(U) Global IED Highlights: August 2012

Reporting Period: 01-31 Aug 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

Source: Global IED Relational Database

** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**

(U) YEMEN: 18 AUG 2012
20 Killed / 8 Wounded
SVBIED
Government
AQAP

(U) SPAIN: 1 AUG 2012
Plot Disrupted
Explosive Motorized Air Attack
Three suspects arrested, Gibraltar
likely target
AQ

(U) NIGERIA: 03 AUG 2012
1 Killed / 20 Wounded
PBIED
Religious figure, Yobe State
Boko Haram

(U) SOMALIA: 08 AUG 2012
15 Killed / 3 Wounded
IED
TFG Dep. Mayor Motorcade
Al Shabaab

(U) SOMALIA: 08 AUG 2012
15 Killed / 3 Wounded
IED
TFG Dep. Mayor Motorcade
Al Shabaab

(U) NIGERIA: 05 AUG 2012
11 Killed / 8 Wounded
SVBIED
Army convoy, Damaturu
Boko Haram

(U) LIBYA: 19 AUG 2012
2 Killed / 0 Wounded
4xVBIED
Libyan Gov’t Buildings, Tripoli
Gaddafi Loyalists

(U) YEMEN: 4 AUG 2012
2 Large IEDs
60 Killed / 48 Wounded
Funeral Ceremony
AQAP

(U) NIGERIA: 05 AUG 2012
11 Killed / 8 Wounded
SVBIED
Army convoy, Damaturu
Boko Haram
(U) Global IED Highlights (2): August 2012

Reporting Period: 01-31 Aug 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**

(U) TURKEY: 20 AUG 2012
- VBIED
- 9 Killed / 66 Wounded
- Security Forces
- PKK suspected

(U) RUSSIA: 28 AUG 2012
- PBIED
- 8 Killed
- Sufi Sheik
- Female Suicide Bomber

(U) RUSSIA: 6 AUG 2012
- PBIED
- 4 Killed
- Security Forces
- No Claim of Responsibility

(U) COLOMBIA: 26 AUG 2012
- IED
- 6 Killed / 4 Wounded
- FARC suspected

Source: Global IED Relational Database

*UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO*
(U) Device Types by COCOM

Reporting Period: 01 - 31 Aug 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

Source: Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Worldwide IED Database (WWIED DB), dtd 24 SEP 12.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
**LEXICON NOTE**

CACHE = FOUND, NON-COMPLETED IEDs, I.E. PRECURSOR MATERIALS (NOT COUNTED IN IED INCIDENT TOTALS)

**Source: Global IED Relational Database**

**IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U) Global IED Highlights: August 2012

**GLOBAL IED TYPES – AUGUST 2012**

- IED: 88%
- PBIED: 7%
- SVBIED: 1%
- UVIED: 1%
- VBIED: 1%
- Unknown: 3%

**GLOBAL IED INCIDENTS – AUGUST 2012**

- Finds: 55%
- Detonations: 45%

**GLOBAL TGT TYPES – AUGUST 2012**

- Government: 38%
- Security Forces: 6%
- Civilian: 14%
- Infrastructure: 31%
- Religious: 3%
- Combo TGT: 2%
- Unknown: 3%
- Other: 2%
- None/Accident: 2%

August 2012 had a slightly higher-than-average percentage of IED detonations compared to IED finds.

**GLOBAL IED TYPES – 25 Months**

- IED*: 91%
- PBIED: 4%
- SVBIED: 1%
- UVIED: 1%
- VBIED: 2%
- Unknown*: 1%

**GLOBAL IED INCIDENTS – 25 Months**

- Finds: 52%
- Detonations: 48%

**GLOBAL TGT TYPES – 25 Months**

- Government: 32%
- Security Forces: 15%
- Civilian: 4%
- Infrastructure: 36%
- Religious: 1%
- Combo TGT: 7%
- US Target: 2%
- Unknown: 3%
- Other: 1%
- None/Accident: 2%

*LEXICON NOTE

IED = Analytically determined to be an IED based on reporting (which might refer to an IED, bomb, or explosive device).
Unknown = Reflects lack of specificity in reporting (e.g. "explosion", "blast", or "suspected pipe bomb") where, based on location, perpetrator group, etc. the incident is likely an IED. The device type label "unknown" maintains fidelity to the source but the incident is not disregarded. These "unknowns" account for 1-2% of the database.

Source: Global IED Relational Database

** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**
(U) Global IED Highlights
Incidents by CCMD – August 2012

**Centcom continues to have the highest number of IED incidents, including detonations, in August 2012 – largely due to Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. As of the time of this report, the numbers for Northcom and Pacom continue to be significantly below the 25-month average.**

Source: Global IED Relational Database

**IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**
(U) Global IED Highlights
Casualties by CCMD – August 2012

Casualty numbers for August 2012 have risen since July, but remain below the 25-month average.

Source: Global IED Relational Database

** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**
(U) **AFRICOM Significant Activities**

**Reporting Period: 01-31 AUG 12 (ICOD: 31 AUG 12)**

(U) **SIGACTS**

1. **(U) Libya:** On 19 August three VBIEDs detonated in Tripoli near the Ministry of the Interior and Women’s Police Academy, killing two. Libyan officials blame Qaddhafi loyalists for launching the attacks in retaliation for the one-year anniversary of the fall of Tripoli to anti-Qaddhafi forces.

2. **(U) Nigeria:** On 3 August in Yobe State, a Boko Haram (BH) PBIED targeted the Emir of Fika. The Emir escaped injury, but the blast wounded 20. This is the second PBIED attack on religious figures this summer. On 5 August, a BH SVBIED struck a military convoy in Damature, Yobe, killing 11 and wounding 18. Since BH SVBIEDs normally target fixed and strategic targets, this strike is an expansion of its TTP.

3. **(U//FOUO) Somalia:** On 1 August, two Al Shabaab (AS) PBIEDs detonated outside the Somalia National Assembly complex, after police opened fire on the bombers. Three were killed. On 8 August, an AS IED targeting government troops detonated in Mogadishu, killing 15 and wounding three.

(U//FOUO) **Boko Haram continues to target Nigerian security forces, entities, and whoever its members consider heretics.**

(U//FOUO) **Al Shabaab unsuccessfully attempted to disrupt the formation of a new Somali government. Military pressure on AS has degraded its SIED operations in Mogadishu and pushed its forces further from the city.**

**UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO**

Sources: Multiple
(U) Notes

• (U) **Libya:** Two car bombs exploded at dawn near the interior ministry and security buildings in residential areas of the city. The first bomb caused no casualties, but a second car bomb killed two people and wounded two. A third IED was found at the site of the explosion but had not blown up. This is the first lethal attack since Gaddafi's fall - occurring on the eve of his overthrow last year. No one claimed responsibility for the blasts. Libyan officials blame Qaddafi loyalists, who launched the attack in response to the one year anniversary of the fall of Tripoli to anti-regime forces.

