ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook
Edition 4

public intelligence
# TABLE of CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE of CONTENTS</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST of TABLES</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST of FIGURES</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST of ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION I - INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why a PRT Handbook?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the PRT Handbook</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ISAF Mandate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PRT Mission</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECTION II – The PRT CONCEPT AND INTENT</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PRT Concept</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT Guiding Principles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT Purpose</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Buy-In</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT Resources</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Transformation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stability Matrix</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Lines of Operation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Constituted Government</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION III – IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding the Strategic Framework</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the Planning Process</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Planning Process</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Year Provincial Support Plans</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Operations – Prioritization and Sequencing</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Elements of an Integrated Intervention</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the Capacity of the GIRoA</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Illegitimate Actors That Decrease the Capacity of the GIRoA</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve GIRoA Legitimacy and Increase IO Efforts</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Factors Decreasing Legitimacy of GIRoA</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Strategic Considerations

SECTION IV – PRT MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE

Key Components in the Chain of Command

Resources at HQ ISAF

PRT Management

PRT Key Leaders and Responsibilities

PRT Structure

PRT Functional Areas
  J1/J4 (Personnel and Logistics) Capability
  J2 (Intelligence) Capability
  J3/J5 (Operations and Planning) Capability
  J6 (Communications) Capability
  J8 (Contracts/Financial) Capability
  J9 (CIMIC/Civil Affairs) Capability
  Medical

Further Integration

Ensuring PRT Coherence

ANNEX A: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1817 and PRIOR—ISAF and UNAMA MANDATES

ANNEX B: The UNITED NATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Appendix 1 to Annex B - PRT External Engagement UN Country Team

ADB – Asia Development Bank
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
UN-HABITAT – United Nations Human Settlements Program
ILO – International Labour Organization
IOM – International Organization for Migration
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNCLASSIFIED
Joint Provincial Coordination Centers................................................................. 127
CSTC Assistance in Setting up JPCCs ................................................................. 128
Appendix 2 to Annex D: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) .................... 131
ANSF .................................................................................................................. 131
Afghan National Army (ANA) ............................................................................. 131
  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 131
  Training and Fielding ..................................................................................... 132
Afghan National Police (ANP) ........................................................................... 132
  ANP Support ................................................................................................ 132
Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) ........................................................... 133
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) ..................................................... 134
ISAF’s role: RCs and PRTs .................................................................................. 135
  PRTs ............................................................................................................. 135
  Regional Commands (RCs) .......................................................................... 135
  HQ ISAF .................................................................................................... 135
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 136
Appendix 3 to Annex D: Disbandment Of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) .......... 137
  Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) .............................................. 137
  What PRTs can do to support DIAG ............................................................ 138
Appendix 4 to Annex D: Counternarcotics .......................................................... 140
  Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan ......................................................... 140
  Structure and Responsibilities of Drug Control in Afghanistan .................... 140
  Counternarcotics Law and Strategy ............................................................... 141
  Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) .......................................................... 142
  Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) ................................................................. 142
    Where is PEP Operating? ............................................................................ 142
    The Role of PRTs in Counternarcotics ........................................................ 143
Appendix 5 to Annex D: Programme TAHKM-E-SOHL (PTS) ......................... 144
  Purpose ......................................................................................................... 144
  Intent ............................................................................................................. 144
  Background .................................................................................................. 144
  PTS Locations (January 08): ......................................................................... 145
  Suggested PRT Responsibilities .................................................................... 145
Appendix 6 to Annex D: PRT Provincial Assessment and Conflict Assessment Tools
  Introduction .................................................................................................... 147
Performing An Assessment ................................................................. 149
   Steps to performing a situational or conflict assessment .............. 149
   Step 1A .............................................................................................. 150
   Step 1B .............................................................................................. 150
   Step 1C .............................................................................................. 151
   Step 1D .............................................................................................. 151
   Step 1E - Opportunities for Increasing and Decreasing Conflict .... 152
   Step 2 - Map Dynamic Interrelation of the Factors ....................... 152
   Step 3 – Apply Targeting and Prioritization Criteria ..................... 153
   Step 4 - Identify Hypothesis .............................................................. 153

After the Assessment ........................................................................ 153

ANNEX E: GOVERNANCE / HUMAN RIGHTS / DIPLOMACY ............ 155
   Appendix 1 to Annex E: PRT Interaction With the Provincial Government .... 155
      Informed, Coordinated Approach Is Best .................................... 155
      Facilitating Communication Between Departments ................ 155
      Linking the Center and Periphery .............................................. 156
      Provincial Councils (PC) ............................................................ 156
   Appendix 2 to Annex E: Afghan Civil Society ................................ 158
      What is Civil Society? ................................................................. 158
      Security: Military, Policing and Human .................................... 160
      The Rule of Law ........................................................................ 161
      Corruption ................................................................................ 161
      Narcotics ..................................................................................... 161
      Civil Society Links ..................................................................... 162
      PRTs' Interaction With Civil Society ........................................ 163
   Appendix 3 to Annex E: Women's Affairs ..................................... 166
      Ministry of Women's Affairs ..................................................... 166
      National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) .... 167
      UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Women, Peace and Security .. 167
   Appendix 4 to Annex E: Engagement With the Media .................. 168
      The Importance of Local Media ................................................ 168
      Helping Them to Identify Stories ............................................. 169
      Forward Media Teams ............................................................... 169
      HQ ISAF PAO/CJPOTF Support .................................................. 170

ANNEX F: DEVELOPMENT / HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE / DISASTER RELIEF 171
Appendix 1 to Annex F: Development Overview: Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Afghanistan Compact, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) ................................................................. 171

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) .................................................. 171
Afghanistan Compact .......................................................................................... 172
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) ....................................... 173
Supporting Consultations That Strengthen the ANDS ..................................... 173
Facilitating Research and Information Management ....................................... 174
Coordinating Communications and Public Information About the ANDS ....... 174
Paris Agreement on Aid Effectiveness ................................................................. 175
Breakdown of the Three Pillars of the Afghanistan Compact ........................ 176

Appendix 2 to Annex F: Provincial Development Committees ............................ 177
Ministry Of Economy Has the Lead .................................................................. 177
PDC Capacity Is Growing, But Needs Further Strengthening ........................ 177
Challenges .......................................................................................................... 178
PRT Role in Supporting PDCs ................................................................... 178
Presidential Decree ............................................................................................ 182

Appendix 3 to Annex F: Emergency Response Guidelines and Procedures ........ 184
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 184
Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Purposes in Complex Emergencies 185
Response Guidelines and Procedures for Minor Disasters .............................. 188
  Afghanistan Government Response ................................................................. 188
  UNAMA and International Partners’ Response Procedures ......................... 190
Response Guidelines and Procedures for National Disasters .......................... 191
  Afghanistan Government Response ................................................................. 191
  The International Community Response ..................................................... 192
Request for Military Emergency Assistance (ISAF/Coalition) ......................... 195
The Role of PRTs In Provincial Disaster Management ...................................... 196
Request for External International Assistance ............................................... 197
Trigger Mechanism and Capacity for Response ............................................. 197
Core Commitments and Principles ................................................................. 199
Current Provincial Emergency Response Structure ....................................... 201
Current National-Provincial Emergency Response Structure ........................ 202

Appendix 4 to Annex F: Emergency Response Guidelines and Procedures ........ 203
PRT Executive Steering Committee Policy Note Number 3 ............................. 203
Humanitarian Relief Coordination ................................................................. 203
UNCLASSIFIED

15 Monitoring and Resolution of Disputes ......................................................... 263
16 Approval ........................................................................................................... 263
Appendix 1 - Acronyms .................................................................................... 264
Appendix 8 to Annex F: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ....... 266
  The ICRC mandate .......................................................................................... 266
  The ICRC’s activities in Afghanistan ................................................................. 267
  The ICRC and PRTs ......................................................................................... 268
ANNEX H: ............................................................................................................ 271
  Appendix 1 to Annex H: PRT Best Practices ................................................... 271
    Introduction .................................................................................................... 271
    Strengthening GIRoA through R and D ......................................................... 271
    Mentoring GIRoA through R and D ............................................................... 272
    Operate the PRT as a True Civilian-Military “Team” ................................... 272
    Building Afghan Civilian Capacity ............................................................... 274
    PRT R and D Best Practices ......................................................................... 274
      Develop Municipal Capabilities ................................................................. 276
      Manual Construction Methods ................................................................. 277
    PRT R and D Lessons Learned ..................................................................... 277
    Improve NGO/IO Interaction ....................................................................... 278
  Appendix 2 to Annex H: Governance-Building PRT Project Status Checklist ...... 280
LIST of TABLES

Table 1. PRT Key Leader Responsibilities ................................................................. 25
Table 2: PRTS in Afghanistan (alphabetical order) .................................................. 104
Table 3: PRTS in Afghanistan (chronological order) ............................................... 111
Table 4: PTS Field Office Contact Information ...................................................... 145
Table 5: Suggested PRT Responsibilities .................................................................. 146
Table 6: Millennium Development Goals .............................................................. 171
Table 7: Three Pillars of the Afghanistan Compact .................................................. 176
Table 8: Appropriate Use of Military Force ............................................................ 186
Table 9: Examples of Training and Mentoring Activities ....................................... 225
Table 10: Pitfalls to avoid in medical infrastructure projects ................................. 228
Table 11: Governance-Building PRT Project Status Checklist .............................. 283

LIST of FIGURES

Figure 1. Mission Hierarchy, Spectrum of Intervention and Elements of National Influence .................................................................................................................. 7
Figure 2. Spectrum of Conflict Transformation ...................................................... 10
Figure 3: Stability Matrix · Explanation of quadrants ............................................... 13
Figure 4. Stability Matrix Lines of Operation .......................................................... 14
Figure 5. Spectrum of Intervention (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2005) ..... 5
Figure 6: UNAMA Organizational Chart ............................................................... 66
Figure 7: Map of UNAMA Regions ........................................................................ 75
Figure 8: Map of UNAMA and ISAF Regions .......................................................... 76
Figure 9: UN Afghanistan Accessibility Map ......................................................... 77
Figure 10: Ambassador Fernando Gentilini ............................................................ 97
Figure 11: PRTS in Afghanistan (Map) .................................................................. 112
Figure 12: Policy Action Group .............................................................................. 125
Figure 13: The Link Between the Pag and the Regional Security Committees ....... 125
Figure 14: National Security Coordination System .................................................. 126
Figure 15: Policy Action Group Process – from the Strategic to the Tactical .......... 130
Figure 16: Provincial Development Committee ...................................................... 180
Figure 17: PDC Sectoral Committees .................................................................. 181
Figure 18: PDC Secretariat Committee ................................................................ 182
Figure 19: Provincial Emergency Response Structure .......................................... 201
Figure 20: National-Provincial Emergency Response Structure ............................. 202
Figure 21: MoPH Management Structure ............................................................. 219
Figure 22: Overview of Afghan Medical Services ................................................. 220
Figure 23: Medical Infrastructure Project Process ................................................. 224
Figure 24: Spectrum of NGO Interaction ............................................................. 238
### LIST of ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Anti Coalition Militia</td>
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<td>ACSP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Country Stability Picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations (SHAPE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADZ</td>
<td>Afghan Development Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>Afghanistan Engineer District (U.S. Corps of Engineers)</td>
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<td>AFG</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Anti-Government Element</td>
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<td>AHP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Highway Police</td>
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<td>Alternative Livelihoods</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
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<td>ANBP</td>
<td>Afghan New Beginnings Programme, Afghan National Border Police</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANSO</td>
<td>Afghan NGO Safety Office</td>
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<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>Afghan National Development Programme</td>
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<td>ARCS</td>
<td>Afghan Red Crescent Society</td>
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<td>AREU</td>
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<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
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<td>BSC</td>
<td>Balanced Scorecard</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (U.S.)</td>
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<td>CF</td>
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<td>CFC-A</td>
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<td>CG</td>
<td>Command Group</td>
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<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counter Intelligence</td>
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<td>CIED</td>
<td>Counter [methods/planning] Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIG</td>
<td>Confidence in Government</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<td>Combined Joint Statement of Requirements</td>
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<td>CN</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
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<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>District Development Assemblies</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation &amp; Reintegration</td>
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<td>DDP</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Preparedness</td>
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<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>Development Advisor</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
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<td>DMT</td>
<td>Disaster Management Team</td>
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<td>DNSA</td>
<td>Deputy National Security Advisor</td>
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<td>Forward Patrol Base</td>
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<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Force Protection, facilitating partner</td>
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<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
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<td>Forward Support Base</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>GoA</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Advisory Group</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>HiG</td>
<td>Hizb‘i Islami Gulbuddin</td>
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<td>Military Observation Team (similar to MOLT, MRT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOLT</td>
<td>Military Observation and Liaison Team (similar to MOT, MRT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation &amp; Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRT</td>
<td>Military Reconnaissance Team (similar to MOT, MOLT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPCE</td>
<td>National Assembly &amp; Provincial Council Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMP</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEOC</td>
<td>National Emergency Operation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NERC</td>
<td>National Emergency Response Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Priority Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Solidarity Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OF1  Lieutenant
OF2  Captain, Lt (Navy)
OF3  Major, Lt Cdr (Navy)
OF4  Lieutenant Colonel, Commander (Navy)
OF5  Colonel, Captain (Navy)
OF6  Brigadier General (1*)
OHDACA  Overseas Humanitarian Disaster & Civic Aid
OMF  Opposing Military Forces
OMLT  Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team
ONSC  Office of the National Security Council
OPLAN  Operational Plan
OPSEC  Operational Security
OSC-A  Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan
OSOCC  On Site Coordination Centre

PAG  Policy Action Group
PAR  Public Administration Reform
PAT  Provincial Assessment Team
PC  Provincial Council
PCC  Provincial Coordination Centre
PDC  Provincial Development Committee
PDMP  Provincial Disaster Management Plan
PDP  Provincial Development Plan
PERC  Provincial Emergency Response Commission
PEP  Poppy Elimination Programme
PET  PRT Engagement Team
PG  Provincial Governor
PLC  Police Liaison Cell
PN  Partner Nation
PO  Provincial Office 1
POLAD  Political Advisor

1 A team from a PRT which is permanently forward based in a Province for those PRTs which have more than one province in their AOO.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Police Reform Directorate (CSTC-A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT DG</td>
<td>PRT Donor Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT ESC</td>
<td>PRT Executive Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT SST</td>
<td>PRT Stabilisation Support Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT WG</td>
<td>PRT Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Provincial Stability Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Provincial Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCG</td>
<td>Provincial Security Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PsyOps</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Programme Takhm-e-Sohl</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rule of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Regional Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Situational Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Swedish Committee of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Senior Medical Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVBIEB</td>
<td>Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities &amp; Threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>Tasking Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
TTP  Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

UN    United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDMT United Nations Disaster Management Team
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund
UN-OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSC(R) United Nations Security Council (Resolution)
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
US DoS United States Department of State
USG United States Government

VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VetCAP Veterinary Civil Assistance Project
VMO(P) Village Medical Outreach (Programme)
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
SECTION I · INTRODUCTION

Why a PRT Handbook?

All of the PRTs in Afghanistan have been under one theater military command (ISAF) since October 5, 2006, when ISAF completed its four-stage geographic expansion throughout the country by assuming responsibility of Region East. Until then, there were two separate military commands – Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) and ISAF – each commanding PRTs in its own separate area of operation. Bringing all the PRTs under one theater commander constituted a major step forward in achieving unity of effort. But even with a single command, achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs remains a challenge, if for no other reason than, as of March 2008, there are 14 different nations leading PRTs.

Therefore, this Handbook provides guidance to those leading and working in PRTs to ensure a consistent and coherent approach to PRT activity in promoting stability across Afghanistan. It seeks to ensure a set of common objectives and increased convergence between the activities of all PRTs.

Organization of the PRT Handbook

This Handbook is divided into two parts. The core section explains the conceptual framework for a PRT, how concept and strategy are implemented at the grassroots (provincial and tactical) level and explains how a PRT can be best organised. This is done in four sections:

- An Introduction (this section)
- PRT Concept and Intent · Section II
- Implementing PRT Strategy · Section III
- PRT Management and Structure · Section IV

The annexes of the Handbook hold many references relevant to PRT challenges and activities, some of which are referred to in the core document. These references include
supporting tools, examples of best practices, information notes on individual subjects and more.

The ISAF Mandate

ISAF emerged from the Bonn Agreement of 2001. The UN Security Council, under UNSCR 1386, authorised the establishment of ISAF to assist the Afghan government “in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.” NATO assumed command of ISAF in August 2003 and soon after, under UNSCR 1510, the UN gave ISAF a mandate to expand outside of Kabul. ISAF took its first step on expansion by taking over PRT Kunduz from the Coalition in December 2003. In 2004 - 2005, ISAF further expanded into the North and West of the country. Annex A contains the UN Security Council Resolutions on Afghanistan since 2001. UNSCRs 1563, and 1623, for example, specifically mention PRTs within the context of ISAF’s Chapter VII mandate in Afghanistan. ISAF’s mandate has been renewed every September, while UNAMA’s mandate has been renewed every March for the past several years.

It is important to mention the role of Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A), the US-led international military coalition, that initially focused on the removal of the Taliban regime, in concert with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban Afghan militia forces. After the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, Coalition Operations focused primarily on Phase 3 Operations – continuing combat operations in the South and East against Taliban and AQ forces. As ISAF expanded across Afghanistan, Coalition Forces dedicated significant effort in preparing the conditions for a successful transition of authority to ISAF command. On 5 October 2006, authority to command the East transitioned to ISAF in accordance with UNSCR 1707 (see Annex A).

The PRT Mission

The PRT mission statement is not solely of military origin, as it was agreed on 27 January 2005 as part of the PRT Terms of Reference by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in Kabul, an ambassadorial-level body chaired by the Minister of Interior that sets high level strategic policy for all PRTs in Afghanistan. The PRT mission statement, which has been incorporated into the ISAF Operational Plan, is as follows:
“Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a **stable and secure environment** in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”
SECTION II – The PRT CONCEPT AND INTENT

The PRT Concept

A PRT is a joint, integrated military-civilian organisation, staffed and supported by ISAF member countries, operating at the provincial level within Afghanistan. A PRT is operated by a single nation or a coalition of two or more nations. A PRT is generally responsible for covering one province, but some have responsibility for two or more.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) has limited outreach to the provinces. The PRT should not act as an alternative to the GIRoA, but rather seek to improve the capacity of the GIRoA to govern itself. PRTs perform a vital role in helping to extend the reach of the as yet incomplete government presence especially in remote areas and hence deterring agents of instability. PRTs seek to establish an environment that is stable enough for the local GIRoA authorities, international agencies, non-government agencies and civil society to engage in reconstruction, political transition and social and economic development. In line with the objectives of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and its evolving Provincial Development Plans (PDPs), the PRTs’ role is to ensure international efforts are in line with Afghan development goals. This includes but is not limited to direct support to the three ANDS pillars of security, governance, and development.

PRT Guiding Principles

A PRT should:

- Focus upon improving stability by seeking to reduce the causes of instability, conflict, and insurgency while simultaneously increasing the local institutional capacity to handle these on their own;

- Operate as a fully integrated military-civilian organization as described in the PRT Best Practices Annex;

- Work to a common purpose or end-state with unity of effort;
• Link the people and their government and separate the spoilers/insurgents from the people, all the while transforming the environment to ensure both of these efforts are enduring;

• Facilitate the visibility of the GIRoA presence in the Province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation, communications, etc). Do not dominate meetings and events by an overwhelming physical ISAF presence;

• Conduct joint patrols with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) whenever possible to mentor them as they serve as the primary security interface with local residents;

• Guide and mentor from behind and underneath, ensuring Afghan leadership and ownership. Promote Afghan primacy and legitimacy, understanding that the Afghan pace may be slower than PRTs may find convenient;

• Ensure that interventions at the provincial level and below support national GIRoA processes and the ANDS;

• In concert with other development actors, actively engage and help develop the capacity of the Governor, GIRoA officials, Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), District Development Assemblies (DDA), Community Development Committees (CDCs), Shuras, and other established and/or traditional bodies;

• Promise ONLY what you can deliver: manage expectations (under-promise and over-deliver);

• Focus on achieving effects, not outcomes (e.g., what effect will helping the GIRoA to begin building a road from point A to point B have on extending the reach of government security and other services, particularly in comparison with the easier-to-achieve but less significant “outcomes” of completing a few QIP projects during a four-month rotation?);

• Ensure that GIRoA officials and the PRT have “political buy-in” with each other in agreeing to address priority needs so that the appropriate authorities assume sustainment responsibility. Sustainability must be “planned in” at the outset of any project;
• Identify and implement projects through CDCs, DDAs, PDCs, and line ministries to build governance capability and enhance GIRoA leadership and ownership on projects. See PRT Project status checklist in Annex xxx:

• Commit to consulting and/or working with international partners such as UNAMA, IOs and NGOs;

• Ensure that projects do not duplicate the work of others and that they lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes;

• Respect and be aware of civil-military sensitivities - lives may depend on effective planning and coordination with each other;

• Work towards a finite lifespan for the PRT, linked to an end-state of improved Afghan stability, governance capability and sufficient reconstruction to enable drawdowns and closure of PRTs; And

• Be aware that even-handed development across Afghanistan, in accordance with the Afghan Constitutional requirement under Article 6 to “provide for balanced development in all areas of the country” would likely provide a better opportunity for all the PRTs to disband sooner, without leaving a security vacuum in provinces where PRTs may be ready to close sooner than others.

PRT Purpose

The events of 11 September 2001 were the catalyst for international intervention in Afghanistan, with the mission of ensuring that Afghanistan will never again be a source of instability to the world. Operations ideally progress in a linear fashion along what is called the spectrum of intervention (see Figure 1 below). First, kinetic operations are performed in an area, followed by non-kinetic operations, the second phase leading into a period of stabilization operations, which sets the ground for long-term transformational development efforts designed to ensure the area does not “slip back” to the left of the spectrum.²

² Each PRT is at a different place on the spectrum of intervention, so the activities of each PRT must be wholly dependent upon local conditions.
In the case of Afghanistan, some areas of the country appear to be “stuck” within the middle transitional stage of this process. That is to say, kinetic operations are mostly over, yet the area has not progressed significantly toward greater security, stability and economic development and there is a risk of “slipping back” if security forces are removed before GIRoA agencies are prepared (capable and committed) to assume the responsibility.

This problem exists for the areas at the lower end of the stability stage, indicated as inaccessible in accordance with Annex C, Appendix 6 UN Program Accessibility Map, because often no actors aside from the military can operate in unstable areas. In order for the military to pass off responsibility for an area (i.e., exercise its exit strategy), it must deliver some level of stability. However, moving these areas further along the spectrum of intervention is beyond the expertise and capabilities of the military. While such expertise resides in diplomatic and development agencies, these agencies are not able to operate in these areas using their traditional program delivery mechanisms.
because of the instability. An effective approach to this problem is the creation of a single unit incorporating the capabilities of both military and civilian organizations, called a PRT. Hence a PRT must focus on strengthening all three pillars of security, governance and economic development, with the emphasis shifting to enabling greater R and D as a province stabilizes and becomes more development-permissive.

PRTs were devised in 2002, with the initial PRTs being deployed in late 2002 and 2003, as a mechanism that could “solve” this problem. A PRT is a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and development components. When the capabilities brought by the military component of the PRT are no longer needed, the military can withdraw, the PRT can dissolve and the diplomatic and development components of the PRT revert to more traditional, effective, and efficient means to pursue their aims. This process is a gradual one. Some PRTs require the capabilities of the military component more because they are in much more unstable areas, while other PRTs may begin to draw down their military component once the civilian agencies become more capable of accomplishing their tasks without military assistance.

The PRT itself is neither a combat nor a development institution. A PRT may perform and support such activities in the pursuit of stability, but these activities are not the primary purpose of the PRT. The PRT is an important component of the counter-insurgency campaign. As such, a PRT’s measure of success is not how many development projects it completes, but how all of its activities fully support the end-state goal of improved stability and capable Afghan governance. A critical role for the PRTs enroute to stability is to continuously shape the security and governance environment through active engagement with all levels of provincial society, as well as civil service and security force capacity building. This in turn will allow Afghan and other governments’ development agencies, IOs and NGOs to conduct R and D., in a virtuous circle that extends stability.

The PRT is scaffolding – it is an interim structure designed to support Afghan government and security structures build their capacity to govern and deliver essential public services, such as security, law and order, justice, health care, education, development and so on. Once that purpose has been fulfilled, its stability-focused mission is complete and the PRT structure can be dismantled. PRTs are extremely
expensive in terms of personnel, maintenance, and activity costs. Therefore, it is incumbent on the NATO/ISAF chain of command, troop contributing nations, and participating agencies to provide sufficient support to the PRT and, together with the PRT leadership teams, keep PRTs focused on their ultimate goal and avoid all activities that do not directly contribute to the accomplishment of their mission.

Political Buy-In

Political buy-in is crucial for all security, development and governance activities in the province. A line ministry may be able to provide technical expertise, but it is critical that the appointed, elected, as well as informal leadership (Governor, District Governor, Mayor, Provincial Council, shura) is informed about and engaged with the activity. Internal Afghan governmental communication channels do not always transmit messages from the capital to the province and from the province to the district. The PRT can reinforce message dissemination. The civilian component, particularly the diplomatic officers are well situated to assess, influence and deploy political capital to achieve mission objectives.

PRT Resources

Annex H contains best practices arising from PRT experiences, including Reconstruction and Development (R and D). Again, although a PRT itself is not a development agency, the Annex also contains a PRT project checklist that shows civilian and military members of the PRT how to work step-by-step with Afghan government officials when they do engage in Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Quick Impact Projects (QIP), Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), or larger assistance programs in order to strengthen stability and governance and meet Afghan priority needs. The checklist is also a tool to help ensure that PRTs are conducting R and D using a common methodology.

ISAF HQ CJ9 section also maintains a PRT construction project database for PRTs to access. The goal of the database is to have common sets of engineering drawings and project information that PRTs can use for R and D projects. Building to standardized, GIRoA-approved engineering drawings allows for commonality in construction which assists in lowering PRTs’ costs and saving time while providing the GIRoA consistent infrastructure to maintain.
Conflict Transformation

Experience in the Balkans resulted in the concept of Conflict Transformation which provides another lens through which PRTs can view their mission and purpose. Simply stated, conflict transformation asserts that two efforts need to take place simultaneously to bring about a viable peace. First, the drivers or cause of conflict and instability need to be reduced. Second, local institutional capacity (government and non-government) to manage these causes of conflict and instability need to be strengthened. The role of outside institutions and agencies is to pursue both of these efforts until an inflection point is achieved – this is the point at which local institutions can managed conflict and instability without overt outside assistance (see Figure 2 below). It should be noted that conflict transformation theory does not require all capacity be built or all conflict managed, but only that the inflection point be achieved.

![Figure 2. Spectrum of Conflict Transformation](image)

**Stability**

Stability in the simple sense of the word means “firmly established”. The PRT mission is narrowly focused to help firmly establish government and governance in a conflict or post-conflict environment. In other words, the PRTs exist to help the GIRoA gain a

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3 Oxford English Dictionary.
monopoly over the legitimate use of force (i.e., to extend its reach throughout the country) and build its connection to the population.

The role of the state is to monopolize the use of force, because if a monopoly does not exist, the structure of law and order breaks down into smaller units resulting in anarchy, or in the case of Afghanistan, decades of fighting between various factions of warlords, narco-traffickers and tribes. Force in this definition includes the basic functions of any state: armed forces, policing, and judiciary.

Helping the GIRoA gain control over the use of force is only half of the PRT mission. The other half involves increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government within its constituency. Whilst a government may have “de jure” legitimacy through international recognition or by winning an election, “de facto” legitimacy is a much more important indicator of stability. This implies a social contract between government and the people, where the former undertakes to provide services (welfare, security, human rights, equitable opportunities and access to resources) for the common good in return for the people’s support, including recognition and acceptance that the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. When a government fails to live up to its part of the social contract, people may withdraw their consent to be governed and turn to alternate sources of power. Whilst this may, under certain circumstances, be completely understandable – e.g., in a dictatorship – it will inevitably cause a degree of instability. And this instability can be used to promote the interests of other groups whose agendas are motivated more by political, economic or ideological gain than by the welfare of the people.

The root causes of violent conflict can often be traced to a combination of poverty, political exclusion, cultural or tribal issues, and the inequitable distribution of resources including a lack of educational and economic opportunities – which all add up to human insecurity. This situation provides space for individuals and groups to operate by feeding off of grievances and/or actively working to increase instability. It is through tackling these structural roots that violent conflicts can usually be mitigated and future outbreaks prevented.

Looking at instability created by violent conflict in structural terms allows a more nuanced understanding of stability. Preventing the outbreak of violent conflict requires not just an operational engagement with disarmament, demobilisation, peace
enforcement, aid and political conditionality; it also needs immediate work on poverty, exclusion and inequity. Without attention to physical, economic and political security, the root causes of violent conflict remain unaddressed and the risk of escalation will persist.

Stabilization is not development. Stabilization is carefully designed, by working on security and conflict, to enable the environment for development to take place. The structural roots of conflict exacerbate one another. Working on socio-economic development alone, without attending to physical insecurity, exclusion and inequity will limit the opportunities to effectively bring about development. Thus, stabilization is a necessary precursor to sustainable development in accordance with standard counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, which is to clear, hold, and build. Development assistance in territory that the ANSF, GIRoA and ISAF forces cannot hold does not last. Even in areas of Afghanistan that are presently relatively stable, attention to potential causes of violent conflict cannot be ignored and must be addressed in order to lay a solid-groundwork for long-term development.

The Stability Matrix

Because a PRT has as its goal the achievement of stability, the PRT must strive to bring about an environment with which the GIRoA’s authority is both legitimate and effective in the use of force. Stated another way, the mission of a PRT is to work with all available stakeholders and resources to bring stability to a population group by enabling the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance and government institutions.

The stability matrix strategic framework (Figure 2) represents one framework currently available for use by PRTs to guide their activities and efforts. The stability matrix framework has the benefits of linking mission, strategy, targeting, activity design, implementation, measuring impact, and evaluating success. The stability matrix graphically illustrates stability by plotting its two primary components of legitimacy and effectiveness on perpendicular axis. The resulting four quadrants are then classified broadly as exhibiting the characteristics of low stability, medium stability, or high stability.

The most stable state (upper right quadrant) is the result of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the governing authority. The authority has effective security forces and the population supports the authority against competing political entities. This state is
one that is resistant to criminal activity as the state can eject these spoilers and it is also resistant to political and ideological agitators as the population will not offer such spoilers safe haven but will rather identify them to the authorities. This is enduring stability and is the appropriate mission of interagency civil-military strategy, represented by the PRT. Few, if any areas of Afghanistan, can be safely placed in this quadrant.

**Figure 3: Stability Matrix - Explanation of quadrants.**

The lower right quadrant represents a population that is supportive of very ineffective government authorities. Therefore, ideological or politically motivated spoilers find little purchase among the people, however criminal and other violent activity frequently occur due to the lack of government control. Clearly, what must be done in these areas is to grow the effectiveness of the government. This quadrant characterizes many parts of Afghanistan that are not presently afflicted with insurgency but where governance and development remain fragile at best.
The upper left quadrant represents an authoritarian model of stability. The government is able to deliver services and monopolize the use of force, but does not have the consent of the people to be governed. Criminal activity tends to be low in this area, but political or ideological spoilers have significant influence and must be engaged to bring about stability.

The most worrisome state is that described by the lower left quadrant. This is a state where the government is ineffective and unsupported by the population. This is a state in which criminal elements can run rampant and ideological and political spoilers may be able to gain support from the population to wage insurgency against the government. In such communities the difficult task of growing both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government must be accomplished.

Four Lines of Operation

The matrix is designed to inform the PRT's Leadership (Integrated Command Group) about what effects (i.e., legitimacy or effectiveness) need to be achieved in the AO. This in-turn will determine the capabilities required to achieve success. The matrix prescribes four lines of operations that hold true regardless of the community being engaged or the effects desired: 1) Increase effectiveness of legitimate authorities, 2) Decrease effectiveness of illegitimate entities. 3) Increase legitimacy of legitimate authorities, 4) Decrease legitimacy of illegitimate entities.

In military parlance, increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of state authorities (i.e., lines of operation 1 and 3) can be considered the friendly line of operations. Similarly, countering the effectiveness and legitimacy of non-state (or counter-state) authorities (i.e., lines of operations 2 and 4) represents intercepting the enemy’s lines of operations.
The enemy in Afghanistan comes in many forms that can be placed in three general categories based on their motivation: economic, political, and ideological. The paragraphs below will discuss the motivations of each group in order to better understand them, and derive a useful definition of the enemies' Centre of Gravity (CoG) and Critical Vulnerability (CV). For the sake of this discussion, the centre of gravity for each group is defined as “the sources of strength, power, and resistance” while critical vulnerability is defined as “that which is vulnerable and will achieve results disproportionate to the effort applied.”

Economic spoilers⁴ are individuals and organizations that benefit economically from the lack of government control. For example, in Kunar, many of the insurgents and other troublemakers are fighting to repel government rule that would block their access to lucrative natural resources. Economically motivated spoilers generally acquire access to a resource and then exploit these resources to fund a patronage network. This patronage network is the economic spoiler’s centre of gravity. Occasionally, this patronage network may benefit a single sub-national identity group. This presents a problem in that if friendly forces attack such a group, their actions might be interpreted as declaring war against the group because of their identity. This might motivate the group to defend itself much more vigorously than they would otherwise have done. Therefore, when seeking to decrease the effectiveness and legitimacy of such a group, friendly forces should target the group’s access to economic resources as the enemy’s

⁴ Narco-crime. Organised narco-crime is flourishing in the absence of effective GIRoA security institutions and judicial frameworks, fuelled by a high value opium cash crop (gross income from opium per hectare is $5,200; gross income from wheat per hectare is $546), and a country awash with surplus weaponry and weak governance. The narcotics industry also provides financial support for terrorist groups and factional commanders. Opium production has become a way of life for many, particularly in the absence of similarly lucrative alternative livelihoods or freedom from insurgent pressure to grow poppy. The production and transportation of narcotics is closely protected. Afghanistan produces 93% of the world's opium. The farmers receive less than 25% of the drug revenue in Afghanistan. The rest goes to traders, traffickers, commanders of IAGs, and corrupt government officials. Fighting narcotics requires a national and international effort to manage demand as well as supply. Banditry. Individuals and/or armed groups are opportunistically taking advantage of the absence of effective Afghan security institutions. There is a lack of comprehensive reintegration programmes as well as of a viable economy in rural areas. Warlordism and factionalism. Afghanistan is a tribal society. Afghans have traditionally retained weapons for self-protection in the absence of state security. Kabul's limited influence in the provinces and its accommodation of local power brokers have left factional chiefs in control of many local governments. The significant reliance of Coalition Forces on the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban in 2001 led to the empowerment of factional commanders while contributing to the fragmentation of power and frustrating the reform process. Over the last few years, Kabul has successfully reduced the power of some warlords by reassigning them away from their geographical power base, but their networks continue to influence provincial administration. However, former commanders now in government positions in the police and civil administration have brought with them their often-unqualified supporters as few alternatives exist for them. In parts of Afghanistan, warlords have been known to seize vehicles, livestock and cash as taxes and payment for protection. They also can leverage their power and influence to gain control of customs posts, bazaars, and opium trafficking.
critical vulnerability. Friendly forces should avoid, at all costs, attacking coherent population groups in order to prevent the perception of attacking the sub-national identity group that might coincidentally be associated with the spoilers.

Political spoilers are often led by a cadre which is motivated by the quest for political power. For example, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has consistently stated that he wants to rule Afghanistan. He has sought economic support by exploiting resources and accepting funding from outside Afghanistan to create a patronage network. He has further fuelled this patronage network by granting leadership roles in his organization and promising future leadership roles once he takes power. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his organization, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), seek to destabilize the region in the hope of creating an opportunity for him to take political power. The CoG of the political spoiler is the leadership and the promise of authority in a future state that binds them together. Such organizations are very vulnerable to promises of power in the current state as well as the elimination of the charismatic leader.

A final and the most dangerous enemy is one motivated by ideology. The Taliban, for example, is motivated by the ideology of a conservative Islamic theocracy. Its support in the population derives not from the promise of political power or economic gain, but rather from a common “hatred of apostasy” (i.e., its CoG) and vision of a “pure” future Islamic state. The core leadership and supporters of the Taliban seek to defend their identity as strict Muslims against the perception of a threat to this identity by the outside world although much of the movement's rank and file may join for more personal, tribal or financial motives. However, the people of Afghanistan have already seen the dismal state which the Taliban wish to restore – and this vision of a counter

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5 *Al-Qaeda*. AQ are mostly foreign fighters rather than indigenous Afghans. AQ’s presence in Afghanistan has been significantly curtailed by Operation Enduring Freedom. However, AQ continues to facilitate operations in Afghanistan. *Taliban*. The insurgents are not a homogenous group. The Taliban lack a unified leadership, an ideology that is popular in Afghanistan, and a sustainable logistics support network in-country. Some are Afghan-born and bred; some are Afghans living in neighbouring countries who have been pulled back to Afghanistan through tribal networks; and others are affiliated to organisations outside of Afghanistan who may or may not be ideologically driven. Some Taliban believe they are in a battle of survival to defend their values and way of life. Taliban (most of whom are Pashtun) travel back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan, provided for by local communities with family or tribal links under Pashtun codes of honour. Understanding the motivation of the insurgents, and why people give them hospitality, is crucial for developing effective counter-insurgency and conflict mitigation strategies. The continuing spectre of Western troops killing Taliban is likely to increase opposition to GIRoA and its Western allies.

6 “Reigning in” the Center of Gravity Concept, LtCol Antulio J. Echevarria II USA, Air and Space Power Journal, Summer 2003
state is not very appealing to most people. In a poll conducted in December 2007, 76% of Afghans viewed the overthrow of the Taliban as a good thing, and supported foreign forces remaining in their country.

Far too often the enemy is defined as hostile individuals within organizations that must all be hunted down and killed or captured by kinetic military action. That this enemy is often considered to be monolithic as intimated by the common use of the term Opposing Military Forces (OMF). Such terms are doubly troublesome as they focus efforts on the enemy of ISAF or the Coalition not the enemy of the process, the people, or the government.

Mao Tse-tung stated that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea”. Therefore, one goal of a counterinsurgency effort is to separate the fish from the ocean: that is to say, alienate the spoilers from the population. This is perfectly aligned with the stability matrix concepts of legitimising the government at the expense of the spoilers. According to both doctrines, the higher goal of military and civil action is to win over the population, while killing the insurgents is a supporting or shaping effort. In other words, hostile individuals do not create hostile populations: rather, hostile populations will continue to create hostile leaders until the source of the hostility is alleviated. In the case of Afghanistan, it is the GIRoA who must win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan people; the PRTs can facilitate bringing government authorities to the people, particularly in remote or insecure areas.

If a decision-maker fails to understand the nuances of the enemy's motivations, organization, goals, strategy and means, the actions taken will be at best ineffective, and at worst counter-productive.

**Increase Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Constituted Government**

Increasing the effectiveness of legitimate authorities in Afghanistan starts with the most basic and core function of government as stated above – ensuring the security of the populace through monopolizing the use of force. For this reason, this line of operation should focus on enabling the state institutions that use force: the Afghan National Army; Police; and Border Police. Most of these programs have a large amount of national sponsorship performing institutional reform and mass training. The PRT should monitor and participate where possible in these many activities and evaluate their ability to translate into effectiveness of government security sector actors on the
ground. The PRT should seek to develop programs and interventions that complement these larger national programs.

In the modern era of nation states, the old sources of de jure and de facto legitimacy, such as divine right of rule, are no longer relevant. Holding elections, no matter how free or how many people participate, does not necessarily make a government legitimate. Legitimacy is gained and maintained when a government, at a minimum, represents the consensus of the people, operates under the tenants of rule of law, offers acceptable means for competition among various interest groups and potential leaders, provides inclusion for sub-national identity groups and civil society groups, and provides good governance such as transparency of processes.

In the rural unstable areas of Afghanistan, representatives of the central government have never had a significant presence and the people of these areas historically have a low opinion of the legitimacy of the government. It is in these very areas that sub-national identity is particularly strong. Some have argued that the government could easily co-opt the traditional authority structures in order to enhance its own legitimacy and that the roadmap for such integration already exists. For example, in the justice sector, mechanisms exist by which the traditional shura justice system is integrated into district and provincial justice systems. Furthermore, we should not forget that many states in the western world have some degree of federalism, decentralization, or delegation of authority. In such a state, we see that the use of provincial or district governance institutions (be they traditionally based or based on the western model) does not subtract from the legitimacy of the central state.

Conclusion

PRTs exist to help the GIRoA gain a monopoly over the use of force by aiding the increase of its legitimacy and effectiveness, not least in the security sector. The PRT must utilize each component of national power - diplomatic, economic and military - to achieve this goal with an understanding that the human terrain will dictate which element has the lead in any given intervention. Every activity the PRTs undertake must be in support of stability as the PRTs’ mission is to assist the GIRoA extend its authority. The PRTs’ mission is complete when sustainable stability is achieved across Afghanistan. At that time, the PRTs can then be dismantled. The next section will describe a roadmap for how to implement this strategy.
SECTION III – IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY

Understanding the Strategic Framework

PRTs are one component of a full-spectrum operation. The guide below (Figure 4) is a model that the PRTs can use to understand where their provinces sit in the larger international intervention, and can be used as a discussion point about how they will fulfil the role of non-kinetic operations, keeping in mind the goal of supporting the GIRoA in establishing stability for the province.

![Spectrum of Intervention Diagram](image)

**Figure 5. Spectrum of Intervention (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2005)**

The essential tasks listed are not exhaustive. Rather, they are activities the PRTs have been directly involved with, or those carried out by primarily by others but which have a direct impact on PRTs. In terms of analysis, the operative units are the communities, not PRT AORs or regions. Clearly, some tend toward the extremes. In Paktika and Uruzgan, kinetic operations are still essential, while in Parwan and Bamian long-term
development can proceed largely unimpeded by security concerns. Most places, however, fall somewhere in the middle, and the level of security among communities within a province may span the entire spectrum.

**Introduction to the Planning Process**

A PRT is a distinct civil-military institution with a distinct mission to be achieved. Due to the expense and risk to personnel inherent in PRT operations, it is incumbent on each PRT team to engage in a deliberate and coherent planning, execution, and evaluation cycle. The planning process portion of this cycle should clearly define the quickest path to mission accomplishment and explicitly chart out the transition from PRTs to traditional assistance relationships. The PRT planning process should support, not compete with existing GIRoA planning processes, and must specifically reflect all elements of the ISAF response in the province.

Deliberate planning is especially important in the context of other ISAF efforts in the more unstable parts of Afghanistan. Combat operations have engaged the preponderance of ISAF personnel, expenditures, and efforts. Nonetheless, these combat operations should be seen as “shaping” or “supporting” efforts in support of the stability mission. Without provincial-level plans for achieving stability, these “shaping” efforts can be ad hoc. As a result, PRTs can find themselves responding to a post-combat situation, rather than working collaboratively with combat units towards a common stability objective. The PRT should seek to avoid responding to post-combat situations and should instead seek to define ahead of time the end-states that combat operations should achieve. Likewise, deliberative planning is also vital for PRTs that operate in areas where combat units are not present in order to ensure that all activities the PRT implements lead towards the desired goal.

A PRT planning process can be applied to any PRT mission or problem, however all PRT planning should be ultimately linked to a multi-year provincial support plan. Each PRT (or provincial team), should have a multi-year provincial support plan to provide a roadmap from the existing situation to the day the PRT can be declared successful in the accomplishment of its mission. Such plans are essential to preserving continuity of effort and situational awareness from one PRT team to the next. The mission of each PRT spans several years, with efforts building on successes of each PRT's predecessors. For example, support to an election process, including tasks from registration to
transition of office-holders, may span 3 rotations of PRT staff. When new discrete tasks arise for the PRTs, this planning process must allow for the entire team to determine how to accomplish these tasks and how to integrate this effort into the longer term strategy to achieve the PRTs overall mission.

Before beginning the planning process, the appropriate make-up of the planning body should be determined. At the core of the planning process should be the PRT Integrated Command Group (ICG – see section IV PRT Management and Structure). The planning effort can be expanded to include any local ISAF maneuver units, local elements of national programs, UN and other donor efforts, and, if possible, the local provincial government. The PRT ICG should carefully weigh the benefits and costs of a small core planning group or a large inclusive planning group. For example, if the planning is limited to just the PRT, the resulting plan will clearly focus on only those strategies that must be accomplished for the PRT to exit. However, this risks losing the perspectives, knowledge, and buy-in of other organizations. Conversely, a more inclusive plan, with broader buy-in, perspective, and knowledge, may also include other parties’ areas of interest unrelated to the PRT’s goal of working itself out of a job. For this reason, it is recommended that the PRT ICG consider the capabilities of the larger group within this process and thus determine phases of involvement. For example, it may not be necessary to engage local government representatives on the day-to-day planning process, but to consult with them on specific areas of the plan. It is particularly important to plan together with the provincial government on the elements of their Provincial Development Plan (PDP) that the PRT finds appropriate to support. While selectively involving the UN, donors and other critical partners, more sensitive aspects of the planning process can then be limited to the ISAF community, specifically the diplomacy, defense, and development components present in each province.

Where appropriate, the PRT and the local ISAF maneuver units are referred to as the ISAF Provincial Team (see section IV PRT Management and Structure). Planners from each of these organizations engaged in this planning are referred to as the Core Planning Group (see section IV PRT Management and Structure). The results of such planning processes are often referred to as provincial support plans to indicate that they are broader than just for PRTs, but not a governing document for the efforts of local governments and communities.
The Planning Process

Steps in the planning process:

- Recognize and Define the Mission
- Analyze the Situation
- Determine End-State
- Develop Strategy
- Develop Indicators and Metrics

The first step in the planning process is to understand the various requirements placed on members of the PRTs or the PRT as a whole (this step is often referred to as Mission Analysis by military planners). While the ISAF PRT mission is the overarching directive, the reality is that each element of the PRT is often given (frequently very specific) instructions from their parent organization. While these organizations likely seek to de-conflict this guidance at the Kabul level, the implementation of these directives at the provincial level may need additional de-confliction or negotiation. This is exacerbated by the fact that although ISAF “owns” PRTs, they are under operational control (OpCon) of the regional commands and, where present, task forces. Although PRTs are under ISAF and its subordinate commands for military operational purposes, because the PRTs are in fact national assets for Reconstruction and Development and civilian governance purposes, when these elements choose to engage in reconstruction and development projects, ISAF has minimal input into their decision processes on which projects are selected and how they are implemented. Nevertheless, while the PRTs themselves are not development institutions, they often serve as a platform to enable their national aid agencies and international organizations to provide the international community's most significant donor assistance at the provincial level. The PRTs’ provision of a “security envelope” to permit operating space for civilian actors is a significant contribution on the part of ISAF forces.

Recognizing that the intermediate military commands also do not necessarily have direct access to the civilian diplomatic and development organizations when developing their guidance and tasks, it is essential that anytime any one element of the PRT receives an order or directive from a superior, it is shared with and reconciled with the
other organizations composing the PRT. The result of this step is one understanding throughout the PRT of the common mission. When completing this step in the planning process, some concepts borrowed from military planning may be useful. Specified tasks are those tasks provided by superior headquarters or higher management that are explicitly stated and understood. Implied tasks are those tasks that are not explicitly stated, but must be accomplished in order to achieve the mission.

The second step in the planning process is to conduct an analysis of the situation. This begins by examining the environment with an eye to determining the impediments and “allies” to accomplishing the mission. Specific categories of examination include, but are not limited to, key actors; environmental factors; political, economic, social and tribal dynamics; and causes and potential triggers of instability, conflict, or other social or political distortions. In examining the environment, the team must determine impediments to the accomplishment of the common mission existing within and without the province as well as potential allies, particularly those who may be able to directly influence aspects of the environment where ISAF actors are more constrained. This is the most important step in the process because a misunderstanding of the environment can have significant impact on effectiveness on the ground.

