting to aspects such as the operational environment, technology and the prevailing political conditions. The effort made by the parties - insurgent and counterinsurgent - to gain and maintain popular support within the AOO and internationally has been a constant theme.

0330. As depicted in Figure 3.1, insurgencies are not constrained by regional or national boundaries and may be local, transnational or even global in nature. Figure 3.3 illustrates this complex interrelationship and helps us to contextualise and understand the relationship between insurgency and COIN. COIN may need to act globally
through the aspects of the operational environment, with the military contribution being part of but not the complete solution to countering insurgents. In so far as insurgency takes benefit from different fields, COIN will have to address all these fields.

Figure 3.3 - Nature of Counterinsurgency

0331. NATO’s military achievements alone may not translate into political success. The struggle between insurgency and COIN is a contest for the support of the population and, while military power is important in any COIN campaign, simply killing insurgents may not result in the defeat of an insurgency’s political cause. NATO forces committed to a COIN effort are there to assist a HN government. The long term goal is to ensure the HN government reaches an acceptable level of self-sustainability, since in the end, it has to succeed on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions. NATO forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory. While it may be easier for NATO military units to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them. HN governments have the final responsibility to solve their own problems. Eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or occupiers; the sooner the main effort can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better. A successful military campaign can only be achieved when NATO works by, with and through the HN’s political and military apparatus. To be truly successful, NATO’s military campaign must “put the HN’s face on the operations”.

0332. Although COIN and the range of military activities have been described in Chapter 1, the application of offensive and defensive activities is integral to fighting and physically defeating insurgents. However, there is a need to apply a balanced military approach at the commencement of operations that also includes stability activities. These activities are aimed at protecting the population and at bringing
about security and stability. As they restore or create infrastructure and civil services, humanitarian aid is delivered, and governance is improved by reinforcing local governments’ authority and credibility. A proper balance between stability and other military activities can demonstrate to the population tangible signs of progress within a legitimate context. Thus one of the keys to success may be to gain the support of the population and deprive the insurgents from it.

Section VI - Attributes in Counterinsurgency

0333. In addition to the principles of allied joint and multinational operations, which apply to all operations, NATO has developed, from an analysis of recent operational experience and historical examples, the following attributes of COIN:

a. political primacy (and a clearly-defined political objective);
b. it is a struggle for the population, not against the population;
c. the relevance of legitimacy;
d. intelligence drives operations;
e. unity of effort (the requirement of a coordinated government structure);
f. neutralise the insurgency and isolate the insurgents from their support;
g. prepare for a protracted campaign;
h. security under the rule of law is essential;
i. hand over responsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable; and
j. learn and adapt quickly.

Political Primacy

0334. Before initiating a COIN, a clearly defined and achievable political objective must be established. To ensure the success of the political objective, several intermediate objectives should be established, disseminated and publicised to inform the population of the HN government’s intentions.

0335. The primacy of the political dimension will have an impact on all campaign aspects. In order to attain objectives and produce the desired effects a comprehensive approach (as described in Chapter 1) is required. Accordingly, military campaign design must be in accordance with clearly stated and achievable political goals.

0336. Closely related to political primacy is the requirement for political will to underpin military effort. Political will in COIN is often regarded by insurgents as the Achilles heel of liberal democracies. Typically, counterinsurgencies that have failed have done so because of an inability to sustain political will in protracted campaigns. Ultimately, insurgency and COIN are locked in a persistent “contest of political wills” both at home and in the theatre of operations.
The Struggle Against the Insurgent is a Struggle for the Population, not Against It

0337. The population is the main focus and arguably the COG of COIN. Whenever possible, the population’s trust in the HN government’s legitimacy must be emphasised and reinforced. To that end, effective HN government information activities such as public affairs should “vaccinate” or insulate the population against insurgent misinformation and disinformation.

0338. Because the struggle in COIN is essentially political, the counterinsurgent must shape a narrative message with the aim of discrediting the insurgent’s cause. This message or dominant narrative is crucial when attempting to anticipate and pre-empt insurgent propaganda. This narrative must negate the insurgent message. A counter-narrative must articulate the goals and purposes of the legitimate political authorities, highlight military and political successes, and manage public expectations. The COIN narrative must be transparent, timely, open, honest, verifiable and accessible.

0339. Successful COIN largely depends on NATO forces quickly developing an understanding of the operational environment and determining the importance of particular environments within respective AOOs. Through this enhanced understanding of the population and what affects it, NATO forces will be able to effectively execute all actions within the range of military activities. However, an inability to deliver on promises to local authorities and the population damages the credibility of the force and ultimately undermines the HN government.

0340. Unlike in conventional conflicts, counterinsurgent actions involve deeper integration of the military forces into the population; as a result, smaller self-contained and agile units have an essential role in COIN. This will pose a dilemma for military commanders, since they will be forced to assume greater risks in order to establish the procedures required to achieve their objectives - the deployment of detachments throughout the population, unit dispersion, dismounted patrols and so on. Commanders will have to find a balance between force protection and mission accomplishment (for further information on these paradoxes see Section 5, Part III).

0341. The significance of actions and activities planned or executed against the insurgent must be assessed in terms of the potential effects which they could cause on the population, not only on the insurgent.

Relevance of Legitimacy

0342. Legitimacy is an essential element in any COIN and involves the following two aspects:

- the population’s perception of the legitimacy of the HN government, including their security forces; and

- the perception of the legitimacy of the Allied security forces by international authorities, the HN and the contributing nation(s).

0343. COIN efforts will be in vain if the HN government cannot gain and maintain legitimacy. Promoting the establishment of an efficient, legitimate government is
essential, and commanders should ensure that the impact of military actions contributes to reinforcing the local HN government’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of an HN government can also be enhanced by demonstrating to the population the capacity to provide security and ensure basic essential services. Other indicators of legitimacy might be as follows:

a. a high-level recognition and acceptance of the HN government by major social institutions;
b. a culturally accepted level of political, economic and social development; and
c. the majority of the population feels appropriately represented by the state government and its institutions.

0344. Any insurgency will try to undermine the local government’s legitimacy and will question the legitimacy of foreign forces’ intervention by influencing local and NATO nations’ public opinion. To counter this, HNs and NATO forces should adhere to the following:

a. have international support or at least neutrality.
b. undertake diplomatic actions to gain support from countries belonging to the HN’s area of interest and influence. Efforts should be made to explain to the population and respective governments the objective of Allied forces’ intervention. This may assist in securing control on the HN borders, which is an essential factor when it comes to denying external support to the insurgent; and
c. consider support from intervening countries’ public opinion. The withdrawal of troops once a nation is involved in a campaign can:
   (1) damage alliance cohesion;
   (2) be claimed as a success by the insurgency; and
   (3) undermine capabilities. Deficiencies may result, and they can be exploited by the insurgency.

**Intelligence Drives Operations**

0345. COIN is an intelligence-driven activity. In COIN, effective intelligence requires close engagement with, and understanding of, the target population, including its political, social and cultural organisation. All sources of intelligence will be utilised, but there will be a special emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI). Insurgents tend to use the cover of everyday life and the population to mask their activities. This may reduce effectiveness of the more technological means of intelligence-gathering unless they are closely integrated with basic CI/HUMINT.

0346. Intelligence is an essential pillar of COIN. Accurate and actionable intelligence is key to defeating an insurgency. An efficient HN intelligence architecture must be
developed and accessible. Ideally, all intelligence organisations and agencies should be unified, integrated and centralised for information management, and decentralised for information gathering. For situational awareness and strategic level decisions, intelligence should be linked to high-level political decisions, and consist of civil and military personnel. However, for effective operations in the field, because a great deal of actionable intelligence is very perishable (within minutes and hours) it must be analysed and fused at the lowest possible level of command that reasonably results in effective tactical action.

0347. Intelligence and information activities should be closely coordinated to create the desired effect on the target population. Intelligence gathering should be continuous and focused and should prioritise collection assets in direct contact with the local population. In this respect, HN security forces, local intelligence organisations, HUMINT / COMINT (Communications Intelligence) sources and personnel frequently operating off-base have an important role.

0348. In addition to such skills as linguistic ability and cultural understanding, a broader mission awareness should be emphasised when training military personnel prior to participating in COIN. Some of the required topics are as follows:

a. a clear understanding of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict;

b. an understanding of the insurgent’s motives, strengths and weak points; and

c. an understanding of the roles of other actors in the AOO.

Unity of Effort

0349. The complexity of building an alliance COIN effort from the various governments, organisations, nations and armed forces involved can be daunting. The inherent “organisational friction” in such an alliance needs to be addressed through unity of effort at all levels.

0350. Foremost in achieving unity of effort is the development of a COIN strategy based on a shared understanding of the problem. This strategy should be comprehensive and fully coordinated by the HN government through a multifaceted approach combining political, economic and security solutions. A successful COIN strategy requires close cooperation between civil and military authorities at all levels; otherwise well-meaning but badly coordinated actions or statements will expose HN vulnerabilities that will be exploited by the insurgents.

0351. Another method of enhancing unity of effort is to establish liaison elements among the various structures and echelons, which should facilitate, integrate and coordinate civil, military and other agency efforts. Liaison should help ensure that actions and messages are coordinated and understood among all affected elements.

Neutralise the Insurgent

0352. In order to neutralise the insurgent, counterinsurgents must isolate the insurgent physically and psychologically from the population as well as addressing the core grievances of the insurgency. NATO-led COIN should contribute to a
comprehensive approach in addressing the core grievances of the conflict, focusing on the causes which have generated the insurgency and minimising its effects. Effectively addressing core grievances positively will facilitate HN legitimacy, and assist isolating the insurgents from the population. Physically neutralising the insurgents will require involvement of NATO forces ranging from direct combat to support to HN security forces. This requires that NATO forces match or surpass the mobility of the insurgents. Psychologically neutralising the insurgent will require using military capabilities such as PsyOps, CIMIC and public affairs.

0353. While the main focus of the military contribution to COIN is to protect the populace and secure access for HN agencies, another significant contribution should be neutralising the insurgents. This will involve the application of appropriate force to detect, capture or combat insurgents and the imposition of population control measures. Since insurgents do not require widespread active support from a population but only passive acquiescence, unnecessarily restrictive population control measures may be counterproductive. Similarly, killing insurgents can be counterproductive if these actions cause extensive collateral damage and resentment, generating martyrs and promoting recruitment and revenge.

0354. COIN must promote all possible methods to separate insurgents from the population and create divisions within insurgent groups. Several methods (which may involve military support provided by the counterinsurgent force) can be applied:

a. Address reasonable economic, political or social grievances that fuel the insurgency.

b. Implement initiatives promoting the switching of sides, offering them amnesty and promoting social reintegration and rehabilitation.

c. Promote denunciation and betrayal by fellow insurgents or by the populace. The offer of rewards may provide an additional incentive.

d. Apply measures to isolate insurgents by discrediting and demoralising them, and deterring them through detention and imprisonment. Ultimately the legal application of lethal force may be required.

0355. Like any other adversary, insurgents must communicate. In order to isolate the insurgents, their means of communication must be disrupted. For example, insurgents often use the Internet to communicate and to engage in effective information activities, which NATO forces must effectively detect and disrupt.

0356. The most dynamic insurgencies can replace casualties quickly. Therefore, COIN should attempt to deny insurgents the ability to reinforce or regenerate by the following means:

a. **Physical Isolation.** Physical isolation involves sealing borders in order to prevent or at least hinder external support to the insurgents, and developing area control actions to hinder or prevent the flow of insurgents through the population.

b. **Economic Isolation.** Economic isolation involves legal and diplomatic actions at local and international level for eliminating or hindering financial and economic support from external actors.
c. **Psychological Isolation.** Psychological isolation involves the application of targeted constant and consistent messages, psychological operations (PsyOps), and mutual and reciprocal support of HN government and Alliance forces.

**Prepare for a Protracted Campaign**

0357. Insurgencies are protracted by nature, and history demonstrates that they often last for years or even decades. As a result, COIN will normally demand considerable expenditure of time and resources, especially when conducted simultaneously with conventional operations in a protracted conflict.

0358. COIN requires a high degree of political understanding and a recognition of the effect, in terms of the human and economic cost, of military operations. Alliance nations should ensure that the appropriate level of effort is expended to maintain popular support. This support should be directed toward the indigenous population, international interests and the home nations of the insurgents.

0359. Military defeat of the insurgent is not the end of the COIN campaign. Political, social and economic programmes must continue to be resourced to ensure popular support and eradicate the underlying causes that fuelled the insurgency in the first place.

**Security under the Rule of Law is Essential**

0360. One of the pillars of any COIN campaign is the establishment of a secure environment that meets the basic needs of the population. Without a secure environment the insurgency could rekindle, and it would then be very difficult to sustain all the programs and reforms required to achieve the overall campaign objectives.

0361. There will be times when military forces are the only elements with the ability to operate in an area until a secure environment is established and other actors can intervene. In these cases, military commanders will require capabilities and resources which allow them to meet the basic needs of the population and restore normality. The aim is to reduce the level of violence as soon as possible in order to allow police forces - HN security forces - to assume law enforcement tasks.

0362. Similarly, government institutions - especially security forces and a law enforcement system - should be established, promoted and consolidated as soon as possible to maintain order and establish the rule of law. The tendency to create or reform local institutions following foreign models should be resisted. Local culture, tradition and idiosyncrasies should be respected.

0363. The use of military forces for law enforcement tasks should only occur in extraordinary circumstances and for a short period, until government institutions and police forces can undertake the task. The presence of military forces in the streets may help maintain a secure environment in the short term, but this role should be transferred to HN law enforcement agencies as soon as they are capable. In normal conditions, it is a mistake to use a soldier as a police officer, and vice versa.
The struggle against organised crime must be developed by the police and justice authorities. However, military commanders should always be willing to cooperate closely with civil authorities and security forces, especially where appropriate local resources are not available. Systems, processes and procedures should be established at all levels through civil authorities, security (police) forces, and military forces to enable the passage of information and to deconflict military and civilian tasking.

It is essential that COIN forces reinforce the rule of law. Undermining the rule of law in the name of military expediency is always counterproductive. COIN must be conducted in such a way as to reassure the population that the law remains paramount. Rectitude is a vital part of COIN campaigning.

Any illegal activity or human rights abuses by counterinsurgent forces will seriously hinder the attainment of COIN campaign objectives. This has always been the case but, due to the speed and reach of today’s media, it can now be even more damaging. Accordingly, COIN forces of the HN and NATO must ensure the fast dissemination of their public affairs/information message through the media to counter any manipulation of insurgent propaganda alleging human rights abuses.

Hand over Responsibility to the Local Forces as Soon as Practicable

Military commanders are focused on handing over responsibility to the HN government and its forces as soon as practicable in order to transition to the next phase of the COIN operation. Achieving this requires the development of reliable local leaders and institutions, and capable police and military forces. However, some nations are so vulnerable that there may be no other option but for NATO forces to lead operations for a protracted period.

While it may be easier for NATO forces to lead operations, a better approach would be to strengthen local forces and institutions and provide support when required. Ideally, NATO forces would not directly fight the insurgency, but would limit their support to the local regime - intelligence, helicopters, engineers, medical care, the training of local forces and so on. Otherwise, the insurgency is likely to present its cause as a struggle against an occupation force.

Local civil, police and military institutions should assume the COIN effort at all levels as soon as possible. Local forces have a deeper understanding of the local culture and environment. This is clearly a positive outcome from the HN since it establishes the foundation to enable the nation to gain political momentum and avoids NATO units being considered to be occupying forces. It also preserves NATO combat power - especially in terms of troops - in a situation where there may be scarce NATO forces.

Learn and Adapt Quickly

An efficient counterinsurgent force is an organisation with the ability to learn and adapt more quickly than an insurgent. In this context, the battle between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent represents an iterative action-reaction process; it is competitive learning. The side which is quickest to adapt its techniques and understanding seizes the initiative and progressively wins control of the operational environment. Counterinsurgent forces must possess mechanisms to identify and
implement appropriate changes. Tactics, campaign plans and the overarching strategy must be flexible enough to account for shifts in government policy, public sentiment and insurgent methods, while resources must be readily available to implement decisions rapidly.

0371. An efficient training program is essential, as well as the good management of lessons learned. All units should be able to analyse, outline and implement lessons learned, and assess the results obtained. Experiences and lessons identified and learned from recent NATO missions should be disseminated to units preparing for and while on operations.

Section VII - Indicative Tasks and Activities in Counterinsurgency

0372. Chapter 2 discussed those elements that comprise a stable state and how shortfalls and imbalances in these elements can cause state instability. Figure 3.4 illustrates indicative activities and tasks within the three elements of building human security, stimulating economic development, and fostering HN governance and legitimacy. A COIN campaign plan should address these three elements, especially with respect to the lines of operation (LOOs) that are introduced in Chapter 4. Their execution should be guided by the attributes in COIN described in this chapter and the HN’s cultural perspective. While it is accepted that the activities must fall under either a military or civil lead within a comprehensive approach, the military must plan to conduct or support all of these activities in the event that a non-permissive environment prevents civil actors from undertaking tasks best conducted by civilians.

![Figure 3.4 - Indicative Activities and Tasks in Counterinsurgency](image)

Figure 3.4 - Indicative Activities and Tasks in Counterinsurgency
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CHAPTER 4 - PLANNING FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

Section I Introduction

0401. **General.** This chapter focuses on planning for the NATO military contribution to COIN at the operational level. The operational level links the tactical action with achievement of the strategic end state. The general rules for the NATO operational planning process apply also to COIN planning. The principles are described in the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). Operational art and design are the core of planning for the operational level. Commanders use operational art and design to provide a framework to integrate the operational factors of time, space and purpose to achieve the conditions that make up the strategic end state. For COIN, the operational level contributes to reaching the overall strategic end state by focusing on securing the population, neutralising the insurgents and addressing the core grievances of the insurgency.

0402. **Influencing the Future.** Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future rather than merely responding to events. This involves evaluating potential decisions and actions, and shaping conditions in advance. Planning involves integrating individual decisions and tasks together into potential effects, as well as examining the implications of these decisions, tasks and effects. Planning involves thinking through the conditions and how, by achieving the objectives, one will cumulatively reach the end state.

0403. **Time Horizons.** Planning time horizons refer to how far into the future plans attempt to shape events. Uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in the environment. The further into the future plans reach, the wider the range of possibilities and the more uncertain the forecast of future conditions. A fundamental tension exists between planning in detail and lack of certainty of future events. Time horizons in COIN are normally longer than in traditional warfare.

0404. **Plans.** In order to prepare for and conduct military operations, it is necessary to develop operational plans that address all relevant factors applicable to the efficient and successful conduct of an operation. Operational plans must be developed at all levels of the NATO military command structure. An essential element of NATO’s operational planning process is the requirement for political control, guidance and approval, particularly in respect of planning and force activation, in response to an actual or developing crisis. To this end, planning should be flexible enough to allow both frequent exchanges of political guidance and military advice as well as adaptation to political requirements.

0405. **Political Primacy and Unity of Effort.** Political considerations in COIN require special attention to achieve unity of effort. The means to achieve unity of effort are a comprehensive approach - essentially all multinational, joint, intergovernmental, inter-agency, non-governmental and other actors working towards a common purpose. In its most basic terms, all actors should strive to counter an insurgency as a team. The HN government and its strategy are at the centre of this team.

0406. **Comprehensive Approach.** As described in Chapter 1, a comprehensive approach refers to cooperative planning and execution by a range of actors, both national and international; including militaries, other departments of state, IOs, NGOs and the HN government. A comprehensive approach to planning and execution is essential for successful long-term COIN. NATO’s military contribution supports the HN’s military efforts to neutralise the
insurgent’s military efforts, but the military contribution is only one part of a larger comprehensive approach to countering an insurgency.

Section II - Levels of Operations and Counterinsurgency

0407. **Levels of Operations.** The levels of operations remain the same for any campaign theme, including COIN. There is no clean transition between where one level of operations ends and another begins. Brilliance at one level of operations may not overcome shortcomings at another. Success at the lower levels of operations may be necessary but not sufficient to achieve lasting political results. Strategic mistakes may squander operational and tactical successes. By the same token, tactical and operational success cannot rescue a seriously flawed strategy. The tactical and operational levels in COIN may be compressed due to the protracted nature of the conflict and the complexity of the operational environment. The levels of operations are not necessarily associated with echelons or headquarters (HQ); thus, a division may have to plan at the operational level if it is the HQ of the NATO COIN effort within an HN.

0408. **Strategic.** The strategic level is that level of operations at which NATO and individual nations determine multinational or national objectives and how to achieve those objectives. The strategic level of operations may be the most difficult to plan for because the strategic environment is often volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. This level of operations is the most important, as it establishes the framework for how operational and tactical efforts work to achieve the end state. Because political factors have primacy in COIN, the strategic level is vital. Additionally, the strategic level establishes the overall framework to counter an insurgency. While operational and tactical actions can be successful, it is at the strategic level that core grievances are most often truly addressed. For example, HN reform or political accommodation may be required to address the core grievances of an insurgency.