• (U) **Nigeria:** A suicide bomber tried to blow up the Mosque where the Emir of Fika, Mohammadu Ibn Abbali, offered prayers. The bomber laced his body with explosives; some detonated, some did not. The bomber died; the emir was not injured but at least 20 people were injured. This is the second PBIED attack targeting religious figures this summer in Nigeria.
  – 6 soldiers and 2 civilians were killed when a suspected Boko Haram militant drove his CRV Jeep through a military check point at Shagari Low Cost Housing Estate along Gashua road rather than stop for a search by soldiers on duty. He detonated the IEDs already wired on his car. Another report says 6 soldiers, 3 civilians, and the bomber died in the blast. The attack follows a suicide bomber's attempt to assassinate Yobe state's top traditional Muslim leader, the Emir of Fika, on Friday.
  – (U) OSC, AFP20120803965010, 031440ZAUG 12, (U) *Nigerian religious leader escapes suicide attack: residents*, 03 AUG 12
  – (U) OSC, CPP20120805968239, 051910ZAUG12, (U) *Suicide Bomb Kills 6 Soldiers, 2 Civilians in Northern Nigeria*, 05 AUG 12

• (U) **Somalia:** Al Shabaab attempted several suicide bombings in the General Kahiye Station (School Polizio) where the approval ceremony for the new constitution took place. Police opened fire on the two bombers who were wearing suicide vests - the gunfire detonated the vests. Al Shabaab claimed they would kill anyone who participated in the constitutional debates or voted on the matter. The two suicide bombers were killed. Al Shabaab targeted a vehicle escorting the deputy mayor of Middle Shabelle region, Yusuf Abdi Abdulle as it passed ex-control Balad junction. The mayor was not harmed.
  – (U) OSC, AFP20120802597008, 010001AUG12 (U) *Somali Forces Foil Suicide Bomb Attacks at Constitutional Assembly Meeting Venue*, 01 AUG 12
  – (U) OSC, AFP20120809484001 092154AUG12 (U) *Somali Government Official Survives Landmine Explosion in Mogadishu, 6 Killed*, 08 AUG 12
(U) Strategic Environment

1. (U) Mali: 02 SEP – The AQIM-affiliated MUJAO claimed it executed an Algerian diplomat who was kidnapped in Gao, Mali, during the Tuareg rebellion earlier this summer. MUJAO claimed the execution was in response to a breakdown in talks with the Algerian government over prisoner swaps. An Algerian response in Mali is likely to draw retaliation by AQIM and MUJAO.

2. (U) Kenya: 01-03 AUG – IED detonations by AS in Nairobi targeted civilians and Christian churches. Kenyan forces advances on the strategically important port city of Kismaayo are triggering more AS associated attacks inside of Kenya to erode public support for the year-old Kenyan intervention into Somalia.

(U) Kenya: Al Shaba‘ab continues to detonate IEDs targeting civilians and Christian churches.
(U) Notes

• (U) **Mali:** Islamic extremists said Sunday they have executed an Algerian diplomat who was kidnapped during their takeover of northern Mali, according to a statement published by a Mauritanian news agency. Tahar Touati, the Algerian vice-consul "was executed this morning (Saturday) at dawn," said the statement from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).
  – (U) OSC, AFP20120904965085, 021515SEP 12, (U) Mali Islamists say Algerian diplomat executed; 02SEP 12

• (U) **Kenya:** A probably al Shabaab member approached a handcart puller asking if he would take a gas cylinder to a mosque near St. Theresa's Catholic Church on Juja Road. The man agreed, and as he was taking it there the gas cylinder exploded. It was detonated by remote control. 3 people were killed and 5 were injured. This is a new TTP by al Shabaab. Two days later, an Al Shabab operative was holding what looked like a small radio. He asked a person next to him to hold it while he searched for something in his pockets. The operative allowed the man to walk ahead of him into a crowd of people, and then detonated the device inside the radio with a remote control. The man was killed, and six people around him were injured. This appears to be a new TTP al Shabaab is using in Kenya, using unsuspecting people to carry IEDs which they then detonate from a distance.
  – (U) OSC, AFP20120803950020, 031427 AUG 12 (U) Kenyan police confirm home-made bomb killed three in city 03AUG 12
  – (U) OSC, AFP20120805950022, 051435 AUG 12 (U) Somali Islamists using new ways to carry out attacks in Kenya 05 AUG 12
(U//FOUO) Entities Who Use IEDs

- Boko Haram (BH)
- Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
- Al-Shabaab (AS)
- Tawhid Wal-Jihad in West Africa (TWJWA/MUJUA)

(U//FOUO) Common Components

- Main Charge: HME / Military Grade Munitions
- Devices: SVBIED/PBIED/AAIED
- Triggers: RC/VO/PP
- Enhancements: AL, improvised shrapnel

(U//FOUO) Targets

- Security Services
- ‘Non-Islamic’ locations and persons
- Nigerian Churches targeted with SVBIEDs
- Algeria Security Services

(U//FOUO) Enduring Threats

- Boko Haram adoption of more IED TTPs through training with AQIM
- Expanded safe havens in Mali facilitate terrorist planning in northern and western Africa
- Advanced military grade munitions widely available in Libya trafficked for IED main charge across COCOMs
- Exploitation of captured Malian Armed Forces ammunition used for IED components

(U//FOUO) AS operatives in Kenya will carry out asymmetric attacks to erode public support for the Kenyan Defense Force mission in Somalia. As Kenyans place more pressure on the port of Kismaayo, AS attacks will increase in size and scope. Using unwitting civilians to transport IEDs facilitates the placement of an IED near its intended target with reduced risk to the IED cell.
(U) Notes

