ADVISING
MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR ADVISING FOREIGN FORCES

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MCRP 3-33.8A
NTTP 3-07.5
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September 2009

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FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.

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PREFACE

1. Purpose
This multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication will assist in advising foreign forces. It serves as a reference to ensure coordinated multi-Service operations for planners and operators preparing for, and conducting, advisor team missions. This MTTP is intended to provide units and personnel that are scheduled to advise foreign forces (FF) with viable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) so that they can successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission. Currently, material regarding advising is found in joint and Service doctrinal treatment of foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), security assistance (SA), and unconventional warfare (UW). Several Services are developing documents that focus on basic survival and common advisor skills, but do not sufficiently cover how an advisor team might function at all levels. This MTTP provides guidance that will help to enhance the activities of some advisor functions and improve inter-Service coordination for this joint mission.

2. Scope
This publication incorporates the positions of organizations within each Service that relate to preparing, controlling, and employing advisors with FF. Information in this MTTP publication incorporates TTP extracted from existing Service doctrine, publications, and directives, as well as joint, Service, and coalition lessons-learned, subject matter expert (SME) input, and other identified best practices. It is designed for use by advisors at all levels, in any region or theater, and provides guidance for tactical forces on conducting advisor team planning and training.

3. Applicability
This MTTP publication applies to all commanders, their staffs, and individuals participating in advising missions with FF.

4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPR) will review this publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

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b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ADVISING
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ADVISING FOREIGN FORCES

Chapter I:  OVERVIEW
Chapter I discusses how advising fits into security assistance / security cooperation and provides definitions of specific terms.

Chapter II:  ORGANIZATION
Chapter II discusses advisor team functional areas and outlines advisor missions.

Chapter III:  ADVISOR PRINCIPLES AND SKILLS
Chapter III discusses the principles of advising and clarifies critical individual and collective skill sets. The chapter also provides detailed guidance on MTTP for performing critical skills.

Chapter IV:  CULTURE AND THE ADVISOR
Chapter IV discusses the impact of culture and provides techniques for understanding and adapting to foreign cultures.

Chapter V:  EQUIPPING
Chapter V discusses advisor specific equipment and logistical concerns.

Chapter VI:  ADVISOR EMPLOYMENT
Chapter VI discusses how to effectively advise in a combat situation to include considerations when advising foreign force units conducting combat operations.

Chapter VII:  WORKING WITH US PARTNER UNITS
Chapter VII discusses the development of good working relationships with coalition and adjacent units.

APPENDICES
The appendices provide details to amplify the TTP discussed throughout the chapters. Detailed checklists and examples of training tasks are provided. Specific topics and products include:
• Advisor task list example.
• Battle handover and site survey checklists.
• Interpreter support.
• Methods for evaluating success.
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Chapter I

OVERVIEW

"Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries."

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007

1. Introduction

a. This MTTP publication is designed to help individuals and units that have been selected to advise foreign forces (FF). The FF term includes all personnel available to a nation for security to include: civil, federal, and military. For example; coast guard, firemen, police, border patrol, gendarmes, and military functions. Advising Foreign Forces (Advising) covers the principles associated with being an advisor and establishes a foundation for understanding the tasks in which an advisor must become proficient. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, service as an advisor may well be the most important military component of the Global War on Terror. Serving as an advisor is both military science and military art. This MTTP publication describes some of both. It is aimed at the battalion team, but is applicable to advising at all levels. Advisors serving in ministries such as defense, interior, and justice will find this MTTP useful until specific instructions for national level service are produced. It is intended to apply in all theaters, but is obviously influenced by the current advisor missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

b. Assisting the foreign forces of a nation, afflicted by insurgency and terrorism, is part of foreign internal defense (FID). JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Foreign Internal Defense, recognizes the role both special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces play in FID operation. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 expresses the major importance of conventional force participation in FID. It has traditionally been seen as a responsibility of SOF and is outlined in FM 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense (June 2008); FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations (Feb 2007); Training Circular 31-71, Special Forces Advisor Techniques; Training Circular 31-73, Special Forces Advisor Guide; and Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. Additional documents used for this publication include the USMC FMFRP 12-15, Small Wars Manual; and NAVMC 3500.59, Advise, Train, and Assist Partner Nation Forces Training and Readiness Manual; and Army Occasional Paper 18, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador; and Occasional Paper 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present. The primary Army SOF units conducting FID operations for training and advisor assistance missions have historically been civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and special forces (SF). The Advising MTTP publication expands upon those techniques and focuses on the principles of advising, which are derived from SOF imperatives, in order to form a common understanding of advisor skills and operations. The advisor mission is also expanding its role by helping build partner capacity for external defense which helps strengthen a
nation’s sovereignty. Moreover, as demand for advisors exceeds SOF resources, the Department of Defense (DOD) has called on conventional forces to meet the additional requirement.

c. As the Secretary of Defense has stated, “The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of special forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.” Advisors are currently being drawn from the total force of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard units. Members of all Services should find this MTTP relevant as they prepare for what is likely to be both the most important and the most challenging mission they have ever accepted.

d. Although written by advisors to increase advisor effectiveness, this publication does not cover all the information needed to be an effective advisor. Many lessons and TTP will be driven by the peculiarities of the area of operations (AO) and the personalities of the FF unit’s leadership. Effective advisor teams must adapt to the demands of the specific situation in which they find themselves. The best way to create adaptive teams that can teach, coach, and advise—and if authorized, fight and win—is to study the lessons of past advisors, replicate their achievements, and not repeat their mistakes.

e. This MTTP focuses on advisor-specific skills that will need to be developed during the training process. The publication is not designed to review Service training doctrine and does not cover combat, survival, or Service-specific skills that may be critical to the advisor mission.

2. Context

a. To help understand the advisor role, one needs to understand the broader context of US national foreign policy in which an advisor operates. The advisor mission is critical to the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and will continue to be one of the primary tools for building partnership capacity with other nations.

(1) The NSS of 2006 envisions “tailoring assistance and training of military forces to support civilian control of the military and military respect for human rights in a democratic society.” Further, the NSS recognizes that “The world has found through bitter experience that success often depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a functioning justice and penal system. This governance capacity is critical to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which provide long-term stability and prosperity.”

(2) To achieve the goals identified in the NSS, the QDR 2006 directs that joint ground forces “possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.”

(a) The QDR further outlines a requirement for conventional forces “to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare (IW); and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”

(b) The QDR’s vision is that conventional forces will continue to take on more of the train-and-advice tasks performed by today’s SOF. Therefore conventional forces must also understand foreign cultures and societies.
(c) The QDR recommends that Congress provide greater flexibility for the US Government to partner directly with nations fighting terrorists, based on recent operational experience. For some nations, this begins with training, equipping, and advising their forces to generate stability and security within their own borders. For others, it may entail providing assistance with logistics support, equipment, training, and transport to allow them to participate as members of coalitions with the US or its allies in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations around the globe.

(3) Other directives such as the National Security Presidential Directive-41 (NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13) recognize that the US will have to expand its scope beyond traditional military to military relationships. HSPD-13 specifically relates to working closely with other governments and international and regional organizations to enhance the maritime security capabilities of other key nations by:

(a) Offering assistance, training, and consultation with maritime and port security.

(b) Coordinating and prioritizing assistance and liaison within maritime security regions.

(c) Allocating economic assistance to developing nations for maritime security to enhance security and prosperity.

b. Advising FF is part of a larger program of US assistance to other nations. The assistance may be bilateral between the US and a foreign nation, part of an internationally sponsored effort, or the US may use multiple methods to assist other nations in maintaining or achieving stability. The keys to success at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels require advisors to coordinate with related efforts in a given operational area to include working with US civilian interagency partners, multinational allies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

c. Advising FF is required across the spectrum of conflict. Advising may be required under a range of conditions from peace and relative security to insurgency and/or major combat operations with any combinations in between. The US has provided advisors to different types of FF for many years, particularly as part of antinarcotics and antiterrorism efforts. While recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed US advisors into a counterinsurgency (COIN) combat environment, they should not be seen as the only conditions for employing advisors.

3. Definitions

a. Numerous security assistance mission areas have evolved over time. Each mission has a specific purpose, manpower requirement, and limitations. The advisor has to be familiar with the various security missions to know when and how each may apply to the advisor mission.

(1) Security Cooperation (SC) — “All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense
and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation” (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1). DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, further states Security Cooperation as “activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific US security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.” SC activities are not allowed to duplicate security assistance (SA) programs. While many SC activities involve training, the training has to be beneficial to improving the capability of the US forces involved. Training exercises that pair US units with foreign units and officer exchanges on a one for one basis are common SC activities.

(2) Security Cooperation Activity — “Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater campaign plan.” (JP 3-0)

(3) Security Cooperation (SC) Planning — “The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the Department of Defense’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy.” (JP 5-0) Each theater is required to write a theater campaign plan which is supposed to link and coordinate all DOD activity within the theater with national and theater strategic and operational objectives. Every training or advising mission should be incorporated into the theater campaign plan and advisors should know their role in supporting it.

(4) Security Assistance (SA) — “A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.” (JP 3.07.1) The Department of State supervises the overall SA program while the DOD administers the military portion of SA. By law, advisors may not be placed in a combat environment under a SA program. Normally during peacetime, military training or advising is sold to another nation as a service.

(5) Security Assistance Organization (SAO) — “All DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA management functions. It includes military assistance advisor groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform SA functions.” (JP 3-07.1) The size of these organizations is regulated by the Department of State. Regardless of the size or name, their purpose is the same. SAO members are prohibited from training or
advising. They do however manage the units brought into a country to achieve those missions.

(6) Foreign Internal Defense (FID) — “The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” (JP 3-05) The focus of all US FID efforts is to support a foreign nation’s program of internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is defined as “The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society” (JP 1-02). IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat (FM 3-05.202).

(7) Mobile Training Team (MTT) — “A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests.” (JP 1-02) Advisors may be part of an MTT.

(8) Security Force Assistance (SFA) — "Security Force Assistance is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." (FM 3-07) Unified action comprises joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community activity in cooperative effort with NGOs, international organizations, and private companies to ensure and support unity of effort in SFA. SFA was developed to accomplish the organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA) tasks and is a sister discipline of FID which also utilizes the tasks expressed in OTERA to FF. FID supports, within the greater milieu of total nation assistance (NA), the foreign nation’s IDAD strategy. FID focuses mainly on incipient to well developed internal threats and includes comprehensive support and advisory assistance by DOD, other government agencies (OGAs), and other partners in sectors other than FF support. However, current FID doctrine at the joint and Service levels recognizes that there is always an ancillary benefit to the FF’s ability to combat an external threat and habitually does so with cross-border insurgencies that may include regular (and often elite) forces from the nation sheltering the insurgents. FID differs from SFA in that in the preponderance of FID operations, the US ambassador is the supported commander, while the preponderance of SFA missions is executed under the authority of a JFC. SFA deals with internal and external threats, as they are often connected, and the same foreign forces deal with both types of threats.

NOTE: The SFA term and definition are not defined in joint doctrine at this time and are not accepted USMC terminology.
4. Advisors

"An advisor in combat influences his ally by force of personal example. You coach, you teach, and you accompany in action. Liaison with friendly forces becomes a big role, and you ensure independent ground-truth reporting to both your counterpart and your own chain. Finally, an advisor provides the connection and expertise to bring to bear fires, service support, and other combat multipliers. All accolades go to the leader you support. That, at least, is the idea."

—Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, US Army

a. In the context of this MTTP publication, the terms advisor and advisor team are defined as an individual or team tasked to teach, coach, and advise FF in order to develop their professional skills. Additionally, teaching, coaching, advising, training, and educating are defined as follows:

- **Teaching** means to provide instruction and/or education to FF to develop skills or knowledge necessary to do a particular job.

- **Coaching** is to assist a counterpart to reach the next level of knowledge or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The distinctive feature is that the recipient assumes more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as required.

- **Advising** means to provide the advisor’s counterparts with expert opinions, advice, or counsel to assist them in making a decision based on applying knowledge and through a mutually developed bond of trust. The distinctive feature is that the recipient is responsible for making the decision while the advisor provides only advice.

- **Training** is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks or the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.

- **Educating** consists of teaching concepts and knowledge that can be applied over a broad range of applications. The advisor has to be ready to teach and coach concepts and knowledge as necessary.

b. The size of the advisor team and the role that the team plays (teaching, coaching, and advising) will vary depending on the advisor’s mission and the capabilities of the FF. The role (more so than the size) of an advisor team is in every case defined by the authority (i.e., law) under which that team deploys. Teams deployed under Title 10 authorities have different roles depending on the section of Title 10 stipulated for the deployment. Teams deploying under US Code Title 10, 166a may teach. The same team deploying under US Code Title 10, 168 may not. Teams deploying under one of the Title 22 authorities often have some very restrictive limits placed on the role they can play (i.e., combat exclusion). See table 1 for examples. Advisors should determine the authority they are deploying under to ensure they can accomplish their mission effectively. The advisor team’s role will change over time as the FF progresses in skill development. While the advisor’s primary purpose is to teach, coach, and advise FF to be self-sufficient, the advisor must also be aware that when the US military assigns personnel to be advisors, the advisors do more than provide
advice. Normally, the advisor serves multiple purposes. Figure 1 identifies the three most common roles that a US advisor faces: advising, providing support, and conducting liaison. Each role is a mission by itself. Situation and lack of personnel may require advisors to do them all.

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<tr>
<td>Joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries).</td>
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<td>Military education and training of military and related civilian personnel from foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).</td>
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| **Title 10, 168:** Military-to-military contacts and comparable activities (Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Ch 6, Par 168) |
| **Authority** | **Restrictions** |
| Exchanges of civilian or military personnel between the Department of Defense and defense ministries of foreign governments. | An activity may not be conducted under this section with a foreign country unless the Secretary of State approves the conduct of such activity in that foreign country. |
| Exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of foreign armed forces. | Funds may not be used under this section for the provision of defense articles or defense services to any country or for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. |

| **Title 22, Ch 39:** Foreign military sales authorizations (Title 22, Ch 39, SubCh II) |
| **Authority** | **Restrictions** |
| Sale of military equipment and required equipment training to foreign nations. | Personnel performing defense services sold under this chapter may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage United States personnel in combat activities, outside the United States in connection with the performance of those defense services. |

- **Other Title 22 chapters** concerning specific areas (e.g., Ch 82 Afghanistan Freedom Support) each have their own authorities and restrictions which need to be understood by the advisor operating under that specific chapter.
Figure 1. Common Advisor Roles

(1) Advising. The primary advising role can be broken down into three tasks: teach, coach, and advise. Chapter III discusses specific skills for advisor proficiency.

(2) Supporting. In a support role the advisor/advisor team may be expected to provide actual capabilities to the FF. They will require additional personnel and equipment to accomplish the mission. Depending upon available resources, only a portion of the FF support needs will likely be met. Rarely will resources be available to meet all the support needs so advisors must build a plan to maximize available resources and mitigate shortfalls. Examples of common support tasks are:

(a) Fires and Fire Support Coordination – The FF may not have internal fire support and may not be able to use coalition fires without the appropriate communication package or skills. When given appropriate authority, advisors can provide access to these fires and coordinate their effective use.

(b) Logistics – FF may need to use coalition aircraft, vehicles, equipment, or resupply that is beyond their capability or capacity. The advisor team can be the link to provide assets. However, advisors must refrain from becoming the logistics planners and coordinators for their FF counterparts. The advisor’s effectiveness decreases when forced into this role.

(c) Communications – The advisor may have communications equipment that the FF does not have and his ability to communicate with the FF increases the effectiveness of the unit. However, over reliance on advisors for communications
support can also turn them into glorified radio operators if not properly augmented.

(d) Close Air Support (CAS) – The FF may not have the capability to provide or direct CAS. If the advising team is tasked to fill this role it must be trained or augmented to perform the task.

(e) Psychological Operations (PSYOP) – The FF supported unit may not have broadcast platforms or printing capability. When operating under appropriate authority, advisors may link FF units with US assets.

(3) Liaising. The advisor may be required to serve as a liaison officer (LNO). The advisor team should always have the ability to talk with the country team, relevant US government agencies, or coalition forces to help resolve conflict. However, if advisors become a command and control (C2) channel, their focus shifts to getting their FF counterparts to comply with coalition demands rather than developing a self-sufficient FF unit. This conflict may directly counter the advisor mission and result in a critical loss of rapport with the FF.

(a) LNOs are employed between higher, lower, and adjacent organizations. They represent the sending organization’s capabilities, plans, concerns, and normally remain at the receiving organization’s headquarters. The LNO represents the sending commander and he must defend the commander’s decisions. The LNO must understand, interpret, and convey the commander’s vision, intent, mission, concept of operations, and guidance.

(b) LNOs, whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions. The extent to which these functions are performed depends on the mission and charter established by the sending LNO’s commander. A successful LNO performs four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist.

• Monitor. The LNO monitors the operations of both the FF and the sending organization and understands how each affects the other. At a minimum, the LNO must know the current situation and planned operations, understand pertinent staff issues, and be sensitive to the desires of both commanders. Additionally, to lend insight to the sending commander, the LNO monitors the operating styles of the FF commanders and their staffs. These observations help the LNO maintain a smooth working relationship between the sending organization and the FF headquarters. The LNO must possess the training and experience needed to understand the FF staff process. The LNO must routinely assess where he needs to be during the daily operations cycle in order to stay abreast of the current situation and keep the sending organization’s headquarters fully informed.

• Coordinate. The LNO helps synchronize and coordinate current operations and future plans between the sending organization and the FF organization. The LNO does this by coordinating with other LNOs, with members of the receiving unit staff, and with the sending command. The LNO should routinely meet with staff officers and commanders in the FF headquarters and know how to contact them readily. The LNO should gather and send copies of FF standard operating procedures (SOPs),
organization charts, and report formats to the sending command and provide sending command SOPs, organization charts, and intelligence products to the FF unit, in accordance with foreign disclosure laws.

- **Advise.** The LNO is the FF’s expert on the sending organization’s capabilities and limitations. (Note: In the FF advisor role, the advisor focuses on the receiving unit, whereas, the LNO advises on the sending organization.) LNOs advise the FF commander and staff on the optimum employment of the sending organization’s capabilities. LNOs must be available to answer, or quickly find answers to questions posed by the FF staff and other units. The LNO also advises the sending commander on any FF headquarters issues. LNOs must remember they only have authority to make decisions in areas authorized by the sending commander. LNOs must exercise caution to ensure that they do not obligate the sending organization to taskings beyond the specified charter unless the taskings have been forwarded and approved through normal C2 channels.

- **Assist.** LNOs assist on two levels. First, they must act as the conduit between the parent command and the FF. Second, by participating in the FF daily operations cycle (the daily briefing/meeting sequence, sometimes referred to as the “battle rhythm”), the LNO can answer questions from various groups (e.g., the joint targeting coordination board, joint planning group, command group) to ensure that those groups make informed decisions. LNOs also facilitate the submission of required reports between US units and the FF.

(c) The LNO remains in the chain of command of the sending organization and are not filling a staff role within the FF headquarters. FF staff positions should be filled by advisors or full-time planners.

(d) LNOs are not a replacement for proper staff coordination. As an example, if the coalition wants to ensure that coordinating instructions in a recently released order are clearly understood by a particular organization, then the coalition should communicate directly with the operations officer or equivalent staff principal of that unit, rather than use the LNO as a middle-man to relay the expectations and interpretations of the two staffs. The fact that LNOs have relayed information to their respective organizations does not relieve the FF and sending organization staff of their responsibility to promulgate the same information via normal C2 means. Established C2 procedures (such as fragmentary orders [FRAGO], warning orders, and alert orders) are the proper method for communicating specific orders and taskings.

c. Advisors are often assigned to do all three roles with little consideration for the added demands on the advisor team. Adding additional roles without additional resources may be necessary but it is not without cost. Knowing the strengths and weaknesses of each advisor, a commander should make a conscious decision when adding tasks to ensure the advisors are prepared to mitigate any risks.

d. Advisors will not have success every day. Many things could affect how the FF unit performs. The goal for the FF unit is continual improvement. Figure 2 illustrates how certain factors can alter the success path.
Figure 2. Advisor Success

e. An additional consideration for FF improvement is mitigating the affects of advisor team changeover. If newly arriving advisor teams start at the same basic level, the FF unit will stagnate. There will be a drop in performance as each new advisor team establishes itself. Therefore, an effective assessment of the FF unit’s level of proficiency is required to ensure improvement will be maintained. The advisor leadership may expect to see continuous steady improvement but adjustments will need to be made based on actual execution. The drop in FF unit performance, caused by a change of advisor teams, can also be mitigated by only rotating a portion of the advisor team.
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Chapter II

ORGANIZATION

Advisors must learn to master three conflicting roles which involve different responsibilities and loyalties. Wearing a US hat, they are a member of the US military with a well-defined chain of command and familiar responsibilities. Within this organization, they receive and execute the orders of superiors (which may not always be in accordance with the orders the [FF] counterpart receives from his superiors). They also supervise subordinate advisors. Among other duties, he must act unobtrusively but nonetheless positively as an “inspector general” observing, evaluating, and reporting on the performance of his counterpart and the unit to which he is attached.

Next, the military advisor wears the shoulder insignia of the unit he advises, figuratively and often (as in Vietnam) literally. Living, eating, and working with officers and men of his host unit, the advisor soon regards himself as one of them. The sharing of common hardships and dangers forges a potent emotional bond familiar to fighting men of any era or culture. The success and good name of his unit become matters of prime and personal importance to the advisor.

Finally, the advisor is interpreter and communicator between his foreign counterpart and his US superiors. He must help resolve the myriad of problems, misunderstandings and suspicions which arise when men of starkly different cultures approach the supremely difficult task of waging war together. As has been demonstrated often in Vietnam, the American advisor who has quick and easy access to his foreign counterpart can sometimes be the best possible means of communicating with him. If an advisor is to be effective, he must gain his counterpart’s trust and confidence. But this is only prelude to the major objective: inspiring his counterpart to effective action. In pursuing this goal, constantly, relentlessly, and forcefully—yet patiently, persuasively, and diplomatically—the advisor must recognize conditions which can benefit or handicap him.

—COL Bryce F. Denno, Advisor and Counterpart, 1965

1. Understanding Command

a. Advisor teams operating within the boundaries of a foreign nation will face interagency working relationships, multiple chains of command, and both governmental and NGOs. The myriad of inputs will add to the confusion of roles and authorities. To reduce the friction, advisor teams are task-organized to support coordination with higher, adjacent, and subordinate organizations. See figure 3 for an example of advisor command relationships.
b. Advisor teams are assigned a wide variety of training and advisor missions with FF. These missions occur at varying levels and with various types of forces. For example, within the same AO, advisors may work with an infantry battalion, a civil air patrol unit, and a local police station. Subsequently, the chain of command can become more complex. A thorough mission analysis, as contained in the military decision-making process (MDMP), and an understanding of task and purpose will lay the groundwork for a successful advisor team.

2. Task Organization

a. Each team is different. Team leaders need to conduct an initial assessment of their team and then task organize the group in accordance with mission requirements, personality, and capabilities. The unit leader has to allocate resources in order to accomplish the mission most effectively. To match personnel properly (military or civilian) to duty positions within the advisor team, leaders should first consider the internal and external functions that the advisor team must perform. The size of the advisor team will be determined by analyzing the mission and the operational environment. For instance, if FF medical services in the AO are considered sufficient there may not be a team member dedicated to medical functions. In this example another team member must assume the medical functions as a secondary task. The advisor leader must task organize to ensure all functional areas are covered regardless of team size. Functions are broken down into two functional areas, internal and external.

   (1) Internal functions directly support the advisor team. Some examples of internal functions that individuals or units may perform are: force protection; medical
support; administrative support; and logistics support to include supply, maintenance, and communications support.

(2) External functions pertain to the advisor team’s mission as it relates to the FF. Individuals or units build FF capacity through the performance of these functions. These functions may be narrow in scope or apply across the warfighting areas. A mobile training team (MTT) focused on combat service support would have a singular external function to train and advise FF, while a military transition team (MiTT) performs multiple external functions advising and training FF across the warfighting areas.

b. Advisor team billets associated with the above functions have corresponding internal and external responsibilities. Leaders should assign responsibilities to individuals based upon their capabilities, unique talents, and traits. Some people are better suited temperamentally to deal with the complex, and often frustrating, socio-cultural and human relationship issues characteristic of external functions, while others may have skills and abilities best focused internally to support the advisor team. It is imperative that leaders recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals within the advisor team and assign responsibilities accordingly.

3. Advisor Team Functions

a. Tables 2 through 11 provide guidance on the internal and external functions associated with common advisor team billets. They illustrate a way to divide responsibilities within an advisor team, but they are not all inclusive or appropriate in all situations. The central message is that each advisor team must develop their own SOP to perform required functions based on the mission and resources available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Team Leader</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is responsible for conducting assessments of FF capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is responsible for all team operations and actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Leads the team during military decision-making process (MDMP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Approves all outgoing reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provides input for and submits FF training and readiness reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Ensures the establishment of requisition and tracking systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is responsible for overall team force protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Ensures operations are conducted in a safe manner; conducts operational risk management (ORM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is accountable for team equipment.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3. Assistant Team Leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takes command of the team in the absence of the team leader.</td>
<td>Represents the team in the absence of the team leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is responsible for the training, combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare of the team.</td>
<td>Is prepared to organize, train, assist, advise or direct FF as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is responsible for staff coordination of actions prior to reaching the team leader.</td>
<td>Provides input for FF training and readiness assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the budgeting assistance officer.</td>
<td>Reviews periods of instruction prior to execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writes outgoing reports and messages.</td>
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</table>

### Table 4. Senior Enlisted Advisor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assists in the command and control of the team.</td>
<td>Trains and advises FF on roles and responsibilities of enlisted personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leads enlisted team members in daily routine, ensuring that all mission requirements take place, enabling the team’s officers to focus their effort as liaisons to higher and adjacent headquarters or in administrative details as required.</td>
<td>Instills the importance of the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps into FF through counseling and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assists the assistant team leader in writing and reviewing required reports.</td>
<td>Trains and advises FF on the basic tenets of troop welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensures all enlisted team members are capable of training and advising FF in TTP.</td>
<td>Provides input on the FF training and readiness assessment with regard to enlisted forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensures uniform standards are met.</td>
<td>Assists FF senior NCO to enforce commander’s intent, maintain discipline, and conduct pre-combat checks (PCC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5. Personnel Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensures team members are administratively ready to deploy (wills, powers of attorney, insurance, record of emergency data, emergency notifications, etc.).</td>
<td>Trains FF on personnel support of operations to include awards and military pay issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepares personnel accountability, morning reports.</td>
<td>Assists FF processing personnel in support of operations (such as personnel replacement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains record book maintenance.</td>
<td>Assists FF establish personnel tracking and military pay systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handles promotions, reenlistments, pay issues, and awards.</td>
<td>Provides training and readiness assessments as to FF administrative and personnel readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitors family readiness.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does mail handling.</td>
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**Table 6. Intelligence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is the principal advisor to the team leader for Intelligence (S2).</td>
<td>▪ Trains FF S2 section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provides routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, and recent activity).</td>
<td>▪ Trains and advises FF on processing tactical information into predictive analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is responsible for maintaining cultural calendar and advising of key dates and significant activities.</td>
<td>▪ Trains FF in SSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Trains team in sensitive site exploitation (SSE).</td>
<td>▪ Supports intelligence for FF combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Conducts intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) in support of operations.</td>
<td>▪ Supports FF intelligence briefings to FF commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Prepares the intelligence collection plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Assists the team in collecting information for required reports during missions; this includes passive collection, assisting in antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) assessments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provides input for training assessments.</td>
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</table>

**Table 7. Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is the principal advisor to team leader for all operations.</td>
<td>▪ Trains and advises FF on planning and executing operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Establishes C2 presence for all operations.</td>
<td>▪ Trains FF Operations (S3), (current and future operations, battle tracking, reporting).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Reviews all tactical and operational reports to higher headquarters.</td>
<td>▪ Assists FF S3 in MDMP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provides input for and submits training assessments.</td>
<td>▪ Advises FF S3 in base defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is the budgeting assistance officer.</td>
<td>▪ Advises FF S3 in establishing traffic control points (TCP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Writes all outgoing reports and messages.</td>
<td>▪ Trains FF on detainee operations to include handling, processing, and tactical questioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Reviews periods of instruction prior to execution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is the principal instructor for fires effects and considerations (nonlethal fires, civil-military operations, PSYOP, information operations [IO], CAS, and fires).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8. Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assists in the training, combat efficiency, discipline, administration, and welfare of the team.</td>
<td>Prepares to organize, train, assist, advise, or direct indigenous FF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assists the team leader in the development of a training plan for the team to include a training schedule.</td>
<td>Is responsible for the development of FF leaders in the areas of tactical planning, decision making, and execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manages the execution of the team’s training plan based on guidance and future mission.</td>
<td>Conducts tactical training and employment of forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensures that all team members are capable of training, advising, assisting, and directing foreign counterparts in required TTP.</td>
<td>Is responsible for advising FF on mission-essential task list (METL) development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the primary instructor for hand-to-hand combat TTP.</td>
<td>Trains FF in civil and military skills as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the training officer in charge (OIC) for maintaining weekly training and operations calendar.</td>
<td>Trains FF in hand-to-hand combat TTP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides input for training assessments.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9. Logistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the principal advisor to team leader for Logistics (S4).</td>
<td>Is the principal advisor to FF for logistical support of operations (S4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes logistics support requests for operations.</td>
<td>Advises and trains FF on establishing logistics systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains equipment accountability; conducts periodic inventories of team equipment.</td>
<td>Oversees FF training in supply and logistics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the field ordering officer (FOO) for funds.</td>
<td>Oversees FF maintenance training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manages contracts.</td>
<td>Assists FF on contract management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversees maintenance on organic equipment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides input for training assessments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains accountability and welfare of interpreters.</td>
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</table>
### Table 10. Medical

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<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provides input for training assessments.</td>
<td>▪ Trains FF on rapid trauma assessment and trauma medical training, field sanitation, preventive medicine, and food preparation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Advises on medical capabilities of nearby assets.</td>
<td>▪ Stabilizes patients and prepares for MEDEVAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Stabilizes patients and prepares for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).</td>
<td>▪ Advises FF on maintaining class VIII supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Maintains class VIII supply.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is the principal instructor for self-buddy aid, combat lifesavers course.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Assists in setting up a fully operational aid station.</td>
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### Table 11. Communications

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<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Provides input for training assessments.</td>
<td>▪ Trains FF on communications planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Advises on radios and communications capabilities of nearby assets.</td>
<td>▪ Is the principal instructor to the FF for communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Is the communications security custodian; blue force tracker (BFT), and counter radio controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare (CREW) point of contact (POC).</td>
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Chapter III

ADVISOR PRINCIPLES AND SKILLS

“Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them sensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possible, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.”

—T.E. Lawrence

1. Principles of Advising

a. The principles below come from a collection of many experiences and tough lessons learned by advisors. These principles of advising complement SOF and air advisor imperatives which are shown in table 12.

b. Other imperatives include understanding the operational environment, providing effective leadership, total force integration (active duty, reserve, US government civilians), building legitimacy, managing information, sustaining the effort, ensuring unity of effort and unity of purpose.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12. Imperatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOF Imperatives</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize political implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate interagency activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage the threat discriminately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider long-term effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure legitimacy and credibility of special operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate and control psychological effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apply capabilities indirectly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop multiple options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure long-term sustainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide sufficient intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance security and synchronization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) By, With, and Through. Advisors will only succeed “by, with, and through” the success of their FF counterpart. The ultimate goal of advisors is to develop FF that the local population see as responsible and capable of securing their safety. This legitimacy with the local population is the corner stone of stability and an effective
advisor effort incorporates a high degree of FF involvement in operations. Advisors at all levels must focus on building FF legitimacy as they consider the impact of operations on popular perception.

(2) **Empathy Leads to Understanding.** A US advisor described his tour as a MiTT chief with an Iraqi infantry battalion as a “year long course in human empathy.” Empathy can be defined as identification with and understanding of another’s situation, feelings, and motives. Cross cultural empathy is tough to accomplish and harder to explain, but understanding is key to the success of an advisor mission. Truly understanding other human beings and their motivations allows for the development of honest relationships, which is a critical factor of success. In most cultures, the place to begin understanding another person’s feelings and experiences is by understanding the other’s narrative. The narrative is a collective group’s identity as an interpretation of both ancient history and recent collective experiences. Delving into the narrative, understanding the context, and how it affects people is the beginning of empathy.

(3) **Success Is Built Upon Personal Relationships.** Empathy is not enough. In order to change attitudes or values, the advisor must establish a relationship with those whom they are tasked to advise. No amount of resources or firepower can compensate for a lack of relationship between advisor and FF counterpart. It must be honest, genuine, and heartfelt. Mutual respect, trust, and understanding are the keys to success. Both parties rely on each other for mission accomplishment and even survival. The relationship is likely to be tested on numerous occasions but a solid relationship built on mutual trust can survive and promote mission success. Furthermore, the advisor must learn to pick his battles. Painstakingly built camaraderie and rapport can vanish in an instant if one does not prioritize and define the boundaries in the FF relationship.

(4) **Advisors Are Not "Them".** Once advisors have formed a hard-earned relationship with their counterparts, they must constantly remind themselves that they are not part of the FF unit. Living and fighting with FF allows for the development of true bonds, empathy, and trust. These are desired results, but there is a price to pay. Advisors must realize that US units may not understand the advisor mission, roles, or responsibilities. The advisors are often alone, navigating between two military systems and two cultures, never quite fitting in with either one.

(5) **You Will Never Win…Nor Should You.** One of the hardest things for US leaders to understand is what success looks like. Advising is the decisive military component of building partner capacity (BPC) and COIN. In BPC and COIN, there are few if any noticeable victories. Progress tends to occur at a glacial pace and cannot usually be tracked on a day-to-day basis. The advisor attaining a tactical objective does not achieve success; success is achieved by the FF achieving the objective. Conversely, failure belongs to the advisor. In a more immediate sense, advisors will likely never please their own Service with regard to the forces they are advising, and they will never fully satisfy the demands of the FF unit. Advisors are figuratively and literally caught in the middle. Advising is the art of striving to make a win-win situation for all parties. Thus, the advisor and FF relationship is like the offensive line and quarterback on a football team: The advisor removes the
obstacles in the way of the FF and takes the blame when the quarterback gets sacked. Only a FF plan will succeed—and it will only succeed if it is their plan.

(6) **Advisors Are Not Commanders.** Advisors are responsible for the C2 of their own small team of US advisors but they do not command or lead FF. Advisors provide expert advice and access for FF to coalition assets.

(7) **Advisors Are Honest Brokers.** Advisors are advocates for the FF with conventional coalition forces. They transparently access capabilities and reveal limitations of FF units to the coalition forces. They also provide the FF with access to coalition assets e.g., CAS and MEDEVAC.

(8) **Living With Shades of Gray.** Advisors should understand that all situations will not be black and white. They are caught between two cultures, systems, and narratives. They must live in the proverbial gray area while maintaining legal, moral and ethical standards. Advisors will likely find themselves isolated with great autonomy and no supervision. Under these conditions, advisors will face moral and ethical dilemmas on a daily basis. Advisors will have to grow mentally to be comfortable in this environment. They will lose sleep at night and question their actions and those of the FF. Honest assessment should be encouraged. Thus, the advisor mission calls for leaders of enormous character, moral courage, and sharp intellect.