0409. **Operational.** The operational level links multinational, national and military strategic objectives to the tactical employment of forces, and the focus is on campaigns and major operations. The operational level requires the use of operational art and design. Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs, supported by their skill, knowledge and experience. The operational design is the framework for the commander’s efforts and includes operational objectives. Operational objectives change a condition at the theatre level and are consequently broad in scale and size or space. In COIN, actions at the operational level are normally protracted in nature, as successfully achieving operational objectives requires cumulative tactical successes over time. Achieving strategic objectives similarly requires cumulative operational successes over time. Long-range planning, complex situations, large spans of control, and working with other agencies are also indicators for operating at the operational level; however, it is the level of the objective that is the determining factor.

0410. **Tactical.** The tactical level focuses on planning and executing battles, engagements and activities to achieve tactical objectives. The overall COIN campaign consists of a series of major tactical actions and operations of long duration. Tactical action in COIN is the direct link with the relevant population, gaining counterinsurgent credibility and HN legitimacy. The cumulative effect of tactical action translates to changing conditions. The operational and strategic levels in COIN are extremely sensitive to tactical actions. Tactical commanders should be empowered with the authority and capabilities they need. Tactical COIN efforts are normally decentralised with a centralised vision and message.
However, NATO commanders must avoid having a “strategy of tactics”. In other words, commanders must have an overarching framework and plans that tactical efforts nest within. Additionally, NATO Commanders must ensure that tactics that win in combat but prevent operational or strategic success are not used.

Section III - Intelligence

0411. **Population.** Intelligence in COIN is focused on the population. Effective counterinsurgents must understand the population of the HN, the insurgents, and the HN government and military. This level of understanding requires insight into the human environment.

0412. **Intelligence-Operations Dynamic.** Intelligence and operations dynamically support each other. Effective intelligence is vital to effective operations. In turn, effective operations tend to produce information which can generate actionable intelligence, corroborated intelligence that is immediately useful, specific, and relevant enough to efficiently conduct action. Similarly, ineffective or inaccurate intelligence tends to produce ineffective operations, which often have unintended and negative effects.

0413. **Local Focus.** Insurgencies vary greatly in time and space, in terms of their leaders, approaches, organisations and tactics. The insurgency one unit faces will often be different from that faced by an adjacent unit. The mosaic nature of insurgencies, coupled with the fact that all personnel are potential intelligence collectors, means that all echelons both produce and consume intelligence. In COIN, much of the information and intelligence flows from the bottom up. This pattern also means that tactical units require a lot of support for both collection and analysis, as their organic intelligence structure is often inadequate.

0414. **Intelligence Collaboration.** NATO COIN normally occurs in a multinational, joint and inter-agency environment at all echelons. Commanders and staffs must consequently share intelligence with other militaries, intelligence services and other organisations, as applicable to their roles and missions in the COIN effort. Depending on the duration and complexity of the COIN effort, the Joint Forces Command (JFC) may consider standing up a multinational intelligence cell to produce combined intelligence products. Due to the imperative for operations-intelligence fusion in COIN, commanders may consider fusion cells and other solutions that enable operations and intelligence to work more closely in a dynamic relationship.

0415. **Determine Adversary Courses of Action.** After analysing the operational environment, assessing adversary approaches and tactics, and identifying adversary COGs, the next step is to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s campaign plan and probable courses of action (COAs). The overall approach, or combination of approaches, that the insurgent senior leaders have selected to achieve their goals, and their recent tactics, are key indicators of their campaign plan. From these indicators a model of the insurgent campaign plan can be constructed. The final step is determining the COAs that the insurgency may use.

0416. **Insurgent Campaign Plan.** The insurgent campaign plan is the way in which the insurgent strategic approach is applied to create the conditions necessary to achieve the desired end state. Insurgents can accomplish this goal by maintaining pre-existing adverse conditions or by creating those conditions. While insurgents normally do not have a
campaign plan in the same sense that NATO does, constructing a model of their actions in this form adds to a counterinsurgent understanding of the insurgency, predicting insurgent COAs, planning a COIN campaign, seizing the initiative, execution and assessment.

0417. **Collaborative Effort.** Constructing a model of an insurgency’s campaign plan requires participation and input from the HN, joint force command (JFC), outside agencies and the entire staff. Cultural understanding, as well as judgement, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception and character are required to effectively produce a useful and accurate model. It is imperative that the entire process is based on open discussion and intellectual honesty. Mirror-imaging or biasing this process will result not only in a skewed view of the insurgent campaign plan, but all friendly efforts based on it.

0418. **Model-making.** The process of constructing a model of an insurgency’s campaign plan is an inductive and intuitive one that requires detailed intelligence products. These products are based on the insurgents’ actions, and building the model requires analysing these products holistically and then inductively determining the insurgents’ LOOs.

0419. **Graphic Example.** Figure 4.1 graphically depicts one example of insurgent campaign plans in terms of the end state and LOOs. The insurgent ‘end state’ is the sum of several conditions that the insurgents must change from current conditions (see Chapter 2 for more information on the operational environment). The LOOs are the insurgency’s operational ways to cause effects to change the current conditions. Insurgents execute tactical actions simultaneously or sequentially along these LOOs. These tactical actions strive to create certain effects in the overall operational environment. These effects, or an accumulation of effects, may occur simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the situation and the effectiveness of insurgent and counterinsurgent efforts. When tactical actions and their cumulative effects have successfully translated to the operational level to achieve insurgent objectives, the insurgency will have reached its end state. It is important to note, however, that the operational environment is a complex and dynamic one which will often require changes in planning and execution or even the desired conditions.
EXHAUST THE WILL OF NATO PEOPLE

- Cause casualties among NATO Troops (Daily Deaths on Evening News)
- Build appearance of “Popular Revolt” of the theatre - # of Attacks
- Undermine the legitimacy of Coalition – Occupation was/is illegitimate
- Shape perception of continued instability – and the inevitability of more

DELEGITIMIZE THE HN GOVERNMENT

- Fracture HN Political Cooperation/Consensus
- Assassinate/Discredit/Intimidate HN Political Leaders
- Seize/Hold Sanctuary Enclaves – Key Terrain
- Disrupt Essential Services
- Disrupt Economy

SHAPE INTERNATIONAL OPINION AGAINST OCCUPATION

- Exploit NATO collateral damage through media
- Portray collateral damage as attacks on cultural/religious sites or civilians
- Create perception of Popular Revolt Against the Occupiers
- Undermine the legitimacy of NATO countries political leaders Policy

PROMOTE LEGITIMACY OF INSURGENT CAUSE

- Conduct Info Ops to Create Perception of a Popular Insurgency
- Promote vision of a better future or return to “Golden Age”
- Provide security and essential services: food, water, power
- Unite insurgent groups under political party
- Promote religious goals

END STATE:
- NATO Forces withdraw from the HN territory, leaving remaining groups to decide its future

Figure 4.1 Example of an Insurgent Campaign Plan

0420. Multiple Insurgencies or Threats. If there are multiple insurgencies, this process of model-making must be undertaken for each insurgency or adversary. Once the models have been made for each adversary, they must be accounted for holistically or cumulatively. Thus the intelligence community will incorporate this comprehensive view of adversarial end states, conditions and LOOs into the intelligence estimate. The comprehensive view must be accounted for in the HN’s strategy and other subordinate COIN plans.

0421. Assessment and Adjustment. Any model must be continuously evaluated, and updated if necessary. A change to the model may cause the overall strategy and supporting plans to be modified. While the overall strategy may not require changes, operational and/or tactical adjustments may be necessary.

0422. Insurgent Courses of Action. The insurgency campaign plan model provides a disciplined methodology for analysing the set of potential adversary COAs. However, insurgents may pursue many different tactical COAs within an operational area at any time. Insurgents base their tactical COAs on their capabilities and intentions. Evaluating the support, information, political, and violence capabilities of insurgent organisations has been discussed. The intentions come from goals, motivations, approaches, culture, perceptions and leadership personalities. However, insurgent tactical actions can have operational and strategic effects. This is partly due to the fact that insurgent propaganda and media reporting can reach a wide and even a global audience.

Section IV - Counterinsurgency Campaign Planning Overview
General. NATO operational planning is oriented to the achievement of a political end state and strategic objectives established by NATO’s political-military authorities and carried out within the political limitations and resource constraints set by these authorities. For COIN the HN will play a key role in determining the end state and objectives. Operational planning will seek to translate strategic guidance and direction into a scheduled series of integrated military actions, carried out by joint forces to achieve strategic objectives efficiently and with acceptable risks. It begins with an analysis of the situation and the mission to develop a clear appreciation of what must be accomplished, under what conditions and within what limitations. Based on this appreciation, it then focuses on determining how operations should be arranged within an overall operational design. The operational design provides the basis for subsequent development of the operational concept as well as a detailed plan (see Annex D). Operational art is applied to determine how best to conduct operations (ways) using available forces and capabilities (means) to achieve the objectives (ends) efficiently and within acceptable risk parameters. Key to the application of operational art is the ability to envision the employment of forces and capabilities in time and space to create effects, to appreciate the realm of possibilities, and to anticipate probable outcomes and their implications.

Fundamentals of Operations Planning. Operations planning may be carried out at different levels under varying circumstances and produce different outputs. In any case, the basics outlined in the following paragraphs are fundamental to any operations planning effort, including COIN.

Direction and Requirements. Operations planning involves concurrent activity at different levels of command in iterative cycles as planning matures from a basic idea to a concept and finally to a mature plan. Guidance and direction are transmitted from higher to lower levels while requirements for resources and requests for information are transmitted for approval from lower to higher levels. Operations planning at any level should take account of guidance two levels above and requirements two levels below; however, in COIN the lowest tactical levels (each individual military member) must understand the key strategic objectives.

Objective Oriented Planning. Operations planning seeks to describe the sequence of actions that have the greatest likelihood of setting the military conditions required to achieve the objective and the desired end state. Therefore, it is usually necessary to clearly describe the desired end state and work backwards to the initial entry or build-up of forces in the joint AOO, and even to consider preventive measures to determine the activities most likely to be required to establish conditions for success along the way.

Operational Approaches. There are a range of possible operational approaches to COIN, depicted in Figure 4.2. The proportion of effort that counterinsurgents use is the vital consideration. For example, a direct approach will have a greater proportion of defence (military and law enforcement) efforts rather than development and diplomacy efforts. Conversely, an indirect approach will have more diplomatic and development efforts than defence efforts. Careful consideration and coordination determines which initial approach is appropriate given the starting conditions; however, the earlier efforts can begin, the more likely an indirect approach is appropriate. Commanders adjust their approach as circumstances change, especially the security situation. COIN should strive to move to the right on the scale - from direct to balanced and from balanced to indirect.
0428. **Direct.** A direct approach may be required where an HN government is losing ground in its struggle with an insurgency or there is no viable HN government. The first task in this situation is to establish security and control in as wide an area and with as great an extent as possible. Once security and control are established, the counterinsurgent approach should strive to become more balanced. The direct approach may also be appropriate for the long term when facing an insurgency that is not concerned with the support of the population and when the population supports the HN government. In this situation, the commander leads all NATO efforts in support of the HN’s strategy.

0429. **Balanced.** This approach is a more even blend of NATO political, development and military efforts. The balanced approach is led by the commander and supported by the JFC, but all efforts support the HN’s strategy. While the overall level of effort is balanced, military efforts are secondary and subordinate to political and development activities when using this approach. Removing the fuel that keeps an insurgency going - the core grievances and narrative - is more effective in the long-term than attacking or destroying the military wing of the insurgency.

0430. **Indirect.** An indirect approach utilises more development and political efforts than military efforts to address an insurgency. The ability to use the indirect approach is based on the security situation. If the insurgency is at least in military stalemate, counterinsurgents can avoid direct military confrontation and instead focus on addressing the core grievances and combating the insurgency’s narrative. The indirect approach also requires that the HN be viable. If the HN is viable, NATO can support the HN’s COIN efforts. Advisory efforts are normally an essential part of the indirect approach. Finally, the indirect approach is best suited to early intervention and must be a holistic effort.

0431. **Progression.** Figure 4.3 is an example of how a COIN operation might move from a direct approach to a balanced approach and is currently using an indirect approach. In other words, initial efforts have focused more on defensive efforts and, over time, successes and the operational environment in general have allowed for efforts to shift to more emphasis on diplomacy and development. In this example, however, the COIN operation has not reached its end state and is consequently ongoing. This reinforces the principle that NATO
long-term efforts should aim to be more developmental and political than military until the presence of NATO forces is no longer required.

Figure 4.3 Example Progression of the Operational Approach

0432. **Coordination and Leadership.** In planning, permanent coordination between the civil and military authorities is paramount to ensure effectiveness and avoid prejudicial frictions. Yet it is paramount to assess the results in order to decide the beginning of a new phase of the campaign. Any transition has to be carefully managed if one does not want to lose the benefit of the previous phase. For instance, the military will become the supporting element and the civilian the supported as the prominence of military activity reduces and the emphasis of the campaign transitions to civilian development and diplomacy. This has to be prepared; otherwise an insurgency can develop quickly pending a decision. Coordination requires leadership. Indeed, it also requires the existence of one top theatre authority (either civilian or military, depending on the phase, but it must be one authority) that will define priorities and makes decisions, as the proportion of effort requires (see Figure 4.3). One should keep in mind that the insurgent’s strategy often benefits in terms of time from the coexistence of equally high ranking leaders who may be unable to agree and are then unable or slow to trigger effort in given fields. The subsequent lack of unity of effort can protract the insurgency.

**Section V - Operational Art**

0433. **Operational Art.** Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns, operations and battles. While military art transcends the levels of operations, operational art is focused on the operational level - the link between the tactical and strategic levels of operations. Operational art translates strategy into an operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of operations. It promotes unified action by facilitating the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state which is essential
for long-term COIN success.

0434. **Understanding the Operational Environment.** Operational art involves considerations that must reflect more than just rote knowledge of doctrine and manuals. It should be applied with a broad knowledge and understanding of the complicated relationships of all the factors influencing the planning and execution of a campaign. In COIN, a deep understanding of the operational environment is fundamental, especially the population and the insurgency. Operational art also requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of “means” to “ends” and an understanding of the inherent and effective synergy that flows from properly coordinated joint operations.

0435. **Considerations.** When designing a campaign, the commander utilises operational art to consider the following four aspects:

a. **End State.** The end state that will achieve the strategic objective must first be identified. Further, the military conditions that comprise the end state must be identified. The military conditions and overall conditions for a COIN end state are interdependent (see Figure 4.4). In other words, all participants in COIN must work towards one end state.

Figure 4.4 - Example of Counterinsurgency Campaign End State and Lines of Operation

b. **Sequencing.** The ordering of activities, both sequentially and simultaneously, will lead to the fulfilment of the military conditions, which should lead to success.

c. **Resources.** The application of the military resources allocated to commanders, within the constraints and restraints imposed upon them, to sustain their sequence of actions.

d. **Risk.** The risks involved must be identified and the commander must have an appreciation of what is possible. To achieve success commanders must be prepared to take risks, but they should also make some contingency plans to mitigate the risk involved.
0436. **Concepts of Campaign Design.** In seeking to conduct operations, battles, and engagements in pursuit of the strategic objective, operational level commanders will design the campaign around a number of planning tools that help them visualise how the campaign will unfold. Thus the commander articulates a vision or concept of operational design, a statement of intent for the campaign plan, and a command structure for executing the plan.

0437. **Time, Space and Forces.** Operational art is largely a matter of imagination and skill in balancing the influences of time, space and forces in order to gain and maintain the initiative and set military conditions for success, as follows:

a. **Time-Space.** Time-space factors relate to the relative speed with which forces can reconnoitre, occupy, secure or control a given area. These factors are critical in COIN, as insurgents normally attempt to protract a conflict in order to exhaust the counterinsurgents.

b. **Time-Force.** Time-force factors relate to the relative readiness and availability of forces and logistic support over time, including implications regarding their preparedness as well as the evolution of capabilities.

c. **Space-Force.** Space-force factors relate to the relative ability to control or dominate operationally significant areas, the concentration and dispersion of forces within (Joint) AOOs, including the consequences of over-extension, dislocation, and exposure and the ability to give up space in order to avoid becoming decisively engaged.

d. **Time-Space-Force.** Time-space-force factors relate to the relative capability to project forces into a region and the comparative speed with which they can build up decisive force capabilities.

0438. **The Adversary.** Regardless of the situation, the underlying premise for operational planning is that military operations are required to pre-empt and counter threats from an adversary or to contain violence and hostilities. This pertains to COIN as well as other associated threats such as crime, ethnic violence and terrorism. The insurgents, their leaders, and the population at large possess their own “will”, influenced by their own culture, perspectives and vital interests, to pursue goals in opposition to NATOs. It is therefore imperative during all operational planning to attribute to the opponents and opposing factions the potential to willingly oppose NATO operations with their full potential when their aims conflict with our own.

0439. **Ends, Ways, Means and Risk.** Operational art requires that NATO commanders understand the relationship between ends, ways, means and risk. Ends consist of the required conditions to achieve the overall objectives. Ways are the required actions and sequence of actions that are most likely to bring about the ends. Means are the required resources necessary to support the ways. The risk includes both the likely cost in performing that sequence of actions and the overall probability of the ways and means being able to bring about the desired ends. Because the ends are established at the strategic level, ends remain constant with respect to operational art. If ways and means are insufficient for the ends, NATO commanders will have to address this with their superiors. Figure 4.5 depicts balanced ends, ways, means and risk on the left, and ways that require
more means than are currently available, with consequent risk, on the right.

Figure 4.5 - Balancing Ends, Ways and Means

Section VI - Operational Design

0440. The development of an operational design is fundamental to operational planning. It represents the formulation of an overarching idea for the operation, based on a general estimate of the situation and the mission analysis, and embodies the commander’s intent. Operational design provides design elements to help visualise and shape the operation to accomplish the mission. Elements of operational design help to visualise the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish the mission. The key to operational design involves understanding the strategic guidance, determining the end state and objectives, identifying the adversary’s principal strengths and weaknesses, and developing an operational concept. Operational design for COIN should reflect a comprehensive approach applicable to each phase of the campaign. Because there is only one strategy or campaign, there should be only one operational design. This single design should incorporate all actors, especially the HN (see Annex D).

Section VII - Planning Considerations

0441. **Air Command and Control.** The command and control relationships established for engagement operations should consider both the need for flexibility and the training level of forces to be employed. For example, the training and competency required for precision strikes in COIN are more demanding than for traditional warfare. Consequently, joint force commanders and component commanders must consider the command and control architecture that best suits the situation. A highly responsive command and control architecture that allows the employment of the wrong weapon at the wrong place or time may be worse for the overall effort than a more rigid structure that causes delays but ensures appropriate weapons employment. The key is striking a balance that suits the situation. Air forces have historically provided capability to NATO-led ground forces with close air support (CAS) where a qualified forward air controller (FAC) is available. Being especially cognisant of the fluid environment of COIN, we must be mindful of how and when to engage or use force. Considerations for air command and control are as follows:

a. **Command and control architecture.** COIN operations require a joint, multinational command and control architecture for air that is effective and responsive. The command and control structure applies to more than just NATO forces; it involves coordinating all air assets, including those of the HN. COIN
planning must thus establish a joint and multinational air power command and control system, and policies on the rules and conditions for employing air power in the theatre.

b. **Planning.** During COIN operations, most planning occurs at lower echelons. Ideally, components at the operational level fully coordinate these plans. Air planners require visibility of actions planned at all echelons to provide the most effective air support. Furthermore, COIN planning is often fluid and develops along short planning and execution time lines, necessitating some degree of informal coordination and integration for safety and efficiency.

0442. **Information Activities Planning.** These activities are synchronised and nested within the communication strategy developed for each operation. They should also reflect a dominant narrative agreed upon among Allies for both the civilian and military elements of the COIN operation. Planners must coordinate information activities, conducted through capabilities, key tools and techniques to accomplish COIN objectives. In this context, the Info Ops function will provide advice on and help to co-ordinate information activities throughout the planning process. The successful execution of information activities also requires early detailed information activities planning, coordination and deconfliction with all appropriate participants in unified action. Uncoordinated information activities can compromise, complicate, negate or harm other activities within operations. Planners must also recognise that other agencies and nations will have various concepts concerning information activities and some have thorough and sophisticated doctrine, procedures and capabilities for planning and conducting information activities. Planners should develop common, multi-echelon themes based on and consistent with HN government policies and the operation’s objectives.

0443. **Release and Execution Authority.** As part of the planning process, designation of release and execution authority is required. Release authority provides the approval for information activities employment and normally specifies the allocation of specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the execution authority. Execution authority is described as the authority to employ information activities and capabilities at a designated time and place. Information activities may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national level coordination and approval; however, it is imperative that information activities in COIN be as rapid and flexible as the insurgents’ use of information, since the population’s perception of events is vital.

0444. **Vision.** The vision of the role of information activities in an operation should begin before the specific planning is initiated; it is a vital component of the operational art and design for COIN. COIN relies on information activities and capabilities, and the related priority intelligence requirements and requests for information must be given priority to enable the intelligence products to be ready in time to support the COIN planning, execution and assessment.