The situational analysis is critical for all tasks performed by the PRT. For a short-term task, such as meeting with the provincial governor, this step can be completed through a single meeting of the ICG and a review of existing intelligence/information. However, when the PRT develops or revises its multi-year provincial support plan, the examination of the environment can be a very involved continuous process. One of the available methodologies for accomplishing this task is a conflict/instability assessment (see Appendix 6 to Annex E – Provincial Assessment and Conflict Assessment Tools). At a minimum, a conflict/instability assessment will identify the primary factors contributing to or failing to manage conflict/instability and the causal relationship between these factors. Knowing these causal relationships will assist the PRT in focusing potential interventions, alleviating negative effects, and reinforcing positive effects. The key is for all ISAF elements operating in the province to come to a common understanding of the problems and opportunities in the environment.

At all steps in the process, it is essential to identify critical facts and assumptions. This is particularly important in the situational analysis step. As PRTs explore the various factors and causal relationships that exist within the social, political, economic, and
other spheres of their AOR, they often realize that they are missing critical information. However, planning must often proceed without that information, so assumptions are made. These must be formally captured as assumptions until they can be proved or disproved. Two categories of assumptions the PRTs may find helpful are: Descriptive assumptions which describe how the PRT understands the environment to be functioning (e.g. “youths are joining the insurgency for pay”); and Prescriptive assumptions which describe the PRTs hypothesis about how the environment might be transformed (e.g., “if we provide the youths with pay, they will not join the insurgency”). The information required to prove or disprove these assumptions should be captured in a list of critical information requirements. A component of the multi-year provincial support plan should determine how to acquire this information and turn assumptions into facts.

In addition, the PRT should review all “assets” available to be applied to the accomplishment of the task or mission. Assets include units, agencies, programs, funding, assistance delivery mechanisms, etc. For example, a superior command may instruct ISAF units to reduce insurgent threats within a valley or among a particular tribe. For such an effort maneuver or combat forces as well as additional quick impact project funding or longer-term project funding may be made available. In the case of the longer-term mission reflected in the multi-year provincial support plan, immediate assets would include the ISAF provincial team/PRT (including in-house development and diplomatic elements), Maneuver Unit, Special Forces elements, intelligence assets, etc. Broader assets for building the positive local institutional capability necessary for success exists among UN organizations and programs, other multilateral and bilateral donors and their implementing partners, civil society, traditional tribal and religious institutions and influences, and the local government.

After creating a common mission and coming to a common understanding of the evolving situation on the ground, the third step is to compose a common end-state. This end-state should represent the best analysis of the team, using the situational analysis to translate mission guidance into an end-state in which the PRT has truly completed its mission. This should be captured in a statement that is realistic and doable given the timeframe, the will of the stakeholders, and the resources available. Also, the end-state should be measurable (i.e. there should be a way to know when the end-state has been achieved) – this can be ensured by developing the indicators for the end-state at the
same time the end-state is being articulated. For the multi-year provincial support plan, the PRT end-state should be captured in an overall goal statement. The PRT should be careful to differentiate between the goal statement which is the condition necessary for the PRT to exit and the long-term vision which are the conditions necessary for all developmental assistance to exit.

The goal statement by nature will be broad; therefore the goal can be broken down into elements to make it more understandable. To accomplish a discrete directive, a goal statement is usually sufficient. For more complex missions, a goal statement can be broken into objective statements that together equal the goal statement. For very complex tasks or those that require a series of effects over time, those objective statements can be further broken down into sub-objective statements. All the rules that apply to a goal statement apply to objective and sub-objective statement (i.e. measurable, doable, statement of a condition, etc.). A responsibility of a planner is to determine the number of levels of condition statements required to make a goal “actionable”.

The fourth step in the planning process is to derive clearly defined tasks and activities from the end-state goals, objectives, and sub-objectives. In lieu of unity of command, one of the primary means to ensure unity of effort among ISAF elements operating in a province is to write a multi-year provincial support plan holding all elements collectively responsible for bringing about the end-state condition. Individual elements operate independently only when accomplishing tasks and activities. However, an integrated PRT team can together monitor effects and hold itself responsible for achieving changes in the conditions of the environment as articulated in the goal, objectives, and sub-objectives statements. In the case of a multi-year provincial support plan, each sub-objective will require the accomplishment of a number of tasks to bring about the condition described in the sub-objective. These tasks are assigned to a responsible party and are to be accomplished within a defined period of time to a specified standard. Success will depend on performing all the tasks that are necessary and sufficient to achieve the sub-objective and evolving these tasks to meet the challenges of the changing environment. Tasks can be broken down into their constituent activities to make them more actionable and better able to be synchronized with other activities of the ISAF support plan as well as with the activities of allied institutions.
The fifth step is to develop indicators and metrics and a scheme to collect and evaluate them. This is listed as a separate step, but it is in fact integral to the development of effective end-state goal, objectives, and sub-objectives. Two types of indicators are needed: output indicators and impact indicators. Output indicators measure the quantity/quality of the goods or services created or provided through tasks (using inputs). These could include such information as numbers of farmers receiving agricultural assistance, miles of roads built, success of electricity generation and installation of transmission facilities. Output indicators (also called measures of performance) measure whether, in performing our tasks, things are being done right. Outcome or “impact” indicators measure the quantity & quality of the results (effects) achieved via the provision of project goods and services. These could include reduced incidence of disease, improved farming practices, increased vehicle use to move goods to market, increased rural supply and consumption of electricity, reduced mortality rates or lower health costs. Outcome & impact indicators (also called measures of effects) measure whether the right things are being done to achieve the goal. Metrics need to be established to monitor whether an outcome and impact indicator is moving in one direction or another.

The PRT should construct an effects monitoring and collection regime fully integrated with the effects processes in place at the brigade/task force, regional command, and ISAF HQ levels and among the civilian international institutions. However, this type of information collection can quickly overwhelm PRT teams and should not keep the team from performing their primary functions. Thus it is important to weave such information collection into the daily activities of the PRT and maneuver units. More importantly, the PRT itself does not have to collect all the metrics required to determine its own success or failure. Extra-PRT organizations such as higher commands, Embassies, international organizations, and NGOs can collect such data on a national level, disaggregate by province, and provide it to the PRT in a useful manner for regular analysis.

Multi-Year Provincial Support Plans

Each PRT or each ISAF provincial team should capture, in writing, its long-term plan to achieve its common mission and develop a regular schedule to revise these plans. This provides continuity between PRT units while it records and updates the evolving understanding of each PRT about dynamics on the ground and provides an informed
mechanism for successive PRTs to build on the efforts of the previous PRT. It also provides a reference document to keep all members of the PRT on the same page even if they are executing only one small part of the overall plan, and it provides a means to evaluate success or failure derived from a common baseline. (Note: In addition, the full planning document, down to the activities and projects level, captures what was achieved, begun, promised, or not, by previous rotations, which is critical in engaging with local actors and in carrying on those activities.) Experience suggests that such a multi-year provincial support plan should contain a number of key components. Some of these components will be classified, but most of the plan should be unclassified to ensure effective distribution.

- Situational Analysis
- Provincial Framework
- Concept of Operations
- Tasks and Coordinating Instructions
- Monitoring and Effects Plan

The first component of the plan itself is a mission analysis. The mission analysis is a cataloguing, analysis, and integration of the various mission statements and directives received by the ISAF organizations participating in the PRT or operating at the provincial level. At a minimum, this section should include the ISAF, Regional Command and Brigade (if present) orders to the military component of the PRT as well as orders to the local maneuver unit (if present). It should also include directives and direction provided to the development, diplomatic and other civilian components of the PRT. Most importantly, this section should include an analysis and series of statements that reconcile and bring into coherence the directives given to each component of the PRT. One approach to accomplish this task is to catalogue the specified and implied tasks provided to each PRT component organization. Those tasks that are common among all key organizations will make up the PRT's common essential tasks. This reconciliation must take place based on the overall goal of achieving sufficient stability such that ISAF military forces are no longer necessary (see Section 1 - Introduction and Section 2 - The PRT Concept and Intent). To achieve this, the PRT's efforts must reduce the destabilizing threats (and their underlying causes) while simultaneously building
the capacity of local institutions to counteract these destabilizing “causes” with minimal ISAF support.

The second section is the situational analysis. This step is designed to capture in writing factors in the provincial environment (and the relationships between these factors) that have bearing on the mission. This section should record impediments and allies to the accomplishment of the mission that exist in the environment covering the following categories: actors, the means available to actors, the motivations of the actors, existing local institutions that constrain destabilizing factors, missing or weak local institutions that are failing to constrain destabilizing factors, triggers and windows of opportunity, and underlying risk factors. The situational analysis, however should be more than just a cataloguing of factors, it should offer insight to the reader as to what factors should be supported in the environment and what factors should be weakened. The situational analysis should discriminate between causes and symptoms. It should also hypothesize/prove the causal relationships between factors. Then, taking into account those factors and relationships the PRT is able to affect and will have the greatest enduring results, the plan should clearly state the “transformative hypotheses” – the expected transformations to the environment – upon which the prescriptive portion of the plan is based.

The third section of the plan is the provincial framework. This is a graphical representation (accompanied by text) of the goal, objectives, and sub-objectives of the provincial support plan. The goal statement is a description of the conditions that must be realized in the environment so that the PRT can transition out the military component and handover activities to longer-term development actors (see Section 1 · Introduction and Section 2 · The PRT Concept and Intent). The goal should represent the minimum achievable effect required to be successful, not a broad vision statement for aspirations such as a full-fledged democracy and a total end to all insurgent activity.

An example of a multi-year provincial support goal for a PRT:

“GIROA authority is established in all districts and supported by a majority of the population; local authorities can prevent or manage internal sources of instability; and outside sources of instability can be managed by ANSF with minimal support from international community.”
An example of an objective statement in service of this higher goal statement:

“The population accepts the government as legitimate and rejects insurgents.”

An example sub-objective statement in service of this higher objective statement:

“Tribal leadership and local religious figures actively support the government through messaging and enabling local government service provision.”

The fourth section of the plan is the concept of operations. Along with the situational analysis this is the most important section of the plan. This section spells out the Integrated Command Team’s priorities for intervention directly linked to the prescriptive hypothesis articulated in the situational analysis section. The concept of operations describes the synchronization in time, space, and purpose of various aspects of the provincial support plan. The concept of operations consists of an accounting of the disposition of ISAF elements as well as that of destabilizing elements, a prediction or most probable course of action for the destabilizing elements, as well as an intent, goal, and concept for the current year and the following year.

The fifth section of the plan identifies the tasks and coordinating instructions to the various ISAF elements operating the province. A task/activities synchronization matrix describes the tasks that are necessary and sufficient to accomplish each sub-objective. It also describes the activities that are necessary and sufficient to achieve each task. The matrix should also include the ISAF and civilian elements responsible for accomplishing each task and activities or monitoring its progress if it is being carried out by allied institutions such as UNAMA and other international partners. The plan captures the activities of these latter organizations as a way to ensure that the PRT’s activities are appropriately prioritized and integrated.

The final section of the plan is the monitoring and effects plan. This section includes all the indicators and metrics the PRT and provincial team wish to collect. Most importantly, it articulates the regime (the who, what, when, where, and how) of the collection of these metrics and indicators. The section also describes how the monitoring and effects plan is integrated into related activities being performed by superior and adjacent elements. For example, using both military QIP and national aid agency
funds, the PRT arranges to build a road connecting two quarrelling tribes’ districts to a common market center to foster healthier relations and strengthen private enterprise, were these effects achieved, and/or were there other unintended positive or negative consequences? How are those healthier relations measured?

Concept of Operations – Prioritization and Sequencing

The mission of the PRT is to increase stability. In developing and implanting this mission, PRT planners will need to understand how best to examine the environment. Traditionally, geography has been used to map stable and unstable areas. However, the concept of human terrain suggests that sub-tribes, demographic groups, or politically associated communities may prove to be a more productive lens to examine the environment.

Once the lens through which to see the environment is determined, the PRT should decide on its priorities for intervention. One school of thought suggests that PRT planners should focus their attention on the areas and communities with the least amount of stability while ensuring that the GIRoA’s provision of security and other services continues in the more stable areas. Success in extremely complex areas may create more positive momentum than a myriad of successes in medium-stable areas. Another argument suggests that the PRT should reinforce success and seek to grow the “inkblot” of stability out from stable areas to unstable areas. ISAF campaign plans often dictate which of these two schools of thought should be pursued.

Common Elements of an Integrated Intervention

Conflict assessments acknowledge the importance of building trust amongst local populations through sequenced interventions. The purpose of an intervention is to stabilize unstable areas through a combination of quick impact aid incentives and political dialogue with local influential people, together with Afghan authorities. The success of this kind of approach depends on combining military, development and political expertise in order to encourage improvements in security.

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It is important to note that although the PRT may have 1-2 priority communities, it may have to plan on developing interventions across the district in order to avoid appearing to operate on tribal lines – empowering one tribe over another. And if projects are involved, they should be of equal or similar value so as not to aggravate inter-community tensions.
Planning effective responses by identifying actions and steps that can be taken to alleviate tensions and promote non-violent resolution of conflict is the foundation of developing an intervention.\textsuperscript{8} Often the best way to begin working in a particularly difficult community is using the development component of the PRT by delivering “entry projects”. These are projects that are nominated by the community (through Community Development Councils or CDCs, where they exist – see Annex F, Appendix 1) that tend to address immediate needs and can be used to build trust between the community, the PRT and the government.\textsuperscript{9} Some examples are below:

\textbf{Increase the Capacity of the GIRoA.}

Interagency efforts in this area could include equipping and training the police, building government buildings, roads, communication facilities and other infrastructure projects, facilitation of GIRoA leadership (e.g., PDCs and regional Governors’ conferences), and technical assistance. In most instances the provincial and/or district authorities themselves will choose which capacity-building assistance projects they need most, and these priority projects should be reflected in their Provincial Development Plan (PDP).

\textbf{Counter Illegitimate Actors That Decrease the Capacity of the GIRoA.}

Illustrative interagency activities include support for judicial reform, Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG), and counter-narcotics efforts, promotion of Taliban/insurgent reconciliation, support for anti-corruption initiatives, mitigation/resolution of green-on-green conflict, and the isolation/containment/removal of warlords. Another significant role for the PRTs in this area is reporting to policymakers in Kabul via their respective chains of command.

\textbf{Improve GIRoA Legitimacy and Increase IO Efforts:}

This can be accomplished in part by taking GIRoA officials to remote areas to facilitate the strengthening of their connectivity to the population, enabling them to convey their own messages in person. In addition, aside from the obvious need to conduct outreach


\textsuperscript{9} Depending on the nature of the conflict in the community, the entry project step may be more effective without direct government involvement. However, if at all possible, this should be done in co-ordination with provincial/district authorities.
and public affairs (with GIRoA getting credit, not the PRT), interagency efforts in this area include support to independent media outlets, greater community involvement in CERP and QIP projects (even though their involvement may slow them down), elections support, civic education campaigns, and support to civil society organizations (including advocacy groups and business associations).

The need for effective PRT information campaigns cannot be overstressed, in the first instance at the local level. This media/public affairs outreach effort must be carried out in a manner that strengthens and supports the provincial and/or district governments (and sometimes in support of a specific district administrator or line ministry department director – for health, education, etc. – if he or she operates within an otherwise corrupt government). ISAF is steadily deploying Forward Media Teams (FMTs) to the PRTs in order to help with this effort. In addition, it is important for the PRTs to work with their Regional Commands (RCs) and ISAF HQ to inform the contributing nations’ domestic, as well as international, audiences about the difference the PRTs are able to make in aiding the GIRoA and in the lives of the people of Afghanistan.

Counter Factors Decreasing Legitimacy of GIRoA.

Any effort in this area must begin with an understanding of sub-national identity based on ethnic, tribal, regional or other factors. Armed with this knowledge, interventions can be tailored to target and engage specific communities, mullahs and local leaders, undermine the causes of anti-government attitudes and counter the highly sophisticated information operations of the Taliban, AQ and HIG.

Strategic Considerations

The challenge on the ground is to unify fractured relationships, build confidence in the legitimacy of a central state and its sub-national (provincial) elements, and ensure that ongoing stability allows appropriate security sector reform and reconstruction and development to roll out from the urban centres. Direct outreach and dialogue with remote and insecure communities should encourage understanding of what macro-processes are happening and increase ownership of change processes through strengthened local and district-level decision making. Direct aid does contain manifold risks when used purely to buy favour with communities and not linked with wider capacity-building processes. There can also be considerable risk to aiding in the roll out
of central government programmes that are culturally alien to marginalized and largely self-governed communities.

In August 2007 the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) was created within the President’s Office to provide stronger governance linkages from the central government to the sub-national levels of government. Civilian governance functions were transferred from the MOI to the IDLG, which is now the oversight body for provincial governors who are still appointed by the President. It also has appointment functions for district governors, as well as being the national-level implementing agency for the provinces’ PDPs. It is very important for the PRTs to cooperate closely with IDLG representatives as they arrive in each province. For marginalized or unstable areas of a province where the PRT may be the only entity able to reach them, it is particularly necessary to provide situational awareness and coordinate the PRT’s outreach efforts to those communities with the provincial authorities. The ANA-led clearing and stabilising efforts in Musa Qala, Helmand Province, in December 2007 provided an excellent coordination example among the IDLG, the ANSF, the provincial and district authorities and local shuras, PRT Lashkar Gah, and the British military Task Force.

This comprehensive approach, together with the participation of appropriate GIRoA entities, demonstrates that direct and well-targeted interventions utilizing economic, diplomatic and military components in extremely insecure districts can contribute to enhanced stability. This is achieved through a careful process of outreach, facilitated by the military, which builds confidence and encourages dialogue about security in the area. The key is to ensure that military intervention, political dialogue and aid levers are mutually complementary. Most importantly, they must work in tandem with one another to enhance security. This is a markedly different perception from the classical view that military intervention alone is required to stabilise an area to the point where direct development or humanitarian assistance can work.
SECTION IV – PRT MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE

Key Components in the Chain of Command

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the supreme decisionmaking body of the Alliance, consisting of ambassadorial-level Permanent Representatives (PermReps) of all 26 member countries meeting together at least once a week at NATO HQ in Brussels under the chairmanship of the NATO Secretary General. The current Secretary General is Jaap de Hoop Scheffer of the Netherlands. The NAC also meets at higher levels involving foreign ministers, defense ministers or heads of government, but the NAC has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets.

The senior military authority at NATO is the Military Committee, which consists of flag-level representatives from each country. Its job is to provide advice on any military-related issue that comes to the NAC for decision, including, for instance, the proposal in April 2003 that NATO assume leadership of ISAF.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near Mons, Belgium is the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO), one of NATO’s two strategic military commands. It performs the operational duties previously undertaken by Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. ACO is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and is responsible for all Alliance operations, including ISAF. The current Supreme Allied Commander Europe is General John Craddock, United States Army. He assumed office as the 15th SACEUR on 7 December 2006.

Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum in the Netherlands is one of the two joint force commands under Allied Command Operations (the other being in Naples, Italy). JFC Brunssum is the operational command between ACO and ISAF. About 1,000 military and civilian personnel work in the Brunssum Headquarters. The current JFC Brunssum Commander is General Egon Ramms, German Army, who assumed office on 26 January 2007.
The PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) is an ambassadorial/ministerial-level body, co-chaired by the Minister of Interior and COMISAF, which provides guidance for and oversight of all existing and proposed PRTs in the country. Its membership includes the ambassadors of all the PRT Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs) and potential contributing nations, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development (MRRD), the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and the EU Special Representative. The ESC meets as necessary and endorses policy notes that give specific guidance on PRT support for certain elements of security sector reform and reconstruction and development. The PRT Working Group is a subordinate body of the ESC. Its role is to resolve operational issues, prepare the ESC agenda and prepare issues for decision. It meets approximately once a month and consists of representatives from the GIRoA, UNAMA, ISAF and PRT TCN embassies. The Working Group is chaired by the Head of the PRT Section at MOI, with UNAMA and ISAF serving as co-chairs.

HQ ISAF is the multinational operational-level military headquarters, based in Kabul, responsible for assisting the GIRoA in the establishment of a safe and secure environment. There are five subordinate Regional Commands - RCs (North in Mazar-e-Sharif, West in Herat, South in Kandahar, and East in Bagram and Capital in Kabul City) that act as tactical military headquarters providing military command and support to both PRTs and other military force elements.

Each PRT, which covers one or more provinces, is established by a Lead Nation (LN). In many instances, the Lead Nation is assisted by one or more Partner Nations (PN) who contribute assets and personnel.

Resources at HQ ISAF

The PRT Helpdesk is situated in the CJ9 PRT Office at HQ ISAF. It is ready to field any question or problem that the PRT has not been able to resolve at its level or through its RC. To contact the helpdesk, send an unclassified e-mail to cimicops prtspoc@isaf-hq.nato.int or call +93 -(0)799-51-1034

The Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) is a civil-military geographic information system (GIS) offering situational awareness on a variety of information
themes. Information held includes development spending, physical infrastructure, geographical features, project plans and status, presence of governance institutions, etc. The information can be used to assist analysis and support operational decision-making. The database is widely available to ISAF members, the GIRoA and IC. It is updated monthly but relies heavily on users, including the PRTs, to confirm the "ground truth" of the information it contains. The ACSP office can be reached on +93 (0)799-51-2283.

The Civil-military Fusion Centre/Civil-Military Overview (CFC/CMO) is a new capability being field-tested by ISAF throughout all of 2008. The CFC’s task is to collect, sort, manage, fuse, and disseminate unclassified humanitarian assistance information via the CMO’s controlled-access website as hosted on an unclassified, commercial internet accessible network. Credentials for entering the CMO portal are given to requesting individuals from accredited military or civil humanitarian assistance agencies. The CFC’s civilian subject matter experts (called “Knowledge Managers” or “KMs”) have an additional function similar to that of a university research librarian. Registered CMO users can send information requests to one (or more) of the KMs managing the following specialty sectors: Security, Justice & Reconciliation, Governance & Participation, Economic Stabilization, Humanitarian Assistance, Infrastructure Development, and Social Well-Being. Assistance information in the neutral ground of the internet found at the following URLs:


PRT Management

The Integrated Command Group. A PRT must have an integrated command group, composed of senior military and civilian officials. Ideally the command group should be co-located (within the PRT, possibly share an office) and have a highly consensual and considered approach to decision making. There should be regularly scheduled meetings involving all members of the Command Group. The Command Group is responsible for taking ISAF top-level direction and, in combination with contributing nations’ priorities, determining the PRT strategy to include approach, objectives, planned activities, and monitoring and evaluation systems. It is the command group that must write a campaign plan for the PRT consisting of an end-state, objectives and coordination between lines of operation. Without an integrated command group, a PRT will be unable to harmonise the diplomatic, economic and military lines of operation and will
fail to act with unity of effort. In order to succeed, PRTs must become truly integrated civil-military structures, and not just military organizations with “embedded” civilian advisors or bifurcated organizations with two separate components (military and civilian) that operate separately from one another.

“The ‘House’ [a PRT] must have internal harmony [be in good working order] before it can expect to work effectively externally [and succeed in its mission]. Sound internal working comes before external results.”

Fletcher Burton, Director PRT Panjshir 2005-2007

PRT working groups. Units and elements deploying to PRTs in Afghanistan may arrive in country in specific units such as a civil-affairs team, a police mentoring team, or a civilian development agency office. However, as the PRT begins to plan and operate together, they may also reorganize themselves into groups focused on key elements of their strategy and not solely on their functional specialties or administrative organizations with which they deployed. For this reason, a number of PRTs have chosen to create issue-specific working groups focused on the key elements of their strategy. For example: Governance, Population Outreach, Economic Development, Security Sector, Border, Counter Narcotics, and PRT Transition. These groups often have representatives of all organizations that touch on an issue. They avoid “stove piping” and the misperception that anyone organization has a monopoly on a specific sector or activity. In addition to strategy focused working groups, the PRT should be prepared to assemble “special” working groups. For example, within a few months of the end of their rotation, each PRT team should assemble the key planners and representatives from all the participating organizations to revise their multi-year provincial support plan to ensure it is up to date for their successors. These assembled key planners and representatives can be called the Core Planning Group (CPG). Another special working group that could meet quarterly would be an effects/impact assessment group.

Provincial Perspective. A trend over the past few years has been the increase in the number of maneuver or combat elements operating in many provinces. A second trend has been that these elements are performing more than just combat operations, they interact with local government and traditional institutions, perform strategic communications, and even engage in diplomatic and development work. These activities are necessary and often the maneuver forces are well-qualified to perform these
functions. In recognition of this trend, many PRTs have begun to shift from planning, operating, and evaluating their effects solely as PRT teams to doing so with the local maneuver elements. In the provinces where this has occurred, the PRT is able to ensure that maneuver unit engagement with local communities and government as well as diplomatic and development activities are not only coordinated with the PRT’s activities, but effectively serve the same goal and mission. A second benefit of shifting emphasis to all elements in the province is that the civilian components of the PRT are provided a venue to help shape the intermediate end-states of combat operations. This serves to ensure that combat operations are correctly planned as operations which shape the political and social landscape. The PRT and Maneuver Unit as well as the civil affairs functions of the Special Operations Forces units should work together as an ISAF Provincial Team. Their actions must operate in conjunction with Afghan authorities and other international actors.

PRT Key Leaders and Responsibilities

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Key Appointment</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
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| PRT Commander usually LTC or COL or civilian equivalent | • Development of PRT Strategy  
• Overall command of PRT  
• Conduct KLE with high level GIRoA officials  
• QIP/CERP project funding in coordination with PRT elements  
• Ensure all chains of command have same SA on PRT activities/issues  
• Harmonize all political, military and development activities within the Lines of Operations and understand the network of the PRT tasks. |
| Military Commander usually LTC or COL. Duties usually assumed by PRT Commander if military | • Security operations, including framework patrolling across province(s), C-IED activities, joint patrolling with ANSF, support to DIAG/CN operations, etc.  
• Security engagement (CoP, NDS, PSC/JPCC, etc)  
• Force protection for PRT (civilian and military) |
| Diplomatic Officer | • Development of PRT Strategy  
• Lead on policy, governance and political issues  
• Political reporting, through the national chain of command, through ISAF channels together with CIMIC officers, and to HQ ISAF (NATO/ISAF PRT Weekly)  
• Engagement with key local actors (governor, PC, elders, tribal leaders, etc) |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Key Appointment</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
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| Development Officer                                 | • Development of PRT Strategy  
• Development advice to entire PRT and local governance structures  
• All PRT Development interventions (projects programmes and policy), including CIMIC activities  
• Engagement with development actors (governor, PDC, donors, UN/NGOs, etc)  
• QIP – Budgeting, programming, reporting, etc. |
| Police Officer/Advisor/Mentor (May be EUPOL, military, or contractor personnel) | • Police reform (incl. ANBP, etc) - training, mentoring, partnering, advice, etc  
• JPCC (and JRCC) engagement  
• Security intelligence fusion  
• Advise and direction to military police assets regarding police SSR |
| Other Civilian Experts                               | • Specific advice and engagement as appropriate                                                                                                      |
| Deputy Commander                                     | • Assist the PRT Commander as required                                                                                                                |
| Chief of Staff                                       | • Manage the PRT daily routine allowing the PRT Commander to be free to operate and engage with key provisional issues  
• Integration of all PRT (including civilian) activities:  
• Fusion and distribution of intelligence  
• Integrated information campaign  
• De-confliction of PRT activities |
| CJ9 section                                          | • Develop mid-term projects  
• Run QIPs  
• Harmonize CIMIC activities, military Lines of Operations and the PRT activities                                                                   |

Table 1. PRT Key Leader Responsibilities.

PRT Structure

The structure of a PRT will be a composite of military and civilian elements. Decisions on the size and nature of each PRT will be a matter primarily for the country providing the core of the PRT (the lead nation) in coordination with contributing states (partner nations) and organisations. Factors within the Province/s such as: the security situation, the effectiveness of governance institutions, the status of reconstruction and development, the presence of other IOs and agencies will all play a role in defining the specific manpower and functional expertise required of each PRT. PRT organisational structure should be based on unity of effort, clear co-ordination and good communications.
PRT Functional Areas

Security Element. Each PRT is responsible for provision of a level of security appropriate to the local security situation. In broad terms three elements are required: compound security, force protection escorts (drivers and escorts for Command Group, advisors, administration etc), and a small tactical reserve or Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Best practice would suggest that the compound security force should be a combination of ISAF military personnel and Local Nationals. Employment of the latter, if sourced from the immediate local population, contributes to the overall level of force protection, enables military personnel to be released for more demanding tasks, benefits the local economy and acts as another method by which the PRT can engage positively with the local population. However, PRTs need to consider the source of such manpower carefully. PRTs should avoid using manpower from local power brokers (LPBs), since the PRT will compromise its position, and make it harder to negotiate with the LPBs.

Mobile/Military Patrolling/Observer Capability. A vital military element of any PRT is its mobile patrolling, observing and communicating capability (connecting with the Afghan people), without which the PRT has limited ability to effectively facilitate the extension of GIRoA authority into its AOO and its situational awareness is totally impaired. Mobile teams – which are typically called Military Observation Teams (MOTs) or Military Liaison and Observation Teams (MLOTs) – are an operationally effective and cost-efficient way to make best use of a PRT's limited resources. The PRT's capacity to interact with the local population throughout the province(s) and disseminate information, conduct mediation, and identify needs and priorities is crucial. Influencing local leaders to follow a pro-GIRoA agenda, spreading news and generally connecting the people with their government has a powerful message that the PRT must achieve.

Essential characteristics of the mobile teams are:

10 Partner Nations are responsible for all contractual arrangements.
• Sufficient in number to provide an effective footprint throughout the PRT's AOO\textsuperscript{11}.

• Allocated a discrete AOO within the PRT's AOO, in order to establish an effective presence, develop the all-important trust with district officials and populations, and maintain continuity of knowledge/expertise.

• Manned\textsuperscript{12}, equipped\textsuperscript{13} and trained to undertake long range patrols, using all available methods of insertion/extraction\textsuperscript{14}, typically for up to 10 days duration.

• Conduct operations in such a manner that optimises direct, regular and positive interaction with local authorities and populations.

\textit{J1/J4 (Personnel and Logistics) Capability.}

• Personnel manning and casualty reporting.

• Monitoring completion of International Evaluation Reports (IER).

• Planning, coordination and management of external official visitors.

• Planning, coordination and management of all appropriate logistic support.

• Monitoring local logistic support contracts.

• Recruiting, vetting, coordinating and managing local interpreters\textsuperscript{15}.

\textsuperscript{11} Operational effectiveness can be considerably enhanced by the temporary deployment of mobile teams to satellite PRT locations (safehouses). In the latter scenario, consideration should be given to establishing a Provincial Office (PO) team (led by an OF3), collocated at a safehouse in the Provincial capital. The PO team is responsible for liaison with provincial authorities/councils, thereby enabling collocated mobile teams to concentrate effort within their own allocated districts. A PO team would provide the additional personnel (eg., chefs) for the safehouse.

\textsuperscript{12} For example a typical team might consist of: Commander (OF2), 2IC (OF1), Combat Medic, Signaller, 2 x Drivers.

\textsuperscript{13} Ideally, PO and mobile teams should be equipped with 2 x civilianised 4x4 vehicles capable of operating in the AFG terrain and climate

\textsuperscript{14} For example: vehicle, helicopter, animal (horse, donkey) or foot, or any combination of these methods, in order to optimise ISAF's reach and facilitate the connection of all Afghans to provincial and central GIRoA authorities.

\textsuperscript{15} Use of LNs, resident in the PRT AOO, is very strongly recommended. Apart from their interpreter role, they also act as a considerable knowledge base, improving situational awareness by bringing clarity to understanding the complexities of the AOO, and for providing an Afghan insight/perspective on PRT activity and local perceptions.
**J2 (Intelligence) Capability.**

- Planning, coordination, analysis, assessment and timely dissemination (both to PRT J3/J5 and to higher headquarters) of information from diverse sources\(^\text{16}\).
- Intelligence fusion.
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
- Counter Intelligence (CI).
- Conduct intelligence preparation of a province, to include tribal mapping, demographic, influence mapping (LPBs, warlords, etc), historical influences, terrain mapping and more.

**J3/J5 (Operations and Planning) Capability**

- Plan, coordinate and execute the full range of operations in order to achieve the PRT mission, objectives and joint effects.
- Plan operational activities such as patrols so that they are integrated if suitable with political and development activities as well as CJPOTF activities under one umbrella. This does not necessarily mean to build a convoy of 6 to 10 or more vehicles.
- Ability to routinely man an Operations Room 24/7.
- TACP and FAC capability.
- Psychological Operations (PsyOps) capability.
- Media Operations/Public Information Operations (Media Ops/PIO) capability.
- Provide manpower and expertise to a Joint Provincial Coordination Centre (JPCC).

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\(^{16}\) Sources are likely to be very diverse and may include: International Military (ISAF/RCs/SOF); international civilians (UNAMA/IOs/NGOs); PN assets; ANSF, local national employees, civil society engagements (tribal elders, religious leaders), “walk-ins”, etc.
**J6 (Communications) Capability**

- PRT Lead Nation is responsible for the provision, operation, maintenance and security of all CIS capability internal to the PRT.
- Ability to operate, maintain and secure CIS capability provided by HQ ISAF, as directed.
- Ability to routinely support an Operations Room 24/7.

**J8 (Contracts/Financial) Capability**

- Conduct contract negotiation for PRT support requirements.
- Authority to sign local contracts.
- Ability to monitor effectiveness of local contracts.

**J9 (CIMIC/Civil Affairs) Capability.**

- Ability to plan and coordinate CIMIC activity, in accordance with direction from the PRT Integrated Command Group, to assist achievement of PRT mission, objectives and joint effects.
- Coordinate disaster relief/humanitarian aid when PRTs are needed as a last “in extremis” resort for HA – the first being the GIRoA and the second being UNAMA.
- Project management development interventions to increase stability, including QIP.
- Support development officer(s).

**Medical**

- PRTs maintain a minimum of a Role 1 Medical Treatment Facility.
- Forward Support Bases have a minimum of a Role 2 Medical Treatment Facility.
- FSBs will utilise NATO rotary and fixed wing assets to extract casualties from PRTs and, if necessary, transport them to theatre Role 3 facilities.
Integration of PRT Partner Nation (PN) Civilian Staff. Other nations, in particular the U.S., may provide additional civilian expertise\textsuperscript{17} to PRTs. These advisors bring considerable benefits to a PRT and should be fully integrated. These benefits include:

- Additional civilian expertise.
- Access to additional information.
- Increased reporting capability.
- Access to alternative/additional reconstruction and development resources.
- Improved liaison with ANP Mentors, ANA and associated training teams (OMLTs and ETTs), and Poppy Elimination Programme (PEP) Teams.
- Continuity (civilian personnel are generally deployed for 12 months or longer).
- Unity of effort.

Ensuring PRT Coherence

Given the large number of PRTs led by different nations, it is more important than ever to have unity of effort. HQ ISAF has a variety of tools at its disposal to maximize the degree of coherence among PRTs:

- **The ISAF PRT Handbook**: The PRT Handbook is probably the single most important element of PRT coherence. It provides clear guidance on the PRT concept and how a PRT should be structured and managed.

- **NATO School ISAF PRT Predeployment Course**: Following a successful pilot course in September 2006, the NATO School in Oberammergau has begun conducting a five-day ISAF PRT pre-deployment course four times a year for those who will occupy key positions within a PRT (i.e., PRT commander, political officer, development officer, police advisor), with approximately 50 students per class. The goal is to offer standardized pre-deployment training so that all key PRT leaders

\textsuperscript{17} For example, United States Government can provide representatives from the Department of State (DoS), US Agency for International Development (USAID) and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) who are involved in the delivery of National level programmes.
have a common frame of reference before arriving in Afghanistan and deploying to their individual PRTs.

- **ISAF PRT Key Leader Theater Orientation Course**: This course is designed to ensure that all newly arrived PRT commanders, political officers, development advisors and other key PRT staff are familiar with the PRT Handbook and understand the role of PRTs as fully integrated civil-military units. Even for PRTers who did a lot of pre-deployment training and preparation and understand the role of PRTs, the course is invaluable in familiarizing them with ISAF HQ and the current operational and intelligence picture. This course is usually immediately before or after an ISAF PRT Conference.

- **Quarterly ISAF PRT Conferences**: HQ ISAF calls in PRT key leaders (PRT commander, political officer, development officer, police advisor) once per quarter for a two-day conference in Kabul. This gives COMISAF and other key HQ staff an opportunity to speak directly to all the PRTers as a group and provide guidance. In turn, the PRTers have the opportunity to share best practices and their perspectives from the field. The conference, which is a mix of briefings, panel discussions and breakout groups, also offers networking opportunities and provides a brief respite from the tactical operations.

- **PRT Engagement Teams (PETs)**: The ISAF CJ9 PETs, each of which consists of one or two military officers, a development advisor and a political officer, conduct a continuous round of visits to PRTs to share PRT best practices and to offer assistance in resolving Kabul-based problems, as well as gathering updated information directly from the PRT. The goal is to visit every PRT at least one every six months, if not more often. Each PET has to have at its disposal the PDPs from its AOR provinces as a reference document.

- **NATO/ISAF PRT Weekly**: This is a joint publication of the ISAF POLAD and PRT Offices, which was established in cooperation with the NATO SCR. It gives political advisors/officers serving at ISAF PRTs the opportunity to freely share their reporting and analysis directly with ISAF HQ and each other. The Weekly, which is published every Monday, is forwarded by the SCR to NATO HQ in Brussels so that the NATO PermReps have the benefit of reading it before the weekly North Atlantic
Council (NAC) meeting on Wednesdays. In addition, it reaches the capitals of all 37 contributing nations, as well as readers in JFC Brunssum and SHAPE.

- Reporting as a PRT: The reporting from PRTs to ISAF HQ CJ9, through the chain of command, should focus as much as possible on combined civilian and military CIMIC, governance, and Reconstruction & Development activities. In order to achieve coherence, situational awareness, information sharing, and obtain more complete knowledge about the work being conducted by the PRTs, it is of great importance that the ISAF CJ-9 branch receives regular, holistic reports about planned and ongoing activities in the AOO. Therefore, the ideal is for this reporting to be a joint CIMIC, POLAD and DEVAD effort. ISAF CJ-9 is responsible for providing information and briefings to COMISAF, NATO HQ, UNAMA and other stakeholders. The quality of the information received from the PRTs is decisive for the quality of the reporting and information the ISAF CJ-9 PRT Section can provide to them.

- Reporting Channels. In the first instance, the easiest way for the CIMIC and civilian officers to combine their reporting is for the civilians to provide direct input into the weekly CIMIC reports that the civil-military officers are required to provide to ISAF. This will give ISAF HQ a far more complete picture of the governance and R&D picture in each province, rather than a strictly military point of view. POLADs and DEVADs are also encouraged to share their reporting for their national capitals with other offices across their PRTs as appropriate. Especially at multinational PRTs, this horizontal information sharing can be of critical importance in avoiding national (or civilian vs. military) stovepipes and ensuring unity of effort.

As there are no standard systems of communications networks implemented in all PRTs except for unclassified Internet access, another reporting opportunity to share information on governance efforts, capacity building, and R&D projects with ISAF is via internet submissions to CJ-9. This is also in accordance with Annex W (the Civil-Military Affairs portion) to ISAF OPLAN 38392 Chapter 3 A\(^\text{18}\): “The use of restricted

\(^{18}\) Transparency: ISAF effects must be transparent in order to develop the mutual trust and confidence of all the actors. Failure to deliver this will lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Transparency remains therefore vital if ISAF is to instill trust, increase confidence and encourage mutual understanding of its actions

UNCLASSIFIED
and classified information should be limited to information that might endanger human lives or compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organisations working in the AO.” The reports from the PRTs should contain relevant information about ongoing and planned projects, including pictures, to facilitate the CJ9 PRT office to promote the ‘best practices’ and sharing this information and knowledge with other PRTs, IOs, NGOs and other relevant entities, as appropriate. The basis for this effort could start with the NATO-ISAF PRT Weekly submissions that PRT POLADS and/or DEVADs already provide, adding more detailed information that can highlight the work you are doing. This will help the ISAF CJ-9 PRT Section better tell your story. These reports can be sent to the ISAF CJ-9 PRT Engagement Team Officers for each of the Regional Commands, cc’ing your RCs’ J-9 or G-9 sections.

PRTs should also feel free to post information about governance and R&D capacity building and other projects on their own ISAF Wise Web home pages under their respective Regional Commands. Broader information sharing benefits everyone.
ANNEX A: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1817 and PRIOR—ISAF and UNAMA MANDATES
Resolution 1817 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5907th meeting, on 11 June 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1659 (2006), 1776 (2007) and 1806 (2008), and the statement of its President on 17 June 2003 (S/PRST/2003/7),

Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1735 (2006), and reiterating its support for international efforts to combat terrorism in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations,

Noting with concern the existing links between international security, terrorism and transnational organized crime, money-laundering, trafficking in illicit drugs and illegal arms, and in this regard emphasizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge,

Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the continued violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between illicit drugs trafficking and terrorism, and Calling upon the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan in the fight against narcotic drugs and also welcoming the efforts of neighbouring countries to
within the United Nations system on international drug control issues, and welcoming its intention to consider the issue of precursors control as one of the central questions to be discussed during the high-level segment of the fifty-second session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,

Acknowledging the mandate and the leading role played by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), as an independent treaty body, in the implementation of the United Nations international drug control conventions and the international control of precursors,

Stressing the central role played by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in assisting Member States, notably by providing technical assistance, in the fight against illicit drugs,

1. Expresses utmost concern at the high level of opium cultivation, production and trafficking, which involves in particular the diversion of chemical precursors, and stresses once again the serious harm that it causes to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, and to the success of the international efforts;

2. Calls upon all Member States to increase international and regional cooperation in order to counter the illicit production and trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan, including by strengthening the monitoring of the international trade in chemical precursors, notably but not limited to acetic anhydride, and to prevent attempts to divert the substances from licit international trade for illicit use in Afghanistan;

3. Invites all Member States, in particular chemical precursors producing countries, Afghanistan, neighbouring countries, and all countries on the trafficking routes to increase their cooperation with the INCB, notably by fully complying with the provisions of article 12 of United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, in order to eliminate loopholes utilized by criminal organizations to divert chemical precursors from licit international trade;

4. Urges exporting States to ensure the systematic notification of all exports of relevant chemical precursors, upon request from importing States, in accordance with provisions of the 1988 Convention, and encourages importing States to request the systematic notification of such exports, also urges the Governments that have not yet done so to register with and utilize the online system for the exchange of pre-export notifications (PEN Online);

5. Calls upon States that have not done so to consider ratifying or acceding to, and State parties to implement fully the multilateral treaties whose aim is to fight against the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, notably the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol of 25 March 1972 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, underlines the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully, and stresses that nothing in this resolution will impose on State parties new obligations with regard to these treaties;

6. Expresses its continued support to the commitment and efforts of Afghanistan to achieve a sustained and significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to complete elimination, Expresses also its

13. Encourages Member States to submit to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) for inclusion on the Consolidated List names of individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, using proceeds derived from the illicit cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotic drugs produced in Afghanistan and their precursors, in order to give full effect to the relevant provisions of resolution 1735 (2006);

14. Requests the Secretary-General to include, as appropriate, in his regular reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation in Afghanistan, in close consultation with UNODC and INCB, observations and recommendations on the fight against drug production and trafficking, notably on the issue of the illicit traffic of chemical precursors to and within Afghanistan;

15. Invites the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to consider, in accordance with its mandate, ways to strengthen regional and international cooperation to prevent the diversion and smuggling of chemical precursors to and within Afghanistan, and further opportunities for Member States to support the Afghan Government in developing capacities to tackle precursors and trafficking;

16. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Resolution 1806 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5857th meeting, on 20 March 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 1746 (2007) extending through 23 March 2008 the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as established by resolution 1652 (2006), and recalling also its resolution 1659 (2006) endorsing the Afghanistan Compact,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations,

Reaffirming in this context its support for the implementation, under the ownership of the Afghan people, of the Afghanistan Compact, of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and noting that sustained and coordinated efforts by all relevant actors are required to consolidate progress made towards their implementation and to overcome continuing challenges,

Recalling that the Afghanistan Compact is based on a partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community, based on the desire of the parties for Afghanistan to progressively assume responsibility for its own development and security, and with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations,

Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community, including, jointly with the Government of Afghanistan, the coordination and monitoring of efforts in implementing the Afghanistan Compact, and expressing its appreciation and strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Afghanistan and the women and men of UNAMA,

Recognising once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and
development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges through a comprehensive approach,

Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach in addressing the challenges in Afghanistan and noting, in this context, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and stressing the need for strengthened cooperation, coordination and mutual support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities,

Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the increasingly strong links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, including children, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel,

Stressing the importance of ensuring safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers, including United Nations staff and associated personnel,

Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups on the capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of law, to provide security and basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the improvement and protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Recalling the importance of the Kabul Declaration of 22 December 2002 on Good-Neighbourly Relations (Kabul Declaration) (S/2002/1416), looking forward to the Third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Islamabad, and stressing the crucial importance of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan,

Welcoming the holding of the Afghan-Pakistani Peace Jirga in Kabul on August 2007 and the collective determination expressed at the Jirga to bring sustainable peace to the region, including by addressing the terrorist threat, and expressing its support for the relevant follow-up processes,


1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 6 March 2008 (S/2008/159);
2. Expresses its appreciation for the United Nations long-term commitment to work with the Government and the people of Afghanistan;
3. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMA, as defined in its resolutions 1662 (2006) and 1746 (2007), until 23 March 2009;
4. Decides further that UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, within their mandate and guided by the principle of reinforcing
Afghan ownership and leadership, will lead the international civilian efforts to, inter alia:

(a) promote, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government and the adherence to the principles of aid effectiveness enumerated in the Afghanistan Compact, including through mobilization of resources, coordination of the assistance provided by international donors and organizations, and direction of the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in particular for counter-narcotics, reconstruction and development activities;

(b) strengthen the cooperation with ISAF at all levels and throughout the country, in accordance with their existing mandates, in order to improve civilian-military coordination, to facilitate the timely exchange of information and to ensure coherence between the activities of national and international security forces and of civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams and engagement with non-governmental organizations;

(c) through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country, provide political outreach, promote at the local level the implementation of the Compact, of the ANDS and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and facilitate inclusion in and understanding of the Government's policies;

(d) provide good offices to support, if requested by the Afghan Government, the implementation of Afghan-led reconciliation programmes, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and with full respect of the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1267 (1999) and other relevant resolutions of the Council;

(e) support efforts, including through the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption, in particular at subnational level, and to promote development initiatives at the local level with a view to helping bring the benefits of peace and deliver services in a timely and sustainable manner;

(f) play a central coordinating role to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and with a view to building the capacity of the Afghan Government, including by providing effective support to national and local authorities in assisting and protecting internally displaced persons and to creating conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

(g) continue, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to cooperate with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to cooperate also with relevant international and local non-governmental organizations, to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a state party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights;

(h) support, at the request of the Afghan authorities, the electoral process, in particular through the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (AIEC), by
providing technical assistance, coordinating other international donors, agencies and organizations providing assistance and channeling existing and additional funds earmarked to support the process;

(i) support regional cooperation to work towards a stable and prosperous Afghanistan;

5. *Calls upon* all Afghan and international parties to coordinate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and in efforts to promote the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country;

