LAND OPERATIONS
(ENGLISH)


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Director of Army Doctrine

2008-01-01

Canada
FOREWORD

1. B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario. It is effective upon receipt.

2. B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Land Operations* supersedes both B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* and B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*.

3. The French Version of this publication is B-GL-300-001/FP-002 *Opérations terrestre*.

4. This is no limit or restrictions placed upon the distribution of this publication. The electronic version of this publication can be found in the Army Electronic Library, accessible from the LFDTS Homepage, at [http://lfdts.army.mil.ca](http://lfdts.army.mil.ca).

5. Suggested amendments should be forwarded through normal channels to the OPI of the publication, the Directorate of Army Doctrine.

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PREFACE

AIM

1. The purpose of this publication is to present capstone doctrine for the conduct of land operations. It combines and supersedes two former publications, *Conduct of Land Operation—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (B-GL-300-001/FP-000) and *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* (B-GL-300-002/FP-000). This combination reflects the intrinsic link between activities and effects across these two levels of command.

APPLICABILITY

1. This publication is applicable at the operational and tactical levels and relevant to strategic level planners and commanders.

SCOPE

1. This publication is written to be in line with and to reflect the long-standing, proven and extant philosophies and principles for the creation and application of a military force’s fighting power. It describes the Canadian approach to operations.

2. The doctrine within publication recognizes that in order to reach enduring operational and strategic end states, the root causes of a conflict must be addressed in light of the given environment and its influencing elements and systems. To this end, land forces do not simply undertake physical activities and effects against adversarial forces. Land forces apply their capabilities to complete a combination of physical activities and influence activities that create effects on the physical and psychological planes. In doing so, a wide range of targets is engaged. This range will certainly include adversaries, but also other groups, systems, and individuals within the battlespace and environment that play a role in reaching the operational and campaign objectives and end states. In this comprehensive application of combat power the military does not act alone, for many enduring solutions to a conflict requires the support of other agencies and elements of power. Thus, this publication does not view military operations in isolation, but places them in the context of a joint, inter-agency, multinational, and public framework.

3. Although the publication introduces some new terminology and expands upon certain concepts, the roles, missions, and tasks in which Land Force units have traditionally participated have not changed. The doctrinal concepts are not necessarily new, but they only articulated in more detail.

4. The publication addresses the following subject areas:

   a. The place of the land force with strategic and operational hierarchy.

   b. Characteristics of an operating environment.

   c. The conceptual employment of land forces.

   d. The generation of fighting power and its application through conceptual frameworks.
e. The application of fighting power.

f. The planning of land operations.

g. The conduct of land operations.

h. An introduction to specific operations and specific environments.

RELATIONSHIPS TO ALLIED DOCTRINE

1. This publication is consistent with the doctrine of Canada’s key allies and partners, particularly those in the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Standardization Programme (ABCA). Major concepts are also in-line with current North American Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine and Standardization Agreements (STANAGs). This publication is, in essence, the implementation of NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.2 (AJP-3.2) Joint Allied Doctrine for Land Operations and Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.1 (ATP 3.2.1) Allied Land Tactics.

2. Vignettes used in this publication illustrate the application of doctrine or present lessons learned. Unless otherwise noted, all formal definitions and abbreviations given herein have been taken from NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) Glossary of Terms and Definitions, or NATO AAP-15 Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents and Publications. It is vital from a point of common understanding and academic rigour that discussions about doctrinal concepts utilize formally adopted terminology. Questions or comments regarding the content of this publication shall be directed to the Directorate of Army Doctrine.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF CANADIAN LAND FORCES

There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens.¹

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

101. GENERAL

1. Despite regular changes in the manner in which the Land Force (LF) prepares for, mounts, and conducts operations, the role of land forces in meeting the tactical, operational, and strategic aims of Canada remains extant. Indeed, there has become a heightened relevance of tactical operations in meeting Canada’s strategic end states. Indeed, the link from tactical activities to operational and strategic objectives has never been more acute. Thus, it is essential that all Army personnel understand the operational and strategic context in which LF units will conduct operations.

102. STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

1. Canada’s International Policy Statement of 2005 outlines how national strategic objectives will be achieved through a forward looking, fully integrated and unified approach, that is, a comprehensive approach that intertwines diplomacy, defence, development, and commerce in a harmonized, complementary fashion in the pursuit of enduring end states that make a contribution to a safer world.² Canada’s Defence Policy Statement notes that the Canadian Forces (CF) will continue to perform the following three broad roles, emphasizing that the defence of Canada and North America must be the first priority:
   a. Protect Canadians.
   b. Defend North America in cooperation with the United States (US).
   c. Contribute to international peace and security, including coalition operations in conjunction with our allies.³

2. To perform these roles, the CF must be effective, relevant, responsive, and remain capable of carrying out a range of operations, including combat. Much of this combat, particularly in terms of establishing enduring end states in various regions, will be focused on the land force.


3. The threats to Canada’s national security are wide ranging. Furthermore there is a moral obligation, based on the relative position and status of Canada in relation to the majority of the world, to undertake measures to ensure the spread of peace, stability and development. This in turn will help secure Canada and her interests. Situations that may involve Canadian intervention and application of military capability, in harmony with other capabilities, may include the following:

   a. Failed and failing states that are unable to:

      (1) maintain political authority;

      (2) provide security and other basic services and needs; and

      (3) protect essential human rights.

   b. The spread of violence through political, economic, social or religious motivations.

   c. Spread of weapons of mass destruction.

   d. Ongoing regional conflicts.

4. Our national military policy and strategy are the products of the strategic role and objectives assigned to the CF. These roles and objectives are:


   b. Meeting threats to our security as far from our borders as possible, including:

      (1) Protecting people who cannot protect themselves.

      (2) Providing humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need.

      (3) Rebuilding shattered communities and societies.

5. From these priorities the CF derives both domestic and international responsibilities in either supported or supporting roles:

   a. **Domestic responsibilities**:  

      (1) Defend Canada against all threats.

      (2) Protect the northern portion of our continent.

      (3) Preserve our sovereignty including that of the Arctic.

   b. **Global responsibilities**:  

      (1) Halting or preventing conflict.

      (2) Improving human welfare around the world.
6. Many of these priorities and undertakings will be realized through our standing alliances.

103. COMMAND AND CONTROL—SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED ELEMENTS

1. **General.** Force generation and force employment of military organizations for domestic, continental, or international operations requires clearly designated supported and supporting organizations. Specification of the command and support relationships between elements of the supported and supporting commands is essential. While there is some variance in the command relationship terminology used within the LF and the operational commands, it is generally consistent with the NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6), *Glossary of Terms and Definitions*. Note that CF units deployed on domestic operations must also be conversant with their unique legal and procedural responsibilities and rights as detailed by the Federal Minister responsible for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), the Minister of National Defence (MND), the CDS, the Criminal Code of Canada, the Emergencies Act, and the National Defence Act.

2. **Supported Command.** The supported command has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the strategic or the operational command. In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the CDS. In the context of a support command relationship, the supported commander receives assistance or capabilities from another commander's force, and is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required.

3. **Supporting Command.** The supporting command provides forces or other support to a supported command and develops a supporting plan. In the context of a support command relationship, the supporting command, in accordance with a directive from either the strategic or an operational command, aids, protects, complements, or sustains the supported command's force, and is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander.

SECTION 2
THE LAND COMPONENT: ROLE AND COMPOSITION

104. ROLE AND EMPLOYMENT OF LAND FORCES

1. The mission of the LF is to generate and maintain combat capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence objectives. In order to fulfil its mission the LF must constantly assess and align its structures and capabilities. The role of LF formations or units is to conduct land operational and tactical operations.

2. Land forces may be employed as part of a force under a national operational level headquarters for domestic or continental based operations. As such, they must be prepared to assist local, provincial, or federal authorities to undertake a wide variety of tasks under the following legal frameworks: Public Welfare Emergencies (PWE); Public Order Emergencies (POE); International Emergencies or War under the Emergencies Act; and, in accordance with the National Defence Act (NDA).

3. Land forces may also be employed under a national operational level headquarters as part of an expeditionary force and may be the lead or main element in a Joint expeditionary campaign. As such, they must be prepared to conduct rapid expeditionary operations normally at great distances from their home garrisons and for extended periods. These may involve:
Land Operations

rapid deployment in response to or pre-emption of a crisis; deterrence or coercion of potential belligerents from further escalation or confrontation; the conduct of high intensity combat to disrupt or defeat a determined enemy, typically in conjunction with allies; or, participation in other activities and campaigns across the continuum of operations aimed at stabilizing areas of conflict or conducting limited military intervention (see Chapter 3). Many of these deployments will be in the form of a multi-national coalition (combined) force. Allocated forces and doctrinally accepted command and control relationships will be established on a bespoke basis for each deployment or campaign.

4. The LF’s ability to address these tasks requires a broad mix of military capabilities. Many such capabilities have a wide utility across the defence missions and military tasks. Chief among these is the ability to conduct combat operations. This provides core capabilities that result in a land force trained, equipped, and mentally prepared to meet a wide range of challenges. It also provides deterrence against hostile conventional forces.

105. LAND FORCE ELEMENTS AND TYPES

1. General. A land force, or the land component at the operational level within a combined joint task force (CJTF), comprises several different elements, such as combat and combat support units. It may also contain troops of different types, such as ground and air manoeuvre units. The force should be selected and assembled to form a cohesive and balanced whole that can operate effectively and efficiently to achieve desired objectives and the assigned mission.

2. Force Elements. Combat, combat support, combat service support, and command support are the possible elements of a land force. The proportion of each element within a specific land force will be task-tailored and therefore will vary for different operations:

   a. Combat Elements. Combat (cbt) elements consist of those elements that engage the enemy directly. They fight and typically employ direct fire weapons and manoeuvre, and include armour, infantry, and direct fire units. They are considered ground manoeuvre forces.

   b. Combat Support Elements. Combat support (cbt sp) elements consist of those elements that provide fire support, operational assistance, and enablers to combat elements through designated command and control and fire support relationships. Cbt sp elements include fire support, air defence, reconnaissance, combat engineer, some electronic warfare elements, and some aviation assets. They may be referred to as simply support elements.

   c. Combat Service Support Elements. Combat service support (CSS) elements primarily provide administration and logistics support to Cbt or Cbt Sp elements. CSS elements include log, HSS, LEM, and PSS. Force support engineers that normally provide water, electrical power, infrastructure, and main supply route (MSR) maintenance are classified as CSS elements.

   d. Command Support Elements. Command support (Comd Sp) elements assist commanders in the exercise of command. It includes staff of all types, communications, intelligence, information systems, and other elements assigned to protect, sustain, and move the commander or the headquarters. They include signals and headquarters organizations.
e. **Combat Arms.** The term “combat arms” is a colloquial term that refers to a slightly wider description of “combat elements.” It includes armour, infantry, field engineers, and artillery.

3. **Reconnaissance Forces.** Reconnaissance (recce) forces have the primary purpose of gaining information. As such, they are normally classified as cbt sp forces. While they do not generally fight for information, they may be assigned combat roles, typically as guard forces or flank protection forces. A recce element that is primarily tasked with provision of battlespace information has a cbt sp role. One with a more aggressive task, such as guarding a flank, has a cbt role.

4. **Manoeuvre Forces.** There are three types of ground manoeuvre forces: heavy, medium, and light. They may be grouped together and operate in combination.

   a. **Heavy Forces.** Heavy forces exploit automotive power to deploy significant firepower combined with protection and mobility. They deploy with armoured fighting vehicles and fight either from their vehicles or with their vehicles in direct, intimate support.

   b. **Medium Forces.** Medium forces are strategically and operationally more deployable than heavy forces, and may be among the first elements to deploy into a theatre or operations. They have less firepower and protection than heavy forces and are therefore less capable in certain circumstances.

   c. **Light Forces.** Light forces are defined as military forces rapidly deployable at all levels of command and optimized for terrain and conditions not suited to mechanized forces. They have significant strategic mobility, as they can be transported to any theatre by aircraft. They may be the only forces that can operate in complex environments characterized by close terrain. However, their firepower is limited compared to heavy or medium forces and they are vulnerable without the protection of dispersion, concealment, or fortification.

---

4 Armoured infantry and/or mechanized infantry as part of a heavy force may close with the enemy or objective mounted in their vehicles, and like all infantry, fight dismounted. While dismounted, they normally have the advantage of additional firepower from their integral vehicle.

5 These circumstances are not limited to heavy conventional enemies. Heavy forces have proven capable when combating unconventional, insurgent groups in urban areas. The heavy forces provide increased protection that allows the infantry to close with and destroy the enemy.

6 Definition proposed to Army Terminology Panel September 2007, to replace the extant definition: “forces optimized for military operations in complex environments, rapidly deployable through a variety of means, yet not tied to any one platform.”
5. **Air Manoeuvre Forces.** Air manoeuvre forces exploit the mobility of aircraft to provide reach and agility. They include attack, support, and reconnaissance helicopters, airmobile forces and airborne forces, along with their close support (CS) and CSS elements. Normally, light forces will be trained to operate as air manoeuvre forces. The operations of air manoeuvre forces should be closely integrated with close air support (CAS), fire support, and other force enablers that will help reduce the vulnerabilities of air manoeuvre forces.

6. **Amphibious Forces.** Amphibious forces undertake littoral or riverine operations, deployed and supported (at least initially) from ships. The land force component of an amphibious force will normally consist of light, or a mix of light and medium forces.

7. **Combined Arms Groups.** The concept of combined arms groups integrates the application of several arms such as infantry, armour, aviation, artillery, and engineers in a complementary fashion normally under a single command. Combined arms groups should be used within a heavy, medium, light force, or air manoeuvre force wherever possible. Their groupings are generally ad hoc and are created to meet a specific operational or tactical situation. They may be combined for a specific mission and re-organized during that mission as required. Properly employed, combined arms groups provide a complementary range of capabilities and flexibilities that will overmatch a less balanced force.

106. **ORGANIZATION OF LAND FORCES**

1. Land forces are structured hierarchically into formations, units, and subunits. Units are termed regiments or battalions, subunits are termed squadrons, batteries or companies, and sub-subunits are termed Platoons or troops, depending upon the Arm or Service:

   a. **Formation.** A formation is a grouping of several units, together with dedicated command and comd sp elements. They normally consist of units of several Arms and Services and thus will consist of manoeuvre units, cbt sp, and CSS elements. Given their level of command and comd sp, the size of the assigned area of operations (AO), and the complexity of problems with which formations are normally confronted, the operational planning process (OPP) is applied to develop plans and orders. A brigade group is a formation level organization task tailored for operations based upon comd sp (i.e., brigade headquarters), cbt (manoeuvre) units, cbt sp, and integral CSS (i.e., service battalion or other logistics unit).

   b. **Unit.** A unit is the smallest group capable of independent operations over long periods. It contains integral comd sp and CSS elements, and the required maturity and level of command. Integral or organic CSS normally provides “first line” support only. A unit tasked to operate independently over an extended period of time or distance (i.e., beyond 72 hrs) may have their integral support echelon reinforced or be assigned integral “second line” CSS in the form of a forward logistics group (FLG) or similar grouping.⁷

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⁷ Lines of support refer to the following: In land operations, the echelon at which a combat service support function is performed. "First line" is the support organic to a unit; "second line" is the support organic to a brigade and division, "third line" is provided by corps or national in-theatre support elements, and "fourth line" is the national base—level support. First line support at the sub-unit and unit level is often referred to as A echelon, and second line support is referred to as B echelon support.
c. **Subunit.** A subunit is a subdivision of a unit normally commanded by a field grade office in the rank of Major. It consists of a number of platoons or troops. A subunit is the smallest manoeuvre element of a land force that may contain the integral combat power, command authority, and CSS to complete tactical tasks independently for up to 72 hours. At the subunit level, full-spectrum operations (FSO) will likely be conducted sequentially, vice simultaneously (see Chapter 3).

d. **Below Subunit.** Subunits consist of three sub-sub-units, a command element, and integral CSS. Platoon or troop level is normally the lowest organizational structure where executive authority is exercised by commissioned officers. Platoons and troops consist of sections, patrols, or vehicle crews.