(9) **Talent Is Everything, But Understand Rank.** Military forces around the world approach rank and prestige in completely different ways. In some cultures rank equals experience, nobility, education, or familial ties. Often many militaries have rewarded loyalty with promotions, resulting in rank-heavy armies. What is common among all militaries, however, is the recognition of talent. The FF paradox occurs when recognized talent takes a back seat to rank. While advisors will likely advise counterparts more senior in rank, they must understand that the ways around rank are relationships and talent.

(10) **Make Do.** Advisors will never have everything they need to succeed, however; their creativity will make up the difference between success and failure.
2. Individual Advisor Skills

“We are still using the age-old approach to our newly acquired problem, and professional competence and military know-how are considered as the dominating factors in selecting advisors. From a strictly military viewpoint, this is a correct determination.

On the other hand, empathy on the part of advisors has seldom been formally encouraged as a need-to-have personality factor. Advisors who possess both empathy and knowledge are rare, indeed, but possessing military knowledge alone is not sufficient.”

—MAJ Irving C. Hudlin, “Advising the Advisor” Military Review, November 1965

a. Advisors need to possess a variety of individual skills in order to properly perform their assigned mission. Therefore, advisors should initially be selected based on subject matter expertise. However, tactical proficiency does not necessarily equate to proficiency as an advisor. Modern-day military advisors must be able to both teach and advise FF. In order to do this, they must be knowledgeable and proficient in TTP and have the skill to effectively impart knowledge. Beyond this, they have to operate effectively within cultural settings that can be very different in behavior and language from their own. They may also be able to advise the FF in the areas of intelligence, communications, operations, and logistics. Some advisors may be required to call in US supporting arms (e.g., artillery, air support, or coordinate both air and ground casualty evacuation). Finally, advisors should be proficient in basic combat skills, advisor skills, and situation specific skills. Figure 4 illustrates these subsets of individual skills.

Figure 4. Individual Advisor Skills

(1) Subject Matter Expert (SME) Skills. SME skills are defined as those skills learned through experience, education, or training. Selecting someone that does not have the correct subject matter expertise does not automatically result in mission failure, but it puts that individual advisor at a severe disadvantage.

(2) Combat Skills. Common skills (e.g., land navigation, radio operation), warrior skills (e.g., weapons proficiency, call for fire procedures), and survival skills (e.g., combat lifesaving) are often required by advisors. Combat skills should be refreshed
during pre-deployment training. These skills are critical to an advisor due to the isolated and independent nature of the mission.

(3) Advisor Skills. Advisor-specific skills fall into two sub categories: enabling skills and developing skills.

(a) Enabling skills include understanding human nature and communicating across cultures, building rapport, influencing, and negotiating. Successfully employing these enabling skills will set the conditions for advisors to move forward with their mission.

(b) Developing skills are the main advisor tasks of teaching, coaching, and advising. Advisors use these skills to develop the capabilities of the FF.

(4) Situation-specific Skills. These skills are determined based on the operational environment and the specific mission and include cultural understanding and language.

b. SME and combat skills are covered in depth throughout Service doctrine and will not be expanded upon in this MTTP publication.

3. Understanding Human Behavior

a. In order to influence future human behavior, one needs to understand the factors that motivate people to act. Knowing what a person is likely to do, and why, greatly increases the probability that advisors can modify or influence their counterparts behavior. The military primarily focuses on cultural differences to try and explain why people behave in a manner that seems unusual in the west. It is assumed that advisors understand the common points of human behavior as well as variations not directly tied to group culture. However, advisors need to remember that behavior is driven by three principal factors: needs, culture, and personality. While human behavior varies around the world in relation to time and culture, certain aspects are believed to be constant over long periods of time and across very different cultural contexts. See figure 5.
Figure 5. Human Behavior

(1) Needs. Despite obvious differences in culture and language, people are invariably people. They have common needs, beliefs, and values. People generally respond to fear and motivation for similar reasons. See figure 6.

(a) One theory that supports the concept that people are similar is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory which expresses common motivating factors amongst all people. This theory emphasizes that humans have certain needs which are unchanging and genetic in origin. These needs are the same in all cultures and are both physical and mental. These needs are hierarchal, meaning that some needs are more basic or more powerful than others and as these needs are satisfied, other higher needs emerge.
(b) Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is represented as a pyramid with the more basic needs at the bottom. The basic needs of an individual must be met first and are essential for life and health. The higher needs only become important when the lower needs have been satisfied. Once an individual has moved upwards to the next level, the needs in the lower level will no longer be prioritized. However, if a lower set of needs is no longer being met, the individual will temporarily re-prioritize those needs by focusing attention on the unfulfilled needs. The needs are described as:

- **Physiological Needs.** Physiological needs of the organism take first precedence. These consist mainly of: eating, drinking, sleeping, and shelter. If some needs are not fulfilled, a human's physiological needs take the highest priority. Physiological needs can control thoughts and behaviors, and can cause people to feel sickness, pain, and discomfort.
- **Safety Needs.** When physiological needs are met, the need for safety will emerge. When one stage is fulfilled, a person naturally moves to the next. These include: personal, and family, security from violence, security against unemployment, health and well-being, safety against accidents/illness.
- **Social Needs/Love/Belonging.** After physiological and safety needs are fulfilled, the third layer of human needs is social. This psychological aspect involves emotionally-based relationships in general, such as: friendship, intimacy, and having a supportive and communicative family. Humans need to feel a sense of belonging and acceptance, whether it comes from a large social group (such as clubs, work culture, religious groups, professional organizations, sports teams, gangs) or small social connections (family
members, intimate partners, mentors, close colleagues, confidants). They need to love and be loved by others. In the absence of these elements, many people become susceptible to loneliness, social anxiety, and depression. This need for belonging can often overcome the physiological and security needs, depending on the strength of the peer pressure (e.g., an anorexic ignores the need to eat and the security of health for a feeling of belonging).

- Esteem Needs. All humans have a need to be respected, to have self-esteem, self-respect, and to respect others. People have a need for recognition in an activity or activities that give the person a sense of contribution. Imbalances at this level can result in low self-esteem. People with low esteem often seek respect from others. It may be noted, however, that many people with low self-esteem will not be able to improve their view of themselves simply by receiving fame, respect, and glory externally, but must first accept themselves internally.

- Self-actualization. Self-actualization falls into the psychological requirements level on Maslow’s pyramid. This is the instinctual need of humans to make the most of their abilities and to strive to be the best they can. They embrace the facts and realities of the world (including themselves) rather than denying or avoiding them. They are spontaneous in their ideas and actions. They are creative. They are interested in solving problems; this often includes the problems of others. Solving these problems is often a key focus in their lives. They feel closeness to other people, and generally appreciate life. They have a system of morality that is fully internalized and independent of external authority. They have discernment and are able to view all things in an objective manner. In short, self-actualization is reaching one’s fullest potential. The advisor wants to seek out these people and win them over.

(2) Culture. Culture reflects the beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions, customs, and norms of a society or a group and is addressed as a situation-specific skill. Chapter IV is devoted to its discussion.

(3) Personality. While Maslow’s theory shows a commonality between all people, no two people are exactly alike. Often groups are thought to act and think alike under similar circumstances but this is a false impression. Two biological brothers could be raised in the same house under the same conditions and have completely opposite personalities. If advisors can identify a few critical aspects of the personality of the people they are dealing with, they may be more effective in selecting techniques to influence them. At the very least, it may help to explain the activities of individuals when they act differently than their needs or culture would indicate. Below are five factors that advisors should be able to assess by speaking with and observing the people they come in contact with.

(a) Extroversion – Introversion. People with a preference for extroversion draw energy from action: they tend to act, then reflect, then act further. If they are inactive, their level of energy and motivation tends to decline. Conversely, those whose preference is introversion become less energized as they act: they prefer
to reflect, then act, then reflect again. Extroversion is marked by pronounced engagement with the external world. Extroverts enjoy being with people, are full of energy, and often experience positive emotions. They tend to be enthusiastic, action-oriented individuals who are likely to say "Yes!" or "Let's go!" to opportunities for excitement. In groups they like to talk, assert themselves, and draw attention to themselves. Introverted people prefer time to reflect in order to rebuild energy. Someone with a clear extroversion preference is not necessarily a party animal or a show-off, any more than someone clearly preferring introversion is necessarily shy, retiring, and unsociable. An introverted person meeting another introverted person may begin a conversation with recognition of a shared interest and continue with a rapid exchange of data and theories. Introverts lack the social exuberance, energy, and activity levels of extroverts. They tend to be quiet, low-key, deliberate, and less dependent on the social world. The introvert simply needs less stimulation than an extrovert and more time alone to re-charge their batteries. Samples of extroversion-introversion questions are below and may be reversed to ask the opposite question:

- Does he like being the center of attention?
- Does he enjoy meeting (interacting) with lots of people?
- Does he feel comfortable around people?
- Does he start most conversations?
- Does he talk to a lot of different people in a relaxed setting?
- Is he quiet around strangers?
- Does he try to avoid drawing attention to himself?
- Is he reserved when talking?
- Does he have little to say?

(b) Sensing–Conceptualizing. This factor refers to how people gather information: sensing (touch, taste, sight, smell, sound)–conceptualizing (thought-reflection). Sensing–conceptualizing describes a dimension of personality that distinguishes imaginative, creative people from down-to-earth, conventional people. The factor describes how new information is understood and interpreted. Individuals with a preference for sensing prefer to trust information that is in the present, tangible and concrete: that is, information that can be understood by the five senses. They tend to distrust hunches that seem to come out of nowhere. They prefer to look for detail and facts. For them, the meaning is in the data. They prefer the plain, straightforward, and obvious over the complex, ambiguous, and subtle. Sensing people tend to prefer familiarity over novelty; they are conservative and resistant to change. On the other hand, those with a preference for conceptualizing tend to trust information that is more abstract or theoretical and that can be associated with other information (either remembered or discovered by seeking a wider context or pattern). They may be more interested in future possibilities. They tend to trust those flashes of insight that seem to come from the unconscious mind. The meaning is in how the data relates to the pattern or theory. They therefore tend to hold unconventional and individualistic beliefs, although their actions may be conforming. Samples of
sensing–conceptualizing questions are below and may be reversed to ask the opposite question:

- Is he full of ideas?
- Is he quick to understand things?
- Does he speak with a rich vocabulary?
- Does he spend time reflecting on things?
- Is he disinterested in abstract ideas?
- Does he have difficulty understanding abstract ideas?

(c) Logic–Values. This refers to value-based or logic-based decision making. Both value based and logic based people strive to make rational choices, based on the data received. Those with a preference for values prefer to come to decisions by associating or empathizing with the situation, looking at it "from the inside" and weighing the situation to achieve, on balance, the greatest harmony, consensus and fit, considering the needs of the people involved and unverifiable rules. Those with a preference for logic prefer to decide things from a more detached standpoint, measuring the decision by what seems reasonable, logical, causal, consistent, and matching a given set of verifiable rules. People with a logical preference do not necessarily "think better" than their value based counterparts; the opposite preference is considered an equally rational way of coming to decisions. Similarly, those with a value based preference are not necessarily 'more feeling' or emotional than their logically based peers. Leaving no man behind would be considered as a values decision rather than a logical decision. It does not make logical sense to lose more living men to recover dead ones. It makes perfect sense based on values. Samples of logic–values questions are below and may be reversed to ask the opposite question:

- Is he interested in people?
- Does he empathize with others?
- Is he soft hearted?
- Does he make people feel at ease?
- Does he take time out for others?
- Is he disinterested in other people’s problems?
- Does he feel little concern for others?
- Does he insult people?

(d) Contemplative–Impulsive. Contemplative–impulsive concerns the way in which we control, regulate, and direct our impulses. Impulses are not inherently bad; occasionally time constraints require an immediate decision and acting on our first impulse. Contemplative individuals tend to avoid trouble and achieve high levels of success through purposeful planning and persistence. They are also regarded by others as reliable. They can be compulsive perfectionists and workaholics. Impulsive people may be criticized for their unreliability, failure to remain focused, and failure to stay within the lines and praised for their ability to make quick decisions or adapt to new situations. Samples of contemplative–impulsive questions are below and may be reversed to ask the opposite question:
• Is he always prepared?
• Is he exacting in his work?
• Does he follow a schedule?
• Does he get chores done right away?
• Does he like order?
• Does he pay attention to details?
• Does he leave his belongings lying around?
• Does he shirk his duties?

(e) Consistent–Unpredictable. Consistent-unpredictable refers to the tendency to follow a set pattern. Those who are highly unpredictable are often emotionally reactive. They respond emotionally to events that would not usually affect most people, and their reactions tend to be more intense than normal. They are more likely to interpret ordinary situations as threatening, and minor frustrations as hopelessly difficult. Their negative emotional reactions tend to persist for unusually long periods of time, which means they exhibit frequent and significant mood swings. These problems in emotional regulation can diminish the ability to think clearly, make decisions, and cope effectively with stress. At the other end of the scale, individuals who are consistent are often less easily upset and are less emotionally reactive. Samples of consistent-unpredictable questions are below and may be reversed to ask the opposite question:

• Is he easily disturbed?
• Does he change moods a lot?
• Is he easily irritated?
• Is he stressed out easily?
• Does he get upset easily?
• Does he worry about things?
• Is he relaxed most of the time?
• Does he follow a set pattern?
• Does he react the same to similar circumstances?

(f) Implications. The point here is to acknowledge that people from the same culture or social group may act differently but still base their behavior on some form or pattern that may help to predict how they will act in the future. Cultures tend to favor specific personality traits. Extroversion, sensing, logic and impulsive behavior are perceived as socially desirable preferences in Western culture. Other cultures will be different. Americans revere personal time. In some cultures, seeking personal time would lead people to believe there is a serious problem and they would intrude to provide support.

(g) Application. Understanding the needs, culture, and personality of an individual is key to building rapport. Building rapport is central to advisor mission accomplishment.

4. Building Rapport

a. Rapport Defined. Numerous sources dealing with advising, often as part of COIN or FID, emphasize the importance for advisors to develop strong positive rapport with their
counterparts. This section looks at the definition of rapport; its role in advisor missions; possible ways to develop adequate rapport to accomplish the mission; and other interpersonal skills supporting the advisor’s mission. Rapport may be defined as understanding, empathy, or bonding between individuals. Establishing rapport is the desired method for influencing a counterpart. Genuine rapport is developed slowly, but can be ruined in an instant. Why rapport? Quite simply, effective rapport will allow advisors to successfully complete their missions. The advisor must be able to influence their counterpart to follow a particular course of action or behavior pattern. Since the advisor is not in the counterpart’s chain of command, they cannot simply order any specific action, but rather needs the counterpart to follow the desired course of action by working toward a commonly developed goal. The measure of effective rapport is whether the advisor can influence his counterpart to take the desired action.

b. Components of Rapport. Rapport is comprised of three components: understanding, respect, and trust.

(1) Understanding is the first component of rapport. It begins prior to deployment and may include cultural studies, language training, and FF equipment and doctrine familiarization. Once in country, advisors should continue to broaden their understanding by observing and asking questions.

(2) Respect is the next component of rapport. It is a reciprocal commodity. The FF counterpart should grow to respect who the advisor is (character), what they know, and how they perform. The advisor should look for those things that they respect in their counterpart. This is often a challenge. The counterpart may not fit the mold of US or other coalition officers. They may not have formal training or education; they may even be illiterate. Their “uniform standards” may not be the same as the advisors. They may have more egregious characteristics, like corruption, a poor attitude towards their profession or even a lack of basic warrior values such as courage. In this instance, outward displays by the advisor should be respectful with the advisors true opinion held in abeyance and not communicated to his counterpart. Start with the basics and expand over time. There may be additional factors that affect your counterpart’s willingness and motivation. For example, your counterpart may be placing himself, and possibly his family, in mortal danger simply by accepting their job. They may have proven themselves as fearless warriors, even if they didn’t have formal training. In short, there may be traits deserving of respect even before the relationship matures. Mutual respect grows through shared experiences and shared dangers. Advisors should live, eat, and if authorized, fight with their counterparts. Sharing hardships and dangers will help you build respect.

(3) Trust is the final critical component of the rapport building process. Trust grows only over time and is based on understanding and respect. Building trust needs to begin on day one, but it will not mature until later in the relationship. There also remains a possibility that the advisor’s counterpart may not prove worthy of complete trust. In this instance the advisor may need to constantly mitigate the counterpart’s shortcomings. The advisor should begin by showing that they are reliable and should do everything that they say they will do. They should be where they are
supposed to be, on time. Trust will develop as FF and their advisors perform their respective functions. Two things can enhance this growth:

(a) The advisor should start out with “confidence-building missions.” Early success will build both self-confidence and trust.

(b) The advisor should not “promise” any support that he might not be able to deliver.

(4) Since all the components of rapport are two-way streets, the advisor has to be willing and able to share things about their culture, language, and experiences. It is important to remember that rapport building requires the advisor to establish a personal level of understanding with their counterpart in order to be effective.

c. How to Build Rapport. Be a positive example. FF respect advisors who actually show them the right way to do a task, rather than just talk. Experience has shown that FF units will not hesitate to go into danger if their advisors are right there with them. The following areas also contribute to building rapport:

- Maintaining enthusiasm and a positive attitude.
- Developing language skills and/or the ability to utilize an interpreter.
- Respecting a counterpart’s rank, age, status, and experience.
- Developing negotiation skills.
- Improving interpersonal skills.
- Being confident, competent, and capable.
- Never expecting or demanding your counterparts do something you are unable or unwilling to do.
- Demonstrating everything.
- Learning your counterparts’ names and spending time with them on their compound at meals and during holidays.
- Mentally preparing yourself to interact with your counterparts at all times.
- Avoiding the creation of an American enclave, an advisor assignment requires constant interaction to achieve the desired results.
- Frequently assessing your counterpart’s perceptions.
- Avoiding the impression of favoring any one group.
- Recognizing threats to discipline (foreign forces trying to circumvent their own leadership by going to an advisor with a complaint or problem).
- Enforcing the unit’s chain of command even if the advisor discretely assists the decision process and outcomes.

d. Rapport Considerations

(1) Language. Advisors should make every effort to learn to communicate effectively in their FF counterpart’s language. Generally, advisors that can converse directly with their counterparts are more effective. If language proficiency is not an option, learn to work with an interpreter. It is still essential to learn enough of the language for basic items like greetings. It helps to have enough of an understanding to catch the basic direction of conversations, even those between the interpreter and the counterpart. The advisor should attempt to improve their language proficiency over time as this will be a well received gesture of respect.
(2) Body Language/Gestures. Body language and gestures are more powerful than verbal language. Subtle movements of the body may indicate that a person understands the message that is being conveyed. Likewise, conflicting messages may be sent by unintentional body language or gestures.

(3) Local Customs. Respecting local customs goes a long way in building effective rapport. In every culture, refusing invitations is seen as a slight. This is extreme in some cultures. The advisor must be prepared to accept many forms of unfamiliar hospitality. Eating local food, unless there is a documented medical threat, should be the order of the day. Participating in cultural ceremonies also helps build rapport. At some point, however, there is a level of activity where it is necessary to draw the line. The advisor must be prepared to be able to deal tactfully with issues that are out of bounds.

(4) Uniform and Grooming Standards. Advisors should adhere to their Services' grooming and uniform standards. This will establish a level of expectation in respect to other standards such as training, maintenance, etc.

(5) Expertise. This is based on one's knowledge and experience. The advisor will have to repeatedly demonstrate their expertise by making sound judgments and keeping all promises. Bad advice and failing to keep promises can destroy credibility. If credibility is lost, the advisor will fail to build rapport.

(6) Going Native. Building rapport has its limits. Some people claim that one must go native in order to truly understand the host nation and its challenges. In the military, it is appropriate to assume enough of the customs common to the AO to be effective. Advisors who are close to their counterparts can often provide their higher headquarters with valuable insights into how things look from a grass roots level. However, once the advisor begins to pursue the agenda of the FF to the detriment of the US/coalition campaign plan, they have effectively stepped over the line.

(7) Political Discussions. Try to avoid initiating lengthy lectures about political philosophy. However, FF should know about the current situation in their country and may have preconceived notions about the US. When the topic of politics does arise, be ready to discuss American history, difficulties in establishing peaceful democracies, minority rights, and other positive aspects of the US system. Reinforce the counterpart's national pride. Get them to talk about their national traditions and history.

5. Influence

a. Understanding human behavior and building rapport allows the advisor to influence his counterpart. In general, influence can be assessed as one's ability to modify behavior. There are two major methods of influencing: compliance and commitment. See figure 7.
Figure 7. Influencing Human Behavior

(1) Compliance-focused influence is based primarily on the advisor's authority. Compliance is appropriate for short-term, immediate requirements and for situations where little risk can be tolerated. Compliance techniques may be appropriate for advisors when the FF is unwilling or unable to commit fully to a request. If something needs to be done with little time for delay, then compliance may be an acceptable approach. Compliance-focused influence is not particularly effective when the advisor’s aim is to create initiative and high esteem within the FF unit. The effects will only last as long as the advisor is able to affect FF unit behavior.

(a) Incentives and Disincentives. Incentives and disincentives refer to the advisor’s ability to give things or take things away in order to change behavior. Behavior can be modified or changed by changing the consequences of the current behavior or by introducing new consequences (incentives or disincentives) that a subject receives for engaging in a behavior.

(b) Increasing a behavior involves increasing the value of the positive consequences and/or decreasing the value of the negative consequences. Introducing or emphasizing things in the environment that are desirable or pleasant when a person engages in the desired behavior, or removing things that are unpleasant when he engages in the desired behavior, are ways of increasing a behavior.

(c) Decreasing a behavior involves devaluing or reducing the positive consequences and increasing the value of the negative consequences a subject receives. Removing something desirable or pleasant that is currently reinforcing...
a behavior, or introducing something into the environment that it is unpleasant, are ways of decreasing a behavior.

(2) Commitment-focused influence generally produces longer lasting and broader effects. Whereas compliance only changes behavior, commitment reaches deeper—changing attitudes, values, and beliefs, and subsequently behavior as well. For example, when an advisor builds a sense of responsibility amongst his counterparts, they will likely demonstrate more initiative, personal involvement, and creativity. Commitment grows from an individual's desire to gain a sense of control and develop self-worth by contributing to the organization. Depending on the objective of the influence, advisors can strengthen commitment by reinforcing the counterpart's' identification with the nation (loyalty), the service (professionalism), the unit or organization (selfless service), the leadership in a unit (respect), and to the mission (duty). Long term success hinges on the advisor's ability to develop commitment.

b. The art of influencing requires knowing what techniques to use based on the situation. Compliance works for quick and short term behavior modification but no single technique will work in every situation. Positive reinforcement in the form of incentives (for example, supplies or time off) as well as internal rewards (for example, praise and recognition) can reinforce positive behavior. Disincentives (withholding support, scorn) can be used when there is an immediate need to discontinue dangerous or otherwise undesirable behavior. Disincentives can also send a clear message to others in the unit about behavioral expectations and the consequences of violating those expectations. In this way, an advisor can shape the social norms of a unit. One caution is that disincentives should be used sparingly and only in extreme cases because it can lead to resentment.

c. Cialdini’s Six Principles. Dr. Robert Cialdini identified six influencing principles that are relevant to virtually any culture and any group. Understanding and applying these six basic principles can increase an advisor’s effectiveness in persuading a group or individual.

(1) **Principle of scarcity:** People value more what they can have less of. They typically associate greater value with things that are rare, dwindling in availability, or difficult to acquire.

(2) **Principle of authority:** People are more easily persuaded by individuals perceived to be legitimate authorities or experts. They defer to experts who provide shortcuts to decisions requiring specialized information.

(3) **Principle of social proof:** People often look to the behavior of those around them for direction about what choices to make. This action is heightened when those around them are similar in terms of age, education, social standing, and experience.

(4) **Principle of liking:** People prefer to say yes and to comply with the requests of those they like.
(5) **Principle of reciprocity:** If someone grants favors, invited or uninvited, an overpowering need to repay that favor immediately blooms within the recipient of that favor. This human trait transcends all cultures and races.

(6) **Principle of consistency:** The desire for consistency is a central motivator of behavior. The drive to look and be consistent is a highly potent weapon of social influence, often causing people to act in ways that are clearly contrary to their own best interests. People do not like to appear inconsistent to others. Inconsistent behavior produces psychological tension that must be avoided. It is human nature that people strive to feel good about themselves, which includes behaving in accordance with their important values and beliefs. When the behavior is consistent with who people are and what they value, they feel good. People align with their clear commitments.

6. **How to Influence/Change Behavior**

   a. **Step 1: Determine your goal.** As shown in figure 8, this is the first step. Advisors influence others to achieve some purpose. To be successful at exerting influence advisors have an end or goal in mind. Sometimes the goal will be very specific. Many goals are less distinct and measurable, but are still valid and meaningful. Goals should be written down and addressed in mission statements and/or internal assessments.

   b. **Step 2: Determine who you need to influence.** The advisor needs to develop a mental list of those who might need to be influenced. Getting a FF unit to do what the advisor wants may be as simple as influencing the commander but he may have to influence the unit members as well as the leader’s commander. The advisor should consider as many variations as practical. Advisors should look for any conditions or circumstances in the immediate environment that significantly affect the individual or the group’s emotions or behavior. Individual or group characteristics that the advisor might consider include:

   - Gender.
   - Religion.
   - Age.
   - Socioeconomic status.
   - Ethnicity.
   - Political affiliation.
   - Level of education (very important in determining how to access and persuade).
   - Occupation.
   - Recent Events.
   - Geography (beliefs and values can vary widely from region to region).
(2) The challenge is to determine which of these characteristics have a significant impact on emotional or behavioral responses and under what circumstances. Ethnicity may significantly affect behavior and emotions regarding voting and politics, but may have almost no effect on the decision to enlist in the military. Individual and group characteristics may provide additional insight on motivations.

c. **Step 3: Determine motives.** Motives are the reasons behind the decisions people make. Motives come from an inner desire to meet a need or want. Advisors use the knowledge of what motivates others to influence them. Knowing one's counterpart, and others who may be influenced, gives advisors insight into affecting their behavior. The desire to fulfill, alleviate, or eliminate a need or want, provides the motivation to change behavior.

   (1) Identify basic motives. Basic motives involve physiological needs such as food, water, and safety needs such as security and shelter. When people feel hunger, they are motivated to eat. When people feel pain, they are motivated to reduce the source of the pain. Such basic motives are extremely powerful in driving behavior and overwhelm psychological needs and wants.

   (2) Identify social motives. Social motives are derived from access to other tangibles (money, goods, education, infrastructure, health care) or more complex psychological motives such as status. For example, people learn to want money because it can be exchanged for food and other desired goods. Power/control, achievement, reassurance, escape/avoidance, justice/revenge, and acceptance/affiliation are all types of learned social motives. Examples include:
• Wanting better education opportunities for their children.
• Wanting better-paying jobs.
• Wanting their interests represented by the government.
• Wanting revenge for perceived wrongs.
• Wanting self-rule.

(3) Prioritize motives as critical, short-term, and long-term. Advisors prioritize motives by immediacy of the need or want, and/or delay in satisfaction. Critical motives are immediate needs. Short-term motives are those currently being satisfied or active efforts are being made to satisfy them in the near future. Long-term motives are those that are desired but are not immediately important, and satisfaction may be delayed until some point in the future.

d. Step 4: Determine individual's/group's beliefs, values, and attitudes.

(1) Beliefs are information thought to be true. In many cultures conspiracy theories exist due to misinformation and a lack of external communication. People vary from being gullible (believing everything) to skeptical (believing little). Religious and cultural beliefs can hold deeper meaning and significance than intellectual beliefs.

• What do they consider to be true?

(2) Values are a prioritization of what one believes. Values can be ethical/moral, doctrinal/ideological, social, aesthetic, or economic in nature.

• What is valued? (What is considered important?)

(3) Attitudes reflect whether one likes or dislikes something. Likes and dislikes can often be traced back to a person’s beliefs and values. This includes loves, hates, frustrations, and fears. They provoke an emotional response that can be used to increase the effectiveness of an argument or act. Frustrations occur when a want is not met. By examining what is causing frustration, the advisor may find another motive he can address.

• What is loved?
• What is hated?
• What makes them angry?
• What is feared?
• What is considered shameful or embarrassing?
• What are they dissatisfied with? (What are their gripes?)
• What are their frustrations? (What do they want that they cannot get?)

(4) Although often difficult to derive, beliefs, values, and attitudes can prove to be very effective in persuasion.

e. Step 5: Compare individual beliefs, values, and attitudes with the predominant cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes. The predominant cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, traditions, and norms may be very different from the group the advisor is trying to influence. Many Americans will act differently in different cultures. This change in behavior is directly related to the host’s predominant culture.

• What are the cultural norms? (How are they expected to act?)
f. **Step 6: Determine susceptibility.** Susceptibility is the likelihood an individual or group will be open to persuasion. Determining susceptibility aids in prioritizing efforts. If susceptibility is moderate to high, then an advisor may not need to focus as much effort as he would if the susceptibility was low. Susceptibility is determined by assessing the strength of the underlying motivation source and the FF perception of the desired corresponding behavior. The strength of the motivation depends on the perceived risk and the perceived reward, while the perception of the behavior is linked directly to how consistent the behavior is with the individual’s or group’s values and beliefs.

   (1) Risks and rewards can be social, emotional, financial, and physical. Risks may include the threat of physical harm, financial loss, or disapproval of peers. Rewards may include financial gain, political power, approval of peers, or increased self-esteem. Risks and rewards can be immediate to long-term. Immediate risks and rewards are stronger than long-term risks and rewards. Example: Very few people are willing to walk a tightrope (immediate risk), but many people smoke (long-term risk). The higher the perceived rewards and the lower the perceived risks, the more likely the behavior will occur.

      (a) Perceived risk: What are the perceived risks (negative consequences), by the individual, to engage in the desired behavior?

      (b) Perceived reward: What are the perceived rewards (positive consequences), by the individual, to engage in the desired behavior?

   (2) Consistency with values and beliefs: How consistent is the desired behavior with the values and beliefs of the individual? Generally, behavior will be consistent with values and norms relative to moral, ethical, religious, political, or cultural beliefs. Behavior that is inconsistent or incongruent with values and beliefs will decrease over time. Alternately, if behavior continues to be incongruent with values and beliefs, then individuals are likely to adjust their behavior before modifying their values and beliefs. Thus the likelihood of a desired behavior change is based on the connection with an individual’s values and beliefs.

   (3) A lower susceptibility does not mean the person cannot be influenced but more effort and analysis will be required to effectively influence any behavior. The lower the susceptibility, the higher the effort required to adjust conditions for behavior change to occur.

g. **Step 7: Determine tactics.** Motives, personal characteristics, and environmental conditions determine which influence tactic or combination of tactics is appropriate. When a situation is urgent and greater risk is involved, eliciting counterpart compliance may be necessary. Advisors typically pursue a longer-term focus and use influence to build strong commitment.

   (1) When influencing their counterparts, advisors should consider:

      (a) Objectives for the use of influence should be in line with the advisor’s values, ethics, laws, and codes of conduct.

      (b) Compliance-seeking influence focuses on meeting and accounting for specific task demands.
(c) Commitment—encouraging influence emphasizes empowerment and long-lasting change.

(2) Advisors can use various tactics that focus on compliance or commitment. See table 13. Advisors will want to employ several tactics simultaneously to rapidly change behavior while providing knowledge and experience to change beliefs, values, and attitudes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Compliance/Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Initially depends on credentials, but quickly depends on the ability to give good advice. (Expertise)</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relationship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal friendship</td>
<td>Requires that counterparts like you and you appear to like them. (Rapport)</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Advisor assists counterparts with their plan.</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Advisor involves counterparts in his plan to make it their plan. (Buy In)</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Experienced expert provides evidence or logical arguments.</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persuasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Using strong emotion to build conviction.</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Source of authority is basis for request.</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>A trade of desired actions or items.</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprising</td>
<td>Explaining benefits of specific requested action. (Benefit not within the control of the advisor.)</td>
<td>Compliance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) **Professional relationship.** This tactic begins with the advisor's credentials. After the first meeting, the advisor needs to immediately establish and maintain his credibility by providing good advice. If the counterpart is not personally warming up to the advisor, then the advisor must depend on the quality of the advice to win over the FF counterpart. With time, a consistent approach can effectively gain commitment from FF counterparts. It works best in conjunction with the personal friendship, but it also works where personal friendships cannot be established.

(b) **Personal friendship.** This tactic occurs when the advisor has established a strong rapport with his counterpart. This works when the foreign counterpart actually likes the advisor. The advisor will have to have a high level of trust in the counterpart as well. This tactic allows the advisor to be able to access the counterpart’s attitudes and beliefs in a way that is not possible in any other tactic. However, it is not always possible to achieve and has a greater risk of the adviser internalizing and adopting the counterpart’s problems.

(c) **Collaboration.** This tactic occurs when the advisor cooperates in providing assistance or resources to carry out the foreign counterpart’s plan. This works when the counterpart is at a level where they can develop their own plans or is determined to do things their way. The advisor should become involved in the
counterpart’s process to help shape how the FF will operate. For example, the advisor could offer to proofread an order before a major planning effort to ensure the operation will have collaboration with joint, interagency, or multinational agencies.

(d) **Participation.** This tactic occurs when the advisor asks a FF counterpart to take part in planning. Active participation leads to an increased sense of worth and recognition. It provides value to the effort and builds commitment. An invitation to get involved in problem solving or objective planning is critical when the advisor tries to institutionalize a vision for long-term change. By involving key FF leaders at all levels during the planning phases, the advisor ensures that their counterparts take stock in the vision. These FF leaders will later be able to pursue critical intermediate and long-term objectives, even after the advisor has moved on.

(e) **Rational persuasion.** This tactic requires the advisor to provide evidence, logic arguments, or explanations showing how a request is relevant to the goal. This is often the first approach to gaining commitment from counterparts and is likely to be effective if the advisor is recognized as an expert with an established rapport. The advisor trying to change beliefs and values often draws upon their own experience to give reasons that will work based on the advisor’s expertise.

(f) **Inspiration.** This tactic occurs when the advisor arouses strong emotions to build conviction. An advisor may stress to his counterpart that without help, the safety of the team may be at risk. By appropriately stressing the results of stronger commitment, an advisor can inspire followers to surpass minimal standards and reach a higher level of performance. The advisor is working to amplify existing beliefs and values as well as change attitudes.

(g) **Authority.** This tactic occurs when advisors refer to sources of authority (legal, religious, tradition, position) to establish the basis for a request. In the military, certain jobs must be done regardless of circumstances when subordinate leaders receive legitimate orders from higher headquarters. Reference to one’s position suggests to those who are being influenced that there is the potential for official action if the request is not completed. The following are types of authority appeals:

- Legal: An appeal to laws or regulations, or to people in superior positions in the social hierarchy. For example, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, NCOs and officers, police officers, parents, or government officials. The group/individual must recognize the authority for the appeal to work.
- Religious: An appeal to a belief-teaching institution or individual that is revered or worshiped; for example, the Dalai Lama, the Roman Catholic Church.
- Tradition: An appeal to time honored customs familiar to the group/individual or behaviors that are repeated continually without question. (e.g. people eat turkey on Thanksgiving as a time honored practice).
- Position: An appeal from someone of authority. Examples are chairman of the board, leader of a military unit, family patriarch or matriarch, a boss or
foreman. The appeal is useful where the counterpart’s superior has issued an order which he has the power and authority to enforce. The advisor has to be fully aware of what direction was given by his counterpart’s superior.