6. *Stresses* the importance of strengthening and expanding the presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the provinces, and *encourages* the Secretary-General to pursue current efforts to finalize the necessary arrangements to address the security issues associated with such strengthening and expansion;

7. *Calls* on the Afghan Government, and the international community and international organizations, to implement the Afghanistan Compact and its annexes in full, and *stresses* in this context the importance of meeting the benchmarks and timelines of the Compact for progress on security, governance, rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics;

8. *Reaffirms* the central role played by the JCMB in coordinating, facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the Compact, *stresses* the need to strengthen its authority and capacity to, inter alia, measure progress towards the benchmarks outlined in the Afghanistan Compact and facilitate the coordination of international assistance in support of the ANDS, and *calls upon* all relevant actors to cooperate with the JCMB in this regard, including by reporting assistance programmes to the Afghan Government’s aid coordination unit and to the JCMB;

9. *Welcomes* the progress made by the Afghan Government in the finalization of the ANDS, *looks forward* to its launch, and *stresses* the importance, in this context, of adequate resource mobilization, including through the fulfillment of the pledges made at the London Conference, possible new pledges and increased assistance to the core budget;

10. *Notes* with interest the intention, expressed by JCMB members at the Political Directors Meeting on Afghanistan held in Tokyo on 5 February 2008, to prepare an international conference to review progress on the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact; *welcomes* the offer of France to host such conference in Paris in June 2008, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on its outcome and to include in this report, if necessary, further recommendations concerning UNAMA’s mandate;

11. *Calls upon* the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade;
12. **Condemns** in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, and **condemns further** the use by the Taliban and other extremist groups of civilians as human shields;

13. **Reiterates** its concern about all civilian casualties, **calls for compliance** with international humanitarian and human rights law and for all appropriate steps to be taken to ensure the protection of civilians, and **recognizes in this context the robust efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimize the risk of civilian casualties, notably the continuous review of tactics and procedures and the conduct of after-action reviews in cooperation with the Afghan Government in cases where civilian casualties have reportedly occurred**;

14. **Expresses its strong concern** about the recruitment and use of children by Taliban forces in Afghanistan as well as the killing and maiming of children as a result of the conflict, **reiterates its strong condemnation** of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and all other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict, and **stresses the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1822 (2008)**; in this context, **requests the Secretary-General to strengthen the child protection component of UNAMA, in particular through the appointment of child protection advisers**;

15. **Stresses** the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector through training, mentoring and empowerment efforts, in order to accelerate progress towards the goal of self-sufficient and ethically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country;

16. **Welcomes** in this context the continued progress in the development of the Afghan National Army and its improved ability to plan and undertake operations, and **encourages** sustained training efforts, including through the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), and advice in developing a sustainable defence planning process as well as assistance in defence reform initiatives;

17. **Calls for** further efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Afghan National Police in order to reinforce the authority of the Afghan Government throughout the country, **welcomes the increasing role played by the International Police Coordination Board in policy setting and coordination, and stresses the importance, in this context, of the contribution of the European Union through its police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan)**;

18. **Calls for** further progress in the implementation by the Afghan Government, with support from the international community, of the programme of disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG);

19. **Expresses its concern** at the serious harm that increasing opium cultivation, production and trafficking causes to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally; **calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to accelerate the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy as discussed at the JCMB meeting held in Tokyo in February 2008, in particular at the local level, and to mainstream counter-narcotics throughout national programmes, encourages**
additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy, including through contributions to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund;

20. **Calls upon** States to strengthen international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the illicit production and trafficking of drugs originated in Afghanistan, including through border management cooperation in drug control and cooperation for the fight against the illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors and against money-laundering linked to such trafficking, taking into account the outcome of the Second Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan organized by the Government of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime held in Moscow from 26 to 28 June 2006 (S/2006/598), within the framework of the Paris Pact initiative;

21. **Welcomes** the adoption by the Afghan authorities, in accordance with the outcome of the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, of the National Justice Programme launched at the JCMB meeting held in Tokyo in February 2008, and **stresses** the importance of its full and timely implementation by all the relevant actors in order to accelerate the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, strengthen the rule of law throughout the country and eliminate impunity;

22. **Stresses** in this context the importance of further progress in the reconstruction and reform of the prison sector in Afghanistan, in order to improve the respect for the rule of law and human rights therein;

23. **Notes with concern** the effects of widespread corruption on security, good governance, counter-narcotics efforts and economic development, and **calls on** the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to vigorously lead the fight against corruption and to enhance its efforts to establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration;

24. **Encourages** all Afghan institutions, including the executive and legislative branches, to work in a spirit of cooperation, **calls on** the Afghan Government to pursue continued legislative and public administration reform in order to ensure good governance, full representation and accountability at both national and subnational levels, **stresses** the need for further international efforts to provide technical assistance in this area, and **recalls** the role of the Senior Appointments Panel in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact;

25. **Encourages** the international community to assist the Government of Afghanistan in making capacity-building and human resources development a cross-cutting priority;

26. **Notes** the leading role that the Afghan institutions will play in the organization of the next elections, **encourages** the Afghan Government, with support from the international community, to accelerate the planning and preparation of such elections, **stresses the need** to establish a permanent Civil Voter Registry (CVR) in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact, and **emphasizes** the importance of free, fair, inclusive and transparent elections in order to sustain the democratic progress of the country;

27. **Calls for** full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law throughout Afghanistan, **notes with concern** the
increasing restrictions on freedom of media, commends the AIHRC for its courageous efforts to monitor respect for human rights in Afghanistan as well as to foster and protect these rights and to promote the emergence of a pluralistic civil society, and stresses the importance of full cooperation with the AIHRC by all relevant actors;

28. Recognizes the significant progress achieved on gender equality in Afghanistan in recent years, strongly condemns continuing forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls, stresses the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and requests the Secretary-General to continue to include in its reports to the Security Council relevant information on the process of integration of women into the political, economic and social life of Afghanistan;

29. Calls for enhanced efforts to ensure the full implementation of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in accordance with the Afghan Compact, without prejudice to the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 and other relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

30. Welcomes the cooperation of the Afghan Government and UNAMA with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) with the implementation of resolution 1735 (2006), including by identifying individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban using proceeds derived from illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors, and encourages the continuation of such cooperation;

31. Welcomes ongoing efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and its neighbouring and regional partners to foster trust and cooperation with each other, including recent cooperation initiatives developed by regional organizations, and stresses the importance of increasing cooperation between Afghanistan and the partners against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, in promoting peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and in fostering cooperation in the economic and development sectors as a means to achieve the full integration of Afghanistan into regional dynamics and the global economy;

32. Calls for strengthening the process of regional economic cooperation, including measures to facilitate regional trade, to increase foreign investments and to develop infrastructure, noting Afghanistan's historic role as a land bridge in Asia;

33. Recognizes the importance of voluntary, safe, orderly return and sustainable reintegration of the remaining Afghan refugees for the stability of the country and the region, and calls for continued and enhanced international assistance in this regard;

34. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every six months on developments in Afghanistan, in addition to the report requested in paragraph 10 of this resolution;

35. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Resolution 1776 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5744th meeting, on 19 September 2007

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003), 1707 (2006) and 1746 (2007),

Reaffirming also its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and reiterating its support for international efforts to root out terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,


Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghan Authorities and welcoming the cooperation of the Afghan Government with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),

Recognizing the multifaceted and interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges in a coherent manner through the comprehensive framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact,

Stressing the central role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan, noting, in the context of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and of ISAF, and stressing the need for further sustained cooperation, coordination and mutual support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities,

Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between...
terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel.

Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and other extremist groups on the capacity of the Afghan Government to guarantee the rule of law, to provide basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Reiterating its support for the continuing endeavours by the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition, to improve the security situation and to continue to address the threat posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, and stressing in this context the need for sustained international efforts, including those of ISAF and the OEF coalition,

Condemning in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces and their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, and condemning further the use by the Taliban and other extremist groups of civilians as human shields,
Expressing its appreciation for the leadership provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and for the contributions of many nations to ISAF and to the OEF coalition, including its maritime interdiction component,

Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of ISAF, in coordination with the Afghan Government,

Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force, as defined in resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 2007;

2. Authorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;

3. Recognizes the need to further strengthen ISAF to meet all its operational requirements, and in this regard calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to ISAF, and to make contributions to the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 1386 (2001);

4. Stresses the importance of increasing the effective functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector in order to provide long-term solutions to security in Afghanistan, and encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police;

5. Calls upon ISAF to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Government and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the OEF coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;

6. Requests the leadership of ISAF to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its mandate, including through the provision of quarterly reports;

7. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.
Resolution 1746 (2007)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5645th meeting on
23 March 2007

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolution 1662 (2006) extending through 23 March 2007 the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as laid out in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 March 2006 (S/2006/145), and its resolution 1659 (2006) endorsing the Afghanistan Compact, and recalling also the report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 2006 (S/2006/935),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations,

Reaffirming in this context its support for the implementation, under the ownership of the Afghan people, of the Afghanistan Compact, of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and noting that sustained efforts by all relevant actors are required to consolidate progress made towards their implementation and to overcome current challenges,

Recalling that the Afghanistan Compact is based on a partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community, with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations,

Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges in a coherent manner through the comprehensive framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact,

Noting, in the context of a comprehensive approach, the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
and stressing the need for continued cooperation and coordination, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities.

Reiterating its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activities by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, and the links between terrorism activities and illicit drugs, resulting in threats to the local population, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel, and stressing the importance of the security and safety of the United Nations and associated personnel.

Expressing also its concern over the harmful consequences of the insurgency on the capacity of the Afghan Government to provide security and basic services to the Afghan people, and to ensure the full enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Recalling the importance of the Kabul Declaration of 22 December 2002 on Good-Neighbourly Relations (Kabul Declaration) (S/2002/1416), welcoming the New Delhi Declaration adopted at the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan on 19 November 2006, looking forward to the Third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan in 2007, and stressing the crucial importance to all parties of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan,


Stressing the central and impartial role that the United Nations continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community, including, jointly with the Government of Afghanistan, the coordination and monitoring of efforts in implementing the Afghanistan Compact, and expressing its appreciation and strong support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Afghanistan and the women and men of UNAMA,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 15 March 2007 (S/2007/152);

2. Expresses its appreciation for the United Nations long-term commitment to work with the Government and the people of Afghanistan;

3. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMA, as established by resolution 1662 (2006), until 23 March 2008;

4. Stresses the role of UNAMA to promote a more coherent international engagement in support of Afghanistan, to extend its good offices through outreach in Afghanistan, to support regional cooperation in the context of the Afghanistan Compact, to promote humanitarian coordination and to continue to contribute to human rights protection and promotion, including monitoring of the situation of civilians in armed conflict;

5. Welcomes UNAMA’s expanded presence in the provinces, through regional and provincial offices, which support efforts at the central level to
coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and assist the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners in improving the delivery of services to Afghan citizens throughout the country; and encourages further progress in this regard, including in the southern and eastern provinces, security circumstances permitting;

6. Reiterates its call on the Afghan Government, and on all members of the international community and international organizations, to implement the Afghanistan Compact and its annexes in full;

7. Emphasizes the importance of meeting the benchmarks and timelines of the Compact for the progress on security, governance and development as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics and of increasing the effectiveness and coordination of the assistance to Afghanistan;

8. Acknowledges the central role played by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board in facilitating and monitoring the implementation of the Compact, stresses the role of the JCMB to support Afghanistan by, inter alia, coordinating international assistance and reconstruction programmes, encourages efforts to strengthen the JCMB Secretariat, welcomes the results of the JCMB meeting at senior officials level held in Berlin on 30 and 31 January 2007, and encourages further efforts to provide appropriate high level political guidance and promote a more coherent international engagement;

9. Calls on all Afghan parties and groups to engage constructively in an inclusive political dialogue, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and Afghan-led reconciliation programmes, and in the social development of the country, and stresses the importance of these factors to enhance security and stability;

10. Stresses the need for further progress on security sector reform, inter alia in order to advance towards the goal of ethnically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country, welcomes in this regard the ongoing efforts to increase functionality, professionalism and accountability of the security sector, including the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, including the recent proposed contributions by the United States and other partners, and calls for proper monitoring of the deployment of the Auxiliary Police to ensure its accountability to central authorities;

11. Welcomes the decision by the European Union to establish a mission in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law and counter narcotics, to assist and enhance current efforts in the area of police reform at central and provincial levels, and looks forward to the early launch of the mission;

12. Welcomes the successful conclusion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process started in October 2003, as well as the launch of the programme of disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG) and the commitments made in this regard at the Second Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan on 5 July 2006, calls for determined efforts by the Afghan Government to pursue at all levels the timely implementation of the programme throughout the country, including through the implementation of the newly adopted Action Plan, and requests the international community to extend further assistance to these efforts, taking fully into account the guidance by UNAMA.
13. \textit{Stresses} the need for accelerated progress in the implementation of the 10-year strategy for justice reform in the framework of the Afghanistan Compact, including through a definition of responsibilities and provision of adequate resources, \textit{invites} the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to continue to work towards the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, including the reconstruction and reform of the correctional system, in order to strengthen the rule of law throughout the country and eliminate impunity, and \textit{takes note} with interest of the initiative to organize in Rome a Conference on Rule of Law in Afghanistan to enhance Afghan and international commitment to justice sector reform; 

14. \textit{Welcomes} the continued efforts by the Afghan authorities to promote legislative reform, and stresses the importance of international support for capacity-building in such reform and its implementation; 

15. \textit{Welcomes} the establishment of the provincial councils in accordance with the Afghan Constitution, \textit{encourages} all institutions to work in a spirit of cooperation, \textit{calls on} the Afghan Government to pursue continued public administrative reform in order to ensure good governance, full representation and accountability at both national and local levels, and \textit{stresses} the need for further international efforts to provide technical assistance in this regard, particularly at the local level;

16. \textit{Calls upon} the Afghan Government, with support from the international community, to begin planning and preparation for Afghanistan’s next election cycle, including the establishment of a permanent Civil Voter Registry (CVR) as called for in the Afghanistan Compact, the passage and implementation of an updated Election Law, and financial and political support for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to ensure that it possesses the resources needed, and to ensure that Afghanistan is set on the path to the creation of affordable and sustainable systems that will contribute to fair, fair and transparent elections;

17. \textit{Notes with concern} the effects of widespread corruption on security, good governance and counter-narcotics efforts, and \textit{calls on} the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to vigorously lead the fight against corruption and to sustain its efforts to establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration, and \textit{welcomes} recent steps by the Afghan Government in this regard;

18. \textit{Calls for} full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law throughout Afghanistan, \textit{requests} UNAMA, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to continue to assist in the full implementation of the human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a state party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights, \textit{commends} the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission for its courageous efforts to monitor respect for human rights in Afghanistan as well as to foster and protect these rights;

19. \textit{Stresses} the importance of the ongoing process of national reconciliation undertaken by the Government of Afghanistan and \textit{encourages} the full and timely implementation, with international support, of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in accordance with the Afghanistan Compact, without prejudice to the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution

20. Welcomes the cooperation of the Afghan Government and UNAMA with the Security Council’s Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) with the implementation of resolution 1735 (2006), and encourages the continuation of such cooperation;

21. Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the ANDS, stresses the need for continued leadership by the Afghan Government in its implementation, and encourages the participants at the Loudou Conference to continue to fulfil and consider increasing their pledges, including financial assistance for the implementation of the Strategy;

22. Expresses its concern at the serious harm that increasing opium cultivation, production and trafficking causes to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally; calls on the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, to pursue effective implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy; and encourages additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy, including through contributions to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund and continued regional cooperation for the fight against the illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors and against money-laundering linked to such trafficking;

23. Welcomes the outcome of the Second Ministerial Conference on Drug Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan organized by the Government of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime held in Moscow from 26 to 28 June 2006 (S/2006/598), within the framework of the Paris Pact Initiative, and calls upon States to strengthen international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the illicit production and trafficking of drugs originated in Afghanistan;

24. Calls upon all Afghan and international parties to continue to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and in efforts to promote the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country;

25. Calls upon the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, other extremist groups and criminal activities, welcomes the completion of ISAF's expansion throughout Afghanistan and calls upon all parties to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and to ensure the protection of civilian life;

26. Welcomes the ongoing efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and its neighbouring and regional partners to foster trust and cooperation with each other, stresses the importance of increasing cooperation between Afghanistan and the partners against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, in promoting peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and in fostering cooperation in the economic and development sectors as a means to achieve the full integration of Afghanistan into regional dynamics and the global economy, and further welcomes progress in this regard;
27. Recognizes the importance of voluntary, safe, orderly return and sustainable reintegration of the remaining Afghan refugees for the stability of the country and the region, and calls for continued and enhanced international assistance in this regard;

28. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every six months on developments in Afghanistan;

29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Resolution 1707 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5521st meeting, on 12 September 2006

The Security Council,


Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming also its resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 and reiterating its support for international efforts to root out terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves and welcoming the cooperation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),

Recognizing once again the interconnected nature of the challenges in Afghanistan, reaffirming that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as on the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics, is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community to address these challenges,

Stressing, in this regard, the importance of the Afghanistan Compact and its annexes, launched at the London Conference, which provide the framework for the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community,
Expressing its concern about the security situation in Afghanistan, in particular the increased violent and terrorist activity by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, illegally armed groups and those involved in the narcotics trade, which has resulted in increased Afghan civilian casualties,

Reiterating its call on all Afghan parties and groups to engage constructively in the peaceful political development of the country and to avoid resorting to violence including through the use of illegal armed groups,

Stressing, in this context, the importance of the security sector reform including further strengthening of the Afghan National Army and Police, disbandment of illegal armed groups, justice sector reform and counter-narcotics,

Expressing, in this context, its support for the Afghan Security Forces, with the assistance of ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition in contributing to security in Afghanistan and in building the capacity of the Afghan Security Forces, and welcoming the extension of ISAF into Southern Afghanistan, with effect from 31 July 2006, the planned further ISAF expansion into Eastern Afghanistan and the increased coordination between ISAF and the OEF coalition,

Expressing its appreciation to the United Kingdom for taking over the lead from Italy in commanding ISAF, and recognizing with gratitude the contributions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and many nations to ISAF,

Determining that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of ISAF, in consultation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1 Decides to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 2005;

2 Authorizes the Member States participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;

3 Recognizes the need to further strengthen ISAF, and in this regard calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to ISAF, and to make contributions to the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution 1386 (2001);

4 Calls upon ISAF to continue to work in close consultation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the OEF coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;

5 Requests the leadership of ISAF to provide quarterly reports on implementation of its mandate to the Security Council through the Secretary-General;

6 Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.
Resolution 1659 (2006)

 Adopted by the Security Council at its 5374th meeting, on
 15 February 2006

 The Security Council,

 Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its
 and 1589 (2005) of 24 March 2005,

 Reaffirming its full commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial
 integrity and national unity of Afghanistan,

 Pledging its continued support for the Government and people of Afghanistan
 as they rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of a constitutional
 democracy and assume their rightful place in the community of nations,

 Stressing the inalienable right of the people of Afghanistan freely to determine
 their own future,

 Determined to assist the Government and people of Afghanistan in building on
 the successful completion of the Bonn Process,

 Recognizing the interconnected nature of the challenges ahead, and affirming
 that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, which
 necessarily involves capacity-building, is mutually reinforcing,

 Recognizing the continuing importance of fighting terrorist and narcotic
 threats and addressing threats posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist
 groups,

 Stressing that regional cooperation constitutes an effective means to promote
 security and development in Afghanistan,

 Welcoming the letter of 6 February 2006 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs
 of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan informing the United Nations Secretary-
 General of the launch in London of the “Afghanistan Compact” on 31 January 2006,

 1. Endorses the “Afghanistan Compact” and its annexes as providing the
 framework for the partnership between the Afghan Government and the
 international community which underlies the mutual commitments set out in the
 Compact;
2. **Calls** on the Afghan Government, and on all members of the international community and international organizations, to implement the Compact and its annexes in full;

3. **Affirms** the central and impartial role of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including coordination of efforts in implementing the Compact; and **looks forward** to the early formation of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the United Nations, and with a secretariat function to support it;

4. **Welcomes** the interim Afghan National Development Strategy (iANDS) presented by the Afghan Government and the political, security and financial pledges made by participants at the London Conference; **notes** that financial assistance available for the implementation of iANDS has now reached $10.5 billion; **further notes** the intention of the Afghan Government to seek debt relief through the Paris Club;

5. **Recognizes** the risk that opium cultivation, production and trafficking poses to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, **welcomes** the updated National Drug Control Strategy presented by the Afghan Government at the London Conference, and **encourages** additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy including through contribution to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund;

6. **Acknowledges** the continuing commitment of NATO to lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and welcomes the adoption by NATO of a revised Operational Plan allowing the continued expansion of the ISAF across Afghanistan, closer operational synergy with the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and support, within means and capabilities, to Afghan security forces in the military aspects of their training and operational deployments;

7. **Declares** its willingness to take further action to support the implementation of the Compact and its annexes, on the basis of timely reports by the Secretary-General which encompass recommendations on the future mandate and structure of UNAMA;

8. **Decides** to remain actively seized of this matter.
ANNEX B: The UNITED NATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Appendix 1 to Annex B - PRT External Engagement UN Country Team

Afghanistan was admitted as a member of the United Nations on 19th November 1946 and its relationship with the UN thus goes back some 60 years. Many of the major UN agencies work in Afghanistan with Afghan counterparts and with national and international NGO partners. All UN programmes recognize the lead role played by the Afghan Government.

ADB – Asia Development Bank

www.adb.org

The work of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is aimed at improving the welfare of the people in Asia and the Pacific, particularly the 1.9 billion who live on less than $2 a day. Despite many success stories, Asia and the Pacific remains home to two thirds of the world’s poor.

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

www.fao.org

The mandate of the FAO in Afghanistan is to support agricultural and environmental rehabilitation and assist the country to become a food secure and self-reliant nation in accordance with the principles of the National Development Framework of the Afghan Government.

UN-HABITAT - United Nations Human Settlements Program

http://www.unhabitat.org/

UN-HABITAT has been working in Afghanistan for the past 15 years and has implemented a wide range of human settlements initiatives, from housing and schools to sanitation projects, from city wide drainage to water supply. The most significant programs implemented during this period included the Resettlements Programme, the
Urban Rehabilitation Programme and the Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment Programme.

ILO - International Labour Organization

www.employmentservices.org.af

The ILO’s mandate in Afghanistan is to help the government create more decent and productive employment opportunities for all, especially for women, persons with disabilities, young people, demobilized soldiers, and returnees.

IOM - International Organization for Migration

www.iom.int

In Afghanistan, IOM focuses on technical cooperation and capacity building of government counterparts throughout all programme areas. IOM’s programmes facilitate return to and within Afghanistan, stabilize communities for sustainable and productive reintegration within the context of a long period of mass population displacement, contribute to reintegration of former combatants, and strengthen the capacity of Afghan government institutions to manage migration.

OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

http://www.ohchr.org

The Office of the HCHR is a department of the United Nations Secretariat mandated with promoting and protecting the enjoyment and full realization, by all people, of all rights established in the Charter of the United Nations and in international human rights laws and treaties.

UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

www.unama-afg.org

UNAMA is a Political Mission, directed and supported by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It has some 1,000 staff, of whom around 80 percent are Afghan nationals. Its main office is in Kabul, with eight regional offices around the country and several sub offices.
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme


UNDP first came to Afghanistan in the 1950s. Since then the organization has been providing development assistance to the country. Another main area of work has been to help build the capacity of many national institutions. In the 1990s UNDP delivered US$200 million worth of assistance to Afghanistan at a time when a civil war and the Taliban regime jeopardized the country and neglected government institutions.

UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme

[www.unep.org](http://www.unep.org)

UNEP addresses environmental issues at the global and regional level with a mandate to coordinate the development of environmental policy consensus by keeping the global environment under review and bringing emerging issues to the attention of governments and the international community for action.

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

[www.unesco.org/afghanistan](http://www.unesco.org/afghanistan)

UNESCO is a laboratory of ideas and a standard-setter in forging universal agreements on emerging ethical issues. In Afghanistan, UNESCO helps in the rehabilitation process by supporting Afghanistan's search for peace, security and development.

UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund

[http://afghanistan.unfpa.org](http://afghanistan.unfpa.org)

The United Nations Population Fund promotes the right of every woman, man and child to enjoy a life of health and equal opportunity. UNFPA supports countries in using population data for policies and programmes to reduce poverty and to ensure that every pregnancy is wanted, every birth is safe, every young person is free of HIV/AIDS, and every girl and woman is treated with dignity and respect.

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees

[www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org)
UNHCR launched a large-scale voluntary return operation in Afghanistan in 2002. UNHCR operates in close coordination with the Ministry of Refugee and Repatriation and helps them build their capacity.

UNICEF · United Nations Children’s Fund

www.unicef.org

UNICEF’s activities in Afghanistan focus on ongoing emergency activities in the areas of girls’ education, health, water & environmental sanitation, demobilization and reintegration of former child soldiers and preparedness and response to potential natural disasters.

UNICEF supports the Government in fully implementing policies for women and children through technical and financial assistance, enhancing governmental technical capacity at the national and provincial level, and enabling the Government to meet its commitments to the Millennium Development Goals, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and the Afghanistan Compact.

UNIDO · United Nations Industrial Development Organization

www.unido.org

UNIDO works towards improving the quality of life of the world's poor by helping countries achieve sustainable industrial development. UNIDO views industrial development as a means of creating employment and income in order to overcome poverty. It helps developing countries produce goods they can trade on the global market, and helps provide the tools · training, technology, and investment · to make them competitive. At the same time, it encourages production processes that will neither harm the environment nor place too heavy a burden on a country's limited energy resources.

UNIFEM · United Nations Development Fund for Women

http://afghanistan.unifem.org/

UNIFEM is the women’s fund at the United Nations and provides financial and technical assistance to innovative programmes and strategies that promote women’s human rights, political participation and economic security worldwide.

UNIFEM’s goal in Afghanistan is to increase opportunities for women that transform the development of Afghanistan into a more equitable and sustainable process.

IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Networks

www.irinnews.org

IRIN provides news and analysis for the humanitarian community by targeting decision-makers in relief agencies, host and donor governments, human-rights organizations, humanitarian advocacy groups, academic institutions and the media. At the same time, IRIN strives to ensure that affected communities can also access reliable information, so they can take informed decisions about their future.

IRIN is part of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, but its news service is editorially independent. Its reports do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations and its various agencies.

UNMACA · United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan

www.mineaction.org

UNMACA is a project of the United Nations Mine Action Service and, on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, coordinates the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA), which is the largest of its kind in the world. MAPA’s implementing partners have been working since 1990 to rid Afghanistan of the mines and unexploded ordnance that lurk in the ground after more than two decades of war.

UNODC · United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

www.unodc.org/afg
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. The objective of the UNODC assistance programme for Afghanistan has been to contribute to the long-term and sustainable reduction and eventual elimination of illicit drug production, trafficking and drug abuse in the country. Following the establishment of the Government of Afghanistan, the role of UNODC has shifted more to an advisory function aimed at assisting the Government in building up and strengthening its capacity in all areas of drug control.

UNOPS · United Nations Office for Project Services

www.unops.org.af

The United Nations Office for Project Services – Afghanistan Project Implementation Facility (UNOPS-APIF) provides project management services as well as direct implementation and support services to UN organizations, bi-lateral donors and direct to the Government of Afghanistan. Works in Afghanistan have included: major construction, engineering, elections, currency conversion, large-scale logistics, emergency employment, labour-based, environment, and customs and trade project management.

WFP · World Food Programme

www.wfp.org

The United Nations World Food Programme is the food aid arm of the United Nations. Each year, WFP provides food aid to an average of 90 million poor people globally to meet their nutritional needs, including 61 million hungry children, in at least 80 of the world's poorest countries.

WHO · World Health Organization

www.who.int

In Afghanistan the World Health Organization supports national health programmes, ranging from policy and strategy development to service delivery. The WHO’s technical and material support is delivered through a joint Government/WHO collaborative agreement in which areas of collaboration are clearly articulated and endorsed by both sides.
The World Bank strategy for Afghanistan focuses on three areas of support: building the capacity and accountability of the state, primarily to ensure the provision of services that are affordable, accessible, and of adequate quality for citizens; promoting growth of the rural economy and improving rural livelihoods; and supporting growth of a formal, modern, and competitive private sector.

UN Agencies and the ANDS

Pillar I – Security:

IOM, UNDP, UNODC, UNMACA

Pillar II – Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights:

UNESCO, UNIFEM, UNDP, OHCHR, IOM, HABITAT, UNFPA, FAO, UNHCR

Pillar III – Economic and Social Development:

Infrastructure and Natural Resources: WFP, UNEP, FAO, HABITAT

Education: WFP, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNIFEM, ILO, FAO, HABITAT

Health: WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, FAO

Agriculture and Rural Development: WFP, UNIFEM, UNHCR, UNDP, FAO, IOM, HABITAT


Economic Governance: UNIFEM, UNDP, IMF

Cross-cutting Themes:

Gender Equity: WFP, UNESCO, UNIFEM, WHO, UNFPA, UNDP, ILO, UNAMA, FAO, HABITAT
Counter Narcotics: UNDP, FAO, UNODC

Regional Cooperation: UNHCR, UNDP, FAO, IOM

Institutional Reform, Capacity Development and Anti-Corruption: UNDP

Environment: WFP, UNEP, FAO, UNDP
Appendix 2 to Annex B: UNAMA Organizational Chart

Organizational Chart
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

*Abbreviations: USG = Under-Secretary-General; ASG = Assistant Secretary General; FS = Field Services; GS = (OL) General Services (Other level); LL = General Services (Local level); NO = National Officer; SS = Security Services; UNV = United Nations Volunteers.

*Proposed new posts

Figure 6: UNAMA Organizational Chart
Appendix 3 to Annex B: UNAMA Recommended Best Practices

Decentralized Structure

UNAMA and the family of UN agencies, while responding to direction and policy guidance from Kabul, are extremely decentralized in terms of command and control. For example, the regional Area Security Management Team makes decisions about the regional security situation and determines where UN staff can and can not travel in that region. Regional Heads of Office (whether UNAMA or UN agency) have considerable independence and much personal responsibility for the development of plans in their areas of responsibility.

Each regional office is composed of a Head of Office, Governance Officer, Relief and Development Officer, Political Affairs Officer, three Human Rights Officers, Department of Safety and Security Officer, UN Military Advisor and support staff. Contact details for personnel in regional and sub-offices are available through the CJ9 PRT Section of ISAF HQ.

Recommendations for Deconfliction, Coordination and Cooperation

Handover

UNAMA is willing and able to assist with the PRT handover process in order to improve institutional memory. One important step is introducing the incoming team to established contacts within the UNAMA regional or sub-office. It would be helpful for the PRT to provide UNAMA with points of contact for projects, humanitarian assistance, governance, human rights, security, etc. An example is the current protocol between ISAF RC W and UNAMA relative to security and sharing of information for effectiveness and efficiency on both sides. The group: UNAMA, UNDSS, and ISAF meet fortnightly and look at areas where there are high numbers of security-related incidents/activities and determine what method/strategy will be employed to curb these. When there is a handover this should be included, preventing a reinvention of the process. UNAMA can then facilitate dialogue with relevant governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. UNAMA does not have a budget for project implementation. It would be useful if incoming PRT personnel seek to continue useful initiatives started by previous PRT personnel whenever possible.
Best Practices

- The PRT handover process should directly involve the Task Force Commander to reinforce previous lessons learned in coordinating war fighting and civil affairs imperatives.

Role of PRTs in Remote Provinces

PRTs have an important role to play in remote and/or insecure provinces where humanitarian and development actors have a limited presence. This is especially true when it comes to sharing information about the situation in the province. If UNAMA does not have an office in the province, UNAMA recommends the PRT establish dialogue with the closest regional office through regular email and phone conversations. The PRT is also encouraged to set up meetings with the regional office whenever they travel to meet with the RC, since the regional offices are in the same cities as the RCs, except in the case of RC East. The PRT can also contact and meet with the UNAMA civil military officer in Kabul who can help them establish links with the regional offices.

UNAMA would appreciate it if PRTs where UNAMA has no provincial office would do their best to provide UNAMA and other relevant agencies with regular updates about key issues affecting the province. In some cases this is already happening. In provinces such as Kandahar, where UNAMA has a regional office but has difficulty accessing all the districts due to the security situation, patrols can provide useful information on education, infrastructure and other needs. In some cases a UN agency may ask the PRT to do informal monitoring of a project in a remote district.

Political

UNAMA field offices have found it useful to hold bi-weekly meetings with PRT Commanders (and RC Commanders where appropriate) to assess the security, political and development situation in the region/province. In these meetings common agendas can be identified and questions and issues addressed. However, in order to achieve a meaningful dialogue, information must flow in both directions. UNAMA, for its part, can provide the PRTs with political insights and advice that may otherwise be difficult for them to obtain. UNAMA generally has good communication with the local population
and main stakeholders, including the opposition. UNAMA is also willing to undertake joint conflict assessments.

It can also be beneficial for UNAMA field offices and PRTs to coordinate efforts related to political disputes and armed conflicts. For example, in one case the UNAMA Head of Office used her good offices to mediate a conflict. The PRT supported her efforts by providing military patrols to secure the cease-fire agreements. The PRT was also able to provide her with information from villages which the UN was unable to access due to tensions in the area.

Recommended PRT Best Practices on Promoting Human Rights

The Human Rights Mandate of UNAMA is outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1662 of 23 March 2006. It states,

The Security Council calls for full respect for human rights and international Humanitarian law throughout Afghanistan; in this regard, requests UNAMA, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to continue to assist in the full implementation of the human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a State party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights; commends the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission for its courageous efforts to monitor respect for human rights in Afghanistan as well as to foster and protect these rights; welcomes the adoption of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation on 12 December 2005; and encourages international support for this Plan.

The UNAMA Human Rights Unit reports to both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva as well as the SRSG. The Human Rights Unit is the official representative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Afghanistan.

Consultations throughout the Human Rights Unit (HRU) and Human Rights Officers (HROs) in Regional and Provincial Sub-offices indicate that HROs do see a need to, and indeed do liaise with PRTs on human rights (HR) and HR related matters, including in terms of development assistance. Examples of lessons learned, best practices, and proposed recommendations on the relationship between PRTs and HROs, as well as HR related stakeholders, coming from the regional offices are, in general, consistent and can be summarized according to the following thematic issues:
Training

In the context of police reform, security sector reform, and/or judicial reform (e.g. in the south and north), there is agreement that such training ought to include, as it often does, a human rights component. On the other hand, it was also noted that the substantive skills in the PRT may be largely inadequate to conduct certain types of training. These are best left to more specialized agencies and organizations that have the lead in a given sector. Avoiding a situation where two or more institutions carry out training on the same topic to the same target group means avoiding duplication, as well as the risk of conveying different messages.

Best Practices

- If the PRT engages in training activities, ensure that a human rights component is included.
- Ask a specialized agency such as UNAMA or the AIHRC (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission) to design a human rights training module – and to provide HR training itself when possible.

Land Disputes

The involvement of PRTs in land disputes is not desirable. Complaints should be referred to UNAMA and/or the AIHRC should there be issues related to protection, as well as to the appropriate governmental institutions.

Best Practices

- The PRTs can play a role when land disputes could result in a threat to peace and stability, for example by patrolling relevant areas.
- Best if the PRT does not get involved in complex land disputes involving different tribes and dating back several years.
- In the southeast, UNAMA reached an agreement with the PRT that all land related disputes would be referred to the designated focal point in the Governor’s office
- Informing UNAMA and appropriate mediation specialist NGOs is the PRTs’ most effective role. This also avoids the appearance of the PRTs (and thus their nations) taking sides in a local land dispute.
Individual Complaints

The PRT may be a reliable source of information from individuals, particularly with respect to areas that are inaccessible to UNAMA because of security reasons.

Best Practices

- Follow-up individual complaints against ISAF/CF/PRT/RC/maneuver unit/SF.
- If a complaint not related to ISAF/CF/PRT/RC/maneuver unit/SF activities is received in an area where UNAMA is not present, always respect issues related to confidentiality in order to protect the informant/victim. For example, UNAMA received a complaint from a province to which UNAMA currently cannot travel. UNAMA was able to verify certain facts of the case thanks to information from local actors, including the PRT.
- Best if PRTs steer away from following up individual complaints that are not against international military forces. These are best referred to the most appropriate agency, such as the AIHRC.

Development of HR-related infrastructure assistance projects

The building and refurbishing of schools, courthouses, detention centres, etc. can assist in providing the conditions for responsible governmental departments to meet international human rights standards, and for other stakeholders, including UNAMA and the AIHRC, to conduct effective capacity building activities. For example, the AIHRC’s training activities in Herat on children in conflict with the law and their treatment will acquire more meaning for detention centre officials when a Juvenile Correction Centre that reflects international standards is constructed. However, there is widespread agreement that in some cases PRTs’ prioritization of efforts, maximization of resources and practical impact, participation and non-discrimination could be enhanced in the following manner:

Prioritization: Infrastructure assistance projects can have a significant visible impact in the short term but may prove unsustainable or of little use in the long term. For instance, several hundred thousand USD were spent on judicial buildings that sit empty because there are no judges and/or prosecutors to work in them. In some areas it is reported that PRT support to the Department of Women’s Affairs does not take into account either the Ministry of Women Affair’s framework, or the National Action Plan on Women’s Advancement. This practice may have been the result of a unilateral
initiative taken by the PRTs that did not take into account project sustainability, national strategies, long-and short-term impact, and a thorough needs-analysis.

**Best Practices**

- Carry-out a needs-analysis; engage with governmental departments in order to place the project within existing strategies and ensure sustainability.

- Ensure that projects are designed according to the ANDS framework and Provincial Development Plans (PDPs).

- Ideally, it would be useful if at least some members of the civil military component of the PRT had some knowledge of human rights policies and a rights-based approach to development. UNAMA’s HRU can provide details should the PRT be interested.

- Projects should never be drafted and implemented in a vacuum and without carrying out a study on the long-term impact and sustainability, together with the responsible Afghan provincial departments.

Participation: To further enhance the development of infrastructure assistance projects it is highly desirable to engage in a participatory and consultative process with all concerned stakeholders. PRTs should consult with the authorities, international community, AIHRC, IOs and NGOs, as well as grassroots organizations and shuras to find out what the priority needs are in a given area.¹

¹ PRTs should not only consult one interlocutor, i.e.: a governor, who may have an interest in achieving a short-term highly visible result to secure popular support.
Best Practices

- PRTs should always appoint two focal points for HR and HR development-related issues to liaise with the HR Officer and/or the Governance and Relief and Development Officers in UNAMA field offices.

- Focal points should be encouraged to use a Human Rights perspective. By using Human Rights language, focal points will be able to sharpen the focus on beneficiaries and identify gaps in assistance projects more easily. For example, rather than report a school was burned in X village, it would be better to say: “Girls’ right to receive an education was infringed upon in X village because their school was burned.” This leads to follow up questions such as: Are girls more impacted than boys by school arson? Do they enjoy the same level of access to alternative facilities (i.e. do they enjoy the same freedom of movement)?

- The above focal points need greater engagement with actors at the local level, who can sometimes provide invaluable information as to real needs and what should be prioritized as an urgent matter. These include governmental authorities, but it is equally important to engage with non-governmental organisations such as the AIHRC, grassroots organisations and shuras, as well as with the international community.

- UNAMA can facilitate this interaction, either regularly or on ad hoc basis, especially if it is related to HR, Justice and/or Governance projects.\(^2\)

- The PRTs need to be aware of, and acknowledge the presence and role of the AIHRC as a key interlocutor and actor in the country.\(^3\)

- In the area of Human Rights, consulting solely with the government is insufficient. PRTs should engage in a consultative process with both duty bearers (governmental departments) as well as rights holders (non-governmental stakeholders). Examples of rights holders are individuals (mullahs, arbabs), village shuras, women and youth shuras, professional shuras (teachers’ associations, lawyers, journalists, doctors or other associations), NGOs and other civil society groups to name a few.

- Focal points are encouraged to provide copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Afghan Constitution. UNAMA’s HRU is available to supply Dari/Pashto copies.

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\(^2\) UNAMA’s intermediation would also favour contacts between the PRT and NGOs, given that the latter, very often and understandably, have quite restrictive rules as to the degree they can interact with military personnel.

\(^3\) The AIHRC could also facilitate the contact between national NGOs and the PRT.
Discrimination: When implementing quick impact projects it is easy to overlook ethnic, tribal and other issues, which may result in different neighbouring communities and tribes being treated or impacted differently. While this is not the result of intentional differential treatment, but rather a lack of understanding about political and ethnic factions of the AOR, it may result in one community feeling disadvantaged or discriminated against. Hence opening a consultative process with a wide array of interlocutors, including non-governmental and grass-root ones, may help avoid being perceived as supporting a specific group or governmental official.

**Best Practices**

- PRTs must be seen as objective and impartial as possible. The rapid turnover in contingents may mean the PRTs are not always aware of the specific ethnic composition, strife, and enmities in a given area.
- PRTs can contact the UNAMA political section for information on these issues.

**High Turnover**

Experience shows that PRT turnover is high. This can hinder the building of a historical memory and confidence building with local stakeholders. It would be desirable if the abovementioned focal points prepared handover notes for their successors comprising, not only the status of implementation of agreed projects, but also a contact list of key interlocutors amongst governmental departments and NGOs. Ideally, the departing focal point would introduce the incoming focal point to the interlocutors as part of the handover process.

**Best Practices**

- Focal points should prepare handover notes for incoming colleagues and organize introductory meetings with national and international interlocutors to guarantee continuity of dialogue.
- Focal points should not leave theatre and take the PRT's institutional memory with them.
Appendix 4 to Annex B: Map of UNAMA Regions

Figure 7: Map of UNAMA Regions
Appendix 5 to Annex B: Map of UNAMA Regions

It is important to note that while UNAMA divides the country into eight regions in comparison to ISAF's five. This can present challenges to coordination. For example, when the Central Highlands office wants to address an issue involving both Bamyan and Dai Kundi, they have to coordinate with the PRTs in Bamyan and Uruzgan, which fall under different ISAF regional commands. However, understanding these differences and knowing which unit within UNAMA and the IMF is responsible for each province can minimize confusion and frustration.

Figure 8: Map of UNAMA and ISAF Regions
Figure 9: UN Afghanistan Accessibility Map
ANNEX C: HISTORY, FACTS, FIGURES, AND INFORMATION SOURCES

Appendix 1 to Annex C: Afghanistan Background Notes

Official Name

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA)
However, IRoA is often referred to as “Government of Afghanistan” (GoA)

Geography

Area: 647,500 sq. km. (249,935 sq. mi.); comparable to Germany and Italy combined and also slightly smaller than Texas.
Cities: Capital—Kabul (1,780,000; 1999/2000 UN est.). Other cities (1988 UN est.; current figures are probably significantly higher)—Kandahar (226,000); Herat (177,000); Mazar-e-Sharif (131,000); Jalalabad (58,000); Kunduz (57,000).
Terrain: Landlocked; mostly mountains and desert.
Climate: Dry, with cold winters and hot summers.

Government

Type: Islamic Republic.
Independence: August 19, 1919.
Political subdivisions: 34 provinces.
Suffrage: Universal at 18 years.
Economy

GDP (2004 est.): $4.7 billion.
GDP growth (2004 est.): 7.5%.
GDP per capita (2004 est.): $164.83.

- Natural resources: Natural gas, oil, coal, copper, chromite, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, zinc, iron, salt, precious and semiprecious gem stones.

- Agriculture (estimated 52% of GDP): Products--wheat, corn, barley, rice, cotton, fruit, nuts, karakul pelts, wool, and mutton.

- Industry (estimated 26% of GDP): Types--small-scale production for domestic use of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, and cement; hand-woven carpets for export; natural gas, precious and semiprecious gemstones.

- Services (estimated 22% of GDP): Transport, retail, and telecommunications.

Trade (2002-03 est.): Exports--$100 million (does not include opium): fruits and nuts, hand-woven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semiprecious gems. Major markets--Central Asian republics, Pakistan, Iran, EU, India.

- Imports--$2.3 billion: food, petroleum products, machinery, and consumer goods. Major suppliers--Central Asian republics, Pakistan, Iran.

- Currency: The currency is the afghani, which was reintroduced as Afghanistan’s new currency in January 2003. At present, $1 U.S. equals approximately 45 afghanis.

People

- Nationality: Noun and adjective - Afghan(s).

- Population: 28,513,677 (July 2004 est.). More than 3.5 million Afghans live outside the country, mainly in Pakistan and Iran, although over two and a half million have returned since the removal of the Taliban.

- Annual population growth rate (2004 est.): 4.92%. This rate does not take into consideration the recent war and its continuing impact.
• Main ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Aimaq, Baluch, Nuristani, Kizilbash.

• Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%, Shi’a Muslim 19%, other 1%.

• Main languages: Dari (Afghan Persian), Pashto.

• Education: Approximately 4 million children, of whom some 30% are girls, enrolled in school during 2003. Literacy (2001 est.) 36% (male 51%, female 21%), but real figures may be lower given breakdown of education system and flight of educated Afghans.

• Health: Infant mortality rate (2004 est.) 165.96 deaths/1,000 live births. Life expectancy (2004 est.) 42.27 yrs. (male); 42.66 yrs. (female).

Ethnic and Cultural Information

Afghanistan’s ethnically and linguistically mixed population reflects its location astride historic trade and invasion routes leading from Central Asia into South and Southwest Asia. While population data is somewhat unreliable for Afghanistan, Pashtuns make up the largest ethnic group at 38-44% of the population, followed by Tajiks (25%), Hazaras (10%), Uzbek (6-8%), Aimaq, Turkmen, Baluch, and other small groups. Dari (Afghan Farsi) and Pashto are official languages. Dari is spoken by more than one-third of the population as a first language and serves as a lingua franca for most Afghans, though Pashto is spoken throughout the Pashtun areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. Tajik and Turkic languages are spoken widely in the north. Smaller groups throughout the country also speak more than 70 other languages and numerous dialects.

Afghanistan is an Islamic country. An estimated 80% of the population is Sunni, following the Hanafi school of jurisprudence; the remainder of the population—primarily the Hazara ethnic group—predominantly Shi’a. Despite attempts during the years of communist rule to secularize Afghan society, Islamic practices pervade all aspects of life. In fact, Islam served as a principal basis for expressing opposition to communism and the Soviet invasion. Islamic religious tradition and codes, together with traditional tribal and ethnic practices, have an important role in personal conduct and dispute settlement. Afghan society is largely based on kinship groups, which follow traditional customs and religious practices, though somewhat less so in urban areas.
Pashtun

Pashtun - The largest and traditionally most politically powerful ethnic group, the Pashtun (or Pakhtun in northern Pashtu dialects), is composed of many units totalling in 1995 an estimated 10.1 million, the most numerous being the Durrani and the Ghilzai. Other major tribes include the Wardak, Jaji, Tani, Jadran, Mangal, Khugiani, Safi, Mohmand and Shinwari. Like a number of other Afghan ethnic groups, the Pashtun extend beyond Afghanistan into Pakistan where they constitute a major ethnic group of about 14 million.

The Afghan Pashtun heartland roughly covers a large crescent-shaped belt following the Afghan-Pakistani border on the east, southward from Nuristan, across the south, and northward along the Iranian border almost to Herat. Enclaves of Pashtun also live scattered among other ethnic groups throughout the nation, where they have settled at various times since the end of the nineteenth century as shifts in populations, some forced, some voluntary, occurred in response to political expediency and economic opportunities.

Physically, the Pashtun are a Mediterranean variant of the greater Caucasian race and speak several mutually intelligible dialects of Pashtu; some also speak Dari. Both Pashtu and Dari belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. Pashtun are generally Hanafi Sunni Muslims.