2. These structures are building blocks upon which required capabilities are grouped and organized to conduct operations. While the LF may be organized under a force generation model in garrison, the formation of integral force employment structures for operations ensures an optimum mix of required capabilities and fosters cohesion and morale, particularly if force employment is based upon historic, traditional units. Integral force employment structures normally include capabilities across each of the five operational functions (Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain).

3. A modular approach supports re-grouping of units, sub-units or sub-sub-units for specific operations or phases.

   a. **Order of Battle.** Although there are standing orders of battle for LF formations and units, land forces deployed on an operation will have a specific list of forces, known as the order of battle (ORBAT).

   b. **Task Organization.** The regrouping of forces for specific operations and phases within operations is normally detailed in a task organization. Typically, subunits are task organized to form combined arms battle groups (BGs) that may include an appropriate balance of capabilities across the five operational functions. They are based around an existing battalion or regimental headquarters.

   c. **Task Forces.** A task force (TF) is a general term that refers to a temporary grouping of units under one commander formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. It is generally formed in a joint environment.

   d. **Battle Group.** A battle group (BG) is a combined arms tactical organization task tailored for operations based upon a unit headquarters (usually an armour, mounted recce, or infantry unit), consisting of manoeuvre subunits with integral cbt sp and CSS, a cbt sp subunit and an integral CSS subunit, organized to complete a specific mission or task.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Normally a battle group will consist of an infantry or armour unit HQ with at least one integral subunit and at least one subunit from the other arm.
107. MODULARITY AND SCALABILITY

1. **Modularity.** LF contributions to force employment structures will be task tailored for a specific mission, task, and operating environment. Forces will be modular and containing the optimum balance of operational functions within the constraints, restraints, and limitations imposed by the force employer. While task tailoring is a well-established practice, it must be applied with careful consideration and with respect to long-standing command and control relationships inherent to our standing units, particularly battalions and regiments.

2. **Scalability.** No two operations are identical. Demands for offensive, defensive, and stability operations vary by campaign. The LF is but one force generator that may be tasked to provide complementary operational function capabilities to the force employment structure. In a coalition, international partners may also contribute complementary capabilities to the force. After considering the requirements of a specific operation or campaign and the assessment of the force employer, including complementary capabilities that will be provided by other force generators or coalition partners, the LF will generate a modular, scalable force that will be assigned to a force employer.
CHAPTER 2
DEFINING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND THE NATURE OF LAND COMBAT

Complex Environment: A battlespace with a mix of geographical, environmental and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations.\(^9\)

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

201. GENERAL

1. Land forces will operate in an increasingly complex, interdependent environment in which they must plan to conduct operations that will influence the physical and cognitive aspects of the terrain, threats and hazards, the local populace and other systems, actors, and entities within the environment. They must do so in a comprehensive approach, working within a joint, inter-agency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework to achieve enduring success.

SECTION 2
ELEMENTS OF THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT\(^{10}\)

202. INTRODUCTION

1. The operating environment is a consequence of the overall operational and tactical circumstances in which the Land Force (LF) is expected to conduct operations. It exists on both the physical and psychological planes. It is a complex mix of the geographical, environmental, and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations. Success is dependent upon understanding the environment and its constituent elements and systems.\(^{11}\)

203. MAIN ELEMENTS

1. A wide range of characteristics and elements that will differ within each campaign or operation defines an operating environment. While some elements of the operating environment will consist of those found in the physical theatre of operations, such as the

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\(^9\) Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel (ATP) and approved by Director General Land Capability Development on 31 March 2005.

\(^{10}\) The operating environment may be described through its constituent characteristics. The concept of a contemporary operating environment will defy description until the environment, and more specifically the battlespace, is defined in temporal and spatial terms. Only after that, can the characteristics and systems at play within that particular environment be identified and used to define the specific operating environment.

\(^{11}\) Systems refer to the political, military, economic, social (including cultural and religious), infrastructure and information (PMESII) constructs and characteristics within an environment.
populace and their culture, some will be imported, such as the information capabilities of a collation force or the political interest or influence in a campaign. In general, the constituent elements of an operating environment that will be encountered by land forces, which must be understood by them and within which they must work, will fall under the following broad headings:

a. **Physical Environment.** The physical environment includes the physical terrain or the ground on which the force will be operating and the physical climate. The LF must be capable of operating in a wide variety of physical environments such as arctic, mountainous, littoral, forest, open savannah, or urban. As campaigns may cover vast areas, land forces may operate across various physical environments. Soldiers must be physically and mentally prepared to deal with the unique and arduous challenges imposed by this aspect of the operating environment.

b. **Local Populace.** As future military operations will likely take place amongst a civilian population, and consequently long-term success will require the support of that local populace, it is essential that commanders at all levels, but specifically at the tactical level that will have daily contact with the local community, consider the effects that operations will have on civilians and their infrastructure. A solid knowledge and understanding of local culture and customs, mitigation of danger to the population and civilian infrastructure, and the planning of information operations in relation to the population, should be applied to achieve the desired effects and avoid undesired effects.

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### OPERATING ENVIRONMENT: THE LOCAL POPULACE

Most contemporary operations will take place amongst local populations. Particularly during [counter-insurgency] COIN operations, the support of the local peoples will be crucial to achieving the desired end-state. Given this fact, certain risks in force protection or tactical operations may have to be accepted in order to protect the civilian populace in order that support for our adversaries is minimized. An insurgency lives or dies largely on the support or at least acquiescence of local residents.

On 8 and 9 June 2006 Israeli forces employed artillery along the coast of the Gaza strip near the town of Beit Lahiya in an effort to dissuade Palestinian militants from launching Qassam rockets into Israeli territory. Indiscriminate harassing fire from Israeli artillery killed seven members of one family, including both parents and five siblings.

As a result of the Israeli shelling, a surviving 18 year-old male member of the family declared his support for the Palestinian Islamic militant group Hamas, even though the family previously had shown no outward support for any militant group. Moreover, Hamas itself declared an end to a 16-month cease-fire that had halted indiscriminate suicide bombings by that group.

The use of indiscriminate force by the Israelis had a diametric result in that the harassing fire failed to dissuade rocket attacks and new supporters for the adversary were created.

c. **Adversary**\(^{12}\) Threats—Conventional and Irregular. The adversary threats that land forces will face may take a number of forms.

1. They may be a well organized and identifiable military force equipped with modern weapons. In such cases they are considered and termed **conventional threats** and will likely be in a recognisable form of manoeuvre forces.

2. The threat may consist of irregular elements such as criminal organizations or insurgent groups that may not be easily identifiable. Such threats should be considered **irregular threats**. These groups will have their own aims and methods of operating. Groups such as insurgents will seek to undermine the existing government or expel foreign forces through a combination of violence and subversion. Other irregular threats such as organised criminal elements will seek to simply undermine stability and good governance in order to exploit the situation for their own ends and gain.

3. Often more than one irregular threat will exist in the battlespace and they may come together to cooperate in order to further their own aims. The usual links between insurgent groups and criminal groups is an example. Other irregular threats will consist of radical sectarian groups seeking dominance, private militias and their leadership.

4. In a peace support campaign, the adversary may consist of two or more belligerent forces who pose no direct threat to campaign forces, but who must be monitored and controlled.

5. Adversaries may take a number of forms and may alter over time, such as irregular forces that may aid conventional forces, or a foreign-sponsored insurgency that may follow the defeat of a conventional military.

d. **Environmental Threat.** Environmental threats are known as hazards, and take forms other than that of an enemy or military force. Natural disasters, poverty, starvation, disease, environmental degradation, unexploded mines and ordnance, or other features of the terrain, may pose threats or risks for our forces and undermine a campaign or operation. Land forces must be equipped, trained, and prepared to deal with such environmental hazards and may be called upon to provide relief to civilian populations who suffer from such threats.

e. **Involvement of Multiple Agencies and Forces.** Campaigns and operations will normally involve the LF working in concert with Canadian Forces (CF) air, maritime, and special operations forces (SOF), as well as supporting, or being supported by, other agencies. These other agencies may include military forces from other nations as part of a coalition, local and national government agencies,

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\(^{12}\) The term adversary is a noun, not an adjective, however, like the term enemy, it will be used in this context for the sake of military concepts.
departments, constabularies, or security forces from the host nation or even private and non-governmental international organizations. To achieve enduring success in a campaign, all forces and agencies involved must reflect a comprehensive approach to campaign planning and execution, linked ideally by a unifying theme and manifested in a unity of effort, or as a minimum, a unity of purpose.\(^{13}\) While there may be clear doctrine and procedures on the responsibilities of other agencies, it may fall to our commanders to proactively take a leading role to encourage a comprehensive, collaborative approach across all agencies involved, working to a common purpose and end state.

### 204. A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

1. A complex environment is defined as: a battlespace with a mix of geographical, environmental and human factors that collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations.\(^{14}\) Campaigns will likely occur in complex environments in which there are numerous interdependent systems, entities, and actors all affecting the situation at hand. Their roles, power structures, objectives, and the part they play in the current crisis or situation must all be assessed in order to understand the environment and its constituent elements. Only in this manner, will the most appropriate objectives and activities be assigned. Even at the lowest tactical levels, commanders must appreciate and understand these complexities, their affect upon one another, and their affect on tactical operations. They must understand that at times expedient tactical success may have to be sacrificed for long-term operational and strategic gain. The more tightly connected the strategic, operational and tactical levels of a campaign are, the more complex and difficult the environment will be.

2. If we could understand the various elements that combine to create and complicate an operating environment, and through analysis and careful consideration, identify their characteristics unique to the given environment, then we could better understand cause and effect relationships and be more effective in applying our combat power to reach desired objectives and end states.

### 205. INTERRELATED SYSTEMS AND ENTITIES

1. Social environments consist of, and are complicated by, a number of interrelated systems, actors and entities, closely tied to the local populace and culture. These systems, entities, and elements will include a wide range of aspects to the environment:

   a. political;

   b. military;

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\(^{13}\) The comprehensive approach to campaigns involves the holistic, integrated employment of multiple agencies in concert with land forces to conduct operations in addressing all the sources of conflict, and secondly a holistic assessment of the effects of our operations in a wide array of realms, including political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII).

\(^{14}\) Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel (ATP) and approved by Director General Land Capability Development on 31 March 2005.
Defining the Operating Environment and the Nature of Land Combat

c. economic;

d. social (including culture and religion);
e. infrastructure; and
f. information.

This list of an environment’s systems may be abbreviated to PMESII.

2. A successful campaign will likely require a comprehensive approach incorporating multiple agencies (e.g., diplomatic, defence, development, and commerce) working in a complementary manner towards shared end states. This comprehensive approach must be effectively applied against the environment’s PMESII systems with due consideration of their interrelated nature. Such an approach will be necessary if the root causes that led to a crisis requiring military deployment are to be addressed and enduring solutions created.

3. It is vital that commanders understand the relationships within and between each of these systems, particularly relationships that deal with power structures. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and similar processes should define these elements and systems, and assign priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to define them to the greatest detail possible. Additionally, continuous assessment and analysis is vital to ensuring activities and resulting effects on these systems support operational objectives and end states.

4. Despite detailed analysis of an environment’s systems, there exist too many factors and complexities, some of which are individual human traits, to accurately and continuously predict cause and effect relationships. Thus, the development of plans remains more of an art than a science where commanders must predict actions, effects, and reactions as well as mitigating undesired or unintentional effects.

206. STRATEGIC END STATE

1. National strategy works towards the achievement of national aims and objectives. Military strategy is an element of national strategy that involves the application of military resources to the achievement of the goals of national strategy. It is concerned with the determination of military strategic objectives and the desired operational end state, and is implemented at the operational level of conflict. A campaign plan will identify the operational end state, operational objectives, and their supporting effects required to realize them. In this way, it will provide a key link between national strategy and tactical activities by formations and units. The campaign plan must focus on the long-term outcomes, while constituent, sequential operation plans (OPLANs) address the near to mid-term situation with a view to achieving the overall campaign plan.

2. Campaigns that simply seek the destruction of an enemy force or that seek to provide basic, emergency humanitarian aid to a troubled state will be fairly straightforward. However, campaigns that seek to stabilize a failing state besieged by numerous external and internal problems and influence, such as corrupt government, failing economy, criminal gangs and foreign insurgents, will be more complex in their nature and in their execution. Enduring solutions will require a multi-agency approach to address all the sources of conflict and instability, only one of which may be military related. In such environments, it is important to recognize that different organizations and agencies within a multi-agency framework may have
different objectives and end states, therefore different campaign plans. This may be the
greatest challenge to commanders in achieving unity of effort or even unity of purpose. Ideally,
a comprehensive approach will be adopted that will see a single campaign plan designed with
agencies sharing as required the various lines of operation to reach operational objectives and a
common end state.

207. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Many potential theatres of operation will involve a range of physical environments from
mountain, arid, jungle, littoral, urban, or a combination of two or more. Reflective of this
geography will be extremes in climate including seasonal extremes, such as a hot, dry season
followed by monsoon rain. Geographical and climatic extremes may also degrade the
performance of LF personnel and equipment, and result in additional hazards resulting from
unfamiliar health risks, including insect-borne diseases.

2. Failed or failing states in which land forces may operate will vary in the level of
development of their infrastructure. Some may suffer from a lack of modern infrastructure or
mature institutions with urban areas dominated by crowded slums. Rural areas will be remote
and isolated. Lines of communication may be limited and in generally poor condition. Others
may be highly industrialized and developed with extensive electrical, sewer and communication
grids, as well as high-rise and subterranean structures creating a complicated three-dimensional
battlespace.

3. The urbanization of many nations has increased the likelihood of tactical military
operations in urban areas where the military force may be surrounded by both friend and foe.
Although operations may occur in large urban areas, the geography should not be envisioned
as a single, monolithic entity. Each city, or “urban jungle,” may consist of a series of local areas
or neighbourhoods where citizens live, work, worship, and socialize. To plan effectively,
commanders and staff may have to delineate neighbourhoods, villages, and areas by their own
local power structures, dynamics, and issues.