(h) **Exchange.** This is an influence technique that advisors use when they make an offer to provide a desired item or action in trade for compliance with a request. The exchange technique requires that the advisor control certain resources or rewards that are valued by those being influenced.

(i) **Apprising.** This happens when the advisor explains why a request will benefit a counterpart, such as giving them greater satisfaction in their work or performing a task a certain way to save time. In contrast to the exchange technique, the benefits are out of the control of the advisor. An advisor may use the apprising tactic to inform a new unit commander that by building rapport with the local population, he will gain more information.

(3) Influence tactics outline the general efforts an advisor can make to change behavior. If the advisor has time for long term change, he will focus on commitment. If the advisor has infrequent interaction with the person, then he will probably focus on compliance to get the desired behavior. Once a tactic is selected, the advisor needs to assess the counterpart’s motives, personality, and the environment to determine the proper influence techniques to actually persuade the counterpart to change behavior.

h. **Step 8: Determine techniques.** The influence techniques that follow can be selected and implemented in conjunction with the previously mentioned tactics to answer basic needs to include: social, psychological, or growth. They can also be used to emphasize fears, likes or dislikes in conjunction with environmental conditions such as traditions or demographics. These techniques can emphasize positives or negatives (incentives/disincentives) and can be applied with little or large amounts of pressure.

   (1) **Inevitability.** This most often relies on the emotion of fear, particularly the fear of death, injury, or some other type of harm. For example, if a person does not surrender, he will die, or if a person does not pay his taxes, he will go to jail. It can also be an appeal to logic. Both require proof that the promised outcome will actually occur. Therefore, it is crucial that credibility be gained and maintained.

   (2) **In group-out group.** This technique seeks to divide a group or separate two groups. It creates an enemy of one group, and encourages the other group to rebel/discriminate against them. This appeal frequently points out major differences between groups, or factions of a group.

   (3) **Bandwagon.** This technique plays upon the group's need to belong or conform to group standards, i.e., join the bandwagon. The two main types of bandwagon appeal are an appeal to companionship and an appeal to conformity. Peer pressure is an example of conformity type bandwagon appeal.

   (4) **Nostalgia.** This technique refers to how things were done in the past. The appeal can be used to encourage or discourage a particular behavior. In a positive light, it refers to the “good old days” and encourages the group to behave in a
manner that will return to those times. In the negative, it points out how bad things
were in the past and why a change in behavior will avoid a return to misery.

(5) **Self-interest.** This technique plays directly to the wants and desires of the
individuals. The appeal can play upon the group’s vulnerability for acquisition,
success, or status. A self-interest appeal can be presented in the form of a gain or
loss. An appeal to loss exploits the group not wishing to engage in an advisor
recommended desired behavior by highlighting the current behavior will not satisfy
the group’s need. An appeal to gain would inform the group that to satisfy a want,
the group must engage in a desired behavior.

(6) **Glittering generalities.** These are intense, emotionally appealing words so
closely associated with highly valued concepts and beliefs that the appeals are
convincing without being supported by fact or reason. The appeals are directed
 toward such emotions as love of country or home, and desire for peace, freedom,
glory, or honor.

(7) **Transference.** This technique projects positive or negative qualities of a
person, entity, object, or value to another. It is generally used to transfer blame from
one party in a conflict to another.

(8) **Least of evils.** This technique acknowledges that the course of action (COA)
being taken is perhaps undesirable, but emphasizes that any other COA would
result in a worse outcome.

(9) **Name-calling.** Name-calling seeks to arouse prejudices in an audience by
labeling the object of the propaganda as something the group fears, loathes, or finds
undesirable.

(10) **Plain folks or common man.** This approach attempts to convince the group
that the position noted in the argument is actually the same as their own. The
technique is designed to win the confidence of the audience by communicating in
the usual manner and style of the audience. Communicators use ordinary language,
mannerisms, and clothes via face-to-face or other audiovisual communications when
they attempt to identify their point of view with that of the average person.

(11) **Testimonials.** Testimonials are quotations that are cited to support or reject a
given policy, action, program, or personality. The reputation or role of the individual
giving the statement is used. There can be different types of testimonial authority.
Official testimonials use endorsements of approved people in authority or well known
in a particular field. Personal sources of testimonials may include hostile leaders,
fellow Service members, opposing leaders, famous scholars, writers, popular
heroes, and other personalities.

(12) **Insinuation.** Insinuation is used to create or increase suspicions of ideas,
groups, or individuals as a means to divide the adversary. One hints, suggests, or
implies, but lets the group draw its own conclusions.

(13) **Presenting the other side.** Some people in a group believe that neither of the
belligerents is entirely virtuous. To them, messages that express concepts solely in
terms of right and wrong may not be credible. Agreement with minor aspects of the
enemy’s point of view may overcome this cynicism.
Simplification. In this technique, facts are reduced to either right, wrong, good, or evil. The technique provides simple solutions for complex problems and offers simplified interpretations of events, ideas, concepts, or personalities.

Compare and contrast. Two or more ideas, issues, or choices are compared and differences between them are explained. This technique is effective if the group has a needs conflict that must be resolved.

Compare for similarities. Two or more ideas, issues, or objects are compared to try and find a common understanding. This technique tries to show that the desired behavior or attitude is similar to one that has already been accepted by the group.

Illustrations and narratives. An illustration is a detailed example of the idea being presented to make abstract or general ideas easier to comprehend. When a story is used they are called narratives.

Specific instances. These are lists of examples that help prove a point.

Statistics. Statistics have a certain authority, but they must be clear enough to maintain relevance for the group. In most cases, it is best to keep the statistical evidence simple and easily absorbable by the group.

Explanations. These are used when a term or idea is unfamiliar.

Gifts. Giving something as a gift before requesting compliance. The idea is that the target will feel the need to reciprocate later. Example: “Accept this well and cistern as a gift to the people of your town from the coalition forces…to demonstrate our good will and hope for mutual cooperation in the future.”

Debt. Calling in past favors. Example: “Coalition forces have done a lot for your town: the new school, the well in the center of town… these insurgents are endangering all we have worked for together. We need your help in stopping these groups by reporting any information you and your people may discover.”

Aversive stimulation. Continuous punishment, and the cessation of punishment, is contingent on compliance. Example: “We will continue to bomb your position unless you surrender immediately.”

Moral appeal. Entails finding moral common ground, and then using the moral commitments of a person to obtain compliance. Example: “The killing of innocent civilians is wrong; please help the security forces stop this tragic loss of innocent life by reporting any information on terrorist activities.”

Positive and negative self-feeling. “You will feel better/worse if you do X.” Example: “Become part of something bigger than yourself, know honor and take pride in your work…join the national security forces!”

Positive and negative esteem of others. “Other people will think highly/less of you if you do X.” Example: “Earn the respect of your friends and the pride of your family…join your country's National Guard now!”

Fear. “Bad things will happen to you if you do X.” Example: “Only death and fire await those who continue to fight…surrender now.”
i. **Step 9: Apply tactics and techniques.** This is a dynamic process. The advisor should have a plan before attempting to influence a group but if one technique is not working, he'll need to shift quickly to other techniques. The advisor does not need to sit down and create a plan before he attempts to influence people. However, even if he is having good apparent effect, the advisor should take the time to review his tactics and techniques. If he is only using compliance tactics, he might need to focus on incorporating more commitment tactics.

### Advisor Influence Example

We graduated our first group of new instructors in several months, increasing the number of Iraqi instructor pilots in the Fighter Training Wing by 150%. For the previous months, Iraqi instructors had only flown (on average) 4 sorties each per month. We needed to get them to increase the workload for two reasons. One, our student population was increasing and we had no additional influx of American instructors. Two, the focus on transition to Iraqi control and leadership had intensified, and we needed to begin positioning the Iraqis to take our place. With the graduation of the new instructors, the time was ripe to push towards transition.

We sat down with the Iraqi leadership and spoke with them about allowing the Iraqis to take a larger ownership role in the wing by increasing their sortie production rates. Their duty schedule, which was limited by the amount of monthly leave each pilot took, seemed to be the critical impediment to their ownership of various programs in the wing. We suggested that they modify their duty schedule to be present three weeks out of the month. The Iraqi wing commander explained that he wished that he could, but that his pilots would feel that he was being too hard on them, and he needed to get guidance from his commander to that effect. That way, his pilots wouldn't be mad at him, and would realize that there was a common Iraqi Air Force duty standard. He told me that he had even asked his commander to issue an order to codify the work schedule.

What I didn’t realize was that he was trying to politely tell me that he didn’t support an increased work schedule. He had sent no such request to his commander. By telling me that he couldn’t make the decision—that his commander needed to issue an order to that effect—he was telling me no. Not realizing that, I pushed ahead with the proposal to change the vacation schedule, sending it up through the advisor staff, and mentioning it to the Iraqi Air Force commander the next time that we sat down together to chat. It caused a huge rift. The Iraqi wing commander became extremely frustrated and was present even less at work. When he was there, he began acting in a very hostile manner towards the advisors, and me in particular. It was obvious that our efforts—my plans—were not achieving the desired results. Instead, they were harming the relationship between the Iraqi leadership and the advisor team.
So we changed our vector. Rather than push for a different work/vacation schedule, I stopped asking them about their work schedule or even when they would be present for duty. Instead we began to post sortie counts prominently in the operations room. It was also about this time that our new instructor pilots began flying in earnest. Every day, we would post the top fliers for the month, and a bar graph of how many sorties were being flown. We showed the sorties for both the Iraqi pilots and the US pilots. Within the Iraqi ranks, the younger pilots quickly jumped ahead in the sortie counts. All of a sudden, the senior Iraqi pilots began making themselves available to fly. It was a pride issue—the older pilots did not want to be out performed by the younger pilots. Sortie rates per pilot more than tripled by the end of the month. Every day, the Iraqi pilots would look at the sortie count, and then look at the scheduling board to ensure that they were up to fly the next day. Some pilots began to take considerably less vacation time.

The key, it turned out, was finding the correct leverage point. The older pilots were not interested in true ownership over the processes, and they certainly didn’t want to give up time with their families. So offering them ownership as an incentive to spend more time away from their families was not an effective form of persuasion. But personal pride—being on top of the sortie count list—now that was important to them. This month, one of the younger pilots has announced that he will not take vacation the entire month, because he wants to maximize his sorties. He wants to build experience so he can be better qualified to teach his students. So in the end, we’re achieving success by letting them be motivated by the same thing that motivates us as advisors—leadership by example. Only in this case, the example is being set by their newest pilots. And that is a great success for us.

—US Air Force Advisor, Coalition Air Force Transition Team

j. **Step 10: Check measures of effectiveness (MOE) and look for unintended consequences.** The advisor should be able to easily assess if he is achieving his immediate MOE. However, with every action there may be unintended consequences or the activity may not be preparing his counterparts for more complicated tasks later. Using soccer as a team building effort could work well as the sides learn to work with each other, unless it also causes the unit to split into two ethnic or political factions.

k. All the techniques mentioned are designed to help the advisor achieve a goal, but just knowing your counterpart wants something is not enough. The advisor will have a limited supply of resources available to commit for changes or behavior modification. Given, the advisor can only bend so much on rules, regulations, and laws; he must eventually resort to negotiations.

7. **Negotiation**

a. This section on negotiations and mediation is presented from a Western perspective. Many of these techniques are universally useful, but the section on culture should be referenced to see what adaptations need consideration before using these techniques. For example, the Western definition of a mediator is someone impartial and without any stake in the outcome of the mediation process. In some non-Western cultures, the mediator is known to both parties and usually has a stake (such as prestige and standing within the community) in the outcome. Additionally, modern negotiation techniques emphasize the integrative approach (win/win), and discount the distributive
win/lose, and other approaches. Each major approach to negotiating (distributive, integrative) has advantages and disadvantages. In planning for each negotiation, consider the desired outcome (both sides), the situation, and the cultural considerations. This will help you determine your initial negotiating approach. During the negotiating process, you may need to adjust and/or completely change the approach based on changing circumstances and/or new information.

b. Advisors should understand that some of their attempts to influence will be unsuccessful but the goal of negotiation is compromise. If the advisor's goals and those of his counterpart are not the same, negotiations will be challenging.

c. US culture will lead the advisor to believe that every situation has a win/win solution and that his counterpart will also want to achieve a win/win outcome. Some cultures do not believe that win/win is optimal and prefer a win/lose philosophy.

d. There are two main types of bargaining which reflect the general philosophy towards negotiating: distributive and integrative.

(1) Distributive. The distributive process uses negotiation meetings to present a position, protect information from disclosure, or to discredit another party. It uses the negotiation to marshal evidence advocating one’s position while discrediting the other party’s position. The objective is victory for your position and defeat for the other party's inputs. The distributive negotiator believes the following:

   (a) The disputants are adversaries, and the goal is victory.
   (b) Fixed resources can be divided so one side receives more than the other after concessions are won.
   (c) One person’s interests or position opposes the others.
   (d) The dominant concern is usually maximizing one’s own interests.
   (e) Distributive strategies include: understanding the point at which your opponent will walk away from the negotiation and pushing him almost to that point by manipulation or withholding information.

(2) Integrative. The integrative process uses negotiating meetings to present ideas and interests and not to present preconceived positions. The negotiating meeting is used to share ideas, interests, and information. The discovery process then fosters the development of potential solutions that none of the parties could have likely developed on their own due to incomplete information. From the potential solutions, parties then agree on selection criteria to determine which option provides an agreeable solution. The objective is consensus and satisfaction, not victory. The integrative negotiator believes the following:

   (a) The disputants are joint problem solvers seeking a wise decision.
   (b) An understanding of needs will allow resources to be divided and both sides can win.
   (c) The relationship between the parties is critical.
   (d) The dominant concern is to maximize joint outcomes.
(e) Integrative strategies include cooperation, sharing information, and mutual problem solving.

(3) Distributive bargaining is win/lose while integrative is win/win. The two major negotiating strategies (distributive and integrative) are mutually exclusive in their approaches and desired outcomes. However, after you select your initial strategy, you should consider what triggers might occur which would motivate you to switch approaches in order to reach a desired outcome. When considering a change in approach, think about the new set of pros and cons you must consider. Successful negotiations can involve a mix of both strategies.

e. Additionally, four other perspectives that impact negotiations are time, environment, self, and nonverbal communication.

(1) Time. Some cultures and individuals see time as a micro-view. It is all about here and now. Other cultures and individuals see time in a macro-view. Now is a point that bridges the past with the future. For example: a deadline driven person may strive for a decision in minutes or hours from an FF member who thinks in terms of months or years to reach a decision.

(2) Environment. Some cultures believe impact on the environment is directly attributable to a person and every accident is preventable. Other cultures believe the environment impacts the person. Accidents just happen and no one could have done anything about it. One side may be quite ready to commit to something in the future “knowing” that nothing stands in the way, while the other side may be reluctant to talk in certainties of the future “knowing” that factors beyond their control may prevent them from fulfilling their commitments.

(3) Self. In some cultures, when a person makes a mistake, blame can be isolated to that person. In other cultures, the individual is seen as an element of the group and so a mistake is made not by the individual but rather the whole group. Thus in negotiations, one might accept a personal slight to get a goal accomplished, but the counterpart, representing the group, cannot allow shame to fall on the group.

(4) Nonverbal Communication. Since advisors will often have to work through interpreters, nonverbal communication is very important. Some cultures respect people who mean what they say and maintain their composure. Other cultures respect the eloquence in which something is said or the emotion used to convey it. Where words may be translated improperly, the advisor or his counterpart can hear tone and see emotion.

f. Negotiation Roles. When entering a negotiation, it is very important to know the advisor’s role. There are three major roles associated with negotiation: negotiator, mediator, and arbitrator. Each role has its own techniques and separate functions.

(1) Negotiator. The negotiator role is the most common advisor role. A negotiation is the process by which parties exchange commitments or promises to resolve disagreements and reach settlements. The advisor needs to prepare for each negotiation or he will be at a significant disadvantage during the negotiation session. In order to prepare for a negotiation session the advisor should consider the following:
(a) Examine your options.

• What are you trying to accomplish?
• How important is it to you?
• How important is it to them?
• How much leverage do you have?
• Who is in the position of power?
• What if you can’t agree?

(b) Discover the motivations of your counterpart(s). What are their underlying needs?

(c) List all the scenarios that could satisfy your needs. Add features to these scenarios that increase the opportunity for all parties involved to be satisfied. List and prioritize the interests behind your positions. This helps you determine the “why” behind the “what” (position /solution /demand). Also list what you think the other party’s interests are behind their potential position(s). At the negotiations, the information sharing process (discussing your and their interests) is the basis for the follow-on brainstorming that develops potential solutions that neither of your could have developed on your own due to the fact that before the meeting, neither of you had complete information.

(d) The integrative process seeks to generate a solution that is better than any single party could generate on their own. It is a process that requires trust between parties to share their information so there can be a productive brainstorming process. At times, simple compromises can facilitate the negotiations and help create a win / win outcome. Achieving consensus, not total agreement or satisfaction, is key. A consensus means that all parties are at least minimally satisfied. You strive to maximize the benefits (positive) to each party while minimizing the cost (negatives). This is the hallmark of a skilled negotiator as it creates an agreement that has an increased chance of being effectively executed while simultaneously preserving the relationship.

(e) The negotiator represents one side and has a vested interest in the outcome of the negotiation.

• If the FF asks the advisor to negotiate for them, they expect the advisor to have their best interests in mind. The coalition may try to use the advisor to push their agenda and influence rather than negotiate.
• It is best to avoid conflict of interest situations. The advisor could lose the trust of his counterpart if he blindly pushes the coalition agenda.
• If the FF counterpart desires to take action that is not legally acceptable, the advisor will probably not be able to use commitment techniques discussed earlier. He will probably need to use some form of compliant technique.
• If the FF counterpart is not violating any laws, the advisor should be focusing on commitment techniques. Success will not be achieved quickly. A sample interest based negotiation worksheet is presented in table 14.
### Table 14. Interest-based Negotiation Worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessing the Negotiation Context</th>
<th>Your Side</th>
<th>Other Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong> (Assumed best outcome or solution.)</td>
<td>– What is “our” position?</td>
<td>– What is the other party’s position(s)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Is the position unique to a single organization or must the scope of the position include other organizations (other stakeholders)?</td>
<td>– Do they present any existing agreement to support their position?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Is this a new situation or the continuation of another situation?</td>
<td>– Do they see it as a new situation or the continuation of another situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Are there any existing agreements?</td>
<td>– Is there precedent/tradition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– What does your organization/chain of command/team want to have happen?</td>
<td>– What does the other party’s chain of authority look like? What do you think they will desire as their “best position”?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– What is the rationale for this position?</td>
<td>– What might be the rationale for this position?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests &amp; Priorities (Why do I want the outcome above? How important is the interest?)</th>
<th>Your Side</th>
<th>Other Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– List (and prioritize) your interests in this case. (What is the context/situation/conditions/environment BEHIND your position, driving the negotiation?)</td>
<td>1. From your perspective, what are the overarching issues? What are other stakeholders’ (if any) overarching issues?</td>
<td>1. From their perspective, what are the overarching issues? What do they think ours might be? (Avoid mirror imaging, strive to put issues in their context.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. From your perspective, what are issues specific to this region outside of this individual case (economic, political, cultural, etc.)?</td>
<td>2. From their perspective, what are issues specific to this region (and/or other interested parties with power) outside of this individual case (economic, political, cultural, etc.)? What are their issues? Why might they be interested in the negotiations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. From your perspective, what are issues specific to this individual case (for example: SOFA, laws, existing contracts/agreements, maximize a gain or minimize a loss, political issues, economics, tradition, etc.)? Do you see this as an individual case or part of a larger situation?</td>
<td>3. From their perspective, what are issues specific to this individual case? What might their perceptions be of ours? Does the other party see this as an individual case or part of a larger situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Identify your stakeholders. What are the stakeholder’s positions and interests? What are their relationships with the other parties and with each other? Who has power, why and how can it be affected?</td>
<td>4. Identify their potential stakeholders. What are their positions and interests? What are their relationships with your parties and with each other? Who has power; why and how can it be affected?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Are there any interrelations between issues? (For example, if I execute an action because of this case, what will the effect be on my relationship with other parts of their government? Might other parties [i.e., stakeholders] relationships change? How and why?)</td>
<td>5. What does the other party see as the interrelations between issues? (For example, if they execute an action because of this case, what might the effect be on other elements of their relationship with your stakeholders?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interests & Priorities (continued)

6. What does your side want the situation to be AFTER the negotiations conclude? (What is/are the long-term interest(s))? Do all stakeholders share the same long-term goal?

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)

BATNA: an action that may be pursued by your side without any consultation or agreement by the other party.

– Determine your options if you “leave the table” that you can execute unilaterally?
– Within each option, what is /are the desired response(s) from the other party?
– Within each option, what action by the other party might trigger this event?
– Within each option, how might your stakeholders respond?
– Within each option, what are some possible consequences that are undesirable to your position?
– Within each option, how will executing the option affect your long-term relationship with the other party? With your stakeholders?
– Within each option, how much does the other party know about the option? How much power/ability do they have to weaken your BATNA options?

A BATNA may be pursued by the other party without any consultation or agreement by you.

– Determine the other party’s options if they “leave the table” that they can execute unilaterally?
– Within each option, what is/are the desired response(s) they might desire from you?
– Can they impact a stakeholder that can exert influence on your BATNA?
– Within each option, what action by you might trigger this event?
– Within each option, how might their stakeholders respond? How might your stakeholders respond?
– Within each option, what are some possible consequences that are undesirable to their position? To their stakeholder’s position? To your position? To your stakeholder’s position?
– Within each option, how will executing the option affect their long-term relationship with you? With your stakeholders?
– Within each option, how much do you know of the details? How much power/ability do you have to weaken their BATNA options?

Agenda for the meeting

— What is the most appropriate approach, presenting your “full proposal” or going “issue at a time”? Consider:
– Broaden/narrow the scope: Should you add or subtract issues from the table to help to create a common interest?
– Are there automatic de-railers? How might you avoid them?
– What will your opening statement be in the “first 90 seconds”? What do you expect the other party’s “first 90 seconds” to be?
– Who should go first? What should go first? An easy issue (trust building?) or a hard issue?

(2) Mediator. An advisor may find himself in the position of mediator. In Western Culture, a mediator is defined as one who is not known to either party, has an impartial stance in any outcome of the mediation, and has no decision-making authority. In many other cultures, a mediator is a known respected person who sometime has a stake in the outcome and at times has decision-making authority. Before embarking in the role of a mediator, ensure you understand the cultural
expectations and adjust as needed. As a minimum, you must be seen as an honest broker, able to understand all aspects of the argument and guiding the disputing parties to their own solution with a minimum of direction on your part. Table 15 outlines some potential mediator roles. As a reminder, these roles must be compared to the local cultural norms and adjusted as needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>When to Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>You are not a player.</td>
<td>No influence. Their decision, their outcome.</td>
<td>Focus on process.</td>
<td>Participants will agree on their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulator</td>
<td>You coach both players.</td>
<td>Indirect influence. They think your solution was their idea.</td>
<td>Focus split between process and results.</td>
<td>Participants need help to agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulator</td>
<td>You are a player.</td>
<td>Direct influence. They know you are trying to get them to agree.</td>
<td>Focus on results.</td>
<td>Participants will not agree without external pressure or incentives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Facilitator Tactics.
- Make yourself available to meet with each party as they desire or as you need to.
- Only share information with one party that the other party allows you to share.
- Arrange for interaction.
- Clarify the situation.
- Supply missing information.
- Transmit messages between parties.
- Ensure all interests are discussed.

(b) Formulator Tactics.
- Make yourself available to meet with each party as they desire or as you need to.
- Only share information with one party that the other party allows you to share.
- Control the pace, formality, and physical environment of the meetings.
- Highlight common interests.
- Help parties save face.
- Keep process focused on the issues.
- Make substitutive proposals.
- Suggest concessions parties could make.
(c) Manipulator Tactics.

- Make yourself available to meet with each party as they desire or as you need to.
- Only share information with one party that the other party allows you to share.
- Keep parties at the table.
- Change parties expectations.
- Highlight costs of non-agreement.
- Reward concessions.
- Promise resources.
- Threaten the withdrawal of resources.
- Offer to verify compliance.
- Threaten to withdraw mediation.

(3) Arbitrator. The FF may try to put the advisor in the position of arbitrator. Arbitration is the process by which disputing parties submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial source selected by mutual consent or statutory provision. The advisor is in trouble when they are looking for him to make a decision between two FF positions. If a win/win solution can be found, the advisor will improve his rapport with both parties but a win/lose situation will alienate one or both groups. If the FF is constantly seeking decisions from the advisor, the advisor should reassess his level of involvement to avoid the arbitrator role.

g. Confrontation Preference and Expected Outcomes. Negotiators will have one of three preferences for confrontation: avoidance, collaboration, or competition. Those that prefer avoidance will consider accommodation as a viable means to resolve an issue. A negotiator that prefers collaboration considers compromise as the preferred outcome while the competitor wants to win. Intentionally losing in a negotiation to avoid confrontation seems counterintuitive; however it tends to protect the current relationship. Collaboration requires a mutual respect of the existing relationship, while competition is generally indifferent. For example: consider the situation where one friend wants to go fishing and another to a baseball game. The avoidance preference would be to value the friendship, give in, and go to the game. But if that person was inclined to collaboration, they might suggest, taking a radio on the fishing trip. If they were inclined to competition, they would be going fishing with or without their friend. It would be fairly easy to take advantage of a negotiator that prefers to avoid confrontation. At the same time, expecting to be able to compromise with a highly competitive negotiator may become a point of frustration. For the competitor, winning may be more important than the deal itself. Some of the characteristics associated with each type of negotiation perspective or start position are listed in table 16.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 16. Negotiation Perspectives/Positions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positional Soft/Avoidance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants are friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal is agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make concessions to reach agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change your position easily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make offers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclose your bottom line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept losses to reach agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insist on agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid contest of wills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yield to pressure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Negotiation Focus. Defining whether the negotiation is a win/win situation is not as simple as which side gained the most tangible material from the negotiation. Military negotiators often focus primarily on physical outcomes where as diplomats focus on relationships. Every negotiation will vary on which factor is more important. Just as a car dealer may accept less profit on individual services, he gains overall, if the customer returns because the customer trusts the dealer.

8. Developing Skills

a. Advising Levels. Every advisor is required to developing skills for: teaching, coaching, and advising. The advisor will make an initial assessment of the FF unit’s proficiency, in order to start with the appropriate developing skill. Figure 9 illustrates the appropriate level of advice that corresponds to the FF unit’s capabilities.
b. Teach, Coach, Advise. Advisor teams have limited positional power and depend upon personal influence in order to positively affect FF efforts via teach, coach, or advise. Advisor team members often work with people of higher rank or grade than themselves. Advisors should remain cognizant of FF unit experience and capabilities to carefully choose opportunities for injecting or imparting knowledge. FF units are normally agreeable to advisor teams who teach unobtrusively. Advisors who are subtle in their approach to teaching, coaching, and advising are highly valued by FF units. Advisors who make FF personnel feel they are teaching themselves are often the most effective.

(1) Teaching. Teaching includes training and education. Methods of teaching can include classroom lectures, seminars, exercises, or simulations.

(2) Coaching. Coaching refers to guiding someone through a set of tasks to enhance capabilities already present. Those being coached may or may not realize their potential. The coach helps them understand their current level of performance and instructs them on how to reach the next level of knowledge and skill. Coaching requires identification of short and long term goals and devising plans to achieve those goals. The coach discusses strengths and weaknesses with the person to sustain improvement. Coaches use the following guidelines:

   (a) Focus goals.
   (b) Clarify the leader’s self-awareness.
   (c) Uncover potential.
   (d) Eliminate developmental barriers.
(e) Develop action plans and commitment.

(f) Follow up.

(3) Advising. Advisors have experience in their advising areas but are not required to have similar backgrounds.

(a) Advisors provide expert opinion, advice, or counsel by focusing on both personal development (interpersonal and communication skills) and professional development (technical and tactical knowledge) to develop mutual trust and respect.

(b) Advisor relationships are not based on superior to subordinate relationships.

(c) Figure 10 shows how teach, coach, advise aligns with corresponding FF tasks of learn, practice, execute. As FF masters one skill, the advisor can move on to other skills and initiate the process again for new skills. If they require additional teaching or coaching the advisor can focus them on one part of the cycle. Eventually, the teaching and coaching should decrease, and the majority of the advisor’s time will be spent as an advisor providing an expert second opinion.

![Figure 10. Advisor Cycle](image)

(d) Every advisor has to be a trainer, but not all trainers can perform the more demanding task of advising. Training occurs in a controlled environment with the trainer frequently following a fixed program of instruction in order to improve unit skills, whereas advising often requires the advisor to develop a training program and then coach or advise the unit under actual circumstances where the outcomes are real. The advisor works to improve the performance of the unit in real time as the mission is executed. In order to be effective, personnel selected as advisors need to have both experience as an SME and interpersonal skills.
9. Collective Advisor Skills

a. Collective Skills. Once the advisor team is formed, they must practice their unit combat and survival skills tasks and organize to cover normal functions associated with any team to include member duties and responsibilities. As with individual advisor skills, some are refined prior to deployment and others are learned in country. See figure 11 for collective advisor skills.

![Chart showing practiced as deployment prep, learned before deployment, and learned in country skills]

Figure 11. Collective Advisor Skills

b. Training Foreign Forces.

(1) Training Concept. Training varies according to the FF requirements, force composition, and US/foreign agreements. The goal of the advisor mission is to enable FF counterparts to eventually conduct all instruction and training without assistance from US personnel. Initially, US personnel may find themselves conducting all the instruction through interpreters. Advisor teams will need to use a “train the trainer” concept in order to prepare the FF to be self-sufficient.

(a) Advisors must prepare to be the primary instructors.

(b) Advisors should use the “building block” approach or the “crawl/walk/run” approach for developing FF capabilities. The key is to develop effective procedures FF leaders will accept and maintain. Success will breed success.

(c) The advisor should quickly establish capable FF personnel as primary instructors. This builds rapport, credibility, and friendship.

(d) Advisors use training to build FF leader credibility. Advisors train the leaders and let them lead. They coach and assist the leaders in training their personnel.
(2) Methods of Instruction. Advisors should know their material so that they are not dependent on notes.

(a) Advisors should use hands-on training. It is the absolute best method of instruction. FF officers should be involved in all training events where their troops participate. Hands-on training involves:

- Demonstration.
- Step-by-step walk through.
- Practice.
- Test.

(b) Advisors should not rely on lectures as a method of training. Some FF may be illiterate so advisors cannot rely only on written media.

(c) Advisors should reinforce bottom-up planning and top-down guidance. This takes time, but the FF will be more receptive to this methodology once they see it can contribute to successful missions. Advisors should encourage problem solving at the lowest level.

(d) Advisors should take advantage of low cost solutions that are technology independent such as sand tables or table top exercises.

(e) Advisors can use simulation but caution should be exercised when designing programs around expensive simulation systems.

(f) Advisors reinforce the FF chain of command. Advisors help them solve their problems; they do not solve their problems for them.

c. Common Pitfalls.

(1) Some members of the FF may try to use the advisor as a scapegoat when tough / unpopular decisions have to be made. The FF will take on some of the personality of their advisors. If the advisors are aggressive, confident, and motivated, they may be the same.

(2) Some members of the FF may try to influence their advisors with excuses or even threats to get leaves and passes. Work with the FF leaders to establish an equitable pass and leave policy that supports them in maintaining the standards.

(3) In many parts of the world, directly confronting someone is considered improper and results in FF leaders unwilling to confront individuals about performance. Advisors need to be aware of how they provide feedback and encourage the FF leaders to adopt a command climate that permits constructive criticism.

(4) The FF leadership may attempt to get advisors involved in simple organizational problems that they should be handling. Advisors need to be careful to avoid being seen as decision makers because it will undermine a unit’s morale and cohesiveness.

(5) Tribal, ethnic, economic, caste, racial, or religious discrimination may be common within the AO. The advisor should carefully consider mixing diverse groups to get them to work together. One method to overcome ethnic bias is by promoting
teamwork and basing rewards on merit. Encourage friendly competition between units to build cohesiveness and teamwork.

(6) The advisors’ perception of corruption, nepotism, and graft may be quite different from that of the local society. Family, friends, and affiliated tribe members may receive favored status for appointments, jobs, and other rewards. Advisors must learn the locally acceptable practices and work to change those that inhibit developing professional, cohesive units. Strong leadership, training, and performance-based awards are factors that contribute to managing the problem.

(7) Some leaders will be reluctant to delegate authority. They may feel threatened by anyone around them who is competent or possesses leadership abilities. They may view such people as a threat to their personal position and may attempt to get rid of these perceived competitors. Advisors need to show that truly powerful leaders are those that can maximize the abilities of their subordinates.
Chapter IV

CULTURE AND THE ADVISOR

1. The Importance of Culture

a. Advisors derive much of their effectiveness from their ability to understand and work with foreign counterparts in another culture. This ability is called cross-cultural competence. They understand enough of their own culture and their counterpart’s culture so that they can accurately convey ideas, concepts, and purpose without causing counterproductive consequences.

b. What is culture? In brief, culture is the set of opinions, beliefs, values, and customs that defines the identity of a society. It includes social behavior standards (e.g., how men relate with women, children relate with adults), language (standard of speech), and religion (standards on how man relates with his mortality and creation).

c. The advisor must be aware of the local and FF cultural/historical aspects which influence behavior. Advisor team members must understand the reasons and motivations underlying personal interaction. Advisors must practice patience when dealing with their counterparts. Instead of asserting their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, other cultures tend to interact as members of a group—family, clan, village, neighborhood, and tribe. Group norms guide individual behavior, and other cultures display a high need for social approval.

d. Cultural understanding is not derived from demographic information like that usually provided to the military through country briefs prior to deployment. It is gained from studying and understanding the people’s: religion, history, customs, social and political structures. For a true immersion, it is necessary to live among the people, gradually understanding the subtleties and nuances of their culture.

2. Principles of Culture

a. Several important principles follow from the concept of culture.

   (1) Culture is learned. People are not born with culture. It is learned first in the family and then by other experiences over the life of the individual.

   (2) Culture is adaptive. The customs a group develops are based largely on a particular environment as opposed to attitudes which may change quickly. Values, however, are the slowest to change because they are directly related to beliefs.

   (3) Culture is in a constant state of change. Most cultural change occurs quite slowly, over a period of years in a series of small accommodations to new circumstances. However, rapid cultural change often creates tension (or even violence) as people attempt to reconcile their beliefs and values with the new conditions.

b. As a body of learned behaviors common to a given society, culture acts like a template, shaping behavior and consciousness within a society from one generation to the next. Most of what we observe as the manifest or explicit forms of culture; including
clothing, gestures, and food, are only the surface level manifestations. In other words, these are the most visible but the least important elements of culture.

c. When comparing cultures there is a tendency to focus on how cultures are different from each other. However, cultures are also similar because they are designed to resolve common human problems. Advisors must be familiar with their own culture in order to find common experiences they can use to convey their message. While, focusing on differences will help an advisor avoid areas where common bond are difficult, the similarities will help an advisor find and use those points of similar understanding. In western culture pride is often based on individual achievement; in other cultures pride is more based on group harmony. In group level pride situations, the advisor should emphasize how FF actions would bring credit/harmony to the group.