- **(U) Kenya:** A probably al Shabaab member approached a handcart puller asking if he would take a gas cylinder to a mosque near St. Theresa's Catholic Church on Juja Road. The man agreed, and as he was taking it there the gas cylinder exploded. It was detonated by remote control. 3 people were killed and 5 were injured. This is a new TTP by al Shaabab. Two days later, an Al Shabab operative was holding what looked like a small radio. He asked a person next to him to hold it while he searched for something in his pockets. The operative allowed the man to walk ahead of him into a crowd of people, and then detonated the device inside the radio with a remote control. The man was killed, and six people around him were injured. This appears to be a new TTP al Shabaab is using in Kenya, using unsuspecting people to carry IEDs which they then detonate from a distance.
  - (U) OSC, AFP20120803950020, 031427 AUG 12 *(U) Kenyan police confirm home-made bomb killed three in city* 03AUG 12
  - (U) OSC, AFP20120805950022, 051435 AUG 12 *(U) Somali Islamists using new ways to carry out attacks in Kenya* 05 AUG 12
(U) AFRICOM IED Incidents: August 2012

**65 TOTAL INCIDENTS**
- 50 IED DETONATIONS
- 14 IED FINDS
- 1 CACHE

**50 IED DETONATIONS**
- 29 WITH CASUALTIES (58%)
- 21 W/NO CASUALTIES (42%)

**164 TOTAL CASUALTIES**
- 72 KILLED
- 92 WOUNDED

**COCOM TOP 3 (AUGUST 2012)**
- SOMALIA (24 INCIDENTS)
- NIGERIA (24 INCIDENTS)
- ALGERIA (6 INCIDENTS)

**IED TYPES – AUG 2012**
- IED
- PBIED
- SVBIED
- UVIED
- VBIED

**TGT TYPES – AUG 2012**
- Government
- Security Forces
- Civilian
- Infrastructure
- Religious
- Combo TGT
- Unknown
- None/Accident

**Source: Global IED Relational Database**

**IED INCIDENTS**

AFRICOM 25-MONTH AVERAGE:
- 38 DETONATIONS (PER MONTH)
- 13 FINDS (PER MONTH)
- 4 CACHES (PER MONTH)

AFRICOM 25-MONTH AVG: 213
- 79 KILLED (PER MONTH)
- 134 WOUNDED (PER MONTH)

AFRICOM 25-MONTH AVG: 55
- 38 DETONATIONS (PER MONTH)
- 13 FINDS (PER MONTH)
- 4 CACHES (PER MONTH)

IED incidents for August 2012 are above the 25-month average. Casualty numbers are below the 25-month average.
(U) CENTCOM Significant Activities
(Outside IRQ & AFG) Reporting Period: 01-31 Aug 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

(U) SIGACTS

1. (U) Yemen: 21 Aug – Probable AQAP IED detonated near liquefied national gas facilities in Shabwah Province; conflicting damage reports but no large economic impact.

2. (U) Syria: 28 & 30 Aug - 2 x VBIEDs (NFI) detonated in Jaramanah, Damascus (Christian/Druze area); possible sectarian implications, total 12 killed, 50 wounded.

• (U//FOUO) Sinai border-post attack – significant impact on Sinai stability (Egyptian Army “Operation Eagle” security operations) – significant political impact for Mursi Government.
(U) Notes

(U) CENTCOM: Significant Activities:

• (U) Yemen: 21 Aug 12 – Initial reporting showed IED detonating along Yemen’s only LNG pipeline at Station 5, in the village of Zahira, Shabwah Province, approximately 170 km north of the Belhaf LNG Plant run by France’s Total company on the Gulf of Aden. Subsequently, the Yemen LNG company reported the IED hit gas well number 26, with 2 x other well-head IEDs defused; the perpetrators are unknown, but attributed to AQAP. Most of Yemen’s LNG exports go to South Korea and China. This pipeline is around 320 km long, was last attacked in mid-May, and was then placed back in operations in 10 days. Company officials said the attacks did not stop pipeline use or LNG plant operations.

• Sources:
  1) (U) OSC, Yemen Observer, Yemen: Suspected Al-Qaida Suicide Bomber Kills Tribesman Injures 6 in Abyan (U), 19 AUG 12.
  2) (U) Beirut Al-Manar TV Online In English, GMP20120819966056, Al-Manar: Qaeda Suicide Attacker Kills Three In Yemen (U), 1220 GMT 19 AUG 12
  3) (U) Sanaa Yemen Post In English, GMP20120819192003, Yemen: 14 Killed, 7 Wounded In Suicide Bombing In Aden's Intelligence Building (U), 18 AUG 12.
  4) (U) Al Bawaba Business via COMTEX, Yemen: 19 soldiers killed in al Qaeda attack (U), 19 AUG 12.
  5) (U) Al Bawaba Business via COMTEX, quoting AFP report, Yemen LNG pipeline down after another bombing (U), 21 AUG 12.
  6) (U/FOUO) Geospatial Open Source Situational Awareness (U/FOUO), 4 SEP 12.
(U) Notes

(U) Con. CENTCOM: Significant Activities:

1. (U) Syria: 28 Aug 12 - 1 x VBIED detonated in Jaramanah, Rif Dimashq, Damascus during funeral for two regime supporters; 12 killed – 48 wounded. Syrian State TV blamed rebel forces, and government forces have intensified their bombardment of the eastern districts of Damascus that serve to shelter some of the FSA’s best units. The Syrian National Council (SNC) accused the regime of staging the blast to divert attention from its own operations, killing many civilians in a largely Sunni neighborhood of the capital. Likewise, on 30 Aug 11 – 1 X VBIED detonated in Jaramana, near a sweetshop, wounding two. The VBIED was described as a Peugeot 504, and open press noted that that type of car is usually owned by police or security members in Syria. Jaramanah is a predominantly Christian and Druze area, and has been loyal to the Assad regime. Such attacks may widen sectarian conflict.

• Sources:
  1) Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Worldwide Improvised Explosive Device Database (WWIED DB) (U), dtd 4 SEP 12. UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION CITED.
  2) (U) London BBC News Online In English, EUP20120828960004, Deadly Car Bomb Hits Funeral In Damascus Suburb (U), 1600 GMT 28 AUG 12 (U)
  3) (U) Al Bawaba Business via COMTEX, 12 Dead, 48 Hurt in Blast at Funeral of Regime Supporters near Damascus (U), 29 AUG 12.
  4) (U) Xinhua via COMTEX, 1st LD: Booby-trapped car goes off in restive Damascus suburb (U), 30 AUG 12.
(U) Strategic Environment

(U) Syria: Suspected opposition efforts to influence government information operations by employing IEDs to attack TV station – unlikely to have significant effect.

(U) Free Syrian Army & IRAMs: FSA Al-Tawhid Brigade claims to have constructed missiles similar to Hamas’ Al-Qassam types for use in Aleppo. IRAMs are one solution to FSA firepower needs in the fight against the Syrian Army.
(U) CENTCOM: Strategic Environment

(U) Syria: 6 Aug 12 – IED detonated on the third floor of the Syrian State TV/Radio Headquarters, located in the heavily secured Omayyad District of Damascus; none killed, several persons wounded, and the TV/radio station continued to operate.