4. Whether in urban or rural areas, land forces will likely operate in areas characterized as
close terrain where the maximum or even optimum range of direct fire weapons cannot be
exploited. As a result, the advantages of technology and superior training may be limited and
significantly reduced.

5. Operations in urban areas must be planned and conducted with close consideration for
collateral damage and unintended civilian casualties. While missions must always be planned
to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties, risks may have to be taken to avoid undesired
effects and to achieve long-term tactical, operational, or strategic success.

6. An area of operations (AO) for a formation or unit will likely be large, up to several
hundred kilometres, creating tactical and operational challenges in terms of time and space.
Depending on the campaign theme or type of operation or mission, planners will have to design
and employ a force that can effectively achieve its goals and objectives. While a small force
may be able to achieve success across a large AO during a peace support operations (PSO), a
counter-insurgency (COIN) operation in the same area may require a much larger force with
specific internal capabilities tailored to different sectors of that AO. Again, a keen understanding
of the environment is necessary.
208. THE LOCAL POPULACE

1. Whether conducting operations in urban or rural areas, land forces will deploy and operate amongst a nation or region’s population. The presence of civilians will be a key factor that will influence all aspects of the campaign.

2. Cultural training of land forces prior to and during a campaign will ensure an appreciation and understanding of the local population. Cultural appreciation and understanding will include many aspects of a specific culture such as ethnic heritage and religion. While cultural appreciation will identify a culture’s visible landmarks, cultural understanding is a more in depth knowledge of the power structures that are essential to develop operational or tactical level plans. In many cultures or societies, those who outwardly represent the group may hold little power, if any. Alternatively, they may hold some power over many, or a great deal of power over just a few. An understanding of such aspects is vital to ensure that the correct activities are undertaken to achieve desired effects. Cultural understanding may hold critical importance in situations in which the local populace is a key factor, or even the centre of gravity. It is vital that a comprehensive assessment of the demographic makeup of the AO be initiated from the outset of the IPB and be continually developed through a dynamic and continually revised collection plan. The success of most operations will ultimately depend upon the continued support of the civilian population.

3. Within a single region or AO there may be a number of distinct cultural groups with different power structures and perspectives on the military objectives and end state. Accordingly, plans must be developed and operations conducted across these often-conflicting groups. Information operations activities may be tailored for specific groups or regions. Ideally, know the power structures that may be exploited so that messages are delivered through a group’s leadership. This will help ensure the majority accepts the message.

4. In many campaigns, a population and its support for the campaign will be essential to enduring success and outcomes. Thus, the campaign, its objectives and the manner in which it is prosecuted must be seen as legitimate by the population.

5. The prominence of the civilian populace in operations and ultimate campaign success must be understood at all rank levels. Certain risks in force protection may have to be accepted in order to protect the civilian populace, and certain tactical successes may have to be delayed or sacrificed for the benefit of protecting, and keeping the support of, the local populace. Support to this population for long-term campaign success may outweigh the need to gain a short-term tactical success.

6. The civilian populace may also provide an invaluable source of information contributing to the intelligence picture at both the operational and tactical levels. Contact with the populace may provide indications of enemy strategic and operational aims, or highlight popular support for or against an adversary or friendly forces. At the lowest tactical level, the populace may provide patrols and field human intelligence (HUMINT) teams (FHTs) with valuable intelligence regarding the mood of the population, local concerns or dissension, enemy locations, intentions, and capabilities. Thus, apart from intelligence, the local populace may be a means of measuring effectiveness of activities and overall support for the campaign.

7. When facing an irregular adversary that is seeking support and shelter from that populace, land forces must establish and maintain contact with the civilian population. Gaining and retaining the support of the populace will be vital for friendly forces to achieve success.
Continuous assessment of plans and popular support will be required to identify the levels of success of operations, and prompt possible adjustments to the operational campaign plan and tactical plans. Contact with the local populace will likely be best achieved by dismounted troops and the establishment of bases, positions, or posts in proximity to, or amongst, concentrations of civilians.

8. In dealing with a local populace and their institutions, such as police and government, commanders and staff must guard against a tendency to practise moral relativism. Although it is vital to appreciate cultural differences and the unique mechanisms of some societies, campaigns must seek to stabilize and improve societies and to remove root causes of instability. For example, corrupt behaviour by the local constabulary cannot be chalked up to cultural eccentricity and ignored. Indeed, such conduct may be one of the underlying causes of instability and public discontent. In this instance, the raising of professional standards and expectations and the removal of the causes of corruption (e.g., low pay) would be a key part to any security sector reform (SSR) mission and would build to an overall increase in enduring stability.

CAMPAIGNING IN FOREIGN CULTURES

Our forces and strategic objectives may at times face a clash between Western and regional cultural values during deployed operations. There may be a number of cultural friction points: religious; governance; history; and the concept of time to name but four. In order to understand how to mitigate friction points and how to achieve our intended effects within the populace, we require cultural intelligence as part of the IPB process. Commanders will need to incorporate more thorough cultural assessments into their planning cycles, and their decision-making processes. The most important factor for operations amongst foreign cultures may be the comprehension of the prevalent religion’s central role in all aspects of the society, then accrediting this fact due respect and priority.

A critical component of assisting the governance of a failed or failing state will be a thorough understanding of the importance of its sectarian composition and then the identification and tactful empowerment of key native leadership in pursuit of operational objectives. Plans will have to incorporate not only the powerful sects of society but also accommodate minorities in order to assist in the development of a self-sustaining society. It will also be necessary to understand the domestic society’s difficulties in the move towards democracy and to support the conditions for the gradual establishment from within of their traditional civil society proposed by modernists and moderates. Comprehension of the importance of the historic roots of past conflicts on the collective social psyche of the region will assist the development of policies, including balanced use of force, that will aim to avoid further inflammation of old grievances.

A deployed commander who is ignorant of or minimizes the importance of the domestic culture will fortify his enemy, offend his allies, isolate his own forces, and jeopardize his public support. Only through improved cultural intelligence will an operational level commander and his tactical subordinates be able to prepare their forces, plan wisely and execute successful operations.

Source: Adopted from the abstract of the paper, “To Clash or Not to Clash: Canadian and Islamic Values on Canadian Forces’ Deployed Operations,” by Lieutenant-Colonel M.D. Makulowich, CD, prepared for the Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course 8.

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Relativism is the doctrine that knowledge, truth and morality exist in relation to culture, society or historical context, and are not absolute. *Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed, 2001*
SECTION 3
THE NATURE OF ADVERSARIES AND HAZARDS

209. ADVERSARIES

1. The potential adversaries that land forces may face in the operating environment may take a number of forms. They will act on both the physical and cognitive planes in order to fulfil their aims. They cannot be considered in isolation from the other elements of the operating environment. For example, an insurgent group will likely be linked to wide spread criminal activity and gain moral support from otherwise peaceable leaders in the society. In general, adversaries will classified as:

   a. **Conventional Adversary.** The conventional adversary will have a definitive structure and identifiable order of battle. It will likely be an extension of a political government and have a recognizable, institutional doctrine, known rules of engagement, and known intelligence assets. In other words, it will be a recognizable military force.

   b. **Irregular Adversary.** The irregular adversary will not likely be tied to a particular nation-state although it may have political aims. Understanding that it will suffer defeat within the battlespace from a conventional force, it will utilize asymmetric tactics that seek strategic effects and outcomes in pursuit of its political aim. Some irregular adversary’s may not seek outright defeat or victory, but simply wish to maintain an unstable environment for their own gain.

210. CONVENTIONAL ADVERSARY

1. Most of the military forces in the world continue to operate in conventional ways, which remain sufficient against other local and regional actors. Conventional forces will be identifiable with a particular recognized government and normally a nation state. They will have a standard order of battle and identifiable chain of command. They will likely adhere to some form of rules of engagement (not necessarily based upon the Geneva Conventions) and will have institutionalized doctrine.

2. Notwithstanding these commonalities, conventional forces will be tailored in terms of organization, resources, and doctrine to reflect their physical environments and the most serious threats to their political entity or government. This will vary with each nation state and region. Thus, while one nation with large open rural areas, sufficient national resources and comparable neighbours, may focus on the creation of heavy manoeuvre forces, another nation that has predominately close, mountainous terrain and an insurgent adversary, will focus on light forces and paramilitary police.

3. The physical capabilities of a conventional force, in terms of both people and equipment, will reflect the economic means of their government. Thus, in many parts of the world, conventional military forces will be based mainly on light forces. Conventional forces will be manoeuvre-based and likely trained to counter other manoeuvre forces.

4. Any assessment of a military force, particularly a conventional military force, will look at the component elements through which any military will generate its combat power: the physical component; the conceptual component; and, the moral component.
5. Despite a relative lack of conventional technology, many lower grade conventional forces maintain significant capabilities. They are generally experts in operating in their own environments and understanding the weaknesses that foreign forces will have in operating in that environment. Furthermore, although they may lack formal doctrine for information operations, low-level conventional forces are often very skilled in psychological and media operations.

6. Many conventional forces will rely in part at least on conscript soldiers, particularly if they have mobilized for an invasion or defensive campaign. Like most conscript soldiers, their skills and professionalism will likely be lacking, and unless they are suitably motivated and committed, they will make a suitable target for psychological operations that seek to undermine the moral cohesion of the force.

7. Despite the common characteristics of conventional forces, they may very well adapt asymmetric and irregular characteristics when faced with superior forces. This transition may see a change in tactics to more dispersed and networked operations. In an extreme case, the transition may see a change in strategies and the adoption of irregular techniques and aims to the point of becoming in insurgency, even one that resorts to terrorism to reach its political aims.

8. The possibility of such a transition demands that commanders carefully monitor the tactical and operational situation as they gain success over conventional enemy forces. Any overt defeat of conventional forces must be carefully and quickly managed so that there is a smooth and honourable transition from defeat to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and SSR. Note that DDR may not be necessary or immediately desirable. A great deal of instability may be caused if large numbers of conscripts and soldiers are sent away from military service without suitable resettlement, including employment.

9. A transition of a conventional force to an irregular force will require a change in tactics and operational objectives from a friendly force’s point of view. No longer will a manoeuvre force have to be defeated on the field of battle. Instead, a new battle over the implementation and support of a new authority, government, and social structure, may be required.

211. IRREGULAR ADVERSARY

1. The irregular adversary will not likely be linked, at least directly or overtly, to an identifiable nation state or legitimate government, although it may have a political wing. Hence, it may be a non-state element with varying goals and aims that may range from forming its own state to simply expelling foreign forces to gaining political concessions. Irregular adversaries may include the following:

   a. Insurgents seeking to force political change through the use of, or threat of, violence.
   b. Criminal elements and organisations that seek to create instability and exploit violence for their own gain.
   c. Private militias that seek regional dominance and control and reject any central or national authority.
   d. Sectarian elements that seek through violence and strife independence of some sort along religious, cultural, ethnic and/or tribal lines.
2. A number of irregular adversaries or potential adversaries may exist with a theatre of operations. They will not act independently, but will often come together to cooperate in order to further their own interests. It is common for criminal elements and insurgents to become affiliated.

3. An irregular adversary will be dynamic and random in the initiation and conduct of operations, and will develop doctrine and capabilities in a non-linear fashion. An irregular adversary will often blend with its surroundings for conceptual and tactical camouflage. Foremost will be its willingness to hide amongst the civilian population. It may fight without constraints or rules of engagement and will exploit its amorphous character for purposes of intelligence gathering and attacking. A foremost example of an irregular adversary is an insurgent force operating in primarily urban areas.

4. An irregular adversary will exploit asymmetric tactics to attack and morally defeat a physically superior force. The asymmetric approach is used to achieve success “by avoiding strengths, exploiting weaknesses and employing unexpected or unusual techniques.”16 In recent times, the emphasis, particularly by non-state or irregular adversaries, has been placed on an asymmetric approach as a means to offset the military capabilities of a stronger enemy, and to attack the will of the stronger force and that of its political supporters and population base.

5. This asymmetrical, irregular adversary operates on more than a single plane. On the physical plane, tactics will be adaptive and cunning. They will involve the innovative combination of advanced, commercially available technology with crude, simple and unsophisticated weapons and tactics. For example, it may consist of a homemade mortar, combined with a high-tech, remote firing device. They will conduct attacks against high value or soft targets such as combat service support (CSS) echelon forces. It will exploit what it considers to be moral or cultural weaknesses. It will take actions that given military rules of engagement, laws of war, or higher operational objectives, will be difficult to counter. For example, an asymmetric adversary will engage land forces from known safe areas (e.g., hospitals, schools, religious, or historic structures). It may utilize its own supporters as suicide bombers, or may intentionally target civilians in order to embarrass the security forces. Thus, an adversary employing an asymmetrical approach will have a distinct advantage over conventional forces.

6. On the cognitive plane, an irregular adversary will conduct a robust campaign to influence target audiences in the local, regional and international forums. Propaganda will be well developed and tailored for specific audiences in order to create desired cognitive effects. While locals may be threatened and coerced to support the adversary, the international media will be engaged to portray particular messages such as “victim-hood” at the hands of a foreign aggressor.

7. The desired objective of these activities, be they physical or cognitive, is not to defeat the physically superior conventional forces, but to break their will and determination, and that of their political and domestic populations.

16 Definition developed by the Army Terminology Board (later, the Army Terminology Panel) 22 January 2002.
8. As a result of asymmetric tactics, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets must be appropriately targeted to provide indications of asymmetric tactics, their warning signs, and their sources. Combat situations will present themselves in many different forms for the operational and tactical commanders. The onus must be on the ability to quickly adapt to the unexpected and to take actions that will support the long-term operational objectives and not simply short-term tactical success.

9. The adversary will observe and learn over time and alter its doctrine, particularly tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), to avoid or counter our advantages. Given the likelihood of our, or a coalition’s, technical and physical superiority, the adversary will avoid concentrating forces and thus making them susceptible to destruction. He will seek to concentrate only when and where there is a distinct advantage and in areas that reduce the effectiveness of our advantages, or limit our ability to exploit technological superiority. Such areas will include those with dense cover and with civilian infrastructure and populations.

10. It is likely that the adversary will take the form of mixed forces and may well alter over time. Irregular forces may appear in support of conventional forces early in the campaign. The various elements of the adversary may not be linked by any common effort or single purpose. They may utilize different tactics and seek different long-term aims, but at least in the face of a common enemy (i.e., our forces), they will work together to a certain extent. Moreover, even though their long-term goals may be different, some of the irregular threats will assume international linkages and will appeal to other irregular threats for short-term support.

11. As conventional forces are defeated or come to be frustrated in their operations, the adversary may shift to a more asymmetrical model and will combine with irregular forces and methods already present. Thus, there may be a period of blending of conventional and non-conventional elements within the adversary force. Included in this mix may be an element of foreign fighters motivated by a variety of reasons. Our forces will have to be prepared to counter a combination of conventional and irregular threats.

12. If irregular forces begin to see major success in combat directly against conventional forces, and if their physical resources develop, they may adopt conventional tactics of manoeuvre. This process may be expedited by the intervention, either overtly or covertly, of a foreign power.

