



# (U) Super Bowl XLV

## Joint Special Event Threat Assessment

*11 January 2011*



Homeland  
Security



Dallas Police  
Department



United States  
Northern  
Command



National Geospatial-  
Intelligence Agency



Federal Bureau  
of Investigation



Arlington Police  
Department



National  
Counterterrorism  
Center

## (U) Joint Special Event Threat Assessment: Super Bowl XLV

11 January 2011

*(U) Prepared by the Dallas Division of the FBI; DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A) Homeland Counterterrorism Division, Terrorist Targets and Tactics Branch; the FBI Counterterrorism Division/Threat Review Unit; the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); the Arlington, Texas Police Department (APD); and the Dallas Police Department. Contributing information provided by the DHS/Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and the Terrorist Screening Center. This information is intended to support federal, state, and local government agencies and authorities, and other entities in developing and prioritizing protective and support measures relating to an existing or emerging threat to homeland security. The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group reviewed this product from the perspective of our nonfederal partners.*

### (U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Joint Special Event Threat Assessment (JSETA) addresses potential threats to the National Football League (NFL)<sup>USPER</sup> Super Bowl XLV, which will be played on 6 February 2011 at Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas. It focuses on potential threats to the game—and to various NFL-sanctioned events scheduled for the Dallas/Ft. Worth Metroplex-area during the 12 days prior to the game—from international and domestic terrorists, cyber actors, criminals, and foreign intelligence services.

(U//FOUO) Information in this assessment is current as of 10 January 2011. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies will provide any subsequent threat information received from FBI Intelligence Information Reports, DHS Homeland Intelligence Reports, and FBI Operational Situation Reports, as warranted.

(U) Additional information on security aspects of Super Bowl XLV is available on SIPRNET at [http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Super\\_Bowl\\_XLV](http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Super_Bowl_XLV) and <http://current.nctc.sgov.gov>; on JWICS at [http://www.intelink.ic.gov/wiki/Super\\_Bowl\\_XLV](http://www.intelink.ic.gov/wiki/Super_Bowl_XLV) and <https://current.nctc.ic.gov>; and on LEO.

#### (U//FOUO) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) The information contained in this assessment is derived from national level intelligence and law enforcement sources, state and local law enforcement, and open source reporting. Where no source reporting exists, judgments are based on the most likely potential threats or on past threats to similar targets. The reliability of federal and local law enforcement information sources is generally assessed as HIGH (the information is credibly sourced and corroborated). Open source reporting is assessed as MEDIUM (the information is credibly sourced and plausible, but may contain political or journalistic bias, and may be intended to influence as well as inform).

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**(U) Key Findings**

(U//FOUO) The FBI, DHS, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and Dallas/Ft. Worth Metroplex-area (DFW-area) law enforcement agencies have identified no credible terrorist threats to Super Bowl XLV or its associated events and venues. Nevertheless, the Super Bowl's high profile could make it a desirable target for violent organizations or individuals seeking to exploit intense media coverage to promote their cause.

(U//FOUO) We assess that the placement of explosive devices in heavily trafficked areas would be the most likely mode of terrorist attack. Security breaches facilitated by stolen or counterfeit credentials or by individuals with legitimate access to the facility pose additional threats to stadium security.

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating any credible cyber or foreign intelligence threats to the Super Bowl.

(U//FOUO) The highly visible security presence at the stadium most likely will deter potential attackers. Prospective attackers may view nearby local infrastructure, such as hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs as more feasible targets.

### **(U) Event Overview**

(U) On 6 February 2011, the NFL championship game, Super Bowl XLV, will be played at Cowboys Stadium in Arlington.<sup>a</sup> Opened in 2009, Cowboys Stadium is the fourth largest NFL stadium, with a normal seating capacity of 80,000. Seating will be expanded to accommodate 93,000 spectators for the Super Bowl. Although this marks the first Super Bowl held at this venue, Cowboys Stadium previously hosted the 2010 National Basketball Association (NBA)<sup>USPER</sup> All-Star Game, along with numerous professional and collegiate football games and other sporting events. Three games of the 2010 Major League Baseball (MLB)<sup>USPER</sup> World Series were also played in Arlington at Rangers Ballpark.