3. Cultural Training

a. The general methodology for culture training should be first to understand one’s own culture, then learn ways to communicate cross-culturally, and finally to develop a basic understanding of the specific FF culture, to include a knowledge of those items which may appear culturally unusual to the advisor. See table 17 for a list of training recommendations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 17. Cultural Training Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Outline</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Indoctrination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of cultural values and social structures (United States compared to those of the AO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local customs and traditions (for example, greetings and do's and don’ts).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical history (pre-colonial to contemporary and the orientation of each faction or party).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of religion in daily life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to gain acceptance and trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to maintain a neutral perspective (for example, avoiding stereotyping and being aware of bias).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to gain cooperation during investigations and information gathering sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to avoid embarrassing or potentially dangerous situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to recognize and mitigate culture shock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training Tools</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest speakers native to the country of interest (for example, NGO staff, foreign students, recent immigrants, or selected refugees).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others who have worked in or studied the mission area (for example, SOF personnel, diplomats, and scholars).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of briefings, small group discussions, and question and answer periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handouts to augment, not replace, speakers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual media, specifically slides and videos of the mission area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Culture Shock

a. Culture shock is a lack of direction; the feeling of not knowing what to do or how to do things in a new environment; or not knowing what is appropriate or inappropriate.

b. There are four distinct stages in the culture shock process. See figure 12 to view the process and effects of culture shock.

![Figure 12. Stages of Culture Shock](image)

- **Premission**
  - **Enthusiasm**
    - Very positive about the culture.
    - Overwhelmed with impressions.
    - Finds the culture exotic and is fascinated by it.
    - Is largely passive, does not confront the culture.

- **Stage 2**
  - **Withdrawal**
    - Begins to interact with the culture.
    - Finds the culture’s behavior unusual and unpredictable.
    - Begins to dislike the culture and reacts negatively to the behavior.
    - Feels anxiety.
    - Begins to withdraw.
    - Begins to criticize the culture/people.

- **Stage 3**
  - **Reemergence**
    - Begins to understand more of the behavior of the people.
    - Feels more comfortable living in and encountering the culture.
    - Feels somewhat less isolated.
    - Regains sense of humor.

- **Stage 4**
  - **Achievement**
    - Enjoys being in the culture.
    - Functions easily in the culture.
    - Understands culture behavior that differs from own culture.
    - Adopts appropriate behaviors.

- **Postmission**

(c) Culture shock is a normal part of the advisor’s adjustment process. To cope with culture shock be patient, maintain contact (with your team members and new culture), and accept the new culture as being different. Be prepared to accept things in the local culture that will seem culturally wrong to you. Try to learn at least a little bit of the local language as you attempt to reduce stress.

1. The advisor team must understand the effects that culture shock will have on them. All advisors should be aware of how culture shock will affect every member of their team. Culture shock comes from:

   - (a) Living and working for an extended period of time in a different environment.
   - (b) Having values you held absolute brought into question because of cultural differences.
   - (c) Being constantly put into situations where you are expected to function with maximum proficiency but where the rules have not been adequately explained.

2. The feeling of culture shock generally sets in after the first 2 weeks of arriving in a new place. Culture shock occurs because the mind and body have to go through a
period of psychological and physiological adjustment when individuals move from a familiar environment to an unfamiliar one.

(3) The “spoken” rules of a culture (such as favored foods) may not be simple or pleasant to adopt. However, the “unspoken” rules are even more difficult to understand and/or adopt. Creative advisors will be able to extract basic information on why similar acts are performed differently. FF may also have culture-based expectations unfamiliar to the advisors. These situations will occur everywhere during the first few months in a new country.

(4) Some of the differences between life at home and life in a new place are obvious. Other differences not as obvious include:

(a) How people make decisions.
(b) How people spend their leisure time.
(c) How people resolve conflicts.
(d) How people express feelings and emotions, meanings of gestures, facial expressions, and other body language.

(5) Common reactions to culture shock include:

(a) Irritability, even anger directed toward one’s own group or organization.
(b) Feeling isolated or alone.
(c) Tiring easily.
(d) Changes in normal sleep patterns (too much sleep, insomnia).
(e) Suffering minor but persistent body pains, especially in the head, neck, back, and stomach.
(f) Hostility and contempt directed towards local people.
(g) Withdrawal (i.e., spending excessive amounts of time reading or listening to music; avoiding contact with host nationals).

(6) How to fight culture shock:

(a) One of the most important advantages is familiarity with the language used in the new area. An ability to communicate in the new culture, even at a very basic level, goes a long way to reducing and shortening the period of adjustment.
(b) Seek those with previous experience in the area.
(c) Develop a portable hobby.
(d) Be patient, the process of adaptation to new situations takes time.
(e) Learn to be constructive. If you have an unfavorable encounter, learn from it and don’t put yourself in that position again.
(f) Don’t try too hard. Give yourself a chance to adjust.
(g) Learn to include a regular form of physical activity in your routine. This will help combat stress in a constructive manner. Exercise, swim, run, or whatever is appropriate to the area.

(h) Relaxation and meditation have proven to be very positive for people who are passing through periods of stress.

(i) Maintain contact with your teammates. Pay attention to relationships in your organization. This will give you a feeling of belonging and reduce feelings of loneliness and alienation. They also serve as support in difficult times.

(j) Maintain contact with the new culture.

(k) Accept the new culture; do not waste time and energy criticizing it. Focus on getting through the transition. Try to think of one thing each day that is interesting or likeable about this new environment.

(l) Establish simple goals and continuously evaluate progress. Find ways to live with things that aren’t 100% satisfactory.

(m) Maintain confidence in yourself, your organization, and your abilities.

(n) If you feel stressed, look for help. If you do not like your new surroundings and find a lot to criticize, understand there are uncertainties and confusion which will continue. Imagine how a local resident might react to living in the US. Observe how people in your new environment act in situations that are confusing to you. Try to understand what they believe and why they behave as they do.

(o) Avoid judging things as either right or wrong; regard them as merely different.

(p) Remember the methods that have been successful in reducing stress in difficult situations in the past and apply those methods to the present circumstances.

(q) Try to see the humor in confusing or frustrating situations; laughter is often the best medicine.

(r) Accept the difficult challenge of learning to live and function in a new cultural setting. Believe that you can learn the skills to make a satisfactory transition.

(s) Gradually try to apply some of the skills you are learning.

(t) Recognize the advantages of having lived in two different cultures. Meeting people with different cultural backgrounds can enrich your life. Share time with many different people. Avoid having only American friends but maintain strong personal ties to the US. Think about ways to help local residents learn how Americans believe and act.

(u) Acknowledge even slight progress in adjusting to the new culture. Recognize that, like many who have adjusted to difficult and alien environments, you can and will make a successful adjustment to the new culture.

5. Advisors and Cultural Relations

a. Setting the Example. Setting the example for your counterpart must be an ongoing effort in order to avoid the appearance of a “do as I say, not as I do” attitude. In setting
the example, the advisor should make every effort to explain to the counterpart that what he is doing is the most effective form of behavior for the situation. This is particularly true when the behavior (or purpose) is not readily understood by the counterpart. In following this guidance, the advisor may also reinforce his perceived competence.

b. Compromise. When seeking compromise with your FF counterpart, the advisor may create a situation in which the counterpart has a personal interest in successful execution. In some cultures, seeking a compromise may also be desirable to allow the counterpart to save face. Furthermore, in certain situations the counterpart, because of practical experience, may have a better solution to the problem at hand.

(1) Advisors must also recognize that when they seek a compromise in certain cultures, their perceived competence may suffer. This may be mitigated somewhat by approaching the compromise as two professionals (the advisor and the counterpart) reaching a mutual conclusion. Note: There are two areas of concern that must never be compromised for the sake of maintaining rapport—force protection (FP) and human rights.

(2) Advisors must prevent their counterpart or his subordinates from attempting to work the advisor team into the FF chain of command. Advisors provide recommendations, not orders, to their counterparts. Only the counterpart should issue orders to subordinates.

c. Importance of Family. The concept of family is heavily steeped in religious and cultural norms. The family is one of the most influential elements of social institutions. It is the starting point for the development of all other forms of social organization. Families teach human beings what is demanded of them in the real world and where humans learn to transcend themselves. A person’s first experience with power and authority occurs with the family.

d. Importance of Religion. Because religion is such an integral part of culture, careful mission preparation and analysis should examine the religions and religious groups in the AO for a given mission. Most of the people of our world practice religion and many take it very seriously. Religious beliefs, leaders, and institutions are central to the worldview of many societies. The impact of religion on the local population must be considered when planning any operation.

e. Importance of Language. Language is the ultimate communication barrier and thus fundamentally important for cross-cultural communications. The greater the proficiency in the local language, the quicker an advisor can effectively communicate. Reaching a communication level that permits the advisor or liaison to understand nuances and inferred or implied messages vastly enhances mission accomplishment. While proficiency using an interpreter can be substituted for language ability; interpreter usage always diminishes the capability to effectively and confidently communicate. Both language proficiency and the proper use of interpreters require significant training. Appendix D, “Interpreter Support,” discusses the use of interpreters and translators. As a minimum, the successful advisor should study common language phrases used in the AO.
f. Developing Rapport. Setting the example, being open to compromise, and recognizing the importance of family, religion, and language can contribute to developing good rapport with FF counterparts. Advisors succeed or fail based on the rapport they develop with their FF counterpart. This rapport provides the lubricant that makes combat advising operate smoothly amidst the differences of cultural, personal, and linguistic environments. When thinking about rapport between an advisor and a FF counterpart, focus on developing mutual understanding, respect, and trust.

(1) Understanding. Broaden your knowledge of the area that you will operate in by studying its history, politics, language, society, and culture. Interpreters can also offer valuable insight into local culture.

(2) Respect. Maintain your integrity and look for admirable qualities that you respect in your counterpart and show a sincere interest in your counterpart.

(3) Trust. An advisor-counterpart relationship will eventually develop into strong trust when built on shared understanding and respect. Understand what comprises a promise in the local culture. Show that you are reliable and follow through on your commitments. Do not give the impression of a promise for anything that you might not be able to deliver.

g. Personal Issues. Undoubtedly, FF counterparts will want to speak with advisors about personal issues. Here are some guidelines for dealing with personal questions.

(1) Be careful when talking about religion, regardless of your personal beliefs.

(2) Be careful regarding talk about women. You may shame your counterpart.

(3) Be careful if asked about sex, drugs, or alcohol. Being asked may be a way of testing you to see if you are honorable or not.

h. Chain of Command Communications. Effective communication is essential for an advisor-counterpart relationship. The use of proper channels should be stressed at all echelons. Advisors must keep the FF unit leaders informed of advice given to FF subordinates. Fellow US personnel should also be kept informed of advice offered to counterparts. FF officers should be persuaded to pass information up, down, and across the chain of command.

i. Customs and Courtesies. Local customs and courtesies should be observed. Advisors should seek to understand the customs and social structure on which they are built, such as local tribal dynamics. Counterparts that are senior in grade should be treated accordingly. If warranted by the FF customs, senior-ranking personnel should be saluted. Such individuals should be referred to by their rank (as customs permit) and shown respect and deference. Although FF officers may have no command authority over the advisor, effectiveness is greatly enhanced when the advisor displays respect for the counterpart and the FF chain of command.

j. Social Dynamics. Human beings throughout the world have developed various methods of social organization based on varying/fluid or fixed/rigid social identities. Often times, social organization and social identity are overlapping constructs, which are occasionally in conflict with one another. If advisors look at their own lives, they can see various layers of social identity and organization similarly in conflict with one
another. At the core of any culture is the structure of the society. Societal structures can range from nationalistic to tribal. The most common social structure that advisors will encounter in the developing world will be tribalism. Tribalism is a normal cultural component in a large portion of the world. Common themes in tribal cultures are: pride, revenge, hospitality, honor, brotherhood, and warrior ethos.

(1) Understanding Tribalism. Many US forces do not understand tribalism but there are several benefits to individuals in a tribal society.

(a) Tribes serve as a social safety net in countries lacking strong centralized governments.

(b) Tribes provide a sense of belonging and community.

(c) Tribes spread responsibility and risk away from individuals.

(d) Tribes are designed to prevent all out warfare and chaos. Individual tribal debts of blood and honor serve as a surrogate to warfare.

(e) Individuals are viewed mostly as how they serve the tribe.

(2) Tribal Dynamics.

(a) The advisor should seek to understand the specific tribal dynamics within the indigenous forces he is advising and the local populace. Do not ask a tribe member to do something that is contrary to the wishes of his tribe (i.e., go arrest a relative). The advisor must appeal to the tribal sense of honor and warrior ethos to influence tribe members. Figure 13 below illustrates the loyalties found in tribal culture and is representative of most tribal societies.

![Figure 13. Tribal Society](image)

(b) While tribalism exists in many forms, it is generally characterized by familial bonds strengthened through intermarriage and the possession of a common tribal origination. Tribes develop norms and rules that structure behavior towards members of the tribe as well as toward other tribes. Generally, these rules regard the welfare of the tribe over the welfare of the individual. These rules...
generally focus on structuring the competition for resources, spouses, and power as well as establishing forms of social welfare. At times, these rules may come into conflict with other means and modes of social organization, such as national or religious laws.

(3) Tribal Structures. Ethnic, religious, and civic nationalism are relatively new forms of social organization/social identity that will often conflict with tribal norms and rules. In counterinsurgency efforts to establish, build, and strengthen national governments, dealing with tribalism is a vital and difficult task. Even within a single theater the nature and challenges presented by different tribal structures will vary both geographically and across tribes. Knowledge of tribal organization and identity is highly localized and will require time with focused intelligence gathering in order to develop the knowledge of tribal structures required to strengthen support for the government and assist the government in defeating the insurgency in the advisor’s AO.

(4) Traditions and Rules. Tribal rules and traditions provide both challenges and opportunities for the counterinsurgent. A thorough knowledge of tribal governance and traditions is required in order to tailor actions across the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, people, and time (PMESII-PT) spectrum. Rules and traditions are often comprehensive and regulate political action (ties to the government and other tribes), economic behavior (smuggling, farming, toll-taking), and social behavior (roles of men, women, and children, marriage, divorce). Tribal rules may provide means through which to tie recalcitrant tribes into evolving government structures. Conversely, some tribal structures are extremely egalitarian with little or no sanction placed on a head of household who “opts out” of a given tribal action. Rules and traditions will vary across tribes and may even vary across the same tribe. Also, long periods of conflict and noncontiguous geographic arrangements may weaken the role of tribal law. Detailed understanding of tribal rules and traditions must generally be gained through interaction with tribal elders and determination of the extent to which these rules are followed.

(5) Identity. Tribal identity can be fluid or fixed. It may be subordinate or superior to other identities, e.g., religious identity, national identity, ethnic identity, or familial identity. Identity may vary across the tribe. Tribal identity may be enmeshed with ethnic or religious identity or may be separate and cut across ethnic and religious lines. Often, tribal identity is stronger in rural areas and weaker in urban areas. Also, geographic dispersion into noncontiguous enclaves can weaken tribal identity, especially in areas where different tribal organizations are commingled. Tribal identity is often compartmentalized into ethnic or supra-tribal identity and sub-tribal identity (and even into smaller categories or branches). A tribal member will often consider himself first as a member of the closest smallest group: e.g., branch “w” of sub-tribe “x” as opposed to a member of sub-tribe “x” from tribe “y,” or a member of tribe “y” from ethnic group “z.” Generally, the smaller the tribal affiliation (i.e., a branch of a sub-tribe), the stronger the identity will be. Different sub-tribes within the same tribe may compete over resources and power. A strong sense of tribal identity among members of FF can result in conflicts within or between nascent national forces and prevent effective units from evolving unless there is intervention by
advisors. The stronger a sense of tribal identity, the more important it is that counterinsurgents utilize tribal leadership and structures to tie groups into the national government. Counterinsurgents with in-depth knowledge of tribal identity can exploit different areas of tribal identity by separating or bringing together various elements of the tribe.

(6) Boundaries. The geographic extent, distribution, and contiguousness of a tribe are vital to understanding the implications of a particular tribe within the advisor’s AO. Generally the larger the geographic area of a tribe, and the more contiguous its tribal boundaries, the more power tribal leaders will have over the actions of their tribe. Additionally, small but contiguous enclaves of different tribal groups in close proximity to one another may create a highly unstable environment, albeit one that is ripe for manipulation by the astute counterinsurgent. Often administrative boundaries, including district, province, and even national boundaries, will not align with tribal boundaries. This is particularly true in countries where colonial powers arbitrarily drew boundaries without consideration of tribal demarcation lines.

(7) Tribal Ties. In order to deal with issues arising from tribes, governors or sub-governors and foreign forces from adjoining administrative areas will need to work jointly with tribal leaders in order to develop solutions for tribally-based problems. This may include working with leaders across national borders. Geographically dispersed tribes who exist in small enclaves across wide swaths of land will generally have weaker tribal governance structures, increasing the importance of local tribal leaders. That said, tribal ties are often maintained across geographical space through intermarriage and visits. Dispersion is used to maintain trading routes and economic activities, such as smuggling. These tribal ties may allow insurgents to operate in one area while exploiting administrative and military boundaries in another area. In order to deny safe haven, FF requires detailed understanding and coordination by military and civilian leaders to prevent any exploitation.

(8) Access to Patronage. In most tribal constructs, tribal leadership is expected to provide patronage to tribe members in the form of wealth, jobs, and other goods. Generally, effective tribal leaders will bankrupt themselves on these provisions, setting the stage for others to step in. However, conflict situations, illicit trade, and government corruption can result in upsetting the normal fluctuating balance of patronage goods available. Understanding the means of obtaining and distributing patronage is vital for counterinsurgents who wish to use tribal structures to support effective counterinsurgency.

(9) Tribal Leadership. Leadership in tribal systems varies across tribes, and it is vital to understand both who the leaders are and the nature of tribal leadership. Some are based on kinship to the leader passed from brother to brother or father to son. In other cases, religious connections may result in leadership positions within the tribe. In times of conflict, traditional leadership may become destabilized and military capability, i.e., the ability to provide security, can result in new leaders arising outside of traditional nobility or religious families. Intra-tribal conflict is often the result of conflicting claims on leadership, particularly based on post-conflict rivalries between tribal elders. Conflicting claims on tribal leadership can result in
significant unrest, and leaders may turn to either the government or the insurgency in order to gain support for their claims. Advisors in a counterinsurgency must understand the leadership dynamics of a tribe to ensure they are dealing with the underlying causes of unrest in a particular area and not simply fueling ongoing intra-tribal rivalry. In addition, areas where leadership remains relatively stable and unchallenged present opportunities to gain tribal support through close collaboration with tribal leaders.
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Chapter V

EQUIPPING ADVISOR TEAMS

1. Equipment Considerations

a. Advisor teams must be equipped appropriately to accomplish their mission and some teams have a standing table of equipment (T/E). Mission analysis and bottom up refinement from advisors already in the field should be used to validate/modify the baseline T/E or develop a completely new one. Once an appropriate equipment list is determined the advisor commands, teams, and individuals should understand how equipment is procured, maintained, and tracked. Commands should understand the funding authorities involved and when possible track advisor equipment expenses with unique funding codes. Understanding the advisor’s organizational relationship (see chapter II) with higher, adjacent, and/or supporting commands assists in obtaining required equipment. Once equipped, the advisor must constantly reassess the equipment needed for the mission in order to provide feedback to higher headquarters and follow-on teams.

(1) Integrating With FF. Equipping advisors differs from equipping traditional combat formations in that advisors must consider FF equipment. Working with foreign forces creates unique equipment needs for advisors. Advisors must conduct regular equipment evaluations as part of regular assessments of the mission, AO, and FF. This also applies to teams that "fall in" on pre-existing equipment sets which may not support current conditions. Some of the reasons for fresh analysis of equipment requirements are as follows:

(a) Hostile forces develop TTP that make the current equipment set obsolete.

(b) FF acquire new equipment or upgrades to current equipment.

(c) Technological changes in the environment (e.g., emplacement of cell phone networks where none previously existed or the loss of such a network due to hostile action) may require changes in equipment.

(2) Internal and External Equipment. Before generating equipment lists, consideration must be given to both internal and external equipment. Internal equipment applies to that equipment the individual or team needs to perform internal functions; external equipment relates to individual or team functions that involve interaction with the FF. For example, if the FF is equipped with Russian weaponry, Russian weaponry could be considered an external equipment need for an advisor team working with a FF infantry unit requiring weapons training. An internal equipment requirement could be cryptology equipment necessary to communicate with higher or adjacent commands. Equipment has become more complex with the introduction of electronic countermeasures, tracking devices, worldwide positioning tools, and language equipment. Equipment is continually developing to reflect new technologies. Advisor teams should be afforded the opportunity to evaluate and if necessary, incorporate these technologies into their equipment sets. However, the
team leader must be aware of his authorized operating budget and any fiscal restraints set by higher headquarters.

(3) Communications. Consideration for type and amount of communications equipment is driven by the advisor’s need to communicate with internal and external contacts. Controlling fires, especially terminal control of aircraft, requires special equipment located with the advisor. Secure automated data processing equipment (ADPE) must be capable of connecting with theater support agencies as well as operating in distributed environments. For example, reach back via secure means to national or theater assets may be necessary to support intelligence driven operations. In the event of kinetic operations, advisors do not possess supporting arms assets and must rely completely on other agencies to provide this capability. Communicating with FF may require additional communication equipment. For example: the advisor team may rely on US radio equipment for communications internally, but the foreign military commander may only have access to a cell phone. Advisors need secure communications capabilities.

(a) Internal communication requirements.
- Intra-team / intra-vehicle communications.
- Electronic positioning—global positioning system (GPS).
- Counter radio controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare (CREW).

(b) External communications requirements.
- Higher headquarters; adjacent, and/or supporting commands.
- Terminal control of aircraft.
- Control of fires.
- Battlefield tracking.
- With FF units.
- Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) / medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

(4) Logistical Support. While not every advisor team may have a logistics specialist, it is incumbent upon the advisor to understand how the advisor team will be supported, and the advisor must task someone to be responsible for each of the functions listed below. The advisor must ensure that each function is planned and required equipment is available to accomplish the mission. If operating in an area that has a US military commander, the commander must make arrangements for the advisor team(s) to be included in that commander’s logistics plan. There are six main categories of logistical considerations.

(a) Health Services. Where are the nearest medical facilities? What is the plan to get to those facilities? Who on the advisor team is responsible for the medical plan and for triage? Where is the next higher echelon of care? Are partner nation reciprocal status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) available?

(b) Maintenance. Coordination with maintenance activities is necessary. In some areas, services will be available locally and in other places the advisor must seek maintenance assistance through civilian contractors.
(c) Transportation. What requirements are there for transportation (cargo, passengers, distance, on/off road, armored vehicles)? Some advisor teams may be confined to small compounds or bases. Others will need to blend in with vehicles common to the AO. What are the limitations on transportation (type of fuel available; licenses required by Service and local government)? What is the availability of FF equipment?

(d) General Engineering. What structures are needed that are not already available? What improvements need to be made? The method used to support the advisor must remain within the limits of Title authorities. Adding infrastructure may not be within those legal limitations.

(e) Other Services. How will sanitation (trash and sewage removal) be accomplished? Is there a requirement for electricity? If so, how much? How is laundry being done? How is the foreign force addressing these issues?

(f) Supply. Where does the advisor receive supplies? Will there be an emphasis on large internal support (e.g., equipment maintainers internal to the team may need repair parts)? Ten categories of supply items should be considered.

- Subsistence. Are food stuffs (e.g., meals, ready to eat [MREs], Kosher meals, Hallal meals, humanitarian rations) and water provided?
- Organizational Equipment. Will the advisor team need body armor, uniforms, mosquito netting, or cold weather clothing? What types of batteries are required?
- Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL). What type of fuel will the advisor team use? What fuels and oils will the foreign force use?
- Engineer Equipment. Will the advisor team be setting up TCPs that need concertina wire? Is there a requirement for engineering stakes?
- Ammunition. Consider resupply of ammunition.
- Sundries. Toiletries may be hard to come by in some remote areas.
- Principal End Items. Does the advisor team have all of the vehicles, communications equipment, or tools necessary for the mission?
- Medical Items. Advisors in high-intensity areas often use their individual first aid kits and need to resupply them.
- Repair Parts. To what degree will your advisor team be maintaining equipment? Operator preventive maintenance (PM) requires at least a minimum of parts. Distance from the maintenance activity may require repair parts located with the team.
- Equipment for Foreign Countries (tractors, generators, teapots, etc.). The advisor’s mission may require assisting the security cooperation officer (SCO) by teaching foreign forces how to use equipment obtained through the foreign military sales (FMS) program.

(g) Contracting Support. The advisor team leader must be aware of which organization in his chain of command will provide contracting support to the team.
2. Introduction to FF Logistics

While taking care of the team’s logistical needs can seem like a full-time job, advising the FF logistical counterpart may be the primary mission. Advisor teams can teach, coach, and advise their counterparts in all aspects of logistics which includes accounting for property; maintaining property books; requesting, storing, and distributing all classes of supplies; and performing unit level maintenance or establishing a maintenance program if one is not already in place. In addition, advisors may have to request contracts to improve their FF’s area of operations through host nation construction companies. Additionally, advisors keep their higher logistics advisors informed of any logistical function the FF counterpart is performing through their logistical system.

a. Dealing with FF Logistics. It is critical that advisors have a good working relationship with their FF counterpart. If you are unsure on an issue say “no” and work the problem to a successful outcome later. The loss in credibility to working relations with your counterpart from an empty promise is hard to recover.

(1) Typical Problems: The focus here needs to be on generic and experience-based problems. Many FF fight well; but have problems with logistics. This problem is very complex: (1) they may have underfunded logistical systems which lack command emphasis or are subject to corruption from point of issue to point of delivery, and (2) many officers, and NCOs won’t think past today much less tomorrow, next week, or next month. The lack of understanding or emphasis on logistics leads to a lack of bench stock, poor fuel planning, and an unworkable system of resupply.

(2) Team Logistics and Logistical Advising: The logistics officer will have a dual role on the team serving as the joint multifunctional logistical officer for the team and as the logistical advisor to the FF logistics officer. The logistics officer will be required to support the team’s logistical needs for classes of supply (CL I, II, III, IV, V, VII, IX), and provide logistical coaching, teaching, and mentoring to the FF counterpart in regards to the same classes of supply. Additionally, the advisor may be expected to request contracts for either their team or their FF for a variety of reasons.

b. Property Accountability/Property Book. It is important that during the relief-in-place (RIP) process with the out-going team, you ask your out-going counterpart if they have an equipment roll-up of what has been issued up to the RIP date. The list will serve as the base document for tracking how much equipment, by major end item, has been issued to the FF unit via coalition or local government. During your tour, you will add any CL VII items that are issued to keep track of your percent fill per major end item for when you are asked by your higher HQ for information regarding the amount of CL VII issued to your FF unit. See the example below in table 18.
Table 18. Property Accountability Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Short</th>
<th>% Fill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM MACHINEGUN</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEVY LUV</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEVY SILVERADO</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARGO TRKS</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUEL TRAILERS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF RADIO H/H</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Tracking FF Equipment. Equally important is your ability to track how much property your FF unit has issued down to their subordinate units by major end item. Build a good working relationship with your FF counterpart in order to determine the FF commander’s written authorization for CL VII distribution. Additionally, you will need to keep your own property book showing advisor unit current CL VII status with entries depicting the subordinate unit’s issue by major end item. Your FF counterpart may already have a working property book that you can bounce numbers off of to ensure a somewhat accurate document. You will most likely have to work through your interpreters to translate both documents if your counterpart is unable to read or speak the English language. See example below in table 19.

Table 19. Property Book Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AK-47</th>
<th>Issued</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date: 15 JUL XX</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV HQ</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade (Bde)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 AUG XX</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV HQ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Request/Store/and Distribute all Classes of Supply.

1. Before you request classes of supply, you will need to determine the SOP for requesting supplies within your FF logistical system. You can ask them what forms they use; their forecasting requirements, and where to send requests. In addition, you will need to ask your advisor team logistics chain of command what the procedures are for oversight and tracking of requests.

2. Once supplies have arrived at your FF’s base, you should advise your FF counterpart on inventory and storing controls to ensure the safety and security of the supplies.
(3) Once supplies have been inventoried and secured, you and your FF counterpart will assess all subordinate units for supply shortfalls. Ideally, you want your counterpart to tell you the best way to distribute the supplies by filling the units who have the most shortages. However, you may have to help your counterpart with identifying the best way to distribute the supplies. No matter who came up with the plan, it is best to give your counterpart full credit for the idea. However, normally the FF logistical officer does not have the final say in the distribution. The logistical officer will bring the suggestion to the unit commander for the final distribution decision. Be aware that unit commanders may use property and supplies as a form of leadership. If the commander wishes to reward a subordinate commander, he might give him more property or supplies. In addition, a unit commander may show his power by waiting for subordinate commanders to ask him for supplies or property.

e. Unit Level Maintenance.

(1) Your FF counterparts may or may not put emphasis on performing preventative maintenance, checks, and services (PMCS) on their equipment. One reason is that they may not have spare parts or lubricants within their own system. Ask through the advisor logistics channels if there is a maintenance contract, repair parts, or lubricants available for FF use through the US system.

(2) You may be amazed at the level of maintenance that your FF counterparts are able to perform. Out of necessity, FF units with inadequate supply systems are often very skillful at cannibalization. They will do whatever it takes to keep their vehicles fully mission capable. However, they may not understand the importance of performing PMCS to prevent maintenance problems.

(3) There are few PMCS manuals in foreign languages for your FF counterparts to use in order to perform the correct preventative maintenance. In addition, your counterpart may have many different vehicles in his motor pool with no manuals, no organic trained mechanics, and no spare parts. You will have to work through this issue the best you can. There is no magical answer to solve the problem. The only answer is to find an effective solution as you work through the issue.

f. Contracting.

(1) In case you need to build, purchase, or service something beyond the limits or authorities of the advisor team, you can submit a request for proposal or a request for quotation to the higher headquarters J4 that provides contracting support to the team. For example, if you need to put armor on your FF vehicles to increase survivability, then a contract will be required to purchase the armor and install it on the vehicle. Another example may be to purchase air conditioner units (to include installation) for your FF offices or a detainee area. A contract must be awarded in order to purchase and install these units.

(2) The contracting process begins with the logistics advisor, but the final approving authority may reside at the general officer level. All contracts must be fully vetted to ensure that they remain within the limitations of Title funding authority for which they
will be used. The following is an example of a typical contracting process that an advisor may encounter.

(a) The process begins with getting multiple estimates for the work, product, or service.

(b) A statement of work (SOW) is then written. The SOW must be completed in detail. The contract will be written per your statement of work. If you wish a contractor to perform in a certain way, it must be in the statement of work. Ask your outgoing advisor counterpart, a contracting officer in your advisor chain of command, or the J4 for an example.

(c) Next, write a justification letter describing why you need the product, service, or construction.

(d) Finally, a purchase request and commitment (PR&C) and the SOW are submitted through your appropriate approval chain for resourcing. This does not mean that the company you would like to do the work will be chosen for the job. For high dollar amounts, the contracting officer will bid the job regardless of your estimates. When your packet makes it to the contracting office, find the officer or NCO who will be responsible for writing the contract, and be a part of the process. This will increase your ability to influence the outcome of your request.
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Chapter VI

ADVISOR EMPLOYMENT

1. Rules of “Must, Never, and Should”

a. An Advisor Must…

(1) As part of negotiations, the advisor must skillfully present recommendations which explain the advantages to his FF counterpart. During the interaction, however, the advisor must stay within the boundaries of US intent while using influence to ensure his FF counterpart retains ownership of the negotiation outcome. The advisors approach must be based on facts, logical reasoning, and sincere attempts to do what is best for FF and US forces. Advisors must always be cognizant of presenting a negative view of a particular subject—e.g., do not humiliate a FF commander. If possible avoid making recommendations that require an immediate decision. For example, expect subjects that involve religious holidays and operations to take several meetings to gain initial decision-making progress. Counterparts must be allowed to exercise their prerogatives and not appear to be overly dependent on US influence.

(2) The advisor must be aware that some US practices are the product of culture and custom which may not be appropriate in the counterpart’s culture. The best approaches should include local cultural influences and practices to encourage greater FF ownership and understanding.

(3) The advisor must be willing to ask for the counterpart's advice. The FF solutions are often preferable in the long run to “American solutions,” which may only solve short-term issues. In many cases, FF will be experienced in areas of concern like cultural issues or local customs and courtesies.

(4) The advisor must be willing to participate actively in local military, athletic, and social functions. If unable to accept a social invitation, decline with regrets expressed in accordance with local custom and invite counterparts to appropriate social functions. Insure that they are active participants to the maximum extent possible.

(5) The advisor must develop a sense of identity with the counterpart’s unit or geographic area by spending maximum time at the scene of activity. Advising FF is a 24/7 job.

b. An Advisor Never…

(1) The advisor never attempts to command the counterpart’s organization. He must study the counterpart’s personality and background and make every effort to build and maintain friendly relationships, based upon professional respect.

(2) The advisor never conveys the impression that everything is all wrong. A careless word or negative action can severely impair counterpart relations. Instead, an advisor must explain the pros and cons of a decision in tactical and technical terms easily understood by his counterpart. The advisor must then provide
reasonable alternatives supported by local culture and sound tactics. Never be reluctant to criticize when required, but criticism should be couched tactfully. An unwillingness to provide appropriate criticism may leave the impression that the advisor lacks either knowledge or concern. Appropriate and timely corrections can engender respect.

(3) When it comes to promises the old adage of “under-promise and over-deliver” is still a valid tactic. The advisor should only make promises he can legally deliver within the limits of his authority. The advisor who oversells himself may arouse suspicion or create false expectations that cannot be met.

(4) It is critically important for the advisor to be proficient in all combat skills. Mastery of these skills will help establish the advisor’s identity as a professional warfighter. Additional SME skills and combat experience will also help enhance the advisor’s position when the FF counterpart is an experienced combat veteran.

c. An Advisor Should…

(1) The advisor should make “on-the-spot” recommendations to his counterpart whenever appropriate.

(2) The advisor should represent his counterpart or defend the counterpart’s position in disputes with US agencies. However, this support should be based on sound judgment and not blind loyalty.

(3) Advice should be given at appropriate times in appropriate places. The advisor must not harass or browbeat the FF counterpart or any local leader. This is especially critical when the FF counterpart is in the presence of subordinates, as it may degrade his authority.

(4) The advisor should not present too many subjects at once or unnecessarily prolong the discussion of any one subject. Restrict meetings to covering two to three subjects at a time, and permit the FF counterpart to take action in order to correct any deficiencies, prior to re-assessing that particular area. However, do make sure a subject is discussed until the counterpart understands. The advisor must be prepared to deal with slow or small amounts of progress made on subjects discussed with the counterpart. Suggestions and recommendation should be within the counterpart’s authority and capability. Advisors should take care not to strain their relationship with counterpart by asking them to do the impossible.