0445. **Legal Considerations.** Information activities may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review. NATO forces, whether operating physically from bases or locations overseas or from within the boundaries of NATO or elsewhere, are required to act in accordance with all appropriate law, especially legal agreements with the HN.
0446. **Contribution of PsyOps.** In COIN, PsyOps forces have a vital role in maximising the effects of conventional and Special Forces’ operations in the perception of the local audiences. It will always require action balanced with information activities to gain the support of the local population and containing the adversaries psychological and propagandistic outreach. PsyOps forces are enhanced by their capability to analyse and assess audiences belonging to a foreign culture, advise joint planning and targeting and conveying culturally attuned messages to approved target audiences. PsyOps forces are the single provider for military mass media capabilities (radio, print, TV/video, new media and direct communication and other activities, e.g. traditional communication, events, etc) in direct support and disposal of the theatre commander. The three basic aims of PsyOps are to:

a. Weaken the will of the adversary (or potentially adversary) target audiences.

b. Reinforce the commitment of friendly target audiences.

c. Gain the support and cooperation of uncommitted or undecided audiences.

0447. The considerable challenges of COIN will require robust PsyOps forces under the theatre commander as a Component Command or Task Force and attached support elements with tactical commanders to allow agile and direct engagement in the information domain. They will be competing with highly flexible adversaries not limited by legal, or ethical bounds. PsyOps therefore is to be well integrated into the overall operational effort throughout the theatre in support of combined, joint operations mission accomplishment. Swift release of products and activities is vital, as is credibility and truthfulness with regard to the product content. Co-ordination will be achieved through the PsyOps staff that is required for the operational and tactical headquarters, the InfoOps function and Strategic Communications. PsyOps specialists may also be used to train and advise HN forces and agencies in their particular field of expertise to enhance domestic capabilities for the struggle against insurgents.

0448. **Planning Security Sector Reform (SSR).** Sustainable SSR depends on thorough planning and assessment. Through unified action, the various actors consider the unique capabilities and contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a practical pace of reform and accounts for the political and cultural context of the situation. The plan accounts for available resources and capabilities while balancing the human capacity to deliver change against a realistic time line. The SSR plan reflects HN culture, sensitivities and historical conceptions of security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm for the security sector, understanding that a Western model may not be appropriate. As with the broader campaign plan, the SSR plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while preventing new or escalating future security crises. The level of HN development - especially as it pertains to poverty and economic opportunity - is an important consideration in SSR planning. Planning for SSR includes building or rebuilding culturally appropriate security forces, judicial systems, law enforcement and corrections. Security force assistance builds or improves security forces.

0449. **Planning Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).** In NATO doctrine, DDR is part of SSR. Planning for a successful DDR program requires an understanding of both the situation on the ground and the goals, political will and resources of actors and other organisations willing support. Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics and local society, as well as the nature of the conflict
and the ongoing peace processes. Assessments are conducted in close consultation with the local populace and with personnel from participating agencies who understand and know about the HN. Joint forces and other actors may enter the DDR process at many different stages; therefore, assessment is a continuous process used to guide decision-making throughout the DDR program.

0450. Planning Detention Activities.

a. As a matter of policy, the mandate and strategic operation plan (OPLAN) may confirm what, if any, powers of arrest, detention or internment the force may exercise, and how the exercise thereof reflects the oftentimes competing aims of providing a secure environment and facilitating the administration of criminal justice. To ensure the highest level of interoperability, commanders at all levels will have to give particular consideration to the question of whether such powers shall be discharged of either in a national capacity or as the responsibility of NATO. National decisions concerning transfer authority will determine whether troops or individual soldiers contributed to the counterinsurgent force may exercise the powers of arrest, detention or internment should they have been vested in NATO.

b. Supplementing relevant decisions by higher authority, commanders must ensure that any individual apprehended, whether formally arrested, detained, interned or not, shall at all times be treated in accordance with the relevant principles and rules of international law. This may involve, but is not limited to, appropriately resourced holding facilities, specialised training, and transparent periodic review of all cases where individuals are kept in custody, and independent external monitoring provided by impartial organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At the same time, all Allied personnel are responsible for acting in conformity with any pertinent guidance concerning the treatment of individuals in the custody of the force. Personnel must at all times be fully aware that disrespectful or ill treatment of persons held in custody will adversely affect their credibility (both in theatre and nationally/globally) and have similar repercussions on their ability to accomplish the mission. It will, moreover, set a bad example for indigenous forces as well as law enforcement bodies supported and/or trained by, or otherwise cooperating with, the NATO force.

c. Prudent use of the powers of arrest, detention or internment may also yield significant (and often actionable) intelligence, rehabilitate casual and reconcilable insurgents, and help spread fear and mistrust within the insurgency’s leadership. This, in turn, reduces the indigenous population’s risk of falling victim to violence inflicted by the insurgency, enables more precise targeting by the counterinsurgent force, and stimulates the perception of progress, restraint and legitimacy.

d. Wherever possible and appropriate, those held in custody should be brought swiftly under due legal process to bolster perception of normality and the rule of law. While the conditions and procedures for transferring individuals from NATO or national custody to the indigenous law enforcement system or judiciary will, as a rule, be determined by higher authorities, commanders at all levels have a responsibility to see that no transfer will expose the transferred individual to the danger of foreseeable torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. To this end, they should duly consider all available information concerning the effectiveness of the indigenous police, the independence of the judiciary, as well as the correctional systems capacity and resolve to be effective. In addition, any transfer of the
detainees to the host nation, be it directly to indigenous forces or law enforcement bodies or through an intermediary, will have to comply with pertinent transfer agreements. Such agreements may have been concluded by NATO or individual troop-contributing nations, as appropriate, and may require supplementation by military technical arrangements.

e. To support indigenous law enforcement and judicial due process, the NATO force should also make its best efforts to collect and properly handle any items (e.g. weapons, equipment, drugs, etc.) document and information technology, including if exploited from an intelligence perspective, in light of its possible use as evidence, should charges be laid against an insurgent. To this end, the commander should ensure he is familiar with the evidential requirements of the local justice system.

f. In some cases, it may be appropriate to release individuals from custody and facilitate their return into local communities. Such releases will carry significant political and symbolic importance both within the host nation and the wider international audience. Getting local leaders to guarantee good behaviour mitigates risk, assists reintegration, and breaks adversarial control. However, any such release must be with the approval of host nation authorities, and ideally, in conformity with their legal system.
CHAPTER 5 - THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION

Section I - Introduction

The Aim of the Military Contribution to Counterinsurgency

0501. Military activities aim to protect the population and neutralise the insurgents. These activities will create favourable conditions for HN and Alliance agencies and all other civil actors to gain access to the population and address core grievances. They will also allow the HN government to broker a political solution which defeats the insurgency. As stated in Chapter 3, however, the military contribution supports the political aims of the HN and the Alliance. Destruction of insurgent military capabilities alone will not address the cause that is the driving force of an insurgency. Thus, the use of force alone against insurgents does not guarantee a decisive success.

Some thoughts about the military contribution and the commander’s environment

0502. In a COIN environment, the commander is pivotal in orchestrating the efforts of a wide variety of agencies into a comprehensive approach. This approach is achieved through consensus and compromise as well as with traditional command practices. Commanders should promote the role and sovereignty of the HN. Although NATO forces are endowed with immense military power, versatility and an enduring ability to manage and project firepower, they have to operate in close coordination with non-military actors. This cooperative and collaborative effort is required to stabilise the environment and to contribute to the defeat of an insurgency. Commanders must act as diplomats as well as soldiers.

0503. NATO forces are, more than ever, operating where the human factor predominates and action on the ground and the capacity for discrimination in the use of force are vital for success. In operations that take place “amongst the people”, NATO forces face opponents for whom asymmetric attack is the norm.

0504. As every insurgency is unique, COIN will require the considered application of the full range of military activities. Operations in a COIN campaign combine offensive, defensive and stability activities in order to achieve the stable and secure environment needed for the restoration of essential services and the further development of effective governance. While securing the HN population, NATO and HN forces must also neutralise the insurgent military wing. This effort includes a spectrum of activities, including combating and capturing irreconcilable insurgents, combating terrorism and shaping perceptions through information activities.
Structure of the Chapter

0505. This chapter describes the military contribution to COIN. While much of the information is contained within various other NATO publications, this publication consolidates and adds to this information within the context of COIN. Section II details considerations in relation to that contribution, while Section III addresses a number of paradoxes inherent in COIN. Section IV defines possible military objectives when facing an insurgency. Section V presents the clear, hold, build (CHB) approach that can be used by the military to shape their contribution to the defeat of an insurgency. Section VI focuses on some of the military activities that need additional attention in the context of COIN. As all components of NATO joint forces are essential for the overall military contribution to COIN, Sections VII through X discuss land, maritime, air and special operations forces (SOF) component contributions to COIN. Finally, Section XI addresses the transfer of the governance and security responsibility.

Section II - Considerations

Be Coherent with the Political Direction

0506. Military activities against an insurgency are part of a comprehensive approach and, consequently, are linked to the political strategy. The political objectives are normally articulated within diplomatic, economic and security processes, which contribute to the implementation of the defined strategy.

0507. The duration of NATO support to the HN, which is linked to the political acceptability of the intervention, may be difficult to forecast. Nevertheless an estimate on the duration of the mission has to be made to help define military COAs, as this will influence the actions of the non-military instruments. The details of the military approach should not be made public, as this knowledge would greatly assist the insurgents.

0508. Despite the primacy of political considerations, Alliance policy and political guidance may be vague or incomplete. The confusion and chaos caused by the instability of failing states may preclude timely and effective policy making and guidance by either the HN or Alliance governments. In the extreme case of a failed state, the HN government may even be nonexistent. However, the absence of a clear defined political end state should not dissuade commanders from working to gain the principal objective of securing the population.

Focus on the Population

0509. Since the actions of the population contribute to the ultimate success of the campaign, the population is the primary focus, making it is necessary to gain and retain influence. The population affected by conflict includes opponents, allies and neutral elements which change over time. NATO forces must therefore operate amongst, and be focused on, the population; and fully understand its culture and history.

0510. Because the primary focus of COIN is on the population, holding or controlling physical terrain - particularly those areas which are centres of population - is also a major necessity.

14 AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations; ATP-3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics; and ATP-3.2.1.1, Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks.
Thus the AOO will be extremely complex and difficult to work in. Eliminating insurgency from the major centres of population will be a major endeavour. However, because insurgents will blend into the population, the COIN force must exercise constraints on the use of force. Excessive collateral damage caused by the perceived indiscriminate use of force can alienate the population and undermine the objectives of the COIN force.

Understand the Insurgent

0511. Gaining a clear understanding of the insurgents and their motivations, structures, strengths and weaknesses is a critical output of the analysis process. Without a clear understanding of the insurgency on this level, COIN will be unsuccessful. Counterinsurgents will need to possess cultural understanding as well as a more general understanding of the social, economic and political landscape of the affected country. This will contribute to the development of a deeper level of situational understanding.

0512. Insurgents will always seek to attack where they perceive weaknesses to exist. Exploiting weaknesses in a state can take many different forms, and these will depend on the context of any given situation. For example, some insurgents may concentrate on exposing political weaknesses, some may choose to stir up ethnic tensions, and others may choose crowd manipulation or violence intended to cause problems for the intervention force. Many successful insurgencies have developed a cellular structure which allows them to operate with great flexibility. These will be difficult to dismantle by pure military operations alone, as the linkages between the cells are only loosely defined. Others may have a more formal structure containing both political and military wings.

0513. Insurgent tactical activities - which could include bombings, assassinations, hostage taking and attacks against the state, or manipulation of riots and demonstrations - directly influence the operational and strategic levels. Insurgents will be looking to create strategic effects from tactical activity. In these situations, military capabilities, especially lethal ones, may be ill-suited to responding to such insurgent activities and risk being used inappropriately and even counterproductively. Insurgents will capitalise on such actions for propaganda purposes. The military response to atrocities must be measured, proportionate and appropriate, while also being swift, precisely targeted and overwhelming.

Intelligence

0514. COIN is focused by intelligence and, as such, all military activity must be based on timely and accurate intelligence. Understanding the insurgent and the environment requires emphasis on intelligence, which is an essential precondition for success in COIN. However, the successful collection and management and analysis of information to produce intelligence is complex when it comes to fighting insurgents while at the same time attempting to re-establish trust within the HN population.

0515. NATO forces in COIN focus less on intelligence based on material indicators and more on subjective but systematic analysis. Equipment, often unidentifiable and blended into the environment, no longer provides sufficient indicators to determine an opponent’s intent. It is the mindset and the aims of the insurgent that have to be understood. Accurate analysis is difficult, especially due to the need to properly select useful information in a complex human environment. Additionally, language is a critical consideration for intelligence.
0516. While technology is vital to intelligence collection, it only allows NATO forces to “know” rather than to “understand”. As such, understanding requires CI/HUMINT specialists who have not only extensive military training but also a detailed knowledge of the operational environment and its complexities in such areas as the theatre of operations, the relevant societies and cultures, and the opposing groups.

0517. By its very nature, insurgency conducts non-military activities that must be understood in the appropriate context for both current and future operations. Intelligence gathering by a NATO force in COIN also has to rely on and fuse information from other actors, other networks and other services from a variety of other nations. It will also involve enabling or accessing the intelligence structures of the HN. This impacts the larger struggle, since the information gathered feeds demands other than those of the deployed force.

Information Activities

0518. The struggle for dominance in the cognitive domain is a constant necessity for the NATO forces in COIN, particularly where insurgents rely on the use of information to manipulate public opinion. Paradoxically, the reality is that “what is believed is more important than what is true”. In this way, hype and distortions can influence what the population believes to be true, and therefore the Alliance must successfully employ information activities that provide the population timely and accurate information as well as a competing narrative or interpretation of events. Insurgents will use propaganda and attempt to manipulate the media and public perceptions to their own advantage, and this is one of the principal asymmetric elements of their activity. Therefore, NATO forces need to be attuned to the insurgents’ use of the media and must be proactive and first with the truth, based on the campaign’s “dominant narrative” and current theme. The key for the counterinsurgent is to be the first with the definitive version of the truth into the public domain. Remaining silent, not reacting, not giving a version of events, or waiting for the truth to emerge will all be confounded by an agile opponent who is not necessarily bound by the truth. This naturally gives the opponent the advantage, which must be countered by an agile, responsive and forward-leaning organisation.

0519. The ability to operate with incomplete and at times inaccurate information, presenting one's own version and broadcasting one's own film of headline events, is a necessary element of success in COIN operations. The adroit and timely handling of messages can sometimes help to prevent tactical successes from becoming strategic failures. NATO forces need to be able to conduct offensive and defensive activities in the fields of information and communication. Information activities must be actively employed and synchronised with intelligence to accomplish the following:

a. creating favourable perceptions of the HN’s legitimacy and its capabilities;

b. obtaining local, regional and international support for COIN operations;

c. publicising insurgent violence and warning the population that they will be subject to insurgent propaganda;
d. discrediting insurgent propaganda and providing a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative; and

e. providing a favourable narrative that supports the legitimate role of the NATO-led forces.

0520. Psychological Dimension. Psychological Operations (PsyOps) are planned psychological activities using methods of communications and other means directed to approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The psychological dimension of an insurgency is as important as the physical. Conflict is a struggle of wills that takes place in people’s minds as well as on the battlefield. The attitudes and behaviour of people (friend, foe and the undecided or uncommitted) may be central to determining the outcome of conflict and the nature of the post-conflict environment. Therefore it is necessary to understand the motivation of various target audiences - leaders, opposing forces, populations - in order to shape their perceptions, affect their will and to persuade them to accept the outcome desired by NATO. PsyOps as a capability constitutes a key information activity of the military engagement in the information domain with regard to local and regional audiences.

Combine the Legitimate Use of Force and Information to Defeat the Insurgent’s Ideology

0521. Insurgents use violence to create effects by spreading fear through the local population, and they manipulate opinion by conducting aggressive propaganda. In the conduct of these operations, they are unconstrained by the normal rules of war, legality or the need for truthfulness. It is vital that counterinsurgents, through the legitimate use of force and information, strive first to contest and then to neutralise these insurgent efforts in both the physical and cognitive domains.

0522. When NATO forces take part in COIN, they are engaged in a general battle of perception for two major considerations. Firstly, they will be the target of the offensive actions of the insurgent, who will aim to weaken the legitimacy and the credibility of the cause and the HN government. Secondly, counterinsurgent military action is valuable only if it reduces the legitimacy and credibility of the insurgent in the eyes of the population.

0523. The battle for perception and the senses extends beyond the local area, and the insurgent therefore often enjoys a strategic advantage. This stems from the capacity of insurgents to relate local issues to the outside world, where globalisation affords them accessibility with little or no constraint. The worldwide reach of the media allows insurgents to spread their message rapidly and widely to a large number of target audiences, many of whom will be outside the joint operations area.

0524. Any military action against an insurgent must be linked with countering an insurgent’s strategy and operational and tactical plans. Military participation in efforts against the insurgent must be dynamic. Counterinsurgents must exploit all the possibilities and contingencies to limit or defeat the efforts of the insurgent.

0525. Although military actions may involve the use of force, the overarching aim is to secure the population. Within this framework, when employing coercive actions, it is necessary to accurately determine limited objectives rather than large-scale objectives. Initially, it is necessary to estimate whether such actions will achieve a decrease in the number of
insurgents or unintentionally assist insurgent recruiting. The use of lethal and non-lethal force should be tailored to the situation, with particular attention paid not only to the prevention of collateral damage but also to its repair.

**Be Aware that Insurgents Often Have the Advantage of Asymmetry**

0526. The asymmetry which often characterises the operational methods of insurgents confers on them a certain strategic impunity and other tactical advantages. It affords insurgents the possibility of using both uncertainty and brutality in terms of space, time and information. These effects can be extended and amplified by the absence of a need to operate within any legal or ethical construct. On the contrary, NATO forces may be restricted in utilising and applying the full spectrum of political and operational mechanisms against insurgents.

**Identify the Actors and Discriminate Between Them**

0527. When countering insurgents, it is crucial to create a clear picture of all actors in the operational environment in order to distinguish the insurgents from the other actors. It is important to list in detail the opposing actors. At first, this can be done by mapping structures at regional and local levels. On this basis, the insurgents or the main actors must be identified and then designated. The analysis process enables an understanding of all the issues and helps to identify opportunities for action against the insurgents, which may well be beyond the main areas in which violence originated. These actions will need to be synchronised between military and non-military actors, especially politically.

**Requirement for a Highly Proactive Command**

0528. From a long-term perspective, the effective engagement of insurgents’ demands that NATO commanders develop an understanding of the local tolerance for violence, including the acceptability of and use of force employed by NATO and HN forces. In these conditions, commanders must be flexible and have the ability to articulate their intent clearly and concisely. To that end, the commander must be provided with a proactive and agile HQ.

0529. Commanders have to create opportunities and seize them immediately. To do this, command and control must be decentralised to allow for tactical initiative. This facilitates agility at the tactical level, allowing junior commanders to work with their civilian counterparts to seize the initiative in rapidly developing situations. In COIN, tactical activity, both military and non-military, often has strategic effects and, in order for junior levels of command to generate the effects sought, they must have access to the appropriate resources. The delegation of resources and the appropriate authority to use them must form an intrinsic part of the command and control construct in which the NATO force will operate.

**Need for Flexible Military Action**

0530. It is a characteristic of insurgencies that they tend to change and evolve, sometimes quite rapidly, over time. If an Alliance response is to be successful, the Alliance must understand its own multinational capabilities, constraints and limitations, in addition to understanding similar aspects of the insurgency. Counterinsurgents must keep the insurgents off balance as they attempt to obtain influence through physical and
psychological activity. The use of the military instrument must remain flexible and adaptable over time as the insurgency changes shape and direction during its course.

Need for Force Protection

0531. When NATO forces face insurgents they must ensure the security of the population and assist in the maintenance of law and order. Insurgents know that any human or materiel loss, of either real or symbolic value, can weaken political will to pursue a successful COIN. To this end, NATO forces can expect to be the target in a variety of different attacks conducted by the insurgent. These could take the form of suicide bombnings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or stand-off weapons such as rockets or rocket propelled grenades. When pressing home these attacks, insurgents may demonstrate little concern for either the consequences of their actions or the collateral effects on the civil population or the environment. Therefore, the protection of NATO forces is an essential element of the freedom of action and, for this reason, has to be a permanent concern of the command without being considered as a purpose in itself. However, its implementation has to avoid excessive security which would mean either refraining from the necessary actions, being perceived as cloistering itself from the HN population or wasting too much effort to the detriment of the main missions.

Necessity to Continually Learn and Adapt

0532. The struggle against an insurgency requires great agility from commanders and command systems in both planning and the conduct of operations. The ability of counterinsurgents to continuously adapt is one of the keys to success, particularly considering the polymorphous nature of most insurgencies. A cycle of adaptation usually develops between insurgents and counterinsurgents, with both sides striving to adapt in order to neutralise existing adversary advantages and develop new advantages of their own. Advantage is gained through adaptation that is beyond the other side’s ability to achieve or sustain. Education facilitates learning and adaptation. Successful counterinsurgents understand the theory and history of insurgency and COIN, as well as the appropriate culture, languages and history.