13. Irregular adversaries will routinely be linked to other non-military or irregular activities. They will likely be closely linked to or directly involved in crime. This will provide a source of funding and another means of unhinging social stability. This criminal activity may include kidnappings as a source of potential income, or as a means of instilling fear and undermining the resolve of other forces and their support base.

14. Furthermore, irregular forces may seek and obtain support externally from the region in question. They may have sources of intelligence, moral and financial support from other nations, including those providing troops to the friendly force coalition effort.

15. The appearance of an irregular, asymmetric adversary, either on their own or in combination with conventional tactics, will pose serious challenges to commanders.
THE NATURE OF IRREGULAR THREAT

The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Arab Proverb

The irregular threats facing the CF today are unlikely to be state-based, that is, the adversary is unlikely to be an official representative or branch of a government. Given this fact, and keeping in mind that any type of insurgency or terrorist campaign requires substantial fiscal resources to facilitate training, operations, arms, and munitions, it is not uncommon for various groups to form temporary ad hoc alliances. These alliances may be between groups with little obvious common interest. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was known to form temporary alliances with such divergent groups as the Red Army Faction (Bader-Meinhof gang) in Germany, the Libyan government of Moammar Khadafi, Irish-Americans, and various drug cartels in South and Central America. These ties provided funds, arms, safe houses, and money laundering that financed its 30-year campaign against Britain and Irish Loyalists.

Although the PIRA officially followed a socialist-communist ideology the reality was that it would create ties with any group that could help facilitate its military and political campaign. This is not a new development for these types of alliances are common throughout history. A current example is the cooperation between the Hizb-I Islami (HIG), Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and al Qaeda with narcotics producers and traffickers in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Sources:

212. HAZARDS

1. Hazards are passive risks or dangers, that is, threats that exist in the environment. Environmental hazards are defined as: “a source of danger existing within physical surroundings and having the potential to negatively affect personnel, materiel, facilities or information.” They exist within the physical surroundings and have the potential to negatively affect personnel, material, facilities, information, and activities. Environmental hazards are largely dependent upon an element of chance and generally affect equally all parties present within the AO. Environmental hazards include dangers arising from geography, weather, disease, flora and fauna, toxic industrial materials, and unexploded ordnance and mines.

2. Many nations to which forces will deploy are characterized by a wide variety of hazards. These will include extremes in climate, indigenous diseases, and terrain to name only some. Terrain will include urban areas that are poorly maintained, and have such threats as open sewers and dangerous driving conditions. Many developing nations will have poor or non-existent industrial and environmental standards, and a pervasive hazard may exist from industrial toxic leakage.

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17 Definition developed by Army Terminology Panel.
3. Pre-deployment training and preparations must attempt to lessen the threat posed by these hazards. Assessments will occur prior to deployment and must occur again following initial deployment and any subsequent change to an AO.

213. A JOINT, INTER-AGENCY, MULTINATIONAL AND PUBLIC (JIMP) FRAMEWORK

1. Within a specific theatre of operations, land forces will likely operate with and amongst many different agencies with varying, even competing, interests. Given their scale, most campaigns and major operations will be joint and likely conducted in a multinational coalition. Most importantly, the complexity of the operating environment, the desire to achieve enduring outcomes that solve root causes of crises, and national political and strategic objectives, demand that a range of national instruments of power be applied.

2. This is a collaborative endeavour that seeks to harmonize various elements of power—diplomacy, defence, development and commerce—to meet desired, enduring end states. Much of the work required in a successful campaign will require the involvement of a range of agencies, such as local governments, other security forces, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In many cases, it is only non-military agencies that can create enduring solutions to grievances that led to the crisis. Together, this combination of joint, coalition, multi-governmental, and non-governmental agencies constitutes a comprehensive approach that involves the holistic consideration of, and coordination with, all these elements and agencies to reach enduring solutions in a campaign.¹⁸

3. This incorporation is realized in a framework termed joint, inter-agency, multinational, and public (JIMP). This is defined as follows: “Refers to a framework of joint, interagency and multinational partners, in a public environment, who cooperate at all levels of command to achieve shared objectives.” ¹⁹

4. A reasonable expectation of cooperation and a unity of purpose towards the desired end state differentiates the JIMP framework from other actors and elements within the theatre of operations. Additionally, it must be remembered that the campaign will be conducted in the public domain under the scrutiny of local, domestic, and international media and audiences.

5. The constituent elements of the JIMP framework include the following:

   a. Joint. Joint is defined as an adjective that denotes activities, operations and organizations in which more than one service of the same nation participates. The LF will work in close cooperation with air, maritime, and SOF. Integration of joint capabilities may be pushed down to the tactical level.

¹⁸ The other two parts of a comprehensive approach include a commander’s unifying theme, which should tie together the efforts of all the elements in the JIMP framework to craft the visualization and intent, and a holistic consideration of the effects that military activities will have on the broad range of systems, actors and influences in a theatre: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII).

b. **Inter-agency.** Inter-agency is a broad generic term that describes the collective elements or activities of the CF working in conjunction with other agencies, both governmental and non-governmental. These other agencies may include: host nation government departments including security forces; other government departments (OGDs) and agencies from supporting nations; international organisations (IOs) and governmental bodies, such as United Nations (UN) agencies; NGOs; private volunteer organizations (PVOs); and private business ventures including private security agencies. Many campaign situations and conflicts involve complex root causes that the military will have difficulty addressing to achieve enduring, stable end states. Thus, a military force must work in concert with inter-agency organizations within a theatre of operations, and strive to achieve common operational objectives and a shared end state. This is a **comprehensive approach** and its inherent unity of effort and unity of purpose will facilitate mission success by addressing, in a holistic fashion, the root causes of violence and instability in an operating environment. The following issues should be considered during planning and execution of operations within this JIMP framework:

1. The inter-agency aspect of the JIMP framework incorporates as part of the construct all the elements of power that may be applied in a campaign design to reach enduring end states. The application of these elements of power together in a campaign may be referred to as a **whole of government approach: diplomacy, defence, development, and commerce.**

2. The inter-agency aspect includes not only the OGDs (whole of government), but all other agencies, be they OGDs, IOs, NGOs, etc., in what may be termed a **comprehensive approach** to campaign planning and execution. This will allow the prosecution of campaign lines of operation that address all facets of a society and its crisis and help create enduring solutions.

3. Political advisors (POLADs) and other specialists must be available to advise commanders on specific non-military facets of the environment (economic, social, etc.). As such, these advisors should play a key role in the planning, execution, and assessment of missions. Their direct advice to commanders and staff will ensure that military activities are designed, planned, and executed to achieve the desired effects, objectives and the overarching political end state. Such advisors also provide insight to the political nature and machinations of the theatre or region and power structures in question. They may also assist in gaining cooperation from other agencies not formally tasked to work with the military.

4. The efforts of all agencies, military and non-military, will have to be coordinated so that at the very least a unity of purpose, and ideally, effort is gained to meet the desired end state.

5. While military commanders may not be the designated lead in a multi-agency or JIMP framework, it is essential that they assist greatly in achieving inter-agency coordination and cooperation. Positive personal relationships between military commanders and non-military agencies will improve cooperation and reinforce unity of effort and purpose. This may
be difficult given a lack of information or pre-dispositions on the part of some non-military agencies. In order to foster cooperation, the personality of the commander will play an important role. Commanders must avoid stereotypes and be seen to be acute in analysis, cooperative in nature, and generous in understanding.

During the outset of a campaign, when the security situation is yet to be stabilized, the military must be prepared to assume many of the responsibilities that would best be undertaken by OGDs or elements. Ideally, as the security situation improves, the military will be able to pass such responsibilities to other agencies and departments better suited to their long-term execution.

c. **Multinational.** Multinational refers to military activities, organizations or operations in which the CF participates with one or more allies or coalition partners. Our forces will most often operate as part of a multinational coalition at the operational or even tactical levels. Commanders, particularly those in multinational command positions, must carefully consider the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations (both technical and political) of each contributing nation. At the tactical level, close coordination with the forces of other nations will be a common occurrence. Operations will have to be preceded with well-coordinated battle procedure to ensure common operating methods, effective command, and the avoidance of fratricide.

d. The public aspect of the JIMP framework reflects the fact that all campaigns will occur in the public eye and forum: locally; regionally; internationally; and, domestically (the latter referring to the home nations of contributing nations). It also reflects the concept that campaign success may very well depend upon the active support of the indigenous population, and likely those domestic populations of coalition members. Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of a campaign and the manner in which it is conducted must be established and maintained in the eyes of public audiences. All operational plans and activities must be considered and war-gamed from this viewpoint, with due consideration as to how activities and effects will be viewed by each of those public audiences through their respective cultural filters and biases. This should be a factor in any operational planning process (OPP) and estimate process. Failure to establish and maintain campaign legitimacy may very well lead to campaign failure, certainly in a campaign in which public support is key.\(^\text{20}\)

6. The requirement and desire to coordinate activities and objectives within the JIMP framework will have to be carefully considered and planned, and a great deal of effort and work will be required to ensure that efforts are complementary and coordinated. Further, the responsibilities of a military force with respect to the security and control of other agencies will have to be considered and factored into planning. The legal and moral aspects of providing protection and security to other agencies, and the relationship and laws governing private security firms operating in a theatre of operations, will have to be considered fully.

\(^\text{20}\) For a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, the support of the populace is viewed as a key strategic centre of gravity.
SECTION 4
THE NATURE OF LAND COMBAT

214. ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS

1. General. Even in its most straightforward form, land combat is a complex and dynamic undertaking. It is characterized by friction, uncertainty, ceaseless change, and violence. Furthermore, it is a fundamentally human endeavour and is affected by a seemingly innumerable number of factors and variables. The situation is worsened by the introduction of irregular forces, civilian populations, and foreign cultures. The influence of these factors can be understood and reduced, but only to a certain extent.

2. Uncertainty and Chaos. Although intelligence and analysis can reduce some uncertainty, commanders will still have to make decisions based upon incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory information, and deal with the perpetual “fog of war.” Risk may be reduced as information on the adversary and other factors is increased, but risk will still exist due to chance. Chance, or luck, can lead to chaos, which can be good or bad depending upon the commander’s reaction. Flexibility in command, a pervasive understanding of the commander’s intent, and confidence in subordinates, will allow opportunities to be exploited to meet the desired end state. Likewise, timely and effective decision-making, initiative, and freedom of action are the keys to exploiting opportunities and uncertainty. The use of simple, flexible plans and the anticipation of contingencies will help overcome uncertainty and take advantage of chaos. Furthermore, given that not all results or effects of activities can be forecasted, plans must be ready to mitigate undesired effects and outcomes.
The US-led [Provincial Reconstruction Team] PRT in Zabul province is emblematic of both the positive and negative commentary with regard to the PRT concept and highlights some of the difficulties and friction facing operational commanders in the field working within the JIMP framework. Formerly a Taliban stronghold, insurgent activity in Zabul province has now waned to the point where representatives of the central government can travel in relative security. The primary reason for this is the successful PRT operations that have met the immediate needs of the local residents. The US-led PRT, enabled by flexible funding regulations, has been able to improve the lives of local residents through the construction of schools, roads, wells, trade skills workshops, and other projects. This has increased support for both the coalition and central government. The fact that the US PRT commander controls both the military force and a significant amount of money is said to suit Afghan culture, where power is respected; a person possessing both coercive and economic power will command greater respect than a person who has to defer to higher authority for permission to act. A crucial component of COIN activities in the region, the Zabul PRT credits much of its success to being able to satisfy needs rapidly, meaning that promises to improve lives were kept and by creating infrastructure (primarily roads and bridges) that enabled more efficient coalition military operations in the province.

Critics, however, have pointed out that the US model of PRT lacks an appreciation of long-term end-state goals, and that the majority of projects only seek to increase immediate local support for the coalition without consulting other elements of the JIMP framework such as civilian governmental agencies, NGOs, or even the central Afghan government. For example, buildings constructed may not meet building codes, the military commander may not possess important planning skills, and support for various local strongmen may have unforeseen undesirable long-term repercussions. The more appropriate alternative, these critics contend, is for a slower, more considered development plan that incorporates greater non-military participation, such as that envisioned within the Canadian/UK PRT model that works within the JIMP framework, to produce projects in synch with Coalition, Canadian, and Afghan government end-state goals.

What is the military commander to take from this? What is the best model for PRT operations? A military-centric approach, as illustrated, will likely focus on short-term goals; the Canadian approach firmly entrenched within the JIMP framework is slower but likely harmonizes projects with long-term end-state goals more effectively. In the end, the best method of operating will depend on the tactical environment: in areas where insurgent activity is frequent and effective a military-centric PRT approach may be necessary to undermine support or indifference to insurgent activity to achieve sufficient security for development to take place. In more docile environments the Canadian approach is more effective, conditional on a streamlined bureaucratic process that enables projects to be undertaken and completed in a timely manner. Ultimately, the robust surge capacity of the military will always be greater than that of civilian agencies, guaranteeing that the military will play a central and probably leading role in PRT efforts. The key problem the military commander must solve is discerning when tactical exigencies demand action on projects crucial to winning over a population and when the slower JIMP framework method geared toward unified efforts at achieving end-state goals is most appropriate.

Sources:
3. **Violence and Danger.** Violence has been a pervasive and constant characteristic of conflict. It results in destruction and human suffering, shock, surprise, and fear. Courage is the strength to overcome fear and this courage will come from not only individual or internal sources, but from external sources: a shared belief in a cause; moral cohesion of a group that can only be truly fostered in long-standing, intimate, shared identities; and strong leadership. Soldiers must be mentally robust to deal with the violence and fear.

4. **Friction.** Friction opposes all action. It will make the simple seem difficult and the difficult seem impossible. Friction may be mental, such as indecision over what to do next. Alternatively, it may be physical, such as the effects of intense enemy fire, difficult terrain or bad weather. It may be induced by a poor plan, misunderstanding between allies, or a clash of personalities between commanders, or more likely, between commanders or heads of different agencies. Determination is a primary means of overcoming friction, and experience is another. High morale, sound organization, effective command systems, and well-practised drills all help a force to overcome friction.

5. **Human Stress.** The presence of violence and its affect on the individual remains a constant. The effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness, and boredom, interspersed with intense activity and privation, affect the willpower of all combatants. Therefore, the determination of commanders and soldiers to fulfil their mission despite these circumstances is the mainstay of a land force’s fighting effectiveness. Strong discipline, moral cohesion of standing units, and the support of peers and commanders who have undergone similar experiences and who know one another with a certain amount of intimacy, all help individuals overcome the stress of battle.

215. **COMPLEXITY**

1. The complexity of land combat stems from the large number of soldiers and weapons platforms involved, and their interaction with the enemy, terrain, and each other. Land combat is fundamentally different from naval and air combat, and the command and organization of land forces are critically different from those in the other environments. Complexity in the land battle stems in great part from the other actors involved, the enemy, other agencies, or a population. The focus of land force capability development is on the human dimension, vice platforms and equipment. The moral component of a land force’s combat power is vital to success (see Chapter 3).

2. The allocation of unique battlespace tasks amongst soldiers has been the initial source of complexity in combat. The complexity has been increased with combined arms, joint operations and the combined work with other agencies to meet the strategic and operational outcomes. The presence of civilian populations, global media, and political influences has only added to the complexity of the battlespace, even at the tactical levels. Added to this, in many campaigns, is the complexity of social systems present in the battlespace and the complexities and root causes of the conflict at hand.