The Pashtun have provided the central leadership for Afghanistan since the eighteenth century, when Ahmad Khan Abdali of Kandahar established the Durrani Empire. This one-time general in Nadir Shah’s Persian army was elected to power in 1747 at a tribal jirgah, an assembly which takes decisions by consensus. The legitimacy of his rule was sanctioned at the same time by the ulama (religious scholars). Ahmad Khan assumed the title of Durr-i-Durran (Pearl of Pearls) and was henceforth known as Ahmad Shah Durrani and his tribe, the Pashtun Abdali tribe, as the Durrani. When his successors lost the support of the tribes after Ahmad Shah’s death in 1772, control passed to the Mohammadzai lineage within the Barakzai section of the Durrani Pashtun.

Mohammadzai dominance continued from 1826 to 1978, interrupted only for a scant nine months in 1929. Then power shifted to the second largest Pashtun tribe, the Ghilzai, who dominated the leadership of the secular Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) after 1978, although most were essentially detribalized because of
their close association with urban life. This regime was in turn replaced in 1992 by the Islamic State of Afghanistan, established by the mujahidin whose leaders were mostly from the Ghilzai, and a variety of eastern Pushtun tribes, although the President from 1992-1996 was a Tajik. The Taliban heartland remains in the South and while the original leadership bid for unity by playing down tribal identities, divisions began to surface after Kabul was taken in September 1996.

Pushtun culture rests on Pushtunwali, a legal and moral code that determines social order and responsibilities. It contains sets of values pertaining to honor (namuz), solidarity (nang), hospitality, mutual support, shame and revenge which determines social order and individual responsibility. The defence of namuz, even unto death, is obligatory for every Pushtun. Elements in this code of behavior are often in opposition to the Shariah. Much of the resistance to the largely detribalized leadership of the DRA stemmed from the perception that in attempting to nationalize land and wealth, as well as regulate marriage practices, the DRA was unlawfully violating the prescriptions of Pushtunwali.

The Pushtun are typically farmers or herdsmen, although several groups are renowned for specialized occupations. For instance, the monarchy and many government bureaucrats were Durrani Pushtun, the Ahmadzai Ghilzai are consulted for their legal abilities, the Andar Ghilzai specialize in constructing and repairing underground irrigation systems called karez, and the Shinwari of Paktya monopolize the lumber trade.

**Tajik**

Tajik - The Tajik form the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Estimates in 1995 averaged around 4.3 million. Afghan Tajik live mainly in the Panjsher Valley north of Kabul and in the northern and northeastern provinces of Parwan, Takhar, Badakhshan, and also Baghlan and Samangan. Tajik also extend into the central mountains. There is a tendency of some non-Tajik groups to classify any Dari speaker as a member of this group. Some also tend to categorize any urban resident who has become detribalized as Tajik. This is particularly true in Kabul. Tajik are also found north of Afghanistan's border in their own state of Tajikistan.

Tajik are physically from the Mediterranean substock. They speak various Tajiki dialects of Dari, an Iranian language in the Indo-European language family. Most are
Hanafi Sunni, although a sizeable number living in areas from Bamiyan to eastern Badakhshan are Ismaili Shia. Tajik are not organized by tribe and refer to themselves most often by the name of the valley or region they inhabit, such as Panjsheri, Andarabi, Samangani, and Badakhshi. Those living among non-Tajik, such as those living among the Pushtun who refer to them as dehqan, often describe themselves simply as Tajik.

Tajik are predominantly fully sedentary mountaineer farmers and herders, who often make short-range seasonal migrations to mountain grazing meadows during which whole families move up to the mountains to harvest grain and melons. The Tajik areas are famous for a wide variety of fruits and nuts which are acknowledged to be among the finest in the country.

Many Tajik migrated to the cities, especially to Kabul, which was primarily a Tajik town until Timur, the son of Ahmad Shah Durrani, moved his court to Kabul in 1776 and declared it to be the Pushtun capital. In Kabul the Tajik are still dominant and well-represented in the upper-middle class. Many are active in business and in government service; others find employment as cooks, houseboys or gardeners in the homes of foreigners. On the off-agricultural season Tajik may join the workforce at industrial complexes near their villages. Whether seasonally or permanently based in cities, Tajik tend to maintain close links with their rural kin.

Except for the short rule of the Tajik known as Bacha Saqqao in 1928, the Tajik have not dominated politically. Since 1978, however, several Tajik military leaders have gained substantial recognition, the most renowned being Ahmad Shah Masood from the Panjsher Valley. Burhanuddin Rabbani who served as President of The Islamic State of Afghanistan from 1992-1996 is a Tajik from Badakhshan.

**Hazara**

Hazara · Afghanistan's rugged central mountainous core of approximately 50,000 square kilometers is known as the Hazarajat, Land of the Hazara. Others live in Badakhshan, and, following Kabul's campaigns against them in the late nineteenth century, some settled in Western Turkestan, in Jauzjan and Badghis provinces. The estimated population in 1995 was one million.

Physically the Hazara are Mongoloid, possibly of mixed Eastern Turkic and Mongol origin, although numerous contradictory speculations exist. Scholars agree that the
Hazara were established here since the beginning of the thirteenth century. Hazara speak Hazaragi, a Persianized language with a large mixture of Mongol words. A majority are Imami Shia; fewer are Ismaili Shia; while others, particularly in Bamiyan and the north, are Sunni.

The leaders of Hazara lineages, known as mirs or khans, lost their powerful status in communities after Amir Abdur Rahman subdued them in 1891. The Pushtun state established a local administration, imposed harsh taxation policies and distributed lands to Pushtun, including fertile pasture lands in areas previously inaccessible to Pushtun nomads.

The Hazarajat continued to be a neglected area. Services and physical infrastructure were practically nonexistent. Farming and animal husbandry are the principal occupations; there is no industry. Because of their meager resources, the Hazara seasonally sought work and services in other areas as low grade civil servants, shopkeepers, artisans, urban factory workers, and unskilled labour. In the 1960s an estimated 30-50 percent of Hazara males migrated to the cities where they were considered to be on the lowest rung of the social scale. During the 1960s and 70s their economic and political status improved remarkably.

During the war, contending groups within the Hazarajat achieved greater unity than ever before. Hazara political parties were excluded from the mujahideen alliances, however, largely because of rabidly anti-Shia prejudices held by some leaders, such as Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf and Yunus Khalis. It is doubtful if the Hazara will accept their former inferior status in the future.

Uzbek

Uzbek - About 1.3 million Uzbek live mingled with the Tajik all across the northern plains of Afghanistan, from Faryab Province to Faizabad, capital of Badakhshan Province. There are many mixed Uzbek and Tajik villages, although each live in separate residential quarters. In 1983 a sizeable group of Uzbek were included among the group of 4,000 Turkic speakers from Afghanistan that were resettled in Turkey. Uzbek also reside North of the Afghan border in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
The Uzbek are Mongoloid with considerable Mediterranean admixture. They are Sunni Muslim and speak central Turkic dialects called Uzbeki. Uzbek practice agriculture and herding, but many live in towns where they are known as astute businessmen and skilful artisans as silver and goldsmiths, leatherworkers, and rug makers.

Some Afghan Uzbek refer to themselves by old tribal names; others identify with their towns of origin in Central Asia. Uzbek social structure is strictly patriarchal, giving considerable authoritarian power to leaders called begs, arbabs or khans. Marital endogamy is of prime importance. Although interethnic marriages between Uzbek, Turkoman and Tajik do take place, antipathy to marriage with Pushtun is widespread.

Afghan Uzbek originally came from Central Asia and their rise as the dominant political force in north Afghanistan followed the demise in 1506 of the Timurid dynasty centered at Herat. They established eleven strong principalities from Maimana to Kunduz under strong leaders, sometimes independent, sometimes nominally acknowledging allegiance to either Bokhara or Kabul, but always jockeying for power among themselves.

At the end of the nineteenth century Amir Abdur Rahman consolidated these Uzbek khanates under his rule. Later, fresh immigrations took place in the 1920s and 1930s as Russian conquests and local uprisings in Central Asia continued. During this same period many Pushtun settled among the Uzbeks with the result that by the 1960s the Uzbek had become a small minority within the area they once dominated. Since 1992, the Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostom, principal leader of the coalition opposing the Taliban, has controlled the predominant centers of power in the North.

Turkmen

Turkmen - Turkmen are another Sunni Turkic-speaking group whose language has close affinities with modern Turkish. They are of aquiline Mongoloid stock. The Afghan Turkmen population in the 1990s is estimated at around 200,000. Turkmen also reside north of the Amu Darya in Turkmenistan. The original Turkmen groups came from East of the Caspian Sea into Northwestern Afghanistan at various periods, particularly after the end of the nineteenth century when the Russians moved into their territory. They established settlements from Balkh Province to Herat Province, where they are now concentrated; smaller groups settled in Kunduz Province. Others came in considerable numbers as a result of the failure of the Basmachi revolts against the Bolsheviks in the 1920s.
Turkmen tribes, of which there are twelve major groups in Afghanistan, base their structure on genealogies traced through the male line. Senior members wield considerable authority. Formerly a nomadic and warlike people, feared for their lightening raids on caravans, Turkmen in Afghanistan are farmer-herdsmen and important contributors to the economy. They brought Karakul sheep to Afghanistan and are also renowned makers of carpets, which, with Karakul pelts, are major hard currency export commodities. Turkmen jewellery is also highly prized.

Aimaq

Aimaq, meaning tribe in Turkish, is not an ethnic domination, but differentiates seminomadic herders and agricultural tribal groups of various ethnic origins, to include these the Turkic Hazara and Baluch, that were formed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They live among nontribal people in the western areas of Badghis, Ghor and Herat provinces. They are Sunni, speak dialects close to Dari and refer to themselves with tribal designations. Population estimates vary widely, from less than 500,000 to around 800,000. A group of about 120,000 live in Iranian Khorasan.

Large groups of Sunni Arab living in the vicinity of Bokhara in Central Asia fled to northeastern Afghanistan following Russian conquests in the nineteenth century. By the 1880s they were, with the Uzbek with whom they established close ties, the second most populous ethnic group in present day Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan provinces. Smaller groups settled in scattered communities as far west as Maimana, Faryab Province.

Arab

The Arab are pastoralists who raise sheep and grow cotton and wheat. Some among the eastern groups make summer migrations of up to 300 kilometers to reach the lush high pastures in Badakhshan. Government development schemes, especially those which brought large numbers of Pushtun to the area in the 1940s, relegated the Arab to a small proportion of the population and the Arab ceased to hold a monopoly on long distance migration. Bilingual in Dari and Uzbeki, but speaking no Arabic, they continue to identify themselves as Arab although they have had no contact with the Arabs of the Middle East since the late fourteenth century.
Kirghiz

Kirghiz - The Kirghiz are a Sunni Mongoloid group speaking Kipchak Turkic dialects who were originally from Central Asia. About 3,000 lived in the Pamir mountains east of the Wakhan Corridor, one of the more inaccessible regions in the world where relatively flat valleys suitable for habitation lie at altitudes over 10,000 feet between ranges rising over 16,500 feet. Only a small group remains. A majority moved to Pakistan in 1978 after Soviet and Afghan troops occupied the Wakhan; later, in 1983, they resettled in Turkey.

The Kirghiz lived in yurts, tended large flocks of sheep and utilized yak which are found only in this area of Afghanistan.

Wakhi

Wakhi - The neighboring Wakhi, along with several thousand other Mountain Tajik who are physically of the Mediterranean substock with Mongoloid admixture, speak Dari and various eastern Iranian dialects. They live in small, remote villages located at lower altitudes in the Wakhan Corridor and upper Badakhshan. They are often Ismaili Shi'a, but some are Imami Shi'a and Sunni.

Farsiwan

Farsiwan - Farsiwan are Dari-speaking village agriculturalists of Mediterranean substock who live in the west near the Afghan-Iranian border or in districts of Herat, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces. Estimates for 1995 vary from 600,000 to 830,000. Most are Imami Shi'a; in urban centers some are Sunni.

Nuristani

Nuristani - The Nuristani are of the Mediterranean physical type with mixtures from Indian stocks on the fringes. Historians accompanying Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC described this group as differing culturally and religiously from other peoples in the area. They were forcibly converted to Sunni Islam in 1895 during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman but retain many unique features in their material culture.

The Nuristani reside throughout a 5,000 square mile area in the east bordering Pakistan that is heavily forested and so rugged that much of it is accessible only by foot trails. The Nuristani designate themselves by the local geographical names of the five
major north-south valleys and 30 east-west lateral valleys leading into the major valleys where they live. They speak Indo-Iranian dialects of Nuristani and Dardic called by village and valley names; many are mutually unintelligible from valley to valley. In 1990 the province of Nuristan was created from parts of the provinces of Laghman and Kunar. The population in the 1990s is estimated at 125,000 by some; the Nuristani prefer a figure of 300,000.

The Nuristani are mountaineer herders, dairymen and farmers. They hold a respected place in the social order and many have risen to high government positions, particularly in the army.

Baluch

Baluch - The homeland of the Sunni Baluch in southwestern Afghanistan is in the sparsely settled deserts and semi-deserts of Hilmand Province, although Baluch enclaves are also found in Northwestern Faryab Province. These semisedentary and seminomadic populations are famed for camel breeding. They number perhaps around 100,000, although other estimates are lower. Seventy percent of the Baluch live in Pakistan; others reside in Iran. The Baluch speak Baluchi, an Iranian branch in the Indo-European language family; most speak Dari and Pashto as well. Baluch society is tribal, highly segmented and centrally organized under powerful chieftains known as sardars.

Brahui

Brahui - The Sunni Brahui is another distinctive group settled in the desert areas of southwestern Afghanistan. They numbered about 200,000 in 1970 according to an estimate by Louis Dupree; estimates in the 1990s run lower. The basic Brahui physical type is Veddoid of South India, and they speak Brahui which is allied to Dravidian, a major language of South India, with a heavy mixture of Balulchi and Pashto. Brahui mostly work as tenant farmers or hired herders for Baluch or Pushtun khans. Larger communities of Brahui reside in Pakistan's Baluchistan Province.

Qizilbash

Qizilbash - The Qizilbash of Mediterranean sub-stock speak Dari, are Imami Shi’a, and scattered throughout Afghanistan, primarily in urban centers. There are perhaps 50,000 Qizilbash living in Afghanistan although it is difficult to say for some claim to be Sunni.
Tajik since Shia Islam permits the practice of taqiya or dissimulation to avoid religious discrimination. The Qizilbash form one of the more literate groups in Afghanistan: they hold important administrative and professional positions.

The Qizilbash are traditionally considered to be the descendants of Persian Shia mercenaries and administrators left behind by the Safavid Emperor Nadir Shah Afshar (1736-47) to govern the Afghan provinces. Under Ahmad Shah Durrani, who served in Nadir Shah’s bodyguard, and his successors, the Qizilbash acquired power and influence at court out of proportion to their numbers. This created resentment among the dominant Pushtun which hardened over the years, especially after the Qizilbash openly allied themselves with the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842). Amir Abdur Rahman accused the Qizilbash of being partisan to the enemy during his campaigns against the Shi’a Hazara in 1891-1893, declared them enemies of the state, confiscated their property, and persecuted them.

Kabuli

Kabuli - Kabuli, is an ambiguous term which provides a sense of identity for Afghanistan's largest heterogeneous urban population without designating distinct ethnic associations. The city of Kabul has drawn members of all ethnic groups in growing numbers since 1776 when it was declared the capital in favor of Kandahar; generations of intermarriages have also taken place. Nevertheless, ethnic roots and regional links have always also remained important. This is reflected in the spatial layout of the city which, before two-thirds of the city was reduced to rubble after 1992, consisted of ethnic, geographic or religious-oriented wards and suburbs. Social stratification along occupational lines was also clear although over the past few decades lines tended to blur significantly.

A typical Kabuli speaks Dari in addition to his mother tongue and, whether male or female, is urbane, favors European fashions, is secularly educated, and most probably works as a bureaucrat, shopkeeper/owner or in the service sector. Many have had professional education or experience abroad, live in apartments or single-family dwellings, are Western-oriented in outlook and enjoy cosmopolitan lifestyles.

Jat

Jat - There are other small marginal communities of occupational specialists based in eastern Afghanistan in provinces such as Laghman. They are commonly referred to as...
Jat which is a generic term indiscriminately applied by others with derogatory connotations implying low descent and low occupations. The groups reject the term and refer to themselves by specific names. Of Mediterranean-Indian type physically, speaking Indo-Aryan dialects in addition to Pashto and Dari, they are primarily gypsy-like itinerant petty traders, bangle sellers, fortune-tellers, musicians, jugglers, snake-charmers and performers with animals such as bears and monkeys. Some are specialized craftsmen, working as weavers, potters, sievemakers, knife-makers, and leather-workers. Some hire out as seasonal itinerant farm laborers. They rank lowest on the social scale and are stigmatized by many in the society.
Appendix 2 to Annex C: Evolution of ISAF and PRTS

ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001 after the ousting of the Taliban regime. The concept of an UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was launched to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

ISAF is not a UN force, but rather a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council under a Chapter VII (obligatory) mandate. Nine UNSC Resolutions - 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1659, 1707, and 1776 - relate to ISAF, and two specifically to PRTs – 1563 and 1623. A detailed Military Technical Agreement between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.

Initially, individual nations volunteered to lead the ISAF mission every six months. The first ISAF mission was run by the UK. Turkey then assumed the lead of the second ISAF mission. The third ISAF mission, as of February 2003, was led by Germany and the Netherlands with support from NATO.

NATO Takes on ISAF Command

Since 11 August 2003, ISAF has been supported and led by NATO, and financed by the troop-contributing countries. The Alliance is responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force. This includes providing a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.

NATO's role in assuming the leadership of ISAF in August 2003 overcame the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment. A continuing NATO headquarters also enables small countries, which find it difficult to act as lead nations, to play a strong role within a multinational headquarters.
Appointment of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative

In November 2003, NATO appointed Minister Hikmet Cetin, of Turkey, to the post of Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. The current Senior Civilian Representative is Ambassador Fernando Gentilini (see biography).

The Senior Civilian Representative is responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance's engagement in Afghanistan and receives his guidance from the North Atlantic Council. He works in close co-ordination with the ISAF Commander and the United Nations as well as with the Afghan authorities and other representatives of the international community present in the country, such as the European Union.

Expansion of ISAF’s Presence Through PRTs

ISAF's mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission in four sequential geographic stages, starting in the north, and moving counter clockwise to the west, then south and finally east.

ISAF decided to follow OEF’s lead and base its expansion on the PRT concept. PRTs grew out of the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs or "Chiclets") established in 2002 in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the Taliban. The mission of these 10-12 man teams was to provide information on humanitarian needs, de-conflict military operations with assistance, and implement small projects using a U.S. military fund called the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) in order to build trust and confidence among the population.

OEF’s First Eight PRTs

By the time ISAF decided to expand outside of Kabul through the creation of PRTs, OEF had already established PRTs in four strategic locations, covering each of the country's four main ethnic groups: Gardez (Pashtuns), Kunduz (Tajiks), Bamian (Hazaras) and Mazar-e Sharif (Uzbeks). PRTs Gardez and Kunduz were established and led by the United States, while PRT Mazar-e Sharif was established and led by the UK. The U.S. established the Bamian PRT in March 2003, but only six months later, turned it over to New Zealand.
By the end of 2003, four additional PRTs had been established under OEF, covering other strategic provinces: Kandahar (spiritual home of the Taliban), Jalalabad (traditional gateway into Afghanistan from the south), Herat (Afghanistan's second most important city and home of one of the most influential warlords) and Parwan (site of Bagram Air Base). All four of these PRTs were established and led by the U.S.

Beginning of ISAF Expansion: ISAF Takes Over Kunduz

In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's principal decision-making body, authorized SACEUR to initiate ISAF expansion outside of Kabul by taking over command of the existing OEF PRT in Kunduz. Just shortly before this transfer of authority from OEF to ISAF, Germany assumed leadership of the PRT from the U.S. PRT Kunduz was to be the sole ISAF PRT for several months, until stage 1 expansion to the north was completed in the fall of 2004.

Pioneering PRTs Operate Develop Distinctive Personalities

These early PRTs were pioneers in that they operated without a great deal of guidance in terms of mandates and essential tasks. This naturally led to each PRT focusing on a different array of activities shaped by local conditions. For example, Mazar-e Sharif (UK) did outstanding work mitigating the Dostum/Atta conflict, while Herat (U.S.) helped pave the way for a peaceful transition into the post Ismael Khan era. Under German lead, Kunduz played a pioneering role in the area of information operations, setting up a Dari language radio station broadcasting to the entire Northern region and establishing a 3 language newspaper (Dari, Pashtu and English) that eventually evolved into an ISAF wide publication.

This initial group of PRTs also developed distinct personalities and force structures, creating what came to be called the American, British and German models. American PRTs had less than 100 personnel, stressed force protection and quick impact assistance projects. The British PRT was somewhat larger, emphasized Afghan security sector reform (SSR), and helped defuse confrontations between rival warlords. The German PRT had over 300 members and was distinguished by its strict separation between its military and robust civilian component. While the PRT civilian leader, a senior foreign ministry official, and other MFA diplomats lived on the PRT, the German development agencies had their own separate compound, reflecting the relaxed security environment in Kunduz.
The evolution of PRTs in 2003 and early 2004 was both a strength and a weakness. On the positive side, it firmly established that no one-size-fits-all blueprint would be imposed on lead countries – i.e., each PRT would be allowed to adapt to its environment and the resources available. This has been an enduring strength. The downside was confusion among many (and NGOs in particular) about what a PRT is and what it ought to do. Although this led to criticism of the PRT concept itself, by early 2004 many had concluded that PRTs were adding value.

Stage 1: To the North

On 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would assume command of the existing UK-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif from OEF and establish three new PRTs in the north of the country: Meymaneh (UK), Feyzabad (Germany) and Pol-e-Khomri (Netherlands).

This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking the completion of the first stage of ISAF’s expansion. ISAF’s area of operations now covered some 3,600 square kilometers in and around Kabul and approximately 185,000 square kilometers in the north and the mission was able to influence security in nine northern provinces of the country.

Rapid Increase in OEF PRTs in 2004

While ISAF was expanding to the north in 2004, OEF was continuing to establish new PRTs in the rest of the country at a rapid rate. Eight new PRTs were established by the U.S. under OEF that year, seven of them in the south and east of the country (Asadabad, Khowst, Ghazni, Qalat, Lashkar Gah, Sharan, and Tarin Kowt), where the need for a presence was deemed to be the most urgent. The lone exception to this predominantly southern and eastern focus was PRT Farah in western Afghanistan. The year ended with five PRTs under ISAF command and 14 under OEF (16 PRTs created under OEF, minus the two transferred to ISAF).

Stage 2: To the West

On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that ISAF would be further expanded into the west of Afghanistan. This process began on 31 May 2005, when ISAF took over command of two existing U.S. PRTs from OEF, Herat and Farah. The U.S. retained
leadership of Farah, making it the first U.S. PRT to come under ISAF command. The U.S. turned over leadership of the Herat PRT to Italy.

At the beginning of September, two new PRTs in the West became operational under ISAF, one in Chaghcharan (Lithuania) and one in Qala-i-Naw (Spain), completing ISAF’s expansion into the west. The extended ISAF mission now led a total of nine PRTs, in the north and west, providing security assistance in 50% of Afghanistan’s territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations to further expand ISAF, to the south of the country.

Two new PRTs were established by the U.S. under OEF in 2005, both in the east—Mehtarlam and Panjshir. Panjshir was then a brand-new province, carved out of Parwan and created in honor of the martyred mujahideen hero, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Befitting this relatively peaceful and stable province, the U.S. made PRT Panjshir its first (and so far only) civilian-led PRT. At the end of 2005, the PRT count stood at nine PRTs under ISAF and 14 under OEF (18 PRTs created under OEF minus four transferred to ISAF).

Stage 3: To the South

On 8 December 2005, meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Allied Foreign Ministers endorsed a plan that paved the way for an expanded ISAF role and presence in Afghanistan. The first element of this plan was the expansion of ISAF to the south in 2006, also known as Stage 3.

This was implemented on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from U.S.-led Coalition forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional six provinces and assuming command of the four existing OEF U.S.-led PRTs. The U.S. retained leadership of one PRT (Qalat), while the remaining three were taken over by other Allies—Lashkar Gah (UK), Kandahar (Canada) and Tarin Kowt (Netherlands). The movement of UK and Dutch forces south required other countries to assume responsibility for their PRTs in the north. Sweden took charge of the UK PRT in Mazar-e Sharif and Norway assumed leadership of the UK PRT in Meymaneh. The Netherlands turned control of its PRT in Pol-e Khomri over to Hungary.
The expanded ISAF now led a total of 13 PRTs in the north, west and south, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan's territory. For the first time since the start of ISAF expansion, more PRTs were under ISAF than under OEF. OEF had 10 PRTs (18 created under OEF, minus eight transferred to ISAF), for a total of 23 across the country.

The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased significantly, from about 10,000 prior to the expansion to about 20,000 after.

Stage 4: ISAF Expands To East, Takes Responsibility for Entire Country

On 5 October 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led Coalition. The Alliance's mission now covers the whole of Afghanistan. Unlike previous stages of expansion, stage 4 did not involve the creation of any new PRTs or the transition of PRT leadership from one nation to another, which explains why it was able to follow quickly on the heels of the stage 3.

Two new PRTs were established in November 2006, both in the east - U.S.-led PRT Kala Gush (Nurestan) and Turkey-led PRT Vardak. That brought the total number of PRTs to 25.

The PRT in Nurestan became the first PRT to be established outside the capital of a province. The PRT was temporarily set up near the Nurgaram district center (Kala Gush) in western Nurestan, pending the completion of a road network to allow more reliable, year-round access to the provincial capital of Parun, which is located high in a remote alpine valley of central Nurestan.

Vardak was unique in being the first genuinely "civilian" PRT, in which the role of the military component was limited to just securing the PRT compound. All interaction with Afghan officials was carried out by the civilian component, led by a senior Turkish diplomat who has the title "civilian coordinator." Force protection for the civilians when traveling away from the PRT compound was provided by Turkish special forces police rather than the military.
In March 2008 the Czech Republic opened a new PRT in Lowgar Province. U.S.-led PRT Gardez had previously covered Lowgar Province from Paktia Province. This brings the total to 26 PRTs in Afghanistan.

Requirement for Two More PRTs

With the creation of Daykondi and Panjshir provinces in 2004, Afghanistan now has a total of 34 provinces. That means there are now seven provinces without their own dedicated PRTs, not counting Kabul Province, which is covered by RC Capital. As of January 2008, the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) continued to identify a need for PRTs in two of those provinces – Nimruz and Daykondi. The need for PRTs in Nimruz and Daykondi was especially acute since ISAF had no presence in these provinces.

Takhar, Jowzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pol and Kapisa are being covered by PRTs in neighboring provinces: PRT Kunduz covered Takhar; Mazar-e Sharif covered Jowzjan, Samangan and Sar-e Pol; and Bagram covered Kapisa. PRT Mazar-e Sharif maintained full-time PRT provincial offices in the capitals of the three provinces for which it was responsible. On February 23, 2008 PRT Kunduz opened its Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) in Taloqan, Takhar province. The civil-military PAT, which included representatives from the German ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economic Cooperation and Development and Interior, extended ISAF’s reach into this province. The PAT maintained a permanent civilian-military presence (40 soldiers) and reported to PRT Kunduz. PRT Bagram had a dedicated civil affairs team for Kapisa that visited the province regularly.

NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan

Figure 10: Ambassador Fernando Gentilini
• Born in Subiaco (Rome), Italy, 2nd March 1962:

• Graduated in Law from the University of Rome, 1986:

• Joined the Italian Diplomatic Service in February 1990: first assigned to Department of Human Resources and Administration, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome:

• Second Secretary (Economics and Trade) at the Italian Embassy in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), July 1992:

• Promoted to First Secretary of Legation, January 1995:

• First Secretary at the Italian Permanent Representation to the E.U. in Brussels, December 1996:

• Seconded as Italian Representative within the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit at the E.U. Council Secretariat, under the authority of the High Representative for the E.U. Common Foreign and Security Policy, December 1999:

• Promoted to Counsellor of Legation, Rome, July 2000:

• Posted to MFA’s Department of European Countries as Head of Unit for Western Balkans, Rome, December 2002:

• Seconded as E.U. High Representative’s Personal Representative to Kosovo, April 2004:

• Promoted to Counsellor of Embassy, July 2004:

• Seconded to the Policy Unit at the Office of the Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP in Brussels, December 2004:

• Seconded to the Presidency of the Council as Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to the Italian Prime Minister, Rome, August 2006:

• Second Lieutenant (short service) of the Italian Army (Artillery), March 1987:

• Awarded the Italian Honour, “Cavaliere Ufficiale dell’Ordine al Merito della Repubblica” in 2006.
## Appendix 3a to Annex C: PRTS in Afghanistan (alphabetical order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>PROVINCES COVERED</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>OPENING DATE</th>
<th>ESTABLISHING NATION</th>
<th>CURRENT LEAD NATION(S)</th>
<th>CURRENT CONTRIBUTING NATIONS</th>
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Table 2: PRTS in Afghanistan (alphabetical order)
## Appendix 3b to Annex C: PRTS in Afghanistan (chronological order)

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### Table 3: PRTS in Afghanistan (chronological order)

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<th>CURRENT CONTRIBUTING NATIONS</th>
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</table>
Appendix 5 to Annex C: Reading List

A sample of Afghanistan-related fiction and nonfiction recommended by past and present PRT officers. In alphabetical order by book title.

A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush by Eric Newby. (1950s). A classic of travel literature and a great read.

Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia by Victoria Schofield. A very carefully researched and well-written documentary on the North-West Frontier.

Afghanistan by Louis Dupree. Written in 1973, this book traces the development of this country from tribal and politically unstable towards a system of representative government consistent with its cultural and historical patterns.

Afghanistan: A Chronological Fact Sheet by Juma Khan Sufi. A really useful thumbnail history of significant historical events.

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban by Stephen Tanner. Excellent and highly recommended.

Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics by Martin Ewans. Ewans covers the entire scope of Afghanistan's history and put the nation's current situation in perspective.

Afghanistan: A Traveler's Companion and Guide by Bijan Omrani and Matthew Leeming. Excellent companion with great maps, regional overviews, photos, and a well-written historical overview.

Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban by Larry P. Goodson. A scholarly survey of the Afghan civil war, the Soviet occupation, the pursuit of power by the competing mujahideen factions, and the rise of the Taliban.

Afghanistan, Where God Only Comes to Weep by Siba Shakib. A novel of one woman's incredible hardships during the Soviet and Taliban eras. Another novel of hers is Samira and Samir.
Afghan Tales: Stories from Russia’s Vietnam by Oleg Yermakov. A Soviet perspective on the war in the 1980s.


A Thousand Splendid Suns by Khalid Hussein. A gripping story of the plight of two women during the Soviet and Taliban eras. It is a fictional story that represents the highs and lows of Afghan life and culture during those decades.


Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad by David B. Edwards. Sent in 1987 to cover the tail end of the war with the Soviets, Edwards’s pieces together relationships that have shaped Afghanistan’s past, present, and inevitably its future by following the lives of three Afghan leaders: Nor Muhammad Tamaki, Camilla Safi, and Quiz Amen Waa, bringing us to the point where Taliban and Topeka were created. Filled with photographs and maps that document the stories told, this book provides a rare and timely account of politics and culture in Afghanistan.

Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History by George Crile. A must read for those curious about the U.S. Government role in Afghanistan during the 1980s – very entertaining and, at times, insightful.

Come Back to Afghanistan: A California Teenager’s Story by Said Hyder Akbar. The young author made several visits to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, when his Afghan-American father joined the newly-formed government of Afghanistan.

Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in Asymmetric Warfare by Martin Ewans. Ewans, a retired diplomat, describes Afghanistan’s long history of asymmetric tactics applied to the weaknesses of stronger powers, from the First, Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars to the Soviet invasion and post-9/11 U.S.-led operations.

Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid. In a searching retrospective,
Rashid (author of Taliban) surveys the region to reveal a thicket of ominous threats and lost opportunities—in Pakistan, a rickety dictatorship colludes with militants, and Afghanistan's weak government is besieged by warlords, an exploding drug economy and a powerful Taliban insurgency. Rashid finds plenty of blame to go around for the current situation, but he displays some optimism.

Fire in Afghanistan: 1914-1929 by Rhea Talley Stewart, Well-written book about a period of Afghan history that remains salient today.

Flashman: From the Flashman Papers 1839-42 by George McDonald Fraser. Terrific way to get into an incredible episode of British and Afghan history. Fraser embeds his characters in extensively researched history.

Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 by Steve Coll. An inside look at CIA involvement in “covert wars in Afghanistan that fuelled Islamic militancy and gave rise to bin Laden’s al Qaeda”.

Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare by Bard O'Neill. O'Neill has provided his readers with a framework through which to analyze insurgencies, past, present and future.

I is for Infidel…J is for Jihad, K is for Kalashnikov: From Holy War to Holy Terror in Afghanistan by Kathy Gannon. With 18 years of experience in Afghanistan, this reporter gives a first-hand view of the Taliban and post-9/11 events.

Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Columbia/Hurst) by Antonio Giustozzi. Separate chapters treat how and why the neo-Taliban were recruited, their organization, their tactics and strategy, and the counterinsurgency efforts of the Afghan government and its outside supporters. With copious cross-referencing, he works in such subjects as the continued involvement of Pakistan, the drug trade, neo-Taliban relations with Al Qaeda, and the rural-versus-urban dimension of this struggle.
Not A Good Day to Die: The Untold History of Operation Anaconda by Sean Naylor. The first half of the book is actually about the US military organization in Afghanistan in 2001-02 and the planning of the largest battle of the war. Best single introduction to military acronyms – should be required reading for anyone headed to the Pak-border area (south and east).


Pashtun Tales from the Pakistan-Afghan Frontier: From the Pakistan-Afghan Frontier by Aisha Ahmad & Roger Boase. These oral tales were collected in the tribal areas on the Pakistan-Afghan frontier, a region described as the last free place on earth. With their blend of wit, fantasy, comedy, and romance, they reflect the Pashtun code of honor and way of life.

Reaping the Whirlwind: Al Qa’ida and the Holy War by Michael Griffin. Provides a cradle-to-grave narrative of Afghanistan's Taliban movement, its relationship with Osama bin Laden, the hatching of the September 11 conspiracy and the war that followed.

Small Wars Manual by the U.S. Marine Corps. Pavilion Press. First published in 1940, this book is full of wisdom on counterinsurgency. This was revised and re-issued in 2007 as joint U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine.

Soldiers of God by Robert D. Kaplan. A view of the mujahideen who really fought and won the war, and are now “conveniently for some” dead.

Soldier Sahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who Tamed India's Northwest Frontier by Charles Allen. Drawing extensively upon diaries, letters, and family mementos as well as his own frequent travels in the northwest region of India, the author recounts a lively chapter out of British colonial history that prominently featured his ancestor Brigadier General John Nicholson.
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia by Ahmed Rashid. By a well-known Pakistani journalist who writes frequently about Afghanistan. Chronicles the rise of the Taliban to power as of 2000, with eerily accurate predictions of what was to follow.

The Afghanistan Wars by William Maley. by Palgrave MacMillan. This is an excellent review of the many wars suffered by Afghanistan and the reasons these wars occurred. A helpful primer for someone spending time in Afghanistan or studying the country or region.

The Bear Trap by Mohammed Yousaf & Mark Adkin. A marvellously skewed view of the jihad and its players from the former head of ISI's Afghan Branch. For those that do not fully appreciate the fact that 85% of the world's proven conspiracy reserves are found in South Asia, this will be an eye-opener. Valuable for getting the ISI perspective.

The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System by Barnett R. Rubin. This book is a complete analysis of the Afghan civil war, from the 1978 communist coup to the fall of Najibullah, the last Soviet-installed president, in 1992. Argues that the GoA's dependence upon foreign aid and self-defeating tribal policies over the past century led to the political fragmentation that culminated in the civil wars in the 1990s.

The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia by Peter Hopkirk. Hopkirk, a former reporter for The Times of London with wide experience of the region, tells an extraordinary story of ambition, intrigue, and military adventure.

The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan by Artyom Borovik. More a personal account than an historical work, Borovik provides some good insights on what life was like for Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.

The Kite Runner by Khaled Hosseini. A bestselling novel by an Afghan-American about a boy growing up in 1970s Kabul and his return there during the Taliban era – an educational and eye-opening account of the country’s political turmoil.

The Man Who Would Be King by Ben McIntyre. A true story of one of the first Americans in Afghanistan, a Quaker who bluffed his way onto the local political scene.
and served the local potentates and worked his way up to warlord. A good insight into 19th Century politics and the roots of the British problems.

The Places in Between by Rory Stewart. The improbable but true story of a former British diplomat’s walk from Herat to Kabul in 2001. The descriptions of the characters and places he encounters along the way make this an unforgettable book. Useful for learning about the mindset, history and cultural heritage of the Afghan people.

The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban by Sarah Chayes. A first-person account of life in Kandahar by a former journalist and NGO activist who lived with a family of 21 people. Chayes documents warlordism, bureaucratic bungling, and other lost opportunities to make better progress in rebuilding the country.

The Road to Oxiana by Robert Byron. Written in the 1930s, this is a travel classic covering both Iran and Afghanistan, the true objective but he keeps getting stuck in Iran. Byron is the one who, upon arriving in Herat, said, “At last – this is Central Asia without an inferiority complex.”

The Sewing Circles of Herat by Christina Lamb. Another first-hand account that paints a vivid picture of Taliban rule and offers a broader sense of life devastated by two decades of war, revealing the heroism of the Afghans, who not only survived but also resisted their Soviet occupiers. She describes clandestine female literary circles and art preservation techniques, for example, which helped Afghans salvage their education and history from total destruction. She interviews Afghan warlords, former members of the Taliban, and Pakistani Taliban patrons Sami-ul-Haq and Hamid Gul.

Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace... One School at a Time by Greg Mortenson and David Relin. An inspirational story of one man's efforts to address poverty, educate girls, and overcome cultural divides by building schools in rural Pakistan.

Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam & the Future of America by Anon. This book, written by a senior U.S. civil servant with nearly two decades of experience in the U.S. intelligence community’s work on Afghanistan and South Asia, describes the motives and determination of radical Muslims like Osama bin Laden and their quest to destroy the West.
Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam by John L. Esposito. Esposito, a professor at Georgetown University, corrects popular misconceptions about this faith. Explains sociopolitical and cultural developments in the Muslim world in a way easily accessible to nonspecialist readers.
Appendix 6 to Annex C: Useful Websites

A sampling of Afghanistan-related web resources:

2. ACBAR Resource and Information Centre (ARIC) - www.afghanresources.org
3. Afghan Civil Society Forum* (ACSF) - www.acsf.af/
5. Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau (ANCB) - www.ancb.org
6. Afghan News Network - www.afghannews.net
7. Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) - wwwadf.gov.af
8. Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) - www.aims.org.af
10. Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) - www.undpanbp.org/index.htm
11. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) - www.areu.org.af
12. Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) - www.acbar.org
15. Canadian International Development Agency - www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/afghanistan-
e
16. Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha - www.unomaha.edu/~world/cas/
23. Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society - www.impacs-afghanistan.org/
24. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) - www.irinnews.org
25. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (for coordination of humanitarian assistance) – www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/
27. Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) - www.jemb.org
29. Ministry of Communications - www.moc.gov.af
32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) – www.afghanistan-mfa.net/
34. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) - www.mrrd.gov.af
36. Pajhwok Afghan News - www.pajhwak.com
37. ReliefWeb - www.reliefweb.int
38. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) - www.unama-afg.org/
41. US Department of State, Rebuilding Afghanistan - http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/rebuilding_afghanistan.html
42. South West Afghanistan and Baluchistan association for Coordination (SWABAC) (HQ in Kandahar) - swabac@yahoo.com
43. United States Agency International Development USAID - www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/afghanistan/
44. World Bank, Afghanistan Pages - www.worldbank.org.af
ANNEX D: SECURITY SECTOR

Appendix 1 to Annex D: The Policy Action Group and the National Security Coordination System

Policy Action Group

The Policy Action Group (PAG) was created in July 2006 in response to the heightened security threat, particularly in the South. The intent was to develop a crisis response mechanism integrating security, intelligence, reconstruction, and public outreach to mitigate the threat and reassure the people in those areas that the central Government was fully engaged in responding to their needs. From the first, the PAG has concentrated on the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Urugzgan and Zabul, although on occasion it has addressed issues outside that area, such as the Kabul Security Plan and the extension of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) to the East. At the same time, when the PAG takes up a predominantly “southern” issue, its discussions can end up having wider implications. Counter narcotics is a case in point as well as governance. The PAG, with its limited membership (only embassies with PRTs or sizeable troop contingents in the South are represented), was never intended to replace the Joint Control and Monitoring Board (JCMB) as a long-term joint policy planning body. Rather, it was intended to focus on specific, short-term objectives, bringing together the combined efforts of the various Ministries, foreign missions, and international military forces in pursuit of specific, agreed objectives. That said, in the absence for now of another well functioning discussion forum bringing together the Afghan authorities, the international military, and foreign missions, the PAG has become an important venue for airing views that in turn contributes to synchronizing the various stakeholders.

Although the President nominally heads the PAG, its biweekly meetings are almost always chaired by the National Security Advisor. The PAG also has a small administrative steering group, known as the Implementation and Coordination Team (IACT). The IACT meets three times a week to review the work of the PAG’s working groups and prepare the PAG agenda. With the creation last year of Governance and Counter Narcotics working groups, the number of such groups – also known in PAG parlance as “pillars” – rose to six. The original four include the Intelligence Fusion
Group, chaired by the National Directorate of Security; the Security Operations Group (SOG), chaired by the Ministry of Defence; the Strategic Communications Working Group, under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Information and Culture; and the Reconstruction and Development Working Group, under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics chairs the Counter Narcotics Working Group; and the R&D Working Group now meets together with the Governance Working Group, with the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) as co-chair.

Regional Security Committees (RSC)

At a meeting of the Policy Action Group (PAG) in December 2006, President Karzai requested that the Regions look at better ways to coordinate regional security. The PAG approved response to this was the Regional Security Committee (RSC) concept, which was accepted on 11 January 2007. The Regional Security Committees are weekly meetings attended by all key security leaders in a Region (regions in this case are based on the five Police Regions). The Chair of the Meeting is the ANA and attendees are: The Regional Commander of Police, the NDS Regional Director, the ABP Commander, the ISAF RC Commander and any other key leader in regional security. The secretariat is formed by CSTC-A PMI Regional Coordinator, an ISAF representative and the Regional representative for UNDSS. The Agenda is proposed by the Secretariat and approved by the Chairman. The minutes taken are provided to the Policy Action Group (Implementation and Coordination Team (IACT) and should be translated into Dari and made available to Afghan channels. The RSC Secretariat is also responsible for ensuring follow up action from RSC decisions and passing coordination and information items to the Joint Regional Coordination Centre (JRCCs) (See National Security Coordination System below). The goal of the RSC is to better coordinate through comprehensive communications and this not only includes the key regional security leaders but also includes Provincial Security Committees, JRCCs and PAG process involvement.

Figure 12: Policy Action Group shows the PAG with its subordinate working groups (pillars).
Figure 12: Policy Action Group

Figure 13: The Link Between the Pag and the Regional Security Committees shows the link between the PAG and the Regional Security Committees.

Figure 13: The Link Between the Pag and the Regional Security Committees
National Security Coordination System

The Minister of Defence is responsible for providing coordinated guidance and direction for security operations across Afghanistan and for facilitating co-ordination between security operations, governance, development, and reconstruction activities. Most importantly, the design is for a fully linked national security coordination system to flow from the MoD/MoI down through the National Military Coordination Centre (NMCC) and the National Police Coordination Centre (NPCC), through five Joint Regional Coordination Centers (JRCCs) to 34 Joint Provincial Coordination Centers (JPCCs). (As of late January 2008, the NMCC and NPCC exist in Kabul, five of the JRCCs exist, and 31 of the JPCCs exist).

Figure 14: National Security Coordination System shows the key components of the national security coordination system.

**Figure 14: National Security Coordination System**

The aim of the National Security Coordination system is to create an Afghan Security Forces nationwide structure for coordinating and synchronizing operations and sharing information and fusing intelligence. The goal of this coordination system is to better
coordinate and allocate ANSF resources and assets across the provinces, regions and the entire country. Until recently there have been only the most rudimentary elements of such a system but efforts are underway at all levels to create a functioning and viable national coordination system from the provincial level all the way up to the Ministries of Defence and Interior and the Office of the National Security Advisor. This section describes this coordination system and process and the role PRTs play in its implementation and support.

Joint Regional Coordination Centers

The concept (led by GIRoA/ISAF and supported by CSTC-A) is the creation of five Joint Regional Coordination Centers that are jointly manned in Kandahar, Gardez, Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-I-Sharif. Each JRCC has its own flavour depending on the region. However, in general terms, the centers conduct regional coordination. This includes reporting procedures up to the NMCC/NPCC and down to the JPCCs. They also work to gather regional intelligence and develop situational awareness of regional ANSF – ANP, Afghan Border Police (ABP) and ANA assets. The intent is to have ANSF representatives in each JRCC (to include the ANP Regional Command, the ANA Corps and other Afghan security entities). The JRCCs also have representatives from the international security community. The PRTs are unlikely to get involved in the development of JRCCs but should certainly be aware of them and how they fit into the overall national coordination process. Joint Provincial Coordination Centers report to JRCCs and Joint District Coordination Centers (JDCCs) report to JPCCs.

Joint Provincial Coordination Centers

The JPCC is also one of the key components in the national coordination system and of much greater interest to PRT Commanders because PRTs have been instrumental in setting up and supporting JPCCs and JDCCs. A JPCC is designed not only to coordinate and de-conflict security and law enforcement efforts but also to connect law enforcement and security actions to the Government. The JPCC is a designated 24/7 operations centre designed to enable ANP, ANA, NDS, Counter Narcotics (CN), international forces and the provincial government to synchronize, coordinate and monitor provincial security and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) combined operations and training.
There are currently 31 existing JPCCs. The only provinces without JPCCs are Daykondi, Samangan and Sar-e Pol.

Historically the PRTs, depending on the province, have played a significant role in standing up the JPCCs. In some cases the PRTs currently help to man JPCCs or provide life support to the ISAF/Coalition manning in PCCs. (In other cases the local FOB mans PCCs.) Regardless, PRTs will continue to play an active role in helping to support existing JPCCs and stand up new JPCCs. This support may range from discussion with the Provincial Governor or Chief of Police on establishing a new JPCC; manning the JPCC; providing manning or life support; or simply hosting the CSTC-A Regional Coordinators.

CSTC Assistance in Setting up JPCCs

On 28 June 2006 CSTC-A approved the following package to help resource existing JPCCs and stand-up remaining JPCCs in every province:

1. To place all JPCCs eventually in Police HQ buildings. Over the next two years a Provincial Police HQ will be financed and built by CSTC-A (Title 22) funds in every province. Into the Statement of Work was added a requirement to build an additional room that would house the JPCC complete with a sleeping area for shift workers. Ideally each JPCC should move to Police HQs because this is in keeping with a philosophy to promote police primacy as directed by central Government.