0533. Forces need to adapt not only to the changes in the conflict over time, but also to changes in those they work with or those they fight. Consequently, it is essential to have the capacity for flexibility, tolerance and openness that allows counterinsurgents to confront the unknown or the unusual. Adapting to the local population requires cultural understanding. It also means accepting that the objectives of the local actors may be far removed from those of the force, of their country or of the international community. It means creating, even at the lowest levels, local solutions in keeping with the environment and the broad strategic approach. This ability to adapt is principally based on a proximity which enables the understanding of fluctuations in situations and attitudes, and thus the complexity of reality.

0534. Counterinsurgents need to develop innovative tactics and capabilities very quickly in response to the ever-changing situation that they might face. The role of the lower tactical echelons, of those who are confronted with tactical problems on a daily basis and hence never cease to come up with the most appropriate solutions, is essential in this process. Initiative must be encouraged in order to facilitate the emergence of responses to asymmetric threats. The work carried out in the field has to be supported by a central mechanism which controls the proliferation of ideas, focuses the gathering of experience
and provides the reactivity necessary to supply immediate answers when the situation dictates. Lessons learned\textsuperscript{15} should therefore be rapidly disseminated throughout the force. It should be noted that discretion must be used, as solutions that work in one area may not be quite so successfully applied in another.

\textsuperscript{15}There are two types of lessons learned - the lessons learned from historical COIN cases and the lessons drawn from the contemporary COIN campaigns. The latter will focus on enemy tactics (e.g. IEDs, ambush settings, and the use of recorded voices to divert attention during combat), equipment (newly purchased weapon systems), or other assets (e.g. psychological pressure on locals).
Win the Battle of Perception

0535. In most cases, insurgents will have a well-established cause that exposes perceived weaknesses in the state. By means of their own narrative, they will often attempt to demonstrate the inability of the state to provide for the population, and will offer themselves as a viable alternative. They will seek to build in the minds of the population the impression that their alternative is better for the long-term prospects of the population. In a world where information is a means of action, this demands that intervention forces in support of the HN have the ability to act quickly and effectively in the psychological domain while denying the insurgent the ability to do the same.

0536. Information and its effects are vital as insurgents find a way to gain advantage, often through distortion of events, exploitation of collateral damage or interviews with journalists. Hype and distortions can influence operational decisions and the course of events in a manner contradictory to actual events on the ground.\(^\text{16}\) Tensions in the veracity of information are characteristic of the asymmetric struggle in an insurgency. Therefore, NATO forces need to develop the ability to engage and diminish the effects of the insurgent narrative and information activities. Without exception, within COIN, information activities have a major role to play. These activities should aim to influence or correct perceptions, representations and attitudes of the chosen audiences, to convince them to act in favour of the mission, or to incite them not to act in opposition to the action of the armed forces. It is a question of shaping in the psychological, emotional or intellectual aspects of the information environment to exploit opportunities and create conditions to reach the desired end state. This often requires counterinsurgents to communicate effectively with a wide variety of target audiences, and to always be the first with their version of events.

Building Influence with the Local Population

0537. The counterinsurgents’ battle for the population seeks to undermine the local support of insurgents and to reinforce HN legitimacy. To win popular support and isolate the insurgents, it is advisable both to take into account the security expectations of the population and, simultaneously, to influence the insurgents. Counterinsurgents seek to influence insurgents’ reactions and to destroy their credibility with friendly and neutral actors.

0538. Undermining support for insurgents within the population is a key method to isolate them. Building influence with the population requires knowledge of the culture, clearly explaining counterinsurgent intentions, and aiming to take advantage of insurgent mistakes in terms of legitimacy and rationality. Creating and establishing a “counter-cause” to the insurgents’ requires a comprehensive approach, unity of effort, and the ability to act decisively and effectively.

Section III - Paradoxes

0539. The considerations discussed in Section II demonstrate the complex operational environment normally associated with COIN. History has shown that COIN is counter-intuitive to more traditional warfare, and some of these paradoxes are presented in this

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\(^{16}\) Often, for example, attacks by youths armed only with slings against heavily equipped soldiers only aim to show the world an unequal struggle and to make believe that their fight is just, since it is that of the oppressed.
section as examples of the different mindset required of all military components to be successful in COIN. These paradoxes are offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it. The applicability of the thoughts behind the paradoxes depends on the context faced by the commander in any given insurgency. They are not intended to be applicable in all cases, and the list itself is not exhaustive.

0540. **The More You Protect a Force, the Less Secure You May Be.** Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace and not exclusively the COIN force itself. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the population and then concede the freedom of action to the insurgents. Even if the level of insecurity threatens the security of the force, commanders should find a balance between implementing restrictive force protection measures and the need to maintain close contact with the locals. Overly restrictive force protection measures tend to isolate and, over time, alienate, the force from the local population, denying them the vital “finger-tip feel” for what is happening on the ground. They need this in order to protect the population, to understand their needs and to collect vital intelligence. Operations conducted at the tactical level among the population, while attracting high levels of risk, will reflect a will to share that risk with the populace and consequently help to gain their support to defeat the insurgency.

0541. **The More Force is Used, the Less Effective it May Be.** Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The greater the force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and with restraint strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. The key point for counterinsurgents is to know when more force is needed - and when it might be counterproductive. This judgement involves constant assessment of the security situation and the necessity of having information available on potential actions by the insurgent. Generally obvious for commanders, it is sometimes forgotten at lower levels when self-defence is at stake. It should be kept in mind that killing numerous insurgents will be seriously counterproductive if collateral damage kills peaceful civilians too. That will create legitimacy for the insurgency and lead to increased support from the population. For this reason commanders have to establish procedures to achieve a balanced use of force and to avoid any excessive use of force that leads to collateral damage.

0542. **The More Successful a Counterinsurgency Operation is, the Less Force Can be Used and the More Risk Must be Accepted.** This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgency violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction of the direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers may also have to accept more risk in order to maintain contact with the population.

0543. **If a Tactic Works Today, it Might Not be the Case on the Following Days; if it Works in a Given Area, it Might Not Work in Another One.** Efficient insurgents are adaptive and are often part of a network that communicates constantly. Insurgents quickly adjust to COIN practices and rapidly disseminate information throughout the insurgency. Indeed, the more effective a COIN tactic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Effective leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as adaptive as their enemies. Constantly developing new tactics, techniques and procedures is essential. However, it is essential to have a common
doctrine and set of tactics to provide a common understanding on the planning and execution of military activities which creates a starting point for adaptation. Consequently, commanders should always be on their guard when implementing proven methods. There are no template solutions that can be universally applied - each situation demands a bespoke approach.

0544. **Tactical Success Alone Guarantees Nothing.** As important as they are, military actions by themselves cannot exclusively achieve success in COIN. Sometimes a doctor or a teacher may locally be more efficient than one infantry company in undermining an insurgency. Insurgents who never totally defeat counterinsurgents in combat may still achieve their strategic objectives, because they can win by not losing. Tactical actions thus must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to the HN’s essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain.

0545. **Doing Nothing May be the Best Reaction.** Often insurgents carry out actions with the primary purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit - for example, using more force than appears appropriate in the circumstances or executing a clearance operation that creates more enemies than it takes off the streets. If an assessment of the effectiveness of a potential COA determines that negative effects outweigh the positive effects, then no action may be the preferred COA.

0546. **Some of the Counterinsurgent’s Most Appropriate Weapons Do Not Shoot.** Counterinsurgents often achieve the most meaningful success in garnering public support and legitimacy for the HN government with activities that do not systematically involve killing insurgents. Arguably, the decisive battle is for the people’s minds; hence coordinating and synchronising information activities with efforts along the other LOOs is critical. While security is essential to set the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation and restored hope. Depending on the state of the insurgency, therefore, Alliance forces should be prepared to execute the full range of military activities in support of COIN efforts, and make a valuable contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction.

0547. **The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably is Often Better Than the Force Doing it Well.** It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. The HN must take ownership of the solution, and this is best done by empowering it to act purposefully, and increasingly to give it the lead as its capability improves. This approach will ensure that the solutions arrived at have local buy-in and are culturally attuned to the HN. It is accepted that, while some of these solutions may be sub-optimal from a NATO perspective, they do have HN ownership, and are therefore more likely to be enduring. Where NATO is supporting an HN, long-term success requires the establishment of viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant Alliance support. The longer that process takes, the more the troop-contributing nations (TCNs) domestic support is likely to wane and the more the local populace may doubt the ability of their own forces and their government to bring about substantive change.

**Section IV - Military Objectives during COIN**

0548. As stated, the aim of the military contribution to COIN is to secure the population and neutralise the insurgent. Analysing this aim allows the commander to establish the following military objectives: secure the population, isolate the insurgents from their
support, and neutralise the insurgent armed organisation. Achievement of these objectives will contribute to successful achievement of the political end state of defeating the insurgency and addressing core grievances.

### Secure the Population

0549. The commander should identify what the military may be required to contribute to human security tasks, recognising that military provision is a last resort and that the main responsibility lies with international organisations and the host nation government. Failure to provide for the populations’ needs may undermine the foundations of stabilisation as the people struggle for survival. Political progress is unlikely to take place in the midst of chronic human insecurity. Focusing on the population does not mean ignoring the adversary; on the contrary, the contest for security will be fought amongst the population and for their support. The population may not like us, but our military aim is not the pursuit of popularity, although this is important for indigenous forces. International forces should seek to husband respect, to prevent the adversary from gaining influence and security control, and to re-connect the population with their government; this requires their government be perceived as credible.

0550. Where the state lacks the capability or will to meet human security needs, individuals tend to transfer loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, including adversarial groups. These groups can exploit human insecurity by providing money, basic social services and a crude form of justice. Winning the contest for human security therefore, is fundamental to the development of host nation government authority and, ultimately, security of the state.

0551. Providing protection for the population stimulates economic activity and supports longer-term development and governance reform. Importantly, it generates confidence in local people about their own local security situation - their collective human security - and an economic interest in ongoing stability. It also denies adversarial groups one of their principal strategies for expanding their support base.

### Isolate the Insurgents from Their Support

0552. Defeating an insurgency requires NATO forces to sever the insurgents from their support base by isolating them from their resources and the outside environment. This helps to provide the counterinsurgents with freedom of action for subsequent military action.

0553. **Contain the Insurgent in a Broader Regional Context.** Denying insurgents access to safe havens and sanctuaries that may be present in the surrounding region will be an important element of any COIN, and this will need a high level of political as well as military involvement. In complementing these actions, NATO forces may need to conduct operations to deny insurgent movement, possibly in partnership with neighbouring countries or international spaces. This peripheral posture, which could contribute to regional stability, may be enhanced through regional actors’ situational awareness of insurgency issues, and in turn support the legitimacy of the military presence in the region.

0554. **Target the Insurgents’ Organisation.** Targeting the insurgent’s organisation places emphasis on neutralising the mechanisms, systems, methodologies and structures of the insurgency. These efforts are aimed at neutralising the insurgent’s strategy and
It is vitally important to correctly determine the balance between actions focused on the population and the conduct of overt and covert actions focused on the insurgent’s organisation. Effective targeting of the insurgents’ organisation enables the selection of the most effective approach, often times indirect rather than direct.

Neutralise the Insurgent’s Armed Organisation

Neutralising the insurgent’s armed organisation stops the insurgent’s use of violence. It is a long-term effort, is often more psychological than physical, and is often achieved by involving the population. Depending on the situation, several approaches can be chosen or combined and should consider influencing or shaping key actors. One approach is to create conditions in which insurgents must concentrate and attack friendly forces in a conventional manner, which will make them more vulnerable to the strengths of NATO military forces. Another approach could be to defeat the insurgency in detail, after isolation had been achieved by an adapted task organisation of NATO forces committed to maintaining contact.

It is difficult for NATO forces to avoid being drawn by the insurgent into prepared operations conducted in complex terrain, which may include densely inhabited areas. These areas usually represent the seat of local, regional and national government as well as centres of key economic activity. At the same time, it is necessary to generate a feeling of insecurity among the insurgents to reduce their freedom of action, which is key to their survival. Finally, counterinsurgents should attempt to force the insurgents to regroup and then, by working in an “oil spot”, gradually to suffocate them, to undermine the internal linkages which unify their various constituents, to weaken them by increasing their internal dysfunctions, and even to decapitate their political-administrative organisation.

Building the capability and capacity of indigenous security forces is vital to effectively fighting an insurgency and should be seen as the optimal solution. HN security forces must become capable of leading offensive actions in the most sensitive zones, even at night. When HN forces are the lead agencies, supporting NATO forces must be discreet to avoid local resentment. This contributes to avoiding the perception of NATO forces as being foreign invaders or occupiers. Finally, it also helps to make the local populace take a hand or stake in their fate and to deprive the insurgents of their favoured targets.

Section V – Operational Approach (Clear, Hold, Build)

This section discusses the NATO preferred operational approach to COIN using the CHB framework. CHB is civil-military action taken in COIN which combines NATO, HN and civil actors. CHB encompasses offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities. CHB must be driven by an in-depth understanding of the operational environment. Staffs perform COIN intelligence preparation of the operational environment and analyse the dynamic characteristics of insurgency to determine the nature of the insurgency.

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17“Organisation” refers to the different cells that insurgent have created to be effective: an intelligence cell, a political cell, a terrorist cell and a logistic cell.

18 This consists of two phases. Firstly, it demands that counterinsurgents completely control some isolated areas; then the purpose is to extend these areas to form bigger controlled areas.

19 The possibility of tasking units for night missions will ensure continuous pressure on insurgents, reducing their freedom of action.
CHB establishes control over the population and areas so that HN governance and internal development programmes can be pursued in a secure environment. It also supports development operations by preventing insurgent interference. Figure 5.1 depicts the phases of CHB in relation to all potential actors. Although these phases are depicted in a linear fashion, they may not be sequential in practice, as insurgent efforts may require moving back to a previous phase.

An effective CHB approach depends on the ability to carry out the following:

a. physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population;

b. provide the conditions for economic, political and social reforms;

c. safeguard the population and key infrastructure;

d. provide training and opportunities for HN security forces to improve and take the lead in taking and maintaining control;

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20 Paramilitary: within AJP-3.4.4, paramilitary forces refer to those forces or militias which have risen in some inhabited areas aiming at ensuring self-protection for the population and the rule of law. These forces are under the control of the HN authorities and work closely with NATO forces.
e. provide opportunities for the HN police and other governmental institutions to establish and maintain the rule of law;

f. provide essential services and address the core grievances of the insurgency;

g. assist with resettling displaced persons and refugees to their homes (this task is done by UNHCR, and only in extreme circumstances will the military be asked for assistance);

h. use and train local workers and materials to rebuild and provide a sustainable economic and social system;

i. deny the enemy active and passive support; and

j. gain the support of the populace.

0561. Phases of Clear, Hold, Build. While the three primary phases are clear, hold, build, there is a total of four total phases to the successful execution of the CHB approach. These phases are likely to be non-linear in progression and are linked to a series of decisive conditions that allows a transition of responsibility and authority to the HN. These phases require a comprehensive approach and sufficient resources. The four phases are as follows:

a. Preparation Phase. Typical activities of the preparation phase include:

   (1) an assessment of the situation and resources and the vetting of HN personnel;

   (2) conducting overall planning;

   (3) assigning responsibilities to civil and military elements;

   (4) conducting combined/joint training and rehearsals;

   (5) beginning information activities and/or information engagement operations; and/or

   (6) establishing temporary facilities for basic services to civilians being displaced in the area to be cleared.

b. Clear Phase. This primarily involves offensive activities. Counterinsurgency forces focus on freeing the area of insurgent’s control. Typical activities of the clear phase include:

   (1) information activities,

   (2) cordon and search,

   (3) neutralising armed elements, and

   (4) removing those who have infiltrated the HN government or security forces.
c. **Hold Phase.** This primarily involves defensive operations. In the hold phase counterinsurgents ensure that areas that were freed from enemy control remain so. This requires the control of the HN government with an adequate HN security force presence. Typical activities of the hold phase include:

1. information activities;  
2. providing basic essential services and humanitarian assistance;  
3. conducting infrastructure assessment;  
4. establishing combat outposts;  
5. fortifying police stations;  
6. cordon and search;  
7. combined and joint dismounted presence patrols;  
8. building intelligence networks;  
9. identifying and neutralising remaining insurgent underground, auxiliary and leaders;  
10. recruiting local police and security forces; and  
11. reassessing the situation and the resources.  
12. CIMIC activities, in particular establishing / holding liaison network with local key leaders, reassessing the civil environment and initiating quick impact projects if required.

d. **Build Phase.** This primarily involves stability operations. In the build phase the focus is the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law and nurture civil society. Typical activities of the build phase include:

1. information activities;  
2. promoting the legitimacy of the HN’s authority;  
3. beginning the transition of authority to the HN government and security forces, shifting to advisory and support roles for NATO civil-military elements;  
4. providing security for the reconstruction efforts;  
5. providing security for infrastructure; and  
6. training, equipping and advising police and civil defence forces.
(7) CIMIC activities, in particular keeping close contact with key leaders, the populace and agencies engaged in stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts

Transitions

0562. Insurgency contexts are complex and multifaceted. The scope and nature of the military contribution may vary. In such circumstances, a key part of the planning process involves an analysis of the conditions required to enable the earliest practicable transition of tasks to capable civilian actors and the HN government. The need to foster HN governance, authority and capacity must be a key driver in this process. The particular points at which these transitions take place is a finely balanced judgement and must involve close consultation between commanders and the appropriate national, international and HN actors.

0563. Campaigns will pass through a number of transitions as they progress. Planning for them in advance is critical to the successful management of a campaign. Transitions usually involve the progressive handover of responsibility from the intervention force to other actors. This requires that they be tied to a particular set of decisive conditions which can be measured. Only when these conditions have been met, and confirmed through assessment, can complete transition take place. Supporting and developing the conditions which facilitate this is a key objective of the commander. Progress on transitions is essential to campaign success as it meets the expectations of the HN government and its population, and demonstrates a momentum that underpins confidence in the overall operation. The result should be the release of the military to focus on their primary tasks - elements of security and SSR. Getting this right is fundamental to running a successful campaign. Typical activities of transitions phase include:

a. conducting assessments and transitioning authority and responsibility for service provision to appropriate HN government, law enforcement and security forces; and

b. beginning the expansion into other areas.

0564. Figure 5.2 is a representation of the evolution of CHB operations, especially the shifting predominance of offence, defence and stability activities during CHB phases. CHB progresses based on the security situation; however, it should be noted that this is the ideal situation and the enemy will endeavour to unhinge the counterinsurgents’ efforts. The diagram also depicts the level of effort or capacity of key actors.
0565. Commanders will continue expanding controlled areas with CHB into contested and insurgent-dominated areas. Operations are also conducted to locate and destroy insurgent forces in areas outside of the CHB operations by harassing them and keeping them off balance.

**Section VI - Execution of Military Activities**

**Introduction**

0566. The full range of military activities\(^{21}\) is applicable when performing operations within a COIN campaign. As already stated, within the framework of the CHB approach, offensive, defensive and stability activities will occur simultaneously. Although the range of military activities is clearly described in various NATO doctrinal publications, the special circumstances that may occur within the COIN operational environment require, for some of the activities and underlying tasks, a short additional explanation. The categorisation in Figure 5.3 may seem artificial, but is used as an example to show that some activities may be conducted more frequently in one of the phases.

\(^{21}\)As described in AJP-3.2, ATP-3.2.1 and subsequently (stability activities) in ATP-3.2.1.1.
**Offensive Activities**

0567. **Attack and Raid.** These activities may be used locally to neutralise insurgents and to gather intelligence using joint assets. This will often be conducted in urban areas amongst indigenous people, and therefore particular attention has to be paid to avoid collateral damage which will inevitably undermine the legitimacy of the force.

**Defensive Activities**

0568. Because reconstruction and transformation are antithetical to insurgency, soft targets and foreigners are usually in the crosshairs of insurgents. The natural reaction is to conduct civil COIN where it is safe to do so, which means virtually writing off those areas where it could do the most material and political good. The field-level security of civil COIN personnel and operations must be treated as a major mission of security forces. Improved civil COIN capabilities may, but will not necessarily, reduce reliance on the use of force.

**Stability Activities**

0569. **Escort.** Many insurgents use multiple and asymmetric threats. As such, convoys are often vulnerable targets that need armed escorts for their protection. They can even be high-

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22 See ATP-3.2.1.1 RD1 (July 2009).
value targets because of their crucial importance for the counterinsurgents, such as the provision of logistic supplies food, water, ammunition, petroleum, medical supplies and humanitarian relief supplies for civilians and the protection of transportation assets.