– (U/FOUO) COIC Analyst Comment. The attack likely complements a suspected opposition 27 Jul attack on the al-Ikhbariya satellite channel outside Damascus, which included direct fire and an IED used to destroy the channel’s offices after the attack; seven Ikhbariya employees were killed. The key nature of the IO component of the struggle is recognized by both sides. The opposition will likely continue to target official media outlets, and the government media will continue attempts to claim that national media reporting represents “the complete truth”, as well as linking “terrorist” attacks to western plots, international institutions, and Arab funding. Opposition attacks against mass media facilities are unlikely to have significant effect on IO campaigns, unless they are either spectacular themselves, or they take multiple facilities off the air in close time-proximity to one another.

Sources:
1) (U) OSC, Beirut Naharnet in English, GMP20120806966334, Bomb Rocks Syria TV Headquarters in Damascus, Causing Casualties (U), 6 AUG 12.
2) (U) OSC, Ammun News in English, GMP20120806966148, Damascus Explosion Targets State Television (U), 1120 GMT 6 AUG 12.
3) Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Worldwide IED Database (WWIED DB) (U), dtd 13 AUG 12.
4) (U) OSC, Damascus Sana Online in English, Syrian Journalists Organize Solidarity Stand, Condemn Terrorist Act Against Syrian TV (U), 1715 GMT 08 AUG 12.
5) (U) OSC, Beirut Naharnet in English, GMP20120806966334, Bomb Rocks Syria TV Headquarters in Damascus, Causing Casualties (U), 6 AUG 12.
6) (U) Damascus Sana Online in English, GMP20120628966037, Armed Terrorist Group Attacks al-Ikhbiriya TV Channel, Three Journalists Martyred (U), 0720 GMT 28 JUN 12.
(U) Notes

(U) Con. CENTCOM: Strategic Environment

(U) FSA and IRAMs in Syria: (U) Open press report – in an al-Jazeera interview with the “chief of operations in the Al-Tawhid Brigade,” purportedly fighting in and around Aleppo, Abd-al-Qadir al-Salih claimed that the Al-Tawhid Brigade had succeeded in constructing missiles similar to Hamas’ Al-Qassam types (Qassam-I: 60mm rocket – 4 km range; Qassam-2: 115mm rocket – 9 km range, Qassam-3: 170mm rocket). An open source NGA report shows an IRAM launched in Aleppo by opposition forces.

• Sources:

  1) (U) Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic, Aleppo rebel commander says brigade makes missiles like Hamas’ Al-Qassam (U), 1430 GMT 11 Aug 12.
  2) (U) NGIC, Hamas (Palestinian) 60-mm (1-round) Rocket Launcher Qassam (U), 22 JUL 09.
  3) NGIC, The Hamas Rocket Launcher, Qassam (U), UNDATED. UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION CITED.
  4) NGIC, Hamas 170-mm Qassam 3 (U), 6 SEP 08. UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION CITED.
  5) (U//FOUO) Geospatial Open Source Situational Awareness (U//FOUO) 4 SEP 12.

continued on next page →
(U) CENTCOM IED Threat Overview

(U//FOUO) Entities Who Use IEDs
- AQ, AQI, AQAP/Ansar al-Sharia (AAS)
- Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan (TTP)
- Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)
- Syrian Opposition Groups (various)
- Jibhat al-Nusrah (Nusrah Front)

(U//FOUO) Common Components
- Main Charge: HME, Commercial, Military
- Devices: VBIED, SVBIED, PBIED, UVIED
- Triggers: RCIED, Suicide, Time, Mechanical Pull
- Enhancements: Fragmentation

(U//FOUO) Targets
- 45% of targets were unknown. Civilian, Military, Government, Police, Transportation, Infrastructure targets constituted greatest numbers in order

(U//FOUO) Enduring Threats
- AQI/ISI-al-Nusrah Front: expanding influence in Syria
- Pakistan safe haven for multiple VEOs’ operations
- Multiple conflicts in Yemen: AQAP vs. ROYG/Houthis; Houthis vs. AQAP/Salafists/ROYG
- AQAP pursuit of regional and transnational targets
- Increased operations by radical Islamists in the Sinai – targeting Israel/destabilizing Egypt (Sinai Bedouins, Muslim Brotherhood, and Palestinian rejectionist groups)

Sources: Multiple

• (U//FOUO) Yemen: Huthis or SMM disenfranchisement may drive use of IEDs.
• (U//FOUO) All “armed opposition” groups in Syria improving IED capabilities.
• (U//FOUO) Increased operations by radical Islamists in the Sinai – target Israel/destabilize Egypt (Sinai Bedouins and Palestinian rejectionist groups)
(U) CENTCOM IED Incidents: August 2012

159 TOTAL INCIDENTS
-- 104 IED DETONATIONS
-- 49 IED FINDS
-- 6 CACHES

104 IED DETONATIONS
-- 69 WITH CASUALTIES (66%)
-- 35 W/NO CASUALTIES (34%)

593 TOTAL CASUALTIES
-- 203 KILLED
-- 390 WOUNDED

COCOM TOP 3 (AUGUST 2012)
-- PAKISTAN (114 INCIDENTS)
-- YEMEN (19 INCIDENTS)
-- SYRIA (14 INCIDENTS)

IED TYPES – AUG 2012

TGT TYPES – AUG 2012

IED incident and casualty numbers for August 2012 continue to be above the 25-month averages.

Source: Global IED Relational Database

** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**
(U) EUCOM Significant Activities

Reporting Period: 01-31 Aug 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

(U) SIGACTS

1. **Turkey: 20 Aug** – Separatist group Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) exploded a remote-control VBIED in front of a police station in the southeastern town of Gaziantep, resulting in 10 dead and 70 wounded. The separatists demand greater autonomy within Turkey.

2. **Russia: 19 Aug** – Islamist insurgents linked to Imirat Kavkaz (IK) detonated a PBIED in Malgobek, Republic of Ingushetia. The attack targeted Ingushetian police attending a funeral, and resulted in nine dead and 15 wounded.

3. **Russia: 28 Aug** – A female Islamist insurgent linked to IK detonated a PBIED outside the home of a popular Sufi Mufti in Chirkei, Dagestan, killing six. Insurgents seek to discredit the Russian government by targeting leaders of federally supported religious institutions.