2. An equipping/communications resource package was approved for each JPCC as follows:
   - Basic office equipment to include furniture, map boards, maps
   - A computer
   - Two Light Tactical Vehicles per JPCC
   - Two CODAN base stations per JPCC and one per vehicle
   - A generator (on a case by case basis)

3. The creation of CSTC-A PMI Regional Coordinators, whose goal to visit each of the JPCCs and accomplish the following:
• Where required, train and bring JPCCs up to Full Operational Capability with the ability to conduct basic 24/7 TOC battle drills, reporting, and operational mapping

• Ensure communications connectivity to the JRCC, ANSF, ABP, ISAF, and identify shortfalls

• Inventory JPCC equipment and identify equipment shortfalls for CSTC-A to fill

• Identify with the local PRT and ISAF, the time line for the move into Police HQ Buildings

• Ascertain current GIRoA and ISAF/Coalition manning for JPCCs and identify shortfalls

JPCCs are part of an enduring GIRoA national security coordination structure, one which has been embraced by the GIRoA in many regions and demonstrated viability in some of the southern and eastern provinces. With the continued support of PRTs and local FOBs, with Tiger Team visits and a healthy resource package, it is intended that JPCCs will continue to flourish and mature. It is also the intention over the next few years that JPCCs can be stood up in all remaining provinces as Police HQ Buildings are built. The JPCC initiative will require PRT interest and ownership on behalf of ISAF(?), and PRT Commanders are urged to actively support existing JPCCs. In provinces where there is no JPCC, PRT Commanders are urged to actively seek the support of local Governors and Chief of Police to stand-up a JPCC in Police HQ Buildings (or Governors compounds). In several provinces the PRTs are also actively helping to establish and to support JDCCs, which replicate the JPCCs’ 24/7 “common operational picture” effort at the district level.

For assistance in Regional Coordinator visits and resourcing JPCCs, the PRTs should contact CSTC-A, Political Military Integration, DSN 237 3703/3368.)
Figure 15: Policy Action Group Process – from the Strategic to the Tactical
Appendix 2 to Annex D: Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

ANSF

The two main elements of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The manning, training, equipping and mentoring of the ANA and ANP are two of the five pillars of security sector reform (SSR).\(^{20}\)

Afghan National Army (ANA)

Introduction

The Army in Afghanistan has historically been one of the few genuinely national institutions in a country divided by geography, ethnicity, language and tribal loyalty. After the Soviet occupation and the fall of the Najibullah Government in 1992, the Army split along ethnic and tribal lines and ceased to exist as a national institution.

After the fall of the Taliban a project to build a new national Army of between 50 – 70,000 soldiers, based in five regional Corps and with national training and sustaining institutions, was begun under the security sector reform line of operation. The U.S. became the lead nation and it created Task Force Phoenix, a multinational coalition to train, sustain and mentor a new, integrated Afghan National Army – the ANA.

Clearly this was a huge undertaking. Little remained of the old Army. Much of the infrastructure was in ruins. Although there were plenty of men with military experience from the decades of conflict, there were few with sufficient training and experience to run a modern, professional Army.

\(^{20}\) The three other pillars of SSR, as defined in the 2002 Bonn Agreement, are 1) Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration, led by Japan, 2) Judicial Reform led by Italy, and 3) Counter Narcotics led by the UK. However, formal “lead nation” designations were dropped in August 2007 to invite broader international participation.
Training and Fielding

The ANA is recruited nationwide and all recruits receive their initial training at Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC) which runs courses for Officers, SNCO’s and soldiers. KMTC is the main military school and is reinforced by other three Regional Military Training Centers located in Herat, Ghazni and Mazar-e-Sharif. The different courses are run in accordance with a fielding plan to build the five Corps with 14 Brigades by the end of 2008. The plan ensures the ethnic balance of every Kandak (Afghan Battalion).

TF Phoenix provides support in the form of Embedded Training Teams (ETT) and Logistic Support Teams (LSTs). These 16-20 man teams provide continued training, operational and logistic support to the different ANA units, at the Corps, Brigade and Kandak levels. ETTs monitor the progress of units and provide capability assessments with the aim of bringing units to capabilities whereby they no longer require ISAF/Coalition support.

ISAF assumed a portion of the ANA training by deploying Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to replace ETTs in some cases, or sharing the burden in others cases.

The partnering of ANA units with Coalition and ISAF units has been increased in order to accelerate the development of the ANA.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The development of the Afghan National Police has been even more difficult than that of the ANA as there was an immediate requirement for police. Therefore, much of the training policy and development has had to be done retrospectively, and mostly in the absence of sound judicial reform. Current ANA manning is at approximately 63,200. It will be just over 70,000 by the end of 2008.

ANP Support

The initial lead partner nation for the development of the ANP was Germany, although involvement from other nations in ANP training is steadily broadening, which deployed the German Police Project (GPPO). The work of the GPPO focussed primarily, but not exclusively, on delivering a sustainable long-term capability in the ANP. This involved
working closely with the MOI on matters as diverse as: structures; recruitment, selection and training (and, in particular, the selection and training of key leaders); pay and conditions of service; and ethos. It also includes the delivery of key training at the Afghan National Police Academy. The political coordination takes place in Kabul. On 17 June 2007, the European Union assumed the duties of the GPPO and formed the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL).

The U.S. is the major contributor of funds in the area of police reform and works in close partnership with the key partner nation and EUPOL. At CSTC-A, the Police Reform Directorate (PRD) is responsible for the mentoring of the MOI and ANP leadership, the delivery of training at the Regional Training Centres (RTCs), and resourcing and supporting the ANP. It also has a remit to provide training and mentoring support to regional, provincial and local police commanders, although, here its delivery is hampered by resource constraints. To improve this situation CSTC-A has solicited mentor assistance from EUPOL and the International Community.

Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)

President Karzai decreed the stand up of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) in October 2006. The creation of the ANAP was a way for the Afghan Government to increase the number of policeman without involving the London Compact, which had decreed at the time a ceiling of 62,000 police. The Afghans believed that this was a woeful underestimation of the number of police required.

The ANAP programme recruited and trained ANAP in the following Provinces only (any ANAP outside these Provinces are not “true” ANAP and are likely to be militia men): Helmand, Zabul, Nimruz, Ghazni, Kunar, Paktia, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Lowgar, Ghowr, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daykondi, Khowst, Paktika, Laghman, Vardak, Nurestan, Farah, Herat, and Faryab.

The ANAP are designed primarily as “local police” and are recruited and vetted through local shuras and MOI recruitment personnel. Each recruit is carefully vetted and recommended for training by a guarantor. During the recruitment special care is taken to ensure that there is tribal balance that represents the locale. The objective is to recruit local police to police locally, but this is not always possible. When local ANAP recruits cannot be found then recruiting can be from the District and then the Province, and then as a last resort outside of the Province. The recruits receive two weeks of basic
police and weapons training and are provided with weapons and uniforms to go back to their communities for police duties. The ANAP is a one-year programme, which means after the year is up the ANAP recruit is released. During his year of service the ANAP policeman can expect to receive a further three weeks of sustainment training. After his initial year of service, coupled with three weeks of Sustainment Training and a letter of recommendation from his District Chief of Police, the ANAP is eligible for transfer to any other police department, and qualified Auxiliary Policemen are being encouraged to transfer over to the ANP.

The ANAP recruits are paid through international contribution through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and they receive their money in the same way the ANA receive their pay.

As of October 2007 approximately 96% of the ANAP target figure was reached and recruiting was suspended. The expectation is that it will be October 2008 before all ANAP are trained, just as the programme concludes. The ANA is currently building to an 80,000 personnel structure. They will complete it around January 2010. The MOD and CSTC-A are expected to approve a 122,000 personnel structure.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

The GOA, with the assistance of CSTC-A, began to stand up the Afghan National Civil Order Police (formerly the Civil Order Maintenance and Constabulary Police) in early 2007. This police force consists of two types of units:

a. Urban units, which can be deployed to the major cities in the country (Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz, Mazar-e Sharif) to deal with urban unrest, civil disorder and national emergencies.

b. Rural Patrol units, which provide a mobile police presence along the Ring Road and in high-threat remote areas where there is currently no ANSF or ISAF presence.

The ANCOP are better trained and equipped than the regular ANP in order to provide a reliable and rapid police response to difficult situations and emergencies. The ANCOP receive 16 weeks of training, twice as much as the normal ANP. The urban units also receive six weeks of specialty training in crowd control techniques, while the rural patrol units receive specialty training on techniques required to enforce the rule of law in
remote, high-threat areas. The ANCOP are being equipped with armored vehicles (instead of the unarmored Ford Ranger trucks typically used by the ANP) and are issued newer weapons. The ANCOP also benefit from a more rapid promotion system, which has the effect of significantly increasing their pay. The intent is that the higher pay will discourage corruption, encourage better behaviour and improve retention.

The first urban unit began training in January 2007 in Mazar-e Sharif. Upon completion of training in May 2007, the unit deployed to Kabul. The first patrol unit began training in Herat in February 2007. Upon completion of training in June 2007, it deployed to Kandahar. Currently all five Battalions which have been fielded are employed to backfill police districts.

Under FDD, ANCOP forces are being deployed to hold specific districts as entire district ANP units receive additional training at the RTCs for several weeks.

ISAF’s role: RCs and PRTs

The majority of ISAF’s support for the ANSF is delivered through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), while coordination of support to ANP development lies with the Regional Commands. Their nominated lead is responsible for ANP development and support. ANP Development Working Groups have been formed in all Regions to coordinate ISAF support to the ANP.

**PRTs**

PRTs provide much needed situational awareness (SA) of this key component of SSR. The Police Liaison Cells (PLCs) in the PRTs are the key to providing situational awareness and support. Establishing broadly common structures and working practices in the PLCs is essential if the GIRoA and ISAF are to bring coherence to the development of the ANP.

**Regional Commands (RCs)**

RCs have a key role through their Regional ANP Development WGs in bringing coherence to development support.

**HQ ISAF**

ISAF’s Directorate of ANA Training and Equipment Support (DATES) is the lead branch for monitoring ANA and ANP development and is the primary interface with
CSTC-A. Together they seek to bring coherence to the support that ISAF provides to ANSF development by providing direction, disseminating information and collating and analysing information from the RCs.

Conclusion

The development of the ANSF is a substantial long-term project and one that is key to the success of the international community’s mission. It is also a project that must be completed whilst simultaneously combating a relentless insurgency. An essential element is therefore achieving a balance between capability building and short-term operational effect within the framework of the Afghanistan Compact and the already achieved reform steps.
Appendix 3 to Annex D: Disbandment Of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)

The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) is one of the five strands of security sector reform and is therefore critical for the achievement of lasting stability in Afghanistan. The DIAG program aims to disband those illegal armed groups that exist outside the security structures of the Afghan government and use their arms to engage in illegal activities or otherwise undermine government authority.

Unlike the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, which targeted the official units of the Ministry of Defense, DIAG does not provide reintegration benefits to individuals. The program instead offers development projects to communities where the DIAG Joint Secretariat has deemed the targeted IAGs to have disbanded; funds for these projects currently stand at $15 million, provided by Japan, and are channeled through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).

The first phase of DIAG was directed at IAG commanders who were contesting seats during the 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections (NAPCE); the process resulted in the disqualification of 34 candidates and the collection of 4,857 weapons. The main phase of DIAG was launched in five provinces – Kapisa, Herat, Farah, Takhar, and Laghman – between 1 May and 7 June 2006.

Each member agency of the Joint Secretariat – the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the National Security Department, UNAMA, and ISAF – has a role to play in contributing information, planning operations, and using their good offices to encourage compliance.

\[21\] The four other strands of SSR, as defined in the 2002 Bonn Agreement, are 1) the manning, training, equipping and mentoring of the Afghan National Army (ANA), led by the U.S., 2) the manning, training, equipping and mentoring of the Afghan National Police (ANP), led by Germany, 3) judicial reform led by Italy, and 4) counternarcotics led by the UK.
What PRTs can do to support DIAG

PRT support is critical to DIAG’s success, given the continued influence of IAG commanders locally and the relative weakness of provincial government institutions. Support functions may include (but are not limited to):

- Promotion of DIAG through public information efforts, coordinated with the Joint Secretariat’s public information section.
- Active participation in meetings of DIAG provincial committees.
- Provision of intelligence to the Joint Secretariat through ISAF representatives in the Joint Secretariat on IAG weapons stocks and criminal activities.
- Coordination of development plans with the Joint Secretariat’s development section and MRRD.
- Ensuring PRT Commander presence at DIAG-related events hosted by the provincial governor.
- Meeting with IAG commanders and encouraging them to comply voluntarily with DIAG.
- Increasing the frequency of PRT patrols in districts targeted by the Joint Secretariat.
- Providing logistical support, including airlift for negotiators to remote districts.
- Providing perimeter support for enforcement operations by the Ministry of Interior.
- Gathering and assessing community perceptions of DIAG enforcement.

For further guidance on PRT support to the DIAG process, see Policy Note Number 2 endorsed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) on December 7, 2006 (Annex B, Appendix 5).

Best practice – PRT Kunduz
The extent to which individual PRTs have supported DIAG has varied considerably. A good example of affirmative engagement on the part of a PRT, which could serve as a “best practices” model, is that provided by the Kunduz PRT to NAPCE DIAG.

At the end of May 2005, there were large-scale public demonstrations against Piram Qul, a powerful IAG commander and National Assembly candidate in Rustaq, a mountainous district in northeastern Takhar province. An ISAF flyover dispersed Piram Qul’s militiamen, who had taken up positions around the demonstrators in the district center. The PRT followed up on this intervention with a variety of deconflicting measures, planned and executed in close coordination with UNAMA and the recently appointed, and locally popular, district Chief of Police. The German PRT commander increased the frequency of PRT patrols in Rustaq. The patrols, conducted jointly with the Police Chief in order to bolster his authority within the district, regularly consulted with elders and other community leaders on their perceptions of local security conditions.

The PRT Commander also provided airlift to UNAMA and ANBP representatives going to Rustaq, and participated in their meetings with Piram Qul and his opposition. The PRT Commander arranged for the transportation of weapons and ammunition to the provincial capital, which Piram Qul as a candidate was obligated to surrender, and secured the weapons storage site in the district until the handover could be arranged. The PRT also carried out assessments of potential development projects in the district and committed a substantial amount of funds to the implementation of those projects.22

The active involvement of the PRT in supporting NAPCE DIAG in Rustaq not only helped avert a potentially violent conflict, but strengthened the government’s authority in a remote and previously IAG-controlled area, ensured a significantly higher weapons turnover than was otherwise likely and won enduring appreciation for the international community’s presence from the local population.

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22 Humanitarian assistance should never be linked with DIAG.
Appendix 4 to Annex D: Counternarcotics

Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan

With the exception of Khosh valley in Badakhshan province, poppy cultivation started in Afghanistan during the 1980s and increased significantly during the 1990s. Key cultivation provinces during the 1990s were Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Badakhshan, as well as some other provinces in the southern and eastern regions. The Taliban imposed a strict ban in 2001, and poppy cultivation decreased to a minimum level during that year. Since 2002, cultivation has further increased and expanded to other provinces, in particular to the northwestern region (e.g. Balkh).

Afghanistan now accounts for almost 90% of the global production of opiates (opium and its refined product heroin). The total profit made from opium production has been estimated by UNODC at around almost 50% of the licit GDP (i.e. not including opium profits). Of this, 80% is made at the trafficking level (which is often invested outside the country) and only 20% goes to farmers.

The spread of cultivation throughout the country further confirmed that the driving force behind poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is not primarily poverty, but drug traffickers and warlords who maintain strong power over their territories and have no interest in, and thus undermine, the establishment of governance and rule of law. The cultivation, trafficking, processing, and sale of opium poppy contribute to an environment of corruption and criminality and to political and economic instability. Curbing this trend is the single greatest challenge to the long term security, development and effective governance of Afghanistan.

Structure and Responsibilities of Drug Control in Afghanistan

The Ministry of Counternarcotics (MCN) formulates CN policy, but it must coordinate with other agencies in order to execute that policy. MCN does not directly control most of the assets required for CN operations. The Minister for Counternarcotics chairs a cabinet Sub-Committee on Counternarcotics to exercise coordination among key line ministries. The Ministry of Interior has responsibility for the implementation of drug law enforcement and poppy eradication activities. As such, a Deputy Minister on
Counternarcotics has been created within the Ministry of Interior. On the development side, other line Ministries, including Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Energy and Water, Ministry of Public Works, and others, have implementation responsibility for alternative livelihoods. Roles and responsibility are also defined in the Law on Narcotics.

From the international community, the United Kingdom is lead nation on counternarcotics, which is one of the five strands of security sector reform.23 The UK and the U.S. are the main donors for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main UN body on drug control and criminal justice reform in Afghanistan. UNODC mainly acts in an advisory role to the Government of Afghanistan. Additionally, UNODC carries out monitoring, including on the extent of annual poppy cultivation and trends in drug abuse.

Counternarcotics Law and Strategy

The MCN, with support from the international community, has prepared a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), which was formally launched at the London Conference in January 2006. The Strategy consists of eight pillars: (i) capacity/institution building, (ii) drug law enforcement, (iii) alternative livelihoods, (iv) drug demand reduction, (v) awareness raising, (vi) criminal justice reform, (vii) eradication, and (viii) regional and international cooperation. The first four pillars have been identified as priorities.

On the basis of an existing law, which was issued in 2003, a new Law on Narcotics was prepared in 2005 and adopted on 17 December 2005. The law establishes procedures for investigating and prosecuting major drug trafficking offenses. It defines penalties and establishes Narcotics Tribunals. The law further establishes a Drug Regulation Committee which controls the licit movements of drugs for medical purposes with a view to ensure sufficient availability of medical drugs while avoiding non-controlled drug use causing addiction.

23 The four other strands of SSR, as defined in the 2002 Bonn Agreement, are 1) the manning, training, equipping and mentoring of the Afghan National Army (ANA), led by the U.S., 2) the manning, training, equipping and mentoring of the Afghan National Police (ANP), led by Germany, 3) the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG), led by Japan, and 4) judicial reform, led by Italy.
Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF)

To support the implementation of counter narcotics activities, in particular with regard to alternative livelihoods, a Counter Narcotics Trust Fund was established in 2005, which became officially operational in January 2006. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics has main responsibility over the Fund, with administrative support provided by UNDP.

Poppy Elimination Program (PEP)

It was recognized during 2005 that in order for the NDCS to be successful, there needed to be efficient structures to plan and allocate resources at the provincial and district level. Therefore today, in parallel with an overall trend towards provincial-based delivery of national policies and economic development, the focus of counter narcotics has begun to shift to the provincial level as well. This decentralization of Afghanistan’s counter narcotics efforts is being realized through the implementation of the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP).

PEP is a program of the MCN, supported by the U.S. and UK governments. PEP conducts a year-round campaign that aims to reduce poppy cultivation at the provincial level by conducting outreach activities and providing direct support to the governor as part of the MCN’s province-based implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. The MCN PEP teams support the Governors’ CN efforts by providing three areas of expertise: 1) development liaison, 2) community outreach, and 3) monitoring farmer’s intentions and activity.

PEP staff are employees of the ministry, who are attached to the governors’ offices and report to the PEP Director at the MCN in Kabul. Together with the MCN PEP staff in Kabul, they oversee PEP operations. At provincial level, the PEP teams are made up of a team leader, public information officer, an alternative livelihoods officer, a monitoring and verification officer and an international advisor.

Where is PEP Operating?

PEP has deployed teams to Afghanistan’s major poppy-producing provinces: Badakhshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Uruzgan. PEP offices are typically located at the provincial governor’s compound and the Governors provide office and meeting space, materials, and communication infrastructure for all PEP staff. ISAF has agreed to house PEP international advisors at ISAF PRTs, thereby building in
the coordination mechanism as well as counternarcotics subject matter expertise within the PRTs.

The Role of PRTs in Counternarcotics

ISAF does not engage in direct operations against the narcotics industry, including destroying narcotics production labs, eradicating poppy fields or targeting drug traffickers for arrest. However, as provided in the ISAF OPLAN, there are many useful things that PRTs can do in support of the GOA's counternarcotics strategy that fall short of direct operations:

- Report narcotic-related information obtained during normal operations (such as the location of poppy fields, or the latest information volunteered by contacts)
- Seize and secure drugs, associated equipment and traffickers discovered in the normal course of routine operations.
- Provide logistical and security support to international CN agencies upon request.
- Train the Afghan security forces in techniques that will be useful in CN work, such as vehicle searches, cordon-and-search operations and checkpoints.
- Provide support for the GOA's information operations campaign against narcotics.
Appendix 5 to Annex D: Programme TAHKM·E·SOHL (PTS)

Purpose

This appendix establishes guidance and responsibilities for the interaction between PRTs and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) Program Tahkm·e·Sohl (PTS) field offices. It is the intent of the PTS field offices to maintain a low profile and not consistently interact with other GIRoA agencies and Coalition or ISAF forces. However, it is essential the PRT and PTS offices periodically work together to ensure lines of communication are established and remain open for information exchange.

Intent

The Program Takhm·e·Solh, “Strengthening through Peace” has been successful in taking enemy combatants off the battlefield. This program is run by the PTS Commission Office in Kabul; however given the distance from Kabul, logistical support is often disrupted. PRTs which have PTS field offices within their security/support umbrella should make all efforts to contact the PTS field office site manager and schedule periodic meetings. If requested, PRTs can provide material support (within capabilities) to enable these offices to continue operations.

Background

The PTS is a GIRoA program in all respects. The reconciliation process is Afghan owned and the IC does not interfere with it. CSTC·A is mentoring the program, whereas NATO/ISAF and other organizations are playing a supporting role. Formally announced on 9 May 2005, the program is designed to repatriate non-criminal former combatants and insurgents such as the Taliban, HiG, and other Anti-Coalition militia back into mainstream Afghan society. The PRT Commander should be aware of who the PTS field office manager is attempting to recruit in order to not disrupt PTS recruiting efforts.
PTS Locations (January 08):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PTS Field Office</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asadabad</td>
<td>0700 08 83 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>0799 64 07 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardez</td>
<td>0799 14 29 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>0799 16 17 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>0700 17 59 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>0799 27 20 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohst</td>
<td>0799 13 46 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>0799 17 82 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Gah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalat</td>
<td>0700 30 15 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>0700 33 08 97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: PTS Field Office Contact Information

Suggested PRT Responsibilities

- The PRT commander or representative can have a positive impact for PTS by communicating with Governors, village elders, local police, and other influential people in the provinces, encouraging PTS reconciliation. The PTS regional offices operate on a very limited budget and assets. PRT should assist them when operational constraints allow.

- Designate a PRT member (often the political officer) as the PTS liaison officer (LNO).

- The PRT should conduct meetings on a regular basis with PTS counterparts to discuss mission and support requirements. The main areas for discussion, review, and action are ways the PRTs can assist and enable the PTS offices with reconciliation activities. PRT leaders must work within their legal and military framework in providing PTS offices with required support. Logistics, communications, transportation, and security are a few topic areas which the PRT and PTS leaders can discuss.

- Minutes from meetings with the PTS, or any other information concerning PTS, should be forwarded to HQ ISAF CJ5 through the chain of command.
The PTS Central Office in Kabul will host an annual PTS-PRT meeting in Kabul during the last quarter of the calendar year.

Property. The PRT will maintain equipment accountability for all Coalition/PRT loaned equipment. PRTs will conduct monthly non-intrusive inventories and report shortages, damages, and losses to NATO/ISAF CJ5.

Media Operations. This is the responsibility of the Embassies. On request PRTs can assist by distributing PTS media messages and by providing feedback on them. PRTs are not to take their own initiative in this domain.

Public Affairs. It is essential that the PRTs realize that PTS operations are sensitive and must always maintain Afghan-only leadership. Therefore, public interviews of PTS officers and reconcilers are prohibited without the direct consent of CSTC-A or NATO/ISAF.

PRTs do not offer close protection, nor accommodation to possible reconcilees.

Table 5: Suggested PRT Responsibilities
Appendix 6 to Annex D: PRT Provincial Assessment and Conflict Assessment Tools

Introduction

A provincial assessment situation analysis, including a conflict assessment, is part of the PRT planning process. Mission Analysis should be performed prior to beginning an assessment as it provides a lens through which to examine the environment. In most cases, ISAF’s interests are to alleviate the causes of conflict/instability while simultaneously increasing the capacity of local institutions (especially the government) to manage these causes with minimal ISAF support. However, it must be recognized that stability is not always the one and only goal of ISAF. Policy documents acknowledge that ISAF, like the GIRoA, is interested in creating a specific type of internally stable Afghanistan, most notably one that contributes positively to regional and global stability and security. For many PRTs the mission will be to create stability. Therefore the primary purpose of an assessment will be to assess the causes of conflict and instability. However, for other PRTs the mission may be distinctly different. For this reason, this Annex is entitled Provincial Assessment and Conflict Assessment Tools to recognize this broader purpose. The methodology and considerations put forth in this annex are comprehensive enough to be useful for all the possible missions assigned to a PRT. A provincial assessment/conflict/instability assessment will be referred to as an assessment for the remainder of the document.

This Annex also departs from traditional conflict assessment methodologies because it presumes that combat operations are a legitimate prescriptive activity that will result from the planning process. A PRT is composed of all 3 Ds (Defense, Development, and Diplomacy) because it is anticipated that the planning a PRT conducts will result in interventions that require all the capabilities of the 3 Ds to include potential combat operations. Whereas most stability operations involve non-combat activities, it may be necessary to conduct a combat operation to shape decisive stabilization activities.

The purpose of a situational assessment is to ensure that all ISAF elements operating in the PRT are operating with a common understanding of the dynamics shaping the environment in question. The assessment should be the basis on which a mission is both defined, and the way in which it is carried out (plans and tactics).
The assessment process enables a multidisciplinary team to articulate different perspectives of the dynamics shaping instability in the province or otherwise, key actors and dynamics that are aiding or impeding mission accomplishment. An interagency team is engaged to analyze local dynamics affecting stability (e.g. to support factors that are mitigating instability and to undermine factors that are driving instability through complementary 3-D approaches). An interdisciplinary assessment of dynamics enables the ISAF team to achieve an integrated plan that is flexible and adaptable to a changing dynamic on the ground. Assessment is therefore the first step in planning and also an iterative aspect of planning and plan execution. Continual examination of local dynamics and fine-tuning of the PRT tactics will be required.

The PRT will limit the focus of their assessment to the assigned AOR. However, their area of interest may extend beyond their province to the national capital, neighbouring provinces or even across certain international borders to areas of ethnic, cultural, and social relevance to the environment of their province. For example, local dynamics between identity groups are often influenced by key actors or stakeholder groups that operate or are located outside of the AOR, such as in the national government, national or transnational crime networks or perhaps through the diaspora community. External factors must be explored and better understood if the intention is to address a systemic problem or “impediment” to mission accomplishment.

The assessment is commissioned by the Core Planning Group under the authority of the Integrated Command Group (see section IV PRT Management and Structure). The CPG has the discretion to determine who completes the assessment and how. There are a number factors to consider when deciding how to pursue an assessment. PRTs should seek to “see” the environment from the perspective of the local population. This can be achieved by triangulating on information using interviews and surveys and tapping into local institutions such as government and Afghan NGOs. The PRT’s own in-house assets including military intelligence, political analysis, development advice, and police mentoring, NGO and civil society partners can all bring a different perspective to the table that can help the PRT triangulate to better ascertain the drivers of conflict. UNAMA is also an excellent resource to include in the exercise. Those doing the assessment must be non-partisan neutral parties, or as close as the PRT can get to them. Assessment expertise is available in the form of “reach-back” through ISAF channels as well as those of individual agencies.
Ideally, the PRT should be assessing the environment constantly. A baseline assessment, against which progress or success can be measured, will also need to be conducted as part of the planning process. Continuous assessment can be carried out by all members of the PRT who interact in the local environment and gather information in the pursuit of daily activities. Quarterly, semi-annual, or annual assessments are recommended to coincide with revisions of the multi-year provincial support plan revision process.

There are various methodologies for performing an assessment. It is the responsibility of planners to select the methodology that will generate the most useful product for use in their planning. For example, the U.S. uses an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework that engages multiple agency perspectives in examining the root causes of conflict as a first step towards a more effective and coordinated planning and response. A methodology is presented below based on the USG’s best practices in conflict prevention and response.

Performing an Assessment

*Steps to performing a situational or conflict assessment*

1. Analyze the local situation:
   a. Identity groups, societal patterns and institutional performance (structures)
   b. Core grievances and areas of social and institutional resilience (causes)
   c. Key actors, their motivations and means (actors, stakeholders)
   d. Drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, (dynamics, inter-linkages between the above components)
   e. Opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict/instability (scenarios)

2. Map current efforts to address dynamics and opportunities (capacity analysis)

3. Apply targeting and prioritization criteria

4. Identify hypothesis
Step 1A

Situational analysis requires an understanding of the local context. Context can be described as conditions that are often long-standing and resistant to change. An understanding of the context begins with an understanding of structures: Identity groups, societal patterns and institutional performance.

- **Identity Groups** are groups of people that identify with each other, often on the basis of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them (e.g., ethnicity, race, nationality, age, gender); identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups’ interests and needs compete with and jeopardize their security, identity or survival.

- **Societal Patterns** primarily associated with conflict are those that reinforce group cleavages, including the following, alone or in combination: Elitism, Exclusion, Corruption/Rent-seeking, Chronic capacity deficits (e.g., systematic stagnation, necessary resources, ungoverned space), and Unmet expectations (e.g., lack of a peace dividend, disillusionment and alienation). Impacts often include negative economic consequences for the disadvantaged group.

- **Institutional Performance** analysis identifies which formal (e.g., national and local governments, public schools, police, banks and economic institutions) and informal social structures (e.g., bureaucratic norms and patrimonialism) are performing poorly or well and are instigating conflict and instability or managing it, particularly as these institutions regulate the impact of contextual factors on identity groups.

Step 1B

Once the structural components of the local environment are defined, the next step is an analysis of the core grievances and areas of institutional resilience. Core grievances arise from people’s perceptions that other people or formal or informal institutions are to blame for their inability to satisfy their basic needs for security, identity or recognition. Sources of social and institutional resilience are evident in the social relationships, structures or processes in place and able to help this population meet their needs through non-violent means.

The PRT should strive to understand these core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience by collecting information from interviews of country-specific
specialists within and beyond ISAF, interviews of representatives of the various groups involved in the conflict, from the intelligence community, through existing research and analyzing secondary sources. Analysis should begin by attempting to identify and analyze the relevant context, identity groups, societal patterns, and institutional performance. The PRT should seek to describe identity groups’ perceptions of threats to their security and who they hold responsible for these perceived threats. The role that societal patterns and informal institutions play in reinforcing groups’ perceptions of deprivation or threat to their security, identity and recognition must be factored in. The PRT should also explore the cleavages between groups, and/or social relationships, structures or processes that are in place and able to help groups meet their needs through non-violent means, and explain how good or poor institutional performance affects the type and level of conflict.

*Step 1C*

The PRT should next seek to identify key actors and understand whether they are motivated to mobilize constituencies to continue the conflict or to manage or mitigate the conflict. The team should also identify what means are at their disposal. Key Actors are people or organizations who, because of their leadership abilities or power, are related to societal patterns/institutional performance, and are able to shape perceptions and actions and mobilize people around core grievances and mitigating factors. The PRT should look for key actors in the police force, corrections system, civil service, professional bureaucracy, judicial system, military, and social leadership. The PRT can understand key actors’ motivations and means by describing WHAT motivates key actors to exert influence on each of the political, economic, social, and security sectors and HOW they exert influence. Key actors become drivers of conflict when they have the motivations and means to mobilize their constituencies around core grievances and inflame or continue conflict. Mitigating Factors provide key actors with peaceful alternatives for mobilizing identity groups in pursuit of social, political and economic gains.

*Step 1D*

To determine the drivers of conflict/instability and mitigating factors, the PRT should identify key actors that are central to producing or perpetuating the societal patterns identified earlier. The PRT should identify key actor objectives that promote violence or promote peaceful alternatives, the means and resources available to key actors to
accomplish those objectives, and resources that may be available to or controlled by key actors. The PRT should try to understand why and by what means these key actors mobilize constituencies around core grievances and how sources of social and institutional resilience may be leveraged to undermine, or support, the dynamics that are driving or mitigating instability and/or conflict. Understanding the dynamic relationships between contextual factors may require time, consideration and consultation with outside sources. Each PRT member will bring different perspectives and their own respective purview to the situational analysis. Understanding driving and mitigating dynamics is critical to effective response; the PRT is advised to seek outsider insight prior to designing responses that may have inverse effects.

**Step 1E: Opportunities for Increasing and Decreasing Conflict.**

The PRT should next identify potential situations that could contribute to an increase in conflict and potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating conflict and promoting stability. These “windows” are events or occasions – contrasted with descriptions of context – that may provoke negative or positive changes in the status quo. Windows of Vulnerability are potential situations that could trigger escalation of conflict (e.g., by contributing to confirmation of the perceptions underlying core grievances), and often result from large-scale responses. Windows of Opportunity describe the potential situations that could enable significant progress toward stable peace (e.g., through conditions where core grievances can be challenged or begin to be addressed and sources of social and institutional resilience can be bolstered) such as those where overarching identities (tribe versus sub-tribe or clan) become important to disputing groups. In order to address them, the PRT seeks to identify events which may provide openings for key actors (including external parties) to increase conflict such as elections, assassinations, or other actions by disgruntled followers and excluded parties. Alternatively, these events could be conducive to ISAF actions to decrease conflict, such as instances when insurgent attacks backfire or even when natural disaster impacts multiple groups, or other externalities require a unified response.

**Step 2: Map Dynamic Interrelation of the Factors**

Each of the factors described above relate to each other in a number of dynamic and complex ways. Information gathered in step 1 should enable the PRT to map these relationships. One of the most useful ways to understand the interaction of each of these factors is record their causal relationships using a causal diagram and/or a
narrative. In a causal diagram major factors are related in such a way as to depict what will happen to other factors if one factor is “increased” or “decreased”. This depiction results in positive or negative causal loops. For example, an increase in the population’s support for local government increases the effectiveness of local government and an increase in the effectiveness of local government increases the population’s support for local government. If such a causal loop is “stuck” in a downward spiral, it is referred to as a vicious cycle, if stuck in an upward spiral, it is a virtuous cycle.

Many of the factors recorded and the relationships between them will be hypothesized. The PRT should carefully record the certainty with which they “know” this information.

*Step 3 – Apply Targeting and Prioritization Criteria*

After mapping the causal relationships, the PRT should analyze which factors and relationships between factors it should target with its interventions. When performing this analysis, the PRT should seek to prioritize targets based on a number of factors: Criticality is the importance or the factor or relationship relative to other potential points of intervention. Accessibility is the ability of the PRT to actually access and apply transformative effects on the factor or relationship. Recoverability is the ability of the factor or relationship to regenerate or revert back to its pre-intervention state. Vulnerability is the susceptibility of the factor or relationship to being affected. Effect is how wide-ranging or big an impact an intervention will create. Recognition represents the PRTs ability to correctly identify and understand the true nature of the factor or relationship. The PRT must correctly calculate how its own actions (or inaction) can positively or negatively influence these complex relationships.

*Step 4 - Identify Hypothesis*

The PRT should explicitly state its “transformative hypothesis” – the expected results of its general and specific actions to positively affect the environment, particularly in strengthening local governance and stability. This then becomes the basis for prescriptive actions described in step 3 of the planning process as outlined in Section III.

After the Assessment

If the PRT is operating in an environment where no other outside interventions or (more likely) in which substantial previous interventions have taken place, the PRT proceeds to the next step of the planning process – determining prescriptive action.
ANNEX E: GOVERNANCE / HUMAN RIGHTS / DIPLOMACY

Appendix 1 to Annex E: PRT Interaction with the Provincial Government

Informed, Coordinated Approach Is Best

PRTs should endeavor to understand the provincial government structure, how it functions, and the lines of communication and levels of capacity. PRT members with local government experience will have increased credibility with government officials and can build productive relationships. For example, a previous PRT unit in Kandahar had a New York prosecutor on their team. The CIMIC Chief of another PRT contingent was a former mayor in Canada. Both were able to build excellent relations with government officials.

It is important to ensure if there is a maneuver battalion in the same province as a PRT, communication with local officials is coordinated. In some cases, the PRT will meet and discuss issues with the Governor, reach certain conclusions and then the maneuver battalion Commander will visit the Governor, discuss the same issues and reach different conclusions. No only does this waste people’s time, but the mixed messages are counter-productive.

Similarly, the military and civilian components of the PRT should coordinate their interactions with the governor and other key provincial officials to ensure that the PRT speaks with one voice and prevents a united front. This coordination should be done a regular basis at meetings of the PRT’s integrated command group.

Facilitating Communication Between Departments

The PRT should examine how its interactions with the government can increase functionality. For example, if the PRT includes relevant departments in all phases of project development, this will have the secondary effect of encouraging communication and coordination between departments and discourage stovepiping of information. The focus should be on strengthening the institutions, not the individuals holding those positions, though it is important to increase their capacity. However, it must be understood that it takes a long time for capacity building efforts to show significant
results. PRTs need to accept that they will most likely have to continue working with a relatively inefficient sub-national government for the entirety of their tour.

Linking the Center and Periphery

However, one of the most useful “projects” the PRT can undertake is to team up with local government officials in advocating for ministerial visits and working with the regional command to provide logistical support for these visits. This assists the ministers in getting out to the provinces to talk to the people, facilitating the link between the center and periphery. For example, the Zabul PRT worked with the Governor and Director of Health, maneuver battalion, regional command and the USAID Health Officer in Kabul to arrange a visit by the Minister of Health, Minister Fatime, to Qalat. The visit, the first by any minister in the current government, yielded overwhelmingly positive results.

PRTs can also be of great assistance in encouraging and facilitating visits by the Governor and other local officials, including provincial council members, to districts that are insecure and/or difficult to access by providing transport and security. These visits encourage communication between government officials and the local populace. This allows the officials to better understand communities’ needs and increases the legitimacy and credibility of these officials in the eyes of the people.

Provincial Councils (PC)

The Constitution states in Article 138 that PCs should “take part in securing the development targets of the state and improving its affairs in a way stated by law” and give “advice on important issues falling within the domain” of each province. In addition, the councils are to perform “their duties in cooperation with the provincial administration.” A law on PCs was passed by Presidential decree in August 2005. The Law on Provincial Councils delineates a list of broad functions assigned to these bodies and includes items relating to provincial development planning and budgeting, oversight of provincial administration, the settlement of disputes, promotion of human rights, monitoring of law enforcement, eliminating poppy cultivation and anti-corruption. The Wolesi Jirga recently approved amendments to the PC law that

strengthen their monitoring function. As of this writing the amended law had yet to be signed by the President.

Overall, the councils are described in law as linking the people and civil society with the state administration at the provincial level. However, the actual authority of the PCs in this highly centralized state is unclear. Nonetheless, the PC members are a crucial link between central government and the people and must be able to effectively represent the concerns of their constituents in matters related to development, access to services and assistance in conflict resolution. In order to enable them to do this, they require the capacity to take on a greater role in planning, monitoring and decision-making. UNDP’s Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) is one program that will complement the government’s efforts to support sub-national governance, including the PCs.25

If PRTs decide to engage directly with provincial councils, civilians within the PRT should take the lead. The military element of the PRT can support the PC by providing infrastructure. For example, they can undertake projects such as constructing or renovating the PC building. If the PRT decides to support a governance related project, the Civil Service Commission and UNAMA should be consulted on programs and materials.

25 This section relied heavily on UNDP Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) documents.
Appendix 2 to Annex E: Afghan Civil Society

What is Civil Society?26

Civil society really means ordinary people and the many ways in which they endeavour to organize and protect themselves. Individuals, families, and communities can all participate in civil society. Its diversity reflects human needs and the cultural, religious, economic, and political practices formulated to address those needs.

In Afghanistan, sufi movements and khanqahs; religious institutions such as mosques, madrassas, takiakhana (shi'ite mosque); water management committees; cultural circles; artistic and professional associations; and non-profit, non-governmental assistance organizations all form examples of civil society structures and organizations. Many of these structures are ancient ones that continue to form the building blocks of developing civil society today.

Civil society is also of fundamental importance to a functioning democratic process and the protection of human rights which include the right to associate and the right to participate, the right to freedom of thought and expression as well as the freedom to practice diverse religious beliefs. Civil society organizations with wide-ranging social networks can provide momentum towards achieving these goals which are challenging but which constitute the foundation of real and sustainable security.

Ideally, civil society organizations can:

- Consult with communities and government on how to improve physical and human security

26 This section is taken from the ADF 2005 civil society statement agreed by a consortium of civil society organisations.
• Help to address needs by providing services, testing solutions, and expanding the use of successful solutions

• Help to ensure that people’s opinions flow from the periphery to government

• Educate people on the rights of responsibilities of government and citizens

• Educate people on government initiatives

• Assist government in implementing joint programs that enhance the rule of law, human security and job alternatives

• Help voice issues of importance to support transparent and accountable government

However, civil society as a functioning component of democratic process is nascent in Afghanistan. Challenges facing the development of more robust civil society institutions – and the protection of Afghans’ key right to freedom of expression – are rooted in the very limited progress made in security sector reform with the exception of the Afghan army. At the same time civil society actors stress that democratic aspirations survived the various communist, mujahideen and Taliban regimes. The Afghan people braved considerable intimidation to elect a President democratically in 2004. Afghan hopes for a strong parliament that would represent their interests were also high. People want a government that serves their needs and is capable of evolving and changing as peoples’ needs change.

The survival of Afghanistan’s people and civil society through years of war, instability, and drought was due as much to the strength of the social fabric, family and community networks and systems, as to any international assistance. Extended families supported each other, shuras continued to function, shopkeepers gave credit, and assistance organizations were formed. However, the ability of Afghans to utilise the opportunity to promote civil society within the context of the democratic changes and reforms engendered by the Bonn process depends on an enabling, secure environment.

Over the course of the Bonn process, individual and institutional civil society representatives played an active and important role via their extensive networks in the development of the Bonn Agreement, in the establishment of the Interim Administration, in both the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirgas, in the drafting of the Constitution, and in supporting the Presidential election process by the provision
of civic education programmes throughout the country. Non-profit, non-governmental
development assistance organizations have promoted and participated in the
development of NGO legislation that regulates the sector, human rights organizations
are expanding in number and in the scope of their work, and social organizations
ranging from writers groups to farmers unions are forming and talking to each other
about shared issues.

Building and maintaining a government is not merely a technical exercise, it needs to
include the people of Afghanistan. The success of development and peace in
Afghanistan also depends on the ability of the Afghan government to reach out to and
include the Afghan people. To this end, it is essential that the government and its
international supporters actively consult with a wide range of civil society organizations
from the outset of policy discussions. And the government should do everything it can to
support the growth of a vibrant civil society that can facilitate the partnership between
people and the government.

Security: Military, Policing and Human

There are two main dimensions to security: physical security and human security. The
need for physical security provided by the police and the military has been the main
focus of international efforts so far. People need to be protected from violence, theft, and
other abuses, but people continue to feel insecure especially in regard to the police.
Afghans are particularly concerned to see meaningful reform of the Afghan national
police and real progress in DIAG (Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups), which
succeeded the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) process. DDR’s
failure to keep up with the changing nature of Afghanistan’s militia structures has
resulted in the ongoing problem of illegal militias threatening or eroding progress in
other pillars of security sector reform. Afghan civil society has spoken out repeatedly on
the need for disarmament to enable wider security sector reform and to protect
democratic process, for an end to impunity and for the rule of law.

Studies based on Afghan opinions have shown that human security - which amounts to
the ability to lead a normal life with dignity and adequate livelihoods - is as important
to the Afghan people as physical security. The 2004 National Human Development
Report on Afghanistan sums up Afghans’ feelings: “Security is not just the end of war,
but the ability to go about one’s business safely, to go to work or home, to travel outside
knowing that one's family will not suffer harm. It is the assurance that development gains made today will not be taken away tomorrow.”

Peoples’ concerns regarding the sustainability of the political processes engendered by the 2001 Bonn Agreement are acute and include:

The Rule of Law

The establishment of security depends on the establishment of justice. When Afghan and international human rights organizations state that “without justice there can be no peace”, they mean that unless people are guaranteed access to criminal justice other gains will not prove to be sustainable. The absence of justice has deeply eroded trust in public authorities and reversing this is crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the government in Afghan eyes. Despite this, progress in establishing the rule of law has been abysmally slow.

Corruption

Corruption and abuse of power at all levels of government is a central concern. Large-scale corruption fuelled by the narcotics trade is one side of the problem while the majority poor face the need to pay bribes for the smallest transaction linked to government bureaucracy at all levels. Improved governance and the removal of officials widely seen at provincial and district levels to be corrupt and involved in criminal activities is crucial to GIRoA and international attempts to improve the government’s legitimacy and authority.

Narcotics

The narco-economy is the major threat to the future stability of Afghanistan. The UN reported in September 2006 that the opium cultivation rose 59% in 2006, covering a record 165,000 hectares and producing 6,100 tons of opium representing 92% of the World supply of heroin\textsuperscript{27}. The UNODC estimates that opium accounts for more than half of Afghanistan’s gross national product. How the de facto narco-economy is contained and ultimately eliminated requires great care, linked as it is to Afghan

\textsuperscript{27} UNODC website.

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poverty and aspirations, land tenure issues, the creation of debts that can lead to child
labor and the sale of daughters, not to mention the establishment of links to organized
criminal syndicates in other countries. The government needs to be seen to be credible
and honest, but in handling this issue civil society actors stress it also needs to take into
account the economic needs of its people, many of whom now benefit from some sort of
opium-industry related income. In its recommendations to the 2005 Afghanistan
Development Forum civil society representatives called for the following steps to be
taken urgently:

Any supporters of drug trafficking networks inside the government itself must be
removed immediately.

The organization of anti-narcotics committees by the farmers to curb drug trafficking
and to identify the traffickers.

Given the increase in heroin refining laboratories within Afghanistan’s borders, a
national dialogue should be initiated. The use of media by the government to
communicate its counter-narcotics policies is one step but the media should be used with
civil society actors to facilitate a national dialogue on the threats drugs pose to Afghan
society. This dialogue should include political actors, health officials, other government
officials, farmers, the transportation industry, mullahs, and children— in fact, the
entire nation.

Efforts to transform the rural economy will take time and will also depend on wider
macro-economic issues, improvements to the transport infrastructure and most of all on
the establishment of the rule of law. The government and its international supporters
must continue to promote alternatives to opium cultivation but should primarily target
the traffickers through interdiction measures rather than poor farmers through crop
eradication. Farmers’ insurance institutions should be established to help protect them
from adverse economic effects of the government’s counter-narcotics policies.

Civil Society Links

A developing aspect of civil society is the increasing network of civil society actors
spearheaded by consortiums and associations such as:

- Afghan Civil Society Forum* (ACSF) - www.acsf.af/
Here is the plain text representation of the document as if you were reading it naturally:

- Afghan Independent Journalist Association/Committee for Protecting Afghan Journalists · Mr. Samander: [Samander2003@yahoo.com](mailto:Samander2003@yahoo.com)
- Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau (ANCB) · [www.ancb.org](http://www.ancb.org)
- Afghan Women Educational Centre (AWEC) – [www.awec.info](http://www.awec.info)
- Afghan Women’s Network* (AWN) · [www.afghanwomensnetwork.org](http://www.afghanwomensnetwork.org)
- Afghanistan Organisation for Human Rights and Environmental Protection · Mr. Hotakky
- Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief* (ACBAR) – [www.acbar.org](http://www.acbar.org)
- Civil Society Afghan National Development Strategy (CSANDS) · CSANDS Group: [http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NDSAfg/](http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NDSAfg/)
- Civil Society and Human Rights Network
- Counterpart International – [www.counterpart.org](http://www.counterpart.org)
- Foundation for Culture and Civil Society* (FCCS) – [www.afghanfccs.org%20](http://www.afghanfccs.org%20)
- Global Rights · Shaheen Rassoul: [shaheenr@globalrights.org](mailto:shaheenr@globalrights.org)
- Human Rights Watch – [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)
- South West Afghanistan and Baluchistan association for Coordination (SWABAC) (HQ in Kandahar) · [swabac@yahoo.com](mailto:swabac@yahoo.com)
- Tribal Liaison Office* (TLO)

* Asterisked organisations maintain regional offices and/or wide networks covering rural as well as urban areas.