### **(U) Terrorist Overview and Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) The high profile of and media attention afforded to the Super Bowl make it a potentially attractive target for terrorist groups. International and domestic terrorists have targeted major sporting events in the past, including the 1972 Munich and 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games. More recently, foreign media reports indicated potential threats by al-Qa'ida and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to the 2010 Commonwealth Games held during October in New Delhi, India.<sup>1</sup>

### **(U) International Terrorism Threat**

(U//FOUO) We have no credible information that al-Qa'ida or other international terrorist groups are planning to attack Super Bowl XLV, Cowboys Stadium, or other infrastructure and venues associated with the game.

(U//FOUO) The highly visible and extensive security measures for the Super Bowl game, including numerous security personnel and barriers, may deter attacks. At the same time, this tight security could make nearby, less-secure targets attractive alternatives for terrorists determined to conduct high-profile attacks.

(U//FOUO) Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups historically have attacked lightly defended or symbolic targets around the world, such as hotels, housing compounds, nightclubs, places of worship, restaurants, and schools. Open-access facilities near major events, such as team or fan hotels, generally lack the extensive security measures in place at primary special event facilities, offering terrorists better opportunities to cause mass casualties, economic damage, and panic, as well as to attract media attention.

### **(U) Domestic Terrorism Threat**

(U//FOUO) We have no information that domestic terrorists plan to conduct attacks against or coinciding with the Super Bowl.

(U//FOUO) No groups or individuals in the DFW-area are known to have the motivation, plans, or capability to target Cowboys Stadium or associated Super Bowl events and venues. Enhanced security measures will sharply reduce the likelihood of large-scale violent action by domestic terrorists.

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<sup>a</sup> (U) See Appendix A and B for DFW-area maps and locator images of event venues, and Appendix C for a full list of official events and locations.

(U//FOUO) Lone offenders<sup>b</sup> pose a threat to any large event like the Super Bowl. They are often difficult to detect because they have no visible links to known terrorist groups or networks, and they conduct their typically limited planning and preoperational activities in isolation.

**(U) Criminal Threat Trends and Environment**

(U//FOUO) We have no information that any specific individuals or groups plan to conduct criminal actions targeting Super Bowl XLV or associated events and venues. Criminal elements normally operate at such prominent events, but they are unlikely to cause significant disruptions or threaten event security.

- (U//FOUO) Based on previously observed trends at other special events, we assess that prostitution activity and narcotics sales are likely to increase during the Super Bowl.<sup>2</sup>

**(U//FOUO) Crime Statistics During Previous Special Events in Arlington**

(U//FOUO) Crime statistics furnished by the Arlington Police Department (APD) reveal no overall increases in criminal activity associated with the 2010 NBA All-Star Game or the 2010 MLB World Series.

- (U//FOUO) APD made 14 arrests in association with the NBA All-Star Game. Five arrests occurred on Cowboys Stadium property; the remaining nine took place at non-sanctioned events. Most arrests were related to public intoxication or other disturbances; one arrest was made for violating the ticket scalping ordinance.
- (U//FOUO) APD arrested 12 individuals during the MLB World Series for public intoxication, ticket scalping, trademark product violations, and theft.

(U) Source:  
(U//FOUO) Arlington Police Department; Criminal Activity Recap  
NBA All-Star Game and MLB World Series; 30 November 2010.

**(U) Foreign Intelligence Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating a specific foreign intelligence threat related to Super Bowl XLV; however, the presence of many corporate executives, politicians, and VIPs in one location presents collection opportunities for foreign intelligence services.

**(U) Cyber Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating a potential cyber threat to Super Bowl XLV or related venues and events.

**(U) Transportation Threat Environment**

(U//FOUO) We have no information indicating specific plans by violent international or domestic terrorist groups to attack public transportation in the DFW-area in connection with Super Bowl XLV.