(U//FOUO) Turkey: TAK detonates VBIED in front of a police station in southeastern Turkey, killing 10 and wounding 70.

(U//FOUO) Russia: IK increases attack activity in August, and is targeting Russian-backed religious leaders to discredit Moscow.

Sources: Multiple
(U) Notes

TURKEY

(U) OSC, GMP20120820966167, Eight killed, several wounded in southeastern Turkey blast (U), Source: Beirut NOW Lebanon in English 1915 GMT 20 Aug 12

(U) OSC, EUP20120820425002, Column Says KGK Sends 'Messages of Peace' by Kidnapping CHP Deputy (U), Source: Istanbul Today's Zaman Online in English 20 Aug 12

(U) OSC, EUP20120809425003, Column Says Iran, Syria Backing KGK in Effort To Hold Turkey Back in Region (U), Source: Istanbul Yeni Akit in Turkish 09 Aug 12

RUSSIA

(U) OSC, CEP20120819950030, Russia: Ingush bomb update - eight dead, 10 kg of TNT, TV images; Dagestan (U), Source: Moscow Rossiya 24 in Russian 1300 GMT 19 Aug 12

(U) FIND, Ingush Leader Says Umarov Behind Funeral Attack (U), Source: Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications/ContentWorks via COMTEX Aug 21, 2012

(U) OSC, CEP20120829009003, 'Pro-State' Dagestani Spiritual Leader Killed by Bomb Carried by Pilgrim (U), Source: Moscow Gazeta.ru in Russian 28 Aug 12

(U) OSC, CEP20120828950104, Ingushetia Head Says Chechen Calls To Revise Border Create Conflict Risk (U) Source: Moscow RIA Novosti in Russian 1038 GMT 28 Aug 12
(U) Strategic Environment

1 (U) Russia: The command and support structure of the Imirat Kavkaz (IK) is expanding further northward into Russia and is currently active in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria and Nogai Steppe. In August IK personnel conducted an IED attack on religious leaders in previously peaceful Tatarstan. The IK seeks to establish itself as a powerful force within the global jihadist revolutionary alliance.

2 (U) Georgia: In a political move against Russia, Georgian President Saakashvili in 2010 lifted visa requirements for Iranians and Caucasians, allowing them to stay in Georgia up to 90 days, and creating a transport corridor from the Caucasus to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. As a result, hundreds of IK members and other jihadists have enjoyed easier access to Pakistan and Afghanistan where they have received training and gained combat experience.

(U//FOUO) Future Threat Assessment: IK affiliates desire to participate in jihad on a global scale targeting Russian, western and NATO structures. IK Jihadists are successfully expanding within Russia despite Russia’s counterterrorism operations and are gaining training and experience in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
RUSSIA

(U//FOUO) OSC, IAP20120820950059, Shi‘i Mosque Blast Triggers Mixed Reaction In Dagestan (U), Source: Caversham BBC Monitoring in English 20 Aug 12

(U) OSC, CEP20120831964106, Guerillas in Lopota or Putin's Trap? (U) Source: Tbilisi Georgia Today Online in English 0925 GMT 31 Aug 12

(U) TV Rossiya, Georgia Lifts Visa Requirements for North Caucasus Residents (U), 14 October 2010.

SPAIN

(U) EUCOM IED Threat Overview

(U//FOUO) Entities Currently Using IEDs
- Imirat Kavkaz (IK) (Russian Federation)
- Kongra-Gel (KGG- formerly PKK) (Turkey)
- Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) (UK/N. Ireland)
- Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) (UK/N. Ireland)
- Anarchist groups in Greece and Italy
- Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Israel/Palestinian territories)
- Hamas (Israel/Palestinian territories)
- Hizballah (HL) (Israel/Palestinian territories)
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Israel/Palestinian territories)
- Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades (Israel/Gaza/Sinai/ Palestinian territories)
- Resistencia Gallega (RG)
- Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

(U//FOUO) Common Components
- Main Charge: CGE, MGM
- Devices: Roadside IED, VBIED, Parcel Bombs
- Triggers: Radio Controlled, Suicide Person-borne, Vehicle-borne, Time, Victim Operated, and Command Wire IEDs, parcel and pipe IEDs
- Enhancements:

(U//FOUO) Targets
- Government security forces, government administrative buildings, foreign (e.g., Israeli) embassies, and critical infrastructure (e.g., oil, electricity, transportation) and key resources

(U//FOUO) Enduring Threats
- IK/KGG
- Potential transnational threat from Lebanese Hizballah (HL)
- Potential increased use of IEDs by Anarchists and "Occupy" elements

(U//FOUO) RUSSIA: On-going aggressive CT operations having effects - reducing IK IED event numbers.

(U//FOUO) TURKEY: On-going aggressive CT operations having effects - reducing KGK IED event numbers.

(U//FOUO) ISRAEL: On-going Improvised Rocket attacks not reflected in IED numbers.

(U//FOUO) In the Trans-Caucasus region Imirat Kavkaz (IK) will continue IED attacks against the Russian Federation despite the loss of several cells, regional leaders, weapons, and explosive stockpiles. International Jihadists are participating in the conflict.

(U//FOUO) The 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London were concluded with no IED incidents. Other high-profile, international events, such as the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, will remain potential targets.

Sources: Multiple
(U) EUCOM IED Incidents: August 2012

**58 TOTAL INCIDENTS**

- 32 IED DETONATIONS
- 21 IED FINDS
- 5 CACHES

**32 IED DETONATIONS**

- 19 WITH CASUALTIES (59%)
- 13 W/NO CASUALTIES (41%)

**154 TOTAL CASUALTIES**

- 46 KILLED
- 108 WOUNDED

**COCOM TOP 4 (AUGUST 2012)**

- RUSSIA (25 INCIDENTS)
- TURKEY (14 INCIDENTS)
- N IRELAND (4 INCIDENTS)
- IRELAND (4 INCIDENTS)

**IED TYPES – AUG 2012**

- IED: 85%
- PBIED: 5%
- UVIED: 4%
- VBIED: 6%

**TGT TYPES – AUG 2012**

- Security Forces: 29%
- Civilian: 37%
- Infrastructure: 24%
- Religious: 2%
- Unknown: 5%
- None/Accident: 3%

**IED INCIDENTS**

- EUCOM 25-MONTH AVG: 88
  - 43 DETONATIONS (PER MONTH)
  - 35 FINDS (PER MONTH)
  - 11 CACHES (PER MONTH)