(5) The US sense of humor is unique and sarcastic or condescending comments should be avoided. The remarks may be misunderstood or resented even if correctly understood. Advisors should strive to ensure all their actions and verbal communications can be fully understood by FF. In addition, tone of voice or body language can change the way something is understood negating its positive value.

(6) Operational transparency is a measure of trust and confidence so frequent inspections of all kinds should be encouraged. Advisors may need to help their FF counterparts understand how frequent inspections help them determine the actual condition of their units. However, advisors should always check information provided by FF unit counterparts discreetly to ensure assessments are accurate.
(7) Initiative and inventiveness should be demonstrated by the advisor and encouraged in his counterpart. The counterpart should be encouraged to carefully consider orders he receives and ask for clarification or permission to deviate when the need is obvious. It may become necessary for the advisor to become increasingly suggestive to his counterpart when the need arises to question orders from the counterpart’s higher command. This situation occurs when social networks and political structures cause the counterpart to “save face” by presenting false understanding and compliance. In addition to “saving face” among higher commands, counterparts may also be reluctant to accept ideas or recommendations from subordinate leaders. This may occur even if the subordinate has valid ideas. The counterpart can be encouraged to accept requests or suggestions from subordinates by highlighting the net gain to unit effectiveness is a reflection of the FF’s leadership.

### 21 Recommended Practices for Working with Counterparts
Taken from experience in Vietnam, Peru, Liberia, and El Salvador

Attitudes, values, and beliefs can vary significantly between various cultural regions. Nevertheless, small, rural towns and villages in the less developed parts of the world have some important commonalities such as resistance to change. Experience has shown that the practices listed below are effective across cultural regions.

1. Become well acquainted with the culture of the people with whom you will work. A thorough knowledge of their culture is the key that will open the door to success. Read all available literature on their culture. Expect cultural shifts to occur more rapidly than described in available literature [country handbooks]. There is no substitute for living closely with the people to absorb their culture.
2. Respect the beliefs and taboos of the local people.
3. Guard the confidence placed in you. Do not divulge intimate secrets.
4. During planning, stay in the background as much as possible. Your role is that of a catalyst.
5. During execution, do not get so far ahead of the counterpart that you will lose them.
6. Be willing to compromise.
7. Keep an open mind and attempt to operate within the cultural pattern as closely as possible.
8. Include casual conversations as one of your advisor tools. Influence can be wielded effectively outside formal settings. Try to employ fables and short stories that are relevant to the local culture and point up a lesson. Ask questions to illustrate a point.
9. Keep a keen sense of humor. Humor and laughter are wonderful tools for building rapport if used in culturally correct ways.
10. Be what you are, don't pretend. Otherwise unsophisticated people often have the knack of looking into your personality.
11. Patience is a golden attribute in working with non-Western people. They may not have the same "drives" as Western people.
12. Expect counterparts to be long on promises and short on deliveries. They have warded off the "haves" for centuries by this method.
13. Do not expect to use your Western measuring stick for honesty and morals. The same values do not apply. Check your measures of effectiveness and how they relate to the indigenous population. If they do not affect the security and trust of the local population, do they really measure success?
14. Live as close to those with whom you work as possible, but don't "go native." You are an ambassador for your country and will be evaluated accordingly.
15. Accept each local national as he is and respect him as an individual. Never look down on a man, but treat him with dignity. In associations with local officers and officials, even village officials, dignify their positions.
16. Take nothing for granted and be prepared for surprises.
17. Do not identify or align yourself too closely with either the "haves" or "have-nots." To be effective, you must have the respect and confidence of both groups.
18. Do not expect to find US democracy duplicated in an overseas democracy. It has taken us centuries to develop ours.
20. The things that don't concern you should be left along. People in developing areas are often inclined to be superstitious and secretive and will guard these with their lives.
21. Work within a team for maximum training possibilities. Even a lone wolf is much more productive when he works with the pack.

—Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Book
US Army Special Warfare School, Oct 2001

2. Team Force Multipliers
a. Battle Rhythm. Balance the advisor team’s daily schedule without being predictive. Ensure team operations security (OPSEC) by developing an advisor team battle rhythm known only by the advisors. The battle rhythm should be flexible with few details to accommodate combat operations, FF training, and team administrative requirements. In order to prevent being overly predictive (to the FF and the insurgent threat that is always watching), it is recommended that teams change their battle rhythm every 30 days if possible. Events to consider for a team battle rhythm are shown in table 20.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 20. Battle Rhythm Events</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Team battle update briefs (BUBs).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Team patrol debriefs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Coalition security meetings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Pre-combat inspections (PCI).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Counterpart time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• FF BUBs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Team maintenance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mission preparation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Officer/NCO professional development (OPD/NCOPD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training preparation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• After action reviews for FF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• FF maintenance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rehearsals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Team physical training.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Local governance meetings.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

b. Plan for Down Time. The rigors of living, working, and fighting alongside FF counterparts will wear an advisor team down over time. Remember advising is a marathon not a sprint. Advisor teams are small by design and over-worked by nature so the team leader should take stock and invest in the mental well-being of the team members. It is highly recommended to have a day of no scheduled activity in the battle
rhythm. This allows the team to unwind and square away personal requirements. Put the down day on the team schedule and enforce compliance.

c. Interagency and Coalition Considerations. As outside assistance increase to the local government, other US personnel may be introduced into the area. At the sector level, the foreign force advisor can expect to find representatives from US governmental or nongovernmental organizations, third country nationals, representatives of private corporations, and local national voluntary organizations involved in tasks like medical care and agricultural development. Assistance brings positive benefits to FF but effective coordination may be required by the advisor to ensure all activities are coordinated for maximum impact. If the advisor has the authority, he should see that interagency agreements are established as soon as possible. In the absence of such authority, he should actively encourage the development of such agreements. The advisor can expect to find certain technical agencies and services that are extensions of local national ministries. Their activities and efforts should be integrated into the overall plan. This requires that the sector-level advisor maintain close coordination with any US representative who normally has responsibility for advising these agencies.

d. Interpreters. The interpreters you receive are critical for your success. They will normally be Category I or II interpreters. Category II interpreters are US citizens that have ethnic ties to the country you are operating in. This type of interpreter has a security clearance, works for the US government, speaks the best English, and can translate foreign documents. Because of their valuable skill sets, there are not many of them. The disadvantage of Category II interpreters is that few have a current and working knowledge of the areas you and your team will be working. Category I interpreters are the most common. They are hired locally by an interpreter service and live in the very communities in which you will be operating. Many speak English with varying levels of competency; some may even be able to translate written documents. They make up for their lack of English acumen by providing you and your team with invaluable intelligence. They can also provide you with knowledge of the people’s perceptions, fears, and motivations. Trusted Category I interpreters may also assist your understanding of militia and insurgent infiltration within the FF. An advisor team will need to screen and selectively share information with their interpreters. If your advisor team has multiple interpreters, identify an additional duty as interpreter manager for your team. This individual will create the division of labor, assignments, and create the pay slips for the interpreter cell. They are your employees, as well as team members. Treat them with dignity and respect, but be aware of their possible loyalties and be discreet when it comes to OPSEC. Arming your interpreters is a touchy issue. Most of the US contracting firms that hire them explicitly prohibit their interpreters from carrying weapons. Many US units may have similar orders in place. You will have to analyze the situation and the tactical environment. This is a “shade of gray” that you may have to deal with. See appendix D for more information on interpreters.

e. Advisor Enablers that Can Assist Your Team. Advisor teams will find many interesting units and organizations operating within their AO. Not only will they see various FF units (army, police, special police) and coalition forces in their area, but they may see various “alphabet soup” intelligence agencies, news media, civilian reconstruction teams, international organizations, NGOs, and possibly United Nations or
US State Department personnel, working in the same area. As an advisor, you can take the lead to help get these organizations work together, or at the very least, be aware of each other. Depending on the team mission and priorities, US SOF can be a combat multiplier for advisor teams. Approach SOF teams in a manner that is mutually beneficial to the advisor team, the SF team, and the FF you are advising. SOF Service members may assist with training your FF in skill sets your adviser team may lack like reconnaissance, sniper, surveillance, and counter-surveillance. The FF will gain from the opportunity to work alongside these subject matter experts and hopefully this enables an exchange of source and intelligence information. The goal is to increase morale and forge bonds and the SOF teams to benefit from better intelligence networks and work relationships with FF in their area. Leverage their experience also to help your team become even better advisors.

3. Training FF

a. Developing the Training / Operations Cycle

(1) FF “Fight-Leave” Training Cycle. In an unstable environment, like COIN, FF units may spend most of their time fighting, when not on leave. After meeting the operational requirements, there is little room left over for training and maintenance. For example, FF may never get a dedicated opportunity to fire their weapons for marksmanship practice outside of basic training and combat. Maintenance may also not be conducted to a standard which ensures reliability. Over time, uniforms, equipment, and individuals become tired, ineffective, and eventually worn out. This battle rhythm is not sustainable and lacks a means to achieve balance between combat, training, maintenance, and rest. One solution would be to help the FF develop and implement a training and operational cycle akin to a US model, but modified to function within FF terms.

(2) FF “Fight-Train-Leave-Fight” Training Cycle. Using an Army example, a battalion-sized model, based on four rifle companies and one headquarters and service company, it is possible to develop a training and operational cycle that balances all four requirements. One COA would be to establish a 20-day cycle, with company rotations occurring every 5 days. Calling it a “Fight-Train-Leave-Fight” rotation, the battalion could implement a system much like a Green-Amber-Red training/operational cycle. The fight or “green companies” would be manned 100% and would execute continuous operations for 10 days straight. Another company, the train or “amber” company, would execute command maintenance on all their assigned equipment and execute individual task training such as first aid, marksmanship, and communication skills for 5 days. The remaining leave or “red” company would be 100% on leave for 5 days. The headquarters and service company could still rotate FF home and have 25% of the support personnel/staff gone at any given time. The specialty platoons would also rotate through training and maintenance along with the rifle companies. If needed, this same model can be used at platoon level. See figure 14.
b. Task-Oriented Training.

(1) Based on an FF agreed METL, a plan for all individual, collective, and leader training can be developed and approved for use by the FF. Much of the training the advisor team provides will come directly from US doctrine and individual advisor experience.

(2) Depending on the composition of your team, you must focus on individual tasks that play to your team’s strengths, while looking to receive outside assistance when accomplishing tasks beyond the advisor team’s capabilities. Outside assistance includes: coalition units, US SOF, US government organizations, and other FF units. Collective task training can best be performed through the assistance of coalition forces when available. Most coalition commanders will expect the advisor team to formulate a training strategy supportive of an agreed upon METL and to monitor the training effectiveness of collective task training.

(a) Some recommended staff individual tasks include:

- Battle tracking (S3).
- Map reading (S3).
- Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) (S2).
- Patrol debrief (S2).
- Personnel accountability (S1 / NCOs).
- Payday activities (S1).
- Equipment accountability (S4).
• Logistics planning (S4).
• Information operations (S3).

(b) Some individual task training regarding basic warrior tasks include:
• Marksmanship (basic and advanced).
• First aid (stop bleeding).
• Rescue breathing.
• Operate a radio.
• Operate a GPS.
• Hand and arm signals.
• Individual movement techniques (IMT).
• Conduct a breach (mechanical and ballistic).
• Conduct tactical site exploitation.

(c) Some effective collective tasks recommended for FF include:
• Move tactically.
• React to contact.
• Enter and clear a room.
• React to an improvised explosive device (IED).
• Conduct enduring traffic control point (TCP) operations.
• Conduct snap TCP operations.
• Conduct search operations.
• Conduct reconnaissance.
• Conduct patrolling.
• Conduct listening post / observation post (LP/OP) operations.
• Conduct rehearsals.
• Conduct maintenance.

c. Teaching Leadership. Most of what your counterparts learn about leadership will be through observing the advisor team. Leadership training should be modeled on the principle of *leadership through example*. It is the advisor's job to instill the values of duty, sacrifice, and humility in the counterpart’s attitude. The effect of this mindset is the creation of a learning organization with professional leaders who are competent and confident. How you train them on these basic values and effects is the art of advising. Part of that art will be for you and your team to demonstrate through your own actions, these same values and effects. Some suggestions include:

(a) Conducting operations (combat patrols, training exercises, etc.) with FF counterparts should become routine and not exceptions to the rule.

(b) Allowing your FF to observe your advisor team as it conducts pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs), operations orders (OPORDs), maintenance, and debriefs.

(c) Training at one level and evaluating two levels down; i.e., a successful battalion has lethal platoons.
(d) Teaching the art of command presence and staff ownership by routinely taking the higher leadership out on subordinate unit missions.

(e) Coaching the FF counterpart to mandate unit after action reviews after every mission.

(f) Initiating rigorous debriefs for every mission.

(g) Coaching the FF counterpart to start an NCO development program run by the senior FF NCOs.

d. Advisor Approach to FF Training.

(1) On-the-job Training. FF learning during combined operations with your advisor team and other partnered coalition forces can be highly beneficial. Advisors are usually equipped to train functional areas and systems development within a FF unit. Unfortunately, defeating insurgents requires more than the military decision-making process (MDMP) and a solid supply system. Bring coalition forces in to assist if the advisor team is unable to provide on-the-job training in certain areas. The advisor team can schedule these combined operations and use them to train the entire FF unit structure. In addition to training the FF while conducting the operation, you can also train the FF staff and FF logistics units to track and support the events.

(2) Integrate and Synchronize Training. A good advisor team will integrate and synchronize individual, staff, unit, and leader training into FF operational requirements. A great advisor team will also teach the FF how to integrate and synchronize training opportunities into their own schedule. The following tips for success can be extremely useful in adding perspective when developing a training plan with the FF.

(a) Be the expert. Ensure your team understands and can execute the standard you are expecting the FF to perform. The FF will model your actions.

(b) Understand foreign disclosure requirements. Much of what can be taught or given to FF is limited by foreign disclosure laws. Teaching mortar employment may be authorized; however, giving them the lesson plans and the protractors may be restricted due to foreign disclosure.

(c) Incorporate their experience level into your training plan. The FF may have differing TTP they have found effective. Be open-minded enough to consider their techniques for the desired training effect you wish to achieve.

(d) Keep a cool head. An even temperament, combined with a robust sense of humor is more effective than losing your temper. Normal US reasons for anger and impatience seldom translate to other cultures.

(e) Know your AO. You may be coaching and training the enemy. Your FF may be infiltrated mildly to heavily by enemy forces. Be aware and if this is the case, focus on the basics but don’t show the FF anything that may prove effective at engaging coalition forces later, i.e., marksmanship training beyond 300 yards or demolitions training.
(f) Immerse yourself in their world. Live, eat, sleep (security permitting), train, and fight with them. Learn some of their language. The confidence you build by doing this is far greater than having the occasional cup of tea with them. They will listen to those they respect.

(g) Learn their doctrine. You are there to reinforce FF systems and doctrine, not to replicate your own. Learn their doctrine and operate/train within it. Get used to centralized command.

(h) Learn their weapons. You must be a SME on your weapons and at least familiar with theirs to successfully coach them on effective employment.

(i) Train their trainers. Teach and coach through FF leadership. This establishes legitimacy for FF’s right to lead and also effectively enables the secondary objective of training more FF over time.

(j) Be present. Your team must have a presence at training events and during operations. The FF will become proficient at what your team reinforces.

(k) Don’t become their supply system. Your team is not the FF version of “just-in-time-logistics.” Train them to use their system or coach them to develop one.

(3) Partnering with Coalition Units for Training. Most coalition units realize “working themselves out of a job” is their primary mission within a COIN environment. Many also realize the key to achieving the goal is to help train FF up to a realistic level of competency. Advisors can greatly assist this effort by making recommendations, planning training, and tracking FF unit effectiveness. You may also try out-sourcing the training of specific tasks with local coalition units that have subject matter expertise. Some helpful training ideas include:

   (a) Partnering with a coalition squad with a FF platoon to train them on PCC/PCI, rehearsals, or marksmanship.

   (b) Partnering a coalition platoon with a FF company to execute battle drills: react to contact, react to ambush, squad attack/platoon attack, react to sniper, and enter or clearing a room.

   (c) Partnering a coalition platoon or squad with an equivalent FF unit to execute snap TCPs, vehicle searches, tactical site exploitation, or platoon cordons.

   (d) Partnering a FF squad or platoon with coalition SOF units to train basic and advanced marksmanship (SF units may have the “hard-to-find” AK-47 sight adjustment tools to assist with zeroing).

   (e) Partnering your FF reconnaissance/strike platoons with SOF units to train them on: close target reconnaissance, raids, point ambushes, and tactical site exploitation.

4. Advising in Combat


   (1) Advisors contribute to the development and improvement of FF capabilities by providing advice and guidance within US command policy. The US chain of
command should be used to obtain and disseminate guidance and assistance. The advisor is responsible for ensuring the intent of the US chain of command is received and understood by the FF. While FF can be effective within their nation, their leadership methods may be different. Units with poor leadership will often benefit from a more active coalition role in mentoring the leadership. Their operations may lack the standardization expected of US units, but often they will achieve equal or better results.

(2) The advisor provides recommendations to FF, not orders. Only the counterpart should issue orders. The FF counterpart is the advisor’s peer not his boss; nor is the advisor the counterpart’s boss. Given the key advising task of conducting bilateral negotiations, the advisor will need to study how to achieve a successful negotiated outcome with the FF counterpart using leverage where appropriate. Much of the success of an advisor will be based on the personal and professional relationship he has with his FF counterpart. Advisor duty is definitely “leadership by example” and the FF counterpart will watch what the advisor does more than listen to what he says. Saving face and avoiding embarrassment are strong motivators for FF leadership. What is obvious to us is not obvious to them and vice versa. Clear communications are essential. Advisors must make sure what was said equates to what was understood. Politeness and fear of embarrassment can backfire if the counterpart is afraid to admit he doesn’t understand what was really meant. Advisor teams also have limited ability to influence FF higher headquarters policies. One of the major advisor mentoring challenges is to know your target audience and adapt your methods to the circumstances.

(3) There needs to be a comprehensive understanding throughout the advisor chain of command. Higher levels need to have feedback on implications and effects of broad policies. Lower level teams need to have access to raise concerns on how polices might affect operations, training, and the general effects on the FF and the AO.

b. Planning Considerations. Understand MDMP versus the British estimate process. Rather than using the highly structured US MDMP planning model, some FF may be more comfortable using the British process. The British process fits well with certain cultural norms and is summarized below. The British estimate process, or All Arms Tactical Aide Memo, Army Code 71770, consists of seven components:

(1) What is the enemy doing and why? (Based on IPOE – terrain/enemy capabilities and intent.)
(2) What have I been told to do and why? (Based on commander’s intent and mission analysis.)
(3) What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop a plan?
(4) Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? (Results in outline scheme of maneuver.)
(5) What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? (Relative strength, troops to task.)
(6) When and where does each action take place in relation to each other? (Coordinating instructions: fire plan; tasking timeline; wargaming “what-if’s.”)

(7) What control measures (coordinating instructions, boundaries, objectives, routes, report lines, fire support coordination measures, and operational security) do I need to impose?

c. Intelligence.

(1) There may be coalition organizations in the AO that can assist with intelligence requirements but you may still lack intelligence about your AO, FF, and the surrounding civilian personalities who dwell in your AO. What may be missing is an adequate intelligence fusion cell to “piece the intelligence picture together.” This challenge can be met by establishing relationships with the various “special units” that undoubtedly operate within the operational environment. Most will not contact you or offer assistance unless you make the request. These organizations may include cross functional teams of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other US law-enforcement personnel, along with many US intelligence agencies. Many of these special coalition intelligence / law enforcement task forces will share information with you if you merely ask them for assistance. Reciprocal intelligence sharing also helps keep their interest in the process.

   (a) As an advisor, you are in an interesting role to train and potentially collect intelligence concerning your FF. Detailing extensive enemy insurgent infiltration, weapons smuggling, or other criminal activities associated with FF is invaluable to intelligence collectors.

   (b) Such first-hand information is valuable to many of these organizations and can be used by your team to assist in building packets and case files for these organizations. In exchange for the information, they will share information regarding targets, intelligence, and human factor information, such as sectarian infiltration routes and ethnic cleansing areas of focus. This information helps you understand enemy location, kill zones, and determine how the enemy is trying to target you or your team. Though many advisors may have unmitigated trust with their FF, others may not. It is important to understand your environment and observe your FF carefully. The intelligence you witness can be invaluable.

(2) Take the lead as an advisor by coordinating with your coalition unit to invite all available organizations to assist in your AO. There is too much information at stake to not take advantage of the capability. Be creative and the results you gain will surprise you.

(3) In order to promote national policy and attain overall objectives, it may be necessary for advisors to plan and to conduct intelligence training. The advisor should assist their FF counterpart in developing a local intelligence collection program, in training intelligence personnel in their respective specialties, and in effectively utilizing trained intelligence personnel. Advisors may accomplish this aim by:

   (a) Assisting in the establishment of an operations center to coordinate intelligence efforts.
(b) Maintaining liaison with police and intelligence agencies responsible for counter-subversion.

(c) Providing intelligence support and force protection information to US personnel working at other levels.

(d) Establish secure and reliable communications channels.

(e) Preparing daily reports on intelligence-related activities.

(f) Assisting in the development of effective procedures for the collection and dissemination of intelligence information.

(g) Assisting in the establishment of an adequate security program to safe-guard against subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

(h) Encouraging and assisting the establishment and maintenance of a source control program.

(i) Assisting in development and achievement of intelligence training quotas for selected, qualified personnel.

(4) The advisor should be familiar with area studies, area assessments, and after-action reports (AARs). The Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) database and the special operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS) are useful tools for reviewing AARs. Pertinent documents should be compared to detect trends or changes. The advisor also should evaluate the following:

   (a) FF intelligence staff section (G-2 or S-2), its SOPs, and its effectiveness.
   (b) Personalities of counterparts and other persons with whom business is conducted.
   (c) Chain of command and communication channels of the FF unit.
   (d) Intelligence projects initiated by predecessors.
   (e) Intelligence projects that predecessors believed should have been initiated.
   (f) Advisor communication channels.
   (g) Reference material available from other intelligence agencies.

(5) Advisors should prepare and maintain a list of essential elements of information (EEIs) and insurgent indicators, if appropriate. Advisors should determine if:

   (a) Trained subversive insurgent leaders have been discovered.
   (b) Evidence exists of an underground insurgent organization.
   (c) Efforts exist to create or increase civil disturbance and dissension.
   (d) An insurgent psychological campaign is ongoing against existing or proposed government policies and programs.
   (e) Attempts are being made to provoke the government into harsh measures (such as curfews).
(f) Assassinations and kidnappings of local political leaders, doctors, or schoolteachers are taking place.

(g) Guerrilla actions are occurring.

(h) An appreciable decline exists in school attendance.

(6) Advisors may be called upon to provide guidance and assistance in counterintelligence (CI) activities. When acting in such roles, advisors should attempt to answer the following questions:

(a) Is intelligence information disseminated on a need-to-know basis?

(b) Are security precautions observed?

(c) Is access to sensitive areas positively controlled?

(d) Are cryptographic systems available and used in transmitting classified information?

(e) Do personnel follow proper communications procedures?

(f) Are personnel with access to classified information properly cleared? How thorough or effective is the investigation process?

(g) Are security inspections of installations conducted at regular and irregular intervals?

(h) Are periodic security lectures conducted?

(i) Does the counterpart have a covert CI program?

(j) Does the degree of coverage provide reasonable assurance of gaining knowledge of insurgent intelligence, subversion, or sabotage within the area?

(k) What means of communication are employed and do they jeopardize the security of the source?

(l) How much time elapses between a source’s acquisition of information and the submission of a report? Does the elapsed time allow for reaction by friendly forces?

(m) How is the reliability of a source determined? Is reliability (or lack thereof) considered in evaluating information?

(n) How do counterparts evaluate the accuracy of information received from the source?

(o) How do counterparts protect operations against—

- Double agents (agents working for two or more opposing intelligence agencies, only one of whom knows of the dual relationship)?
- Dual or multiple agents (agents reporting to two or more agencies of the same government, which may result in false confirmation of information)?
- Confusion agents (agents fabricating information to mislead friendly forces)?
(7) Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE). It is foolish to assume technology will be the sole savior of your team in combat. In fact, the enemy is proving extremely adept at overcoming new technological advancements and changing tactics and techniques routinely. The best way to survive as a team, and train your FF to survive, is through IPOE. It is better to avoid or mitigate kill zones with combat power than trust IED defeat mechanisms on your vehicles to do the work. Be a learning organization and train your FF to do the same. Understand that outthinking the enemy is the best way to defeat him. Do not assume away the enemy and do not forget that the “enemy always gets a vote.” The following fundamental questions regarding the enemy are more important to answer than turning on your vehicle CREW systems and relying on chance:

(a) **WHO AM I FIGHTING?**
   - Terrorist, insurgent, or militia?
   - Identify zones (attack, support, kill, recon, sanctuary).
   - Identify trends that exist.

(b) **WHAT CAN THE ENEMY DO TO US?**
   - IED, complex ambush, recon, demonstration.
   - How will the enemy use the locals?
   - Times of day/night for activity (where and when).

(c) **WHAT CAN I DO TO THE ENEMY?**
   - How can your team and FF mitigate enemy actions?
   - What joint effects does your FF have?
   - What coalition forces can assist and how?
   - Deception: where and how?

(d) **HOW WILL THE ENEMY REACT TO MY PLAN?**
   - Throughout the mission, what are anticipated enemy reactions to my FF and my team and how do I counter them?

(8) Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Once your team understands and applies the basics of IPOE, train the FF to do the same. Do not assume FF has a good grasp of HUMINT. Many FF may lack a basic understanding of how to analyze their operational environment despite being in the same culture and sharing a common language. Also, FF may not even live in the same operating area. Oftentimes, their deference for rumors will drive conclusions regarding enemy activity. Source operations may in fact be telephonic single-source rumors that create unproductive combat operations. Counterinsurgencies fought in Algeria, Vietnam, and Malaya were all primarily intelligence driven operations based upon solid human intelligence. Train the FF to analyze their area correctly and focus their understanding into actionable HUMINT.

d. Human Rights and Misconduct. The advisor must stress the consequences of mistreating suspects, detainees, or prisoners taken into custody. These persons must be treated in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. This means that
advisors or FF provide care for the sick/wounded and protect prisoners/detainees from all types of abuse or harm. Murder, mutilation, and torture are expressly forbidden as is humiliation or degrading treatment. Sentences and executions may not be carried out unless judgment has been pronounced by a regularly constituted court. US Service members must never be active participants in the conduct of any such punishment and strongly discourage any such activity. They must explain to their counterparts that they are obliged to report any atrocities of which they have knowledge.

e. If you are risk adverse, they will be risk adverse. Your task isn’t to merely teach them MDMP, IPOE, and institute battalion systems to operate effectively in garrison. Your mission is to advise and train them on how to be effective in combat. You are not school house instructors or observer/controllers. You are also not special forces operators that plan and execute independent operations. Your combat missions must be deliberately planned and executed in a combined, sometimes joint fashion with your FF. You must take a moderate amount of risk to win in the COIN environment. Understand and respect the difficulty of your mission, but the benefits received through aggressive prosecution of your duties will directly reflect in the FF units you advise. The better you can do this, the faster you and your team will achieve success and work yourselves out of a job.

20 Advisor Guidelines

1. Learn enough of the language for simple conversation. Know the basics and use them from your first meeting: “hello”, “please”, “thank you”, “yes”, “no”, and “goodbye”. Language demonstrates a willingness to understand and be competent in the host nation culture. Cultural awareness yields situational awareness and leads to increased force protection for you and your team.

2. Be patient and subtle. Explain the benefits of an action. Get them to accept it as their idea. After the advisor plants an idea, let the counterpart modify it and take full credit for it as his own. The advisor’s mission is to enable and mentor. The only successful plan belongs to the FF counterpart.

3. Respect rank and position of counterparts. They often outrank you in their societies and station. Always demonstrate respect towards counterparts.

4. Make corrections diplomatically. Praise success and build unit pride. Upon entering the AO, look for the good systems and policies and praise the counterpart on his successes. At this point, the counterpart is more willing to hear criticism and engage in problem solving sessions designed to improve unit effectiveness.

5. Assist and enable—do not command. Refrain from engaging in bribery or coercion or threatening (even psychologically). Correct important deficiencies first. Reinforce and praise success.
6. Keep counterparts informed—both US and host nation forces. As a corollary, maintain a series of lessons learned for a RIP / TOA plan, on how to work with your counterparts.

7. Encourage continuous training and improvement. Help develop SOPs.

8. Be prepared to act as liaison to multinational units. Liaison is NOT your primary function, but is a skill you must accept to some degree. For instance, maintain liaison with civil affairs units.

9. Be ready to advise on equipment maintenance. However, refrain from using status reports as the most important metric of a FF unit; the reports are difficult, time-consuming and the logistics/maintenance systems may not adhere to FF frameworks.

10. Know small unit tactics and unit security procedures (such as base defense). Teach hand and arm signals (universal and quiet language) for actions in combat patrolling. Integrate indigenous forces into your battle drills—teach them what to expect from a professional force.

11. Use “confidence” missions to validate training and gauge progress. Civil-military operations and static defense operations are valuable confidence missions.

12. Stay with the unit—do not separate yourself from them. Eat their food, live their conditions.

13. Be aware of operations in the area to prevent fratricide. Advisors deconflict the AO on behalf of the FF unit, in addition to providing access to coalition effects; e.g., quick-reaction forces, MEDEVAC for casualties, unmanned aircraft (UA) surveillance, aviation assets, combat camera.


15. Be objective in reports on unit and leader proficiency, nothing will be gained from glossing over problems. Report gross corruption or incompetence.

16. Maintain your military bearing and professional manner.

17. Train security units to standard and fight alongside them. The amount of advising during combat is small—the advisor does most of his advising while preparing for combat. He bases his advice on his observations or those of his fellow advisors during past operations.

18. Be flexible and exercise tempered patience. Consider unit limitations and adjust within FF organizational framework.

20. Develop ideas and solutions with your FF counterparts that make sense. They should be clear, simple, measurable, and sustainable after US advisors depart the area.

—Former MiTT Members
Chapter VII

WORKING WITH US PARTNER UNITS

“When American units get in theater, they are focused on the traditional measures of success: the number of insurgents killed and captured and the number of caches found. It is very difficult convincing these commanders that you [the advisor] have something to offer them [your US partner unit].”
—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Battalion MTT Team Leader, November 2007

1. Understand What Wrong Looks Like

a. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a method to help an advisor team establish credibility in the COIN fight with US and/or coalition maneuver units sharing their AO. While many brigade and battalion commanders understand the value of the advisor team, there is a real possibility of having difficulty integrating US and coalition units with FF units and your advisor team. Advisor team leaders should prepare their teams for an initial worst-case scenario when it comes to conducting operations with these units. Items to consider: you may not have conducted pre-deployment training with the US unit in your AO; the US unit is probably not aware of your specialized predeployment training; they may not be familiar with the FF leaders, capabilities, or limitations in the AO; there will be wariness and mistrust based on crucial unknown qualities. Therefore, you must approach your relationship with the US unit commander in the same way you approach the FF commander. You must build the relationship from the ground up. There are many examples of poor advisor/US partner unit relations. For example:

(1) US unit commanders assign company grade officers from their unit to mentor the FF, despite the presence of the advisor team.

(2) US unit commanders attempt to issue orders to the FF unit through the advisor team (not using the FF chain of command).

(3) US units conduct civic works projects in the AO and taking full credit for the civic improvements (by not informing the advisor team, they cannot put an FF “face” on the project and thus build the credibility of the FF in the eyes of the civilian populace).

(4) US unit commanders routinely not telling the advisor team leader of impending offensive operations for fear of compromising security and losing the element of surprise.

(5) Advisor team leaders have been told not to attend US unit battle update briefings.

(6) US units augment the advisor team with individuals who they deem “undesirable”; e.g., primarily behavioral cases.

(7) US units withholding support from the advisor team in order to get leverage on the FF.

(8) US units demanding the return of ammunition issued to the advisor team when they leave the AO.
(9) US units tasking the advisor team to do non-advisor combat support missions that do not involve the FF (using the advisors as an additional maneuver platoon).

(10) US units not allowing senior FF officers to eat at US facilities without prior written approval.

(11) US units searching the advisor teams and their vehicles at the same level as foreign civilians entering a US forward operating base (FOB).

(12) US units conducting separate operations in the same AO as the FF unit; in essence, they view the FF as a nuisance rather than an asset.

(13) US unit commanders attempting to task the FF with missions considered too dangerous to give to the US units.

2. Expectation Management (Injecting Yourself into the Plan)

a. When your advisor team arrives in theater, you will have to make three initial assessments over the period of your relief in place / transfer of authority (RIP/TOA):
   - The advisor team you are replacing.
   - The US unit operating in your AO.
   - The FF unit.

b. The first and most important assessment you must make is of the outgoing team, and if they were successful advisors during their tour. If they have good relationships with both the FF unit and the US unit, their SOPs will be very valuable and you can continue these relationships. If you determine the outgoing team was ineffective, then you can begin making lists of things you must fix and relationships you must build. Start with the US unit commander.

c. The US commander is the first relationship you should build in your advisor mission. His unit will provide critical support to you and your team, to include quick reaction forces (QRF), medical evacuation, indirect fire, maintenance, recovery, supply, and personnel augmentation. As an advisor, you must understand the concept that US commanders are required to give you support. The quality, speed, and enthusiasm in which this support is provided are primarily based on your relationship with the commander. If he knows you and respects you as an advisor, he will see you and your team as a combat multiplier for his forces. At the earliest possible opportunity, schedule a block of time with him and use this opportunity to introduce yourself and your team. Familiarize him with your operational background and experience level. It is highly recommended that this meeting occur without the outgoing advisor team leader present. Give both the US commander and yourself the opportunity to speak freely about what opportunities exist to improve the FF and the advisor mission.

d. The most effective way to familiarize the US commander with your advisor mission and all its components is to give him and his staff a formal briefing. Keep in mind you are not reinventing the wheel. The majority of this briefing should be based on existing information provided to you during the RIP/TOA briefing. The other components of the brief can be compared to an initial counseling session, but it is you who are explaining to your superior where your team is now and what direction you want your team to go.
You are clearly defining your goals to the US commander. Elements of the brief should include the following:

(1) Introduction. Introduce yourself and your team to the US unit. Include your respective branches/military occupational specialties, number of previous tours, and operational experience. Make sure you identify which staff section each officer/NCO is covering, to include S1, S2, S3, S4, communications, and medical. This will set the stage for introductions of your team to their US staff counterparts as professionals and equals.

(2) Host Nation Unit Assessment. This is a basic statement of what you think the capabilities and limitations are of the FF unit. Bring this information out in the open and eliminate any assumptions that might be present. Include logistics capabilities, maintenance, staff planning ability, effectiveness of FF checkpoints, patrols, and intelligence gathering.

(3) FF Unit Leadership Profiles. This information comes straight from the RIP/TOA briefing and should be the most current information on the leadership. It will refresh the memories of the US staff who have already seen it and inform new members who have not. These profiles include previous military assignments, religion, tribe, number of children, work ethic, and basic personality traits.