3. To achieve desired end states, commanders have the responsibility to think beyond the singular application of their resources against an identifiable enemy, and strive to understand, to the greatest extent possible, the interaction of the multiple factors in the complex battlespace.
216. UNPREDICTABILITY

1. Due to the enduring characteristics and complexity of the battlespace, a certain measure of unpredictability will exist for all commanders at all levels. Unpredictability can be reduced and its effects can be mitigated through practice of the following guidelines:

   a. **Abide by Principles, not Prescription.** In land operations, there should be no prescription, except for the most basic drills and procedures. Doctrine for land combat is framed as guidance and principles aimed at gaining an understanding, and not issued as dogmatic direction and rules.

   b. **Understand and Overcome Complexity.** Commanders should seek success in a complex and seemingly chaotic environment in which activities do not lead to intended effects with any absolute certainty. This factor affects both the nature and art of land command and the business of soldiering. Complexity can be reduced by adopting simple plans that concentrate on the essentials and that move from one incremental objective or decisive point to another. It can also be reduced through the establishment of a broad knowledge base analyzing all systems influencing an environment and through continuous assessment of activities and their effects.

   c. **Take Calculated Risks.** Since friction and risk are inherent in land combat, calculated risks should be taken once factors have been carefully weighed. Risk can be reduced and should be managed. Although its consequences can sometimes be predicted and accommodated, it can never be entirely avoided. Strategic level commanders must understand this fact, and consequently, allow their subordinate commanders at the operational and tactical level freedom of action to accomplish their mission. Moral courage thus becomes a key factor in calculated risks: the strategic and operational commanders must have the courage to allow their subordinates freedom of decision and action; additionally, commanders themselves must have the moral courage to take those calculated risks, or to reject unsound plans that incorporate too much risk in light of the potential benefits. If subordinate commanders cannot be trusted to assess and balance risks within the purview of their executive authorities, then consideration should be taken for their replacement. Risk applies to not only issues of force protection, but to operational objectives and mission success as well.

   d. **Act Pragmatically.** The unpredictability of combat suggests that some courses of action should work, but at times simply will not. Pragmatism, a function of experience and good sense, is required to achieve practical results in complex and unpredictable environments.
ANNEX A OF CHAPTER 2
THE IRREGULAR ADVERSARY

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

2A01. GENERAL

1. Irregular adversaries will differ from conventional adversaries in that they will be much harder to identify, template, and predict. In most cases, they will be non-state elements with a number of varying aims that will range from forming their own state to simply expelling foreign forces. They will have no fixed doctrine and will be highly adaptable. Although the qualities, strategies, and tactics described below may well apply in some measure to conventional adversaries, they are generally more pronounced in irregular adversaries. Irregular adversaries may assume many forms with a wide range of aims. In general, they may be classified as follows:

   a. Insurgents seeking to force political change through the use of, or threat of, violence.

   b. Criminal elements and organisations that seek to create instability and exploit violence for their own gain.

   c. Private militias that seek regional dominance and control and reject any central or national authority.

   d. Sectarian elements that seek through violence and strife independence of some sort along religious, cultural, ethnic and/or tribal lines.

2. It is in the nature of irregular forces that they will often come together with other irregular elements to cooperate for their own gain. Thus, insurgents will deal with criminal elements to gain weapons, while criminals will use insurgents to maintain an environment of disorder and to divert police resources.

2A02. QUALITIES OF IRREGULAR ADVERSARIES

1. Although an irregular adversary may reflect a specific national, religious or ideological grouping, certain qualities typify most irregular threats and transcend such delineations. These qualities can broadly be defined as follows:

   a. **Sense of Moral Superiority.** The irregular adversary will often feel that they are fighting for a justifiable cause and will go to extremes to present our forces in a dark light. In terms of winning the support of a local populace, the adversary forces may commit public atrocities, hoping to gain an overreaction from our forces. Our information operations should be aimed at countering any such public image or claim of moral superiority.
b. **Use of Initiative based upon a Common Understanding of the Objective.** The adversary will likely operate in small, semi-autonomous cells and will depend upon initiative at the lower level to attack our forces when they are found to be vulnerable, or at time that will cause the greatest embarrassment. Elements of the adversary force with differing objectives may come together temporarily to attack our forces, seen as a common adversary. This is, however, a double-edged sword as the use of semi-autonomous cells with a weak central authority would mean that some cells would conduct operations that could possibly harm or undermine their overall cause. For instance, a cell of a particular movement may choose to conduct an operation that fails and embarrasses the movement or succeeds, but is so outrageous that it undermines public or international sympathy for their cause.

c. **Highly Mobile and Agile with a Strong Knowledge of the Battlespace.** The adversary force will likely be light and mobile and exploit this to attack our forces. They will have a detailed knowledge of the environment, as in many cases the adversary will have come from the local area, or will have operated there for an extended period of time. Not only will they know the terrain, but they will also know the populace, their leaders, and their collective desires and grievances.

d. **Robust and Committed to the Cause.** They will, in part through their sense of moral superiority, see their cause worth personal and collective sacrifice. Tactical losses will be accepted for strategic gain. They will understand that they will be unlikely to confront our forces fielding conventional battle and will attack in small groups at our weak or vulnerable points. They will be willing to accept losses in order to inflict damage upon or embarrassment our forces. They will continually recruit new members to their ranks, particularly from areas that have been affected by the presence of our or other military forces (such as areas seen to be under military occupation). They may resort to terrorist tactics and will not be restricted to any set of rules of engagement.

e. **Flexible and Adaptive with Good Situational Awareness of our Activity.** The adversary force will be quick to identify and adopt new tactics and procedures, particularly as they watch and learn from our forces. They will likely be able to blend in with the local populace to conduct surveillance against our forces. It must be assumed then that whenever our forces are operating amongst a civilian populace they are under surveillance and that their activities are being reported.

f. **Skilled in the Conduct of Small-scale Operations.** They will quickly hone their skills at the small unit level where they will attempt to achieve tactical and operational successes, which will ideally have strategic results. The adversary will quickly come to identify our vulnerable points for attack and will master their ability to attack and quickly withdrawal. Their personal skill in terms of field craft and weapons handling may be poor, but collectively they will quickly develop good low-level tactics for attack. Anti-armour gunners will become proficient in attacking fighting vehicles.
2A03. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

1. The irregular adversary sees a direct and ideally immediate link between his tactical activities and strategic effects. In many cases, there will be little possibility of the adversary gaining an outright military victory. Instead, he will attempt to wear down his opponent so that the latter is defeated in a piecemeal fashion, or the opponent's will is undermined to the point that the opponent withdraws from the campaign.

2. The irregular adversary is expected to act offensively, attempt to unbalance our forces and seize the initiative, and set the tempo by attacking at times and places of their choosing against targets that are soft and represent a high pay-off. This could range from causing embarrassment (e.g., significant casualties), to gaining material advantage (e.g., seizure of arms and equipment by attacking police or other government facilities), through to denying critical infrastructure (e.g., sabotage to power facilities, ports, pipelines etc.). They will attempt to leverage the advantage of surprise using their knowledge of the area, mobility, intelligence sources, low-level initiative, and decisive leadership. In an area where they have significant support from the local population, adversary forces may have a high degree of situational awareness of coalition activity, movement, routines, and vulnerabilities.

3. The adversary is likely to take the approach that not losing at the strategic level is more important than sacrificing resources at the tactical level. They will attempt to counter our advantages with sufficient means and technology (both military and commercial) to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses and to make the campaign too costly. In short, they will shift focus from concentrating on our forces to concentrating on our will, particularly at the strategic and national levels. The irregular adversary in many campaigns does not have to win at the tactical or operational levels, but only outlast the will of his opponent at the strategic level. This is a particular aim when the irregular adversary is fighting a force from another nation or fighting a coalition. See Figure 2A-1.
4. At an operational level, the irregular adversary will:

a. Conduct entry denial operations or at least harass our forces as they gain a foothold at an airhead or beachhead. If in-place forces are attempting to expand their control into new areas of a theatre, adversary forces may attempt to repel or dissuade them. This will obviously be done on the physical plane, but on the cognitive plane as well, as the adversary attempts to prevent the forces from gaining support amongst a local populace.

b. Seek to create sanctuaries in difficult, close (e.g. urban) or remote terrain. They will attempt to create temporary operating bases and support bases amongst sympathetic civilian populations.

c. Conduct information operations in order to influence target audiences. Mistakes or overreactions by our forces will be exploited to place our forces in a poor light and undermine our legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace and in the eyes of other nations. Activities will be undertaken to directly attack moral, local, and international support for the campaign.

d. Seek to control the tempo of operations. This will be made easier for them if our forces maintain purely defensive postures in which the adversary will be able to operate at time and locations of his choosing.

e. Focus on asymmetric attacks in areas where our forces concentrate, particularly in support areas, in order to maximize their tactical success and strategic profile, and to cause our forces significant loss and thereby consume more resources.
protecting vulnerable areas. In short, they will seek to make the campaign as expensive and costly for our forces as possible. Furthermore, the adversary will target local populations to demonstrate their freedom of action and our inability to protect the populations. This will be done to undermine authority and legitimacy.

f. Take actions, such as public atrocities, in the hopes of causing our forces to take irrational action, harsh punitive measures, or simply overreact. In turn, this would cost our forces public support from the local populace.

g. Attempt to neutralize the technical superiority of our forces. They will exploit close terrain, particularly urban areas, in order to hide or mask their movement and operations. They will blend with populations and use them to shield them, knowing that our forces will strive to avoid civilian casualties. They will avoid massing their own forces or any other action that will create a target signature. Our attempt to exploit technology in such situations (often done to limit risk from committing soldiers) will often result in tactical failure and cause needless strategic intervention.

h. Attempt to conduct activities designed to manipulate national will. They will comprehend that they will not match our forces on an open field of battle, and therefore, attempt to undermine our will. In simple terms, adversary forces will try to convince our forces at the strategic level that the cost of continued operations is too great to continue.

2A04. IRREGULAR ADVERSARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1. The irregular adversary’s requirements can be broken down into human and material. Support for the adversary from portions of the local population will be the key to meeting most of these requirements, as this support is not only real and material, but intangible, that is, moral and intellectual. For those support requirements that cannot be met locally or in the immediate area, the adversary will seek it externally from other states or non-state actors. In most cases, the adversary will exploit local sources to gain recruits, supplies, shelter, intelligence, and funding. In general terms, these requirements are as follows:

a. **Recruitment.** To achieve success, the adversary will require a sufficient supply of able, motivated fighters. Recruitment of these individuals will be a constant concern for the adversary. An internal network and outside parties will be required to ensure that these needs are met. For individuals with particular special skills (e.g., demolitions, computer hacking, weapons training, etc.), external sources may become especially important.

b. **Information Operations.** The adversary will exploit media and other sources to undermine the legitimacy of our forces, its mission and methods, regardless of how reasonable and justified. Early in the campaign, these measures will likely be rather simplistic. However, as time goes on and the adversary forces develop or recruit information operation skills, the messages and means will become more sophisticated. Such operations will require both technical and intellectual support. A system will be required to develop and promote the adversary’s message through various media, including internal and foreign media and the Internet.
c. **Intelligence.** To be effective, it is essential for the adversary to understand the nature, objectives, and capabilities of its opponents. This understanding includes the size and composition of friendly forces, the strengths and weaknesses of our leadership and strategy, and the level of the population’s support for both the adversary and friendly forces. Often the adversary will have better information on local conditions and local sympathies than any outside forces. In any clandestine movement, members are also part-time intelligence agents, operating amongst the population, gathering information, and conveying it to higher authorities. The adversary will typically be able to draw from a large network of informants and local sympathizers who can provide him with useful information. In some situations, local officials including members of the local security forces will be sources of intelligence for the adversary. The motivation to supply information may simply stem from threats, or a financial need to feed family members. Hence, our forces and staff must be cautious in sharing operational information with local security forces.

d. **Organizational Aid.** Key members will be required by the adversary to assist with their organization. This need may be met by the recruitment of former professional soldiers or the import of experts from other similar adversary organizations from other countries. There may be a requirement for one adversary organization to form a brief coalition with other adversary forces in order to bring unity of effort to bear against the common opponent, that is, our forces.

e. **Safe Haven.** Safe havens are critical to any irregular type of adversary. They allow for rest and recuperation between operations and act as a staging area for future activity. If these safe havens are of sufficient size, they may also act as a source of recruitment and mobilization, and may be a site of individual and collective training. On the other hand, a safe haven may be a single house in an urban area that they have occupied either with the support of the occupants, or by force. Safe havens allow the adversary to gain or retain the initiative by allowing him to set the tempo of operations and choose the time and place of striking.

f. **Financial Support.** Money has a powerful affect on insurgent manoeuvre and capabilities. It can be used to buy weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, buy information, provide a social network that builds a popular base with support and influence, or otherwise fulfil a myriad of purposes. The adversary will often be able to acquire some of what they need via theft or from local supporters. The imposition of “revolutionary taxes” and the profit through illegal activities are also ways for the adversary to generate financial means. The latter source reinforces the potential linkage between the irregular adversaries and criminal elements within the environment.

g. **Direct Military Support.** Direct military assistance to an irregular adversary (e.g., a state player aiding an insurgent force in another country) has a tremendous impact on the fighting. This direct support may come from external military forces or from non-state organizations. It may take the form of material support, additional troops and advisors, or trainers. In most cases, this assistance can fundamentally change the nature of the conflict. With this assistance, the adversary is far more likely to be able to conduct large and
coordinated conventional operations, enabling them to occupy territory, 
overmatch and out-manoeuvre rival forces, and otherwise conduct operations 
that would be beyond their capabilities without the external support. In addition, 
training is often required in the case of more specialized techniques, such as 
terrorist tradecraft, small-unit tactics, and the use of more sophisticated 
weapons, such as man-portable air defence systems and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs).

h. **Arms.** The adversary will use weapons captured from the army, bought on the 
black market, or obtained through sophisticated bartering. They are also usually 
able to acquire some of what they need through theft, raids on police, 
paramilitary, and army outposts, from corrupt members of the security forces or 
sympathizers within their ranks, or from adversaries who simply leave their 
weapons behind after an attack.

### 2A05. ADVERSARY BATTLESPACE ORGANIZATION

1. **Adversary Battlespace Organization.** Commanders must be able to visualize, 
physically and intellectually, the adversary component of their battlespace. As a general 
conceptual model, the irregular adversary’s battlespace organization can be understood as 
having a support zone, a disruption zone, and a battle zone within the environment. See 
Figure 2A-2.