**IED CASUALTIES**

- EUCOM 25-MONTH AVG: 102
  - 20 KILLED (PER MONTH)
  - 83 WOUNDED (PER MONTH)

---

*August 2012 IED incident numbers are below the 25-month average, but casualty numbers are higher than the 25-month average due to a large attack in Turkey.*

---

*Source: Global IED Relational Database*

**IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**
(U) SIGACTS

1. (U//FOUO) **Mexico**: On 13 August, two explosive devices (NFI) were detonated near the Televisa TV facilities in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, directly across the border from Brownsville, TX. The explosions caused no casualties and little damage to the station’s exterior. Televisa TV facilities throughout Mexico have been repeatedly attacked in the past three years. While no one has claimed responsibility, police suspect the Los Zetas drug trafficking organization. (FARC connect 29 June)

2. (U//FOUO) **United States**: Lowell, MA police are investigating explosive incidents from 10 and 12 August. Each incident involved a single explosive device. The first detonation occurred in a public park. The second explosion, likely caused by a pipe bomb, took place within 100 feet of an elementary school. Currently, there are no indications of links to any terrorist activity, and police are not releasing any further information until the investigation is complete.

(U//FOUO) In Mexico, IEDs are being used by drug traffickers against police personnel, police vehicles and property, television stations, journalists, rival gangs - in retaliation for perceived injustices.

Sources: Multiple
(U) Notes

Mexico


(U) NORAD and USNORTHCOM Daily Intelligence Update, A Kidnapping in Nuevo Leon, 17 August 2010.

United States

(U) Strategic Environment

1 (U) Mexico. In August, in an effort to reinforce local security forces in central and northern Mexico, the Mexican government deployed over 15,000 security personnel to states besieged by DTOs. Nearly 4,000 police and 12,000 military troops were sent to the following states: Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Coahuila, and Tampaulipas. This deployment has led to the arrests of several leading drug traffickers.

2 (U//FOUO) United States. There is currently no specific or credible intelligence reporting to indicate an eminent threat to the United States. While narcotic smuggling and human trafficking through Mexico remain a concern, there have been no new developments to prompt an elevated threat level or change to TTPs.
(U) Notes

Mexico
(U) Open Source Center, 15,000 Troops Deployed to Seven States Ravaged by Drug Traffickers, Mexico: 14 Aug 12.
(U) NORTHCOM IED Threat Overview

(U//FOUO) Entities Who Use IEDs
• Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs)
• Anarchists/Other Non-Islamic Violent Extremists (VEs)
• Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM)
• Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)
• Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)

(U//FOUO) Common Components
• Main Charge: HME and some Commercial Explosives
• Devices: Pipe bombs, IEDs made from common household items, and VBIEDs (utilized in Mexico by TCOs/DCOs)
• Triggers: Unknown in most cases, but some attempts with cell phone initiation have been attempted and used successfully by TCOs
• Enhancements: Fuel and other flammable products

(U//FOUO) Targets
• Government Personnel and/or facilities
• Infrastructure that could disrupt travel and financial sectors (Aviation, Ground Transportation, Financial Markets in New York and Chicago)
• Upcoming high-profile events including the Democratic National Convention
• Los Zetas and Gulf DTO/Sinaloa Cartel will continue to target each other as well as Mexican government personnel

(U//FOUO) Enduring Threats
• Potential for increase in IED use by TCOs/DTOs
• Potential for increase use of IEDs by HVEs/Anarchists at upcoming high profile events in the United States

(U//FOUO) US: There will be continued IED attacks as a result of HVEs and individual efforts. High profile events will present opportunities for IED attacks, but there have been no credible threats and no significant changes in TTPs from the previous year.

(U//FOUO) Mexico: Violence will continue (particularly in NE Mexico) between TCOs and DTOs. IEDS will be used against government, police, and other cartels.

Sources: Multiple
(U) NORTHCOM IED Incidents: August 2012

39 TOTAL INCIDENTS
-- 7 IED DETONATIONS
-- 22 IED FINDS
-- 10 CACHES

7 IED DETONATIONS
-- 2 WITH CASUALTIES (26%)
-- 5 W/NO CASUALTIES (74%)

2 TOTAL CASUALTIES
-- 0 KILLED
-- 2 WOUNDED

COCOM TOP 3 (AUGUST 2012)
-- USA (32 INCIDENTS)
-- MEXICO (5 INCIDENTS)
-- CANADA (2 INCIDENTS)

IED TYPES – AUG 2012

TGT TYPES – AUG 2012

Source: Global IED Relational Database

** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**
(U) PACOM Significant Activities
Reporting Period: 01–31 AUG 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

(U) SIGACTS

(U//FOUO) Philippines: 16 August - Nine Philippine civilians were wounded following an IED explosion inside of a commercial bus in Zamboanga City in the Southern Island of Mindanao. The IED detonated as the bus was approaching a bus terminal. Philippine police authorities believe the IED was emplaced in the baggage compartment of the bus. Iron nails were recovered and were probably used as shrapnel.

- No group has claimed responsibility, but Philippine soldiers had been engaged in combat with the Muslim insurgent group “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement” (BIFM) the previous week, following a series of attacks by the BIFM against the Army.

(U//FOUO) After nine Philippine civilians were killed by an IED planted in a bus, local media were quick to point out that the relative calm enjoyed in Zamboanga City for the last two years may be evaporating. Many in the South question the competence and capability of the Philippine Army and Police in dealing with the increase in violence.

Sources: Multiple

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U) Notes

• (U//FOUO) Philippines: (U) 5 wounded in Philippine bus bombing
  Source: (U) The Mindanao Examiner – 16 August 2012

• (U//FOUO) Philippines: (U) Bomb explodes outside Islamic School in Southern Philippines
  Source: (U) The Mindanao Examiner – 17 August  2012

• (U//FOUO) Philippines: (U) ‘The Bombs are Back’
  Source: (U) The Mindanao Examiner – 18 August  2012

• (U) Source: (U) IrWAC Asia Pacific Database – August 2012
(U) PACOM IED Strategic Environment

Reporting Period: 01–31 AUG 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

(U) Strategic Environment

(U//FOUO) Thailand: A total of 102 incidents of violence and vandalism occurred in the four southernmost Thai provinces along the Malaysian border on 31 August, Malaysia’s National Day. Thai authorities claim separatist insurgents are to blame.

– (U//FOUO) IEDs and numerous suspicious objects were planted in all four provinces. While no one was killed from the IED’s, six soldiers were injured by explosions as they attempted to dismantle the devices.