(4) Your Advisor Philosophy and Plan. This section of the brief is where you convey your “vision” to the US commander. Chances are, he will tell you his vision and the two of you can find common ground. Both the US and FF unit will benefit from you obtaining unity of effort with the US commander. You are the sole voice for the FF unit’s capabilities and limitations. This portion of the brief will assist the US commander in understanding how the FF unit can realistically fit into his scheme of maneuver for securing the AO.

(5) Your Support Requirements. This is the support you will need, on a habitual basis, to survive in theater. It includes virtually every class of supply, communications support, maintenance support, ice, fuel, ammunition, and, most importantly, intelligence. US units have access to collection assets you don’t. Real time overhead imagery for raid planning is a good example of what you will need (FF map reading skills are generally weak, and a picture is worth a thousand words). It is vital to get your expectations out on the table early so the US commander gets a clear idea of your logistical limitations.

(6) Your Personnel Augmentation Requirements. As a small team, you will be consistently challenged to meet operational requirements. The US commander in the AO may be willing to augment your team with personnel in key billets where you may have a shortfall (e.g., communications, medical, security). Discuss these shortfalls during your brief and be prepared to explain how filling them will benefit the US commander (e.g., increase in FF effectiveness, ability to run 24-hour operations). Discourage the unit from rotating Service members through your mission, as you will have to continuously retrain the replacements on advisor team SOPs and cultural lessons learned. Augmentation personnel should live with the advisor team in the FF compound.
3. Remove Misunderstanding and Mistrust

"I was escorting my Iraqi battalion commander, a colonel, around a newly established American patrol base that was located near one of his checkpoints. An American specialist (E-4) approached my Iraqi battalion commander, grabbed his shoulder, spun him around, and said ‘dude, let me see your pistol!’ After apologizing for the American Soldier’s breach of military customs and courtesies, I spent the rest of the day explaining to the Iraqi commander why our army, after 4 years, couldn’t tell an Iraqi private from a colonel.”

—OIF Battalion MiTT Leader

a. As an advisor team member, you have received specialized training in both the culture and the language of the FF. You have studied advising techniques and learned the basic art of fighting a counterinsurgency. At the end of the RIP/TOA process, you will have already interacted with FF and generated a unique comfort level with them because they are familiar to you. Of note: the US commander, his staff, and the US Service members in the unit do not have the same familiarity or comfort level. The good news is you can help them and the first step is a simple introduction.

b. Keep it simple at first and arrange a meeting with the US commander and the FF commander. As we are visitors to their country, encourage the US commander to meet at the FF commander’s office. Offer to bring him to the meeting and give him a quick block of instruction on manners and phrases he might encounter during the conversation. Forewarn him of any support requests that may be introduced by the FF commander and caution against making any promises at the first meeting. Arm him with some simple tools to make him successful. The US commander must know and trust you before he will fully accept you as a partner similar to the FF commander. Advise the US commander to offer information about his military career, his family, and his general plan for securing the AO. Inform the US commander of any preconceived notions that the FF has about Americans. Such as, we are fixated on time and work: Don’t we walk into meetings and begin right at the scheduled time and “get right down to business”? Let the meeting flow without rushing it and expect 2 hours for the meeting. The FF commander will demonstrate textbook hospitality for this meeting and give the US commander a look at formal meeting protocol for the region. As the advisor team leader, you are expected to be present for the duration of the meeting. After all, the three of you are ultimately responsible for the security of the assigned AO.

c. After this initial meeting, schedule another meeting with a tour of the FF headquarters by the US unit’s primary staff. The US commander now has a comfort level with the FF commander and a simple understanding of the introduction protocol. He will be anxious to demonstrate this newfound cultural proficiency to his staff. Let the US staff see the FF headquarters, motor pool facilities, arms rooms, and barracks. Many US Service members may have the initial feeling that they are not safe outside the US FOB. Many feel they cannot take their armor and protective gear off while visiting FF bases. If US leadership perceives FF as an organized professional army, then the comfort level will increase. This confidence will facilitate effective personal and working relationships. Lastly, maintain the relationship between the two units by recommending a weekly meeting of the commanders at alternating headquarters. If you
are successful, the two commanders will develop a friendship and a mutual respect. Get to know your neighbor. It's as simple as that.

d. You will learn cultural lessons and nuances as an advisor that your US counterparts will not. You will get direct insight to reasons behind the FF’s “learned behavior” (i.e., behavior you can change). The most effective way to capitalize on this information is to share it. Every member of your team can be scheduled, with the US commander’s approval, to periodically brief their US staff counterpart on lessons learned.

4. Tactical Operations (Building a Partnership)

a. Advisor teams may get themselves in trouble when they first enter a country by making a series of natural assumptions. We assume that the foreign civilians will obey western traffic laws (they don’t). We assume they use the same calendar as we do (Islamic calendar versus Gregorian). We assume the FF lack combat experience and technical competency (Iran-Iraq War, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and First Gulf War). We assume our FF partners wake up and go to bed at the same time we do, and we quickly learn they operate on a significantly different cycle. It is the advisors that must adapt and conform to this daily rhythm and not the FF. Your FF leaders may rise early, between 5-6 am and begin working. They may break at 1130 and begin the process of the mid-day meal, which is a combination of a meal and a command and staff meeting with all the officers in the unit. This meal usually lasts 2 hours and is followed by the mid-day nap. Many advisors who try and meet with their FF counterparts in the middle of the day often find them unresponsive. It would be like someone waking you up at midnight to discuss work. Your counterpart will rise around 1700, eat dinner, and then work until midnight. There is often a social period before going to bed, between 0100 and 0200. If you assume that your counterpart is lazy because he sleeps during the day, understand he may think you are lazy for being asleep at midnight. The advisor team must conform to this new battle rhythm, and many will find it appropriate for example in the desert as the crippling heat descends on the region during the summer months and daylight operations are severely curtailed.

Lastly, our Muslim partners also have a different work week, with Friday being the Sabbath instead of Sunday.

b. As the unofficial cultural liaison between the US and FF, you can convey information to both parties that will avoid misconceptions. For example, brief the US unit on the FF battle rhythm to help explain the region. Inform the FF commander that the Americans will conduct 24-hour operations, 7 days a week by utilizing shifts. Cultural factors like these can significantly affect tactical operations, so be diligent about passing on everything you learn to the US partner units. An excellent method is to provide briefings at company level to the US units. At this level you will be able to educate the core group of Service members and officers who will be interacting with both the FF and the civilian populace on a daily basis. Teaching points to make them more effective partners include:

(1) Meals. You will find that you learn the most about the culture, language, and your counterpart during meal times. While work is often discussed at length, it is considered a social time. It is also imperative that you embrace the culture by eating the local food on a consistent basis, and demonstrating your willingness to share all
aspects of your FF counterpart’s day. Inform the Americans that meals are an excellent time to discuss tactical matters and concepts. However, warn them a meal is a minimum of 2 hours out of their day. FF units also use “feasts” to commemorate special events. Encourage the US staff to attend these functions when invited and reciprocate in kind with American style functions.

(2) Holidays. It isn’t necessary to know the entire list of holidays in the AO, but it is important to know the most important ones (i.e., those comparable to Easter, Thanksgiving, and Christmas). You will find that a small amount of cultural understanding will carry a tremendous amount of weight with your FF partner. Relationships can be advanced exponentially if US leaders know when not to engage in specific operations, when to visit the FF unit for celebrations, and what gifts are appropriate. For example, if you are in a Muslim country, important holidays to educate the US unit on include:

(a) Ashura. This observance commemorates the martyrdom of Imam Ali Hussein and the Battle of Karbala in 680. It is an emotional, week long period of mourning that is marked by pedestrian processions and large gatherings at mosques. American units can expect large amounts of pedestrian traffic on roadways and large gatherings of men in public. Shia Muslims will conduct a ritual of minor self mutilation and bloody themselves to show their devotion. American units should be advised and expect to see crowds of bloodied individuals.

(b) Ramadan. This holiday is observed by all Muslims and represents the month in which the Koran was revealed to Muhammad. Muslims will not eat, drink, or smoke during daylight hours. They traditionally eat large meals before and after sunset. Americans should understand that their FF counterparts will often be in a degraded physical state and a poor disposition. Night operations will be difficult to schedule due to the meal considerations. In addition, it is considered rude to eat or drink in front of a Muslim during the fast.

(c) Eid Ul-Fidr. This is the 3-day period that marks a festive end to the fasting of Ramadan. Muslims will traditionally dress up to visit relatives and friends and give gifts and food to the poor and needy. Americans should visit their counterparts during this period to congratulate them on their accomplishment of remaining pious during the fasting month, and give food or a gift to recognize the occasion.

(d) Laylat-Al Qadr (Night of Power). This observance happens roughly in the third week of Ramadan and represents the event when the first verses of the Koran were revealed to Mohammad by the Angel Gabriel. In basic terms, this night equals 80 times the amount of devotion of a regular day, so Muslims will spend the entire night in the mosque praying. Shia Muslims believe their fate for the coming year will be determined on this night, so they pray for the entire night. Your American counterparts should be sensitive to scheduling operations during this period, but also be aware that insurgent groups believe violence against coalition forces during the night of power more than secures their place in heaven. Traditionally, spikes in attacks have occurred at this time.
(e) Hajj. This is an annual pilgrimage to Mecca that is supposed to be undertaken at least once in a lifetime by Muslims if they are physically and economically capable. During this period, a significant increase in traffic along certain routes may preclude or alter operations.

(3) Mosques. Mosques serve many purposes in the community. Obviously they are a place to worship, but they are also community meeting places, a source of news (loudspeakers on the minarets), a school, and a dining hall. US commanders must understand the mosque is key terrain, and if they damage the mosque, they damage the relationship with the local populace. One man, the Imam, is in charge of the mosque. Recommend to the US commander that he develop a relationship with the Imam and include the local FF commander. The Imam has tremendous influence over the local community and any actions against the mosque should be carefully weighed against the long term consequences of the action. The US commander can use the FF to apply security measures to the mosque, as the local populace will be more willing to accept other Muslims in the sanctuary versus non-Muslims. This information needs to be made clear down to the lowest levels in the US unit. Other considerations when dealing with a mosque include:

(a) The local population is far less likely to use their own mosque for sanctuary or to attack coalition forces. However, there are outside elements.

(b) US Service members should be discouraged from searching a mosque unless it is an extreme circumstance. Advisor teams can organize, train, and equip appropriate FF members to deal with entering a mosque. Both the US unit and the advisor team will need strong justification and be able to clearly explain the requirement to the FF commander. The FF commander is the person ultimately responsible, in the eyes of the local populace, for the consequences of the mosque entry. If you have to do it, make sure the results are worth it.

(c) Most problems arising in and around the mosque can be solved by a dialogue with the Imam. While force is always an option, utilize this course of action first before proceeding to another.

(4) House Searches. A house search is a routine event that happens daily, throughout the COIN environment. Despite its regularity, it is potentially an event that US forces can do the most damage in terms of their relationship with the local populace. As an advisor team, you can only inform the US unit on cultural missteps to avoid, however, you can ensure the proper integration of your FF unit to make sure the searches are done correctly. Cultural considerations for house searches include:

(a) Lead with the FF, but always make sure the search teams are properly supervised by either an advisor or a FF officer.

(b) Avoid putting US Service members, not on the advisor team, in charge of FF teams (unescorted by an advisor).

(c) By using FF, you will be able to communicate what you are looking for to the residents of the house. If you start a dialogue with a resident prior to entering his house, you may get information you are looking for that will negate the need to
search the house. Your interpreters and the FF officers will assist in determining the fidelity of what the resident is saying (filter the information).

(d) American forces dealing with women in the Muslim community is a very fragile subject. If FF work in conjunction with the American unit, they can deal directly with females involved in the search. It is always best to inform the senior, male member of the family what your intentions are, so he can put all the women into one room, away from your search.

(e) In the rare event that a female is to be detained, only use FF to do this, unless it is an extreme circumstance.

(5) Night Operations. US commanders often make the incorrect assumption that FF have the same capability to conduct night operations as the US forces, simply because they have been issued night vision goggles (NVGs). If American forces want to conduct a night operation with the FF unit, they must give them advance notice and reasonable time for them to train for the task. In addition, a comprehensive PCI, at all levels, will assist in preventing shortfalls of items like functioning NVGs, helmet mounts, and batteries. If the American force in the AO has a specialized, subordinate unit that operates only at night, it stands to reason that the Americans should train a similar FF force to operate with them.

c. The cultural awareness piece, simply making the two units comfortable around each other in a garrison environment, can be considered the crawl phase. The walk phase is building trust between the Americans and the FF in a tactical environment. The most effective way to do this is start small (small unit level) and build habitual working relationships. As the advisor, work very hard to make sure your FF squadrons, platoons, or flight work with the same American counterpart unit each time an operation is conducted. Just as personal relationships are built with the leaders, FF members will develop personal relationships with the Americans at the individual level.

d. A good starting point is patrol and raid operations that are conducted on a routine and regular basis. These small unit operations give the FF a solid introduction to the SOPs and the TTP of the US unit. As the spokesman for the FF unit, you are the voice that will get the FF unit and its leaders into the planning and rehearsal process. You are a vital link in this process and must always be present because the advisor team provides the quality interpreter support which ensures the FF unit is being utilized correctly. As the advisor, you will tell US platoon and company leadership the strengths and limitations of the FF unit (expectation management). Examples of small unit integration between the FF unit and US forces include:

(1) FF dismounted house search teams for raids.
(2) A squadron of FF trained for helicopter/air assault raids.
(3) FF vehicles accompanying US mounted patrols.
(4) FF providing security for American medical assistance missions to civilian areas.
(5) FF vehicles and members included in the QRF mission.
(6) FF squad trained solely for night operations/patrols with US forces.
(7) Joint checkpoint operations.

(8) FF medics working in the American aid station.

(9) Joint rehearsals and after-action reviews for all missions.

e. The FF will learn best at the small unit level. Classroom instruction cannot replicate hands-on training of tactical operations with partner US units. FF members will observe the way the Americans conduct operations, how they dress, how they maintain their equipment, their fire discipline, their logistics, and most importantly, how they behave in the presence of both civilians and the enemy. This small unit partnering will facilitate larger integration at company and battalion level ultimately leading to a state of training readiness that does not require an American presence in the AO to be successful.

f. Once the US commander has reached a level of trust with the FF unit, on both a personal and a tactical level, he will be ready to utilize the most valuable asset that the FF unit brings to the COIN fight, HUMINT. US units have become adept at leveraging the technological edge we have on the battle field, through use of satellite imagery, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), thermal technology, etc. However, US units remain separated from information based on the language and culture differences. The advisor team can bridge this gap. As the advisor team, you will develop a collection process through the FF S2 section by utilizing civilian FF sources. You will piece together information that is brought to you from across the operational environment. As you and FF staff put these pieces together, you will find that your picture of the operational environment is different than the Americans because your sources are different. Organize the information and provide daily updates to the US commander. A typical day of information flow should be your team S2 visiting the US unit S2 and getting the intelligence update for the last 24 hours. He then hands over a similar product that details the last 24 hours of the FF unit, to include assessments from the FF and the advisor team S2. The last part of the process is sharing the American intelligence with your FF unit. In addition, make sure they have access to all required imagery for their operations. Intelligence sharing is a powerful tool that will increase the value of FF to the American unit and improve both units’ ability to secure the AO.

g. The two most important services the advisor team receives from the US partner unit are QRF and MEDEVAC. The US unit provides the advisor team with these vital services without hesitation because you are a US unit. They may balk, however, at providing these services with the same enthusiasm to your FF unit. It is your responsibility to clarify the importance of FF unit requirements. The FF unit must be treated as a true partner, to include the knowledge that Americans will make every effort to save their lives if they are wounded. The FF unit will conduct more aggressive tactical operations if they know a US unit will come to their aid when required. As the FF unit improves their capabilities, they can also provide the same services to US units. There is no stronger indication to the FF unit that the Americans are truly interested in being equal partners in the AO than the unrestricted use of US assets to protect their lives.
5. Support Operations

a. It is logical to assume that at some point during your tour you will request every class of supply for the FF unit. You are trying to get them to be self-sufficient, but you also must keep them functioning in the face of fledgling national maintenance and supply systems. In addition, there are times you will provide logistical support to the FF unit simply to maintain your relationship with the FF commander. This is a cultural reality. You will also find that FF leaders may attempt to get as much material support as possible, far beyond what they reasonably need, simply because it is there for the taking. This is a common situation where you must identify what the FF unit truly needs versus what they simply want. Do not assume this is a product of greed, as much as it is a display of status. The more stuff you have, the more powerful you are, the better officer you are. As the advisor team, you are the reality check to the process. You must constantly weigh what the FF unit wants versus what they actually need. You must apply this support judiciously and not destroy your relationship with the FF commander in the process. However, as an advisor, you must understand the FF’s processes and improve those when needed, bounded by the cultural aspects of those processes.

b. Because the FF unit may obtain logistical support from a US unit, you must be able to clearly define actual FF requirements on a routine basis to the US staff. The reason for this is that if you deny a support request to the FF staff, it is possible they will make the same request directly to the US unit when you are not present. Support to the FF requires unity of effort between the advisors and the US staff, and the advisor team’s recommendation should be the most important factor that US commanders in theater consider when supporting FF units. A common US commander mistake is touring the AO and talking to the FF unit without an advisor present. The US trait of asking frontline forces what they need is viewed as a positive leadership trait. However, US Service members rarely ask for outlandish items or distort the truth of their logistical requirements. FF units may ask for items they don’t need, exaggerate their support requirements, or work very hard to illicit a sense of sympathy from the US commander. Encourage US commanders to include advisors in their tours of the AO so that when they discuss FF support someone is there to provide prospective on any requests. Remember, there are many instances where you must trust the FF leadership to solve their own problems, in a way that fits their culture.

c. Advisors must also be able to explain the cultural considerations of logistical support to the US commanders who provide the classes of supply. For example, the US commander may not understand that logistical support represents one of the best leverage tools you have as an advisor to motivate the FF unit. It is a bargaining chip and an excellent technique to assist the FF commander in getting what he wants by trading concessions for things you want as an advisor. An example would be an FF commander who wants all the accessories to make his vehicles look more like the US vehicles. You may be able to fill these CL IX requests if the commander establishes and enforces a maintenance program on his vehicles to improve the operational readiness rate of his fleet. Also keep in mind that this type of bartering is common in many parts of the world. By driving hard bargains you may gain a certain respect from the FF officers. If you blindly give away goods and services to the FF unit, they may
think you are weak of character, not respect you, and take full advantage of you. A
good tactic to unify FF unit support efforts are weekly meetings between the US unit
and the advisors to prioritize and execute routine and exceptional support requests from
the FF unit.

d. This same approach can be used in clarifying the required support for the advisor
team. First, the advisors should always live with their FF counterparts. However, the
advisors must have a near equal level of support as any US unit, so that they may
advise from a position of strength. US units will understand the advisor support concept
better when viewed in the context of observer controllers during training exercises.
Advisors can, theoretically, never accept logistical support from the FF unit they are
advising. This will give the FF commander leverage over the advisor team and thus
degrades the advisor’s status and ability to complete the mission. Advisors must have
access to their own food, electricity generator, fuel, and maintenance support. FF
commanders may try to get support items they want by depriving the advisors in their
compound of desired items. An example is fuel. By not running their generators during
the summer months for “lack of fuel,” an FF commander could deprive the advisors of
electricity needed to run their computers. This would force the advisors to request a
fuel resupply that the team may not need. If the advisors refuse to accept this type of
leverage, unnecessary support requests will decrease and the FF will be forced to
exercise their supply system.

6. Learning to Share

a. Advisors must understand that US commanders often conduct operations without
including the advisors or the FF unit in their planning. US units may occupy their AO,
survey the security situation in a vacuum, and begin conducting their mission. The
internal plans to secure population good will which include public works projects (water,
electricity, schools, clinics) could have much stronger impact with advisor/FF inputs.
Given US unit budgets relative to advisor/FF budgets for public works projects the
advisors must actively convince US commanders on the benefits (in the spirit of COIN)
to shared planning and execution of the projects. Simply deciding what projects to
undertake is critically important.

b. Appreciate local preferences. An accurate needs assessment reflects cultural
sensitivity and will correctly identify the items a populace considers high value. Ask,
how do I know this matters to the local populace? If there is no answer, the effort may
not be important. Local authorities are a good place to start with this question.

c. Civic works projects undertaken in the AO should be reviewed by the senior FF
commander, given he more than likely represents the most impartial and knowledgeable
person concerning the security and life support requirements of the local civilians in the
area. Once these projects are completed, they should never be handed over to the
local authorities by the US unit. In order to reinforce the legitimacy of the local
government and the FF, the credit should be given to the FF unit. Every effort should
be made to put an FF “face” on the project, including a completion ceremony that is
attended by local media, local civic authorities, and the FF commander and staff.

d. Advisor team leaders should remind US commanders that they are building the
confidence of the FF in addition to the tangible measures of the FF unit (troop strength,
combat vehicles, weapons). This confidence can be established and maintained by tactical success.

e. If the FF fails, the local populace may begin to lose confidence in the government’s ability to protect them. A string of relatively minor insurgent victories can cause a widespread loss of FF morale and encourage the “neutral majority” to side with the insurgents. In short, the FF must be prepared for operations so that they have every possible advantage. As their competence and confidence grows, these forces can assume more complex assignments. Collaborating with US or multinational units will help new FF units become accustomed to the stresses of combat.

f. The general concept is for the US unit to take the FF unit under its wing and begin including it as a partner in operations. At first, the US unit will take the lead and show the basic steps of company level and higher operations. Over time, the FF unit will feel confident enough to take over operations as the lead force with an end state of trained, manned, and equipped FF that conduct independent operations in conjunction with US forces. As US units win tactical victories, they must share this success with the FF unit. Methods of tactical sharing include:

1. Including FF commanders in the after action reviews to higher headquarters.
2. Including the mention of FF to US and local press organizations.
3. Sharing “trophies” obtained from tactical operations (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and equipment). This may be a useful source of spare parts for FF equipment.
4. Let FF unit’s take possession and process any detainees.
Appendix A

ADVISOR TASK LIST EXAMPLE

1- Deploy the Team
2- Command and Control
3- Advise Foreign Forces
4- Protect the Team
5- Sustain the Team
6- Redeploy the Team

The advisor tasks required to accomplish advisor missions are listed below:

**Task 1- Deploy the Team**

**1.1- Build an effective team.**
   1.1.1- Select team members based on SME skills, advisor knowledge, skill, and ability, and mission objectives.
   1.1.2- Internally task organize by ability, function, and personality.
   1.1.3- Conduct team building activities, tasks or functions.

**1.2- Conduct pre-deployment preparation.**
   1.2.1- Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks.
   1.2.1.1- Understand and employ planning considerations for the advisor environment.
   1.2.2- Conduct pre-deployment site survey (PDSS).
   1.2.3- Conduct area study/IPOE.

**Task 2- Command and Control**

**2.1- Conduct planning for advisor specific missions.**
   2.1.1- Conduct planning for key leader engagements.
   2.1.2- Conduct concurrent team planning for all FF Events.
   2.1.3- Conduct rapid planning.

**2.2- Coordinate and de-conflict with higher/supporting/adjacent units (coalition and FF).**
   2.2.1- Identify higher/supporting/adjacent units.
   2.2.2- Establish rapport/communication with higher/supporting/adjacent units.
   2.2.3- Advise/influence higher/supporting/adjacent units on advisor mission and requirements.
   2.2.4- Execute reporting procedures and requirements.

**2.3- Identify and establish rapport with key personnel in the AO.**
   2.3.1- Identify key FF personnel.
   2.3.2- Establish rapport with key FF personnel.
   2.3.3- Identify key local civilian/religious leaders.
   2.3.4- Establish rapport with key local civilian/religious leaders.
Task 3- Advise FF

3.1- Effectively communicate in an advising environment- The ability to communicate with your counterpart is critical to the success of the advisor mission. Interpreters are often relied upon to bridge the communication gap, but they are not always available or dependable for providing an accurate representation of a translated conversation based on language skill or experience working with the military. Thus, extensive language training for the advisor team is an important aspect of the train-up to ensure mission success.

3.1.1- Effectively communicate without an Interpreter.
   3.1.1.1- Exchange common greetings in the language used in the AO.
   3.1.1.2- Identify and employ non-verbal communications common in the AO.

3.1.2- Effectively communicate through an Interpreter.
   3.1.2.1- Understand the capabilities of your interpreter.
   3.1.2.2- Evaluate the trustworthiness of your interpreter.
   3.1.2.3- Understand the background and cultural biases of your interpreter.
   3.1.2.4- Prepare an interpreter for a communications event.
   3.1.2.5- Conduct a meeting/event through your interpreter.
   3.1.2.6- Prepare to work with an unvetted/unfamiliar interpreter.

3.2- Gain and use influence to progress advisor mission objectives- An advisor must be able to influence his counterpart to act in ways that may be different from his past experience and cultural norms. Without the ability to influence the counterpart’s actions, the advisor mission may fail. Affinity between the advisor and the counterpart must exist for true influence to occur. A successful advisor will put an influence strategy in motion that results in a voluntary long lasting change in the counterpart’s actions despite the absence of formal authority. Successful influence is gained through a combination of rapport building techniques that can be used to demonstrate value, credibility, and trust. This can only be achieved when each individual perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and compatible (working toward a common goal). If the advisor can convey an committed attitude to his FF counterpart, a long-lasting, effective advisor relationship will exist.

3.2.1- Build rapport with FF counterpart.
   3.2.1.1- Employ a rapport plan.
   3.2.1.2- Build a close relationship with FF counterpart.
   3.2.1.3- Employ cross cultural empathy.
   3.2.1.4- Understand societal influences.
   3.2.1.5- Gain the trust of FF counterpart.

3.2.2- Establish credibility with FF counterpart.
   3.2.2.1- Demonstrate professional skills "worthy of confidence."
   3.2.2.2- Maintain professionalism and adhere to standards.
   3.2.2.3- Provide sound planning and tactical advice.

3.2.3- Demonstrate to FF counterpart that the advisor provides value.
   3.2.3.1- Demonstrate SME advisor knowledge.
   3.2.3.2- Demonstrate access to advisor team/coalition support or effects.
3.2.4- Determine and employ the proper influence techniques.
3.2.5- Understand and employ effective negotiations.
   3.2.5.1- Prepare to conduct negotiations with FF counterpart.
   3.2.5.2- Prepare FF counterpart to conduct negotiations with local leaders.
   3.2.5.3- Prepare FF counterpart to conduct negotiations with coalition forces.
3.2.6- Effectively advise higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces.
   3.2.6.1- Build rapport with higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces.
   3.2.6.2- Educate higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces on the capabilities and limitations of FF counterpart/unit.
   3.2.6.3- Influence higher/supporting/adjacent units or coalition forces in order to progress advisor mission objectives.

3.3- Advise FF unit METL, mission objective or assigned tasks- To be an advisor, you must teach, coach, and/or advise foreign forces in order to develop their professional skills. Teaching means to provide instruction and education to foreign forces in order to develop skills and knowledge necessary to do a particular task or mission. Coaching is to assist a counterpart to in reaching the next level of knowledge or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The goal is for your FF to assume more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as required. Advising means to provide counterparts with counsel to assist them in making a decision based on applying knowledge. The distinctive feature is that the recipient is responsible for making the decision, while the advisor only provides counsel.

   3.3.1- Develop advisor campaign plan.
      3.3.1.1- Incorporate FF objectives into campaign plan.
   3.3.2- Assess FF unit, team, or individual current strengths and capabilities.
      3.3.2.1- Develop measures of effectiveness/performance.
   3.3.3- Employ SME/military occupational specialty (MOS)/experience base.
      3.3.3.1- Teach individual and collective tasks.
      3.3.3.2- Coach-walk through/mission rehearsal/assist.
      3.3.3.3- Advise FF leaders in execution of missions.
   3.3.4- Evaluate effectiveness of advisor effort.

3.4- Understand and operate within operational limitations from higher headquarters- Every unit, team, or individual working with FF must receive guidance on what operational constraints may exist. The advisor will almost always possess more detailed information than the FF require or have a need to possess. The advisor should always receive a detailed briefing from the appropriate intelligence office prior to departing on any advisor mission. Likewise, the advisor may have many assets at his disposal that may or may not be provided to FF counterparts. The advisor must be thoroughly aware of all the assets at his disposal and under what conditions those assets may be provided to the FF counterpart. In addition, the advisor must not only verify the training tasks for the FF, they must evaluate the TTP that apply to those tasks.

   3.4.1- Determine when to provide or withhold information from a counterpart.
   3.4.2- Determine when to provide or withhold assets from a counterpart.
   3.4.3- Determine effective TTP for counterpart usage.
3.5- Operate with cross cultural competence- The advisor must be able to anticipate the actions of his counterpart, understand those actions within the cultural context, and influence the actions of his counterpart to achieve an acceptable outcome. The advisor will not always be able to influence these outcomes, but must determine an acceptable level/line and influence adherence to that level. The advisor must also inform/educate his chain of command on any deviations from advisor/unit acceptable norms and convey the cultural context of his counterpart’s actions.

3.5.1- Understand local ethical model and employ acceptable solutions within that model.

3.5.1.1- Educate chain of command on deviances from accepted cultural behavior.

Task 4- Protect the Team
4.1- Plan for QRF.
4.2- Integrate FF into protection plan.
4.3- Execute emergency procedures.
4.4- Conduct personnel recovery.

Task 5- Sustain the Team
5.1- Develop relationship with supporting units/organizations/assets.
5.2- Coordinate for basic necessities.
    5.2.1- Food and water, shelter, transportation, medical support.
    5.2.2- CL IV, CL V, MEDEVAC, and other effects when required.
5.3- Mitigate culture shock.
5.4- Maintain unit cohesion and morale.

Task 6- Redeploy the Team
6.1- Conduct effective transfer of FF unit, or counterpart, to follow on advisor team.
6.2- Prepare historical documentation of your mission.
    6.2.1- Prepare written AAR.
    6.2.2- Prepare written lessons learned or record of events/training
Appendix B

BATTLE HANDOVER PROCEDURES

“Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not, you must start them.”

—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army,
“28 Articles” 2006

The purpose of this appendix is to provide recommendations/checklists to conduct a battle-handover with the outgoing advisor team and to discuss ideas/suggestions on effective techniques to train your FF units.

1. Predeployment Site Survey (PDSS)

a. Prior to deploying, the team leader and/or selected members of the advisor team may get an opportunity to visit the outgoing advisor team in the combat area. Ideally the PDSS is scheduled 60 days prior to the RIP/TOA process and is an extremely useful tool to help the new advisor team understand their operational environment. The PDSS checklist below can help answer many questions regarding FF in the area, coalition units operating in the area, and specific points of interest regarding current advisor initiatives, shortcomings, or opportunities to focus advisor effort for the incoming team.

b. Every advisor team will have differing missions, areas of operation, and units and personalities with which they will engage. Their environment, their relationships, the FF level of autonomy, and the level of stability within the AO will help define their mission. Prior to departure for the PDSS, the incoming team leader should assemble the request for information (RFI) list based on inputs from his team. The checklist in table 21 below provides a basic outline. Team members going on the PDSS should follow the checklist as a guide to focus on their mission and AO. However, it is important for the incoming advisor team to remain flexible and keep an open mind with respect to training/operating with their assigned FF.

(1) Site Survey Checklist. The site survey checklist helps answer questions identified by the team during their preparation for deployment. The checklist can be modified as needed to aid the site survey team in acquiring information for planning before deployment.

(2) Site Survey Team Mission. The mission of the site survey team is to report on the current FF mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) conditions. It also clarifies in-country C2 systems/logistics relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission execution and coordinates the in-country reception of the main body.
(3) Site Survey Team Procedures.

(a) Before departure, the site survey team conducts pre-deployment activities to include—

- Obtaining required travel documents (visas and passports) and a copy of the country clearance message sent by the US embassy, if required, through the battalion S-2 or S-3.
- Ensuring site survey team member medical and immunization records are current.
- Determine financial management support (location of supporting finance unit and J4 (funding)).
- Confirming that all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team's itinerary and are available for coordination.
- Receiving and updating the threat briefing as well as reviewing the rules of engagement (ROE) and SOFA.
- Conducting a mission analysis and back brief in accordance with unit SOP. The team tailors its mission analysis and back brief to the site survey mission.

(b) Upon arrival in the AO, the team processes through customs, notifies the security cooperation officer (SCO) of its arrival and status, and requests an updated threat briefing. The survey team must be ready to brief the mission and program of instruction (POI) to the SCO for approval and/or modification.

(c) The survey team commander and S-3 establish the command relationship with the next-higher in-country US commander if he is not in the team’s normal chain of command. The team commander also briefs the next-higher in-country US commander on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

(d) The survey team commander also obtains any additional guidance from the higher in-country US commander for the follow-on forces' mission execution. As a minimum, this guidance includes confirmation of the ROE, evasion and recovery (E&R) support, as well as any limitations on the relationships with FF counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following areas with the SCO:

- Training objectives.
- Terms of reference.
- Political situation.
- Social customs.
- Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.
- Currency control.
- Procedures for obtaining intelligence support from the next higher in-country US commander.
- Administrative support.
• Legal status in relation to the foreign country [SOFA].
• Procedures for obtaining logistics from the next-higher in-country US commander.

(e) The team commander confirms communications and reporting procedures between the next-higher in-country US commander, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor units still in mission preparation. The team commander must also verify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission.

(f) The team commander confirms procedures for obtaining logistics from the next-higher in-country US commander. He identifies a POC at the country team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center (EOC) of the US military staff. The POC then informs the team of necessary actions during increased threat/emergencies that require evacuation of US personnel from the AO. The team commander also coordinates procedures to obtain intelligence support from the higher in-country commander or other US agencies.

(g) The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next-higher in-country or out-of-country support element. The survey team:

• Identifies the supporting element location.
• Contacts the supporting element to determine any limitations on available support. Team should know expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and fulfillment.
• Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body in accordance with the requirements in the survey team OPORD.
• Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor team. They identify alternate and emergency communications procedures for C2, logistics, and MEDEVAC.
• Determines the established communications support-requesting procedures for the follow-on advisor team.

(h) The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronize operations. The team:

• Identifies the location of any concerned FF or US agencies.
• Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.
• Exchanges information and intelligence.
• Confirms or establishes communications procedures.
• Reports the newly established or changed procedures for inclusion into the follow-on advisor mission.

(i) The survey team commander establishes a direct working relationship and rapport with the FF unit commander. The survey team:

• Briefs the FF commander on the advisor team survey mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the advisor team by the higher US commander.
• Assures the FF commander his assistance is required to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisor assistance.
• Deduces or solicits the FF commander’s estimate of his unit capabilities, required training, and advisor assistance to include material requirements. They discuss training: plans, current status, units available, facilities, and any additional requirements.
• The survey team obtains the FF commander’s approval of the plan and requests a linkup with their counterparts under the mutual supervision of the FF commander and survey team commander.

(j) The team does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises) to the FF commander about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill material requirements. In particular, the survey team does not:

• Make any comment to the host government on possible US government resources of any kind.
• Provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the external threat, as perceived by the FF.
• Provide advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations.

(k) The survey team analyzes the FF unit’s status to determine FF requirements for advisor assistance. The team:

• Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and/or advisor assistance COAs.
• Prepares written estimates for advisor assistance COAs prioritized in order of desirability.
• Determines the unit location and its effects on the populace.
• Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.
• Determines the FF unit’s existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.
• Determines the compatibility of recommended US equipment with equipment in the FF inventory.