2. **Support Zone.** The adversary can be expected to work from a support zone. Within 
these areas he will establish his command and control centres, medical stations, and logistic 
centres. These are the sanctuaries or safe havens from which he can be expected to conduct 
est and prepare for future operations. Additionally, these areas serve as a location to conduct 
recruitment, train, disseminate propaganda, and communicate with the outside world. The 
successful establishment of support zones allows the adversary to dictate the pace of 
operations, prevent friendly forces from following-up tactical victories, and otherwise help 
adversary forces retain their initiative. Unlike conventional bases or defensive positions, the 
adversary will abandon the area if compromised or if it has fulfilled its purpose for a particular 
mission or task. Support zones may be remote areas well separated from the areas in which 
the adversary conducts operations. They may be in another nation. On the other hand, they 
may be located in dense population centres, in which the adversary will seek shelter and 
security in their own numbers, or in a civilian populace, thus creating difficulty for our forces to 
dislodge them. These populations in which the adversary seeks shelter may be culturally linked 
to the adversary, or may be sympathetic to them for historic, political, or simply tribal reasons, or 
may otherwise be intimidated by the adversary. The adversary may also seek shelter in areas 
that are culturally sensitive, or in areas that will ensure massive collateral damage should our 
forces attempt to dislodge them. In trying to separate an irregular adversary from a population, 
it becomes important to intellectually and morally separate the adversary and undermine his 
local support base, and thus begin to physically separate him from his support. This becomes a 
major focus for the information operations campaign and its influence activities.

3. **Battle Zone.** The adversary will conduct his major operations against friendly forces 
within a battle zone that will be close to, or at least accessibility to, its support zone. The battle 
zone will most likely be in a complex environment, including close terrain, where the adversary 
is able to negate many of technical and stand-off advantages and where he has sufficient local 
support to conduct operations with a good degree assistance, either active or passive, from the 
local population.
4. **Disruption Zone.** Beyond the battle zone, the adversary can be expected to conduct reduced operations in a disruption zone. These operations will be planned to interfere with the friendly forces’ abilities to sustain operations, conduct reconnaissance (recce) and intelligence collection, and to establish a secure environment throughout their area of operations (AO).

![Irregular Adversary Battlespace Organization](image)

**Figure 2A-2: Irregular Adversary Battlespace Organization**

**2A06. ADVERSARY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES**

1. At the tactical level, irregular adversary forces will likely be far more flexible, adaptive and unpredictable in their approach than their conventional counterparts. They will use an asymmetric approach on both the physical and psychological planes; hence, they will attack physical weaknesses such as lines of communications, they will attack what they consider moral weaknesses through their disregard for the law of armed conflict, and they will undermine campaign legitimacy through an aggressive information operations plan. For example, they will stage attacks from sensitive sites, use civilians to mask their operations and shield themselves, and then distribute propaganda to the international media regarding disproportionate responses and collateral damage, often falsified.

2. It must be assumed that the adversary is highly dedicated and willing, at an individual level, to sacrifice themselves for their cause. Generally, they will operate in small cells that number from four to twenty individuals armed with a variety of weapons. In particular, urban cells can be expected to work in sub-groups of approximately four or five, but will concentrate at times to be platoon-sized groups for specific operations.

3. One leader for larger scale operations could control several of these small groups. The adversary will use a swarm or swamp technique by attacking one objective from different directions with a number of small groups.
4. Sub-groups will be expected to show initiative and work independently based upon a commonly understood intent and established objectives. This ensures a high tempo and volume of operations that is intended to wear down the opponent and undermine his will and cohesion at all levels of command.

5. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) use various forms of explosives, including discarded artillery munitions and the like. These will be used to target friendly forces and government forces. The adversary forces will use IEDs in varying size, functioning methods, containers and delivery means, and will draw on military and commercial sources for component parts. The effects of these devices may be delivered in two ways: they may be emplaced and subsequently detonated by timers, triggers or remotely; or they may directly delivered and detonated by an individual on scene. The adversary will primarily aim attacks by IED at soft targets and at convoys in particular. However, they may also be used to initiate ambushes against patrols or other friendly forces. The emplacement of devices will often be done under cover of darkness and it should be assumed that in many cases they are covered by observation and are likely command detonated. The recording and dissemination of images of successful attacks that demonstrate our vulnerability are a part of the adversary’s information operations. If combined with blood-borne pathogens or radioactive material, these attacks have an ability to create follow-on effects and a hazardous material problem for our forces and the local populace.

6. Adversary force tactics will generally be limited to high volume engagements with small arms, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars, followed by immediate attempts to break contact. The offensive action of irregular forces will generally consist of driving commercial vehicles, pick-up trucks, or automobiles to a drop-off point, disembarking the attack force, engaging friendly forces, and breaking contact. They may use IEDs along the side of routes and patrol routes. The adversary forces may combine IED attacks with an ambush. The fact that such tactics will likely kill civilian bystanders will not usually deter the adversary forces, and if civilian casualties do result, the adversary force’s information operations will lay the blame upon our forces.

7. Deception and luring actions meant to draw friendly forces into killing zones must be kept in mind. For example, an IED may be followed by a second IED or ambush once ambulances and other forces arrive on the scene.

8. Some irregular adversaries will resort to the use of suicide bombers. This tactic normally involves the bomber personally carrying or transporting the bomb into the target area and personally initiating it, thus losing his life in the process. These operations range in organizational sophistication and may be applied against vulnerable targets or against combat forces. They may consist of a single individual operating alone or two or more assailants attacking a single or series of targets. The use of suicide bombers may be a frequent tactic of the adversary, or one that is used only on occasion against high value targets. These attacks may rely solely on the bombing aspect, or they could be combined with other types of weapons or attacks.

9. The use of suicide bombing as a tactic offers the adversary certain operational advantages. Not the least of these is that it affords the adversary a means of precision effects capability, taking the explosive device directly to the target. The suicide bomber is a means of covert or stealth delivery. The bomber is able to intelligently penetrate the opponent’s defensive measures and arrive at his intended target. The means of delivery blends in with the surroundings, and could be an individual in a crowd or a vehicle on a busy street. It is this
characteristic that also gives suicide operations their psychological effects, as our forces become suspicious of the local population (where anyone in the immediate area is a potential adversary). In turn, this could undermine the operational and strategic situation and separate our forces from the populace they are meant to secure. If our forces undertake overly harsh precautions, such as the engagement of any remotely suspicious vehicle on roads, it will undermine their legitimacy and authority with the local populace.\(^{21}\)

10. It must be remembered that lower level tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) will change routinely in a theatre of operations. Notwithstanding that fact, certain TTPs generally remain common to all irregular adversaries. Specific methods at the tactical level can generally be anticipated as follows:

a. **Recce tactics:**
   
   (1) Ground recce is the primary source of information.
   
   (2) Recce is primarily viewed as a mission not necessarily a force or unit.
   
   (3) Commanders will commit all necessary combat power to have observation of critical targets.
   
   (4) Affiliated forces and civilians are key elements to the recce effort. Much information may be gained from local authorities and security forces that may be compelled to assist the adversary forces. It will be normal for civilians to stand outside friendly force camps or base locations, to follow dismounted patrols, and to report force activities. Our tactical commanders and troops must be robust in approaching these suspected civilians, question them, and inspect cellular telephone records and radio devices in order to ascertain their intent.

b. **Infantry tactics:**
   
   (1) Infantry tactics will not focus on mounted versus dismounted tactics. Their means of transport, even if they operate some armoured vehicles, will usually only support movement to and from the battle zone, and not manoeuvre within it. Valuable resources such as armoured vehicles will only mass for quick attacks and then disperse rapidly.
   
   (2) Infantry is viewed as the primary tank killer.
   
   (3) Infiltration and ambush are critical to operations.
   
   (4) A swarm technique will likely be used that will see a single objective attacked simultaneously from different directions by a number of small groups.
   
   (5) Infantry forces will routinely conduct or supplement recce missions.

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\(^{21}\) It should be noted that the use of suicide bombers is not restricted to religious-based adversaries. Such as the case of Tamil liberation movements, whereby suicide bombers have been used extensively by organizations with purely political motivations and aims.
c. **Indirect fire tactics:**

(1) Indirect assets are trained and equipped to mass effects of fire without massing systems. Thus, different systems will fire simultaneously on the same target from different locations.

(2) The threat may not hesitate to use irregular weapons such as IEDs mixed with toxic or radioactive materials.

(3) The adversary will focus the efforts of their indirect fire on the destruction of key or high value systems such as command and control nodes, logistics centres, and vulnerable troop concentrations.

(4) The adversary will likely not expose its valuable assets for high volume suppression missions or counter-fire against non-precision systems.

(5) Maximum effort will be made to protect their indirect assets.

d. **Anti-armour tactics:**

(1) The adversary forces will likely be well equipped with light anti-armour systems and will routinely use improvised capabilities. Improvised explosive devices will be planted routinely as an effective method of defeating armour without direct engagement. They will often be remotely fired. Adversary forces will exploit their concealment amongst the population and infiltrate into areas considered cleared or secure to plant the devices.

(2) Using light anti-armour or improvised explosives, the adversary’s infantry will attempt to ambush and destroy our fighting and echelon vehicles throughout the battlespace. They will not be deterred by the presence of civilians and will likely use them to conceal and shield their attacks.

(3) Adversary forces, heavily equipped with anti-tank weapons, will exploit close terrain and choke points to attack our forces. This will be the primary killer of our armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). Attacks and ambushes may see their anti-armour weapons fired in volleys to maximize surprise, maximize the effects of light weapons, and allow for a rapid withdrawal.

11. In order to meet their intent at both the tactical and strategic levels, the adversary can be expected to carry out a wide variety of tactical operations. Such operations may include:

   a. **Attacks.** Attacks on our forces, particularly against vulnerable forces and elements, at the most opportune time and place. These will be done to create attrition, but also to undermine the will and commitment of friendly forces.

   b. **Armed Assault.** Armed assault on infrastructure (e.g., banks, police stations, military facilities).

   c. **Raids or Infiltration.** Raids or infiltrations to inflict casualties, demonstrate abilities, and/or obtain vital equipment or other support. They may include the short-term occupation of an objective area. They may also be conducted as a form of punishment for a sector of the civilian populace deemed to be supporting coalition forces.
d. **Occupation.** Temporary occupation of an area (without the need to raid it or fight for it) in order to gain support, intimidate the populace, or collect intelligence. This occupation may be overt or covert.

e. **Ambush.** Ambush of our forces, other friendly forces, government forces, or other agencies and public elements such as humanitarian NGOs.

f. **Information Operations.** Information operations within the local populace to undermine the legitimacy of government forces and coalition forces. Many irregular groups, particularly insurgents, will target the will and support of the domestic populations of nations contributing to a coalition.

g. **Encouragement of Civil Disobedience.** An attempt will be made to incite work stoppages or subvert peaceful public demonstrations to create riots and violent disturbances in order to demonstrate a lack of control and security by government forces.

h. **Encouragement of Desertion.** Encouragement of desertion from domestic security forces and attempts to dissuade enlistment. There will be an attempt to undermine SSR activities through information operations, intimidation, and direct attack.

i. **Liberation of Prisoners.** There may be direct attacks against domestic security forces and holding facilities in order to free prisoners. Prisoners may be connected to the adversary forces, or they may simply be freed to destabilize the civil society (as with the case in Iraq in 2003 and Haiti in 2004). This aim may be achieved in part through bribery or the intimidation of local security forces and the judiciary.

j. **Kidnappings and Executions.** The adversary forces may kidnap and/or execute those seen to be supporting the domestic government or foreign friendly forces. The victims may be members of the established government, members of security forces, or simply merchants or workers deemed to be aiding our forces or the established authority. Additionally, kidnappings may occur as a means of raising financial support.

k. **Sabotage.** Adversary forces may conduct sabotage of utilities and other vital points in order to demonstrate their capabilities, undermine the authority of the local government, and undermine the support of the local populace for the established government.

l. **Terrorism.** Attacks against civilian populations and targets and other forms of terrorism will be a tactic of some types of irregular adversaries. It will be used to demonstrate commitment and capabilities, undermine the legitimacy of established authorities and our forces, undermine the commitment of supporting friendly forces and our forces, and to intimidate the local populace. Terrorism is more likely to occur in the early stages of the development of an adversary force, and as it attempts to gain wider recognition and legitimacy, it will likely abandon or limit its use of terrorism.

m. In addition to such tactics, it will be common for irregular adversaries to be linked to criminal activities. This may be a means of fund raising, but will also be reflective of a social link. Those individuals acting as adversaries may also be socially linked to criminal elements.
CHAPTER 3
THE EMPLOYMENT OF LAND FORCES

*Tactics form the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.*

From A.A. Svechin: *Strategiya*, 1931

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

301. GENERAL

1. The employment of land forces sees the application of the elements of land combat power\(^{22}\) in a synchronized manner to realize strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Operations across the spectrum of conflict are closely linked and the application of land forces at all levels is guided by sound doctrinal principles.

2. The application of combat power is visualized through the continuum of operations that relates tactical activities to operational campaign objectives in order to meet strategic ends.

302. DOCTRINE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF LAND FORCES

1. Doctrinal concepts are built in a hierarchical fashion, to include a philosophy, supporting principles, practices and procedures. There are a number of doctrinal concepts and overarching philosophies that guide the application of combat power and the conduct of campaigns, regardless of their nature or theme. These include the following:

   a. Adherence to the Principles of War.

   b. A comprehensive approach the uses military capabilities in conjunction with other elements of power to create enduring outcomes to a campaign.

   c. A war-fighting ethos.

   d. An effects-based approach to operations that ensures tactical activities directly support operational objectives.

   e. The manoeuvrist approach.

   f. The application of mission command.

   g. An ethical application of combat power.

\(^{22}\) Combat power is defined as: “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.” (NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP 6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2006)
2. The application of these philosophies and their constituent principles defines the Canadian approach to land operations.\(^\text{23}\) Those in command must understand these philosophies and their constituent principles and apply them in a judicious manner. They must not be doctrinaire or dogmatic but rely upon their own judgement and initiative as appropriate. Indeed, doctrine encourages this.

3. Throughout the conduct of campaigns and operations, doctrine concepts will provide a conceptual framework to guide the application of combat power and capabilities in order to reach desired objectives and end-states.

303. THE LEVELS OF WARFARE

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to make it into something that is alien to its nature. 

This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive

Carl von Clausewitz

1. General. Warfare is conducted at three levels beginning with a national or strategic focus from which the other levels, operational and tactical, flow. The translation of national aims and political goals into military action must be done in a manner that ensures clarity and unity of effort throughout the military elements, and between the military and other agencies. The complexity of the operating environment, the spread of global communications, and the deployment of smaller contingents, has effectively compressed these levels of warfare and it has thus become more difficult to delineate the three levels. Events and actions at the tactical level may have significant consequences at the operational and even strategic levels. The levels are defined as much by the outcomes and effects as by the size of the force or level of command.

2. The Strategic Level. The strategic level of war is the level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. It reflects the national political aim and seeks to fulfil it. From a military point of view, it consists of two elements:

a. National Strategy. The national strategy combines the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of national power to achieve the long-term aims of the nation, ideally within a single campaign plan. A comprehensive approach to the campaign involving all elements of power along with international organisations and agencies to reach campaign end states begins at this level. Successful strategies must be integrated across the elements of national power from the outset. They involve the coordination and cooperation of all relevant government agencies in a unity of purpose and effort. National strategy is based on four broad responsibilities:

(1) To specify the strategic objectives for any intended military activities.

