



Federal Bureau
of Investigation



Homeland
Security

JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(U//FOUO) Indicators and Protective Measures In Light of Boston Marathon Explosions

16 April 2013

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin provides law enforcement and private sector safety officials with protective measures in light of the recent explosions that took place at the 2013 Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts. The information is provided to support the activities of DHS and FBI and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and first responder officials and the private sector to deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks in the United States.

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(U) Incident Details

(U) On 15 April 2013, at approximately 2:45 pm, two explosions occurred in quick succession near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing at least three people and causing numerous injuries.

(U) Ongoing Concerns with Terrorism in the Homeland

(U//FOUO) The activities in Boston highlight the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to target large gatherings, including at special events, in order to inflict mass casualties. Examples of previously attempted or plotted IED attacks include:

- (U//FOUO) The undetonated IED discovered along the planned 2011 “Martin Luther King Jr. Unity March” parade route in Spokane, Washington;
- (U//FOUO) The November 2010 plot to detonate a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) at an annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon;
- (U//FOUO) The October 2010 plot to conduct multiple mass casualty bombings at Metrorail^{USPER} stations in Washington, DC;
- (U//FOUO) The May 2010 attempted detonation of a vehicle-borne IED in Times Square; and
- (U//FOUO) The September 2009 plot to attack the New York City subway using IEDs.

(U//FOUO) Indicators of Pre-Operational Surveillance and Attack Planning

(U//FOUO) Given these events, we are providing indicators and protective measures to aid law enforcement and first responders in identifying and mitigating potential threats. Each indicator listed below may be by itself, lawful conduct or behavior and may also constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the US Constitution. In addition, there may be a wholly innocent explanation for conduct or behavior that appears suspicious in nature. For this reason, no single indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.

(U//FOUO) Possible indicators of pre-operational surveillance or attack planning include:

- (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks;
- (U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures; multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to same locations or similar venues;
- (U//FOUO) Discreet use of cameras or video recorders, sketching, or note-taking consistent with pre-operational surveillance;

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- (U//FOUO) Interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel;
- (U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security measures, to include barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection systems;
- (U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of items that could be used to construct an explosive device, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that could be used to construct an explosive device; and
- (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas.

(U) Protective Measures

(U//FOUO) Terrorists have demonstrated continued interest in attacking significant infrastructure, economic, and symbolic targets. We encourage state and local law enforcement, as well as security personnel, to consider the following protective measures:

- (U//FOUO) Establish a comprehensive security plan and emergency response plan for the event or facility that includes interaction and integration with local law enforcement and public safety agencies;
- (U//FOUO) Test communications equipment with emergency responders, including primary and backup systems;
- (U//FOUO) Provide VBIED indicators (e.g., vehicle sagging, illegally parked, etc.) and reporting procedures to facility or event staff;
- (U//FOUO) Install vehicle barriers and designate vehicle marshaling locations to ensure adequate standoff distances from VBIEDs;
- (U//FOUO) Establish personnel screening checkpoints for access control into the facility or event;
- (U//FOUO) Conduct explosive detection canine team searches of vehicles requiring entrance into a secure zone;
- (U//FOUO) Ensure personnel receive training on IED and threat awareness, emergency communication, response actions, and reporting of suspicious activity;
- (U//FOUO) Develop mass evacuation procedures in response to a threat;

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- (U//FOUO) Identify and designate egress and ingress routes for emergency vehicles;
- (U//FOUO) Institute strategies for detecting and reporting pre-operational surveillance and other suspicious activity;
- (U//FOUO) Remove objects from the facility or event which could conceal IEDs (e.g., trash containers, crates, etc.);
- (U//FOUO) Conduct additional sweeps of the facility or event area using roving patrols and explosive detection canine teams;
- (U//FOUO) Implement a public awareness and vigilance campaign that provides information for reporting and responding to potential IED activity (e.g., PA system announcements, television ads, social media, etc.); and
- (U//FOUO) Be vigilant of secondary devices; specifically at anticipated evacuation routes.

(U//FOUO) We continue to urge federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to remain alert, maintain vigilance, and report potential indications of pre-operational and suspicious activity.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity
(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx .

(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response
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(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.10, HSEC 8.9