**PRTs' Interaction With Civil Society**

It is important for PRTs to reach out to and engage with a wide spectrum of civil society actors in addition to helping to provide an enabling environment for civil society.
development. For example, consultations about potential projects at the provincial and
district levels should include not just government officials, but also civil society
representatives from the locality. These may include ad hoc coalitions of people from
different political backgrounds that command respect within Afghan society, such as
teachers, medics and mullahs, as well as more formal organisations.

For example, when a PRT is identifying potential projects in different districts of the
province, they should consult the Provincial MRRD Director and their NSP facilitating
partner (FP). The FP will have a list of Community Development Councils (CDCs) that
have been established, as well as completed and ongoing projects being implemented
through the CDCs. At a minimum this will allow for deconfliction of activities. The FP
can also advise whether any of the CDCs, including women’s CDCs, would be interested
in engaging with the PRT and if there are any possibilities for joint programming. For
example, in Bamyan UN HABITAT is the FP for NSP and they are working with a
village that would like to use NSP funds for a water piping project. However, due to the
terrain and scarcity of water in the area, the project would cost twice as much as what is
available through NSP. Therefore, HABITAT suggested the PRT might want meet with
the local CDC and consider providing additional funding for the project.

PRTs can also work with tribes in insecure areas where CDCs have not been
established, identifying grassroots project priorities and linking them to improvements
in the security situation, as was the case with the Zadran Initiative outlined in the best
practices section. However, PRTs need to ensure when they engage with the tribes, they
are meeting with a full and representative tribal shura and not only with a few elders
introducing themselves as the spokespersons for their tribe. The PRT should also
endeavor to have a balanced, two-way dialogue. The meeting will not yield positive
results if the PRTs do not listen to the tribal elders but simply lecture them about the
need to improve security, as has been the case in some Pashtun areas of the country.

When engaging with tribal shuras to identify community development priorities, the
PRT should ask the Governor, members of the PC, relevant line department directors
and the district commissioner to take part in the dialogue. The female members of the
PRT can work with the DoWA and UNAMA to explore methods for engaging with the
female segment of the population in these communities in order to determine their
project priorities as well. These processes help the government increase its credibility
through more visibility in remote and insecure areas, more understanding of tribal
concerns and more efficiency in project identification. In addition, there is better targeting of needs and more equitably distributed aid. As mentioned in the PDC section, projects selected by the communities can be presented to the PDC for final government approval. The projects that are selected should be those that best contribute to the achievement of national objectives under the ANDS.
Appendix 3 to Annex E: Women’s Affairs

Ministry of Women’s Affairs

Given the particular challenges women face in Afghanistan, it is worth providing a brief overview of the government institution that has been established to address women’s affairs. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) is the leading governmental institution for advancing women’s rights and improving their situation. The responsibility for achieving gender equality also rests with different government institutions and ministries.

By the end of 2005 MoWA had established a Department of Women's Affairs (DoWA) in each province of Afghanistan. DoWAs are, in most cases, the only governmental institution mandated to advance women’s issues in the province. DoWAs are supported by the Department of Provincial Relations in the MoWA, which facilitates communications to and from the central office, coordinates, monitors and evaluates the plans and operations of DoWAs, consolidates and analyzes provincial reports, supervises the disbursement of funds for provincial operations and facilitates the provision of resources, technical assistance and capacity building to DoWAs.

The DoWA’s main role is to establish partnerships with government, NGOs and civil society in order to catalyze and facilitate the effective delivery of programs and services to women in each province. Although MoWA’s strategies are pushed in all provinces, MoWA’s five year plan (2005-2010) identifies nine of the most depressed provinces to receive additional attention, namely Nurestan, Zabul, Panjshir, Daykondi, Badghis, Uruzgan, Paktia, Samangan and Ghowr.

Since DoWAs are the main mechanism MoWA uses to reach women in the provinces, the UN and the donor community have given special attention to strengthening the capacities of DoWAs to better equip them with the tools needed to fulfil their role. PRTs also participate in this effort. One common project PRTs fund is a DoWA sponsored International Women’s Day celebration every March. Some PRTs also construct buildings for the DoWA since the department is usually located in a rented building due to the small budget of the Ministry. They may also support training for DoWA officials.
or provide women’s vocational facilities or other projects for DoWA to manage within the province.

National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA)

NAPWA is being developed by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and will be completed by the end of 2006. This ten-year plan provides a framework for implementing programmes under six priority areas: Security, Legal Protection and Human Rights, Leadership and Political Participation, Health, Economy, Work and Poverty, and Education. The implementation will be the responsibility of various actors and line ministries during the target period. The plan outlines the strategic actions Afghanistan has to implement to fulfil the Beijing Platform for Action and its twelve areas of concern. The NAPWA is aligned with the ANDS and its full implementation is a high-level benchmark of the Compact. PRTs should consult with the DoWA Director about the status of NAPWA in their province.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Women, Peace and Security

The Security Council recommends that gender perspectives become integral to all United Nations conflict prevention and peace-building, peacekeeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The Resolution stresses the importance of ensuring the protection of women’s rights and the full involvement of women in all aspects of promoting and maintaining peace and security, with a strengthened role in decision-making. It recommends specialized training for peacekeepers on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children, and urges greater representation of women at all levels in peacekeeping operations. It also notes the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, and requests the Secretary-General to include in his reporting to the Security Council, where appropriate, progress on efforts to strengthen women’s participation in peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls.

The Resolution includes paragraphs addressed to Member States, the Secretary-General of the UN, “all actors involved,” as well as to “all parties to armed conflict” and planners. Peacekeeping operations have an obligation to implement Resolution 1325 (2000) and to report thereon.
Appendix 4 to Annex E: Engagement With the Media

The following is intended as guidance to PRT Commanders and their PAOs.

PRTs have an important role to play not only in contributing to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan, but also in communicating their actions to local communities, to the Afghan people as a whole, and to international audiences. Communications should, wherever possible, be conducted having an Afghan face associated with progress and success. This will assist in demonstrating the legitimacy of local Governance, building and maintaining public understanding, acceptance and support for the work of the International Community, NGOs, the GOA and ISAF - both in Afghanistan and more widely. Without this support, both here in Afghanistan and among the international public, we cannot achieve operational success. The media is a key conduit to both these audiences.

In order that we inform people that we are making a real difference, it is essential that PRTs identify examples of success, and in coordination with the Regional Command (RC) PAOs, communicate the information through local, regional and international media outlets, as well as through face-to-face contacts with key local leaders and influencers. This entails not only close coordination with key delivery partners, but also developing excellent relationships with the media, through regular, personal contact at a senior level. This will also help to associate PRTs with positive outcomes.

Whilst a proactive approach to media relations is important, so too is our ability to counter any negative reporting of our activities. PRTs should monitor media outlets in close cooperation with RC PAOs and maintain effective situational awareness of media reporting trends. PRT commanders and their PAOs should be prepared to rebut inaccurate reporting promptly when requested by RC PAOs. Interpreters and locally employed civilians can be used to assist in this regard.

The Importance of Local Media

Although the regional and international media are important to us and must be given due attention, the indigenous media is a vital tool in helping to achieve our operational objectives, in line with COMISAF’s Intent. The Afghan media is at a formative stage
and PRTs can play a part in helping the various outlets develop into credible, objective channels of communication, playing their proper part in Afghan society. We can assist them in this process through regular, proactive engagement which might include, but is not limited to:

Helping Them to Identify Stories

Keeping them informed about our activities through regular update briefings, press conferences, interviews, press notices, advisories etc;

Supporting their reporting of delivery on the ground through providing media facilities as appropriate.

Analysis of the Afghan people’s access to the media shows that the majority – 85 per cent – listen to the radio. Thus this medium is a particularly valuable channel for our messages and local radio stations should be given due prominence in communications plans. Television and local newspapers are also important, watched and read by 36 per cent and 25 per cent of Afghan people respectively (Altai research, 2006).

Forward Media Teams

Forward Media Teams (FMTs) are designed to provide the media products of the Combined Joint PSYOPS Task Force (CJPOTF) with news, stories, reports and imagery from the provinces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) for the regional flavour of CJPOTF’s products.

The FMTs are promoting, informing and supporting:

- PRT projects: CIMIC, POLAD, Development Advisors, Police Advisors
- GIRoA activities
- ANSF success stories and
- Human interest stories

The FMT is pro-government, pro-international community and gives the local population a platform for its stories.
The FMT products are broadcasted and published through one of the largest radio station of Afghanistan, Radio Sada-e Azadi (“Voice of Freedom”) and the country’s biggest newspaper Sada-e Azadi (circulation: 400,000 per issue, published biweekly)

HQ ISAF PAO/CJPOTF Support

It is recognized that effective media engagement is a resource-intensive activity and that in some cases PRTs may need direction and guidance in order to deliver the desired effect. The HQ ISAF and RC PAO/CJPOTF staff are available to provide help and advice as required. They may also be able to provide editorial, video and photographic support on a case by case basis to cover specific periods of activity. In addition, the HQ teams have daily contact with the international media based in Afghanistan and can help to market PRTs’ good news stories to a wider audience when desired. In order to achieve this, PRTs should keep RC PAOs fully informed of media-related activities in their areas.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

“Development without security is unachievable, and security without development is meaningless.”

- Afghanistan’s MDG Report, 2005

The Millennium Declaration, adopted by 189 members of the United Nations in September 2000 at the Millennium Summit, set measurable targets for enabling more human beings to enjoy the minimum requirements of a dignified life by 2015. Afghanistan could not participate in the Summit because it was still in a state of war and turmoil. The Government of Afghanistan endorsed the Declaration as well as the MDGs only in March 2004, by letter from President Karzai to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, thereby making it a late-entrant to global development efforts.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger</td>
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<td>2. Achieve Universal Primary Education</td>
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<td>3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women</td>
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<td>4. Reduce Child Mortality</td>
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<td>5. Improve Maternal Health</td>
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<td>6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis, and other Diseases</td>
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<td>7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability</td>
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<td>8. Global Partnership for Development</td>
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<td>9. Enhancing Security</td>
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**Table 6: Millennium Development Goals**

Due to the complete destruction of its state and economy over the past decades, Afghanistan cannot achieve the MDGs without accelerating growth. But there is no
contradiction between raising the welfare of the most vulnerable and pursuing economic growth. Agriculture, which constitutes one-half of the licit economy and provides employment to two-thirds of the workforce, and related rural development, will be central to any poverty reduction strategy and should receive an adequate share of public spending and international aid. In addition, ensuring an enabling environment for investment, particularly for small and medium-sized businesses, will be essential to generating employment and raising the incomes of the poorest.

To attain the MDGs, Afghanistan must build the capacity of its state and its people. Raising literacy rates requires building primary schools, but it also requires training teachers, which in turn requires secondary schools and universities. Once schools are built and teachers trained, the government will have to maintain the schools and pay the teachers out of its own resources. The same need for building human skills and fiscal capacity holds equally for the health sector or for the transport infrastructure to connect Afghanistan to the world.

Afghanistan Compact

In the post-Bonn phase, Afghanistan had to move beyond relief and humanitarian assistance to long-term sustainable development. The Afghanistan Compact was agreed upon at the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January-1 February 2006. It is a political commitment between Afghanistan and the international community to jointly work towards improving the well-being of the people of Afghanistan. Consistent with the MDGs, it is a five-year commitment by the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to achieve certain targets or ‘benchmarks’. The Compact identifies three pillars:

- Security
- Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights
- Economic and Social Development

These are further sub-divided into sectors as identified box below.
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)

The MDGs and Afghanistan Compact provide the overarching framework for developing the ANDS, which identifies the policies and programmes required to meet the MDGs, while promoting growth, generating wealth and reducing poverty and vulnerability over the next five years. The ANDS will also meet the requirements of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The Interim ANDS (I-ANDS), or the interim PRSP, was presented at the London Conference along with the Afghanistan Compact. The international community made initial pledges at the London Conference of $10.5 billion USD for the implementation of the Compact and the I-ANDS.

Four sets of activities are required to develop the full ANDS. These are:

1. Costing, prioritization and budgetary integration of programs and projects. For the ANDS to have an impact on the lives of Afghan citizens, it needs to be fully integrated with the national budget, and in turn the budget needs to lead to resource allocations to priority programs and projects that are delivered to the Afghan people.

Supporting Consultations That Strengthen the ANDS

Facilitate subnational input to national sectoral strategies. Provincial Development Committees (PDC) (or other existing provincial-level coordination structures) have been coordinating subnational input into sector strategies through the Consultative Group process, aligning with Ministry of Finance initiatives to incorporate subnational inputs into the budget process. Support to the PDCs for this process is being provided by the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s National Area Based Development Program (NABDP).

Incorporate outputs from other subnational consultation activities. The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) (2005) surveyed 5,200 male and female shuras across the country on the activities they want the Government to prioritize. Members of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils have been engaged somewhat less comprehensively and systematically in consultations, although nevertheless intending to reflect their role as elected representatives.

There have been several rounds of Sub-National Consultations (SNCs) held in order to priorities development projects, the result being Provincial Development Plans (PDPs).
The first round of SNCs was held over the summer of 2007. ANDS representatives travelled to all 34 provinces surveyed provincial representatives, including local citizens, on their priorities. No cost cap was placed upon the wish lists which created unrealistically high expectations among the local population. The second round of SNCs was completed in February 2008. In these SNCs, one representative from each province travelled to the ANDS Secretariat in Kabul to review and finalize PDPs and their eight Sector Strategies. However, again, no cost cap was imposed on the wish list. Finally, a third round of SNCs was completed with provincial delegations in Kabul in March 2008. This additional review finally imposed a cost ceiling on each provinces’ PDPs.

The clash of interests between the PDPs (which were agreed at the sub-national level following a bottom-up approach) and the Sector Strategies (which were developed at the top-level, in Kabul) has proven unavoidable. An independent third party, such as the executive-level Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), will need to mediate the conflict between development priorities of the ministries and the provinces.

Facilitating Research and Information Management

Survey data from NRVA 2005 and 2007 will allow for the measurement and analysis of poverty and inequality across different parts of the country, helping with the design of more effective poverty reduction programs. Research from a variety of other sources will also help deepen the understanding of the situation in Afghanistan, feeding into decision-making and the allocation of resources, as well as the development of the full ANDS.

Progress towards the benchmarks in the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS, as well as the MDGs, needs to be monitored in order to ensure positive movement toward meeting commitments. Initial information management efforts will focus on improving access to and the use of data from key data-generating ministries and agencies, through a central ‘query centre’.

Coordinating Communications and Public Information About the ANDS

Communication and awareness-raising activities are aimed at: (1) helping citizens understand the underlying principles and approach of the ANDS, the Afghanistan Compact and the MDGs; (2) encouraging open dialogue, knowledge exchange and information sharing about the ANDS among citizens; (3) encouraging the watchdog role
of the media to monitor the implementation of the ANDS; (4) managing expectations to ensure realistic expectations of achievements; (5) supporting participation in the process by building awareness and advertising opportunities to be involved; and (6) ensuring that the ANDS development process is seen to be Afghan-owned and led.

Paris Agreement on Aid Effectiveness

The Government and the international community, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, have committed themselves to improve aid effectiveness and accountability of international assistance. Therefore, the international community will need to coordinate with the national and sub-national government to ensure maximum alignment of donor projects with the ANDS and PDPs to eliminate duplication. In addition, the Government and key donors must provide feedback on priorities and requirements though consultations. Furthermore they need to provide data and statistics to support the writing of the full ANDS. Finally, donors must support the Provincial Development Plans. PRTs, having taken on the role of a donor organization, should also, in coordination with their higher HQs, follow the above requirements for supporting the ANDS and PDPs.
Breakdown of the Three Pillars of the Afghanistan Compact

- **Pillar 1 (Security)**
  - Sector 1.1 (Security)
    - National Defense
    - Internal Security and Law Enforcement
    - Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
    - De-mining

- **Pillar 2 (Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights)**
  - Sector 2.1 (Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights)
    - Empowering the National Assembly
    - Justice and the Rule of Law
    - Religious Affairs
    - Public Administration Reform
    - Human Rights, Including Women’s Rights Program

- **Pillar 3 (Economic and Social Development)**
  - Sector 3.1 (Infrastructure & Natural Resources)
    - National Roads & Road Transport
    - Air Transport
    - Power & Water
    - Telecommunications
    - Mining & Natural Resources
    - Urban Development
  - Sector 3.2 (Education)
    - Primary & Secondary Education
    - Higher Education
    - Skills Development
    - Culture, Media & Sport
  - Sector 3.3 (Health)
    - Extending the Basic Package of Health Services
    - Extending the Essential Package of Hospital Services
    - National Communicable & Non-Communicable Disease Control
    - Health Sector Human Resources Management
  - Sector 3.4 (Agriculture & Rural Development)
    - Agriculture
    - Rural Infrastructure Including Irrigation Water Management
    - Community Development
    - Rural Financial Services
    - Rural Enterprise Development
  - Sector 3.5 (Social Protection)
    - Humanitarian and Disaster Response
    - Support to Vulnerable Women
    - Support to Unemployed Youth & Demobilized Soldiers
    - Supporting the Disabled
    - Refugees & Returnees
  - Sector 3.6 (Economic Governance and Private Sector Development)
    - Putting in Place a Medium Term Fiscal Framework
    - Enhancing Revenue Collection
    - Enhancing Public Finance Management
    - Strengthening the Investment Climate
    - Trade
    - Financial Services and Markets

- **Cross-cutting Themes**
  - Anti-corruption
  - Counter-Narcotics
  - Environment
  - Gender Equity
  - Regional Cooperation

Table 7: Three Pillars of the Afghanistan Compact
Appendix 2 to Annex F: Provincial Development Committees

On 7 November 2005 the Afghan Cabinet approved the establishment of Provincial Development Committees (PDCs) in each province with the principal goal of strengthening development planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation and decision-making at the provincial level. The goal is that this, in turn, will result in strengthening local administration capacities for better management of the delivery of development programs and consequently, to improved the livelihoods of the local population.

Ministry Of Economy Has the Lead

The Ministry of Economy (MoEc) has been given the lead role in establishing and facilitating PDCs. The Governor is the Chairperson of the PDC and the Ministry of Economy’s Provincial Office will act as the Secretariat for the PDC. The Director of MoEc’s Provincial Office acts as the manager of the Secretariat. The Secretariat is responsible for providing coordination, technical and administrative support, documenting proceedings, undertaking data collection and analysis, facilitating planning activities, preparing draft provincial annual and strategic plans and providing additional assistance as required by the PDC. The Department of Economy is responsible for liaising and coordinating with PDC members, including government ministries and other stakeholders to ensure that all members are informed of the PDC planning process and decisions.

PDC Capacity Is Growing, But Needs Further Strengthening

Often the capacity of many provincial MoEc staff is low, as is the capacity of many Governors and their staffs. Furthermore, there are frequently either no or very little resources and capacity in many of the departments in the provinces. Stakeholders such as MRRD, UN agencies and the donor community have had to fill the gap by providing support and resources to the PDC Secretariat. MRRD has often played a more prominent role in the overall capacity building of the MoEc and PDCs, including the establishment of sound and viable management information systems for data and information collection and analysis. The PDCs completed the first drafts of their PDPs by September 2007, having begun to write them during the previous year. The ANDS
Secretariat held its first round of Sub-National Consultations (SNC) during the summer with the PDCs and community representatives within each province to define priority projects across eight economic, political and social sectors for the following one, five and ten years. The IDLG is the coordinating body between Kabul and the provinces for all local government issues, including PDP implementation. The PDCs are the authorities responsible for ensuring PDP implementation.

Challenges

_PRT Role in Supporting PDCs_

UNAMA continues to support PDCs, working groups and secretariats. However, the initiative must come from the government in order to ensure ownership and sustainability of the process. For the same reason, PRTs must not attempt to lead or be overly involved in the process. It will undermine capacity building efforts and create an unsustainable dependency on the PRT. Also, in line with the ANDS, all organizations must work to build national capacity at all levels, rather than the using the quicker, but unsustainable, approach of relying on external capacity. In capacity building, process is often more important than initial output. This has proved frustrating to some PRTs who want to “fix” the PDC, sometimes upon guidance from their higher HQs.

However, this does not mean PRTs can not do anything to support the PDC. In the past, for example, the PRTs, in coordination with UN agencies, have helped to organize community planning with the government in order to select well-targeted projects and to build the capacity of the government to consult with communities. The projects have then been presented to the PDC. As time goes on, however, the PDCs should be taking fuller ownership of planning, programs and projects as they move beyond simply creating wish lists. UNAMA is continuing to assist local stakeholders, and thus the PDC, to create PDPs that take ministries’ national priorities and budgets into account. This is a critical planning exercise and the PDC should prioritize projects based on this information.

Using their reachback capabilities to HQ, PRTs can help ensure PDCs are equipped with the necessary information about these national priorities and sectoral breakdowns of funding. In addition to allowing them to create rational development plans, it will empower provincial officials in the PDCs to engage the central government in a constructive dialogue about national plans for development in the province.
helps build the credibility of government officials. If they have developed a realistic plan for the province, when they talk with local people the local officials can tell them with a high degree certainty for example, that x clinic will be built in y place by z time next year.

Furthermore PRTs, in close coordination with UNAMA, could fund a capacity-building project similar to the one being implemented by MRRD’s National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) in provinces where the program has not yet been rolled out. As appropriate, the civilian element of the PRT can support efforts to coordinate the Provincial Council with the PDC since their role is to be locally accountable and responsive. Their involvement can encourage the Governor to be more responsive to local needs as well. For more guidance on how PRTs can support PDCs, see Policy Note Number 1, adopted by the PRT Executive Steering Committee on Dec. 7, 2006 (Annex B, Appendix 4).

The following organigrams outline the ideal structure of the PDC, Sectoral Committees and Secretariat.
Figure 16: Provincial Development Committee
Figure 17: PDC Sectoral Committees
Figure 18: PDC Secretariat Committee

Presidential Decree

On the Mandate of the Commission for the Coordination of Affairs of International Coalition Forces PRTs and Afghanistan Local Authorities

No: 2641

Date: 27/4/1387

Pursuant to the Clause (20) of Article (64) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and for the purpose of improving coordination of functions of PRTs and local Authorities, the formation of a Commission, having as its members, the Deputy Minister Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Ministers of the Ministries of Public Works, Rural and Rehabilitation Development and Urban Development and Housing, chaired by the Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, is being approved.
The Commission is mandated to develop an accurate mechanism for the coordination of affairs pertinent to reorganization of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and International Coalition Forces with sub national institutions, and continuously monitor the implementation process of programs of PRTs. Besides, this Commission is to report on the coordination and implementation processes of these teams to the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Office of Administrative Affairs and Secretariat of the Council of Ministers is authorized to monitor the implementation of this decree.

1. With issuance of this Decree, the earlier Decree No. 2783 dated 05/05/1382 is annulled.

Hamid Karzai

President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Appendix 3 to Annex F: Emergency Response Guidelines and Procedures

Introduction

Disasters cause widespread damage and disruption in Afghanistan. There is a high frequency of natural calamities such as earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, sandstorms, floods and drought. Extreme winters are another phenomenon with a large scale impact due to very low coping capacities. The secondary or social impacts of disaster take a sustained toll on the population in large parts of the country and can lead to internal displacement and political destabilization. With extremes of climate and challenging geo-physical conditions, the inherent vulnerability of the communities is high. In recent decades this has been further aggravated due to conflict and limited resources.

Most disaster situations are to be managed at the provincial and district level. The national level plays a supporting role and provides assistance when the consequences of disaster exceed the provincial and district capacities. At the present stage of Afghanistan’s development, both the provincial and central authorities have limited capacity to respond with human, material and financial resources, especially the latter two. Hence UN agencies, other international organizations, NGOs and international military forces are asked to assist, even for small emergencies the district and/or provincial authorities should be able to handle. Such low government capacity at the provincial, as well as national level, to meet such needs is cause for concern. Low capacity notwithstanding, it is an internationally accepted practice that when a disaster occurs and is beyond the capacity of the government to manage, any international/external interventions to assist and support will be done at the request of the government. Discussed below are procedures and guidelines that are currently practiced and proposed.

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28 Reference: Afghanistan - National Disaster Management Plan (December 2003) by Department of Disaster Preparedness
Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Purposes in Complex Emergencies

The military may be requested to assist with humanitarian relief. Though the use of military and civil defense assets (MCDA) is a last resort, such a request to the military for assistance still needs to be interpreted and satisfied so as not to endanger the work of both the humanitarian community, beneficiaries and the military force, both during the crisis and in the longer term. In essence, humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, while fully respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states: the activities of a military force are not always driven by the same constraints. Forces undertaking missions in support of humanitarian activities must reconcile their activities with the circumstances of the operating environment so that all appropriate humanitarian principles are respected.

There is a simple hierarchy of humanitarian activities and it is important to define what activities might be supported by the international military forces:

- Direct Assistance: Face-to-face distribution of goods or services – handing out relief goods, providing first aid, transporting victims, interviewing refugees, locating families, etc.

- Indirect Assistance: One step, or more, removed from the population – transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water sources, clearing mines and ordnance, etc

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29 Reference: Guidelines for the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Complex Emergencies (March 2003 / Revision I January 2006). A complex emergency, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme”

30 As per the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, these are known as the core humanitarian principles: human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable populations, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
• Infrastructure Support: General services that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to, or solely for, the benefit of the affected population – repairing infrastructure, operating airfields, providing information, access to communications networks, etc

The appropriateness of military forces to these generic tasks varies according to the military mission and must balance the impartiality of the troops and the visibility of the task, as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visibility of task decreases</th>
<th>Humanitarian Task</th>
<th>Military Mission</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Keeping</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Assistance</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Assistance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Support</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8: Appropriate Use of Military Force**

The following points must be considered by both the military and the humanitarian actors:

• The military, while undertaking to be a partner to humanitarian agencies, is expected to adhere to the core humanitarian principles.

• The use of MCDA should under no circumstances undermine the perceived neutrality or impartiality of humanitarian actors.

• As military resources are generally diverted from other tasks and therefore only available temporarily; care must be taken to avoid building a reliance on MCDA.

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31 Humanitarian agencies normally rely on states to guarantee their security. When security cannot be assured, they must rely upon their neutrality for security and use negotiation as a means of gaining access to affected population.
Military personnel involved in humanitarian operations should be clearly distinguished from those forces still engaged in other missions. Military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. If military personnel must remain armed or cannot be easily distinguished from those still engaged in other missions, it will be more appropriate to restrict them to indirect assistance or infrastructure support tasks.

Forces, other than UN MCDA performing assistance missions, are in principle not granted any special protection and are not authorized to display the emblems of the supported agencies.

Assets in support of humanitarian relief operations should be under overall civilian control.

Tasks and responsibilities should be established at the earliest possible stage of an operation.

MCDA should be provided at no cost to the affected population or the receiving state or agency.

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**Checklist for Determining Whether To Use Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)**

The following list of questions provides a useful checklist, though a negative response to any them does not necessarily rule out the use military assets; judgments must be made on a case by case basis.

- Are MCDA the option of last resort, indispensable and appropriate?
- Are the countries offering MCDA in any way parties to the conflict?
- Based on the need, is the MCDA capable of the task?
- Can the MCDA be used in accordance with the core humanitarian principles?
- Will this association negatively affect the security of UN personnel and other humanitarian workers?
- Will this association negatively affect the perceptions of UN and humanitarian neutrality and impartiality?
- Are the MCDA available for the expected duration of the need?
- Can transition back to civilian responsibility be achieved?
• Can the MCDA be clearly distinguished from other forces?
• Can the MCDA be deployed without weapons or additional security forces?
• Can appropriate control and coordination arrangements be implemented?
• Are there any negative consequences for beneficiaries, other humanitarian actors, and humanitarian operations in the mid to long term from this use of MCDA?

Response Guidelines and Procedures for Minor Disasters

Afghanistan Government Response

The Afghan Natural Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) is mandated to coordinate and manage disaster response activities; however, it currently has limited presence in the provinces and minimal operational acknowledgement by major line ministries. As such, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) plays a key role in assessment, reporting and coordination tasks. Overall direction and guidance is provided by the secretariat of the National Emergency Response Commission (NERC)32, headed by the Second Vice-President. The central government’s response functions such as assessment, coordination, relief management and logistics, as well as stockpiling of relief materials are supposed to be organized at the NERC. Once a national emergency response is in progress, the minute-to-minute focal point becomes ANDMA’s National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC), although its capacity is presently limited. The Director of ANDMA acts as the national spokesperson for disaster response.

The Provincial Disaster Management Teams (DMTs) – or Provincial Emergency Response Commissions (PERCs) as they are also known are supposed to address small and medium-scale disasters. They are not, though, operational in all provinces. The London Conference on Afghanistan held in early 2006 produced a number of benchmarks and timelines. Under Social Protection, there is a benchmark for Humanitarian and Disaster Response: “By end-2010, and effective system of disaster preparedness and response will be in place.” The current Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), under Environment and Social Protection, contains the

32 Consisting of 19 Ministries, Secretary General of Red Crescent Society, Director of Administrative Affairs of the President, Mayor of Kabul, Director of DDP – chaired by the President
same benchmark. Overall, the PRTs through the civilian element need to strengthen local emergency response mechanisms.

Many provinces have Provincial Disaster Management Plans that are based on the National Disaster Management Plan (2003), yet operational procedures for emergency response are not followed by all parties, especially when it comes to division of responsibilities and costs. In principle the procedure followed by the government when a disaster occurs is as follows:

- The provincial authority is notified by representatives of the affected village or by the district administration office that a disaster situation exists.

- UNAMA/UN agencies/IOs and NGOs are informed of the event by the provincial authority.

- The Governor or a designated Emergency Coordinator calls for a Provincial Emergency Commission meeting of directors of the main government departments, for example: RRD, Health, Agriculture, Irrigation, Refugee & Repatriation and Interior to plan and allocate tasks depending on the scale of the disaster.

- ANDMA maintains Regional Offices in Kabul, Gardez, Takhar, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat. The extent to which ANDMA is visible as a coordinating body depends significantly on the skills and character of the respective ANDMA Director.

- A team is formed to conduct an assessment of damage and needs, usually led by the Provincial Director of RRD or Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS).

- Damage surveys and assessments of relief needs are conducted and a report is produced. Often the assessment team is accompanied by UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNAMA) and NGOs to verify the initial report.

- If the emergency can be managed at the provincial level using the resources locally available from partners (UN agencies, IOs, NGOs, local community, etc), then no assistance from the national authority is needed.

- If it is beyond the capacity of the provincial government to cope with the situation, the Governor approaches the central government to mobilize national resources and/or seek additional assistance from the international community present in
Afghanistan. In almost all cases the latter occurs. The Emergency Response Commission sits to plan the response and assign tasks.

**UNAMA and International Partners’ Response Procedures**

When a disaster occurs, the UN and international partners in the country are requested by the government, at the national as well as the sub-national level, to respond with relief assistance. Before any assistance can be given, a survey of damage needs and capacity must be done together with the government team. The combined team members should consist of the government (national and/or provincial), the UN, IOs, and interested NGOs, assisted by the affected local community leaders.

UNAMA is responsible for coordinating UN and international partners’ responses. The UNAMA Field Offices use existing structures to coordinate and assess the situation. It is advisable to support the Provincial Disaster Management Team/Emergency Response Commission, but other committees, such as the local UN team of Heads of Agencies, could be used. When a disaster strikes, the response procedure presently used is as follows:

**Provincial Level**

- The Governor or Deputy Governor informs the UNAMA Field Office of the event and provides information. In some cases the representatives of the affected community inform UNAMA, IOs or NGOs directly, but official requests and information must be reported through the provincial authority.

- The UNAMA Area Coordinator informs the UN agencies, IOs and NGOs in the region and assembles an inter-agency team to assess the damage.

- The UN agencies and NGO partners meet to decide whether emergency relief assistance is needed and what the needs are, the quantity and duration of assistance - who will provide what, when and to whom.

- The assisting UN agency(ies), IOs and NGOs provide the emergency relief, coordinate the distribution and maintain records of assistance given.
Throughout the emergency phase of the operation, all stakeholders are coordinated by and work closely with the Provincial Authority, especially the Provincial Disaster Management Team/Emergency Response Commission and the Area Coordinators.

The Area Coordinator provides regular or daily situation reports to all the partners involved in the relief operation. Individual agencies report to their relevant hierarchy as required by their own internal processes.

A consolidated list is produced of all the relief items provided.

Lessons learned are produced.

These procedures are currently functioning well for the types of “disasters” that have occurred in the last 12 months, when minor floods, landslides and avalanches were widespread. One of the reasons for this effective response is the presence of the UN agencies, bilateral donors, NGOs, and increasingly, PRTs in Afghanistan. Relief items, food and non-food, are available and strategically pre-positioned in-country. Because the government does not have stockpiles of relief items, it relies heavily on assistance from the UN, NGOs and international military forces; however, the Afghanistan government will need to establish and manage its own stockpiles of relief items if it is to have any credible capacity for rapid response.

Response Guidelines and Procedures for National Disasters

National disasters require a different level of response usually involve international intervention and a specialized response. For Afghanistan, the most likely worst-case situation will be an earthquake that affects either a major urban centre or a densely populated but isolated group of villages, as happened in Nahrin in 2002.

Afghanistan Government Response

When a major disaster has occurred it is the government’s duty through ANDMA to cover the following tasks:

- Through the Office of the President, make an official declaration that a state of emergency exists in the country and international assistance will be required.
• Activate the National Emergency Response Commission (NERC), National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) and Emergency Operations Centres (ERCs) in the affected provinces and operate them 24hrs a day.

• Assemble and mobilize multi-sector quick damage assessment and response teams, with medical response and search and rescue teams as essential members.

• Conduct meetings with key government departments and international community members to facilitate essential information exchanges and decision-making for relief assistance and distribution.

• Monitor and coordinate humanitarian assistance and provide daily reports to the press and all stakeholders.

• Ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief is reaching the victims through tracking and follow-up in the field.

• Conduct a debriefing and lessons learned exercise at the end of the emergency phase.

Government ministries with emergency support functions, such as utilities (power, electricity, communications), transport, public works, health and police are immediately mobilized to provide assistance where needed. A combined government and UN organizational structure for response is provided below. The main interface with the central government during a major disaster is the NERC, to which ISAF, as observer, are usually invited, and the NEOC, where ISAF sends a liaison officer.

The International Community Response

The international community consists of the UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs. The UN takes the lead in any major disaster that requires international assistance, and forms the UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) or alternatively be referred to as a Cluster System as per the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidance Note on Cluster System. This team consists of the following core group: UNDP, WHO, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, IOM, UNOPS, UNICEF and UN-HABITAT, led and coordinated by UNAMA. Other members include HAG, to represent the international humanitarian

affairs advisory group, NGOs’ representative, and IFRC/ARCS. The membership is flexible. Its primary purpose is to ensure a prompt, effective and concerted response by the UN agencies and partners is made when disasters occur. The team provides a mechanism for coordination, a forum for information exchange, discussions, and consensus on decisions. It supports the efforts of the government and also allows a channel for the military to coordinate and share information.

When a major disaster occurs, the UNDMT is immediately activated by the Humanitarian coordinator, who also holds the position of Deputy Senior Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. This occurs regardless of a government request for international assistance. The following are its areas of responsibility:

**Preparedness Tasks**

For the UNDMT to respond effectively it needs a well-defined Action/Preparedness Plan. A checklist of preparedness activities includes the following:

- Identify and commit human and material resources available from each agency to be mobilized during a disaster. For example, where relief items are pre-positioned, quantity, availability, distribution system, etc.

- Prepare a “country disaster profile” that contains an analysis of the most predominant threat, distribution of the most vulnerable population, areas most at risk, maps, emergency health situation, etc.

- Establish multi-agency and multi-sector response teams at the central (HQ) level and at the Area/Regional level.

- Clearly define the functional responsibilities of each member in the event of a disaster.

- Establish in advance the arrangements for assessments, information management, communications and coordination, and a centre from which to operate;

- Have an inventory of relief items and resources (special skills personnel, vehicles and other transportation assets, communications systems, specialized rescue equipment/expertise, etc) that will be needed during a disaster;
• Negotiate in advance, the possible use of military resources such as helicopters, specialized vehicles personnel, portable hospital etc.

• Prepare OCHA-Geneva for mobilizing available international assistance during the initial (0-5 days) and the emergency (2-3 weeks) phases.

Response Tasks

Establish and mobilize response teams for tasks onsite and at the HQ level (national and provincial). The UNDMT is mobilized at the government’s request for assistance and/or at the Humanitarian Coordinator’s request. The emergency planning process must be participatory, involving UN agencies and international partners, so it is clear from the start which agency is doing what. The main tasks are to:

• Work closely with the government in assessing the disaster situation and the need for humanitarian assistance.

• Provide the international community with an assessment of the priority needs for international assistance.

• Mobilize and provide international assistance, doing everything reasonably possible to ensure timely delivery to save lives, minimize suffering and promote recovery.

• Where required, provide operational support to ensure receipt, transportation and distribution of relief items.

• Ensure the effective use of internationally supplied resources.

• Provide regular situation reports of the disaster.

• Set up the Onsite Coordination Centre (OSOCC) with personnel, office and communications equipment.

• Conduct initial rapid assessment and reconnaissance to assess the urgency of the situation and determine immediate relief needs and local capacity.

• Prepare situation reports for mobilization of disaster relief and specialized technical assistance.
• Conduct an in-depth assessment that covers the critical sectors that require medium to long-term relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

• Track and monitor relief distribution and provide progress reports to OCHA, participating UN agencies and donors.

• Promote an awareness of the disaster so the media and UN agencies know who has responded or may want to respond, the requirements needed to improve the situation (gap analysis), and the planned response by the aid community in-country.

Coordination Tasks

The coordination function is essential onsite and at the headquarters level. Coordination of humanitarian response is a key task of UNDMT. It is the role of the government to coordinate humanitarian assistance. The UNDMT and international partners may offer to assist and be part of the coordination team. The following are essential coordination tasks:

• Facilitating a coordinated, comprehensive and concerted assistance operation to meet humanitarian needs in the emergency situation.

• Coordinate the flow and sharing of information to inform decision makers in the UN system, bilateral donors, NGOs and partners (liaison function). Apart from reporting to their own organizations, each member also reports to the UNDMT.

• Coordinate (and if necessary provide) logistical support to enable relief assistance to be delivered in the most appropriate way.

• Coordinate the collection of lessons learned and incorporate them into future emergency preparedness and response plans and operations.

Request for Military Emergency Assistance (ISAF/Coalition)

As GIRoA and UNAMA are the primary responders to natural disasters in Afghanistan, PRTs are meant to be the last resort for in extremis responses when lives are at stake. There are two requesting channels through which the Government can request ISAF/Coalition support:

• Through the NERC as the highest authority for emergency response; and
• Through the 24/7 manned National Emergency Operation Centre.

It is recommended that the request be validated by the UNAMA Humanitarian Coordinator. The Humanitarian Coordinator and the UNDMT may also choose to request in extremis support from the military on their own.

A PRT commander, though, might decide to request air assets to address a provincial disaster. This would be done in coordination with the provincial Emergency Response Centre without consulting the central government. That would be considered a local arrangement between the provincial authorities and the PRT, not in extremis support requested by the national government.

The Role of PRTs In Provincial Disaster Management

In 2005-2006 Coalition and ISAF PRTs increasingly involved themselves in disaster management in general and humanitarian assistance in particular. PRTs fund emergency response capacity-building activities for local authorities and provided assistance during emergency responses to minor or medium disasters. In fact, PRTs often use their capacity to contribute significantly to the prevention or mitigation of a disaster; however, in the past it was not always the case that assistance was given according to the principles of humanitarian aid: humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

Deviating from these principles erodes best-practices established by humanitarian agencies in the past decades and might even contribute to political destabilization. A recent case of ill-advised aid given by a PRT was food distributed exclusively to members of the Afghan National Army in early 2006, even though they were not the people most in need of the food. The local authorities were also a driving force behind this choice of recipients. This is because local authorities, also occasionally tend to “politicize” humanitarian assistance and pressure PRT commanders to distribute humanitarian aid according to their wishes.

To avoid duplication and confrontations with authorities claiming a humanitarian need, the PRTs are strongly advised to coordinate with provincial and national authorities if they decide to become involved in humanitarian assistance. The responsible UNAMA field office is always available to share best practices and lessons learned from past emergencies.
In planning efforts for winterization and flood preparation, for example, PRTs should only monitor progress. Given the propensity for massive floods, avalanches and other disasters PRT commanders should be prepared to act as first responders when lives are at stake. Although provincial authorities involved in a significant disaster will inform the NERC, they will often turn to the PRTs for immediate support because PRTs (with their RCs) are usually the only actors able to respond immediately with air and vehicle assets to reach victims first. Over a period of days or weeks PRTs may be the only entities capable of travelling to isolated areas beyond the reach of national authorities or UN agencies. Thus, PRTs could conceivably have to rescue stranded individuals, clear roads to allow access to medical care, provide emergency humanitarian assistance and the like.

Request for External International Assistance

Depending on the magnitude of the disaster there may be resources that are needed but not be available in-country. In such situations, the UNDMT, through the Humanitarian Coordinator, can request the Field Support Coordination Unit based in Geneva coordinate external international assistance. The types of resources that may be requested include specially trained personnel such as the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, urban search and rescue (SAR) teams for earthquakes, specialized medical teams, water purification, bridging assets and mobile hospitals. Most of these resources can be made available within 48 hours from the time a request is received by OCHA-Geneva. Depending on the magnitude of the disaster the usual relief items required to satisfy basic needs such as food, shelter, water and other non-food items may have to be provided bilaterally by donor partners to complement those already available in-country. In most cases, the government either requests, or is offered assistance, by donor countries. Coordination and management of such assistance is the responsibility of the government.

Trigger Mechanism and Capacity for Response

It is a prerequisite for most donor countries that a state of disaster be declared before humanitarian relief assistance can be officially donated and mobilized. This also applies for the activation of the UNDMT. A disaster declaration by the President or his designated official/minister will trigger activation and deployment of resources to gather information on the basis of which relief assistance is provided.
The trigger mechanism recommended below is to ensure the smooth flow of response activities after a disaster and to clearly allocate responsibility to the various level of administration within the country. However, to provide the exact quantity of losses or damage to each L level of response is premature at this stage of Afghanistan’s social and economic development and its high vulnerability. Each level of response has to be weighed against a range of criteria: socio-economic, vulnerability status in terms of food, water, shelter, environment, community cohesiveness and coping capacity, etc.

Examples are given below to highlight the concept with the overriding principle being the encouragement of community self-reliance vice “relief culture.”

LO denotes a normal situation that can be used for preparatory activities, training, evaluation, lessons learned and debriefing, updating inventory, conducting recovery activities, etc.

L1 is when the disaster can be managed at the district level but the provincial and the national levels need to be prepared in the event assistance is required. For example, if a community is affected by a flood that seriously damages 8 houses out of a total of 100 houses (8% affected), and 30 hectares of crops are damaged out of a total of 400 hectares (7.5% affected), the district or the community itself should be able to cope with this level of destruction. At present the authorities refer this level (and lower) of emergency to the UN, NGOs and international military forces for assistance. Increasing community and district capacity is a slow, long-term process but as the districts develop and communities prosper, the threshold to cope should increase.

L2 is when the participation and resources of the province are required to manage the disaster. There are no acknowledged benchmarks as to when this should be the case. The national level response is on standby to give assistance if required. As with L1, the involvement of humanitarian organizations and international military forces is required/requested at a very early stage.

L3 is a large-scale disaster where a number of districts and provinces are affected and overwhelmed. National and international level assistance is required. This is when it is recommended the UNDMT mobilize to assist.
Core Commitments and Principles

- Any international assistance for disaster response is in support of the Afghanistan government and provided only upon request.

- The core commitment of the UN and its development partners is to enhance the capacity of the government at both the national and sub-national level, including vulnerable communities, so they are better prepared for and able to respond to disasters effectively. Disaster response should be used as the catalyst that facilitates disaster mitigation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction leading eventually to the sustainable development of disaster preparedness systems.

- The provincial authority should have a Provincial Emergency Response Commission (PERC) to deal with issues ranging from response to recovery. It is recommended the team consist of government officials, the UNAMA area coordinator, UN agencies, NGOs, IFRC/ARCS, a PRT representative and other international organizations present in the province.

- For a rapid, effective and coordinated response each province vulnerable to natural disasters must have a preparedness and response plan that corresponds to existing government rules and regulations, paying special attention to the most vulnerable groups.

- Strategic pre-positioning of relief items by the government (assisted by national and international partners) to reduce delivery time to isolated, inaccessible and vulnerable locations is necessary to enhance response capacity. Currently, UNAMA is creating guidelines on how to decentralize strategic pre-positioning and empower provincial emergency response.

- For L1 and L2 disasters, the affected districts and provinces are responsible and must be held accountable for carrying out their assigned tasks. Assisting organizations, including NGOs and international military forces, should ensure the capacity of the districts and provinces to do these tasks is effectively developed without increasing dependency.

- For major L3 level disasters, the government’s National Emergency Response Committee coordinates the overall response. The UNDMT Coordination Team works
closely with the NERC for mutual support and information exchange and to coordinate jointly the response from the UN and international partners.

- Disaster response efforts must be transparent for both beneficiaries and partners. Relief items should be tracked to ensure those in need of assistance are in fact assisted.

- For effective response disaster information focusing on hazard and vulnerability analysis is essential and should be a priority.

- For disaster reduction to be sustainable in the long-term, community-based projects to reduce vulnerability, increase self-reliance and minimize disaster relief should be identified and implemented.
Current Provincial Emergency Response Structure

**Figure 19: Provincial Emergency Response Structure**

Comment: The flow chart reflects a proposed integrated government and international structure of disaster response coordination. It is important to note, that not all provinces have a designated Emergency Coordinator or a UNAMA field office. Also, in some provinces the Emergency Response Commission might bear a different name.
Current National-Provincial Emergency Response Structure

![Diagram of the National-Provincial Emergency Response Structure]

Figure 20: National-Provincial Emergency Response Structure
Appendix 4 to Annex F: Emergency Response Guidelines and Procedures

PRT Executive Steering Committee Policy Note Number 3

“PRT COORDINATION AND INTERVENTION IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE”

References:

E. Guiding note on Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan – guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN personnel

This policy note was endorsed by the 24th PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) on 22 February 2007 at HQ ISAF. The policy note remains effective until cancelled or updated.

This policy note aims to give formal direction as to how PRTs are to engage in humanitarian relief efforts at the provincial level and how to support provincial Disaster Management Teams (DMTs). This aims to promote effectiveness and efficiency as well as preserving humanitarian space.

Humanitarian Relief Coordination

In addition to responding to the immediate crisis as appropriate, the other critical element is for the PRTs to simultaneously inform their Regional Commands who can then inform ISAF, in order to double-track the province’s own reporting from its village, district and provincial-level emergency responders to the National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) in Kabul. ISAF HQ also needs to know about the amounts
of emergency assistance provided by the Regional Commands and PRTs in order to demonstrate ISAF contributing nations’ goodwill gestures that go beyond our main missions. The use of both foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief activities must be during in extremis circumstances only, to be used as a last resort requested by either the Government of Afghanistan or the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and in accordance with References C and D.

Humanitarian assistance is that which is life saving and addresses urgent and life-threatening humanitarian needs. It must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship building, or “winning hearts and minds.” Humanitarian assistance must be distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.

Any humanitarian response should be overseen by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), in the context of the integrated mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation is the Humanitarian Coordinator.

The Humanitarian Coordinator has the lead role to play in disaster response and preparedness through UNAMA and other UN humanitarian agencies in the provinces. PRTs should work closely with UNAMA as well as the government to ensure coordination and avoid duplication.