0570. Although an escort is considered to be a stability task, the execution may occur in a dangerous and violent environment and will therefore have a “combat” character. Insurgents will not content themselves with blocking convoys but will seek to destroy them, even at times attempting to take hostages. The vulnerability of those being escorted makes the mission even more difficult and, as a result, demands very detailed preparation and requires special training for military forces to react spontaneously to ambushes, obstacles, IEDs and attacks with indirect fire assets.

0571. **Cordon and Search.** The aim of cordon and search is to search for and capture insurgents and equipment that may be among the population or sheltered in favourable locations. This type of activity should be limited and requires a very high level of secrecy in order to generate surprise. It is intelligence-led and triggered on the basis of accurate and targeted intelligence complemented by technological assets (such as unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic intelligence assets). Advantage over insurgents is obtained through isolation by using forces as “sealing off” elements and through the freedom of action allowed by a “covering” element. The activity is conducted as follows:

a. The insurgents are isolated: mobile units, plus units earmarked to stay in the area after the operation, are rapidly concentrated around a targeted area. They start operating from the outside in, aiming at catching the insurgents in a ring. At the same time, units garrisoning the adjoining areas intensify their activity on the periphery of the selected area.

b. The sweep is conducted from inside out, aiming to expel the insurgents.

c. The overall operation is finally broken down into several small-scale ones. All static units are assigned to permanent sectors. A part of the mobile units operates as a body, centrally controlled, with the remainder being assigned support sectors. The entire force works on what is left of the insurgents following the two earlier steps.

d. The insurgents’ moral advantage is exploited, either by extracting some benefit from weakening the insurgency and rallying the population, which consequently undermines the insurgency’s organisation (human and material supply, moral and intelligence support) or by turning the local insurgency leaders to ensure the proper security of the locals.

0572. The extent of the AOO depends on the intelligence about the type and attitude of the target, on the surrounding geographical and human features, and on the available forces. Preparation must be accurate and discreet, with quick conduct and very close cooperation with civil administration, especially when operating in urban areas. A reserve is necessary (equipped with helicopters, boats and armoured vehicles) as well as specific assets such as radars and dog teams.

0573. Cordon and search is supplemented by tactical information and psychological operations directed at various groups of actors: principally the insurgents but also the local population. The aim could be to challenge the military ability of the insurgents, which may make them
stay and fight in order to save losing face and the advantages linked to their current level of freedom of action. Such a decision would be an advantage for NATO forces.

0574. **Control of the Population** The main objectives pursued are to re-establish the counterinsurgents’ authority over the population, to isolate the population as much as possible from the insurgents, and to gather the necessary intelligence leading to the elimination of the insurgent organisation. Controlling the population requires conducting a census and even sometimes imposing a curfew, as follows:

a. **Census.** Every inhabitant has to be registered and given a foolproof identity card. Family booklets should be issued to each household in order to facilitate house-to-house control, and heads of families should be made responsible for reporting any change in family circumstances, such as, births, deaths and marriages. This is a useful measure, as it is essential to keep an up-to-date census and because placing the responsibility on the head of the family directly involves them in the struggle against the insurgency. Since insurgents would envisage how a census limits their freedom of action, they may react either by destroying any identity card (or lead the locals to do so by threats but without a lot of success, since a person without identity card may be considered a suspect, thus triggering strong protest against the insurgent) or by attempting to be registered. A countermeasure is then to request that a suspected claimant be vouched for by two guarantors from outside the claimant’s family, and that the guarantors be responsible under penalty for the veracity of their statements. Properly exploited, the census will provide a great deal of useful information on the relationship between members of the population (family ties are often the base for the recruitment of insurgents); who owns properties out of the cities and therefore has legitimate reasons to travel; and the source and amount of individual incomes, which may justify involvement in irregular activities more or less close to those of the insurgents. The presence of soldiers among the local population may assist with the detection of unusual behaviour. This is a reason why areas are normally divided into sub-sectors - to assist soldiers to become familiar with the inhabitants and their routine.

b. **Curfew.** Control is also achieved by enforcing a curfew and simple rules concerning the movements of persons that will limit the freedom of action of insurgents; for instance, that nobody should leave a village for more than a given duration and nobody may receive a stranger from outside the village without permission. The purpose is not to prevent movement, unless there are specific reasons, but to check it. By making clandestine movement more difficult, the counterinsurgents provide the population with a necessary alibi for not supporting the insurgent. This would work if supported by a strict and systematic enforcement and penalty system.

**Stability Activities: Support to Security Sector Reform**

0575. **Introduction.** SSR is a much wider concept than rebuilding security forces alone. SSR is not a purely military activity: the legal system, the judicial process, detention and prison services, and the police may all require assistance that is beyond military capability and will rely on other services or nations to provide the expertise. This in turn requires a coordinated response and is part of a wider comprehensive approach. An effective SSR can only be delivered with a very large investment through a comprehensive approach at international and in-theatre level. In the early (and preparatory) stages of a campaign this

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23 Electronic means have proven to be very effective and not easy to falsify.
may demand a high level of investment in security training. Within that framework the military contribution will vary but, when required, will be essential. SSR remains a major factor in any successful campaign. Further details of activities and tasks related to SSR are described in ATP-3.2.1.1, ‘Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks’.

0576. **Management and Questioning of Detainees**. A clear distinction has to be made between the management of detainees in military custody, which is an operational responsibility, and their questioning, which is conducted by specially trained elements (except for general initial questions after capture). The treatment and management of detainees in military custody follows internationally agreed standards and must be organised, planned and controlled. The questioning of detainees has to be managed carefully, since captured insurgents may provide useful intelligence and soldiers, having captured them, may be tempted to question them immediately, which they are not trained to do in an adequate way, thus obtaining no information or even false information. Consequently, this task should be performed by intelligence officers specifically trained in the psychological and perception fields and accustomed to the conduct of tactical questioning and its subtleties.

0577. **Host Nation Forces Training**. The training of HN security forces is a vital aspect to defeat an insurgency using the domestic resources available and facilitating the rule of law. This is a core military function. Advisers and trainers are often tasked with mentoring these forces by involving them in ongoing operations and, in time, handing over to them the lead for the planning and conduct of security operations. Because relief of a NATO force can only really be carried out by adequately trained local forces, the task of bringing them up to the standards required to carry out their mission is a vital aspect for the COIN force.

0578. **Tasks**. Security force assistance aims to establish conditions that support the HN’s end state. The security force assistance tasks are to organise, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist, as follows:

a. **Organise**. The training of HN security forces includes organising institutions and units, which can range from establishing a ministry to improving the organisation of the smallest manoeuvre unit. Building capability and capacity in this area includes personnel, logistics, and intelligence and its support infrastructure. Developing HN tactical capabilities alone is inadequate; strategic and operational capabilities must be developed also. HN organisations and units should reflect their own unique requirements, interests and capabilities - they should not simply mirror existing external institutions.

b. **Train**. Training develops programmes and institutions to train and educate security forces. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of the security forces within the operational environment.

c. **Equip**. Equip the HN is accomplished through traditional security assistance, foreign support and donations. The equipment must be appropriate for the physical environment of the region and the HN’s ability to operate, maintain and sustain it.

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24 Cf AJP-2.5.

25 This is the mission of the operational mentoring liaison teams (OMLTs).

26 This implies training in specific skills sometimes quite unknown in some countries, such as crowd/riot control.
d. **Rebuild and Build.** In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild existing or build new infrastructure to support security forces. This includes facilities and materiel but may also include other infrastructure, such as command and control systems and transportation networks.

e. **Advice and Assist.** Advising HN units and institutions is essential to the ultimate success of training HN security forces. This benefits both the state and the supporting external organisations. To be effective, advising requires specially trained personnel. Advising establishes a personal and a professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the adviser will be able to influence the HN security force. Assisting is providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so HN security forces can meet objectives and the end state. The level of advice and assistance is based on conditions and should continue until HN security forces can establish required systems or until conditions no longer require it.

0579. **Activities.** The training of HN security forces is inherently a developmental effort. Success is measured by the increase in the security forces’ capability, capacity, competency, commitment and confidence. Training activities for HN security forces include how to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain, as follows:

a. **Plan and Resource.** The plan and resource activity begins as commanders understand the operational environment and determine the requirements of security forces. It also ensures that NATO provides training for HN security forces that achieves the objectives and end state of both the HN and NATO. The HN and NATO should then analyse the resource requirements and efforts so that developing security forces have sufficient and appropriate resources.

b. **Generate.** The generate activity includes the generation of security forces, including the forces, leaders and joint function capabilities (movement and manoeuvre, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection) based on the desired end state.

c. **Employ.** The employ activity involves security forces transitioning from force generation to mission employment. It does not rely on the maturity of the force or supporting institutions as a whole but is focused on the foreign element in question. Conditions determine when to use an element of security forces. NATO commanders and HN security forces assess the risk associated with employment and mitigate that risk as much as possible.

d. **Transition.** The transition activity defines the transition between two security forces, when applicable. This could be a transition of authority from a NATO force to a new HN security force. It could also be from an HN military force to an HN police force, with or without NATO advisers.

e. **Sustain.** The sustain activity occurs when the institutional capacity of the HN security force has been developed to a point where it is self-sustaining. It may continue to undergo training through combined exercises, educational opportunity exchange, intelligence sharing and foreign military sales.
0580. **Types.** There are three types of training for HN security forces - advising, partnering and augmenting. These define the relationship between outside actors and HN security forces. They may be employed simultaneously, sequentially or in combination. The progression and types are determined by the operational environment, the assessment of the HN security forces, and the resources available. Each of these types requires decidedly different requirements, objectives and legal considerations, as follows:

a. **Advising.** Advising is the primary type of training conducted with HN security forces. Advising is the use of influence to work by, with and through HN security forces. This type of training relies on the ability of the adviser to provide relevant and timely advice to HN security forces. Advisers may also provide HN security forces with joint and multinational capabilities, including but not limited to air support, artillery, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and intelligence. Advisers are not partners. Advising and partnering are complementary but inherently different activities. Advising requires relationship building and candid discourse to influence the development of a professional security force. Partnering incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same goals. Advisers perform partnership-shaping functions, shape discussions with their counterparts and create opportunities for the partner units.

b. **Partnering.** Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of both NATO and HN security forces. As an HN security force’s capabilities mature, the echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the HN security force conducts more autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces and other assistance as appropriate. Partner units should establish combined cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and sustainment. While effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may require completely fused efforts, HNs should eventually build the capability and capacity to conduct all efforts autonomously. Unit partnerships do not replace advisory roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship amongst HN security forces, advisers and the partner units. Partner units should look to the adviser to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering opportunities and training events. Advisers support the Alliance and partner unit objectives but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support advisers or advisers may support the partner unit.

c. **Augmenting.** Augmenting is an arrangement whereby HN security forces provide individuals or elements to combine with NATO units, or NATO individuals or elements combine with HN security forces. Augmentation improves the interdependence and interoperability of NATO and HN security forces. Augmentation can occur at many levels and in many different forms. For example, a NATO squad can be augmented with HN individuals, a company can be augmented with an HN platoon, or a battalion can be augmented with a company from an HN security force. Augmentation can be of short duration for a specific operation or of a longer duration for an enduring mission. Augmenting assists HN and NATO forces to provide language assistance and cultural awareness of the operational environment.

d. **Combining Tasks and Activities.** The execution of successful training for HN security forces links its tasks and activities. The tasks that support one HN security force training activity will normally continue throughout operations. For example,
organise, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist tasks will continue throughout the training activities of employment, transition and sustain.

0581. **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.** The process of DDR is aimed at reducing the number of illegitimate armed groups by removing them from a specific context - disbanding their military structures, and equipping former combatants with appropriate civilian life skills and employment opportunities. It involves disarming and demobilising armed groups and reintegrating former combatants who have not been absorbed into the armed or security forces of the HN back into civilian life, as follows:

a. The disarmament of former combatants may occur very early in the operation or come as the result of a long and delicate process, the progress of which is linked to the development of the political situation or agreements between the parties. It is always an essential step on the road to peace and often, therefore, is at the heart of the operation.

b. Although emphasis is often placed on the two first steps, namely disarmament and demobilisation, because of their symbolic value, they make sense only if an effective and well-resourced process for reintegration is already in place. Indeed, DDR as a process will only succeed if the former combatants are given life skills and employment opportunities that allow them to relinquish their weapons altogether. If their standard of living drops as a result of going through the DDR process, the process itself will fail, as the insurgent is likely to return to the use of arms as a means of employment and of generating income.

c. DDR requires significant logistic support and means, particularly on a financial level, and it relies on IOs or NGOs. Therefore it should be planned early.

d. DDR has to be developed with all parties concerned, and encompasses areas as diverse as security, social reintegration, training, employment and health. DDR is inherently multifaceted. In this process the NATO forces will work with other actors with whom they need to establish a dialogue as early as possible. HN security forces and civil agencies should be broadly involved.

**Stability Activities: Support to Initial Restoration of Services and Initial Governance**

0582. **Protection of the Population.** The population must be protected from insurgents. It is crucial to avoid a situation in which counterinsurgents are dominant during the day and the insurgents are dominant during the night. NATO forces should communicate on the positive aspects of movement restrictions to the populace regarding their security, and of the patrolling in the villages that deny the insurgents any occasion to conduct retaliation actions against the locals, and securing the areas where locals are working (e.g. the rebuilding of roads and bridges). Since the effective gathering of intelligence is paramount to defeating an insurgency, commanders should bear in mind the fact that the population is a principal source of actionable intelligence. Correct and complete flows of information are essential to bring about an improvement in the perception of security.

0583. **Fostering National Reconciliation.** The HN government should foster reconciliation between the population and insurgents, including unknown, potential and captured insurgents. The main actor in the process is the population. Real efforts at reconciliation

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27 Disarmament and demobilisation tasks are described in the current RD of the ATP-3.2.1.1.
demonstrate the will to transcend temporary conflict and give hope to the population dealing with the daily consequences of insurgency. In this way, the treatment of detainees has a crucial impact, especially with respect to future insurgent recruitment and the general undermining of the insurgents. Once the loyalty of former insurgents is confirmed, their integration within the local armed forces will provide a useful knowledge of the insurgent system.

0584. **Reconstruction and Development.** An innovation is the introduction of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The aims in each theatre are different, as are the command and control arrangements, but the underlying purpose is the same as coordinating reconstruction and development initiatives in individual provinces and extending the jurisdiction of state and local government. At best, PRTs should be a reflection of a comprehensive approach and include not just military members but cross-government personnel, including those involved with agriculture, education, health, economy and industry. A PRT should operate within the agreed comprehensive plan and should develop its local area in line with HN plans.

### Section VII - Land Component Contribution

0585. As the population lives and works primarily on land, much of securing and protecting the population is accomplished by deploying manpower within the population with an enduring presence. This includes both NATO and HN security forces. However, HN forces can be the primary providers of manpower to maintain this enduring presence. The current COIN operational approach - direct, balanced or indirect - will determine the size, footprint and roles of, and the relationship between, HN and NATO land forces.

0586. **Host Nation Military Forces.** HN military forces will be unique to their particular culture and location. This includes their quantity, quality and effectiveness. Regardless of their situation or status at the outset of COIN, indigenous forces will be indispensable in terms of the execution of COIN and, more importantly, creating enduring solutions. Professional HN military forces will be invaluable for intelligence and understanding the operational environment, particularly when the joint force is new to the operational environment. The following must be considered:

a. **Host Nation Military Forces and Legitimacy.** If NATO elements are working with or training HN security forces, care must be taken to ensure that the population perceives their nation’s security forces as capable, competent and professional. Failure to do so will generally undermine the HN government’s legitimacy.

b. **Security Sector Reform.** The training and development of HN security forces is a key part of SSR. SSR requires unity of effort to develop not only military forces, but other aspects of security and governance, such as border police, prison services and the judiciary.

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28 See also AJP 2.5 Captured Personnel and AJP 3.2.3.3 Military Police.

29 Two criteria may serve to test their sincerity: a full confession of their past activity and a willingness to participate actively in the counterinsurgent’s struggle.

30 For the time being in Afghanistan this is the name of the small units that are responsible for coordinating, and in some cases, enabling, a plethora of reconstruction tasks. Each of these is dependant on context but may include such activities as building schools, well construction, or providing veterinary advice and support for local farmers. The name may change in other theatres of operation.
0587. **Host Nation Law Enforcement.** HN law enforcement forces play a valuable role in the conduct of COIN if these forces are competent and trustworthy. If they are legitimate in the eyes of the population, they are likely to have access to detailed intelligence on insurgent leaders, networks and links to criminal elements. The presence of indigenous law enforcement elements, particularly if they are perceived to be leading operations, will have a stabilising and normalising impact on the population. The following must be considered:

a. **Coordination Between Law Enforcement and the Military.** Military forces must be closely coordinated with law enforcement forces. Military forces will support law enforcement forces to provide security and protection. This allows the law enforcement forces to perform their routine duties when the security situation requires. Law enforcement forces may support the military as well. For example, police may arrest insurgents captured and detained by military forces and cooperate in site exploitation to gather evidence to prosecute the insurgents. Law enforcement forces and military forces may be co-located to conduct joint operations and to afford the police additional protection, based on the security situation. This coordination will often provide valuable intelligence sources, and law enforcement and military intelligence should be shared within prudent classification restrictions. As security improves, law enforcement forces should assume a greater role and profile amongst the population, thus allowing military forces to focus on subsequent operations. Such coordination will also often increase the sense of success and legitimacy.

b. **Proficiency.** The role of law enforcement in the HN and the level of employment of those law enforcement forces are often dependent on the proficiency of the police force and judiciary and the population’s perception of them. For example, if a police force or judiciary is regarded as corrupt, the population will have little trust that the police have the best interests of the population in mind or that the force can provide real security.

c. **Training Police Forces.** Military forces may have to be used in some instances to train HN law enforcement, especially civilian police. Ideally, this responsibility will be assumed by supporting police forces so that they receive proper mentoring and training in all aspects of police duties. However, the military will continue to work closely with police forces and mentor them when necessary.

d. **Corruption.** Some law enforcement forces are not organised or controlled in a manner common to responsible governance. Law enforcement forces may be corrupt or poorly organised, trained and equipped. In fact, corrupt law enforcement or other security forces may be a core grievance of the insurgency or may be a driver of continuing conflict. One must also understand the potential ramifications of using former insurgents as members of the police force. Efforts must be made to rectify any issues concerning corruption, especially as it is unlikely that a nation will be stable without a competent, professional law enforcement apparatus.

0588. **Host Nation Auxiliary Forces.** When the security situation requires it, counterinsurgents should organise and mobilise the local population to protect themselves by forming auxiliary forces. This is a key policy decision that the HN must make. These forces may augment military and/or law enforcement efforts. The following should be considered:
a. **Training and Roles.** When well organised, equipped, trained and led, auxiliary forces can play a vital role in COIN. They can augment and assist professional military and law enforcement forces, especially with providing a permanent presence within the population. A permanent presence within the population is vital to security but is manpower-intensive. Auxiliary forces are best used to augment or execute defensive or stability operations. The quality, quantity and presence of these forces determine the outcome of the overall COIN effort.

b. **Advantages.** Auxiliary forces are often local in nature, so they have inherent advantages in having an intimate and thorough knowledge of the local population. In this capacity they can be invaluable intelligence assets; their understanding of the local operational environment is far superior to that of any outsider. Auxiliary forces may also have specialised skills, developed as part of their culture that may complement those of other more professional forces. These skills can include tracking, patrolling, an understanding of the terrain and wildlife, and local communications methods.

c. **Disadvantages.** Auxiliary forces can present disadvantages, but these can generally be overcome with oversight. Auxiliary forces may be more prone to insurgent infiltration, and they may provide an informational operational and security challenge. Alliance members should realise that some auxiliaries may be working for both sides in a conflict, most commonly the side they perceive to be winning at the moment. Members of auxiliaries or their friends and family may be subject to insurgent coercion and violence. The overall context will determine how vulnerable and therefore how useful the auxiliary forces may be.

**Section VIII - Maritime Component Contribution**

0589. For COIN, the maritime component plays a critical role in controlling the seas, which may be vital to isolating an insurgency physically and psychologically. The maritime contribution to COIN will continue to be vital because much of the world’s population lives in littoral areas, including large coastal cities. Demographic projections also indicate that the population of these areas will continue to grow in overall numbers and relative to inland populations. A large proportion of this burgeoning population may live in poverty, which may be a key core grievance leading to insurgency. Due to the rise in population and potential unrest, the likelihood of COIN being conducted in the littoral areas also increases. COIN in littoral areas has important maritime considerations.

0590. **Maritime Security Operations.** Maritime forces perform maritime security operations (MSO) in maritime, littoral and riverine environments. For COIN, MSO counters terrorism, insurgency and crime. MSO protects the HN, the population and critical infrastructure from insurgent attack. It also assures access to and the free flow of commerce and sustainment through the waterways. MSO is vital to isolating insurgents from external support via waterways, especially with respect to littorals. Riverine units provide security along inland waterways, which helps to isolate insurgents within the affected area or, if the river is an international border, from external support. MSO also can assist in stopping piracy, which may assist in both stabilising the situation and undermining a source of funding as a focus of insurgent operations. Piracy threatens freedom and safety of maritime navigation, undermines economic security, and contributes to the destabilisation of governance and the security situation.
0591. **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** Naval forces provide the joint force with expeditionary ISR capabilities with global reach and persistence in support of COIN.