\(^{23}\) In terms of allies, the Canadian approach is most akin to the British approach to operations. This is for reasons of culture, history and tradition.
(2) To stipulate any constraints and restraints to be imposed on military activities, including the circumstances for military activity to conclude.

(3) To make the required resources available.

(4) To explain and empower the interaction of strategic military and non-military agencies, and to describe how action across a multi-agency construct is integrated to achieve overall national objectives.

b. **The Military Component of Strategy.** The military component of strategy is the application of military resources to help achieve the national strategic objectives. It is the art and science of applying military force and involves balancing military resources between different activities. The military component of strategy determines operational level end state, objectives, supporting effects, and the military activities required in broad terms. The strategic authority allocates conceptual objectives, military resources, and defines constraints and restraints. Military strategy will in turn influence and affect the formulation of national strategy and will provide the basis for military advice to the Government on the use of armed force and military resources.

3. **The Operational Level.** The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operation (AO). It links the strategic and tactical levels. It prescribes and directs the military activities necessary to realize the operational objectives and end state. At this level, commanders use operational design to construct and plan joint campaigns and major operations and direct them through operational orders. These campaign plans will reflect a particular campaign theme, and in turn, drive force structures, postures, and tactical activities in terms of scope and balance. Joint doctrine concentrates on the operational level, unifying single-service tactical operations into a coherent coordinated campaign. The operational level commander orders the activities of his forces through successive operational orders in pursuit of his overarching campaign plan. Within a joint campaign, the land component commander (LCC) will develop operational plans for the land forces that support the joint campaign plan to achieve the operational objectives.

4. **The Tactical Level.** The tactical level of war is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed by tactical formations to create desired effects and to achieve operational objectives. Tactical operations are specific activities undertaken by formations, units, and subunits, and are realized through one or more assigned tactical tasks.

5. **Linkages Between the Levels.** No level of warfare should be viewed in isolation. Tactical success does not guarantee strategic success. Battles and engagements generally shape the course of events at the operational level, but they become relevant only in the larger context of the campaign plan. The campaign, in turn, only gains meaning in the context of the strategy. For example, if the strategic aim is to defeat an insurgency, which by definition is only partly a military issue, the campaign plan must focus on military resources combined with other agencies, and the tactics must be weighted to protect a population, engender their support, and allow the other agencies to operate. Physical destruction of the insurgents may be a secondary concern and at times counter-productive to the overall effort. (See Figure 3-1.)
6. **Levels of Warfare and Command.** The levels of warfare are not tied to the level of command. A division, brigade, or battalion commander may operate at the operational or tactical level depending upon the nature of the campaign and the situation at hand. In the extreme, a tactical level commander may be required to conduct elements of campaign planning in the translation of operational objectives into tactical operations. The nature of command differs at each level of warfare and the level at which a commander is operating may change during a campaign. Complicating the issue further, tactical activities, should they create undesired results, may have significant operational or strategic impact, due in part to the pervasive media and speed of communications.

7. **The Conduct of Operations in a Joint, Inter-agency, Multinational Environment.** Commanders must work to ensure that military operations are coordinated with those of other agencies within the joint, inter-agency, multinational and public (JIMP) environmental framework, and that they are guided by a unity of purpose and effort (see Chapter 2). The design of a comprehensive, multi-agency approach should be replicated as required at all levels of command so that tactical level commanders understand and appreciate the nature of the campaign and requirement for complementary activities. The line between the operational and tactical levels is often blurred, particularly when national contingents differ in size. The employment of a force from another nation may have political implications even if it is only of small tactical value. The significance of committing forces may vary between nations.

8. **The Contribution of Land Forces to the Joint Campaign.** Land forces are the principle instrument through which a nation or coalition forcibly imposes its will upon another. Further to this however, land forces may be used to undertake a wide range of tasks, for they may work amongst and influence directly a situation and the local populations through their presence and activities. Thus, they have the ability to achieve decisive effects on both the physical and cognitive planes. In doing so, they may undertake activities and create effects along the following lines:
a. **Defeat or Deter Land-based Adversaries.** Land forces have the ability to coerce, persuade and dissuade or comprehensively defeat any adversary. Air and maritime forces may do great damage, particularly to massed forces, but an adaptive adversary will find ways to survive their attacks and avoid defeat. To achieve success, land forces must be used to physically close with the adversary.

b. **Seize Terrain Objectives.** Land forces can effectively seize physical objectives. Fires are rarely capable of ejecting a determined adversary from the terrain they occupy. Even if mass fires might be ultimately effective, the resulting collateral damage may be unacceptable in terms of campaign and strategic objectives.

c. **Secure Terrain Objectives.** Physical occupation of terrain by ground forces is the only certain means of achieving lasting security of an area. This applies to security against conventional manoeuvre forces, and against unconventional adversaries. To effectively combat and counter an insurgency, it is vital for forces to be placed on the ground being contested and to live and work amongst the population. Against an unconventional adversary, land forces as small as a platoon may effectively secure a piece of terrain.

d. **Positive Influence on Populations.** Influence, through daily human interaction, pervasive security and confidence building activities, is key to long-term stability. Well-trained and disciplined soldiers, deployed amongst a population, can have a major impact and influence on a population and garner their support for the campaign.

e. **Enable Other Agencies to Operate.** Land forces provide the framework of security and support that will allow other agencies, particularly civilian and unarmed, to undertake their responsibilities. In any region, long-term stability and prosperity will depend upon other governmental and non-governmental agencies dealing with a wide variety of civil, political and social issues. These agencies can only work in an environment in which land forces have achieved a significant measure of security.

f. **Serve as a Symbol of Political Commitment.** The commitment of a nation’s land forces may be costly in both resources and lives. It represents considerable political commitment and acceptance of risk on behalf of a government and a domestic populace.

304. **APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

1. **General.** Operations are planned and conducted based upon the application of the ten principles of war. These principles are not immutable laws and will continue to develop over time, and their measured application must be considered in light of operational circumstances. These circumstances will dictate the relative weight and importance of each principle. The commander must decide which principles will receive emphasis at any given moment, and which will not. This is a balance the commander must identify, articulate, and continually reassess. To completely disregard a principle involves great risk and the possibility of failure.
The Ten Principles of War. The ten principles of war are applicable throughout the spectrum of conflict, regardless of the campaign theme. Commanders at all levels, guided by the desired objectives, must consider each principle and strike a balance between the competing demands of the various principles. The ten principles of war are:

a. **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** Every operation must have a single, attainable and clearly defined aim that remains the focus of the operation and towards which all efforts are directed. The linkage between the levels of war is crucial for each battle; engagements or operations must be planned and executed to accomplish the military objectives established by the commander. Activities at the lower tactical levels must be planned and conducted in harmony with the intent and operational objectives identified at the higher echelons of command. The aim of any force, therefore, is always determined with a view to furthering the aim of the higher commander. It is thus vital that commanders clearly express their intent in a concise and clear manner.

b. **Maintenance of Morale.** After leadership, morale is the most important element on the moral plane of conflict. It is essential to ensuring cohesion and the will to win. Morale is nurtured through discipline, self-respect, and confidence of the soldier in his commanders and his equipment, and a sense of purpose.

c. **Offensive Action.** Only through offensive action can a military force assure the defeat of the adversary. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize and maintain the initiative through offensive action. Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle by action. It implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. To seize and then retain the initiative requires a constant effort to force the adversary to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while retaining our freedom of action. To achieve this, commanders must be prepared to act independently within the framework of the higher commander's intent. Seizing the initiative, therefore, requires audacity, and almost inevitably, the need to take risks. This applies to both the physical and cognitive planes. In the case of the latter, information operations must be conducted in an offensive manner in order to influence target audiences and affect their behaviour in a desired manner.

d. **Surprise.** Surprise makes a major contribution to the breaking of the adversary's cohesion, and hence, defeat. Against a conventional adversary, modern sensors may limit the chances and overall effects of surprise. However, surprise may well serve to degrade an enemy's ability to react. In facing an unconventional adversary, the use of sympathizers and agents within local populaces will provide adversary forces with early warning. Doing the unexpected and thereby creating and exploiting opportunities will achieve surprise. The effects of surprise are enhanced through the use of speed, secrecy and deception, though ultimately it may rest on the adversary's susceptibility, expectations and preparedness. The adversary need not be taken completely by surprise, but only become aware too late to react effectively. Surprise can be gained through changes in tempo, tactics and methods of operation, force composition, direction or location of the main effort, timing and deception. Deception consists of those measures designed to mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to
influence or induce him to perceive the situation in a manner prejudicial to his interests. It is a vital part of tactical operations serving to mask the real objectives, and in particular, the main effort.

e. **Security.** Security protects cohesion and assures freedom of action. It results from measures taken by a commander to protect friendly forces while taking necessary, calculated risks to defeat the adversary. In operations at the tactical level, we must not associate security with timidity. Regardless of the operations of war and the campaign theme undertaken, commanders must ensure active security through reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, patrolling and movement. It must be kept in mind that an over-emphasis on security, in particular force protection, at the cost of undertaking offensive actions against the adversary, will render the force ineffective and ultimately lead to defeat.

f. **Concentration of Force.** It is essential to concentrate overwhelming force at a decisive place and time. It does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather the massing of effects. This allows a numerically inferior force to achieve decisive results. The principle of minimum force required should be followed, whereby the application of force must be as precise as possible in order to ensure that the engagement will result in the desired primary and subsequent effects and avoid collateral damage.

g. **Economy of Effort.** Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of resources. Commanders must take risks in some areas in order to achieve success in their main effort.

h. **Flexibility.** Commanders must exercise judgement and be prepared to alter plans to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves on the battlefield. Flexibility requires a common battlefield vision by all commanders and a clear understanding of the superior commanders' intent. Essential to flexibility are effective information gathering and dissemination, rapid decision-making, and an agile force that can shift its focus quickly. Forces must also be held in reserve to deal with the unexpected and to maintain the momentum of a tactical operation by exploiting success when there is an opportunity. Commanders at all levels must be prepared to shift rapidly between types of tactical operations from across the spectrum of conflict.

i. **Cooperation.** It is only through effective cooperation that the components of a force can develop the full measure of their strength. It entails a common aim, team spirit, interoperability, division of responsibility, and the coordination of all the operational functions to achieve maximum synergy. Combat service support integration is a manifestation of cooperation. This cooperation may be pushed to the lowest tactical levels, particularly in a dispersed operating environment. This principle of cooperation must be practised within the JIMP framework and as a principle to the comprehensive approach of multiple agencies working in the pursuit of a common end state. When working with non-military agencies, commanders may take an informal lead in implementing this spirit of cooperation.
Land Operations

j. **Administration.** Successful administration is the ability to make the best and most timely use of resources. Administration is the indispensable servant of operations and is often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of an operation or the practicality of an aim. A commander requires a clear understanding of the administrative factors that may affect friendly activities. Commanders must have a degree of control over the administrative plan corresponding to the degree of operational responsibility. Situational awareness, foresight and anticipation are hallmarks of sound administration.

SECTION 2
THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS

305. GENERAL

1. The *raison d'être* of the land force is the application of combat power. This ability to fight also creates organizations capable of performing a wide variety of other activities. Throughout history, land forces have been required to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict, that is, to undertake tasks ranging from building civil infrastructure through policing conflicts to major combat. They must be able to conduct this variety of activities simultaneously and sequentially, and transition quickly from one type of activity to another during rapidly evolving conflicts. Commanders must not focus on a single activity or sequential progression. Rather, they must be able to effectively visualize how a campaign or operation will evolve over time, in the light of changing circumstances throughout their AO, and how the balance across different types of activities will or should shift. Campaign success is likely to depend upon understanding such simultaneity, how it evolves throughout the campaign, and how it affects the planning and execution of operations. This concept is relevant to all levels of command and is referred to as full-spectrum operations (FSO).

2. The **continuum of operations** is a conceptual framework used to explain the relationship between campaigns and the various types of tactical activities that constitute their conduct. It aids in understanding the complexity of the operational environment while planning, preparing for, conducting, and assessing operations. This model enables missions to be visualized with a broader perspective that goes beyond military combat to an environment where the level of violence is reduced. It allows for the visualization at the tactical level of military input into campaign lines of operation in which the land forces have a lead or a supporting role. Commanders must maintain a long-range vision of where a campaign is going and consider the long-term effects of current operations. This framework should help commanders think beyond the specifically assigned mission to what may come next.

3. The continuum of operations places a specific mission into a wider context that includes four major concepts:

   a. **Spectrum of Conflict.** The spectrum of conflict spans from high intensity combat (great deal of violence) at one end to relative peace (a minimum of violence) at the other end, and it provides the overall environment for the continuum and campaigns. It reflects the intensity and level of violence expected and found in a campaign, and success is reflected in a move to the lower levels of violence on the spectrum. In short, the spectrum of conflict provides an environment in which predominant campaign themes change over time, indicating priorities allocated to multiple types of operations that may be conducted simultaneously.
b. **Predominant Campaign Themes.** Predominant campaign themes reflect and describe the general nature of a campaign and will change over time.

c. **Types of Operations.** Campaign plans are realized at the tactical level through three types of tactical operations: **offensive; defensive; and, stability** (tactical) operations, in addition to enabling operations. Note that these operations are classifications of tactical activities, such as attack, and the activities are normally realized through a series of tactical tasks. Priorities and resources ebb and flow between these tactical operations as required by the situation and campaign theme, particularly as the campaign theme changes over time. The balance between the types of operations will reflect the type of campaign and the principles by which it should be conducted.  

24 The balance between the types of tactical operations and activities will change with the campaign theme. For example, there will be more offensive activities in a campaign involving major combat than in peace support or counter-insurgency campaigns.

d. **Simultaneity.** Tactical operations and their constituent activities and tasks will be conducted simultaneously. For example, one tactical unit or subunit may be conducting an attack, while another is defending a vital point and a third may be assisting with reconstruction or the delivery of humanitarian aid, all within the same AO at the same time.

306. **SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT**

1. The spectrum of conflict (see Figure 3-2) reflects the environment in which operations occur. The principle discriminator is the prevalence, scale and intensity of violence. These vary between absolute peace and absolute war. Land forces operate throughout this spectrum.

![Figure 3-2: The Spectrum of Conflict](image)

2. No conflict will exist at just one point on the spectrum of conflict. Its intensity will vary in time and place. At any one time there may be a humanitarian crisis in one location, a requirement to conduct crowd confrontation in another, and intense fighting in a third. At any one place, there may be tasks to conduct house-to-house fighting. A battle group may have to complete all of these simultaneously. It is important to recognize that a campaign will consist of simultaneous and sequential activities from various locations on the spectrum of conflict.

307. **PREDOMINANT CAMPAIGN THEMES**

1. **General.** States of peace, tension, conflict and combat may be local or widespread, and transient or prolonged. The character of any particular campaign may be difficult to define precisely and is likely to change over time. It will probably consist of a wide and changing variety of activities across the spectrum of conflict. It is nevertheless possible to describe

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several predominant campaign themes within the continuum of operations. The character of the campaign varies according to the theme, and major combat for example, is identifiably different from counter-insurgency. They demand different approaches, are guided by specific principles and require different force packages.