The primary governmental body for disaster coordination, including the military assets, at a national level is the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), which reports to the president through the 2nd Vice President’s National Emergency Response Commission (NERC). Within ANDMA, the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) has the lead role for coordination of requests for assistance.

At the provincial level Disaster Management Teams (DMTs) are convened in times of disaster chaired by the Provincial Governor, and include line ministries and departments, ARCS, NGOs, and UN Agencies. Priorities for the relief effort are decided here as well as information submitted by all partners; all relief activities should be reported to this body, including those of PRTs.
PRTs must jointly plan and coordinate their activities with the GIRoA and UNAMA which includes providing inventories of relief assistance that has been distributed to avoid duplication by other humanitarian actors.

Where UNAMA has a reduced or limited provincial presence, PRTs are to make the best use of the closest UNAMA office outside the province and be prepared to take a more substantial role in supporting DMTs.

PRTs are strongly encouraged to support capacity building efforts for provincial Government authorities to respond to disasters and to strengthen disaster preparedness measures. There are activities that can facilitate the Government being the lead in disaster response including identifying locations for receiving and storing relief items, mapping natural hazard areas and sharing this information with humanitarian actors.

Where PRTs are the first international actor at the scene of a provincial disaster, and are best placed to deploy their technical and resource competencies in line with their comparative advantage including logistics, damage surveys and assessments, and monitoring of distribution of relief supplies. PRTs should coordinate with the GIRoA and UN agencies to ensure that all humanitarian needs in their respective areas are being actively addressed, and should share information to the maximum extent possible.

PRTs must designate a Focal Point (FP) for Humanitarian affairs that can be shared with other humanitarian actors.

PRTs can play a crucial role in monitoring the distribution of non-PRT relief supplies in areas where other agencies do not have a presence, if appropriate and requested by the civilian humanitarian community.

PRT Capacity Development of DMTS

In line with the ANDS benchmark of “By end-2010 an effective and system of disaster preparedness and response will be in place” PRTs through the civilian elements are strongly encouraged to support the development of local authorities to address disaster situations in coordination with UNAMA offices at central and provincial levels.

In addition, under the aegis of the Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP is implementing the Comprehensive Risk Reduction Program 2007-2011. PRTs are encouraged to
coordinate disaster preparedness measures with local authorities to complement this program.

UN Humanitarian Office

Provincial Disaster Management Team
(alternatively known as the Provincial Emergency Response Commission)
Appendix 4 to Annex F: PRT Engagement on Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction

Assisting Refugees or Selecting Sights for Projects

PRTs need to be aware of possible land disputes when assisting returnees or selecting sites for wells and other projects. They need to make sure that in addition to consulting with the local elders, they also consult with the district and provincial authorities to determine if the land is public or private and if ownership is contested. It would be useful for PRTs to refer those involved to the appropriate government officials and UNAMA. The PRT can also consult with the Department of Refugees and Returnees, UNAMA, and UNHCR to determine the overall situation of returnees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the province, find out what assistance has already been provided and where the PRT’s contribution would have the most effect.

Humanitarian Assistance

All types of humanitarian assistance, including school supplies and clothing, should be done in coordination with the governor’s office, relevant line departments and UNAMA. This will help avoid duplication in distributions. Distribution of winterization items should be done through emergency response committees, which exist at the regional and most provincial levels. For example, UNICEF distributes school supplies to many schools. Selecting schools in coordination with the Director of Education can ensure the PRT avoids delivering school supplies to these same schools while other schools do not receive anything. In places where insurgents target schools, students and teachers, it is highly recommended that PRTs avoid delivering school supplies directly to schools. This direct link with the military can increase the likelihood of an attack. It would be better to deliver the supplies to the Education Department and allow them to distribute the supplies.

In general, the PRT should involve local government officials (and ANA/ANP when appropriate) in distributions whenever possible. In emergencies, distribution can also be done through the National Solidarity Program’s (NSP) Community Development Councils (CDC) in order to avoid chaotic distributions. Opportunities for local elders, ANA and ANP to misuse distributions for their own purposes should be avoided. When clothing is distributed, it is important to take cultural norms into consideration. Food
distributions should not include expired or culturally unacceptable products. If it is not possible for the PRT to coordinate distributions with the government beforehand, relevant departments should be notified after distributions have taken place.

It would be useful for the PRT to keep a record of their humanitarian distributions. UNAMA is often asked to provide this information to the national disaster management commission and/or the National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) during times of crisis. During emergencies it is generally considered most useful for PRTs to provide logistical support to assessment and aid delivery missions. PRTs have a comparative advantage in logistics and both the Government and humanitarian community appreciates their support during a disaster.

VMOs, MedCAPs and VetCAPs

The selection of sites/villages for Village Medical Outreaches (VMOs), Medical Civil Assistance Projects (medCAPs) and Veterinary Civil Assistance Projects (vetCAPs) should be done in coordination with local authorities and UNAMA for the reasons mentioned in the previous section. In addition, there are some services – cleft palette treatments in particular – which certain international military forces are able and willing to provide. They often ask for children with cleft palettes to be identified at VMOs. However, many times these children do not live in the village where the VMO is being conducted. Without advance warning, it is impossible to get these children to the site in time. Additionally, NGOs should be informed about distributions of medicines to clinics since they may supply the same clinics.

ANA doctors and medics should be involved in, and lead, VMOs, medCAPs and vetCAPs whenever possible. Female soldiers should also participate. Otherwise it will be difficult if not impossible to see female patients. It would be appreciated if VMO, medCAP and vetCAP services were not entirely free of charge. This way they would not to compete with local service providers. As above, if it is not possible for the PRT to coordinate with local officials, especially the Departments of Health (DoH) and Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Forestry (DAAHF), as well as UNAMA, before a VMO, medCAP and vetCAP takes place, they should be informed afterwards.
Sharing of Project Data

The provincial government, IOs and NGOs are usually quite interested in PRT-funded projects (for informational purposes only). Information on planned, ongoing and completed PRT projects in the province should be shared with the PDC, Governor’s office, relevant departments, and UNAMA. Likewise, the PRTs are interested in learning about projects implemented by UN agencies, NGOs and the government. UNAMA regional offices generally have information about the majority of projects in the province. For example UNAMA’s Kandahar Regional Field Office created a “Who is Doing What and Where” database with assistance from AIMS. The database contains all UN agency projects in the region.

However, there is no one central or regional database that has been able to capture all the completed, ongoing and planned projects in any of the provinces. UNAMA HQ does not maintain a central database of UN projects; each agency is responsible for tracking their own projects. Some UN agencies have contributed information to the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) database being developed by ISAF HQ. Therefore, PRTs are encouraged to contact ISAF HQ for provincial project data, as well as the UNAMA regional or sub-regional office. PRTs should, in the course of their normal duties, to verify the accuracy of the project data they receive from the ACSP database and UNAMA and to report back any discrepancies.

Project Identification

Projects in Insecure Areas

PRTs are encouraged to undertake projects in remote and/or insecure areas where civilian agencies and international NGOs cannot work. PRTs have a comparative advantage in these areas. It may be appropriate for them to engage in a broader range of projects, such as schools and clinics, as long as the projects are coordinated with the appropriate government ministries and built according to government approved plans and standards. Properly conceived, well-planned development activities can improve security and assist in dispute resolution. In this regard, PRTs should see if there is a government- or UNAMA-led stabilization initiative they can support.
District Centers

If PRTs plan to build district centers in these areas, they should ensure they are not duplicating work being done under the Afghan Stabilization Program (ASP). In many cases they may be able to support the program because ASP contractors may not be willing to work in a high-risk area, or the district centre may remain unfunded. All district centers must be constructed according to government-approved plans.

Before building a district centre in a high-risk area the PRT should find out whether the government will be able to adequately staff it. Some district centers remain empty because no government officials will accept a job in a high-risk area. Also, the PRT should consider whether the government officials who will occupy the district centre are bringing good governance. If not, the district centre risks being seen by the local populace as an expensive symbol of international support for poor governance. If this is the case, the PRT may want to consider alternatives such as small community development projects, e.g., irrigation schemes and karezes, which will provide direct benefits to the local communities. PRTs can implement the community-based methodology of the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in insecure districts where NSP can not be launched.

Roads

Before building a road, the PRT should consult with the local communities along the road trace to determine land ownership. If a section of the road is going to be built on a family’s property, they must be compensated. There have been at least two examples of roads being built by international military forces without prior consultation with villagers. In one case an IED, believed to have been planted by a disgruntled villager who had his land seized without compensation, killed and wounded soldiers from the unit that built the road. Shortly after the road was completed the unit finished their tour. The incoming unit was left with multiple claims for compensation and little information about the project.

Security Sector Projects

Security sector projects such as police stations, court buildings and prison facilities are also encouraged. Prison construction and rehabilitation has the added benefit of improving human rights standards in the province.
Sensitivity to Cultural Norms

Cultural norms, including gender related ones, need to be understood and observed when developing projects. For example, it is critical to take women’s access to public spaces into account when designing a project. When building or rehabilitating a public park, the PRT should realize it is highly unlikely that girls and women will be allowed access to this space. One solution is to build a separate women’s park as part of the same project. Also, the vast majority of infrastructure projects designed for use by women (such as parks, girls’ schools, bathhouses, DoWA offices, etc), will require a compound wall to be built around them. Without a compound wall the space is considered public and women will not be allowed to move freely within it.

Project Sustainability and Capacity Building

When engaging in infrastructure projects, PRTs should ensure maintenance plans are in place to sustain them. It is essential that gravel roads for example, include a realistic maintenance plan that takes the capacity of the provincial public works department into account and includes a capacity-building element for this department. If a gravel road is not maintained, it is only likely to last for one to two years. Cobblestone roads are cheaper and longer lasting than gravel roads.

As another example, if the PRT wants to conduct simple repairs on a hand pump well, it would be useful to work with the community to establish a small maintenance fund and identify one to two people who will be responsible for repairing the well in the future. These people should be trained in basic well maintenance and repair as part of the project.

Capacity building should be also integrated into projects whenever possible. For example, the Tarin Kowt PRT works with the relevant line departments to design and implement all PRT projects, thus building the capacity of the local government. An additional example is if a PRT wants to fund a poultry project for widows, they need to consider how best to conduct the necessary training about chickens and marketing that the project requires. When considering these types of projects, it may be more useful for the PRT to “outsource” to a civilian agency with expertise in this field, rather than trying to do the project themselves.
The criteria for a successful project should include, but not be limited to, approval by the governor. The project should also meet basic development standards. UNAMA recommends PRTs undertake projects that do not require a sustained commitment. Projects that do require a sustained commitment should only be undertaken if they are being coordinated with other agencies that have the ability to ensure long-term, sustained support to a project. A sustainability analysis should be conducted and include an assessment from the national budgetary perspective. At times, analysis of the ANDS and national budget may mean it is more appropriate to build smaller scale projects that what the PRT originally envisioned. For example, given national priorities it may be better to build several small playgrounds with soccer fields and volleyball courts for young people, rather than one large sports complex. At times, some PRTs incorrectly appear to favour ad hoc projects over a more systemic approach that ties projects in with national strategies and strengthens institutions.

It is recognized that PRTs are under pressure from their headquarters to deliver results quickly. This is why they do “quick impact projects.” However, PRTs and their superiors need to recognize it is important to strike a balance between results and consultation.

Project Implementation

*Maintaining an Afghan Face*

In addition to working with relevant departments, government leaders and PC members to plan and implement projects, PRTs should invite these officials on visits to monitor PRT projects whenever possible and give them centre stage at ribbon-cutting ceremonies. This encourages the officials to take ownership and responsibility for the projects. It will also help ensure that along with the PRT, these officials receive credit for the projects. This will increase the legitimacy of the government because the officials are seen to be involved in improving the lives of the populace by bringing reconstruction and development to the province.

*Contracting*

PRTs should never promise to implement a project until the funding has been approved. Once it has been approved, standardized bidding procedures should be used that minimize the opportunity for corruption. Special attention should be paid to the influence of PRT translators and local national engineers in the contracting process.
PRTs should make an effort to broaden the base of sub-contractors used for projects. These implementing partners should be vetted to determine whether they are friends or relatives of PRT local national employees or powerful members of the community. Contracts should specify a certain amount of local labour will be used. Costs and salaries should not inflate local market values. Some local NGOs are willing to work with the PRT, as are local contractors. Given equal capacity and skills, these local organizations should be given priority over foreign contractors. This can also help improve the security of the project as national contractors have local knowledge of the social and political situation in the area.

Follow-up

As donors, PRTs should ensure equipment (vehicles, computers, etc.) are registered with the relevant government ministry and department (such as Public Works). There should be detailed agreements regarding maintenance responsibilities, including the purchase of fuel and the use of acquired equipment for personal profit, etc. Donated equipment should be public property and PRTs should determine who uses it and make regular checks on its condition and use.

Don't Be Short-sighted in 'Winning Hearts and Minds'

PRTs sometimes engage in humanitarian distributions and small construction projects that are outside any strategic development framework in order to “win hearts and minds” as part of their psychological operations. It is recommended that PRTs take care in how they go about these projects. They can have far reaching implications for future relationships with the local population and other stakeholders. For example, providing humanitarian items or projects to certain groups may help gain their confidence in the short-term. However, they may also create long-term grievances with other groups.
Appendix 5 to Annex F: Military Engagement in Health Sector Reconstruction and Development

Introduction

The aim of this appendix is to provide guidance on military medical engagement in health sector reconstruction and development. It is a summary of the ISAF approach to military involvement in Reconstruction and Development (R&D), the health sector in Afghanistan and the contribution that ISAF medical forces may make in support of the military R&D objectives. The discussion will focus on the contribution that can be provided by medical staff within HQ ISAF, PRTs and military medical treatment facilities. The document does not cover direct medical care provided as part of Medical Civil Assistance Projects (MedCAPS) or Village Medical Outreach Programmes (VMOPs).

Key references are listed at the end of the appendix. They include: the ISAF OPLAN 38302, particularly Appendix 1 to Annex R Medical Support, and Annexes W - CIMIC, HH - Reconstruction and Development and LL PRT Operations. The ISAF PRT Handbook contains valuable background reading on the context of R&D in Afghanistan. Health Sector references are also listed at the end of the document. All of these are available through the ISAF WISE page.

Background

The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) is at a nascent level of development and has limited outreach to certain provinces. HQ ISAF will seek to influence R&D at the National Level in two ways. Firstly by engaging with the long term, and strategic Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) mechanisms, thus ensuring ISAF remains aligned with the overarching development priorities of the GOA. Secondly by the coordination of specific issues at Ministerial level via the Policy Action Group (PAG) to support Afghan Development Zones (ADZs). At provincial and district level, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will remain ISAF’s "front-line" for enabling

34. ISAF OPLAN 38302
R&D. PRTs are joint military-civilian organisations to assist in the development of the GoA capability and capacity by engagement with key stakeholders in R&D at provincial and district levels. It utilises its military component to provide protection and security to provide sufficient stability to enable diplomacy and develop to occur.

The following four enduring principles underpin ISAF’s CONOPS for Reconstruction and Development:

**Afghan-Owned.** The building of AFG’s indigenous capacity remains fundamental to the success of stability operations. Therefore, in order to promote economic growth and strengthen GOA’s capacity for good governance, R&D work will, where practical, be Afghan-owned and led. Indigenous skills must also be employed wherever they are available, and identified for training where they are not.

**ISAF-Enabled.** ISAF will "enable" the Afghan owned ANDS through delivery of direct, indirect and supporting tasks. ISAF will create effect, primarily through exerting influence to support GOA development programmes. ISAF must not seek to "lead" the International Community, nor must it foster a military dependency culture through an excess of direct project execution.

**Wholly Collaborative.** ISAF will not pursue a military strategy to deliver R&D in isolation. Utilising its organisational reach, strengthened under the unified mission, ISAF will work to achieve "coherence" with the development community. Its delivery will, therefore, be wholly collaborative and it will seek to be inclusive to all stakeholders.

**Sustainable.** Reconstruction and Development will only become sustainable when widespread local, District and Provincial "buy-in" to programmes is achieved. ISAF must enable this sustainability by facilitating project engagement with, and commitment from, ad hoc community organisations as well as District and Provincial government representatives.

ISAF has the capability and capacity to operationalise these principles in the health sector through engagement with the MoPH at the national level and the application of military medical resources at the local level whilst ensuring that the medical support to military forces is not undermined.
Health Situation

At the time of the overthrow of the Taliban the health system in Afghanistan had become almost non-existent with standard measures of population health amongst the lowest in the world. After a thorough review of the Afghan health situation (35), the MoPH of the Government of Afghanistan published a series of policies and strategies designed to lead the country from this abyss. The health situation in Afghanistan is summarised in the Afghanistan Health Profile from 2005 (36) The most recent document provides a national health policy for 2005-2009 and a national health strategy for 2005-2006 (37). The National Health Policy Goal 2005-2009 is to “develop the health sector to improve the health of the people of Afghanistan, especially women and children, through implementing the basic package of health services and the essential package of hospital services as the minimum of health care to be provided at each level of the health system”. The Afghan National health policy priorities are shown in Table 1.

35. Afghanistan National Health Resources Assessment December 2002 Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Health Prepared for the Ministry of Health by MSH, HANDS, and MSH/Europe With support from USAID, EC, UNFPA, and JICA


Table 1. Afghan National Health Policy Priorities

Implementing health services

* Implement the basic package of health services
* Implement the essential package of hospital services
* Establish prevention and promotion programmes

Promote greater community participation

Improve coordination of health services

Strengthen the coverage of quality support programmes

Reducing morbidity and mortality

* Improve the quality of maternal and reproductive health care
* Improve the quality of child health initiatives
* Strengthen the delivery of cost effective integrated communicable disease control programmes

Reduce prevalence of malnutrition, increasing access to iodised salt and micronutrients, and increase exclusive breast feeding

Institutional development

* Promote institutional and management development
*Strengthen human resources development, especially of female staff

*Strengthen health planning, monitoring and evaluation

Develop health financing and national health accounts

Strengthen provincial level management and coordination

Continue to implement PRR

Establish quality assurance

Develop and enforce public and private sector regulations and laws

The nine top priorities are marked with an asterix.

This strategy links to previous policy documents that describe the basic package of health services and the essential package of hospital services that provides the core for health service delivery across the country (38, 39). These two documents describe in detail the organisation of health services, and the medical facilities, health providers and the medical equipment required to deliver these health services. All providers of health services are expected to comply with the direction contained in these documents. Furthermore the MoPH has issued clear direction on the requirement of military medical services to coordinate with and obtain permission from the Ministry before undertaking health or health related activities in Afghanistan. The basic structure for the management of the MoPH health system is shown at Figure 1.


The MoPH has developed a framework for the health infrastructure of Afghanistan ranging from Community Health Workers to National Hospitals. This is shown at Figure 2. Locations for all of these facilities have been mapped and are available from either the AIMS website (www.aims.org.af) or the Afghanistan health sector page on ReliefWeb (www.reliefweb.int). They are also mapped by ISAF CJEngr on the Afghan Country Stability Picture (ACSP).
Mission And Tasks

OPLAN 38302 tasks ISAF medical forces to provide functional leadership for medical engagement with Reconstruction and Development. Engagement with the Afghan civilian health sector can be divided into two areas, Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction and Development. The policy framework for each is described below:

Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

Medical HA may be provided in accordance with national regulations of the Troop Contributing Nation (TCN), but must not undermine the capability or capacity to support ISAF forces. ISAF medical support is configured for a specific military population, and it must be remembered that it lacks some specialties such as paediatrics and obstetrics. In the short term, the provision of humanitarian medical support to local citizens or refugees will be in cases of emergency where life, limb or eyesight would be jeopardized without immediate medical intervention. Emergency care will be provided in close co-ordination with civil authorities. Medical HA will require consultation and
co-operation with International Organisations (IO)/NGOs and local public health officials; and must involve close and careful co-ordination with the ISAF CJ5 and CJ9 staffs under the lead ISAF Medical Director. All medical materiel should be provided from HN or NGO/aid agencies resources, unless the medical facility undertaking any task has authorised its supply at no cost to ISAF by the respective National Support Element (NSE).

Reconstruction and Development (R&D)

The GOA has a clear strategy for the development of the health sector within the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), but there is considerable variation in the implementation of this strategy at provincial level. Uniquely, NATO PRTs could provide a useful conduit of information and local oversight of execution of projects at a local level by making use of the pool of highly trained health care professional employed in MTFs in support of military forces. All military medical activities directed towards the local population must be undertaken in concert with the MoPH, IOs and NGOs at both provincial and national level and must also involve close and careful co-ordination with the ISAF CJ5 and CJ9 staffs under the lead ISAF Medical Director. Use of medical materiel for R&D is as for ISAF provision of medical HA.

Concept of Engagement

The concept for engagement is based on the following areas: liaison and situational awareness, facilitation of resources, training and mentoring, and direct patient care.

Liaison and Situational Awareness

Whilst the lead for R&D does not lie with MEDADs, military medical staff have a significant role to play on the basis of their professional knowledge. Dependent upon local priorities, this may mean that CJ9 has medical staff within the CE for engagement in the health sector or that MEDADs are resourced to provide this capability within their branches. Whatever the arrangement, it is vital that all internal staff activity in medical R&D is co-ordinated with the CJ9 lead and reporting framework.

External engagement is often best achieved using professionally qualified staff. MEDADs or Senior Medical Officers in PRTs should be involved in CJ9 engagement in
the health sector. They should work with the Provincial Health Directors and should offer to be members of the Provincial Health Co-ordination Committees. MEDADs/SMOs should be familiar with the major civilian medical facilities in their area in order to develop the opportunities for engagement in the health sector described below. Finally MEDADs/SMOs should provide regular reports on their involvement in medical R&D projects through both the CJ9 and CJMED reporting chain in order to enable HQ ISAF to achieve full situational awareness.

Facilitation of Resources

GoA has limited internal capacity to generate income and the majority of development funding flows into the national budget from donors and the IC. Although generally accepted that funding must be routed through GoA mechanisms to build capacity, much is disbursed via other means. ISAF will not seek to co-ordinate this funding, but may be able to assist in matching requests for assistance with sources of funding at both a local and also national level (including military funding).

In the health sector, military medical staff may have the expertise to assist with the assessment of demand for health services and the development of project proposals. This may be particularly valuable in areas where the security situation inhibits the movement of GoA/IA or NGO personnel.

The renovation and construction of infrastructure medical facilities has been a natural extension of military "hearts and minds" projects. A successful medical infrastructure project can be very rewarding for all involved as well as making a substantial difference to the local population served by the facility. Alongside examples of successful medical construction projects are examples of decaying empty buildings that have no staff, have been ransacked of equipment, and not providing any practical improvement in the health care available to the local population. Whilst the opening of medical facilities can be an important milestone in engaging the local population, it is vital that this investment is safeguarded for the long-term by ensuring the project lies within a wider health programme and is sustainable in terms of staff, equipment, consumables and
local community commitment. There are very few indications for the use of military field hospitals for humanitarian aid and development \(^{(40)}\).

Any infrastructure health project should start with a full needs assessment both in terms of the population and the requirements of the individual facility. The project should comply with local and national plans. Working within the military mission statement to "expand the influence of the Government of Afghanistan", the project should be used as a lever to develop local medical planning capacity and therefore should involve local health officials and any IAs/NGOs that may be legitimate stakeholders. The project plan should ensure the integration of all components: money, facilities, people, intellectual process, capital equipment, consumables. It is vital that all technology and equipment is appropriate to the local circumstances: for instance the Essential Package of Hospital Services contains a detailed list of drugs and equipment required for each type of hospital in the health system. Specific technological solutions, such as solar-powered refrigerators, may be better than conventional equipment. It should also include a post-completion plan to include follow-up engagement with key stakeholders, review of the use and maintenance of equipment, resolution of unforeseen problems and continued integration with local health plan. The whole process is summarised in Figure 3.

Medical Infrastructure Project Process

**Reconnaissance**

- Project proposal: analysis of demand, need, infrastructure, equipment, staff, training, consumables, funding, long-term support
- Co-ordination, internal and external: local representatives, MoPH military, IAs/NGOs etc.
- Project funding submission and award of funds
- Appointment of local project officer
- Procurement of goods and supplies
- Local works
  - Pre-handover training and familiarisation of equipment
  - Formal hand-over
  - Follow-up and post-project evaluation

**Figure 23: Medical Infrastructure Project Process**

**Training and Mentoring**

The lack of "Human Capital" is the biggest constraint on the pace of development in Afghanistan, particularly in the health sector. Where ISAF medical staff are not fully employed caring for military forces, there may be spare capability and capacity to assist with the training and mentoring of Afghan healthcare workers. The target audience extends beyond just doctors to include nurses, paramedics, laboratory technicians, physiotherapists, environmental health specialists, dentists, optometrists and veterinarians. The methods of training and mentorship can also vary according to the training need, resources and best location. Where possible these should be based on existing training design and material from the Ministry of Public Health such as the training manual for community healthcare workers (41). Ideally most educational activity should take place in an Afghan environment but the security situation may make it preferable for the students to travel to an ISAF facility. Examples of training and mentoring activities that could be undertaken are shown in Table 2.

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41. Community Health Care Worker Training Manual Min PH 2005
### Teaching Technique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching Technique</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-off lectures or presentations</td>
<td>Expert presentation</td>
<td>Easy, but may not be appropriate to local health economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case presentations</td>
<td>From care of Afghan patients in ISAF MTFs</td>
<td>Best focussed on Afghan patients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Grand-rounds&quot; case review</td>
<td>Review of ward patients</td>
<td>Best done in Afghan facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td>E.g. emergency planning</td>
<td>ISAF or Afghan location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills-based training</td>
<td>E.g. external fixator training</td>
<td>ISAF or Afghan location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment familiarisation and training</td>
<td>E.g. demonstration and practice of use of new equipment</td>
<td>Best done in Afghan facilities, could set up a skills station in ISAF facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structured teaching programmes</td>
<td>E.g. ATLS</td>
<td>ISAF or Afghan location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared clinical cases</td>
<td>E.g. shared care of clinical referrals to ISAF facilities</td>
<td>ISAF or Afghan location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation into clinical teams</td>
<td>E.g. attachments to wards or clinical departments in ISAF facilities</td>
<td>Best done in Afghan facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow mentoring</td>
<td>E.g. ISAF staff shadow local staff at work</td>
<td>Best done in Afghan facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9: Examples of Training and Mentoring Activities**

**Direct Patient Care**

Any clinical care provided to the indigenous population should take into account aspects like the availability of medical follow-up capabilities, own means and resources and the need to have sufficient capabilities and capacities left for support of the military force. Even if there is a clear health need, the military response should be designed to enable sustainment by the local community with the final outcome being the establishment of
the local civil medical infrastructure under local political control. Alongside these 
clinical sensitivities, it is vital that medical services are tailored to local socio-cultural 
and religious customs and rules. This particularly applies to the role of women within 
health professions and in the care of local women. Finally, military medical services 
must be employed in a manner consistent with their non-combatant status under the 
Geneva Convention. Although under military command, tasks given to military medical 
services must be in accordance with clinical need and should not be dependant on 
engagement with military operations such as intelligence collection – though it is 
legitimate to conduct this in parallel but using separate organisations.

As stated earlier, military medical services have an ethical duty on humanitarian 
grounds to provide emergency medical care to any patient, particularly those in 
vulnerable groups. This does not mean automatic access to the full national military 
medical evacuation chain but should be limited to treatment within the country of 
origin, care appropriate to local capability for further management, and early hand-off 
to local medical providers or health-related IAs/NGOs. The definition of “emergency” 
may be difficult and there may be pressure from external agencies to facilitate access to 
military medical services as a source of influence. Furthermore there have been 
occasions where opposition groups have used simulated patients as an attempt to bypass 
security systems. Thus the management of access to military medical treatment 
facilities by the local population requires a form of access control. This should usually 
include a security check (balancing cultural norms with security imperatives) and a 
preliminary medical assessment to determine need. This preliminary medical 
assessment should also determine whether the military medical facility has the 
resources to influence the patient’s clinical outcome. As local medical services develop, 
this assessment process should be based on a formal referral from a local medical 
practitioner – but the military medical services should ensure that this arrangement is 
not exploited for personal gain. Joint clinical casework can be a further refinement of 
referral, where military medical personnel visit local medical facilities as part of a 
mentoring programme and agree to jointly manage cases with local practitioners. Joint 
clinical casework has the potential to increase knowledge and understanding between 
medical personnel from both settings and can also be used as a mechanism to role model 
more "Western" styles of clinical care involving multi-disciplinary teams including 
nurses, physiotherapists and other practitioners in holistic care of patients. All clinical 
care should be in accordance with local capabilities and cultural norms. This includes
ensuring that all medication is prescribed in accordance with local formularies and
ensuring that hand-off or discharge arrangements reflect the realities of providing
continuing care in the local community. It would normally be inappropriate to initiate
medical care for chronic, long-term conditions that require continuing medical
supervision and treatment unless this has been very carefully coordinated with local
medical providers, possibly including NGOs, and included such issues as care at home
and financial support.

The provision of direct clinical care can be very rewarding to military medical
practitioners but introduces a number of practical and ethical challenges that are not
normally present in "western" clinical practice. As the military operation evolves from
the immediate post-conflict phase, it is vital that any clinical support is fully co-
ordinated and integrated with the prevailing local health economy. There should be no
suggestion that the presence of a military medical treatment facility is distorting or
undermining the regeneration and development of long-term medical services for the
local community. This includes being sensitive to the way in which local medical care is
financed (i.e. to not provide free treatment if local providers have to raise charges) and
ensuring that all costs are covered by the military medical services. It is vital that
military medical staff are aware of these issues before deployment and recognise that
their primary duty remains to provide care for the military community.

Pitfalls To Avoid

Misdirected, but well-intentioned ISAF actions at the tactical level could serve to
undermine or duplicate GOA and IC effort, or, at worse, foster an environment of
military dependency thus undermining GOA's own development. In addition,
potentially ill-conceived ISAF projects may generate unintended alliances and serve to
de-stabilise areas within a longer timeframe. Notwithstanding this principle, ISAF
commanders at the tactical level may need to employ military capability to deliver
projects directly or indirectly in order to win favour or tactical freedoms. In this context,
and only where the tactical benefit significantly outweighs any possible impact on GOA
capacity building, projects may be supportable providing they adhere to the ISAF R&D
principles. Examples of pitfalls to avoid are listed at Table 5.

Providing field hospitals
Planning projects not programmes

Listening to only one opinion

Focussing on infrastructure rather than capability

Focussing on physical capital rather than human capital

Providing treatment solutions without considering prevention

Providing inappropriate technology

Providing "one-off" donations of consumables

Concentrating on doctors without considering "low-technology" health providers

Considering healthcare as only medical care (remember dental care, optometry, environmental health, veterinary programmes)

**Table 10: Pitfalls to avoid in medical infrastructure projects**

Reporting Framework

ISAF SOP 901 and FRAGO 195-09 outlines the CIMIC reporting framework. All medical R&D tasks and projects are to be reported in accordance with this SOP with an information copy going to the RC MEDAD and ISAF MEDAD. These should also be covered in the weekly ISAF MEDASSESSREP. Originators of projects are also to consider the benefit of the project to the wider ISAF Information Operation and to involve Public Information Operations staff to ensure key milestones in medical R&D projects receive the appropriate publicity.

Key References and Resources (accessible through the ISAF MEDAD Wise page)
What is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)?

- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are independent, not-for-profit, civilian organizations engaged in serving the public good (in sectors such as education, health, child protection, agriculture and water supply and sanitation.)

- In Afghanistan, all official NGOs are registered under the Ministry of Economy and under the authority of the Government of Afghanistan’s Law on Non-Governmental Organizations.\(^4^3\)

- All NGOs have individual governing bodies to which they report, and mandates that govern their actions and programs.

- NGOs include international NGOs, which operate in many countries and with headquarters within and outside Afghanistan, and national NGOs operating only in Afghanistan.\(^4^4\)

- NGOs do not adhere to a single set of objectives or one mandate. They vary in origin, faith/secular basis, structure, resources, expertise, sector and areas of operation.

Principles, Mandates, and Standards

*PRTs Must Follow the Civil – Military Guides.*

Individual NGOs have different mandates, as noted, and adhere to recognised international standards to differing degrees. Despite these differences, NGO goals and objectives tend to be similar, and there is wide international support for specific

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\(^4^2\) This section was produced by several NGOs, including ACBAR, ANSO, CARE International, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, and Save the Children UK. Barbara Stapleton of the EU also provided input. Much of the text of this section is taken from the *Code of Conduct for NGOs engaged in Humanitarian Action, Reconstruction, and Development in Afghanistan* (2004).

\(^4^3\) As of August 21, 2006: 1,030 NGOs were registered.

\(^4^4\) The Ministry of Economy officially lists 774 national NGOs and 256 international NGOs working in Afghanistan as of August 21, 2006.
principles and standards. These standards are related to the scope and accountability of humanitarian and development assistance, key areas of which are rooted in international humanitarian law including the Geneva Conventions. These standards include:

- **SPHERE Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response**\(^{45}\)

- **The Humanitarian Accountability Project – International (HAPI)**\(^{46}\)

- **People in Aid Code of Best Practice**\(^{47}\)

- **Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)**\(^{48}\)

- **Do No Harm**\(^{49}\)

In May 2005, in an ongoing effort to improve the Afghan public’s and government’s understanding of valid NGOs and their purposes, most NGOs affiliated with the four main NGO coordinating bodies in Afghanistan\(^{50}\) developed a Code of Conduct for NGOs Engaged in Humanitarian Action, Reconstruction, and Development in Afghanistan. This Code promotes a set of shared values and establishes high standards of accountability, transparency and service delivery for its signatories.

In the Code, a general mission statement is given that encompasses the basic aims of the NGO signatories.

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\(^{45}\) See SPHERE Handbook at www.sphereproject.org

\(^{46}\) See http://www.hapinternational.org/en/

\(^{47}\) See http://www.peopleinaid.org/

\(^{48}\) See http://www.odi.org.uk/alnap/

\(^{49}\) “Do No Harm” – principles based on a book by Mary Anderson. The basic concept is that many programs have been implemented focused on a particular positive impact – but have caused other negative impacts. Do No Harm principles call for programs to be designed in such as way as to ensure they do not inadvertently cause harm.

\(^{50}\) The four main coordinating bodies are ACBAR, ANCB, AWN and SWABAC.
NGO Mission Statement

“Our general mission as NGOs operating in Afghanistan is to address humanitarian, reconstruction and sustainable development needs in Afghanistan, with a special focus on the rights of those who are disadvantaged and vulnerable. We work in partnership with each other, the government, donors, and communities.”

Note that this general mission statement refers to NGOs signed on to the Code of Conduct for NGOs engaged in Humanitarian Action, Reconstruction, and Development in Afghanistan (2004).

The Code of Conduct also provides a list of NGO principles of conduct. These are based on a number of international standards and guidelines, including the Humanitarian Principles (ICRC Code of Conduct). These principles provide both the bases for NGO approaches, activities, accountability and transparency as well as interaction with other actors. The full of principles of conduct can be found at the back of this appendix.
Principles of Conduct

Our organizations are:

1. People-centered
2. Committed to sustainable positive impact
3. Committed to transparency and accountability
4. Committed to good internal governance
5. Committed to honesty, integrity and cost effectiveness
6. Committed to diversity, fairness, non-discrimination against marginalized groups and to affirmative action
7. Committed to building Afghan capacity
8. Committed to independence

In humanitarian emergency contexts, we adhere to the following additional principles:

1. Impartiality: We provide aid on the basis of need alone. We provide support regardless of the race, religion, ethnicity, gender or nationality and political affiliation of the recipients. We do not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of humanitarian assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.
2. Neutrality: We do not promote partisan national or international political agendas. We do not choose sides between parties to a conflict.
3. Application of SPHERE

These principles refer to NGOs which have signed on to the Code of Conduct for NGOs engaged in Humanitarian Action, Reconstruction, and Development in Afghanistan (2004). For further elaboration please see the Code of Conduct in the Appendix section.
NGOs have played a primary role in the public sector in Afghanistan throughout the Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen-led civil wars, and the Taliban regime. Experienced NGOs have considerable institutionalised knowledge of local operational contexts and Afghan social constructs, as well as humanitarian, developmental and technical expertise. NGOs are particularly engaged in a vital aspect of reconstruction and development by prioritising the building of Afghan capacity: from training teachers, health care workers and engineers to helping develop the middle and higher management capacity of hundreds of individual Afghans.

Sectors of activities include:

- Humanitarian assistance and emergency relief
- Health/nutrition
- Water and sanitation
- Education/vocational training
- Income generation including employment generation and micro-finance
- Community development, civil society support
- Governance support including peacebuilding, reconciliation, and civic education
- Rural development, including infrastructure, agriculture and livestock support
- Urban reconstruction
- Reintegration for returnees, IDPs and demobilized soldiers
- Natural resource management

NGOs coordinate activities with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), and play key roles as implementing partners in various GoA programs including the National Solidarity Program (NSP), National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP), basic package of health services (BPHS) delivery and various education initiatives.

Within their mandates, many NGOs also focus on specific, often marginalized, populations that include children, women, people with disabilities, and minorities.
NGOs, Development and the Community-Based Approach

NGOs are usually committed to a community-based approach in Afghanistan because they are the focus and raison d’etre for NGOs and NGO efforts in development.

Community participation entails far more than consulting communities on development activities. Community involvement is encouraged and supported by all good NGOs at all levels from initial project design to management, implementation and evaluation.

NGOs’ field experience repeatedly confirms that community involvement not only strengthens the competence and capacity of the communities, but also creates trust between people and NGOs which allows greater access to communities (to women and girls, for example) as well as establishing peoples’ ownership of the project(s). Significantly, NGOs aim to diminish the development of a dependency culture by focusing on empowering people via their work with communities.

NGOs recognize that such long-term approaches differ from the short-term nature of quick impact projects – and charity. For the reasons outlined above, NGOs actively promote the overriding importance of well-planned programs over the long-term, informed by integrated development approaches and activities. Most importantly, NGOs have learnt that in Afghanistan, detailed local knowledge is essential to avoid development efforts being counter productive either directly or indirectly.

NGOs Structure and Networks

NGOs have different organizational structures that reflect vertical and horizontal hierarchies. Many NGOs have headquarters in Kabul or regional/provincial centers, but also maintain small field offices throughout their areas of operation.

NGO consortiums and coordinating bodies exist both within and outside of Afghanistan. Key internal NGO coordination bodies in Afghanistan include the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the Afghan NGOs Coordinating Body (ANCB), the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), and the Southern Western Afghanistan & Balochistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC) (see Links section for more information on these organizations).

NGO consortiums also include various sector-specific working groups (e.g., alternative livelihoods, gender, and education) and specific initiatives, such as the Human Rights
Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC), a group of 14 international and national NGOs conducting proactive research and advocacy on human rights issues in Afghanistan, and the Civil Society Afghan National Development Strategy (CSANDS) Working Group which supports civil society (including NGOs) efforts in working with the GoA and international community regarding the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). NGOs involved in regional and national projects also coordinate their activities. One example is the Facilitating Partners Resource Group (FPRG) for expediting the aims of the National Solidarity Program.

Outside Afghanistan, further Afghanistan-specific networks exist, including the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) and the recently formed European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA). In addition key NGO networks in the US such as InterAction maintain working groups on Afghanistan.

NGOs and Security

As with all reconstruction and development stakeholders in Afghanistan, NGOs’ ability to operate depends on a reasonably secure environment. As NGOs are voluntary, independent and community-focused organizations that are often locally staffed, NGO security needs and concerns are similar to those held by the communities they support and work alongside. Therefore, NGO security concerns are not limited to anti-government elements – but include crime, local conflicts, corruption and war-related incidents. NGOs are adversely affected by the absence of the rule of law, continuing impunity and lack of access to criminal justice. These constraints exist in many areas and can greatly limit the ability of NGOs to function.

NGOs primarily assess security with regard to:

- Safety of their mainly Afghan staff
- Communities within which they operate
- Effectiveness of their activities

Many NGOs maintain their own security staff but also report to and receive information from the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO).
Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)

The NGO community is not privy to security information held by international and national government, military and police authorities. The gathering of that information and its efficient provision to NGOs is the primary concern of ANSO.

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office exists to gather that information and provide it to NGOs. ANSO’s goal is to enable safer circumstances for NGOs and to increase aid access to all people in need in Afghanistan.

NGOs security strategies are derived from NGOs’ dependence on maintaining the trust and acceptance of the communities they work with. This in turn is based on Afghans’ perceptions of NGO neutrality and impartiality. This is fundamental to the ability of NGO to operate in many areas of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan’s difficult recent past, the maintenance of public perceptions of NGO neutrality allowed NGOs to cross political divides and reach people in all areas of the country.

Actions by NGOs, GOA and military actors that may inadvertently or inadvertently erode public perceptions of NGO neutrality can significantly impact NGO security.
Blurring the Lines

The core operating principles of NGOs are impartiality, neutrality and independence and the acceptance of these principles by belligerent as well as peacekeeping forces has enabled NGO access to communities in insecure areas. This stated, Afghan as well as international NGO staff provide soft targets for those seeking to commit crimes, destabilize situations, etc. Given Afghanistan’s recent history and the uncertain nature of political outcomes and that NGOs will remain in country long after other actors have gone, NGO neutrality is considered to be key to maintaining future operational capacity. Direct relations with the international military in general, but particularly in the south of Afghanistan, are primarily avoided to prevent possible loss of access.

The merging of relief and security, which is apparent in the increasing involvement of the military in relief and reconstruction delivery in conflict zones, both confuses and erodes public perceptions of the impartial and neutral nature of humanitarian aid based on need alone.

There is also concern over “blurring the lines” between the military and humanitarian sectors. When military actors carry out development activities associated with NGOs, this gives rise to confusion which undermines community understanding and acceptance of development activities and established best practice, as well as jeopardizing NGOs security – and therefore their ability to access insecure areas.

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51 The term "humanitarian space" refers to the ability of humanitarian agencies to work independently and impartially in areas without fear of attack. It is only because of broad respect for humanitarian space by various belligerent forces that NGO’s have maintained access to populations in need during Afghanistan’s recent history.
Interaction with PRTs

Figure 1: NGO Interaction with PRTs

NGO interaction with PRTs varies greatly based on location, the local security environment, the principles of specific NGOs and programming, as well as the orientation of the PRT and its activities in its area of operations. Figure 1 gives a general idea of the types of interactions that exists between PRTs and NGOs at various levels.

Active Engagement refers to NGOs actively working with PRTs in the field, and includes NGOs that implement projects directly for PRTs.

Collaboration refers to PRTs and NGOs working together on projects and/or with communities.

Coordination refers to NGOs not directly working with PRTs in the field, but sharing information about program activities, site areas, mandates, and beneficiary needs. Coordination can occur at both the national and provincial levels and often occurs via a mediating body exemplified in Afghanistan by UNAMA. NGO coordinating bodies or line government ministries also provide modes of third party engagement.

No Interaction refers to NGOs that maintain a policy of non-engagement, or refuse any form of direct communication, with PRTs.
Even for the NGOs that do not actively engage with PRTs, their activities in improving living standards, livelihoods and the social safety net have a significant impact on improving security conditions within Afghanistan. Thus, even when not formally aligned, the PRTs have a strong interest in the ongoing activity and success of NGO actors.

Limitations to Interaction

To preserve NGO principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence and retain access to populations in need, many NGOs will limit their interactions with PRTs. The fact that PRTs now include civilian actors has not changed their perception among local communities, and therefore, has not changed the policy of many NGOs.

Programming is also a major factor in the type of NGO relationship with PRTs. Many NGOs question the military’s capacity for conducting effective, long-term, and sustainable development processes and outcomes. The PRT use of Quick Impact Projects, a regular component of counter-insurgency strategy, is an example. Despite their potential value in enabling further development, QIPs are by themselves, short-term, one-off activities. PRT efforts to gather information are also viewed by many Afghans as intelligence gathering, so that their capacity to effectively work with communities on development projects is undermined.

Staff, project and community security concerns also determine the extent to which NGOs will interact with military actors. As already stated, NGO ability to maintain operations within communities in insecure areas depends on community perceptions of NGO neutrality. Thus NGOs rely on keeping a low profile and community support as coping strategies in an insecure environment.

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52 See section on blurring the lines on previous page.
How to Initiate Interaction with NGOs

Initial contact with NGOs is best done through a non-military agency (NGO coordinating body, UNAMA or relevant IRA department). It is requested that armed PRT personnel, including civilians with a military escort, do not visit an NGO office without first obtaining permission from the NGO.

- Locate a point of contact (POC) for the organization and approach the person by phone or e-mail first. This allows the NGO to determine, if they wish, a suitable time and place for a meeting;

- POC can be acquired from NGO coordinating bodies such as ACBAR, the NGO security organisation ANSO, or via UNAMA;

- Have a clear objective in approaching an NGO and be transparent. NGOs do not want to be associated with actions that can be interpreted as being linked to intelligence gathering or military operations. State your goals clearly and honestly;

- If you are not sure about something, ask. Sharing information will build trust;

- All NGOs have “no weapons” policies. This applies to vehicles, compounds and offices. You must establish a comfort level BEFORE approaching an NGO. NGO staffs are oriented by their organizations’ policies, protocols, and practices on this issue. A simple statement as follows will be appreciated:

  “I am required to carry a weapon with me at all times, what is your organization’s policy on this?”

Agreeing to a “no weapons” meeting and then carrying a covert weapon is unprofessional and will likely result in isolation from the NGOs.
If you cannot square your security protocols with the NGOs requirements of the meeting, cancel the meeting.

For information on what NGOs are working in an area or within a sector, please contact one of the following NGO coordinating bodies: ACBAR, ANCB, AWN, SWABAC, the NGO civil military working group (yahoo group) or UNAMA.

Links (Key Umbrella Organisations)

*Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)*

[www.acbar.org](http://www.acbar.org)

ACBAR represents over 90 key national and international NGOs in Afghanistan. ACBAR monitors which organisations are working where throughout the country and this information (regularly updated) is accessible via its website.

Formed in 1988, ACBAR serves the following functions:

- Coordination
- Planning NGO strategy to meet humanitarian aims
- Collection & dissemination of information relevant to humanitarian assistance & development
- Development of NGO advocacy & policy
- Provision of information resources & technology centers
- Links to umbrella NGO organizations in Europe and the US

ACBAR has sub-offices in Jalalabad, Herat and Mazar e Sharif.

ACBAR leads the NGO civil military working group and is widely viewed as providing an interface between the NGO community, GOA, donors and the international military.

Email: acbarkbl@acbar.org

*Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB)*

[www.ancb.org](http://www.ancb.org)
ANCB, established on the 27th of November 1991, is a non-governmental, non-political and non-profit organization operating to coordinate the activities of Afghan NGOs working towards emergency relief, rehabilitation and development of Afghanistan.

ANCB is endeavoring to promote the spirit of cooperation among its member NGOs. To achieve this goal, it has been holding periodic meetings, gatherings, workshops and seminars. ANCB member NGOs are active in different sectors in Afghanistan and some of them are conducting multi-sector activities.

Objectives:

- To be a common forum for Afghan NGOs
- To establish and further strengthen relations among NGOs and with the local and central authorities of Afghanistan and donor agencies
- To establish cordial relations among various Afghan NGOs, as well as build a solid liaison between NGOs and the international community
- To coordinate the activities of Afghan NGOs
- To provide meeting opportunities and venues for NGOs with concerned agencies
- To provide capacity building in the form of refresher-training sessions, workshops, seminars, research work, and technical support for NGO staff
- To establish norms so as to ensure uniformity and further pave the way for conducting research

Email: ancb_ch@yahoo.com

South West Afghanistan & Baluchistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC)

SWABAC was established in 1988 by 12 international NGOs based in Quetta. SWABAC a membership of 70. However, as of August 2006, only 32 of these members have been able to successfully complete the new registration process under the Ministry of Economy. SWABAC membership includes both international and national NGOs.