0592. **Deterrence and Patrols.** Naval support may consist of providing deterrence and presence patrols. These may enforce sanctions or blockades. Naval support demonstrates support for an ally or NATO partner, which may send a strong message to insurgents and their supporters. The ability of naval forces to loiter over the horizon gives them a small footprint while maintaining the ability to quickly intervene.

0593. **Sustainment and Transport.** Maritime forces can provide land-based forces with key sustainment capabilities. This includes commercial vessels providing the majority of bulk supplies. Naval forces, however, may transport forces within the theatre as well. Naval forces can also provide a forced entry capability for insurgent-controlled areas or bases bordering on waterways or in littorals.

0594. **Naval Aircraft.** Like ground-based aircraft, naval aircraft are flexible, provide rapid response capabilities, and are capable of conducting precision strikes. Naval aircraft, however, have added flexibility in that aircraft carriers can be quickly repositioned within theatre. Rapid repositioning may be vital in an austere theatre where the HN may not have a robust air power capability or sustainment capability. Naval air power can thus provide the JFC with a potential source of surge air power within a relatively short travel time.

0595. **Precision Strikes.** Naval aircraft can execute precision strikes in the same way as the aircraft discussed in the air component considerations section. However, naval forces also are capable of launching precision-guided munitions from surface or subsurface platforms. As with the air-launched precision-guided munitions, quality, actionable intelligence is required for these munitions to be effective. As with any use of force in COIN, all of the potential desired and undesired effects must be considered.

0596. **Building Host Nation Maritime Capability.** Security Force Assistance (SFA) also applies to assisting the HN with building or improving its maritime capability and capacity. The maritime component of security forces includes naval, marine and coastguard elements. SFA planners must develop a long-term plan to assist the HN in these areas. As with the air power capability, the maritime elements of an HN must be appropriate for that nation’s requirements and sustainment base.

**Section IX - Air Component Contribution**

0597. Air forces play a vital role in the military contribution to COIN. These forces are especially capable of countering different types of insurgency members, and of gathering information. Air contributions include CAS, including precision strikes, air interdiction (AI); airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); communication; combat support; and air mobility. Air, efforts in coordination with space forces and capabilities can provide considerable asymmetric advantages to counterinsurgents. If insurgents assemble a conventional force, air assets can respond quickly with joint precision fires or the ability to airlift ground security forces to remote locations to track down and eliminate insurgents. Air power enables counterinsurgents to operate in rough and remote terrain, areas that insurgents traditionally have used as safe havens. The air component may be the supported component in COIN when attacking approved insurgent sanctuaries that are outside land or maritime forces’ operational areas.
0598. **Precision Engagement.** The air component can provide CAS, air interdiction (AI) and strategic air attack, which in COIN often includes the use of precision-guided munitions, which both manned and unmanned aerial vehicles can provide. These precision strikes are often based on corroborated HUMINT and are a surgical means of destroying the insurgent military wing, leaders, or assets with minimal collateral damage or risk to land forces. The use of lethal fires, regardless of source, against insurgents must be carefully considered and targets confirmed in terms of their authenticity and value. Additionally, insurgents may have signature reduction methods, deception methods and man-portable air defence systems that must be considered and addressed. Considerations are as follows:

a. **Effects from Air Power.** The effects on the population from using air power strike operations against insurgents must be carefully considered during planning. In determining the appropriate capability to create the desired effects, planners should look at the desired outcomes, duration and consequences to ensure that not only the direct but also the longer term indirect effects of the use of a capability are anticipated. There is potential for collateral damage from the smallest weapons, ground or air, and civilian casualties can do much to undermine indigenous, domestic and international support. Additionally, insurgents will exploit such incidents by using their own capabilities to deal with information. However, strike operations have a vital role in COIN, especially given their ability to destroy targets throughout the operational area.

b. **Intelligence.** Just as in traditional warfare, attacks on key nodes usually reap greater benefits than attacks on dispersed individual targets. For this reason, effective strike operations are inextricably tied to the availability of actionable intelligence, effective ISR, and detailed systems analysis that identifies and fully characterizes the potential targets of interest (networks, nodes and links). Persistence is critical, as it will never be known in advance whether a particular node is key to a network or how long it will remain important to the network. Planners may consider a greater use of airborne alert in COIN than during traditional warfare.

c. **Host Nation Precision Engagement.** If NATO forces conduct the strike, there may be the perception that the HN government is dependent for its survival on foreign forces. This may have the indirect effect of delegitimizing the HN government in the public’s perception. Precision engagement should be designed to employ HN air power resources to the greatest extent possible. Properly trained and structured teams of air power advisers, ranging from planning and liaison to tactical operations personnel, offer the potential for HN unilateral and combined actions against high-value targets. The use of these options serves to enhance the legitimacy of the HN government while achieving important Alliance security objectives. The use of assets controlled by non-military NATO agencies, but not directly affiliated with NATO, may also prove useful in providing precision strike capability.

0599. **Interoperability between Ground and Air.** Given its mobility, flexibility and precision, air power can be a critical enabler for COIN. Air power’s ability to quickly support ground forces can lower the need for mutual support between ground units and therefore decrease overall manpower density. This allows counterinsurgents to further disperse ground forces in areas and in numbers that would not be feasible without air power - mutual support can come from the air rather than from other ground forces or indirect ground fire. The dispersion of ground forces facilitates the actual and perceived level of security. However, NATO planners must carefully balance the risk of catastrophic tactical
surprise of dispersed ground forces with the benefits gained from dispersion.

05100. **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** Air and space platforms have critical ISR roles in supporting COIN in general and particularly in destroying the military wing of insurgencies. Air and space platforms can provide valuable input for each of the intelligence disciplines. Given the challenges faced by human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) assets in finding and penetrating insurgent networks, counterinsurgents must effectively employ all available intelligence collection capabilities. A combination of unmanned aircraft systems, manned aircraft and space-based platforms can provide counterinsurgents with many collection capabilities.

05101. **Air Mobility.** Cargo aircraft provide the important support of inter-theatre and intra-theatre transport. This transport can include deployment to remote regions and deliver resources and personnel and can be used to rapidly deploy, sustain and reinforce ground forces in COIN. Air mobility can be used to support political goals by extending effective governance to remote areas. Sustainment tasks are enabled through air landing, airdrop and the aerial extraction of equipment, supplies and personnel. Additionally, the type of aircraft to be used for each mission should be considered. Fixed-wing and vertical-lift airlift provide a crucial capability in COIN. In the military realm, fixed-wing transports are best suited for carrying ground forces into forward staging areas. Vertical-lift platforms are ideal for carrying ground forces to remote sites that are unable to support fixed-wing operations. Casualty evacuation should be integral to any operation involving the employment of personnel in hostile-fire situations, and vertical-lift assets are best suited for this task. Considerations are as follows:

a. **Advantages.** Airlift provides a significant asymmetric advantage to COIN land forces, enabling commanders to rapidly deploy, reposition, sustain and redeploy land forces. While land forces can execute these basic missions alone, airlift bypasses weaknesses that insurgents have traditionally exploited. For example, airlift enables land forces to operate in rough and remote terrain and to avoid LOCs targeted by insurgents. However, airlift is more costly than surface or maritime transportation. It is usually a small percentage of the overall transportation network during major combat operations; however, in particularly challenging situations, airlift may become the primary transportation mode for sustainment and repositioning.

b. **Sources.** Sources of airlift include multinational and HN rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets. SOF provide specialised airlift capabilities for Special Operations. Strategic inter-theatre airlift platforms can provide a logistic pipeline. This pipeline moves large quantities of time-critical equipment, supplies and personnel into and out of a theatre. Modern strategic airlift can often provide a direct delivery capability, landing at relatively short, austere fields formerly serviced only by intra-theatre airlift.

c. **Modes.** The modes of airlift include airland and airdrop. Each mode provides advantages and disadvantages, depending on the environment. Airland missions carry greater payloads, resulting in less potential for damage. They also provide back-haul capability - critical for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) - troop rotation, equipment repair, and the repositioning and redeployment of COIN forces. Fixed-wing assets on airland missions require longer and better prepared landing surfaces. Vertical-lift assets on airland missions can operate from much smaller, more austere fields; however, they fly at slower speeds and often have smaller payloads and
shorter ranges. Airdrop missions require the least amount of infrastructure at the receiving end and allow for rapid build-up of forces - up to brigade size. Equally importantly, airdrop can provide precision insertion and the sustainment of numerous small units. Advances in precision-guided, steerable parachutes increase the capability of high-value airdrop missions.

d. Special Operations. Specifically trained airlift forces provide unique air, land and airdrop support to SO. Since a limited number of airlift assets are dedicated to this mission, the principle of economy of force is particularly important. HN aviation forces may support ground SOF in hostile or denied territory. Air SO capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and responsive to asymmetric or irregular threats and circumstances.

05102. Basing. NATO and other multinational air units, along with HN forces, are likely to use expeditionary airfields. COIN planners must consider where to locate airfields, including those intended for use as aerial ports of debarkation and other air operations. Air power operating from remote or dispersed airfields may present a smaller signature than large numbers of land forces, possibly lessening HN sensitivities to a foreign military presence. Commanders must properly protect their bases and coordinate their defence among all counterinsurgents.

05103. Building Host Nation Air Power Capability. NATO and other multinational SFA operations strive to enable the HN to provide its own internal and external defence. Planners therefore need to establish a long-term programme to develop an HN air power capability. The HN air force should be appropriate for that nation’s requirements and sustainment base. For conducting effective COIN operations, an HN air force requires aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, air transport, CAS, and interdiction for land forces, strategic attack capability, helicopter troop lift, MEDEVAC and counter-air. Likewise, airlift supports the essential services, governance and economic development of LOOs. HN security forces thus should include airlift development as the HN’s first component of air power.

Section X - Special Operations Forces Component Contribution

05104. SOF input in COIN operation. When preparing for COIN, SOF can provide area assessments and an early command, control, and communications capability. During COIN, SOF could conduct special reconnaissance and surveillance (SR), direct action (DA), military assistance (MA), or a suitable combination of these principal tasks, to support Allied joint operations in order to accomplish the defined political and military/strategic objectives.

05105. Coordination between Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces. Although their tactical missions may be very different, joint SOF and conventional forces must coordinate their efforts. This is especially true between SOF units who are operating in land-owning ground units’ areas; coordination is essential for updated intelligence, as both SOF and the conventional purpose forces may have to deal with local negative consequences of SOF operations. When properly integrated during planning, conventional purpose forces and SOF can capitalise on their collective strengths to achieve the JFC’s intent. SOF are especially adept in providing cultural awareness and can help facilitate the introduction of conventional purpose forces into an area or region. Likewise, conventional
purpose forces can enable the introduction and support of SOF into denied areas, providing them logistical bases for operations, fire support and reinforcements.

Section XI - Transfer of Security Responsibility

05106. NATO forces should transfer the responsibility for security to HN authorities in the latter stages of a COIN campaign. This process is enabled by the effective conduct of SSR and must be implemented when the HN security structures are sufficiently well developed. The process includes the transfer of both authority and responsibility for the provision of security to the HN’s security forces and will be part of an ongoing NATO or international operational transition process. The need for this to occur will have been stated in the campaign plan, and the conditions required to achieve it will need to be developed as the campaign progresses. Implementation is likely to be incremental. The requisite conditions will not be solely concerned with the issue of security but will cover the whole range of security sector issues, including governance capacity, the rule of law and economic reform. Reform in these areas is usually the domain of other government departments (OGDs) and NGOs, and there will be a requirement to conduct coherent planning with these in order to coordinate military activities effectively.

05107. Setting Conditions and Decision-making. Generic conditions for the transfer should be set and agreed by the HN government with advice from NATO or the UN as part of a comprehensive planning process. This should be based on the clearly expressed premise that the HN and its security forces will have the ability and competence to operate and that, when they do, they will operate within the rule of law. It is critical that, when transitions occur, both authority and responsibility are migrated at the same time, as only this will allow the actual transfer of risk to the receiving entity. These conditions will be linked to the campaign’s LOOs. It is critical that the HN government is fully involved with the design of the conditions and considers that it has ownership of them. Above all, the population must see that it is their government that takes the final decision, reflecting their own sovereignty, reinforcing the HN government’s credibility, and continuing to secure the population. Conditions for re-intervention by NATO will also need to be agreed.

05108. Support to Other Institutions. The ability to conduct successful transition and transfer at the operational level depends as much upon the ability and capacity of HN government institutions to operate without support from NATO and other international government departments, as it does on capable and credible local forces. Self-reliance in these areas is central to the draw-down and eventual withdrawal of NATO forces and to the maintenance of longer term security. There may be a requirement to focus on supporting and facilitating fledgling elected bodies and governance while developing cross-ministry cooperation. This should be conducted as part of a comprehensive approach in conjunction with civil agencies, such as national ministries and the UN, and in turn should be supported to improve their effectiveness in order to replace military assistance. At the provincial level, the capacity for governance should complement national initiatives and take place concurrently. It is normally appropriate to use PRTs in this coordinating role. Where specific military teams operate in support of HN government departments at the local/provincial level, plans should be made to hand over remaining functions to, ideally, the HN’s governing bodies or other donors at an appropriate stage in accordance with the LOOs. Civil-military cooperation, information activities and public information activity will be required in support of these activities.
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05109. **Execution.** As operational transition progresses, the NATO force posture will evolve through a number of phases. Changes in this context should be driven by improvements in local forces and HN institutional capability, and designed to promote and support responsibility for security at the provincial and, eventually, national levels. The phases are as follows:31

a. tactical overwatch,
b. operational overwatch, and
c. strategic overwatch.

05110. **Tactical Overwatch.** The major determinant for this phase is the ability of HN forces to take the lead for the provision of security at the provincial level with close support from NATO forces. The likely conditions are as follows:

a. Representative government at local level is capable and able to exercise political control over local forces’ activity and further capacity building, with advice from the NATO forces.
b. Local forces are effective, operating with advice and assistance from NATO forces and dependent upon the tactical security situation.
c. Essential services are acceptable or improving, and provide a reasonably sustained level of service sufficient to preclude widespread civil unrest.
d. Operational mentoring and liaison teams and other military embedded trainers are widespread throughout the indigenous force structure.

05111. **Operational Overwatch and Transfer of Security Responsibility.** The following conditions should apply before a formal transfer to the provincial civil authorities is conducted:

a. The HN is capable, linked to the appropriate national institutional structures, and able to exercise political control over local forces’ operations and further capacity building with very limited advice from international actors or NATO forces.
b. The local forces are able to operate at this level without support, and re-intervention plans are agreed.
c. The majority of opposition groupings are willing to support the government and their leaders advocate engagement with it.
d. Assessed popular opinion indicates a reasonable degree of confidence in the sustained delivery of essential services, and there is a widespread belief that economic opportunities are sufficient or continuing to grow.

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31 For progress to the next stage to be made, a pre-determined set of functional and environmental circumstances needs to apply. Subjective judgement will be required to lead this process.
e. Reconstruction, economic development and inward investment are led by the HN.

f. NATO planning and coordination support to indigenous forces is continued. The scale of military embedment is reduced, although some support continues to be guaranteed.

g. NATO provides appropriate forces at readiness to provide support within agreed timescales. Arrangements for this support are frequently practised.

05112. **Strategic Overwatch.** The conditions for strategic overwatch will be met when HN forces have assumed security and stabilisation tasks from NATO forces, and HN institutions have sufficient capacity to provide control of their security forces at a national level and to provide adequate municipal services to their population. In effect normal bilateral military relations exist, although some specialist military support may continue to be provided by NATO (e.g. fixed-wing or rotary-wing support, or naval support). The following conditions will need to be met:

a. Provincial and national government is able to exercise political control over military operations and capacity building with very limited advice from NATO at the national level.

b. The local forces can operate fully at strategic level in compliance with HN government wishes.

c. An accountable system of national government has been established, with opposition groups being represented by political parties in the first instance.

d. Assessed popular opinion indicates satisfaction with the degree of delivery of essential services and there is widespread belief that economic opportunities and growth exist.

e. There is a national lead for economic development and inward investment.

f. National government conducts bilateral relationships.

g. NATO retains the ability and infrastructure to intervene in support of the HN on call.
ANNEX A - STRATEGIES OF INSURGENCY

General

A01. This annex supports Chapter 3. Contemporary insurgents may use different approaches at different times and places, applying tactics that best take advantage of circumstances. They may also apply a composite approach that includes experiences drawn from other approaches. From an analysis of experience, the following could be distinguished as the strategic models used by insurgents:

- a. conspiratorial,
- b. military-focused,
- c. urban approach,
- d. protracted popular warfare,
- e. identity-focused,
- f. composite and alliances.

Conspiratorial Approach.

A02. This involves a few leaders and a militant cadre or activist party seizing control of government structures or exploiting a revolutionary situation. Such insurgents remain secretive for as long as possible. They emerge only when success can be achieved quickly. This approach usually involves creating a small, secretive, vanguard party or force.

Military-focused Approach.

A03. Those applying the military approach, aim to create revolutionary possibilities by applying military force. They can use conventional forces to secure their independence or secession. Further, they can employ armed elements in a rural environment to create a focus and gain revolutionary support that will enable them to seize power. They spread control through the creation of combat forces rather than through political subversion. This approach was applied in the 60s and 70s and it is currently used in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Urban Approach.

A04. Protracted urban terrorism waged by small, independent cells requires little popular support, so it is difficult to counter. However, popular support could be gained in certain areas where the border between population and terrorists is unknown. As societies have become more urbanised and insurgent networks more sophisticated, this approach has become more effective. When facing security forces’ actions, these groups adopt a cellular structure recruited along lines of close association: family, religious, political party or social group.

Protracted Popular Warfare.

A05. This approach, where decisive combat is avoided, has been frequently employed, even by regular armies. The most illustrative examples are those of the 20th century in Asia (Chinese communist forces in the Civil War and the Vietcong in the War of Vietnam). Mao Zedong’s Theory of Protracted War describes a three-phase, politico-military
approach. Effectively applying Maoist strategy does not require a sequential or complete application of all three phases. The aim is seizing political power. The three phases are as follows:

A06. **Phase I Strategic Defensive (Latent and Incipient).** The first phase of an insurgency normally begins with the government having stronger forces than the insurgents, which means that the insurgency is on the strategic defensive. In this situation insurgents must concentrate on survival and building support. Although they share many of the same activities, there are two distinct common stages within the first phase: latent and incipient. Members of a latent or incipient insurgency conduct several linked, often interdependent, activities. While not all insurgencies will conduct all of these activities or place the same emphasis on them, all insurgencies will use these activities to some degree:

a. **Latent.** A latent insurgency is not yet ready to begin significant subversive or violent activities. A latent insurgency usually begins with a group of like-minded individuals discussing their grievances. This exchange of ideas may occur through many mediums, including the Internet or recorded video. The involved individuals may discuss challenging authority or correcting perceived grievances, which may lead to a conspiracy for action. During this period an insurgency establishes an identity, a cause, a narrative, and a firm ideological or political base. This period tends to be the most vulnerable and crucial time for the insurgents. It can also be a period of frequent fractures into different groups due to ideological or other disputes. Due to their potential vulnerability, the insurgents often try to keep their activities hidden from the government and the majority of the population, secrecy is essential. There are two key tasks insurgents perform during the latent stage - recruitment and infiltration:

(1) **Recruitment.** Beginning in the latent stage, the insurgency will recruit, establish cadres and build underground agents. Through planned recruitment the insurgents try to win members, supporters and sympathisers at all levels. Rival organisations are a key concern for the insurgents, as they can compete for new recruits or support. This competition may become violent in nature if other organisations are impeding the insurgency. **Infiltration.** Insurgents seek to identify power centres at different levels within an HN, including where decisions are made, and infiltrate them. Insurgents will normally form a network of cells and agents to perform this infiltration. A key aim of these efforts is to control elements that regulate national development and activities, especially established government agencies. Infiltration can focus on a wide number of targets, including the armed forces, security forces, legal institutions, the media, trade unions and work organisations, education centres, student/professional associations, institutions, and the so-called “ruling class”.

b. **Incipient.** There is usually a period in which a latent insurgency can transform itself into an incipient insurgency. During the incipient stage an insurgency is becoming active; however, many of the activities from the latent stage will continue throughout the incipient stage and beyond, for example, building and maintaining an ideological or political base. Although the insurgents will continue these activities, they feel they have a sufficient foundation to begin violent activities and additional subversive activities. In addition to the tasks from the latent stage, there are two key tasks insurgents also perform in the incipient stage - preparation and manifestation:
(1) **Preparation.** There are several key tasks that insurgents execute to prepare for major efforts. Building the organisational structures and capabilities to perform subversion and violent activities is a key task. Information activities, especially propaganda, are vital for the growth and long-term prospects of an insurgency. In addition to having members and supporters, insurgents must acquire the materiel means to fight, such as weapons, funds and other supplies. Insurgents also continue to build an intelligence collection network, which may include coercion and blackmail. Some insurgencies will organise support from the local population through networks of legal organisations. An insurgency based on an existing organisation, such as a religious faction or tribe, can have a significantly reduced preparation time. Regardless of the exact tasks or emphasis of the insurgency in the preparation phase, they must balance the risk between secrecy and open operations. While an insurgency needs to promote the cause or narrative to gain popular support, overt operations make them vulnerable to penetration by counterinsurgents. Finally, many insurgencies also turn to criminal organisations or efforts to provide funding.