(U) The City of Arlington is well served by several freeways and interstate highways but does not have a public transportation system. The anchor cities of Dallas and Ft. Worth

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<sup>b</sup> (U//FOUO) FBI and DHS define a "lone offender" as a violent extremist who commits terrorist acts alone and without direction from a group or another individual. The perpetrator may have contact with others, but those other individuals are not aware of the perpetrator's plans or intentions.

have public transportation systems, including commuter and light rail systems and intra- and inter-city buses. Spectators largely will travel to the stadium in private vehicles, rental cars, chartered buses, taxis, and limousines, and on shuttle buses from nearby parking lots.

**(U) Scenarios of Concern**

(U//FOUO) The following hypothetical scenarios address developments that might disrupt Super Bowl XLV, directly or indirectly, or divert law enforcement and security personnel.

*(U) Improvised Explosive Devices*

(U//FOUO) We assess placement of one or more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in or near the stadium would be the preferred method of attack by terrorists. Such an attack during the game would inflict immediate casualties and destruction and create fear and panic among spectators. Terrorists also could use IEDs or VBIEDs against crowded, unsecured targets nearby, such as local businesses and public parking lots, as diversions or to stage secondary attacks against first responders.

*(U) Suicide Bombers*

(U//FOUO) Suicide bombing is a widely used terrorist tactic overseas against events and locations where large numbers of people are present. Such attacks could also target crowded, unsecured targets nearby.

- (U) On 11 July 2010, al-Shabaab-linked suicide bombers conducted attacks at two venues in Kampala, Uganda where fans were gathered to watch broadcasts of the final game of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Nearly 80 individuals were killed, including one American.<sup>3</sup>
- (U) On 14 May 2010, three al-Qa'ida in Iraq-affiliated suicide bombers detonated explosive devices as players and spectators were leaving a soccer game in the town of Tal Afar, Iraq, according to a US media account. The attack killed 10 and wounded 120 people.<sup>4</sup>

*(U) Small Arms Attacks*

(U//FOUO) The relative ease of preparing a small arms attack, the high-profile nature of the attacks in Mumbai, India and on Fort Hood, Texas, and recent guidance by al-Qa'ida and its affiliated organizations urging adherents to devise their own simple attacks, might enhance the attractiveness and effectiveness of this option.

- (U//FOUO) The October 2010 issue of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP's) English-language magazine *Inspire* urged US-based readers to emulate the Fort Hood shooter by conducting small arms attacks. The author of the *Inspire* article praised such operations for their ease of preparation.<sup>5</sup>
- (U//FOUO) In a 7 March 2010 statement issued by al-Qa'ida's as-Sahab Media Foundation, US-born and Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida spokesman Adam Gadahn<sup>USPER</sup> praised the Fort Hood shooter's actions and acclaimed him as a role model for Muslim populations in the West to follow.<sup>6</sup>

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- (U//FOUO) Widespread media coverage of the 2008 Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e Tayyiba provides a potential blueprint for would-be attackers on how to execute a complex team-based attack on civilians at multiple targets.

*(U) Vehicular Attacks*

(U//FOUO) The October 2010 issue of AQAP's *Inspire* magazine also included an article, "*The Ultimate Mowing Machine*," detailing a plan to use a four wheel-drive pickup truck outfitted with steel blades to attack pedestrian targets in crowded public places.<sup>7</sup>

- (U//FOUO) The author of the article urges readers to implement the operation in a variety of Western nations, including the United States.
- (U//FOUO) While sports venues are not explicitly referenced in the article, the author does recommend selecting "pedestrian only" areas closed to vehicular traffic, which often surround special event venues.

*(U) Security Breaches and Insider Threats*

(U//FOUO) Terrorists or criminals might try to gain access to restricted areas by impersonating government or military officials or emergency personnel. Detecting and detaining such individuals would pose a key security challenge prior to and during the Super Bowl.