– (U//FOUO) Thai flags were also burned and Malaysian flags were hoisted to mark the 55th anniversary of the founding of the Bersatu separatist movement.

– (U//FOUO) Thai government authorities believe the insurgents are trying to incite hatred and mistrust between the people of Thailand and Malaysia.

(U//FOUO) Regardless of the incidents, the Thai and Malaysian governments continue to have good relations and these incidents are not likely to damage relations between the two countries.

Sources: Multiple
(U) Notes

- (U) Thailand

- (U//FOUO) Thailand: 102 separatist incidents in the deep South
  - Source: (U) The Bangkok Post – 31 August 2012

- (U//FOUO) Thai south rattled by coordinated attacks
  - Source: (U) AFP – 31 August 2012

- (U) Source: (U) IrWAC Asia Pacific Database – August 2012
(U) PACOM IED Threat Overview

(U//FOUO) PACOM Entities Who Use IEDs
- Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)
- CPI Maoist Insurgents (CPI-M)
- United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
- Southern Insurgents in Thailand
- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
- Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
- Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)

(U//FOUO) Common Components
- **Main Charge**: HME (i.e. Ammonium Nitrate)
- **Devices**: Roadside IED, VBIED
- **Triggers**: VO, CW, RC
- **Enhancements**: Shrapnel, Fuel, Other flammable liquids, shaped charges

(U//FOUO) Targets
- Government security forces, government administrative buildings, foreign embassies, and critical infrastructure (e.g., oil, electricity) and key resources

(U//FOUO) Enduring Threats
- Increased use of IEDs by the CPI-M, Thai Insurgents, ASG
- Potential transnational threat from Lebanese Hizballah (LH)

(U//FOUO) Thailand: Persistent IED incidents in the restive southern provinces indicate insurgent violence will be a continuing problem for the mid-to-long term.

(U//FOUO) Philippines: IED activity is caused by criminal and localized separatist groups. Currently, there are no indications of a well coordinated IED campaign.
(U) Notes

1) (U//FOUO) INDIA: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) – or CPI-M – is an underground political party in India which aims to overthrow the government of India through "people's" war means. CPI-M is often referred to in the Indian press as "Naxalites" in reference to the Naxalbari insurrection conducted by radical Maoists in Western Bengal in 1967. Recent press reports quoted Prime Minister Singh stating that the Naxalites are "the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by India..." The highest number of incidents of violence has taken place in four worst-affected states—Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa. The "military" hardware used by CPI-M/Naxalites, as indicated through a number of seizures, include RDX cable wires, gelatin sticks, detonators of all types, country-made weapons, INSAS rifles, AK-47s, SLRs, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Indian security forces have also recovered codex wire; this is a highly potent explosive with a blast-range of up to 20 meters. Of note, codex wire has only been used by modern national armies. The potential for escalation remains high; while the Indian government is taking countermeasures, pulling the affected states together in an effort to have a coordinated response, it is not known how effective these measures have been as violence continues unabated. The Indian government says it will combine improved policing with socio-economic measures to defuse grievances that fuel the Maoist cause. However, it appears that these socio-economic measures will still not work since the CPI-M aims “…to bring about communism by continuing the revolution under the leadership of the proletariat and thus abolishing the system of exploitation of man by man from the face of the earth.”

2) (U//FOUO) THAILAND: An ethnic separatist insurgency is taking place in Southern Thailand, predominately in the Malay Pattani region, made up of the three southernmost provinces (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat) of Thailand. Violence has spread to other parts of Thailand, however the bulk of IED events have occurred primarily in these three provinces. The government of Thailand has defined the violence in this part of Thailand as an “insurgency” vice a terrorist campaign. This has caused some of Thailand's allies to be unable to fund Thai counter-terrorism efforts. There has been little progress in stemming the violence since the beginning of 2001. The identity of the “Insurgents” remains mostly obscure. There is even some suggestion that the violence is occurring under the influence of foreign Islamist groups such as al-Qa'eda and Jemaah Islamiyah but most legitimate sources view this linkage as weak. A massive security presence in the region has failed to stem almost daily violence, usually involving drive-by shootings, assassination attempts of government representatives and locals, and IED bombings. The insurgents as of late have preferred not to conduct large scale attacks rather they would prefer to conduct well-coordinated small pinprick assaults at many locations while avoiding direct clashes with security forces. The potential for escalation remains very high due to the Thai government’s disjointed reconciliatory gestures.

Sources: Multiple
3) (U//FOUO) PHILIPPINES: The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines refers to conflicts between Jihadist rebel groups and the Philippine government and its supporters. Although the rebel organizations themselves existed prior to the 1960’s, the insurgency itself began in 1969. Since 2001, the Philippine government and the United States have identified this insurgency as part of the th War on Terrorism and the American military has been supporting the Philippine government in combating the insurgency. Currently, sporadic extremist attacks are likely to continue, predominantly against host nation forces in the south. ASG elements will attack government forces if they feel directly threatened but will otherwise engage in criminal activities, such as kidnapping for ransom operations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is expected to refrain from large-scale terrorist attacks or changing their JI policy unless current peace talks stall or disintegrate. With regards to Tactics, Training, and Procedures or TTP’s, violent insurgent/terrorist groups in the Philippines have had to rely on more mundane methods of IED construction utilizing repurposed munitions and limited remote control devices to conduct extortion or attack Philippine troops. Innovations in IED have occurred; there has been evidence of experimentation with multiple IED devices on one target as well as victim-actuated IED’s concealed on roadways.

4) (U//FOUO) INDONESIA: Historically, the primary threat of Indonesian terrorist/insurgency groups was large-scale anti-Western attacks conducted by Jemaah Islamiya (JI) or similar networks. Currently, Indonesian groups like JI or JAT (Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid) reject the current democratic government in Indonesia and its policy of pluralism and instead seek a transition to governance by Islamic, or sharia, law. The current threat is from smaller semi-autonomous networks. These networks conducted several attacks in Indonesia using both firearms and low explosive devices; they primarily target Indonesian police and churches. Since the 2002 Bali bombings, scores of militants associated with the groups have been jailed or killed – primarily by Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorism special operations force known as Detachment-88 or “Det-88”. However the risk of resurgence by the larger more organized groups such as JI/JAT is high; Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency believes JAT aims to reestablish links with the remnants of the regional JI network, which is weakened but not quite dead. JAT, which seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia, is prepared to use wide spread violence to achieve its goal.