(2) **Manifestation.** Manifestation may take many forms and is largely dependent on the insurgents’ strategy. It may include a wide range of non-violent or violent activities that may be generally random and diffuse in form and effect:

(a) **Non-violent Means.** Non-violent efforts may include protest demonstrations at specific locales to obstruct infrastructure, disrupt work, distribute propaganda and have a political impact on the population. Large-scale marches may be used for similar purposes. These non-violent efforts may have an international impact, which may put more pressure on the HN government and counterinsurgents. Insurgents may also use publicised boycotts, such as avoiding the use of specific goods or services, not purchasing particular countries’ goods, refusing to carry out civic actions such as paying taxes or striking. As insurgencies become more adept, they will use non-violent methods in conjunction with violent methods. For example, they may use a demonstration to cover an attack on security forces. However, they may still use non-violent means simply to gain the sympathy or support.

(b) **Violent Means.** Violent efforts may include terror attacks, occupation attacks, sabotage, street tactics, ambushes and raids:

i. **Terror Attacks** may take the form of bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings. Kidnapping targets may include foreign personnel, including attaches, ranking government officials and members of the commercial community.

ii. **Occupation Attacks** are carried out to temporarily occupy an establishment such as a government office or communications facility for the purpose of gaining propaganda or psychological advantage.

iii. **Sabotage.** Insurgents sabotage installations of an economic or political nature such as factories, public or government office buildings, communications facilities, and power-producing
equipment of a critical nature.

iv. **Street Tactics.** Insurgents may use street tactics to involve the population in the insurgents’ efforts against the counterinsurgents security forces. In fact, insurgents may take over existing peaceful demonstrations and turn them into violent ones. Insurgents may also construct barricades to heighten or prolong the existing tensions or violence. Rock throwing, sniping and other means may be used to incite police to attack a peaceful demonstration. The purpose behind such activity is to cause material damage and a general breakdown in the morale of the populace, and to embarrass and undermine the government. Professional agitators from the insurgent organisation may penetrate demonstrations in order to incite violence with propaganda. The insurgents obscure their intentions by blending into the crowd and merging actions with those of the masses.

v. **Ambushes** are generally used to kill key government or military forces and officials and inflict losses on police. Ambushes are carefully planned and may employ blocking elements to prevent rapid reinforcement of the ambushed force. Mines and IEDs may also be utilised as part of the ambush. Snipers may be employed, and the insurgent will normally try to take advantage of the irregularities of the streets and buildings. An ambush often has a devastating effect on security forces.

vi. **Raids.** These are armed assaults made to obtain funds or equipment; free detainees, capture arms, ammunition and explosives and destroy or overrun government or military installations. The usual targets are foreign forces allied with the HN government, monetary and commercial centres, government buildings and police stations, penal institutions, military installations and arsenals, foreign embassies and installations, and communications and transportation facilities. In Phase I a defensive position is adopted, since the correlation of forces is adverse. It is a period of latent insurgency that allows time to wear down adversary strength while the insurgency gains support and establishes an efficient clandestine organisation. Combat is avoided. The primary armed activities are terrorist attacks. They are executed to gain popular support, influence obstinate individuals and undermine morale.

A07. **Phase II—Strategic Equilibrium.** The second phase of an insurgency normally starts when force correlations approach equilibrium and the use of armed elements of insurgency becomes the most important, pervasive activity. This stage can begin with actions of armed elements striking at a time and place of their own choosing and then disappearing back into the population. The size and intensity of such attacks will depend on the situation and the goal of the insurgency. If the intention is to impose a military defeat, the attacks may concentrate on causing military attrition, weakening the military power, and causing desertions, with a view to eventual conventional battles. If the aim is to cause a level of harassment that is unendurable for the government, a wider range of
attacks may be attempted. If the intention is to force a repressive military response from the government, thus alienating it from the population, the application of organised crime and terrorism in a ruthless and systematic manner is likely. Insurgent efforts in this phase may include:

a. more actions by armed elements, which often aim to force counterinsurgents onto the defensive;

b. an increased use of sabotage and terrorism;

c. intensified propaganda;

d. attempts to gain control of isolated geographic areas and develop bases for further operations;

e. driving government officials out of areas with strong insurgent support;

f. the establishment of local shadow governments; and

g. increased efforts to gain international recognition and support.

A08. **Phase III Strategic Offensive.** The third phase of an insurgency begins when insurgents feel they have superior strength and a portion of their military forces attempt to fight in a conventional manner. Insurgent efforts may include:

a. Some armed elements may combine and be trained to fight as conventional forces. Over time these conventional forces may form multiple echelons.

b. More powerful and sophisticated weapons may be acquired through foreign assistance or capture.

c. Insurgents may obtain support from external combat forces, such as Special Forces or conventional forces from a friendly border nation.

d. Areas of insurgent control may expand and political activity may increase.

A09. Protracted popular war approaches are conducted along multiple politico-military COAs and are locally configured. Insurgents may employ different tactics in different regions. The result is more than just a “three-block war”; it is a shifting “mosaic war” that is difficult for COIN to envision as a coherent whole.

**Identity-focused Approach**

A10. The identity-focused approach mobilises support based on the common identity of religious affinity, clan, tribe or ethnic group. These movements may be based on an appeal to a religious identity, either separately from or as a part of other identities. This approach is common among contemporary insurgencies and is sometimes combined with the military-focused approach.

**Composite Strategy**
A11. Contemporary insurgents may use different approaches at different times and places, applying tactics that best take advantage of the circumstances. They may also apply a composite approach that includes experiences drawn from other approaches. In addition, different insurgent forces using different approaches may form coalitions when it serves their interests. Within a single AOO there may be multiple competing groups, each seeking to maximise its survivability and influence. This reality complicates the mosaic in such a way that it will be difficult for counterinsurgents to understand the type of actions necessary for victory. They will have to carefully analyse the root of every action, since a single response will not suffice.

Contemporary Insurgencies and Current Threats

A12. Contemporary insurgencies develop in extremely complex scenarios. There are many interrelated actors, and it is hard to clearly distinguish between two parties: insurgent and counterinsurgent. Among these actors are militias, warlords, organised crime, drug dealers, private security companies, NGOs, the media, multinationals companies, and foreign countries with strategic interests in the area. A global and transnational nature is one of the main characteristics of contemporary insurgencies, since different insurgent movements can cooperate. There may be a flow of volunteers who, after a war, join other wars, and share experiences, training, give logistic/financial support and so on.

A13. All things considered, it can be stated that “new insurgencies” are characterised by their continuous adaptability, and their ability to adapt when developing strategies and procedures, which are inspired on three models, as follows:

a. From the revolutionary strategy, they have taken the relevance of communication, psychological actions, mobilising the population and the use of time.

b. From historical insurgencies and terrorism, they have taken their tactical procedures. They have adapted them to urban environments.

c. From organised crime they have taken their command and control structure, and the networked structure, and the opportunities provided by new information technologies, globalisation and basic funding procedures.

A14. The threat posed by new insurgencies is based on their ability to act in different areas, and their capacity to affect a country’s domestic/foreign politics and its public opinion through the use of violence and propaganda.

A15. To sum up, at present there are different types of insurgency at different evolution stages, evolved or not, taken from former models. New insurgencies are characterised by globalisation; the use of new technologies, propaganda and terrorism in urban scenarios; their connections with organised crime; and their relationships to other profitable irregular activities.
ANNEX B - INSURGENT ACTIVITIES FOR ACHIEVING THEIR GOALS

B01. **General.** This annex supports Chapter 3. Insurgents primarily use the following five activities or instruments for achieving their goals:

a. violent activities,
b. national and international propaganda,
c. social assistance,
d. social and political activism, and
e. international relations.

B02. **Violent Activities.** Insurgent violent activities may take many forms, including actions of armed elements, terrorism, and riots.

a. **Actions of armed elements.** This is carried out by armed forces, generally small, organised into a military structure and commanded by a commander. Their method is harassing and interfering with the adversary. It normally starts with population support in a territory controlled by the adversary. It is a form of combat that eludes direct engagement. It also avoids being an identifiable target for the adversary. Consequently, armed elements primarily use surprise, mobility, and focused attacks followed by immediate dispersal and can occasionally include terrorist actions. Therefore, there is not a clear line distinguishing one method from another. However activities of armed elements in an urban environment, have recently revived, for the following reasons:

(1) accessibility to simple, lethal weapons for short distance in urban areas;

(2) technological development in terms of communications and information systems. They facilitate the tasks of gathering information, coordinating actions, and exchanging lessons learned;

(3) concentration of large numbers of the population into urban areas; and

(4) masking and hiding is easier. In spite of contemporary technological assets, it is more difficult for security forces to locate, identify and act against armed elements and their logistic support.

b. **Terrorism.** This is a set of violent actions aimed at subjugating the population, weakening and undermining the influence of legal authorities’ and interfering with their actions. In order to achieve maximum propaganda and psychological impact - enormously facilitated by the globalised media - terrorists use surprise, provoking a chain of attacks in time, targeting symbolic entities. Their aim is to create a climate of fear among the population without directly facing them, promoting groundless discouragement, undermining their morale, and making them feel helpless. They seek to achieve the following objectives:

(1) spread the feeling of a need for a drastic change in power, allowing normalcy to be re-established;
(2) force radical repressive measures by security or military forces. This will facilitate later recruitment of activists/informers;

(3) eliminate, prevent or interfere with peaceful reformist measures and force the government to use control measures which cause unrest;

(4) provoke attrition and undermine security forces’ morale, causing casualties, forcing them to be continuously deployed, and adopting disturbing measures for the population;

(5) eliminate unyielding adversaries who, with their roles and positioning, damage the insurgents’ “cause”, and prove that the insurgency has strength and capacity to act against any person, regardless of their protection;

(6) prove the government’s inability to restore normality, show its loss of authority, and force it to impose restrictive measures on the population; and

(7) attract international attention in order to influence public opinion and obtain funds.

c. **Riots.** A riot is a modality of violence aimed to intimidate the population or interfere with public order by destroying public/private material goods causing direct engagement with security forces. Riots cause disturbances, and organised strikes and illegal demonstrations can have an attritional effect on government authority, presence and capacity. The press and other media can have a multiplier effect in this sort of action. Insurgency generally generates riots as a complementary form of irregular activities.

**B03. National and International Propaganda.** Insurgents need the local population and international public opinion to know and support their cause and to confront their adversary. The globalisation of the world provides insurgents with multiple means (such as television, radio, audio and video recordings; the printed word; word-of-mouth; digital photographs; and the Internet) that have a multiplying effect on their propaganda. As an example, current religious fundamentalists use the Internet to disseminate propaganda to groups in foreign countries. The Internet significantly facilitates the purchase of goods and radical books, and the broadcast of sermons delivered in clandestine environments.

**B04. Social Assistance.** Through social assistance insurgents win local support and legitimacy, especially in those countries where the state government is weak, corrupt or failed. Social assistance can include:

a. raising funds inside and outside the country used for beneficial and non-beneficial aims;

b. supporting education and medical facilities and activities;

c. aiding workers by supporting labour unions and providing employment; and

d. facilitating the provision of basic needs, such as the care of orphans and widows, and so on.
**Political Activism.** Insurgent political activism often focuses on supporting the narrative and ideology. An insurgency may form a political wing to support these efforts. The success of insurgent activism may depend on the insurgents’ ability to create coalitions with other groups and actors. Insurgents may organise demonstrations, protests, general strikes, boycotts and other types of political activities to support political activism. Additionally, they may use associations and even established political parties. Although they may use legal political parties, the insurgents intend to use these parties to undermine and destroy the existing political system.

**International Relations.** Local insurgencies can establish relations with other insurgent groups that are acting in other countries. This may be a mutually beneficial agreement of “fellow travellers”. They normally do this to receive training, exchange experiences, raise funds, receive arms and pose a united front. Insurgents may also seek material support from other states, or moral support from individuals and NGOs or other organisations with worldwide influence (for example, a group which influences public opinion or an artist who publicizes a legitimate insurgent cause).
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ANNEX C - MOTIVATION METHODS

C01. **General.** This annex supports Chapter 3. The main motivation methods used by insurgents are as follows:

C02. **Persuasion.** In times of restlessness and turmoil, political, social, security and economic benefits may attract popular support for one or another party. Persuasion can be used to win internal/external support through:

a. a charismatic leader or group;

b. appeal to a specific ideology or religion;

c. promise to address grievances;

d. demonstrations of potency such as large-scale attacks or effective social programs for the needy. This can be the most effective technique because it can create the perception that the insurgency has momentum and will succeed; and

e. providing security. In this sense, insurgents will base their actions on the belief that, for the population, a government unable to secure the population loses its legitimacy. Most civilians will tend to support those who ensure their security, even to the detriment of their freedom.

C03. **Coercion.** Insurgents use coercion to intimidate the population. Kidnapping and murdering local leaders or their relatives is a common practice among insurgents, which use it and other criminal activities to deter the population from supporting the government.

C04. **Provoking Disproportionate Reaction.** By provoking a disproportionate response from the security forces, the insurgent aims to alienate the government from the populace. Though firmness on the part of security forces is often necessary to establish a secure environment, a government that exceeds accepted local norms and abuses its power to the detriment of the population, or behaves in a tyrannical way, generates resistance to its rule. People who have been maltreated or have had close friends or relatives killed by the government, particularly by its security forces, may have a violent reaction or join an insurgency.

C05. **Foreign Support.** Foreign governments can provide the expertise, international legitimacy and money needed to start or intensify a conflict. NGOs, even those whose stated aims are impartial and humanitarian, may be drawn into supporting the insurgents, either knowingly or unwittingly. For example, funds raised overseas for professed charitable purposes may be redirected to insurgent groups.

C06. **Apolitical Motivation.** Apolitical insurgents can be attracted by non-ideological factors through economic incentives, promises of revenge, and the idealism of fighting a revolutionary war. Insurgencies attract criminals and mercenaries. Fighters who have joined for money will probably become bandits once the fighting ends. This category also includes opportunists who exploit the lack of security to engage in economically lucrative criminal activities, such as kidnapping and theft. Sustenance and funding requirements often drive insurgents into relationships with organised crime or into their own criminal activities. Taxing a mass base usually yields low returns. In contrast, kidnapping,
extortion, bank robbery and drug trafficking are very lucrative. This is the reason why, throughout history, many insurgent movements have degenerated into criminal bands.
ANNEX D - ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

D01. **General.** This annex supports Chapter 4. The development of an operational design is fundamental to operational planning. It represents the formulation of an overarching idea for the operation, based on a general estimate of the situation and the mission analysis, and embodies the commander’s intent. Operational design provides design elements to help visualise and shape the operation in order to accomplish the mission. Elements of operational design help to visualise the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish the mission. The key to operational design involves understanding the strategic guidance, determining the end state and objectives, identifying the adversary’s principal strengths and weaknesses, and developing an operational concept. Operational design for COIN should reflect a comprehensive approach applicable to each phase of the campaign. Because there is only one strategy or campaign, there should be only one operational design. This single design should incorporate all actors, including the HN.

D02. **Termination.** Termination will depend on political discourse between the HN and NATO members. This focus of termination is normally based on the projected security environment. The ends, core grievances, drivers of conflict and leadership of an insurgency are also important factors. Insurgencies based on interest-based core grievances, such as economic disparity or political corruption, may be persuaded or coerced back into a political process. Insurgencies based on ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural identities are value based, and their demands are more difficult to negotiate. Some insurgencies or groups of insurgencies will be both value- and interest-based. Drivers of conflict also impact termination.

   a. **Process.** Termination includes the resolution of a conflict as well as the mutual acceptance of terms and conditions to ensure a lasting settlement. Political efforts are essential for termination of COIN, as well as economic, informational, and military instruments of national and Alliance power. The political and diplomatic processes may continue well beyond the cessation of hostilities.

   b. **Criteria.** NATO commanders must clearly understand the desired end state and termination criteria for the campaign. Appropriate and well-conceived termination criteria are the key to ensuring that successful military operations result in conditions which allow conflict resolution on terms favourable to the Alliance. In the event that termination criteria are not clearly articulated, the JFC should request, through the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), further guidance or clarification, as appropriate.

   c. **Considerations.** Termination must be integrated throughout the COIN operational planning process. The commander must examine the desired end state and assess whether it is likely to eliminate or sufficiently reduce sources of further conflict. On this basis they must determine what constitutes an acceptable military end state; however, the primacy of political issues in COIN often means the military and political end states are almost the same. In formulating their plans, NATO commanders should ensure that these considerations are addressed.

D03. **Desired End State.** Before designing a COIN operation or campaign it is necessary to clearly identify the desired end state for the HN. This will include statements on the Alliance and the insurgents. The overall end state consists of the political and military conditions that need to exist for an operation to be terminated on favourable terms. The
end state should be clearly established before military forces are committed to execution. The ability to plan and conduct operations for conflict termination depends on a clear understanding of the desired end state.

D04. **Determination of End State.** The Alliance’s strategic end state is established by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), based on advice from the NATO military authorities (NMA) and the relevant NATO senior committees prior to the initiation of operational planning. It includes conditions that must be met. These conditions can be very wide-ranging in COIN and will give a clear indication of the relative importance of the military operations; military operations are only one contribution to COIN.

D05. **Objectives.** Joint multinational operations must be directed towards a clearly defined and commonly understood objective that contributes to the achievement of the desired end state. In simple terms, an objective is an aim to be achieved. Commanders establish objectives at their level to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level.

   a. **Alliance Objectives.** These will represent the Alliance’s overall political aims based on common vital interests and the desired end state. They are determined through political consultation and establish a clear purpose towards which the HN and the Alliance will direct their collective efforts and resources.

   b. **Military Strategic Objective.** Based on the HN’s and the Alliance’s desired end state for a crisis or conflict situation and advice from the NMAs, the SACEUR planning guidance will establish the military strategic objectives to be achieved by Alliance forces in a given situation. The military strategic objectives establish the overall aims of the campaign for the NATO commander and other supporting commands with respect to adversaries and strategically important areas. For COIN, the military strategic objectives will be defined with due regard for other non-military strategic objectives and the political end state identified in the overarching political mandate. This allows the NMAs, in coordination with the NATO commander, to develop military objectives in concert with the objectives of other agencies involved in the operation and to clearly appreciate the part that each will play in achieving the desired political end state. The military strategic objective should reflect a realistic military strategic end state that allows withdrawal of NATO forces at an appropriate stage.

   c. **Operational Objectives.** Based on his appreciation of the desired military end state and military strategic objectives, the NATO commander will establish operational objectives to be achieved by subordinate/component commanders. Military operational objectives often describe conditions to be achieved at decisive points (DP) in terms of force (e.g. expel, defeat, destroy, contain, neutralise and isolate), space (e.g. seize, secure defend, control or deny) and/or time (e.g. gain time for the build up of own forces). This helps define the purpose of the tasks to be accomplished by subordinate/component commands. A similar process is used for COIN non-military activities.

D06. **Determining Centres of Gravity.** One of the most important steps in developing an operational design is to determine COGs for both opposing and friendly forces. While an analysis of insurgents’ COGs determines how to defeat them, it is also necessary to determine Alliance COGs and assess their vulnerability to attack by adversaries in order to
provide for their protection. The essence of operational art is to determine an opponent’s COG and how best to neutralise it in order to prevent them from achieving their objectives while ensuring the protection of one’s own COG in order to achieve one’s own objectives.

D07. **Centres of Gravity.** AAP-6 defines a COG as “characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight”. The friendly and adversary objectives must first be understood to conduct a COG analysis, as COGs are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries; COGs do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum. Each entity in the operational environment has one strategic and one operational COG at one time. At the strategic level, a COG might be a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a COG is often associated with the adversary’s military capabilities - such as a powerful element of the armed forces - but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. COGs are inherently complex and dynamic in that they change depending on each belligerent’s objectives and the operational environment. Changes to COGs must be carefully analysed and planned for. Changes to COGs often indicate a change in the nature of operations. JFCs not only consider the adversary COGs, but also identify and protect their own COGs. Counterinsurgents must similarly determine the friendly strategic and friendly operational COGs. Critical factors analysis provides commanders with a detailed, systemic understanding of friendly and adversary COGs, and the knowledge to balance resources accordingly to protect them as the situation requires.