- (U//FOUO) Terrorists affiliated with al-Qa'ida, the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups have impersonated officials and used stolen or cloned official vehicles in conducting attacks overseas.<sup>8,9</sup> This tactic provides terrorists access to restricted areas or closer proximity to targets without raising suspicions.

(U//FOUO) Past incidents in or around stadiums, although not terrorist-related, reinforce the need for stringent and thorough security measures at major events such as the Super Bowl, including verifying the credentials of all individuals entering the stadium.

- (U//FOUO) On 9 October 2010, an identified individual, wearing a full military dress uniform and carrying two M-16 rifles, was granted access to the playing field of a college football game in Michigan, according to a local media account. By claiming to security personnel that he was part of the game day military honor guard, he was able to pass through several security checkpoints without official authorization.<sup>10</sup>
- (U//FOUO) On 6 September 2010, an identified US person passed through security without credentials at Cowboys Stadium by claiming to be the team doctor for a high school team playing at the facility, according to the APD. He was located in the suites section of the stadium by janitorial personnel. Authorities later determined he employed the same ruse to enter The Cotton Bowl Stadium in Dallas on 3 September 2010, where he gained entry to the command post.<sup>11</sup>

(U//FOUO) Recent events serve to highlight the potential risk posed to Super Bowl XLV by individuals breaching security using false media credentials. While Cowboys Stadium officials advise that between 20 and 60 duplicate tickets are detected at each event, the

use of fraudulent media passes constitutes a new method of gaining unauthorized access to the facility.<sup>12</sup>

- (U//FOUO) On 12 December 2010, several suspects gained access to Cowboys Stadium using counterfeit media credentials. Subsequent investigation revealed that an identified US person produced the counterfeit media passes and sold them via Craigslist<sup>USPER</sup>. A search of the subject's residence revealed evidence linking him to the production of other counterfeit documents used by suspects to gain access to the Big Twelve Championship.<sup>13</sup>
- (U//FOUO) On 4 December 2010, multiple counterfeit media credentials and VIP wristbands were presented for entry at the Big Twelve Championship Game held at Cowboys Stadium. Investigation revealed the fraudulent documents were purchased via Craigslist and three subjects operating out of a Cowboys Stadium parking lot.<sup>14</sup>

**(U) Intelligence Gaps**

(U//FOUO) Has any group or individual conducted surveillance or preoperational activities in support of a terrorist attack against this event or soft targets nearby?

(U//FOUO) Which criminal enterprises plan to target the large number of persons attending Super Bowl XLV and related events?

(U//FOUO) Which foreign intelligence collectors may be present during Super Bowl XLV?



**(U) Reporting Notice**

(U) FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI's 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone number 202-323-3300 or by email at [SIOC@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:SIOC@ic.fbi.gov). The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9685 or by email at [NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov](mailto:NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov). FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm> and Fusion Center information may be obtained at [http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/editorial\\_0306.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/editorial_0306.shtm). For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9201 or by email at [NICC@dhs.gov](mailto:NICC@dhs.gov). When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

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
**(U) Tracked by:** Q-FBI-2400-002-04; HSEC-02-19000-ST-2009