(l) The survey team helps the FF unit prepare facilities (training, security, and administration) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the facilities FF has designated for their use during the mission. Any deficiencies that will prevent execution of the advisor assistance COAs need to be identified. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the FF commander the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found.

(m) The survey team commander tentatively recommends the most desirable COAs to the FF commander emphasizing how to achieve the desired training and/or advisor assistance objectives. The survey team commander:

• Ensures the FF commander understands the desired COAs are still tentative (contingent on the US commander's decision).
• Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant findings in the survey of the FF unit.
• Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on advisor team, after obtaining input from the FF commander.

(n) The survey team ensures its security at all times, according to the latest threat assessment. The team:

• Fortifies their position (quarters, communications, medical, and command) using available means, keeping in mind the requirement to maintain low visibility.
• Establishes and maintains an internal alert plan.
• Organizes and maintains an internal guard system with at least one member who is awake and knows the location of all team members. The guard is ready to react to emergencies by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions according to established ROE and E&R procedures.
• Maintains communications with all team members outside the immediate area occupied by the team’s main body.

(o) Before departing from the AO, the survey team again visits all concerned US and FF staff agencies to clarify any unresolved problem areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 21. Site Survey Checklist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADVISOR TEAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Intelligence briefing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Threat briefing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Maps and photos of the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Weather forecast data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Restricted and off-limits areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Local populace (attitudes, customs, and dangers).</td>
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<tr>
<th>S-3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Initial coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Tentative training plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Aviation support tentatively available (hours and type of aircraft).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ FF plans (tentative).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Problem areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ Evasion plan of action (EPA)-related directives, guidance, plans, or orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Points of contact (POC), phone number list, communications requirements, and systems used.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<th>S-4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Transportation requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Special equipment requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Other support requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Construction equipment and supply requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### HOST UNIT COMMANDER

1. Training plan.
2. Current training status.
3. Units available for training.
5. Additional training desires.
6. Unit policies.

### S-2

1. Local civilians.
2. Security policies and problems.

### S-3

1. Training plan.
2. Support available.
   - Ammunition.
   - Weapons.
   - Vehicles.
   - Aircraft/air items.
   - Facilities: Training areas, classrooms, ranges, training aids, special equipment.
3. Unit equipment.
4. Landing zones (LZ) and drop zones (DZ) in the area.
5. Maps.
6. Rations for field training.
7. Daily training schedules and status reports.
8. POC for training problems.
9. Holidays and unit requirements that may interfere with training.
10. Medical and dental support.
11. Communications capabilities.
12. FF activities.

### S-4

1. Detachment facilities.
   - Barracks.
   - Drinking water.
   - Messing facilities.
   - Secure storage areas.
   - Electrical power supply.
2. Fuel supply.
3. Rations.
4. Transportation.
5. Lumber and materials for training aids.
6. Special equipment.
7. Ammunition.
8. Availability of construction equipment/tools and supplies.
2. Trading Spaces

a. Once you have reached your assigned AO, you will most likely start a RIP/TOA schedule which generally doesn’t allow for much deviation. Typically, every advisor unit follows a theater-approved RIP / TOA checklist that is managed by the outgoing advisor team leader. As the incoming team, you must be careful to maximize opportunities to learn from your replacements during this time. Observe the outgoing team and learn how their relationships with their FF counterpart work. If you are partnered with a coalition unit, understand the roles the FF unit will be expected to fill. Ask lots of questions, but don’t question methods until you have walked in their shoes. Remember “there is a reason they are doing what they are doing” your primary consideration is still do no harm. If you are assigned to a new FF unit and do not have the opportunity for a RIP/TOA you can still use some of the following tools:

b. The operational environment is often diverse, dynamic, and highly volatile. In addition, every area of operation is different and requires an analysis based on political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-people and time (PMESII-PT) that define your area. Understanding these aspects will explain how the FF unit operates, define their motivations/perceptions, and can determine FF unit effectiveness in the future. Questions for consideration by incoming advisor team include:

   (1) Politics. What is the dominant political party in your area? Is the government effective at influencing the people? Do the people support? Is there a shadow government in place and are they the source of power? Is there an effective neighborhood action council (NAC) and when/where do they meet? Is the NAC process infiltrated by militia or insurgent sympathies?

   (2) Military. What FF authorities operate in the area? Does the FF you advise have jurisdiction? What is the division of labor between civil and military units in your AO? What is the infiltration factor by insurgents and/or militia in the team’s assigned FF and others in the area? What are the insurgent lines of communications and support? What threats exist and how will they fight your FF unit? What coalition units operate in your AO and what can be expected from them?

   (3) Economic. What is the poverty level of your AO? What is the primary source of income? What criminal activities exploit the AO (racketeering, prostitution, extortion, illegal fuel sales, bomb-making)? What collective job opportunities exist to employ the young and disenfranchised? What role do your FF currently have regarding corruption within the economic arena in the AO? What corruption is best left alone in the interest of mission accomplishment?

   (4) Social. Is there a tribal network in your AO? Who runs the families and tribes? Do the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability, or merely the perception of it? Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and if so, where do they get their support? What is the ethnic breakdown by neighborhood or village? Where do the sectarian fault-lines exist?

   (5) Informational. Are there any local media in your area? How do the people receive their news? How can I effectively use deception? What is the enemy using to influence information in your area? What is your FF doing to promote a positive
perception of security? What are FF or partnership units doing that detracts from promoting a positive perception of security?

(6) Infrastructure. What is the current sewage, water, electric, and trash pick-up assessment in your AO? What projects must be supported by your FF? What projects require coalition support? What defines your AO—urban or agrarian (what effect does the physical geography have on an insurgency)? What are the road conditions? Are there any political offices, sensitive sites, or otherwise restricted areas?

(7) People. Who are the power-brokers within the AO? What civilians are the decision makers (Sheiks, Imams, political leaders, military leaders, teachers, police)? Are you restricted from interacting with any people in the AO without government approval?

(8) Time. Is there a sense of urgency in your AO from the people? How do they view time? What time constraints does your coalition partner unit have? What are the FF time constraints?

(9) Their Legacy. Finally, your FF counterparts will speak of the old team like long lost brothers after their departure. Honor this relationship. They may have thought your predecessors competent or incompetent, but they will usually speak highly of them. Do not speak ill of your predecessors, regardless of your opinion as this will not endear you to your counterparts.

3. Mission Handoff Procedures

a. Timeline. Table 22 is a sample timeline, or checklist, for mission handoff. It lists in chronological order the tasks an advisor team performs for a mission handoff. During long-term advisor operations, the commander may elect to replace an advisor team for various reasons. Mission handoff is the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity. It is based on a 179-day requirement and involves two advisor teams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Following planning and preparation, the advisor team (less advance party) <strong>deploys to the AO.</strong> The advisor team deploys with all personnel and equipment required to perform the assigned mission. If this is a first deployment to the AO, the advisor team deploys a site survey team (advisor team members) to coordinate all training with the FF unit and the US Embassy. If there is an advisor team in-country, the incoming replacement advisor team</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>The incoming advisor team <strong>receives notification that it will replace advisor team in 179 days.</strong> The advisor team starts its pre-mission planning. The advisor team coordinates for its deployment into the AO. Leaves, common tasks training, and range qualifications take place immediately after the mission notification. The advisor team starts training for the mission assigned.</td>
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</table>
deploys an advance party to coordinate with the deployed advisor team and counterparts.

**Area assessment begins** the minute the advisor team members arrive in-country. The advisor team sends the information it gathers from the area assessment to the incoming advisor team through the monthly intelligence summaries (INTSUMs). The advisor team sends timely information at any time, not just through a scheduled monthly I.N.T.S.U.M.

As soon as the advisor team arrives, it **establishes communications links** with the higher in-country C2 element. The advisor team also establishes a communications link with the advisor commander who has overall authority to order the handoff. This link becomes the information and intelligence link between the in-country advisor team and the incoming advisor team. This link must be maintained and monitored in accordance with prescribed communications schedules.

**Training of the FF begins** as soon as the advisor team is settled.

<p>| 30 | The advisor team sends training reports at least every 30 days. These reports indicate how the FF unit is responding to the in-country advisor team training program. The incoming advisor team uses these reports to modify its training programs and schedules. The advisor team sends an I.N.T.S.U.M at least every 30 days or as the military or political situations change. I.N.T.S.U.M.s are not restricted to monthly transmissions only. |
| 90 | The advisor team receives formal mission notification. All travel arrangements are finalized; the in-country advisor team is notified. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Command inspections performed by the advisor commander are a vital part of an advisor team. They give the commander a chance to see firsthand what an advisor team has accomplished to date. The inspection will ensure that the FF is looking after the welfare of the advisor team, and any problems with the FF are corrected immediately. If possible, one member from the incoming advisor team accompanies the commander.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Training reports, same as day 30. INTSUM, same as day 30.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>The formal advisor team training program begins. All other support requirements must stop; the advisor team mission must take priority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>The detailed intelligence report contains more than the monthly INTSUM. This report becomes a major part of the incoming advisor team mission planning process. The incoming advisor team receives this report the same day it receives its mission notification and starts its detailed planning.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Training reports, same as day 30. INTSUM, same as day 30. Mid-tour leaves are programmed into the training schedule. These leaves must be staggered so that they do not interfere with training. In-country leaves should be considered if appropriate.</td>
<td>Final leaves are granted to advisor team members. They ensure their personal affairs are in order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Command inspection. The advisor team finalizes its travel arrangements. The initial arrangements were made the day the advisor team deployed.</td>
<td>A team from the incoming advisor team may conduct an in-country coordination. The advisor team commander ensures only his personnel are on this team. The advisor team prepares its final shortage lists and sends them to the battalion S4. The advisor team picks up specialized items from the S4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>The incoming advisor team has had its formal mission notification and has started its mission preparation. Training reports, same as day 30. INTSUM, same as day 30. Command inspection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Training reports, same as day 30. INTSUM, same as day 30. This period is the most critical phase of the mission. The advisor team members who were in the advance party depart. The incoming advisor team advance party quickly meshes with the remaining in-country advisor team members and their FF counterparts. They establish rapport and begin the next phase of training. The in-country advisor team must have completed all training by this time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>The advisor team medical personnel complete a final medical screening. Members receive their shots at this time. All injuries sustained during the certification and validation should be healed. Personnel who require more time to recover may be replaced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>The in-country advisor team (minus its already departed members) departs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>The advisor team members’ dependents (families) receive a briefing. Every effort is made to answer all questions that would not create a security risk for the deploying advisor team. Dependent are provided with a POC in the event of problems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>The advisor team palletizes all its equipment and personal gear.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>The advisor team establishes a communications link.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>The advance party members deploy to the AO. They meet with the in-country advisor team members, establish rapport with their FF counterparts, and conduct all necessary coordination. The incoming advisor team (less its advance party) deploys to AO. The mission handoff is completed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The mission handoff is completed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Procedures.

(1) The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command lies with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies with the incoming commander since he will assume responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission will continue.

(2) The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this advice conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander’s desires and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

(3) As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the out-going advisor team under the incoming advisor team during the changeover process. Although this procedure would present a clear and easily defined solution to establishing the incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most effective control for US forces should hostile contact occur during the process.

(4) If the incoming advisor team or the FF unit they advise are in direct contact with insurgents during the handoff and the incoming advisor team commander has not assumed responsibility, his team immediately comes under operational control (OPCON) of the outgoing advisor team and is absorbed into that team’s structure. The outgoing advisor team commander and his FF counterpart will control the battle. If the outgoing advisor team commander has passed responsibility to the incoming advisor team commander, the outgoing team comes under the OPCON of the incoming team, and the FF unit coordinates its movements with the new advisor team.

c. Considerations. The incoming and outgoing advisor team commanders must consider seven factors:

(1) Mission. The incoming advisor team commander must make a detailed study of the advisor mission statement and understand the present mission tasks and implied mission tasks. The mission may also require a unit with additional skill sets such as specific weapons employment, or water operations. Knowing the mission, commander’s intent, commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and information requirements (IRs) will help him understand the mission. After a complete in-depth study of the operational area, the incoming advisor team commander should complete the handoff in a manner that allows for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow the enemy to gain any operational advantages.

(2) Operational Area. The in-country advisor team provides continuous intelligence updates to the advisor commander. Original PIRs and IRs were established for the original mission along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The incoming advisor team must become familiar with all ongoing PIRs/IRs and upcoming mission PIRs/IRs.
(3) Enemy Forces. The incoming advisor team commander must have the latest available intelligence on all enemy forces that affect the mission. This information can be obtained through your unit intelligence officer and should include data on terrorists and terrorist related incidents over the past several months. In addition to the normal intelligence provided to the incoming advisor team commander on a regular basis, the situation calls for a liaison from the outgoing team commander. OPSEC is critical to prevent the enemy from discovering the impending relief and then exploiting the fluidity of the change and the concentration of US forces.

(4) Friendly Forces. To the incoming advisor team, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The team must be familiar with the C2 structure for daily operations. The team must know all friendly units in adjacent AOs and be aware of conventional forces units to include the capabilities of their mission support base. The advisor team must also be aware of other operations, units, and their capabilities. If possible, the incoming advisor team members should receive biographical data on their counterparts, to include photographs. This data allows advisor team members to familiarize themselves with their counterparts before deployment.

(5) FF. The incoming advisor team plans and prepares for a quick and friction free transition in counterpart relations. However, potential or anticipated friction between the FF unit and the incoming advisor team may cause the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing advisor teams need a period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission handoff. Continued execution of the mission must be achieved within the capabilities of the advisor teams, the FF unit, and the available supporting assets. If US combat support units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after the relief of the advisor teams they support.

(6) Civilian Populace. The incoming advisor team must do an in-depth area study, giving close attention to local problems. Popular support for US activities taking place within the AO may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing advisor team must provide all critical information and describe in detail the completed civic action projects and those still underway. The incoming advisor team must understand the functioning of the local government and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved/influencing, the situation in its AO.

(7) Time. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted will determine the time required to exchange advisor teams. There must be an overlap period to allow the incoming advisor team to become familiar with the AO and to establish rapport between the team personnel and their FF counterparts. See table 22 for a sample timeline. However, the handoff operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more vulnerable the advisor team in the AO becomes as a lucrative target for insurgents or terrorists. A quickly executed relief will reduce the time available for the enemy to strike before the incoming advisor team has time to consolidate its position. The advisor team commander should not sacrifice continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming advisor team needs to have enough time to
observe training techniques and procedures and to conduct debriefings on lessons learned.

d. The Four “What If’s”. Assume you have successfully accomplished a PDSS, your questions have been answered, and you are now confident of your mission parameters and your operational environment. Your contact with the outgoing advisor team leader is consistent through email and via cell-phone. You were even lucky enough to have one of the members of the outgoing team visit you and your new team at your US training location prior to you deploying. However, one week prior to deployment, you have been notified of some alarming news: Your team is going to a completely different AO, your partnered coalition unit is different, and you are going to a place that seemingly is resource constrained—what do you do? The following “what-if” scenarios written by LTC David Kilcullen in his paper, “28 Articles,” provide some answers to these questions.

1. What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by al-Hassan and Unizzah tribes and Shia communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply: How to analyze an operational area; how to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same work again but this time the process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure, and can focus on what is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.

2. What if higher headquarters doesn’t get counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you the mission is to kill terrorists, or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage “first do no harm.” Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities: they own the indirect fires.

3. What if you have no resources? Yours is a low-priority sector: You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for funding. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance, keep things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritize effort. Local community leaders are your allies in this: They know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest with them, discuss possible projects and options with community leaders and get them to choose what their priority is. Often they will find the translators, building supplies or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is achievable, the situation can still work.
4. What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare: everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the al-Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army, “28 Articles” 2006

4. Area Assessment

a. To analyze and understand the civilian environment in which an advisor works, many units use the civil affairs (CA) doctrinal tool known as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events (ASCOPE) (this section contains selections from FM 3-05.401). The six characteristics of ASCOPE are as follows:

(1) Areas.
(2) Structures.
(3) Capabilities.
(4) Organizations.
(5) People.
(6) Events.

b. Areas are key civil localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s operational environment. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: How do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact civilian activities in these areas? The answers to these questions may dramatically influence planning and operations.

c. Existing civil structures take on many significant roles. Structures analysis involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.

d. CMO planners can view civil capabilities from several perspectives—existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food or agriculture systems; and capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works or utilities, public health, economics, and commerce. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that military forces could use consistent with international law.

e. Civil organizations are organized groups with or without affiliation to government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, and community watch groups. They might be intergovernmental organizations (IGO) or part of the NGO community. Organizations can assist the
commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They also can form the nucleus of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs, interim-governing bodies, or civil defense efforts.

f. People, individually and collectively, can have a positive impact, a negative impact, or no impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term “people” includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, US forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types.

g. Some examples of civilian events are planting/harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Likewise, there are military events that impact on the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, and deployments/redeployments. CA and CMO planners determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, moral, or legal implications.

h. Although ASCOPE provides a quick analytical framework for understanding the civilian impact on the operational environment, the following area assessment provides a more in-depth framework to evaluate many similar social and cultural factors that influence the advisor’s mission.

i. Area Assessment Format (FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), July 2007) (See table 23.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 23. Area Assessment Format</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Assessment Current as of: (MM/DD/YY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. GENERAL INFORMATION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Location name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Location (military grid reference system or latitude/longitude).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Total land area (square miles, kilometers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Topography (basic type of geography, such as desert, mountainous, or forested).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Climate and seasons (basic description of the local climate and seasonal breakdowns).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Languages and dialects spoken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Key landmarks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Brief area history, with focus on cultural aspects (any pertinent recent or ancient history).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. KEY PERSONS (Brief biographies, including gender, age, family, politics, associations, demeanor, habits, and influence).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Mayor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Police chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Religious leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Local military leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) School leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Tribal leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Other leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) IGOs/NGOs/other governmental agencies (OGAs) in the area (list all entities providing assistance, including POC and type, quantity, and frequency of assistance).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III. INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

(1) Population totals.
- Families.
- Males.
- Average age of males.
- Females.
- Average age of females.
- Children.
- Average age of children.

(2) Ethnic composition (basic ethnic breakdowns by percentage).
(3) Religious makeup (basic religious breakdowns by percentage).
(4) Social structure or hierarchy.
(5) Distribution of specific populations and groups (intermixed or split by ethnicity or religion into areas).
(6) General populace demeanor (pro-, neutral, or anti-United States; pro-, neutral or anti-local government).

### IV. STANDARD OF LIVING.

(1) Food (sources, quantity, quality, average diet, reliability across the community).
(2) Water (sources, quantity, quality, reliability across the community).
(3) Power (sources, quantity, quality, reliability across the community).
(4) Sewage (type, capacity, reliability across the community).
(5) Transportation.
  - Public.
    - Local (basic systems used for travel within the community).
    - Intercommunity (basic systems used for travel between communities).
  - Private
    - Local (basic types used for travel within the community).
    - Intercommunity (basic types used for travel between communities).

(6) Shelter.
- Types of dwellings (huts, single story, multi-story, high-rise).
- Standard construction material (wood, brick, mud, steel, block).
- Number of dwellings (total estimated number).
- Overall category (list by percentage using the structural evaluation chart in figure 15).
  - Category 1.
  - Category 2.
  - Category 3.
  - Category 4.
(7) Communications
- Telephone (percent of households, reliability, service providers).
- Television (percent of households, number of channels, reception, reliability, service providers).
- Radio (percent of households, number of channels, reception, reliability, service providers).
- Newspaper (percent of households, number of printings weekly, views, reliability).

(8) Medical.
- Hospitals (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
- Clinics (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
- Dental offices (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
- Veterinary offices: (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).
- Mortuaries: (size, location, capacity, capability, reliability).

(9) Education.
- Basic education level.
- Facilities.
  - Grade schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).
  - High schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).
  - Universities (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).
  - Religious schools (POCs, locations, capacity [current and future], schedule, shortfalls).

(10) Crime.
- Rate.
- Types (predominant types of crime in the community).
- Areas (locations of concentrations, bad areas).
- Figures (identified crime figures with biographical information, if available).
- Penal institutions (type, organization, structural information, capability, current capacity, and locations).

(11) Unique problems and challenges (miscellaneous information).
V. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

(1) Type of economy (market, agrarian, industrial).
(2) Currency (all currencies and any known exchange rates).
(3) Unemployment rate (percent of eligible work force that is unemployed).
(4) Self-employed (percent of eligible work force that is self-employed).
(5) Nature of self-employment (list professions if they constitute a major percentage of the self-employed).
(6) Employed (percent of eligible work force that is employed by others).
(7) Nature of employment (list professions if they constitute a major percentage of the employed).
(8) Trade/exchange with other locations (list major items, agreements, and methods for trade with other population areas).
(9) Natural resources (list all major natural resources for the community).
(10) Main crops (main staple crops of the community, even if not an agrarian economy).
(11) Livestock (main livestock types, locations, and uses).
(12) Industry type (major industries that support the community).

VI. POLITICS.

(1) Political system.
(2) Parties (number and density).
(3) Representatives (elected or selected).
(4) Political attitude toward the United States and local governments.
(5) Biographies of key officials/leaders (if not covered in Section II).

VII. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. Identify friendly and hostile conventional military forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) and internal foreign forces (including border guards, local police, international police) that can influence mission execution. Analyze non-national or hostile forces, as well as national (indigenous) forces, using the subdivisions shown below.

Coalition Foreign Forces.

(1) Coalition foreign forces within the advisor team’s AO.
(2) Coalition foreign forces adjacent to the advisor team’s AO.

Indigenous Forces Forces.

(1) Indigenous foreign forces within the advisor team’s AO.
(2) Indigenous foreign forces adjacent to the advisor team’s AO
(3) Morale, Discipline, and Political Reliability.
(4) Personnel Strength.
(5) Organization and Basic Deployment.
(6) Uniforms and Unit Designations.
(7) Ordinary and Special Insignia.
(8) Overall Control Mechanism.
(9) Chain of Command and Communication.
(10) Leadership. Note officer and NCO corps.
(11) Non-national Surveillance and Control Over Indigenous Foreign Forces.
(12) Training and Doctrine.
(13) Tactics. Note seasonal and terrain variations.
(14) Equipment, Transportation, and Degree of Mobility.
(15) Logistics.
(16) Effectiveness. Note any unusual capabilities or weaknesses.
(17) Vulnerabilities in the Internal Security System.
(18) Past and Current Reprisal Actions.
(19) Use and Effectiveness of Informers.
(20) Influence on and Relations with the Local Populace.
(21) Psychological Vulnerabilities.
(22) Recent and Current Unit Activities.
(23) Counterinsurgency Activities and Capabilities. Pay particular attention to reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units, counterintelligence units, and units having a mass chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) delivery capability.
(24) Guard Posts and Wartime Security Coverage. Note the location of all known guard posts or expected wartime security coverage for all types of installations. Pay particular attention to security coverage along the main line of communications (LOC) (railroads, highways, and telecommunications lines) and along electrical power and POL lines.
(25) Forced Labor and/or Detention Camps. Note exact location and description of the physical arrangement (particularly the security arrangements).
(26) Populace and Resources Control Measures. Note locations, types, and effectiveness of internal security controls. Include checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits.

VIII. RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION. Identify the organizational elements and key personalities of the resistance organization. Note each group’s attitude toward the United States, the hostile power, various elements of the civilian populace, and friendly political groups.

Guerrillas.
(1) Disposition, strength, and composition.
(2) Organization, armament, and equipment.
(3) Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
(4) Operations to date.
(5) Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.
(6) Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.
(7) Quality of senior and subordinate leadership.
(8) General health.

Auxiliaries and the Underground.
(1) Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
(2) General effectiveness and type of support.

IX. EMERGENCY SERVICES.

(1) Police (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, enforcement methods, and locations).
(2) Fire (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, and locations).
(3) Rescue (organization, structure, strength, functions, equipment, and locations).
(4) Militia (organization, structure, strength, equipment; product of national military policy or separatist organizations).
(5) Unique problems and challenges.
X. SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURES. (This includes any major structures not already covered.)

| (1) Dams.             |
| (2) Bridges.          |
| (3) Water/sewage treatment plants. |
| (4) Water distribution facilities. |
| (5) Religious structures. |
| (6) Historic structures (any items/locations of significant value to the local populace). |
| (7) Cultural structures (any items/locations of significant value to the local populace, to include zoos and libraries). |
| (8) Power generation plants. |
| (9) Power distribution nodes. |
| (10) Rail lines, yards, and switching stations. |
| (11) Airports.        |
| (12) Port areas.      |
| (13) Government buildings. |

XI. DISLOCATED CIVILIANS (DC).

| (1) Location (grids for all major concentrations). |
| (2) Quantity (numbers broken down by male/female/children). |
| (3) Composition. |
| • Ethnicity. |
| • Religion. |
| (4) Disposition (general status of the DC population, for example, self-sufficient, receiving assistance, sick, or starving). |
| (5) Unique problems and challenges with local community. |

XII. OBSERVATIONS. (General comments on traditions, customs, or taboos observed.)

Conclusion:

j. Both ASCOPE and the civil affairs area assessment present frameworks that advisors can use to teach their FF unit for implementation in areas where civilian presence influences the operational environment. Civil-military operations serve as a key line of operation in any COIN campaign and are especially important for FF operating among civilians who are also citizens of the same country. For further information, see FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

5. Post Mission Debriefing Procedures

a. The advisor team commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission, military geography, political parties, military forces, insurgents, foreign forces, underground, targets, health and sanitation practices of the populace, and E&R.

b. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, the advisor team undergoes an extensive debriefing. The S-2 officer organizes and conducts the debriefing, subject to unit SOP. (See table 24.)
c. The S-2 coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to take part in the advisor team debriefing, particularly if other organizations tasked the advisor team to obtain information. All deployed personnel must be available for the debriefing.

d. After the debriefing, the advisor team leader, with the assistance of other members of the team prepares two documents.

(1) The first is an AAR. The AAR states: who, what, when, where, and how of the operation. It is a permanent record of the major activities of the team from isolation to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template on which past missions may be compared and future missions planned. The AAR is normally submitted through command channels to the higher commander no later than 48 hours after an advisor team has been debriefed. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of the advisor team AARs.

(2) Shortly after completion of the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the advisor team leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the team leader’s reflection on his most recent operation and his recommendation for the future. One method is to organize the lessons according to the six warfighting functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fire support, sustainment, C2, and force protection. It addresses what worked and what did not work on the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing TTP in the unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 24. Post Mission Debrief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISSION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief statement of mission by advisor team commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXECUTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of method of operation accomplished during the operation, to include deployment, routes, activity in the AO, and redeployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms and equipment used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications equipment used and results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties (friendly and/or enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action (KIA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly contacts established, to include descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MILITARY GEOGRAPHY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic name, universal transverse mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries (north, south, east, and west).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ What type of terrain is dominant in this area?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation?
What is the approximate degree of slope?
What natural obstacles to movement did you observe and what are their locations?
What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area?
- Direction of flow.
- Speed.
- Depth.
- Type of bed.
What is the physical layout of rural and urban settlements?
What is the layout of various houses within the area?
How would you describe any potential LZs or DZs?
How would you describe any beach landing sites, if applicable?
How would you describe any areas suitable for cache sites and what are their locations?
People.
- What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area?
- What was (or is) their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area?
- What is the principal religion of the area and how is it practiced?
- What influence does religion have on the people.
- Religious holidays.
- Taboos.
- Conflicts in religions.
How would you describe the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, characteristics)?
How do the people of this area dress compared with other areas?
What type clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear?
What symbolism is attached to certain items of jewelry and/or ornaments?
What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?
- Between males and females?
- Between young and old?
- Toward marriage, birth, and death?
- Between the populace and local officials?
What is the ordinary diet of the people?
What was the attitude of the populace toward you and the FF with you?
What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the FF troops toward the government and leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?
What was the general feeling of the populace toward the United States, its policies, and involvement with other nations?
How did the populace cooperate with advisor team?
What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen?
What formal and informal educational practices did you observe?
What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area?
Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so, how?
What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages?
Were you approached or questioned by some member of the populace about the advisor team or your mission? If so, describe in detail. Give names, if possible.

**POLITICAL PARTIES (Major and Minor Parties)**

| Leaders.  |
| Policies.  |
| Influence on government.  |
| Influence on the people.  |
| Foreign influence.  |
| - Ethnic and/or ideological.  |
| - Regional.  |
| - International.  |
| - Stability, strength, and weaknesses.  |

**MILITARY**

| Friendly forces.  |
| Disposition.  |
| Composition, identification, and strength.  |
| Organization, armament, and equipment.  |
| Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.  |
| Mission.  |
| Leadership and capabilities of officers and NCOs compared with those of the United States.  |
| Logistics.  |
| Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.  |
| Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.  |
| Psychological strengths and weaknesses.  |
| Relationship between the FF and the populace.  |
| Influence on local populace.  |
| Recommendation for these forces (military and or paramilitary) for UW contact.  |

**INSURGENT FORCES**

| Disposition.  |
| Composition, identification, and strength.  |
| Organization, armament, and equipment.  |
| Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.  |
| Mission.  |
| Leadership capabilities.  |
| Logistics.  |
Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
Method of resupply and its effectiveness.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship between insurgent forces, your advisor team, and the populace.
Influence on local populace.

**POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES**

Disposition, strengths, and location.
Organization, armament, and equipment.
Logistics.
Motivation, reliability, and degree of training.
Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Relationship with the government and local populace.

**AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND**

Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
Morale and general effectiveness.
Motivation and reliability.
Support.
  - Logistics.
  - Intelligence.

**TARGETS**

Rail system.
  - General route.
  - Importance to the local and general area.
  - Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
  - Bypass possibilities.
  - Key junctions, switching points, and power sources.
  - Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale interdiction.
  - Security.
Telecommunications system.
  - Location and description of routes, lines, and cables.
  - Location of power sources.
  - Location and capacity of switchboards.
  - Critical points.
  - Importance to the local general area.
  - Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating at a minimum.
  - Security.
POL storage and processing facilities.
  - Location.
♦ Capacity of storage facilities.
♦ Equipment used for the production of POL.
♦ Power source.
♦ Types and quantities of POL manufactured.
♦ Methods of transportation and distribution.
♦ Rail.
♦ Truck.
♦ Ship.
♦ Air.
♦ Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities.
♦ Security.

**Electrical power system.**
♦ Location and description of power stations.
♦ Principal power lines and transformers.
♦ Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
♦ Critical points.
♦ Capacity (kilowatts).
♦ Principal users.
♦ Security.

**Military installations and depots.**
♦ Size.
♦ Activity.
♦ Location.
♦ Units.
♦ Equipment.
♦ Reaction time.
♦ Security.

**Highway and road system.**
♦ Name and number.
♦ Type of surface, width, and condition.
♦ Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
♦ Bypass possibilities.
♦ Traffic density.
♦ Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
♦ Security.

**Inland waterways and canals.**
♦ Name and number.
♦ Width, depth, and type of bed.
♦ Direction and speed of flow.
- Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions.
- Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance crew, facilities, and reaction crew.
- Location and description of navigational aids.

**Natural and synthetic gas system.**
- Location and capacity of wells and pipelines.
- Storage facilities and capacity.
- Critical points.
- Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
- Principal users.
- Security.

**Industrial facilities.**
- Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities in wartime to the production of essential military materials.
- Type of facilities.
- Power sources.
- Locations.
- Sources of raw materials.
- Number of employees.
- Disposition of products.
- General working conditions.
- Critical points.
- Security.

## HEALTH AND SANITATION

- To what degree does hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet?
- What cash crops are raised in the area?
- What domestic and wild animals are present?
- What animal diseases are present?
- What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas?
- What systems are used for sewage disposal?
- What sanitation practices did you observe in the populated and unpopulated areas?
- What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?

## EVASION AND RECOVERY

- From which element of the populace is assistance most likely?
- Would you recommend any safe houses or areas for E&R purposes?
- What type shelters were used?
- Were fires small and smokeless?
- Were shelters adequate?
- Was food properly prepared?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Were camp sites well chosen?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were camp sites and trails sterilized after movement to a new one?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What edible wild plants are found in the area?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MISCELLANEOUS**

Weather.
- Wind speed and direction.
- Temperature.
- Effect on personnel and equipment.

Problems encountered.
Appendix C

EVALUATING SUCCESS

1. Evaluating Performance of Foreign Force Units
   a. When FF reach their desired end state at the tactical level, they should be able to:
      
      (1) Provide a reasonable level of security in the AO without infringing on the population's civil liberties or posing a coup threat to the government.
      
      (2) Be founded upon the rule of law and operate within the law.
      
      (3) Be able to sustain their operations after US or multinational forces depart.
      
   b. Effective FF should also display the following characteristics and capabilities:
      
      (1) Flexible. A force that is capable of accomplishing the broad missions required by the nation, not just to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command and organizational structure that is workable for the host nation.
      
      (2) Proficient.
         
         (a) Foreign forces that are capable of working effectively in close coordination with each other to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
         
         (b) Foreign forces that are tactically and technically proficient, capable of executing their national security mission, and integrating with allies.
         
         (c) Nonmilitary foreign forces that are competent in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.
         
         (d) Nonmilitary security forces thoroughly trained with a modern police ethos to include: security procedures, investigation basics, evidence collection, and court and legal procedures.
      
      (3) Self-sustained. Forces capable of managing their own equipment throughout its lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conducting administrative support.
      
      (4) Well led. Leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values and are selected for promotion based on competence and merit.
      
      (5) Professional.
         
         (a) Foreign forces that are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
         
         (b) Foreign forces that are loyal to the central government and serve national interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.
      
      (6) Integrated into Society. A force that is representative of the nation’s major ethnic groups and is not seen as the instrument of just one faction. Cultural
sensitivities toward the incorporation of women must be observed, but efforts should also be made to include women in police and military organizations.

c. These capabilities support the overall campaign design, and evaluations of FF capabilities should reflect the FF ability to influence the operational environment in a way that reinforces the overall design. Ultimately, the success or failure of a FF unit may rest more on its ability to affect the operational environment in general than on its ability to execute specific tasks.

d. While a campaign design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living process, the same holds true for an advisor’s evaluation of FF success. Metrics for evaluating success should and will change as the insurgency adapts and conditions in the AO also shift. An advisor’s ability to implement and maintain the “learn and adapt” imperative will lead to more accurate assessments of FF.

e. These two basic questions provide a starting point for evaluating FF:

1. Base your evaluations on the goals of the campaign design and ask “to what extent can the FF achieve those goals?”

2. Keep in mind the maxims “first do no harm” and “no better friend—no worse enemy.” To what extent do the FF reflect these maxims?

2. Assessing FF Capabilities

a. This list is drawn from FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency. It is meant to serve as a guide for advisors to assess how FF units are doing, where advisors can help, and what FF and advisors should expect from one another. The questions posed here provide a frame of reference to help evaluate the employment of advisors and whether they are helping to adequately develop the FF. These questions combine objective and subjective analysis, but to employ them effectively requires the advisor’s interpretation and sound judgment.

1. Leadership. Are leaders promoted based on demonstrated competence and performance or based on family ties, party membership, or tribal ties?

   a. Do leaders seek to develop subordinates?

   b. Do leaders care and seek to maintain the welfare of their subordinates?