Analysis: JIEDDO-COIC Assessment

General Sources: OSINT
Multiple Media Sources: Press Reports | OSC | Triton | RAPID | IrWAC Asia Pacific Database
(U) PACOM IED Incidents: August 2012

76 TOTAL INCIDENTS
-- 34 IED DETONATIONS
-- 34 IED FINDS
-- 8 CACHES

34 IED DETONATIONS
-- 18 WITH CASUALTIES (53%)
-- 16 W/NO CASUALTIES (47%)

54 TOTAL CASUALTIES
-- 5 KILLED
-- 49 WOUNDED

COCOM TOP 3 (AUGUST 2012)
-- INDIA (51 INCIDENTS)
-- THAILAND (12 INCIDENTS)
-- PHILIPPINES (6 INCIDENTS)

IED TYPES – AUG 2012

TGT TYPES – AUG 2012

IED CASUALTIES

Source: Global IED Relational Database

**IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**

PACOM IED incidents for August 2012 continue to be significantly below the 25-month average. Casualty numbers are about a third of the 25-month average.
**U** SOUTHCOM Significant Activities

Reporting Period: 01-31 Aug 12 (ICOD: 31 Aug 12)

(U) SIGACTS

1. **(U) Colombia: 9-11 August** – As part of its summer offensive, the FARC conducted multiple IED attacks in southern Colombia, damaging several electric power stations. In response, Bogota is mustering seven new battalions to protect the country’s mining and energy infrastructures.

2. **(U) Brazil**: As a result of the increased criminal use of explosives to blow up ATMs, the army is mobilizing 5,000 troops in southern Brazil to set up road blocks and inspect vehicles which may be illegally transporting explosives and weapons.

3. **(U) Chile: 8 August** - During a student protest march in Santiago, several hooded men forced passengers off three city busses and hurled firebombs through the windows, destroying the vehicles.

(U//FOUO) The FARC is maintaining its IED campaign against Colombia’s power and energy infrastructure.

(U//FOUO) Brazil mobilizes 5,000 troops to stop the flow of illegal explosives fueling the use of IEDs used to destroy ATMs throughout the country.

Sources: Multiple
(U) Notes

Colombia


(U) Caracol, *Se inician trabajos de reparacion de torres de energia, dinamitados por la guerrilla en Narino (U)*, 12 August 2012.

(U) OSC, LAP20120810347002, *Pinzon Announces New Battalions To Protect Mining, Oil Operations (U)*, 9 August 2012. Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon announced that by February 2013 seven new battalions will have been activated that will be tasked to protect the country's mining, energy, and highway infrastructure. The seven battalions will join the current 11. To this avail, he disclosed that in addition to an increase in the fighting force for this mission, significant investments will be made in technology and equipment to outfit these new units.

Brazil

(U) OSC, LAP20120808357002, *Brazilian Military Operation on Southern Borders Focuses on Explosives, Drugs (U)*, 07 August 2012.

Chile

(U) Strategic Environment

1. (U) Colombia: On 27 August, President Juan Santos announced his government was holding exploratory peace talks with the FARC in Havana. The president indicated the country’s second biggest illegally armed group, the ELN, had also agreed to talk.

2. (U) Venezuela: Commercial flights to Caracas from Damascus and Tehran may be bringing Iranian-backed terrorists to Venezuela, where they can pick up fake passports and sneak into the U.S., or attack U.S. and Israeli targets in Latin America.

3. (U) Brazil: Beginning in November, the army will set stricter rules on the manufacture, sale, shipment, and use of dynamite. The measure is aimed at reducing the number of robberies using explosives.

Sources: Multiple
(U) Notes

Colombia
(U) BBC, Colombia Agrees To Hold Peace Talks With FARC Rebels (U), 28 August 2012. President Santos gave no details about the exploratory talks with the FARC. According to the regional media network Telesur, the first round of peace talks will be held in Oslo on 5 October 2012. Negotiations will then continue in Havana. **COIC Analyst Comment:** Both sides see themselves at an impasse with regard to the nearly 50-year insurgency. While the FARC is not capable of conducting much more than hit-and-run acts, the Colombian government will not be able to wipe out the last of the guerrillas without tremendous cost and sacrifice.

Venezuela
(U) Houston Chronicle (McClatchy-Tribune Information Services), Border As Terror Route Worries U.S. (U), 12 August 2012. Ever since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck a deal with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez for weekly air service between the two nations’ capital cities, American officials have worried that Iranian-backed terrorists could reach Latin America, pick up fake Venezuelan passports, and sneak into the U.S. Now, with growing talk of a pre-emptive Israeli attack to slow Iran’s suspected nuclear arms programs, Iran has threatened that it would retaliate across the globe. And its easy access to the Western Hemisphere has the U.S. particularly concerned.

Brazil
(U) Belo Horizonte O Estado de Minas (http://www.em.com.br/), Army Formulates Stricter Rules on Dynamite (U), 16 August 2012.
(U//FOUO) Entities Who Use IEDs

- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- National Liberation Army (ELN)
- Criminal Bands (BACRIM) in Colombia
- Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso)
- Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP)

(U//FOUO) Common Components

- Main Charge: HME
- Devices: Roadside IED, VBIED
- Triggers: VO, CW, RC
- Enhancements: Fuel, Other flammable liquids

(U//FOUO) Enduring Threats

- Increased use of IEDs by the FARC
- Potential transnational threat from Lebanese Hizballah
- Potential increased use of IEDs by BACRIM

(U//FOUO) The FARC and ELN continue to conduct an intense IED campaign targeting Colombia’s power and energy infrastructures.
(U) SOUTHCOM IED Incidents: August 2012

133 TOTAL INCIDENTS
-- 35 IED DETONATIONS
-- 76 IED FINDS
-- 22 CACHES

35 IED DETONATIONS
-- 19 WITH CASUALTIES (54%)
-- 16 W/NO CASUALTIES (46%)

74 TOTAL CASUALTIES
-- 21 KILLED
-- 53 WOUNDED

COCOM TOP 3 (AUGUST 2012)
-- COLOMBIA (127 INCIDENTS)
-- BRAZIL (3 INCIDENTS)
-- PERU (3 INCIDENTS)

(UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO) SOUTHCOM 25-MONTH AVG: 155
-- 39 DETONATIONS (PER MONTH)
-- 95 FINDS (PER MONTH)
-- 21 CACHES (PER MONTH)

SOUTHCOM 25-MONTH AVG: 96
21 KILLED (PER MONTH)
75 WOUNDED (PER MONTH)

Both IED incident and casualty numbers for August 2012 are below the 25-month averages.

Source: Global IED Relational Database
** IED incidents occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in this database**

COIC/703-995-6930/14SEP12