SWABAC is the coordinating body for international and national NGOs that are involved in humanitarian and development assistance to Afghans in south-western
Afghanistan. It functions in accordance with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its main goal is to provide a rational framework (via publication, training and communication) within which to help the Afghan people, promote rehabilitation/development and ensure harmony and synergy in the assistance field.

Being a coordination body for all humanitarian actors in the southern region, SWABAC activities fall within 3 categories:

Coordination:

Performing coordination among the various actors through a number of forums, general assemblies, panel meetings, sectoral working group meetings and bilateral meetings.

Advocacy:

Providing a voice for, and defending, NGOs and civil society organizations when there is a requirement for doing so.

Capacity Building:

Providing training to members of NGOs and civil society organizations in order to build institutional and human resource capacities so they become well-established and reliable institutions with proper management, leadership, and transparent financial systems. SWABAC also assists with technical skills training in various sectors.

Email: swabac@yahoo.com

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)

The NGO community is not privy to security information held by international and national government, military and police authorities.

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office therefore exists to gather this information and efficiently provide it to NGOs. ANSO provides its assistance to enable safer circumstances for NGOs and to increase aid access to all people in need in Afghanistan.

Email: coordinator@afgnso.org

NGO Civil Military Group

(http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NGOCIVMILWorkingGroup/)
The NGO civil military group maintains a yahoo group and meets monthly in order to bring stakeholders from ISAF, Coalition, NGO, UN, and donor communities together to discuss policy and resolve issues that may arise in the field. Each month they focus on a different sectoral topic in order to discuss mandates, developmental approaches, roles, activities and concerns. Past topics have included water supply, education, health, veterinary services, provincial governance, returnees and IDPs.

Case studies

The following two case studies provide examples of how PRTs have interacted with NGOs. Places, names and dates have been changed to protect the identity of the individuals and organisations involved. The lessons learned from these experiences can be used in other sectors and situations, which are not discussed here.

The first case study is an example of when relations have been strained between a PRT and an NGO. The second example is of a good working relationship that was established between a PRT and an NGO. It must be stressed that in between these two extremes there are a variety of responses that reflect not only diversity in the NGO community, but also PRTs and the nations that stand them up.

Case Study 1

An NGO operating in the southern region has several projects related to veterinary vaccinations for livestock. They work closely with the government and are establishing semi-privatised veterinary field units run by paravets. These units form the bedrock of the Ministry of Agriculture’s national strategy to vaccinate all livestock in Afghanistan. The NGO is funded by an international donor to implement the project.

The NGO gives a small supplement to the paravets in their first two years as they establish themselves as a viable business. The NGO also provides them with the necessary equipment, such as a motorbike, drugs, etc. so they can work as a paravet. The paravet then charges farmers a small amount (1 – 10 Afs depending on drug used) to do vaccinations. The charges supplement their salary, which is $50 a month, and allows them to make a living wage.

After two years NGO support is withdrawn as it is expected that the paravets will be able to function on their own once they have entered the market in their local area. This
is a national programme, which is seeking to have paravets in each district in
Afghanistan.

The NGO was approached by three different nations’ military forces a total of four
times; all seeking to provide free vaccinations to the local population. One of the
military forces was prepared to offer paravets $70 a day for the vaccination (this is at
the same time that the paravets receive $50 a month from the government).

The repeated attempts by the military actors to carry out vaccinations is disturbing to
the local development of the paravet system, the implementation of e NGOs activities’
and unsustainable.

Concerns of the NGO:

1. Distributing free vaccinations is contrary to the Afghan Government’s national
   strategy on animal vaccination and it destroys the sustainable activities of NGOs.

2. It is illegal to import vaccinations, except through the Ministry of Agriculture or the
   NGO named as a vaccine importer. Therefore, the military forces are breaking
   Afghan law. 53

3. Military forces did not understand that by visibly giving direct support to a paravet
   they could be endangering his life, especially in the southern region where
   collaborating with "foreigners" has led to the death of a number of Afghans.

4. Military plans also included carrying out "one-day" vaccinations. One day
   vaccination drives can not ensure enough coverage of a district, and therefore may be
   ineffective. Paravets may spend 2 – 3 weeks ensuring coverage in their district for
   just one vaccination.

5. The military plans were not coordinated with the government.

6. The NGO noted that similar issues had been voiced about PRT activities in health
   and education.

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53 There is only one NGO in Afghanistan that is legally allowed to import vaccines.
Outcome: The NGO, with pressure from the government and embassies, was able to stop the activities of one of the military forces. Another was modified, but still went ahead. The final military force went ahead and by implementing their plan, endangered two years of work by the NGO in that area.

Case Study 2

An NGO operating in the northern region was approached by a PRT. The PRT wanted to fund a project in the area and asked if the NGO would be able to implement the project.

The project fitted within the goals of the NGO and they agreed to implement the project with some strict guidelines. These included:

- The PRT was not to visit the project site with the NGO;
- If the PRT wanted to visit the project, they were to give at least 24 hours notice to the NGO, so the NGO could remove all of its staff before the PRT arrived;
- Visibility activities (i.e. the sign-board, opening of the project and so on) were not to mention the PRT and the PRT was not to be invited. Only the funding agency, which was a bi-lateral donor, could have their logo on the signs and materials relating to the project.

Outcome:

1. The project was successfully implemented by the NGO and the PRT adhered to the guidelines outlined in their agreement. This allowed the NGO to implement the project as a non-governmental organisation, and kept the separation between the military and civilian actors clear.

2. The local population was able to use the project outputs.
Appendix 7 to Annex F: Non-Governmental Organizations—GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERACTION AND COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTORS AND MILITARY ACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN

Contents

1 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 248

2 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 249

3 KEY ACTORS 250

4 PRINCIPLES 252

5 LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS 254

6 SECURITY AND NEUTRALITY OF HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL 256

7 USE OF MILITARY OR ARMED PROTECTION FOR HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES 257

8 USE OF MILITARY ASSETS IN NATURAL DISASTER OR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS 257

9 PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 258

10 GENDER 260

11 INFORMATION SHARING 260

12 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 262

13 ASSESSMENT OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 262

14 TRAINING 262

15 MONITORING AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 263

16 APPROVAL 263

APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS 264
1 Definition of Key Terms

In order to facilitate a clear understanding of these Guidelines the following key terms are defined for the purposes of this paper, based on internationally-agreed definitions:

1) Civil-military coordination: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

2) CIMIC: ‘civil-military cooperation”: this is a military term for the relationship of interaction, co-operation and coordination, mutual support, joint planning and constant exchange of information at all levels between military forces, civilian organisations, agencies and in-theatre civil influences, which are necessary to achieve an effective response in the full range of military operations.

3) Humanitarian actors: non-profit civilian organisations, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian or development activities. Humanitarian actors share a commitment to working in accordance with the Red Cross Code of Conduct, the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, and other recognised humanitarian guidelines. Some humanitarian actors maintain strict neutrality whilst others have taken positions in support of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA).

4) Military actors: official military actors that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This includes the Afghan National Army, all members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), whose authority is established by the UN Security Council, and forces serving in Operation Enduring Freedom.

5) Other security actors: any lawful security actors other than the military, including both public entities, such as the Afghan National Police and other national and international security agencies, as well as private entities, such as commercial security contractors and guards. This definition does not include illegal armed groups.
which are not covered by this paper which is limited to coordination between civilian and military actors. Other security actors are currently not signatories to these Guidelines but are urged to have reference to and act in accordance with them; as such, in future they may be requested to give formal commitment to this effect.

6) Humanitarian assistance: aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Assistance can be (1) direct: the face-to-face distribution of goods and services; (2) indirect: at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel; and (3) infrastructure support, involving the provision of general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

7) Military assets: relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign militaries and civil defence organizations.

2 Background and Introduction

Traditionally there has been a distinction between the military and civilian domains but military actors have become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including the provision of relief and reconstruction work. At the same time, it has become apparent that security and humanitarian activities and their outcomes are often interconnected, which necessitates increased communication, coordination and understanding between humanitarian actors and the military, including mutual awareness of mandates, capacities and limitations.

These Guidelines have been developed by the Afghanistan Civil Military Working Group which is co-chaired by the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). The Group has the participation of senior military officials serving with the International Security Assistance Force, including the ISAF HQ Chief of CJ9, OEF and a range of humanitarian actors working in humanitarian and development spheres in Afghanistan.
The Guidelines are based on policy guidance issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), particularly on the use of military assets in complex emergencies (March 2003) and in disaster relief, (the ‘Oslo Guidelines’ May 1994, updated November 2006) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper ‘Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies (June 2004).

The purpose of the Guidelines is to establish principles and practices for constructive civilian-military relations, and for effective coordination, which is critical for achieving security and stability in Afghanistan. The Guidelines are intended to address civil-military coordination, and not CIMIC activities, which are substantially broader in scope. The Guidelines are intended to support the development of a relationship between military and humanitarian actors in which differences are recognized and respected.

3 Key Actors

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

As provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), ISAF is a multi-national force acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under the first resolution ISAF was mandated ‘to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security of Kabul and its surrounding areas’, as provided for under Annex I of the Bonn Agreement, 5 December 2001.

UNSCR 1510 (2003) authorises the expansion of the ISAF mandate ‘to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts’ and to provide security assistance for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. ISAF’s mandate has since been extended by UNSCRs 1563 (2004),1623 (2005) and 1707 (2006).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

ISAF has facilitated the establishment of 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), endorsed in UNSCR 1563 (2004) and subsequent UNSCRs. As agreed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee in January 2005, the mission of PRTs is to “assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the
development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts."

**Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)**

The presence of actors operating under US-led OEF is defined in a bi-lateral agreement between participating actors and the GoA of May 2005. The Coalition is referred to in UNSCR 1510 (2003) and subsequent Resolutions, which call for ISAF to work with OEF in the implementation of both forces’ mandates.

**United Nations (UN)**

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)**

UNAMA was established by UNSCR 1401 (2002) with a mandate set out in the UN Secretary-General’s Report of 18 March 2002, which includes, (a) fulfilling responsibilities related to human rights, rule of law and gender issues entrusted to it under the Bonn Agreement; (b) promoting national reconciliation and (c) managing UN relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. UNAMA’s mandate has been subsequently extended and elaborated by UNSCRs 1471 (2003), 1536 (2004), 1589 (2005), 1662 (2006) and 1746 (2007).

UNSCR 1746 (2007) stresses the role of UNAMA ‘to promote a more coherent international engagement in support of Afghanistan, to extend its good offices through outreach in Afghanistan, to support regional cooperation in the context of the Afghanistan Compact, to promote humanitarian coordination and to continue to contribute to human rights protection and promotion, including monitoring of the situation of civilians in armed conflict’

**United Nations Agencies**

There are 17 UN agency funds and programmes as a part of the integrated mission in Afghanistan, under the coordination umbrella of UNAMA. The Agencies include WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, UNIFEM, FAO, UNFPA, UNOPS, IRIN and others. UN Agencies have separate mandates, but all adhere to UN values: they are providers of humanitarian assistance and long term development programmes.
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

NGOs are civil society actors which may be national or international, are non-profit, civilian organizations dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and development support in Afghanistan. NGOs are independent and diverse in their objectives, operations and the degree to which they operate within the principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence. NGOs also vary greatly in terms of the level of interaction or collaboration with military actors. As civil society actors some NGOs may not directly engage in the provision of assistance or service delivery but seek to achieve policy change.

All NGOs in Afghanistan are regulated by Law on Non-Governmental Organisations, June 2005, which regulates permissible activities and sets criteria for the establishment and internal governance of NGOs. Members of ACBAR and other NGOs have committed to abide by the NGO Code of Conduct, September 2006, which almost 100 Afghan and international organisations have signed.

4 Principles

Principles Regarding International Military Actors and Afghan National Security Forces

1) Observance of international law and human rights: military actors will comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and UN Security Council Resolutions to which they are subject.

2) Respect for the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors: military actors should seek to avoid operations, activities or any conduct which could compromise the independence or safety of humanitarian actors. To the greatest extent possible military operations should be conducted with a view to respecting the humanitarian operating environment. The operational effectiveness of humanitarian actors depends upon the actual and perceived adherence to the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is a determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organizations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population may be ensured when it is independent of military and political action.
3) Security role: In line with recognised principles of humanitarian assistance and existing guidelines on civil-military relations, the overall humanitarian assistance effort in Afghanistan is best served through a division of responsibilities: government and humanitarian actors have the primary role of providing humanitarian assistance, and the military is primarily responsible for providing security, and if necessary, basic infrastructure and urgent reconstruction assistance limited to gap-filling measures until civilian organisations are able to takeover.

4) Reporting of violations of human rights or international humanitarian law: such violations or crimes witnessed by military actors, whoever the perpetrator, must be reported to the appropriate authorities.

5) Women in peace and security: military actors must respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, and to take special measures to protect them from gender-based violence including rape and other forms of sexualised violence. The differential impact of armed conflict on women, girls, boys and men should inform activities: and women, as well as men, should be recognised as important actors in the promotion of peace and security as recognised by UNSCR 1325.

Principles Regarding Humanitarian Actors

1) Humanity: the principle of humanity requires that human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. Humanitarian actors must seek to ensure sustainable access to all vulnerable populations in all parts of the country and the freedom to negotiate access across divides to such people.

2) Operational independence of humanitarian action: humanitarian actors must retain their operational independence, including the freedom of movement, recruitment of national and international staff, non-integration into military planning and action, and access to communications.

3) Impartial aid distribution: humanitarian actors and donor governments must ensure that assistance is provided in an equitable and impartial manner without political conditions: it must be provided without discrimination as to ethnic origin,
gender, nationality, political opinions, social status, race or religion and solely on the basis of needs.

4) Neutrality: all humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

All humanitarian actors, military actors and other security actors should at all times be respectful of international law and Afghan laws, culture and customs.

5 Liaison Arrangements

For any interaction and coordination between humanitarian and military and/or other security actors, liaison arrangements and clear lines of communication should be established at all relevant levels.

UNAMA headquarters, regional and provincial offices must ensure permanent means of communication with all relevant commands of ISAF and other military actors, including all PRTs.

The head of each regional office of UNAMA should establish contacts with all Afghan Government and international military actors in the area, in order to maintain channels of communication, to enable rapid contact/coordination where necessary, and to provide information on humanitarian and development activities in the area.

Given military hierarchy, humanitarian actors should ensure that all communication and humanitarian advocacy is directed to the appropriate authorities within the chain of command. Where regular direct liaison is necessary, it should be conducted through UNAMA field offices or headquarters, ACBAR, or Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO).

It is preferable for there to be designated persons within both military and humanitarian actors to conduct regular liaison. If possible, liaison meetings should be held at ‘neutral’ venues, as locally agreed, and other interaction should be discreet, preferably through e-mail or telephone.

Liaison staff of humanitarian and military actors should not be physically permanently co-located. However, the security situation might require temporary co-location of dedicated UN security and/or military liaison personnel.
Wherever possible and appropriate, transparency should be maintained on the participants and purpose of civil-military liaison. Liaison meetings should where possible involve representatives of human rights and women’s rights organisations.

In Afghanistan, civil-military coordination takes place at a number of levels. The following are existing mechanisms for coordination:

The Afghanistan Civil Military Working Group, responsible for this paper, co-chaired by UNAMA and ACBAR, with the participation of ISAF and a range of humanitarian actors, which was established, in its Terms of Reference, to ‘facilitate timely and sufficient communication between NGOs, international military actors and other stakeholders over military activities, security of operations and aid coordination with the objective of identifying and addressing issues of concern.’

The PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) is an ambassadorial/ ministerial-level body co-chaired by the Minister of Interior and COMISAF, which provides guidance for and oversight of all existing and proposed PRTs in Afghanistan. Its membership includes the ambassadors of all the PRT troop-contributing states and potential contributing nations, and key Afghan ministry officials. The ESC considers action on issues developed by the PRT Working Group, its subordinate body. Action by the ESC includes enacting Policy Notes which set out operating guidance for PRTs on key issues.

The PRT Working Group is a subordinate body of the ESC co-chaired by the Ministry of Interior, UNAMA and ISAF. Its role is to resolve PRT operational issues, prepare the ESC agenda, and prepare issues for ESC decision: it includes Afghan ministerial officials, UNAMA, ISAF, EU and Embassies of PRT troop-contributing states. The Group also includes members of NGO representative bodies.

Regional / Provincial / District Coordination meetings, under the government supported by UN/UNAMA/NGO Field offices.

UN/UNAMA Field Office bilateral meetings with civilian and military organizations.

UN/UNAMA/NGO Field office weekly security meetings.

Bilateral engagement between local CIMIC/Civil Affairs teams and NGOs.
The Comprehensive Approach Team which meets on a weekly basis at ISAF HQ and includes representatives of government, military and humanitarian actors.

The National Emergency Response Commission (NERC) is the highest emergency coordination body in the country. It is chaired by the Afghan Vice-President and comprises 22 key government ministries, UNAMA, Kabul Municipality and ISAF. Meeting every two weeks, and more frequently as required this body approves policy, coordinates response and makes requests for assistance from the international community. The Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) is the secretariat of this group.

To contact or access these mechanisms of coordination, the following post-holders, units or organisations should be contacted: UNAMA Civil-Military Coordination Officers, UNAMA Military Advisory Unit (MAU), ISAF CJ9 Branch (CIMIC), UNAMA Humanitarian Affairs Officers, ACBAR and ANSO.

6 Security and Neutrality of Humanitarian Personnel

Humanitarian actors in Afghanistan have adopted a security protocol which relies primarily on acceptance, combined with protection and deterrence strategies. Given that in some areas of Afghanistan humanitarian actors may be targets of armed elements, this may involve adopting a ‘low profile’ approach, paired with protective strategies for travel.

As all actors who have taken a proactive stance in support of the GoA (including the UN, EU, ISAF and other security actors) are currently targets of armed opposition groups in Afghanistan, a distinction must be retained between the identities, functions and roles of these entities and those actors who seek to preserve their neutrality.

The independence and civilian nature of humanitarian assistance should be clear at all times. Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities and thereby endanger humanitarian personnel and intended beneficiaries.

Given the importance of how humanitarian actors are perceived by the population, they should ensure that at all times their outward appearance could not be perceived as military. Humanitarian actors should not therefore wear uniforms or use military
vehicles. Military actors should liaise with humanitarian actors in order to identify means of distinguishing between their respective vehicles.

Since current assistance work in Afghanistan largely entails rehabilitation and reconstruction rather than urgent life-saving activities, humanitarian actors should give careful consideration to the security risks and political implications of working with military actors or other security actors. Humanitarian actors should be aware that strategies adopted by one might have implications for others: at a local level if one agency is perceived as cooperating closely with the military the population may assume the same of other local actors.

7 Use of Military or Armed Protection for Humanitarian Agencies

The use of military or armed protection for humanitarian agencies or for specific humanitarian activities is a measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances in order to meet critical humanitarian needs. Similarly, only in extreme circumstances should staff of humanitarian actors travel in vehicles belonging to military actors. The majority of humanitarian actors have internal regulations which prevent armed personnel of military actors from travelling in their vehicles.

Any decision to request or accept military or armed protection must be made by humanitarian organisations, not political or military authorities. It should be based on the principles endorsed in the non-binding guidelines issued by the IASC in September 2001 on ‘Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys’.

8 Use of Military Assets in Natural Disaster or Humanitarian Relief Operations

In accordance with UNSCR 1510 (2003) and subsequent resolutions the mandate of military actors in Afghanistan is to provide security. In the case of a natural disaster or other civil emergency, the primary responsibility for managing the response is with the, led and coordinated by the ANDMA, supported by the Humanitarian Coordinator in UNAMA.

In exceptional circumstances and as a last resort, military assets, which includes personnel, equipment, supplies and services, may be deployed for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance.

In accordance with these guidelines, military assets may only be used at the request or with the consent of the GoA, at national or local level, as appropriate. In exceptional circumstances, the military may respond to or support humanitarian disaster relief operations prior to receiving a formal request / approval from the GoA if the local commander deems it necessary to save lives.

As set out in the MCDA Guidelines, military assets should only be used in the following circumstances: (1) there is no comparable civilian alternative; (2) the assets are needed to meet urgent humanitarian needs; (3) to the extent possible there is civilian control over the operation involving the assets, meaning civilian direction and coordination, as defined in the Oslo Guidelines; (4) to the extent possible the assets are used only for indirect assistance or infrastructure support; (5) military assets are clearly distinguished from those used for military purposes; (6) the use is limited in time and scale; and (7) there is an exit strategy defining how to achieve a civilian response in the future.

Policy Note Number 3 of the PRT ESC, ‘PRT Coordination and Intervention in Humanitarian Assistance’ reaffirms this approach and provides that humanitarian assistance “must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship-building, or ‘winning hearts and minds. It must be distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.”

No asset of any kind belonging to a humanitarian actor may be used by military actors without explicit, prior permission of the actor concerned.

9 Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The PRT Mission Statement, as agreed by the PRT ESC in January 2005, states that: ‘PRTs will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.’
Although the mandate of PRTs does not refer to humanitarian activities, given the significant involvement of PRTs in civilian affairs, and in civil-military liaison, this section outlines the principles which govern their operations.

Where activities are undertaken by the military to enable SSR or reconstruction efforts, whether or not through a PRT, they should accord to the following principles:

Coordination: in accordance with PRT ESC Policy Note 1 endorsed on 7 December 2006:

PRT activities are to support local priorities within the national development framework, such as the Afghan National Development Strategy.

PRTs should coordinate their activities with the GoA/UNDP/UNAMA sub-national governance programme and other stakeholders in provinces where the programme is being implemented.

PRTs are strongly encouraged to coordinate all projects with the Provincial Development Committee, link with provincial requirements and involve relevant line ministries in all phases of the relevant project.

Provincial Councils are also an important facet of provincial development and PRTs should consult them regularly about their activities.

Local resources: in accordance with Annex II of the Afghanistan Compact, reconstruction projects should make maximum use of local human and material resources, and should be according to local standards.

Ownership: to the extent possible intended beneficiaries in the affected population should be involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance.

Respect for culture and custom: PRT activities must be respectful of local culture and customs.

Gender: in accordance with UNSCR 1325, and as stated below, activities should reflect the particular rights and needs of women and girls.

Identification: outside of designated military facilities military personnel should at all times wear military uniforms.
10 Gender

Military and humanitarian actors should have an understanding of how conflict and disaster affect women, girls, boys and men differently, that they have different coping strategies, roles, capacities and constraints. Their differing needs and capabilities must be identified to make sure all have access to services and information, and can participate in the planning and implementation of relief programmes. (See IASC Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action: Women, Girls, Boys and Men – Different Needs, Equal Opportunities.)

Under UNSCR 1325 all peacekeeping operations are required to mainstream gender issues. The resolution specifically requires special consideration by all military actors, humanitarian actors and all other entities, of the needs and capabilities of women and girls. In particular, all actors should ensure that:

- Efforts are made to involve greater numbers of women at all levels of decision-making and in field based operations;

- Institutional arrangements are made to identify the needs and capabilities of women and girls in conflict through participatory methods and incorporate them in conflict into humanitarian, development, reconstruction, security and peace-building activities;

- The human rights of women and girls are protected in accordance with international and national law;

- Special measures are taken to protect women and girls from violence in situations of armed conflict with specific steps taken to prevent gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse; and

- Training, guidelines and materials are developed which incorporate the need to protect and ensure the rights of women and girls.

11 Information Sharing

As a matter of principle, any information gathered by humanitarian actors which might endanger lives if used for non-humanitarian purposes, jeopardise humanitarian operations, compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian actors, or be used for military purposes, shall not be shared with military or other security actors.
However, to ensure the provision of protection, humanitarian assistance or the safety of civilians and/or humanitarian staff, information sharing with the ISAF and other military actors may be necessary.

Specific information which may be appropriate to share includes:

- **Security information**: information relevant to the security of civilians and humanitarian staff including the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities in the military operating theatre;

- **Relief needs**: identified by the military or other security actors;

- **Humanitarian activities**: humanitarian plans and intentions of humanitarian actors, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts;

- **Mine-action activities**: information relevant to mine-action activities;

- **Population movements**: information on major movements of civilians;

- **Movement of good or personnel**: information on the movement of humanitarian personnel or goods within the country or across borders.

So far as possible, military actors should provide accurate and timely information to humanitarian actors on:

- **Relief activities**: information on relief efforts undertaken by the military and/or other security actors;

- **Post-strike information**: information on strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritization and planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities;

- **Pending military operations**: at the strategic, operational and tactical level concerning military operations which could affect the safety of civilians or humanitarian personnel, or have an impact on population displacement and the provision of humanitarian assistance, to the extent feasible within operational security requirements.
12 Human Rights Reporting

Military and humanitarian actors should report as soon as possible any alleged violations of human rights, women and children’s rights, international humanitarian law or Afghan criminal law by any of the parties to the conflict to the appropriate staff within their organisations or chains of command. Humanitarian actors may refrain from reporting violations where this could create an unacceptable security risk. Military actors shall report in accordance with their respective national law.

Such alleged violations should then be reported, as appropriate, to the relevant Afghan authorities, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNAMA or, where appropriate, UNHCR. Where appropriate, rights violations should also be reported to relevant members of the National Assembly or local Provincial Council.

Military and humanitarian actors will cooperate with any investigation conducted by these authorities, particularly with respect to civilian casualties whether caused by military actors, other security actors or armed groups.

13 Assessment of Humanitarian Needs

While humanitarian actors may be able to benefit from the findings of assessments conducted by military actors, they should conduct independent humanitarian assessments, using their own evaluation and monitoring capacities.

Humanitarian actors may evaluate and consider as appropriate findings of military assessment missions; they may also, when appropriate, share the results of their own needs assessments with military actors so long as these will not endanger lives or be used for military purposes.

14 Training

Training in civilian-military coordination should be conducted for responsible staff at all levels with in humanitarian, development, military and other security actors, including national police and private security actors, both prior to and during the mission. This may take the form of lectures, briefings and/or joint workshops, both in-country and outside.
The UN shall ensure that there is regular training on the application of the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. This training should be undertaken every six months, particularly at PRT level, so that humanitarian and military actors have an understanding of the Sphere Code of Conduct and are familiar with terminology relevant to humanitarian coordination.

The UN shall also ensure that there is specialised training on the protection, rights and particular needs of women and girls in conflict situations, the importance of a gender perspective in humanitarian, development and reconstruction activities, and the essential roles of women in peace-building and peace-keeping.

15 Monitoring and Resolution of Disputes

Incidents involving military or other security actors in which these Guidelines appear to have been breached should be documented and reported as soon as possible to UNAMA, either the regional office or headquarters, or alternatively, to ACBAR or ANSO.

Where such incidents cannot be resolved, or if a party to these Guidelines fails to act in accordance with them, the issue shall be referred to the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group. Any actor involved may raise the issue for consideration by the Group. Such incidents should be reviewed by the Working Group on a periodic basis. The Guidelines are non-binding but the Working Group may make recommendations on their application.

16 Approval

These Guidelines have been prepared and adopted by the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group.

The Group has representation of the following organisations and missions who have agreed to the Guidelines and shall seek to ensure that they act in accordance with them:

- United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan and UN Agencies
The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

The International Security Assistance Force

Forces serving in Operating Enduring Freedom


Appendix 1 · Acronyms

ACBAR · Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief

ANDMA · Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority

ANSO · Afghanistan NGO Safety Office

CIMIC – Civil-Military Coordination

COMISAF – Commander ISAF

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

EU – European Union

GoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

IASC · Inter-Agency Standing Committee
MAU – Military Advisory Unit (UNAMA)

NERC – National Emergency Response Commission

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom

PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team

PRT ESC – PRT Executive Steering Committee

SSR – Security Sector Reform

UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WFP – United Nations World Food Programme
Appendix 8 to Annex F: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The ICRC mandate

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence, and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of armed conflict. It also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (or the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)) and universal humanitarian principles. The ICRC was established in 1863 and is the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The Movement comprises all recognized National Societies (Red Cross, Red Crescent, other designations), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the ICRC.

The ICRC has been entrusted by the community of States in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto with a mandate and specific tasks in case of international armed conflict and a broad right of initiative in situations of non-international armed conflict. The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement also confer on the ICRC a right of initiative in situations other than armed conflicts. The ICRC’s unique mandate and legal status distinguishes it from intergovernmental agencies, such as the United Nations, and from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols also provided for the creation of National Societies of which today there are 186. In Afghanistan, the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) was established in 1934 and admitted to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 1954. Today in Afghanistan, no other organization has the breadth of coverage enjoyed by the ARCS. The ARCS is obliged to adhere to the same Fundamental Principles and Movement Regulations.

Performing activities pursuant to its mandate, the ICRC acts in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement, in particular:
• Impartiality: The ICRC endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress, making no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions.

• Neutrality: In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the ICRC does not take sides in hostilities nor engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

• Independence: The ICRC must always maintain its autonomy from governments and other actors so that it may be able at all times to act in accordance with its Fundamental Principles.

When, according to its mandate, the ICRC coordinates the action of other components of the Movement during armed conflict, it also seeks to ensure that all respect these principles.

The ICRC needs to develop a dialogue with all parties (armed, security or police forces, non-state armed groups, private military or security companies) in order to gain access to victims of armed conflict and others situations of violence, to promote the respect of IHL and to ensure security for its staff. The possibility to develop this dialogue relies on confidence and acceptance by all parties. The principles of neutrality and independence have proved essential in achieving this goal. The ICRC also enters into dialogue with potential actors not directly involved in hostilities.

The ICRC's activities in Afghanistan

The ICRC - currently active in more than 80 countries - has been responding to the humanitarian consequences of successive conflicts in Afghanistan since 1979, first from bases it set up in Pakistan (Peshawar and Quetta) and, since 1986, from different locations in Afghanistan. Its main delegation is in Kabul, with sub-delegations in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Jalalabad. Today, the ICRC also runs offices in Gulbahar, Faizabad and Bamyan. The Afghanistan mission, with about 80 international and 1,000 national staff, is one of the ICRC's biggest operations.

Over time, its main activities have included the following:
• Visits to places of detention and interviews without witness with persons deprived of liberty in relation with the conflict.

• Collection and distribution of Red Cross Messages, in cooperation with the ARCS, helping thereof to restore links between family members separated by conflict and other disasters.

• Orthopaedics and rehabilitation for amputees and other disabled people, from landmine victims to those with motor impairment.

• Support to the medical structures providing war surgery and other essential medical services.

• Re-establishment of urban and rural water networks and sanitation infrastructures.

• Dissemination of IHL to all parties to the different conflicts.

• Close partnership with the ARCS, the ICRC’s primary partner, in the delivery of neutral and independent humanitarian services.

• Playing a neutral intermediary role between warring parties, facilitating for instance the release of captured persons, the evacuation of wounded or the recovering of mortal remains from combat zones.

The ICRC and PRTs

In a world becoming ever more polarized, the ICRC, together with other humanitarian organizations, keeps advocating for a neutral and independent humanitarian approach. This includes a claim for maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian action on the one hand and political-military action on the other. However, the ICRC also recognizes that the military may have specific humanitarian obligations under IHL. It also recognizes that, under exceptional circumstances, the involvement of the military in relief operations can be critical. This is particularly true when insecurity prevails, humanitarian actors are not present and only the armed forces have the capacity to undertake the task at hand.

The Movement's approach to its security is founded on its perception of respect for the protective function of the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. The Movement does
not subscribe to the use of armed protection, unless under particular conditions typically related to criminality. Therefore, the use of military assets in humanitarian operations involving Movement personnel is not a viable option and would have to be declined.

With regards to PRTs, the ICRC considers that "integrated missions" are based on political objectives established by the respective governments. By virtue of its neutrality, the ICRC does not comment on such missions, except when they affect security and access to the victims. The ICRC, for instance, has expressed concerns when the lines between military and humanitarian action became blurred and humanitarian agencies perceived as instruments of a party to the conflict.

In view of the above, the ICRC does not seek to join in an "integrated approach". It will however develop a dialogue and a certain level of coordination with PRTs in order to fulfil its objectives, which is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflicts and others situations of violence, and to provide them with assistance. Lack of coordination may result in an inefficient allocation of resources to respond to the needs of the local population.54

The ICRC strongly believes that all the Components of the Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent should display the same approach when in contact with PRTs. It would for instance not be appropriate for a local branch of the ARCS to become involved in the distribution of humanitarian assistance organized by or together with a PRT. Such involvement would have a serious potential to affect current or future activities by this Society or by any other component of the Movement. For international security forces, it may not always be easy to understand how important it is in Afghanistan for the ARCS to be seen as Neutral and Independent because their home countries’ situation allows for close collaboration between governments and National Societies.

The long-term presence of the Components of the Movement in Afghanistan has had a tremendous impact on the humanitarian landscape. The necessity to have truly Neutral

54. As an example, in Kunduz, in the North of Afghanistan, the ICRC had to withdraw its long-lasting support to a hospital when a PRT force also chose to support it. Later, the ICRC resumed its programme after ISAF had decided to halt theirs. In this case, the ICRC had to stop its programme in order to avoid duplication of efforts and avoid the risk, as a humanitarian organization, of being associated with military forces. In more general terms, when presumably bringing a one-off or short term contribution, PRT representatives should thoroughly balance their contribution against the need that the ICRC would have to suspend or suppress altogether a possibly more limited but more long-term oriented support programme.
and Independent actors that remain a viable response mechanism for any humanitarian crisis is imperative. ARCS personnel who come from the communities they serve face a strict interpretation of neutrality and independence. Participation in humanitarian activities may be discouraged or declined because of the risk that the operation may be misperceived as driven by military/political objectives.
ANNEX H:

Appendix 1 to Annex H: PRT Best Practices

Introduction

Although the conditions and challenges each PRT faces are different, the aim of this annex is to provide PRTs with a set of best practices that have been proven to work in other PRTs. Special emphasis should be placed on those best practices that support Security Sector Reform and Governance.

Themes include:

a. Strengthening GIRoA through R and D.

b. Mentoring GIRoA through R and D.

c. Operating the PRT as a Civilian-Military Team.

d. Building Afghan Civilian Capacity

e. PRT R and D Best Practices

f. PRT R and D Lessons Learned

g. Improving Interaction With NGOs and IOs

Strengthening GIRoA through R and D

The overarching goal for all PRT efforts, including R and D, should be the strengthening of the GIRoA. Although a high-level statement in theory, there are methods and procedures that a PRT can utilise to meet this goal.

The PRT should make every effort to ensure that the respective line ministry is involved in all projects that fall in their respective areas, and directing them when possible. PRT activities should be aligned with the ANDS and Provincial Development Plans. Since the Provincial Development Plans are part of the ANDS, they are the appropriate place for PRTs to focus their efforts in working with provincial authorities to help meet their priority needs.

UNCLASSIFIED
When needed, the PRT should provide assistance through the appropriate level of government. Examples of GIRoA involvement in R and D are as follows:

a. Community level projects should be implemented through recognized CDCs.

b. District level projects should be implemented through District Governors and DDAs.

c. Large provincial level projects should be implemented through the Provincial Governors and PDCs.

Mentoring GIRoA through R and D

PRTs should take every opportunity to mentor the GIRoA. A staged process that has been shown to work for lower levels of government is as follows (it is understood that different projects will be managed at different stages given their respective complexity):

a. Stage 1: Where no GIRoA capacity exists, have GIRoA prioritize their development requirements.

b. Stage 2: Beginning with a small project, allow the GIRoA to manage the entire process with close monitoring. It is essential that a project be selected that will be successful and where any errors made will not be too costly. An example is something like building a wall around a building. Projects will remain at this stage until it is deemed that the capacity exists for project management.

c. Stage 3: Continuing with another small project, allow the GIRoA to manage the entire process with minimal monitoring. It is essential that a project be of similar complexity as the stage 2 project.

d. Stage 4: Begin to increase the size and complexity of the projects to build capacity.

Operate the PRT as a True Civilian-Military “Team”

The most successful PRTs involve both their civilian and military components in forming an integrated team in the decision making process. All PRT-related projects, regardless of funding source, need to be reviewed by the same process.
An example of this is one PRT approach. After receiving an R and D request from Afghan officials, the PRT uses a “total” national approach. R and D decisions are made by the PRT “Targeting Board.” The “Targeting Board” contains representatives all branches including the Development, Political, Military, and Police Mentoring sections in the PRT. Each section can request a project and each has input in the decision process. Each proposed project should answer six questions prior to being considered for implementation. The questions are:

a. What: Project description, clear link to ANDS as a PDP priority; Request originating from an approved government body.

b. Where: District, village, grid location

c. When: Timelines Start and estimated end date of project.

d. Who: Ownership? GIRoA and Afghan lead and ownership is required, but in rare cases for security reasons can be within PRT (after broad consultation between all PRT agencies).

e. How Much: Fairly accurate estimate, funding source clearly identified though broad consultations. One single source is preferred.

f. Why: Does the project bring the effect the PRT wishes to achieve? Is the effect in line with GIRoA requirements and priorities?

Another example is the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) set up by Germany. It provides funding for projects up to US$30,000. Applicants, such as village communities and associations can submit their project proposals directly to German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which checks the technical feasibility of the proposal and forwards it for approval to the PDF Commission which comprises four German representatives (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Economic Cooperation & Development) and four Afghan members (Governor, the Provincial Council and the Departments of Rural Development and Women's Affairs). Once approved by the Commission, GTZ assists the applicants in the implementation of the project which always requires a significant voluntary contribution by the applicant. The Commission meets every two months to consider new applications. Similar PDF sessions also take place regularly in Takhar and Kunduz Provinces.
Building Afghan Civilian Capacity

For over 30 years Afghanistan has been in war and turmoil. One result of this is a significant lack of human capacity. This is especially felt in the areas where PRTs operate. One of the best ways to have the local populace support the GIRoA is through employment. PRTs are encouraged to employ local Afghans in their projects. This can be accomplished by having a clause in any contract to employ a certain percentage of locals. A challenge to having local Afghans employed by contractors is a lack of trade skills.

Several PRTs have addressed this issue by creating local trade schools to increase local trade skills. Each student is provided with a tool kit geared to the specific course upon graduation. Examples of some of the courses are:

a. Carpentry.

b. Electrical.

c. Plumbing.

d. Tiling/cement.

e. Small engine maintenance.

The courses initially require PRT staffs as instructors but students who demonstrated aptitude in a course were given additional training and became instructors. This reduced the PRT workload. The PRTs who have these schools are receiving calls from contractors looking to hire before the students have graduated. Some of the trade schools in existence are being taken over by the GIRoA totally.

PRT R and D Best Practices

Complete the correct projects. The most successful PRTs are not those that complete the most projects or the biggest projects, but those that complete the correct projects together with GIRoA officials. All projects should directly support the pillars of Security, Governance and/or Development. Our efforts should serve to help all three pillars grow equally, as the security environment permits.

Link security with development. It is vital to reward areas where there is good security with development assistance -- places where the environment is development-permissive.
and the people welcome international attention. PRT-contributing nations should not take the stable areas for granted and “reward” instead the unstable areas where the local inhabitants tolerate the insurgents. It should be clearly stated to the Afghan people that the main restriction to a better life is the Taliban and passive support for them. An example is illustrated in the following excerpt from a “Toronto Star” newspaper article:

It was 40 unhappy Pashtoon tribal elders versus three tough-talking Canadian army officers with a rather large carrot and an even bigger stick – a stick they had never before shown.

Align with us against the Taliban, the Canadians told the chieftains, and the people of embattled Panjwaii will reap untold rewards, starting with a large stack of Ottawa-and-Washington-backed development dollars poised for the first whisper of actual security.

Remain mere observers to lawless insurgency and – here comes the stick – Panjwaii will be forgotten. Unless the elders soon seize their tribal entitlement to power and influence and take a stand, the spoils of stability will go to a more hospitable patch of Kandahar province.

Though the ultimatum came without a deadline, there was an unmistakable urgency in the Canadian message yesterday to a rare full quorum of the Panjwaii tribal council. Repeated separately by three different officers, the or-else scenario was clear. Just how deeply the warning registered with the Afghan elders, less so.

Invited to the shura by the Afghans, the Toronto Star was given a fly-on-the-wall glimpse of the political gap that the Canadians on the frontlines say they must close if the Taliban threat in Panjwaii is to be neutralized.

"I know how it has to work here. For people to survive they have to hold hands with both sides," said Maj. Patrick Robichaud, commander of the Canadian forward operating base at nearby Sperwan Ghar.
"But I'm telling you we are approaching a crossroads. We are coming to that intersection where you have to let one hand go or Panjwaii will be forgotten. There are millions of Afghans at stake, and if we cannot attain security those millions will go elsewhere. I can't do this alone. Everyone must contribute."

Civil affairs officers Capt. Michel Laroque and his commander, Maj. Luc Saint-Jean, took turns describing the carrot. Laroque spoke of the job-bearing development dollars that would flow to all, including Taliban fighters who can be persuaded to lay down their weapons. Saint-Jean elaborated, saying: "We want to offer factories, training, equipment – things that will create employment not for 10 or 20 days, but 10 or 20 years."

*Develop Municipal Capabilities.*

PRTs have a responsibility to help develop municipal governance of the GIRoA Government. PRTs must ensure that this level of government is not neglected. One PRT is developing the municipal government’s capabilities utilizing the staged approach described below. The municipal government is at stage 3 and the PRT is finding that the government is capable of implementing projects at significantly lower cost than the PRT was in the past.

a. Stage one: first working together to identify city/urban area projects with the PRT implementing/managing fully.

b. Stage two: Organize/implement/manage a small project together step by step with the municipal government.

c. Stage three: Have municipal government implement/manage a small project (e.g., install a washing area in the local bazaar) with close support from the PRT, learning to develop standardized contracting and quality control procedures.

d. Stage four. Have the municipal government organize/implement/manage a small project (wall around a compound) with minimal assistance from the PRT.

e. Stage five. Begin having the municipal government implement/manage larger and more complex projects.

For R and D projects like road construction seriously consider manual construction as the preferred technique. If there is not an urgent operational requirement to have the project completed, using a manual construction technique is preferred. Manual construction allows for the additional benefits of local capacity building and employment. These two benefits contribute greatly to COIN operations.

PRT R and D Lessons Learned

This section denotes some of the lessons learned though hard experience. Although not by any means definitive list they demonstrate some of the key pitfalls to avoid.

Research Projects before Implementation: It is essential that the PRTs research and investigate potential R and D projects to the extent possible prior to making the decision to implement. There needs to be a clear following of the engineering process and understanding overall environmental effect of a PRT project.

Implement PRT Projects through GIRoA. The political goals and potential results of the project must be included in the planning process. Although it is at times a challenge, the end result of not going though this process will be detrimental. There is no point in building a village school if GIRoA authorities don’t want it, know about it, take ownership of it, provide for it, and sustain it. There are some fine-looking, but empty PRT-built schools because the Education Ministry did not know about them and therefore could not budget for them and provide teachers, desks, textbooks and upkeep. Requests from informal groups (tribal/village elders) must be approved by GIRoA authorities – as agreed priority projects – so that the line ministry provincial directors will be responsible for sustaining them.

Number of PRT Projects Not the Goal: Senior leadership, especially at the Task Force Level, must have a longer-term plan to support the GIRoA. They should not view a PRT’s success as the number of projects implemented during its (often short term) rotation. A PRT is not a tool for a Task Group or PRT commander to produce “Bright and Shiny Objects” (BSOs) for photo opportunities to send home.

Example of when above lessons are not applied. The following is an example of the above lessons not learned. A PRT operating in a province without a functioning PDC felt under pressure to conduct projects in the AOR. It received proposals for 11 dams and began
construction on one without consultation with the respective line ministries to conduct environmental surveys with them. Below is a photo of the result. The dam has never held water and is cracked and failing. The dam is unofficially called “the PRT Commander’s Racquetball Court”

![Dam Picture]

Improve NGO/IO Interaction

In some provinces it can be difficult for PRTs to access NGOs due to the need for “Humanitarian Space” and security issues. Where this is the case, here are two methods that can aid in contacting and cooperating with NGOs.

The first method is to have the GIRoA be the facilitator for local discussions. One PRT has created Working Groups for Governance, Security Sector Reform, Counter Narcotics, and Stabilization and Sustainable Development. Each of these Working Groups is chaired by a GIRoA official. Having the GIRoA call and lead meetings allows the NGOs to interact with ISAF without being seen as part of ISAF.

The second method is to have ISAF HQ conduct liaison with the NGO head office in Kabul. NGO headquarters, most of which are located in Kabul, are more willing to interact with ISAF. The ISAF HQ CJ 9 PRT PET officers representing the RC area can assist in contacting NGOs/IOs on a PRTs’ behalf.
## Appendix 2 to Annex H: Governance-Building PRT Project Status Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STEP</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CHECK</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Project requested by Central Government-recognized GIRoA agency (as opposed to a village elder or tribal leader only)</td>
<td>DG, PG PDC Central</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PROJECT ON HOLD UNTIL SUBMITTED BY GIROA SOURCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>INITIAL PROJECT REQUIREMENTS (decided by Integrated Command Team)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a detailed Project description and a clear link to ANDS/PDPs</td>
<td>YES NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Line ministry department responsible for result of project involved from the beginning?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Location known and agreed upon with appropriate GIRoA authority(ies): District, village, grid location</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project has clear Timelines for start and estimated end date of project – clear schedule and milestones?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will the GIRoA assume ownership? With the provincial or district-level GIRoA authorities having approved the chosen project, they need to be in the lead, or co-lead depending on their capacity, in developing it and in the lead when the ribbon is cut. This will help ensure they take responsibility to sustain it. (If a project is undertaken for security reasons such as building a FOB or a section of road to it – GIRoA ownership rules may or may not apply.)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>STEP</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Project has fairly accurate cost estimate; funding source clearly identified though broad consultations. One single ISAF/national funding source is preferred; Afghan financial commitment should be encouraged and welcomed.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Will the project bring the effect the PRT wishes to achieve?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Is the effect in line with GIRoA requirements?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Does the Project meet the criteria to continue?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>FIRST PROJECT EXIT POINT (Decided by Integrated Command Team)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Are there existing plans in the ISAF CJ-9 Project Database that can be adapted for the project and assist in meeting initial project criteria requirements?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are any feasibility studies required to scope the project? (Engineering, environmental impact, etc)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Has funding been approved to complete required studies?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PROJECT ON HOLD UNTIL STUDY FUNDING APPROVED</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Have all required studies been completed?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROJECT ON HOLD UNTIL STUDIES COMPLETE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Has a request for funding been submitted?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Has Funding been approved?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROJECT ON HOLD UNTIL FUNDING APPROVED</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>GIRoA LEADERSHIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEP</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Line ministry director responsible for result of project has a plan to take ownership of finished project including furniture, maintenance, staffing, etc? Has informed ministry in Kabul to budget for major projects?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Is the GIRoA Support Plan sufficient to maintain the Project through its expected lifetime?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>SECOND PROJECT EXIT POINT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Has a Contract been released for bids? Is the provincial government informed about the bidding process? (Transparency)</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Does the funding meet the bid cost?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Can the Contract proceed to implementation? Is local labor an option? (Holding a shovel is better than an AK-47!)</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td><strong>THIRD PROJECT EXIT POINT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Can the GIRoA announce that the project is open for local bids, cash-for-work jobs, etc.?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Has an IO plan been created for the project – beginning through to completion?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Date and results of periodic project inspections conducted? Milestones met?</td>
<td>DATE</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Is the project completed and presented? In order to strengthen governance, the governor, local line director, (whoever is appropriate), as the GIRoA deliverer of the benefit, must present the completed project to the public from the PRT/International Community.</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEP</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Has project ownership/responsibility been formally turned</td>
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<td>over to GIRoA for sustainability?</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROJECT COMPLETE</td>
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Table 11: Governance-Building PRT Project Status Checklist