2. FF Behavior. Does the unit act corruptly or abuse its power against the public? Does the force treat all members of the public equally regardless of party or tribe? Do foreign forces abuse civilians?

3. Respect for FF Doctrine. Does the advisor team operate according to an “our way is best” approach or does it seek to promote and integrate FF doctrine among the force with which it works?

4. Training Run by Experts. Are advisors facilitating training in their areas of expertise (i.e., MOS, Air Force specialty code [AFSC])?

5. Focus on COIN Operations. Do the advisors and FF understand COIN and focus on COIN operations?
(6) Focus of FF Assessment. Follow on assessments should start by reviewing areas with restricted resources, determining where resources should be committed or redirected, and deciding whether to request additional resources.

(7) Doctrine Uniformity. Are doctrine and unit structures standard (and understood) across the FF?

(8) Warfighting Functions. Do all FF (including police) have appropriate capabilities to achieve their mission?

(9) Doctrine Clarity and Comprehensiveness. Does doctrine provide clear, complete instructions for discipline, acquisitions, and support activities? Do advisor team leaders and FF counterparts understand the doctrine and have it available? Is doctrine written at a level that FF commanders can understand? Do advisor team leaders and FF commanders understand their responsibilities and obligations for detainee operations?

(10) FF Diversity. Do units reflect ethnic/tribal/religious diversity of the AO? Does desertion or any other negative trend particularly affect one group?

(11) FF Recruiting Standards. Are there clear mental, physical, and moral standards for recruits? Are recruiting areas secure? Have recruits been vetted against black lists and known insurgent lists?

(12) Factionalization. Are there large pockets of former members of a single illegal unit, tribal faction, or other illegal militant faction within a single unit?

(13) Promotions. Are foreign forces promoted based on a combination of competence, professionalism, and social status? Does the promotion system result in the selection of competent leaders who are culturally accepted?

(14) Pay and Benefits. Are pay scales widely available and understood? Does taxing of subordinates or other corrupt practices occur? Is a death notification and benefit structure in place for foreign forces killed or who otherwise die in service? Are corrupt individuals dismissed when they engage in corruption?

(15) Education. Do all foreign forces receive a basic education, job training, and moral values inculcation while they are serving?

(16) Officer Vetting. Are all officers vetted to ensure they do not have ties to radical or insurgent organizations?

(17) NCO Selection. Are NCOs selected from the best enlisted foreign forces?

(18) Personnel Accountability. Are personnel accountability systems in place, understood, and enforced? Do FF commanders understand the importance of personnel accountability? Do advisor leaders understand the FF commander’s accountability system and are they capable of tracking it for signs of corruption or widespread disaffection?

(19) Demobilization Planning. Have commanders completed plans for demobilization and transition to civilian life for NCOs/officials who are considered a hindrance to the force? Are transition systems in place for foreign forces returning to civilian life after completing their enlistments?
(20) Garrison Services. Do garrisons provide housing and basic healthcare for commissioned officers, NCOs, and families?

(21) Trainer Standards. Are advisors familiar with FF organizations, equipment, and weapons? Do they have some familiarity with local languages? Are advisors effective in using interpreters? Can advisors distinguish between cultural practices and excuses? Do advisors use AARs to help FF learn?

(22) Emphasis on COIN. Are advisors aware of the additional requirements that COIN places on evaluating and training their units? In addition to evaluating soldier skills, are advisors evaluating subjective measures such as loyalty to the local government and the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption?

(23) Employment of FF Trainers. Do advisors focus on developing competent cadres to conduct training? Do FF personnel conduct the majority of training?

(24) Basic Competencies of FF Units. Does initial training of FF focus on COIN-related skills such as first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline? Are leaders trained on tactics such as patrolling and urban operations? Are training systems in place to teach FF personnel ROE and the law of armed conflict? Are FF units trained to a standard on the following skills:

(a) Managing their security.

(b) Providing effective personnel management.

(c) Conducting logistic (planning, maintenance, and movement) operations.

(d) Coordinating indirect fires.

(e) Providing for effective medical support.

(25) FF Unit Leader Evaluation.

(a) Are FF officers competent in the following skills:

- Intelligence collection.
- Day and night patrolling.
- Point security.
- Cordon and search operations.
- Operations with police.
- Treatment of detainees and prisoners.
- Psychological operations.
- Civic action.

(b) Do FF officers understand how to:

- Work as a team.
- Develop and take advantage of subordinates’ skills.
- Train subordinates.
- Maintain discipline and assume responsibility for one’s own and one’s subordinates’ actions.
- Understand and enforce ROE.
(26) Armaments. Are FF (including the police) better equipped than the insurgents they face?

(27) Advisor Integration. Do advisors live, sleep, and eat with FF units? Is segregation kept at an absolute minimum? Do higher level commanders understand the roles and limitations of advisors, i.e., do they treat them as advisors or do they treat them as command team liaisons?

(28) Employment of Cultural Understanding. Do advisors effectively use culture to accomplish difficult tasks? Do advisors live up to the following guidelines:

(a) Learn enough of the language for simple conversation.

(b) Be subtle and patient with FF counterparts; explain the benefits of an action and encourage them to internalize it; respect their rank.

(c) Act diplomatically in correcting FF while praising successes and helping to instill pride in the FF unit.

(d) Understand the role of an advisor. Make sure the commander makes command decisions, not the advisor.

(e) Keep FF counterparts informed.

(f) Work to train and improve the unit, even in a combat zone; help the commander establish SOPs.

(g) Liaise with multinational assets including air support, logistics, civil affairs, and humanitarian teams.

(h) Advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.

(i) Have a thorough knowledge of appropriate FF unit tactics and unit security procedures.

(j) Use “confidence” missions to assess training.

(k) Stay integrated with the unit (e.g., eat their food).

(l) Be aware of operations in the immediate area to prevent fratricide.

(m) Insist on FF adherence to the laws of war and ROE standards for the treatment of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents while reporting violations.

(n) Be objective in reporting on FF unit and leader proficiency with special attention to corruption and incompetence.

(o) Trust and fight alongside FF units while maintaining flexibility and forward thinking to address future problems not addressed in doctrine.

(p) Remember that most actions have long-term strategic ramifications.

(q) Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.

(29) Local Police/Military LNOs. Do police/military LNOs exist and coordinate military and police actions with their counterparts? Is appropriate detainee coordination conducted between the police and military?
(30) Police Visibility. Is police presence felt 24/7?

(31) Police Corruption. Do effective and adequate mechanisms exist to prevent police corruption? Are corrupt police officers dismissed?

(32) Police Detainee Operations. Are police trained on the appropriate handling of detainees in accordance with human rights laws? Are police trained on the provision of security for both detainees and their handlers? Are police trained to effectively interrogate detainees in accordance with human rights laws? Do police have accountability of detainees?

(33) Police Support Personnel. Do police have trained armorers, supply specialists, communications personnel, administrative personnel, and vehicle mechanics in adequate numbers to accomplish their mission?

(34) Joint Police/Military Operations. In joint operations, do the police and military establish common SOPs, conduct supporting IO, perform combined planning, and ensure command and control interoperability?
Appendix D

INTERPRETER SUPPORT

Understanding how to employ and manage your interpreters is key to your success as an advisor. This appendix will outline the specifics on how to exercise, lead, and direct your interpreter. Realizing that all coalition forces conducting missions outside the wire employ interpreters, this appendix will focus on those guidelines and TTP that are particularly applicable to advisor teams. Advisor teams face some unique interpreter employment challenges with regards to security, force protection, and OPSEC. The conventional unit employment of an interpreter is for short meeting engagements with local leaders, community councils, or security force planning. In contrast, a transition team must utilize their interpreters to conduct the very basic mission of advising, coaching, and training their security force counterparts. Advisor teams will find that they use interpreters 60-80% of the time they spend working with their counterparts, ebbing and flowing based on their counterparts’ command of the English language. Based on mission requirements and a limited number of interpreters per team, advisor team interpreters will often work for long hours transitioning from social to training to operational and formal settings.

1. Your Interpreter
a. First and foremost, your interpreter is not a US military member. Although there are a few exceptions, most transition teams will not have the luxury of employing a US Military trained linguist.

b. Interpreters come with different qualifications or categories (CATs). FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, appendix C, defines interpreter categories. Generally, CAT I interpreters are locally hired and pass a basic background screening, but do not have a security clearance. CAT II interpreters possess a secret clearance and CAT III has a top secret clearance. Advisor teams will usually be assigned one or two CAT I interpreters. While many teams would like to have CAT II or higher interpreters, the reality of supply versus demand requires many conventional units and advisor teams to utilize CAT I interpreters.

c. For the purpose of this appendix, the term “interpreter” refers to CAT I interpreters. The term “he” refers to male or female interpreters, as the coalition and advisor teams employ both in the current theaters of operation.

d. Your interpreters are part of your team. These individuals will live, eat, train, and fight next to you for the length of your tour. It is up to you to ensure that they feel like part of the team. Your success as an advisor and your safety as a team is directly related to your relationship with, and the ability to trust, your interpreter. If at all possible, living quarters for interpreter should not be separated from other team members.

e. Interpreter Considerations.

(1) Using Interpreters. Interpreters can offer valuable informal insights into local customs, traditions, and courtesies. In most cases the interpreter can be
approached more directly than the FF counterparts, especially if the counterparts are of significantly higher rank than the advisor. In some cases their English, host nation language, or interpretation skills can be poor, directly affecting the mission. Interpreters can consider themselves superior to the average counterpart (class consciousness), and this feeling can cause problems.

(2) Native Speaker. Interpreters should be native speakers of the socially or geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that no attention is given to the way they talk, only to what they say.

(3) Social Status. In some situations and cultures, interpreters may be limited in their effectiveness with a target audience if their social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. This may include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the advisor’s personal feelings on social status, he should remember the task is to accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. Local prejudices should be accepted as a fact of life.

(4) English Fluency. An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the advisor and the advisor understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English should be satisfactory. The advisor can check that "understanding" by asking the interpreter to paraphrase, in English, something the advisor said; the advisor then restates the interpreter’s comments to ensure that both persons are synchronized. Also, interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information expressed by the interviewee or target audience.

(5) Intellectual Intelligence. The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, generally speaking, the better educated the interpreter, the better he will perform due to increased exposure to diverse concepts.

(6) Technical Ability. In certain situations, the advisor may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas to translate the "meaning" as well as the "words." For instance, if the subject is very technical or specialized, with terms such as nuclear physics, background knowledge will be useful.

(7) Reliability. The advisor should beware of the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. The advisor should make sure that the interpreter understands the military’s preoccupation with punctuality.

(8) Loyalty. If the interpreter used is a local national, it is safe to assume that his first loyalty is to the foreign nation or subgroup, and not to the US military. The security implications are clear. The advisor must be very cautious in how he explains concepts to give interpreters a greater depth of understanding.
Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job. If the advisor detects or suspects such motives, he should tell his commander, intelligence section, or security manager. The advisor should be aware of and monitor these motives with all interpreters.

(9) Gender, Age, and Race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female interpreter ineffective under certain circumstances. Another example would be the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience’s group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

(10) Compatibility. The advisor and the interpreter will work as a team. For the interpreter to be most effective, he should become an extension of the advisor. The target audience will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between the advisor and the interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the advisor should look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

2. Getting Started
a. Before you start working with your interpreter, you need to spend some time getting to know him. This sounds obvious enough but there are two reasons why this first step is so important. First, find out which languages he speaks. This is especially important in a place like Afghanistan where numerous languages and dialects exist. Remember a culture is based on personal relationships. While your interpreter is likely educated and accustomed to the American ways of conducting business, he’s still a foreign citizen. Secondly, you need to know what you can and cannot trust from this individual. You’re receiving their translation, their advice, and their interpretation of the “un-said messages” in order to accomplish your mission. Any personal baggage your interpreter brings to his job is definitely your business.

b. A starting place for discussions with your interpreter includes:
   (1) Background. How long have they been employed as an interpreter, who else have they worked for, where have they worked? It is often interesting to listen to their combat experience relative to their repeated patrols with US convoys.
   (2) Religion. This is particularly important for a new interpreter. Knowing how they may view an opposite sect is critical to questioning how your interpreter may be translating a message.
   (3) Where he lives.
   (4) Where their family lives.
   (5) Education.
   (6) Previous employment.
   (7) History of hostilities.
3. Relationship with Foreign Forces

a. Often, a new advisor team inherits the interpreters from the outgoing team. As one team completes its tour, the next will simply assume the same set of interpreters and begin work. This is a double edged sword. On the plus side, your interpreter is able to advise you on past conversations, a history of issues, and give you an idea of what to expect from this unit or leader. As a challenge, interpreters inevitably develop relationships with the foreign forces that you are charged to advise. While this is normal and even culturally preferable, this is something you need to monitor.

b. Gifts provided from your interpreters to your military or civil counterparts are a cultural norm. Ensure your interpreters remain up front about this and advise you as to when or why they are providing a gift. Some of this may be a good indication that you, as an advisor team, need to provide a gift as well. The litmus test here falls back to a question of loyalty. You need to be able to trust your interpreter.

A national police transition team in Baghdad employed four Sunnis and one Christian interpreter. Each of these interpreters carried three forms of identification (ID). Each listed their real name and photo, but were used at different points in the city as they traveled to and from work. Their government of Iraq issued ID cards were used at Iraqi Army or Iraqi police checkpoints close to their home neighborhoods. Coalition issued ID cards were used to enter the US FOB. Their national police ID card was flashed when they approached an army or police checkpoint in the Shia neighborhood immediately outside the FOB. These national police ID cards were a gift from the National Police commander. This was an acceptable gift as it allowed the interpreters to travel to and from work with less chance of being targeted by sectarian militias.

—Iraqi National Police Transition Team Member

4. A Cultural Advisor

a. In addition to their specified translating duties, your interpreter will provide an invaluable role as a cultural advisor. From basic phrases to conducting the “man-kiss,” your interpreter can instruct your team on greetings and farewells. During holidays, he can provide a welcome source of information on gifts, observances, culturally acceptable work hours, and customs. This is particularly relevant if you expect your security force counterpart to begin a new operation or work longer hours during a religious holiday.

b. One of the most valuable services your interpreter can provide is to help you say “no,” without losing face. There will be times when you would like to refuse an offer, a gift, or other item while not offending your counterpart. Your interpreter may provide advice on how to accomplish this without unnecessarily damaging your relationship.

c. Your interpreter will provide you with a better understanding of the culture, provided you ask the right questions. Questions on religion or politics that you avoid or approach gingerly with your counterpart can more readily be discussed with your interpreter. Your interpreter should be aware of cultural differences between sects and/or ethnic backgrounds. The interpreter can use this information to your advantage when deciding
on an influence or negotiation strategy. Finally, your interpreter can provide valuable advice on appropriate courtesies for birthdays, births, and funerals.

5. How to Employ Your Interpreter

a. By definition, your interpreter will interpret or translate the local language to English and vice-versa.

b. In reality, your interpreter provides you with what “he thinks” the foreign language speaker said. This is limited by your interpreter’s skill of both languages, his mental alertness, and his relationship with his employer (this is you).

c. When possible, choose the right interpreter for the mission. Interpreter skills vary widely from simple conversational translation at a slow to moderate pace, to rapidly translating military briefings. Based on their education and experience, some interpreters will be able to hand write or type translations of documents or orders. These written interpretations usually lack sentence structure and almost never conform to military jargon and acronyms. Thus teams found that written interpreted products often required a second translation to form these documents into logical sentences and thoughts.

d. The “right” interpreter may also improve the setting in a formal meeting or tenuous setting. Selecting an older, more mature, male interpreter may be more culturally acceptable to a senior military or police official. Certainly, an interpreter that best reflects your tone, inflection, and meaning goes a long way towards ensuring that your counterpart understands what you think you said.

6. Military Briefings

a. For planned briefings or discussions with key leaders, consider briefing the interpreter on the topic in advance. This technique is particularly useful when you are trying to brief a large audience on military tactics or Service doctrine. Reviewing military terms and definitions in advance will save you distracting sidebar conversations with your interpreter during the briefing.

A transition team in Iraq had considerable difficulty with the terms “surveillance” and “reconnaissance.” These terms commonly came up during the planning phase for intelligence driven targets. As US brigades owned the AO, their approval was required before the foreign forces could execute a target. Often, the foreign force’s S2 and S3 would say “yes” to any question if it expedited coalition approval of their requested target. This problem was further exacerbated as different interpreters interchanged the Arabic translation, further confusing the team’s Iraqi counterparts. This problem persisted through several target iterations, until the transition team made a dedicated effort to explain the difference in the two terms to all of the interpreters and their Iraqi counterparts.

—Iraqi Military Transition Team Member
7. Basic Rules for Success

a. These are some basic rules for success when using any interpreter:

(1) Look at your counterpart not your interpreter.
(2) Maintain eye contact with your counterpart.
(3) Speak to your counterpart as if your interpreter is not there.
(4) Think of your interpreter as a tool to transmit your message.
(5) Keep your statements short enough to allow easy translation.
(6) Interpreters get tired – plan periodic breaks or rotate interpreters based on the interpreter’s skill level (60 minutes of constant translation is about the limit for most interpreters).
(7) Rehearse the following:
   (a) Greetings.
   (b) Topics to be discussed.
   (c) Transitions and closings.
   (d) Nonverbal signals. Nonverbal signals are particularly useful when you want to silence your interpreter without drawing any undue attention. Your counterparts may attempt to draw you into a heated argument, or may try to outmatch your point by progressively raising the volume. Silencing your interpreter, using a rehearsed non-verbal signal, will effectively allow you to regain control of the conversation.

b. Your interpreter should:

(1) Provide an accurate translation of your message.
(2) Speak in the first person – use “I” versus “He said.”
(3) Mirror your tone, inflection, and emotion.
(4) Speak for approximately the same length of time as you.
(5) Present a professional appearance – well groomed and dressed.
(6) Understand and translate military jargon – constantly learning.

c. Insist that your interpreters translate exactly what you mean.

(1) Do not allow them to add anything extra or usurp your authority by giving an order. Giving an order turns them into defacto leaders, which can lead to major complications about who is really in charge.
(2) Once your language skills improve, do not be afraid to correct the interpreter if he is not translating exactly what you meant.

d. To the greatest extent possible make your interpreters live and operate under the same conditions as counterpart/coalition troops.
(1) When necessary, interpreters should wear protective gear, observe noise/light discipline, and tactically blend in with the advisor team.

(2) Do not let class distinctions get in the way. This will reinforce counterpart class stereotypes that you are seeking to break down.

e. Be aware of the interpreter’s family/tribal affiliations. They will leverage class distinction based on who they are interpreting for. Do not allow this to happen.

f. Be aware of the placement of the interpreter. He should not be in a position in which he detracts from the conversation between the advisor and his counterpart.

g. When engaged in a conversation, do not look at the interpreter when they speak. Always look your counterpart in the eye when speaking with them. Insist that your counterpart adhere to this protocol as well.

h. If possible validate, through a third party, the job that the interpreter is doing.

i. Consider conducting an AAR with your interpreter following the meetings with your security force counterparts. This may not be as relevant later in your tour, but is especially helpful during those first two months as you are getting to know your counterpart and your interpreter. Your interpreter can provide his assessment of your counterpart’s commitment or truthfulness to your questions. Much of this will be “Culture 101” for you, as you learn to read a different culture’s body language and learn which questions will never be answered as forthright as you may like. Additionally, it is likely that your interpreter will have worked with your counterpart under the last advisor team and will know the foreign forces better than you.

8. Managing Your Interpreter

a. When it comes to managing your interpreter, one team member needs to be in charge of the interpreters. This responsibility typically falls to one of the team’s NCOs as an additional duty. The interpreter NCO handles the schedule, training, replacements, and time sheets while a government contractor hires, pays, and provides interpreters to coalition units in country. A US division or corps manages the number of interpreters required for each coalition element as there are seldom enough for all units.

b. Depending on the number of interpreters available per team, the schedule usually permits interpreters 4-8 days off per month. Interpreters are provided living space on the US FOBs to permit 24/7 employment. Some advisor teams live at a separate FOB than their FF, occasionally you may receive a cell phone call in the middle of the night from your FF counterpart. Access to interpreters 24/7 is essential to conducting routine business, including conversations over a cell phone.

c. The interpreter NCO further coordinates periodic counterintelligence screenings for interpreters. These are required every 6 months and are usually conducted at a set number of locations. Given the lack of security clearances for CAT I interpreters, these screenings are essential to maintain some degree of security.

d. The interpreter NCO also serves to centralize any disciplinary issues within the advisor team structure. Much like young Service members, interpreters may require motivation from time to time to ensure they arrive at work on time, are prepared for missions, or are dressed in the proper uniform. You have a number of options for
curbing negative behavior before you resort to pursuing a replacement. The majority of disciplinary issues can be resolved through a simple verbal counseling, as most interpreters desperately want to keep their jobs. Other options include adjusting the number of work hours or removing privileges. Replacing interpreters is often viewed as a last resort as new interpreters, if available, are often recycled from other units and have unknown capabilities.

e. The interpreter NCO should also create a personnel folder for each interpreter. This should include a basic personnel file with contact information, a picture, and any operational notes. Aside from serving as a pass-on from one team to another, this file may assist the team in the event of an investigation in which the interpreter is suspected or if the interpreter is kidnapped. Further, this information may assist the team if they decide to replace the interpreter. Often, the government contractor will annotate the interpreter’s employment record with favorable or unfavorable remarks when submitted by the coalition. Many teams found one of the ways to reward their interpreters for a job well done was to provide a letter of commendation to the government contractor. This letter may then be used to relocate the interpreter to a more senior position in the future.

9. Interpreter Force Protection

a. Depending on your location and higher headquarters’ rules, you may find it advantageous for your interpreter to carry a weapon when on patrol. This situation provides an advantage to your advisor team when you dismount to accompany your counterparts, as you are always short on dismounted firepower. However, before you commit to arming your interpreter, you should consider the disadvantages. First, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, your interpreter is not a US military member. They did not receive training on the use of force, rules of engagement, Geneva-Hague, or Law of War.

b. Perhaps even more important is their understanding and practice of weapon’s status/condition (i.e., green, amber, red / 4, 3, and 1) and muzzle discipline may prove more of a hindrance than a help. Further, you may find an armed interpreter more likely to personally assault an objective with the FF vice staying at the advisor team’s side. Finally, you should consider where and when your interpreter will have access to weapons. Depending on your local FOB rules, you may not want or be permitted to allow your interpreter to have access to a weapon on the FOB.

c. Regardless of your interpreter’s weapon’s status, you should provide a minimum of body armor and a ballistic Kevlar helmet to your interpreter. Again, as your interpreter is not a US military member, you may find them reluctant to routinely wear this protection. Despite the risks, teams often had to force their interpreters to wear their protective equipment in the summer time temperatures. Remember, this is not all about their personal safety; this is also a matter of protecting your mission critical asset.

d. You may also find that your interpreter insists on wearing a face mask in particular situations. This is usually at the interpreter’s discretion when they fear that their compromised identity will endanger their family. For this reason, interpreters often use pseudonyms to avoid revealing too much information during detainee interrogations or media engagements.
e. Clearly, the most dangerous time for an interpreter is during their transit to and from the FOB. Their risk for kidnapping or murder by terrorists, insurgents, or sectarian militias is particularly high during these predictable movements. As pay checks must be hand carried to waiting families, there is little flexibility in these visits home. However, you should consider any means within reason that mitigates this risk for your interpreter but there is certainly a balance. Combat patrols outside of sector or requests for coalition air lift are generally considered excessive. More routine means include allowing your interpreter to carry a weapon when in transit, adjusting the schedule to mitigate predictability, or dropping off the interpreter at a different location.

10. A Part of the Team

a. As a part of your team and routine member of your combat patrol, you should ensure that your interpreter participates in your convoy battle drills. Actions on dismount, whether armed or unarmed, require a rehearsal. Actions at a halt may vary depending on where your interpreter rides in relation to your team leaders’ vehicle.

b. You should further consider training your interpreter on the very basics of first aid and the operation of US individual and crew-served weapons. US units conducting a ground MEDEVAC have utilized interpreters on more than one occasion to man crew-served weapons.

11. Be Careful with Precedents

a. As an advisor team, you have access to an extraordinary array of capabilities and influences. Use caution when using these to benefit your interpreter, regardless of the immediate situation. The use of coalition air transportation and detained interpreters illustrate this point.

b. Requests for coalition air lift to transfer interpreters from the FOB to home may make sense at the immediate team level. However, at a larger level, it sets a dangerous precedent for other teams as their interpreters request the same privilege to visit family that has relocated to the other end of the country.

c. Interpreters detained by local army or police forces can usually be released by coordinating with the local advisor team and the security force headquarters. While this process appears simple enough on the surface, teams may not fully understand the circumstances that led to the interpreter’s detention. Further, the advisor team that “negotiates” the detainee release often loses credibility, as their counterparts perceive a lack of trust or favoritism for different detainees. Often, the most effective course of action in this circumstance is to visit and express a high degree of interest in the welfare of the detained interpreter. A request for an expedited investigation and a review of the evidence (or lack thereof) usually secures the interpreter’s freedom within 72 hours. By requiring the foreign force to exercise their own procedures for release of questionable detainees, both advisor teams stand to benefit. An internal review of the detention’s legitimacy will serve as a learning point for the foreign forces. This review may also reveal more information for the interpreter’s owning advisor team. Do not allow yourself to assume away a problem because you “know” your interpreter is a “good guy.” There is always the possibility that “your interpreter” is working for more than your team.
12. Information Security and OPSEC

a. Protecting classified or critical information from your interpreter is a “team” responsibility. Based on the current operating environment and information sharing programs, the average transition team has access to a wealth of classified or critical information. Limited to CAT I interpreters, most teams are forced to find creative ways to protect this information.

b. This protection starts with the periodic background screenings. While these are not equivalent to a security clearance, they do provide a comparable level of screening as those held by your foreign force counterparts. In essence, if the classified information you receive is releasable to your counterparts, your interpreter will learn about it through his translation duties. If the classified or critical information is not marked for release to the FF, your interpreter should not have access.

c. You can further protect against interpreter OPSEC violations by managing “how” material is passed through your interpreter. Limiting access to written classified or critical material and rotating interpreters through different meetings mitigates the amount of information any one interpreter accumulates. You should also consider not allowing your interpreter to attend internal team meetings, as these often include classified material that does not need to be shared (i.e., significant activities, convoy routes, the next day’s timeline, etc.).

d. Cell phones and access control pose the final risks to your team and your mission. Depending on higher headquarters or FOB rules, your interpreters may be permitted to carry a cell phone. This should be a deliberate decision by your team, as the payoff to the interpreter is generally not worth the risk to the team.

e. Access control is one of those requirements that is easily neglected with your interpreters. If you are assigned to advise foreign forces at a joint FOB, you may find that your interpreters are not required to submit to normal access control measures. Interpreter access to privately owned vehicles and movement between US and security force areas without searches, pose force protection risks. Ensure that you maintain the standards of searching your interpreters every time they come into and leave your area. Other coalition units will often accomplish this task for you; however, it is your responsibility to ensure that safeguards are in place.
An advisor team in Iraq employed a particularly talented interpreter during their year tour. The interpreter received especially high praise from the outgoing team as he had manned a M240B after the team lost a HMMWV to an IED strike. This interpreter, who I will call Simon, was especially skilled at translating during military briefings, having mastered much of the US military jargon. This interpreter first raised eyebrows in the eyes of his new advisor team when he stated that all of his friends and family at home knew he worked for the Americans as an interpreter. This was unusual as all of the other interpreters told their family and/or neighbors elaborate stories about business contracts they had in neighboring provinces that required them to leave for weeks at a time.

Simon continued his duties, for the most part, without arousing suspicion until he found out that he would not be attending all of the Iraqi security force (ISF) targeting meetings. As a means of mitigating risk using OPSEC measures, the advisor team chief had decided to rotate different interpreters through these meetings so that no one interpreter could assemble too much information. Simon found this odd and began to inquire what targets came out of a particular week’s meeting. Asking questions that were outside of his “need to know” again aroused the team’s suspicions.

Neither of these set off any particular alarm bells and missions continued as usual until the team chief received notification that he was the target of a kidnapping and assassination plot. Given the number of hours the team chief spent working with the ISF on a daily basis (this was a joint FOB), the threat was especially relevant. This threat was further given credence when an ISF commander allegedly enlisted the assistance of an interpreter to participate in this action in exchange for $10,000 US.

The team chief, in this situation, took a short leave of absence while an investigation was conducted. As the advisor team reviewed their assigned interpreters to determine which one was likely the guilty party, an alarming chain of events was pieced together. It seemed that each advisor team member knew something slightly different that, when combined, yielded a startling picture.

Simon was observed meeting with the ISF commander without advisor team members present. He had received a number of gifts from the ISF commander, including a silver plated AK-47 and a highly prized, Glock 9mm pistol. Further, Simon had approached one of the transition team members approximately a week earlier and asked him to hold a large sum of cash. Simon stated that he had saved this cash over the last several paychecks and did not feel safe taking it all home. This seemed a little odd, since Simon was newly married and expecting a child. The team member agreed however, and Simon gave him $10,000 US to hold.

In this case, the US division G-2 assisted the team in scheduling counterintelligence screenings for all of the assigned interpreters. The suspected interpreter was given additional scrutiny and broke under pressure. Simon was detained and, at the time of this writing, is being held as a coalition detainee.

The advisor team chief returned to work, advising the same ISF commander that had conspired against him. Simon did not reveal any information that personally linked the ISF commander to the threat. The ISF commander was eventually reassigned for a host of other issues.

—Iraqi Military Transition Team Member
13. Trusting Your Interpreter

a. So, knowing the risks, can you trust your interpreter? The frank answer is, “you have to trust them.” A vetting process was conducted prior to their hiring, and a determination was made that they were not a security risk to US forces. Keep in mind that their first loyalty is probably to their nation or ethnic group, not to the US military. The fine line of success with your advisor team / interpreter relationship is staying aware of the risks and mitigating them when possible. Keep in mind that the vast majority of interpreters are hard working, honest, local nationals that are committed to their jobs. Of course they are paid well, but many risk personal injury and place their families in grave danger to perform their duties. Many interpreters tell stories of repeated family moves, death threats, and tense moments at insurgent controlled checkpoints. The vast majority of interpreters can be trusted and readily put their lives on the line to ensure advisor teams and other US units can perform their missions.

b. However, for those few interpreters that may still have questionable motives, you can use a few techniques as indicators of loyalty. Loyal interpreters will often provide more info than what is asked. This is particularly relevant when advisor team members sit down in an office to conduct a meeting with their FF counterparts. These counterparts will often have other FF members in the room tending to other business or monitoring the meeting. Good, loyal interpreters prove their worth by providing an insight into those sidebar conversations once the team member and interpreter leave the room.

c. Loyal interpreters may also provide the advisor team with atmospherics on the forces entering or leaving a compound. Your interpreter will pick up these atmospherics from those lower enlisted conversations he overhears and from the body language he observes from your counterpart. This may be part of your formal AAR once you leave the compound, but a loyal interpreter will often provide this sort of information without being asked. When the interpreter feels like part of your team he has an investment in your collective mission accomplishment and security.

14. Closing Thoughts

The nature of your job requires team work and trust. Your interpreter will likely gain your “trust,” becoming a close friend. He will further serve as an irreplaceable advisor and a member of your team. Team work is essential, but “trust” is relative. Your interpreter will risk his life, often daily, to contribute to the accomplishment of your mission. However, at the end of the work week your interpreter will return to his home and family. While your interpreter is a member of your team and an invaluable asset, he remains a member of his tribe, community, or sect first. Use your interpreter to accomplish your mission, but do not allow your “trust” to comprise the protection or security of your advisor team.
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Other
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# GLOSSARY

## PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADPE</td>
<td>automated data processing equipment</td>
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<td>AFDD</td>
<td>Air Force Doctrine Document</td>
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<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force instruction</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>United States Air Force specialty code</td>
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<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>AKO</td>
<td>Army Knowledge Online</td>
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<td>ALSA</td>
<td>Air Land Sea Application (Center)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT/FP</td>
<td>antiterrorism/force protection</td>
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<td>BATNA</td>
<td>best alternative to a negotiated agreement</td>
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<td>Bde</td>
<td>brigade</td>
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<td>BFT</td>
<td>blue force tracker</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>building partner capacity</td>
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<td>BUB</td>
<td>battle update brief</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>casualty evacuation</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>category</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>casualty collection point</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CL #</td>
<td>class of supply</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CREW</td>
<td>counter radio controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
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<td>DLP</td>
<td>Doctrinal Literature Program</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Term</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DZ</td>
<td>drop zone</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>evasion and recovery</td>
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<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential element of information</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>evasion plan of action</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>emergency operations center</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FF</td>
<td>foreign forces</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>forward operating base</td>
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<td>FOO</td>
<td>field ordering officer</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<td>FRAGORD</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>G2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>global positioning system</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>identification</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<td>IDN</td>
<td>initial distribution number</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organizations</td>
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<td>IMT</td>
<td>individual movement techniques</td>
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<td>INTSUM</td>
<td>intelligence summary</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<td>IPOE</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>information requirement</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Force</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<td>JAARS</td>
<td>Joint After-Action Reporting System</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
<td>killed in action</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<td>LP</td>
<td>listening post</td>
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<td>MCCDC</td>
<td>Marine Corps Combat Development Command</td>
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<td>MCPDS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Publication Distribution System</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
<td>Marine Corps reference publication</td>
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<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decision-making process</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>medical evacuation</td>
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<td>METL</td>
<td>mission-essential task list</td>
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<td>METT-T</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (joint and USMC)</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (Army)</td>
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<td>MILSTRIP</td>
<td>military standard requisitioning and issue procedure</td>
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<td>MiTT</td>
<td>military transition team</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>measures of effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>meal, ready to eat</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>mobile training team</td>
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<td>MTTP</td>
<td>multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>neighborhood action council</td>
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<td>NAVSUP</td>
<td>Navy Supplement</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NCOPD</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer professional development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>NVG</td>
<td>night vision goggles</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWDC</td>
<td>Navy Warfare Development Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>officer in charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>observation post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>officer professional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operations order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>office of primary responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORM</td>
<td>operational risk management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTERA</td>
<td>organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDSS</td>
<td>predeployment site survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**165**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>preventative maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCS</td>
<td>preventative maintenance, checks, and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII-PT</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure, people, and time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>program of instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR&amp;C</td>
<td>purchase request and commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>quick reaction force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIP</td>
<td>relief in place</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>security cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>security cooperation officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>special forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SODARS</td>
<td>special operations debrief and retrieval system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>statement of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSE</td>
<td>sensitive site exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/E</td>
<td>table of equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>traffic control point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>transfer of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>United States Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aircraft system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

advisor/advisor team. In the context of this MTTP publication, the terms advisor and advisor team are defined as an individual or team tasked to teach, coach, and advise foreign forces (FF) in order to develop their professional skills.

conventional forces. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

measures of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.1)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisor groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform SA functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.1)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-07.1)

security cooperation activity. Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve
mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater campaign plan. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-0)

**security cooperation planning.** The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the Department of Defense’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 5-0)

**foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02. Source: JP 3-05)

**mobile training team.** A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests. Also called MTT. (JP 1-02.)
By Order of the Secretary of the Army

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