D08. **Analysis.** Thorough and detailed COG analysis helps commanders and staffs to understand the systemic nature of the operational environment and the actions necessary to shape the conditions that define the desired end state. A thorough understanding of the insurgent’s ends, scopes, dynamics, approach and activities are required to begin an insurgent COG analysis. The nature of the insurgent’s strategic ends is predominantly political and often more intangible than in traditional warfare. As a source of power or strength, COGs are inherently complex and dynamic; they can change over time. COGs consist of certain critical factors that may include intrinsic weaknesses. These critical factors help commanders identify and analyse COGs, formulate methods to isolate or neutralise them, and prevent them from influencing events. Insurgent COGs and critical factors also tend to be conceptual and moral, although an advanced insurgency that is able to engage in a struggle of movement and has a shadow government will have more tangible COGs and critical factors.

D09. **Insurgent Centres of Gravity.** The insurgent’s strategic COG is likely to be conceptual or moral, although the core grievances of the insurgency may well be physical. A strategic COG analysis will therefore highlight the insurgent’s ideology, motivations and cause. This also makes it difficult to determine which of the enemy’s critical strengths represent the true COG. The insurgent leaders or their followers might comprise a COG. In some cases, ideology should be considered an important part of a COG. The individual insurgent commanders and their forces in the countryside may in exceptional cases constitute an operational COG. At the operational level, insurgents rarely mass large forces to constitute a tangible operational COG. In determining COGs, it is important to appreciate that our opponents will act according to their own interests, perspectives and values, which are likely to be significantly different from our own. Asymmetric situations are a consequence of significant differences in the ends, ways and means of adversaries. It may be useful to determine COGs for the different factions as well as IOs/NGOs that must
be protected rather than neutralised or destroyed.

D10. **Critical Factors.** Commanders and staffs consider COGs holistically, examining them from a broad perspective to determine the relationships between the conditions, resources and means that enable a COG to function. Understanding the dynamic, complex nature of a COG is the key to exposing weaknesses and vulnerabilities, enabling friendly forces to establish the conditions for success. Through critical factors analysis, commanders and staffs identify those systemic vulnerabilities that, when attacked, expose the enemy COG to paralysis, shock and, ultimately, total collapse. Critical factors analysis considers three essential characteristics of a COG capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities as follows:

a. **Critical Capabilities.** Critical capabilities (CCs) are adversary means considered to be crucial enablers for the functioning of a COG, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objectives. They are the attributes of a COG that can affect friendly force operations within the context of a given scenario, situation or mission. CCs may vary between phases of an operation, function at various echelons, or change in character as an operation progresses. At the operational and tactical levels, CCs represent a potential for action: they possess an ability to inflict destruction, seize objectives or create effects, or prevent adversaries from achieving mission success.

b. **Critical Requirements.** Critical requirements (CRs) are the essential conditions, resources and means required for a COG to be fully operational. For example, CRs can include the resources necessary to deploy a force into combat, the popular support a national leader needs to remain in power, or the perceived legitimacy required to maintain popular support. CRs are the lifeblood of the CC upon which a COG depends; they are also the primary means through which to isolate, dislocate, disintegrate, or destroy a COG.

c. **Critical Vulnerabilities.** Critical vulnerabilities (CVs) are aspects or components of those CRs that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner that will create decisive or significant effects. Commanders may neutralise, weaken or destroy an adversary’s COG by attacking through CVs. Once designated as an objective, a CV becomes a decisive point.

D11. **Using Critical Requirements and Vulnerabilities.** CRs and CVs are interrelated. The loss of one CR may expose vulnerabilities in other CRs, and may initiate a cascading effect that accelerates the eventual collapse of a COG. The analysis of a COG and its critical factors will reveal these systemic relationships and their inherent vulnerabilities. In situations where a COG possesses multiple CVs critical factors analysis helps commanders and staffs to prioritise the vulnerabilities as follows:

a. **Tactical Critical Requirements.** The CRs that sustain a strategic or operational COG function are independent of the respective level of war. This exposes CVs to actions generated by any echelon. For example, an operational COG may rely upon certain CRs that are vulnerable at the tactical level of war. Once identified, these vulnerabilities become DPs at the operational level, and force-oriented or purpose-based objectives at the tactical level.

b. **Focus.** Critical factors analysis may identify a single vulnerability that will isolate or neutralise a COG; however, ultimate success is usually attained by focusing on a
combination of CVs that can be defeated or neutralised through the simultaneous or sequential application of overwhelming combat power. Effective critical factors analysis can determine the conditions required for successive operational advantages that attain the campaign objectives and reduce the associated risk.

c. **Targeting Critical Vulnerabilities.** In identifying and targeting CVs, commanders consider their accessibility, recuperative capability, vulnerability, redundancy, and influence on the operational environment. They carefully balance these factors against friendly capabilities to affect these vulnerabilities. The objective is to direct overwhelming, asymmetric friendly capabilities against these vulnerabilities to affect the enemy COG. Critical factors are the key to protecting or neutralising COGs during a campaign or major operation. To achieve success, the force must possess sufficient combat power and operational reach to defeat CVs.

D12. **Decisive Points.** DPs are a logical extension of COG critical factors. Counterinsurgents should identify DPs to leverage friendly capabilities in order to exploit insurgent vulnerabilities. A DP is a node, system or key event that allows a marked advantage over an insurgent and greatly influences the outcome of COIN. DPs are not COGs; they are keys to attacking or protecting COG CRs. In COIN, this may involve influential individuals in the population, and leader engagement and providing leaders with security may give the counterinsurgents an advantage over the insurgents. When it is not feasible to attack a COG directly, commanders focus operations to weaken or neutralise the CRs and therefore CVs upon which it depends. These CVs are DPs, providing the indirect means to weaken or collapse the COG. DPs at the operational level provide the greatest leverage on COGs, where tactical DPs are directly tied to task and mission accomplishment.

a. **Prioritisation.** A situation typically presents more DPs than the joint force can control, destroy or neutralise with available resources. Through critical factors analysis, commanders identify the DPs that offer the greatest leverage on COGs. They designate the most important DPs as objectives and allocate enough resources to achieve the desired results. DPs that enable commanders to seize, retain or exploit the initiative are crucial. Controlling these DPs during operations helps commanders gain freedom of action, maintain momentum, and dictate tempo. If the adversary maintains control of a DP, it may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination or facilitate an adversarial counter-attack. DPs shape the design of operations. They help commanders select objectives that are clearly decisive relative to the end state; they ensure that vital resources are focused only on those objectives that are clearly defined, are attainable, and directly contribute to establishing the conditions that comprise that end state.

b. **Nature of Decisive Points.** Some DPs are geographic, such as sanctuaries and bases of operations. Other physical DPs may include elements of an adversary, including key individuals. Events, such as an election or a major insurgent effort to hold terrain, may also be DPs. A common characteristic of DPs is their relative importance to the COG; the nature of a DP compels the enemy to commit significant effort to defend or marginalise it. The loss of a DP weakens a COG and may expose more vulnerabilities as it begins to collapse.

c. **Critical Factors and Decisive Points.** Critical factors and DPs are related. CVs identified as objectives are DPs. However, not all DPs are CVs. Typically, CVs are
well protected and not susceptible to a direct approach; any effort to control, neutralise, or destroy a CV is likely to be successful only through an indirect approach. This is accomplished through a series of DPs along a LOO, ultimately exposing the insurgent’s vulnerability to a direct attack.

d. **Stability Decisive Points.** DPs assume a different character during stability operations, which are a key part of COIN. These DPs may be less tangible and more closely associated with critical events and conditions. For example, they may include repairing a vital water treatment facility, establishing a training academy for HN security forces, securing a major election site, or quantifiably reducing crime. While most of these DPs are physical, all are vital to establishing the conditions for defeating an insurgency, addressing core grievances, and building HN capabilities, capacity and ultimately legitimacy.

e. **Designating Decisive Points as Objectives.** The commander should designate DPs as objectives within the campaign or operation and allocate resources to create desired conditions or effects to secure, protect, control, deny, destroy or neutralise them. Operational art is applied in determining the condition or effects to be created at DPs, when, in what sequence and using which resources. This will help in determining the most promising approach and LOO to adopt, in addition to possible alternatives.

D13. **Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).** Establishing objectives requires the commander to make basic decisions about conditions or effects to be created at DPs. Developing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) provide means for determining progress and successful achievement of the objective. The commander should also determine MOEs for each objective to determine whether operations are producing the desired conditions or effects. MOEs typically describe predicted benchmark changes in physical or moral conditions or effects that indicate progress toward the accomplishment of the objective. MOEs should allow the commander to evaluate whether the operation is creating the desired conditions and effects, as well as any undesired consequences that might jeopardise the accomplishment of his objective or mission. MOEs are critical because their use in evaluating progress may influence decisions regarding the conduct of operations and the allocation of resources. Measures of performance examine how well a task is being performed, which may prove useful in assessment.

D14. **Direct Versus Indirect Approach.** The next step in designing an operation is to determine the best approach for dealing with the opposing COGs. Destruction or neutralisation of the adversary COG is the most direct path to success however, two alternative approaches to consider are the direct and indirect approaches, as follows:

a. The direct approach is a linear, uninterrupted approach against an opposing force’s COG, often by way of DPs. The direct approach is appropriate when a force has superior strength and the opposing force is vulnerable. Conversely, when direct attack means attacking an opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach.

b. The indirect approach seeks to exploit opposing force physical and moral vulnerabilities, while avoiding its strengths. The indirect approach is appropriate when a force is insufficient to operate directly against opposing COGs or critical capabilities in a single operation or coup de main, and instead must concentrate on
exploiting the adversary’s CVs in a series of operations that eventually lead to the defeat of the COG. In particular, the indirect approach may seek to exploit opposing vulnerabilities across the opponents fighting power.

It is often difficult or impossible to attack an insurgency’s strategic COG or operational COG; thus, COIN often requires an indirect approach. As a result, the insurgent’s CVs can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over the insurgent’s COGs. In this way, joint force commanders employ a synchronised combination of operations to weaken insurgent COGs indirectly and over time by attacking CRs that are sufficiently vulnerable.

D15. **Lines of Operation.** Having determined the best overall approach to the opposing COG, the next step in operational design is to determine primary and alternate LOOs. LOOs link DPs in time and space on the path to the opposing COG. They connect a force with its base of operations and its objectives. Commanders use them to focus combat power towards a desired end state, applying combat power throughout the three dimensions of space, time and purpose in a logical design that integrates all the military capabilities of a joint force in order to converge upon and defeat the COG of the adversaries. LOOs are a key tool for counterinsurgents to visualise the operational design. Each LOO represents an element of the plan, stated as an outcome. Together the LOOs define the necessary and sufficient objectives / outcomes necessary to achieve the overarching goal. LOOs describe the linkage of various cross-sector actions on nodes and decisive points. They also connect tasks and effects to nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective. COIN requires the synchronisation of activities along multiple and complementary LOOs in order to attain tactical and operational objectives. Figure D.1.1 depicts a set of example LOOs, some working through the population and others focused on the insurgents.

![Figure D.1.1 Example Friendly Lines of Operation](image)

a. **Main Effort.** Commanders may specify a LOO as the main effort. In this case the other LOOs shape the operational environment for the main effort LOO’s success. This prioritisation may change as COIN creates or exploits insurgent vulnerabilities, insurgents react or adjust their activities, or the environment changes. In this sense, commanders adapt their operations not only to the state of the insurgency, but also to
the operational environment.

b. **Interdependence.** Success in one LOO reinforces successes in the others. Progress along each LOO contributes to attaining a stable and secure environment for the HN. Stability is reinforced by popular recognition of the HN government’s legitimacy, improved governance, and progressive and substantive reduction of the core grievances of the insurgency. There is no list of LOOs that applies in all COIN or all phases of COIN. LOOs should be based on the holistic understanding of the operational environment and what must be done to achieve the end state.

D16. **Sequencing and Phases.** As in any operation, COIN planners must determine the best arrangement of actions or major operations to achieve objectives. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential actions or operations designed to achieve the desired end state. However, it is normally impossible to attain all objectives of COIN in a single major operation. As such, the design of a campaign of major operation normally provides for the sequencing of actions or the phasing of operations. A variety of factors must be considered when determining this arrangement for COIN operations, including the population’s current view of counterinsurgent credibility, HN legitimacy and the insurgents in general. The arrangement of COIN operations impacts the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose, as follows:

a. **Sequencing.** Sequencing is the arrangement of actions designed to create desired conditions or effects at DPs within a major operation or campaign in an order that is most likely to produce the desired effect on opposing COGs. Although simultaneous action on multiple LOOs may be ideal, a lack of resources may force commanders to sequence their actions; alternatively commanders may choose to sequence their actions in order to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. This process assists in thinking through the entire operation or campaign logically in terms of available forces, resources and time, and helps to determine different operational phases.

b. **Phases.** While the phasing construct is a helpful planning tool, phases are not linear nor represent a clear-cut distinction in reality. Conditions in the operational environment may force returning or regressing to earlier phases, and various geographic areas within the theatre may be in different phases at any given time, even within a single city. JFCs and joint forces must be agile in recognising how conditions affect phasing. Similarly, they must be prepared to shift from military to civilian control based on the operational environment.

c. **Counterinsurgency Considerations.** Reaching the end state for COIN requires the conduct of a wide array of operations over a protracted period. Because COIN is often of long duration, it is often useful to arrange COIN in phases. Consequently, the design of COIN operations normally provides for related phases implemented over time. Phasing helps visualise and think through the entire COIN effort and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space and purpose.

D17. **Synergy.** Counterinsurgents integrate and synchronise operations, forces and capabilities in a manner that addresses the core grievances of insurgency, deals with the drivers of conflict, and neutralises insurgents. This includes combining forces and actions to achieve concentration in various domains and the information environment, culminating in achieving the assigned objectives. Synergy in COIN consists of physical and psychological aspects. In the complex COIN environment, it is impossible to accurately
view the contributions of any individual organisation, capability, or the domains and information environment in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be critical to success, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be duplicated.

D18. **Simultaneity and Depth.** Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of military and non-military power against an adversary’s key capabilities and sources of strength. Simultaneity in COIN contributes directly to an insurgency’s erosion and ultimate collapse by addressing core grievances and placing more demands on insurgent military forces and functions than they can successfully address. Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. For COIN, depth applies to time as well as to space. This reflects the fact that most insurgencies protract conflict by design. Because of the inherent close relationships between the levels of operations in COIN, commanders cannot be concerned only with events in their respective echelon but must understand how their actions contribute to the military end state and the overall end state.

D19. **Culmination.** Culmination is that point in an operation when the force can no longer successfully continue its current operation. Sequencing and phasing should be designed to ensure that operations by adversaries culminate well before they can achieve their objective while ensuring that our own operations achieve their objective well before any culmination. The art is to achieve the objective of the operation before reaching the culminating point. Therefore, the operational design should determine ways in which to speed the opponent’s culmination while precluding our own. Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. Culmination during COIN or stability operations may result from the erosion of national will, the decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties. A well-developed assessment methodology is crucial to supporting the commander’s determination of culmination, both for insurgent and friendly actions.

D20. **Anticipating Branches and Sequels.** An essential step in operational design is to anticipate eventualities that may occur in the course of a major operation or campaign and determine alternative LOOs and sequences of action that still achieve the overall objective. It must be recognised that for every action there are a range of possible outcomes that may or may not create the desired conditions or effects. Outcomes that are more favourable than expected may present opportunities that can be exploited. Outcomes that are worse than expected may pose risks that must be mitigated. However, the ability to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks depends firstly on anticipating such situations and secondly on developing contingency options for effectively dealing with them. Commanders must anticipate possible outcomes and ensure that options are provided in their operational planning in order to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances and to allow them to keep the initiative despite the actions of the enemy. This is achieved by developing branches and sequels within the overall operational design based on continuously exposing the operational design to “what if” situations which could possibly occur during or after each phase of the operation or campaign. Many COIN operation plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, plans should be flexible by having branches and sequels. Both branches and sequels are plans associated with the base plan, and all are created using the initial problem frame. When transitioning to a branch or a sequel, counterinsurgents should examine whether reframing the problem is required by the current conditions.
a. **Branches.** Branches are options built into the basic plan. Branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organisation and command relationships, or changing the very nature of COIN itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of insurgent action, the availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or many other potential situations. It is vital to prioritise COIN branch planning efforts with respect to the most likely and most dangerous branch plans.

b. **Sequels.** Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation - victory, defeat or stalemate. In COIN, sequels can focus on different phases or on shifting the overall approach. For example, unanticipated success might allow for a more indirect NATO approach, and defeat might require a more direct NATO approach to shore up HN security forces.

D21. **Operational Reach.** Operational reach is the distance and duration over which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Operational reach may be a factor in COIN if there are limitations set on the number, type or general footprint of forces that can support an HN’s COIN efforts. Operational reach can also be a factor if the joint force faces insurgency when there is no HN.

D22. **Timing and Tempo.** The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. However, the COIN intelligence operations dynamic ultimately determines the tempo that the counterinsurgents can maintain. Good intelligence will allow for successful operations that may in turn result in more useable intelligence. Given actionable, reliable intelligence and proper timing, counterinsurgents can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate ahead of the insurgency’s ability to react.

D23. **Forces and Functions.** COIN should focus on addressing the core grievances and drivers of conflict in addition to defeating an insurgency as a military force. Defeating an insurgency as a military force consists largely of neutralising the insurgent military wing.

D24. **Leverage.** Leverage is gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all domains and the information environment. Leverage can be achieved through asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against insurgent vulnerabilities and the concentration and integration of joint force capabilities. Leverage allows counterinsurgents to impose their will on the insurgency, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative. Leverage can be achieved by focusing Allied joint force strengths against an opponent’s weaknesses at DPs in time and space. For example, NATO COIN efforts may use air assets against insurgent ground assets.

D25. **Balance.** Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the overall counterinsurgent force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. Balance also refers to a proper balance of offence, defence and stability operations.

D26. **Anticipation.** Anticipation is essential to effective planning for and execution of COIN. Counterinsurgents must use intelligence to ascertain the insurgents’ approach and campaign plan, which will assist in anticipating insurgent activities. A shared, common holistic view of the operational environment aids counterinsurgents in anticipating
opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of the population and friendly capabilities, and insurgent and other adversarial capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs, allows COIN to focus efforts on where they can best impact the situation. However, anticipation is not without risk, especially if insurgent deception is effective.
LEXICON

PART I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP     Allied administrative publication
AI      air interdiction
AJP     Allied joint publication
AOO     area of operations
ATP     Allied tactical publication

CAS     close air support
CC      critical capability
CHB     clear, hold, build
CI      counterintelligence
CIMIC   civil-military cooperation
COA     course of action
COG     centre of gravity
COIN    counterinsurgency
CR      critical requirement
CV      critical vulnerability

DDR     disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DP      decisive point

HN      host nation
HUMINT  human intelligence

IED     improvised explosive device
Info Ops information operations
IO      international organisation
ISR     intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

JFC     joint force command
LOC     line of communication
LOO     line of operation

MOE     measure of effectiveness
MSO     maritime security operations

NAC     North Atlantic Council
NGO     non-governmental organisation
NMA     NATO military authority

PRT     provincial reconstruction team
PsyOps  psychological operations

SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SFA     security forces assistance
SO      special operations

Lexicon - 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>troop contributing nation</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees</td>
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**actors**
All parties and stakeholders that are part of the operational environment and either directly or indirectly has a share, takes part, or influences the outcome. (AJP-3.4.4; a proposed new term and definition)

**centre of gravity**
**COG**
Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-6)

**civil-military cooperation**
**CIMIC**
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (AAP-6)

**counterinsurgency**
**COIN**
The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. (AJP-3.4.4; a proposed new term and definition)

**defeat**
To diminish the effectiveness of an individual, group or organisation to the extent that it is either unable or unwilling to continue its activities or at least cannot fulfil their intentions. (STANAG 2287)

**end state**
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

**host nation**
**HN**
A nation which, by agreement:
- receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
- allows materiel and/or NATO organisations to be located on its territory; and/or
- provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6)
human intelligence
HUMINT
A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (AAP-6)

information activities
Actions designed to affect information and/or information systems, performed by any actor. (AJP-3.10)

information operations
Is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capabilities of adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives. (AJP-3.10)

insurgency
The actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. (AJP-3.4.4; a proposed new term and definition)

international organisation
IO
An intergovernmental, regional or global organisation governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterised, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.
Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organisation formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions,32 has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.(AAP 6)

irregular activity
The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. (AJP-3.4.4; a proposed new term and definition)

line of operation
In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. (AAP-6)

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32 The provisions of Additional Protocols I and II of Geneva Conventions on the Law of War of 12 August 1949, neither bind nor apply for the States not party (including Turkey) to these Protocols.
non-governmental organisation
NGO
A private, non-profit, voluntary organisation with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organised at local, national, regional or international level. (ATP 3.2.1.1 RD1, a new proposed term and definition)

Note:
1. A non-governmental organisation does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities.
2. NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given non-governmental organisation.

operational art
The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AAP-6)

reintegration
Process through which former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians receive amnesty, re-enter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace. (ATP 3.2.1.1 RD1 proposed new term and definition)

rules of engagement
ROE
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6)

terrorism
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. (AAP-6)