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- <sup>1</sup> (U) Online article; Nishit Dholabhai; *The Telegraph (Calcutta)*; "Attack Alert on Hockey Day"; 16 October 2010; [http://www.telegraphindia.com/1101016/jsp/nation/story\\_13064559.jsp](http://www.telegraphindia.com/1101016/jsp/nation/story_13064559.jsp); 23 October 2010.
- <sup>2</sup> (U) DHS Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Intelligence Assessment; 15 October 2010; "(U) Homeland Security Investigations Threat Assessment for Super Bowl XLV; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- <sup>3</sup> (U) Online article; Sudarsan Raghavan; *The Washington Post*; "Islamic militant group al-Shabab claims Uganda bombing attacks"; 12 July 2010; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071200476.html>; 6 January 2011.
- <sup>4</sup> (U) Online article; CBS News; "Three Suicide Bombers Kill 10 in Northern Iraq"; 14 May 2010; <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/14/world/main643688.shtml>; 14 December 2010.
- <sup>5</sup> (U//FOUO) Open Source Center; GMP20101011569001; 11 October 2010; "AQAP Releases Section Issue of 'Inspire' Magazine, Table of Contents"; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is Shumukah al-Islam Network in Arabic serving as an official online dissemination point for al-Qa'ida and affiliate messaging since late 2008.
- <sup>6</sup> (U) Online Article; The NEFA Foundation; "Adam Gadahn, A Call To Arms; 7 March 2010; <http://nefafoundation.org/file/nefagadahn0210.pdf>; 9 December 2010.
- <sup>7</sup> (U) Open Source Center; IAP20101013950100; 13 October 2010; "BBC Monitoring: Counterterrorism Digest 12-13 Oct 10"; UNCLASSIFIED; Source is Agence France Press news agency, Paris.
- <sup>8</sup> (U//FOUO) FBI; Intelligence Bulletin; "(U//FOUO) Terrorists Continue to Impersonate Military and Civilian Officials to Further Attacks"; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- <sup>9</sup> (U//FOUO) DHS and FBI; Roll Call Release; 5 November 2009; "(U//FOUO) Use of Stolen, Cloned, or Repurposed Vehicles in Terrorist Attacks"; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- <sup>10</sup> (U) Online article; Amalie Nash; "University of Michigan Police Investigation Security Breach at Last Weekend's Game"; 16 October 2010; <http://www.annarbor.com/news/university-of-michigan-police-investigate-security-breach-at-last-weekends-game/index.php>; 9 December 2010.
- <sup>11</sup> (U) Arlington Police Department; Report #100058140; 6 September 2010; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- <sup>12</sup> (U) Arlington Police Department; Bulletin #1012-306-H; 13 December 2010; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- <sup>13</sup> (U) Arlington Police Department; Bulletin #1012-306-H; 13 December 2010; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
- <sup>14</sup> (U) Arlington Police Department; Bulletin #1012-306-H; 13 December 2010; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

(U) Appendix A: Super Bowl Venue Overview

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


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## (U) Appendix B: Cowboys Stadium

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**Arlington, TX**  
Key Feature Locations  
United States National Grid (USNG)

**Venue**  
Cowboys Stadium  
900 E Randol Mill Road  
Arlington, TX.

**USNG Coordinate**  
14S PB 78873 24927

- Law Enforcement
- EMS
- Heliport
- Railroad

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TRANSVERSE MERCATOR PROJECTION, UTM ZONE 14 NORTH

1,000-Foot GRID - 100-METER US NATIONAL GRID  
GRID ZONE DESIGNATION 14S  
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## **(U) Appendix C: Super Bowl XLV Events and Locations**

### **(U) Arlington, Texas**

- (U) Super Bowl Game—Cowboys Stadium (6 February 2011)
- (U) Tailgate Party—Cowboys Stadium (6 February 2011)
- (U) Accreditation Center—Arlington Convention Center

### **(U) Dallas, Texas**

- (U) National Football League (NFL) Experience—Dallas Convention Center (begins 27 January 2011)
- (U) NFL Headquarters—Hilton Anatole
- (U) Media Center—Sheraton Dallas
- (U) National Football Conference (NFC) Practice Site—Southern Methodist University<sup>USPER</sup>
- (U) NFC Alternate Practice Site—Highland Park High School
- (U) NFC Fan Party—Fair Park (5 February 2011)

### **(U) Fort Worth, Texas**

- (U) American Football Conference (AFC)—Omni Fort Worth
- (U) AFC Practice Site—Texas Christian University<sup>USPER</sup>
- (U) AFC Fan Party—Downtown Fort Worth (5 February 2011)
- (U) Taste of the NFL—Fort Worth Convention Center (5 February 2011)

### **(U) Irving, Texas**

- (U) NFC Team Hotel—Omni Mandalay Hotel at Las Colinas
- (U) Alternate Practice Site and Meeting Location—Valley Ranch

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