2. **Campaign Themes.** Campaign themes within the continuum of operations can be broadly divided into the following categories:

   a. **Major Combat.** Major combat campaign is the most demanding of military campaigns and operations. It is characterized by combat that is frequent, widespread and intense. It will usually be conducted against other formal, conventional military forces.

   b. **Counter-insurgency.** Counter-insurgency (COIN) is defined as: *those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.*[^25] A COIN campaign is characterized by an insurgent based adversary, the political nature of the crisis, a need to address multiple facets of the environment and root causes of the crisis through a comprehensive approach with the military in an overall supporting role, and a degree of combat that is less than that experienced in a major combat campaign.

   c. **Peace Support.** A peace support campaign impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or peace building.

   d. **Peacetime Military Engagement.** Peacetime military engagement (PME) is defined as: “military activity in peacetime that involves cooperation with other nations or agencies, primarily intended to shape the security environment.”[^26] It includes initiatives to improve mutual understanding and interoperability. Such operations may include aspects of security sector reform (SSR) in which indigenous security forces are restructured and trained, and other security apparatus and institutions are reformed or developed. It may include programmes and exercises with other nations designed to improve mutual understanding with other countries, improve interoperability, and improve the standards and capabilities of other nations. Military involvement may be complemented by activities conducted by other agencies seeking to improve other aspects of the host nation government and society.

   e. **Limited Intervention.** Limited intervention consists of those operations that have limited objectives and scope, such as the rescue of hostages, security and/or evacuation of non-combatants, re-establishing of law and order, or providing disaster relief. They are usually conducted with a specific, limited aim and for a short duration, often a number of days. Due to their limited scope, they are not true military campaigns. They may occur at point along the spectrum of conflict and may occur while other operations are occurring in the same area. Most domestic operations are classified as limited intervention.


[^26]: Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel.
3. **Understanding the Campaign Theme.** It is vital that a commander be able to recognize the characteristics and other environmental factors that will denote the particular type of campaign in which he is operating. This will guide the manner in which the campaign is designed, planned and conducted, even at the lowest tactical levels. Commanders must be prepared to explain the nuances and demands of each type of campaign to their subordinates, political leaders, and members of other agencies involved. Within a campaign theme, land forces may conduct various operations or activities that may appear to contradict the overall theme. For example, during a peace support campaign, land forces may conduct offensive combat operations to create the conditions for lasting peace. However, it must be understood that all campaigns involve a wide variety of tactical activities depending upon the situation at any given time. It is the overall balance between the types of activities that must reflect the campaign theme. Additionally, the manner in which tactical activities are conducted should not violate the principles of the overall campaign theme. For example, a deliberate attack may be necessary during a COIN campaign, but it will be planned and conducted using different factors than that of an attack during a major combat campaign. The different factors and considerations will be reflective of the principles and aims of a counter-insurgency campaign: plans and events risks will be taken to avoid collateral damage and thus avoid negative influences on the local populace; local forces may be used vice coalition forces; and extra effort may be made to convince the adversary to surrender.

![Predominant Campaign Themes along the Spectrum of Conflict](image)

**Figure 3-3: Predominant Campaign Themes along the Spectrum of Conflict**

4. **Link with the Spectrum of Conflict.** As depicted in Figure 3-3, the campaign themes can be arranged along the spectrum of conflict to reflect the general level of violence and conflict expected. Major combat tends to occur when the environment is characterized by extreme violence, while in PME the level of violence can be expected to be low. However, within major combat there may be large areas within the theatre or AO that are comparatively peaceful. Conversely, within peace support there may at times be extremely violent incidents. Thus, it is useful to describe operations as taking place across the spectrum of conflict, where the character of the conflict, and hence campaign theme, is only partly shaped by the varying degrees of violence within that spectrum. Limited intervention can occur anywhere along the continuum.
5. **Comparative Aspects of the Campaign Themes.** Descriptions of campaign themes are broad and tend to overlap, therefore, there will be common elements among them. The campaigns will change over time for various reasons, such as: deliberate, pre-planned phases (such as a shift from peace support to major combat); changes in the environment brought about by adversary activity, neutral activity and changed political guidance; or, unexpected opportunities or demands that arise during the campaign. As depicted in Figure 3-4, it is possible to discriminate between campaigns by characterizing and comparing various aspects: the level of political risk; the effect sought; the character of combat; and, the type of adversary faced:

a. **Political Risk.** The level of risk acceptable to the Government, including the risk of casualties, is a measure of the political importance of the campaign. It is proportionate to the threat to the nation or national interests. It is influenced by the public appetite to continue the operation, given the public’s perception of the threat, the level of risk, the inherent moral value and the elements or extent of national interest.

b. **Effect Sought.** The strategic effect (result) sought will often determine the character of a campaign. For example, the defeat of a hostile state will demand a different approach from the separation of warring factions.

c. **Character of Combat.** Combat can be characterized by its prevalence, scale and intensity:

   (1) **Prevalence.** Prevalence is a measure of its frequency.

   (2) **Scale.** Scale describes the level of combat, which can be measured by the level at which forces integrate their activities in combat. For example, in major combat, battles are often fought at formation level; however, in COIN, they will be more usual at section, platoon, or company level.

   (3) **Intensity.** Intensity describes the degree of concentration of combat, measurable by the rate of consumption of logistics and casualties.

d. **Type of Adversaries.** The nature and number of adversaries will have a major influence on the character of a campaign and conflict. They may range from sophisticated conventional forces to primitive tribesman. It is important to appreciate that adversaries are adaptive. For example, once a regular army has been defeated, it may mutate into an irregular force with different aims, and thus change the character of the conflict. Therefore, the campaign theme will also alter.
### Spectrum of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Peacetime Military Engagement</th>
<th>Peace Support</th>
<th>Counter-insurgency</th>
<th>Major Combat</th>
<th>Limited Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Risk&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med/Low</td>
<td>Victim: High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Less than risk of inaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect Sought&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Shape security environment</td>
<td>Uphold international peace and security</td>
<td>Defeat insurgents</td>
<td>Defeat hostile state</td>
<td>Varied, to include evacuations, strikes, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence</td>
<td>No combat foreseen</td>
<td>Localized, infrequent, discrete incidents</td>
<td>Localized, intermittent</td>
<td>Widespread, continuous</td>
<td>Plan may involve or avoid combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Self defence</td>
<td>Section and platoon</td>
<td>Section, platoon and company</td>
<td>Battalion and higher echelons</td>
<td>Depends on plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>No combat foreseen</td>
<td>Low; occasionally high</td>
<td>Med/low, long duration; occasionally high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Potentially high; short duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Threats&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Formed units and/or irregulars</td>
<td>Irregulars</td>
<td>Formed units</td>
<td>Formed units and/or irregulars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All characterizations are generalizations. Exceptions may exist.

<sup>1</sup> The level of acceptable risk, including risk of casualties, is a measure of the political importance of the campaign, proportional to level of threat to the nation or national interests.

<sup>2</sup> The strategic effect sought often determines the character of a campaign: removal of a hostile regime demands a different approach than separation of warring factions.

<sup>3</sup> This is the predominant level routinely engaged in combat. Levels may escalate occasionally.

<sup>4</sup> Adversaries are adaptive and may move from one type of strategy or tactic, or even organization, to another as conditions improve or deteriorate for them, and as their opponents adapt to their tactics. In addition, the arrival of new types of forces (e.g., the Chinese in Korea or foreign Mujahadeen in Afghanistan against the Soviets) can change the character of the campaign.

**Figure 3-4: Predominant Campaign Themes by Selected Criteria**

6. **Campaign Themes and Tactical Operations.** Campaign themes should not be confused with tactical operations, tasks or activities. Campaigns and their operational objectives are realized through tactical operations, activities and tasks. These involve the specific application of doctrine to solve specific tactical problems and are often used to assign...
missions to subordinates. Campaign themes, as a rule, are too general to use in assigning missions. Rather, they describe the broad general conditions that exist in an AO and provide principles to guide planning and action as a campaign progresses.

7. **Avoidance of Operational and Tactical Contradictions.** Although subordinate tactical missions may require the consideration and employment of other tactical-level principles, care must be taken not to contradict the logic and overarching principles appropriate for the given campaign. For example, an offensive operation conducted during a COIN campaign will use the tactical principles of the offence, but it should not contradict the broader COIN principles. Tactical actions should always be focused, to facilitate moving to a lower level of conflict. Thus, short-term tactical success must be balanced against long-term operational success. For example, pursuit of a fleeing enemy may have to be declined in order to provide emergency humanitarian aid to a civilian populace.

8. **Campaign Transition.** Although some campaign transitions may be easy to identify, such as a move to major combat against a conventional adversary, a campaign will often change its character gradually over time. An adversary may grow increasingly effective over a period, or there may be a gradual lessening of violence and an increase in peaceful political activity. In such cases, it will often be difficult to identify a single moment of campaign transition. Judgement will be required to determine the most suitable philosophical approach. Different approaches may be required in different parts of the same theatre. For example, forces may conduct predominantly offensive operations in some areas, while other forces stabilize and secure other areas and undertake reconstruction to reinforce public support. Any actions contemplated by commanders and soldiers should be done with the aim of moving the campaign to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

**SECTION 3**

**CAMPAIGN THEME CHARACTERISTICS**

308. **GENERAL**

1. Each campaign theme has specific characteristics. They reflect a relative position long the spectrum of conflict, but the differences may not be strictly delineated. For example, it is possible to have a low level COIN campaign with a lower level of violence than a difficult peace support campaign. A limited intervention may occur at any point along the spectrum of conflict, and indeed, may occur simultaneously with another campaign theme (e.g., a non-combatant evacuation or humanitarian relief mission during a COIN campaign).

309. **MAJOR COMBAT**

1. In a major combat campaign, operations take place in a state usually characterized as war, in which combat is frequent, widespread and intense. They are the most demanding military operations. When states or coalitions embark on a major combat campaign it is usually because they are directly threatened or there is significant threat to their interests. They are therefore normally prepared to take higher risks than in other kinds of campaigns. The goal of major combat may be far-reaching, such as the toppling of a hostile government. Alternatively, it may be more limited, such as the recovery of territory or the changing of an adversary’s behaviour.

2. Major Combat tends to be characterized by:
The Employment of Land Forces

3. A major combat campaign is normally waged between the uniformed armed forces of nation states. Where this is not always the case, the campaign tends to blur with other campaign themes. For example, in Vietnam both sides deployed uniformed armed forces, however, although there were major battles, much of the war can be characterized as a COIN campaign. Similarly, during the Second World War, German forces conducted COIN operations against partisans across occupied Europe.

4. Major combat normally seeks to defeat an adversary’s armed forces and seize terrain. Typical measures of effectiveness are the numbers of military units rendered ineffective or irrelevant, the level of adversary resolve, and terrain objectives seized or secured. Major combat is traditionally the type of campaign for which doctrine was originally developed, including the principles of war. They are considered the norm while doctrinal principles for other operations are variations.

310. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

1. An insurgency is an armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse, but are generally political in nature. Some insurgencies aim to seize power through revolution. Others attempt to break away from state control and establish an autonomous state within ethnic or religious boundaries. In some cases, an insurgency has the more limited aim of achieving political concessions unattainable without violence. Generally, an insurgent group attempts to force political change by a mix of subversion, propaganda, political, and military pressure. These aim to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to support or accept the desired change. Thus the situation and solution are political, but the military becomes involved generally due to the level of violence and threat posed by the insurgents.

2. Counter-insurgency (COIN) is defined as: “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” The objective sought is not primarily the destruction or capture of insurgents. Objectives should focus on controlling the level of violence, reducing popular support for the insurgency, cutting its external links and correcting the root causes and grievances of the insurgency. Thus, the military will play a supporting role in a COIN campaign, and all of its efforts must be harmonized in a comprehensive approach with those of other agencies to properly address the political, social and economic root causes of an insurgency. The military main effort is to provide the level of security that will allow these other organizations and elements of power to manoeuvre and operate.

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27 Further details may be found in B-GJ-323-004/FP-003 Counter-insurgency Operations.
3. COIN is characterized by relatively infrequent combat, compared with a major combat campaign. Combat is typically at section, platoon, and company rather than unit or formation level. The rate of logistic consumption is also lower than in major combat although the campaign as a whole is likely to last longer for its overarching objective is to win enduring popular support for the government and remove social motivations for the insurgency.

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**The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.**

*General Sir Frank Kitson*

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311. **PEACE SUPPORT**

1. A peace support campaign is defined as an campaign that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-building, and/or humanitarian operations. Their intent is to uphold internationally accepted values, and where possible, act within a mandate is implicit. Governments and military forces, either independently or as part of a coalition, frequently support international responses to emergencies, ranging from humanitarian aid to the use of military force.

2. As in many campaigns, a comprehensive approach through a balance and harmonization of military and non-military means is required for success. The role of land forces in peace support is typically required to create the framework of a safe and secure environment, to dissuade potential belligerents from resorting to violence, and to provide specialist support to enable civil agencies to address the underlying causes of the conflict and eventually generate a self-sustaining peace. Peace support campaigns are generally long-lasting so perseverance is required from both civil and land forces to achieve long-term objectives. The creation, enhancement and sustainment of a campaign plan with sufficient resources are fundamental to success.

3. Levels of political commitment to peace support tend to be lower than COIN, and lower levels of risk tend to be sought. Most nations that send forces on operations to a peace support campaign usually do not expect them to be committed to intense, sustained combat. The effect sought is to uphold international peace and security by resolving conflicts through prevention, conciliation, deterrence, containment and civil development.

4. The campaign theme of peace support includes the following sub-categories of campaigns:

   a. conflict prevention;
   
   b. peacemaking;
   
   c. peace building;

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28 Further details may be found in B-GJ-005-307/FP-030 Peace Support Operations.
d. peacekeeping; and
e. peace enforcement.

5. Combat is usually rare in peacekeeping but may be intense in peace enforcement. When combat occurs, it is usually at a low level. Rates of logistic consumption are also generally low.

312. PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

1. Peacetime military engagement (PME) is defined as military activities involving other nations that are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programmes and exercises conducted on a bilateral or multilateral basis, and the provision of advisers and specialist training teams. They will likely involve other agencies in addition to the military.

2. Activities within PME are normally long-term and have the lowest level of risk attached to them. A major objective of PME may be security sector reform (SSR). They are aimed at encouraging local or regional stability and maturity, and it is likely that land forces will work in close harmony with other agencies in the JIMP framework. For example, land forces may be involved in training developing armies while civilian police develop new constabularies, and other government departments mentor new judiciaries, prison services and bureaucracies.

313. LIMITED INTERVENTION

1. Limited intervention operations have limited objectives such as humanitarian assistance or the security of non-combatants. They can be aggressive in nature, such as a strategic raid. They are normally intended to be of short duration and specific in objective and scope. They may be mandated by the UN Security Council or legitimized under international law, and mounted unilaterally or as part of a multinational coalition.

2. By their nature limited intervention operations do not generally warrant great political risk. They are frequently the response of a government wishing to limit risk. They may be planned to seek combat, or to avoid it. The key characteristic is that they are intended to take place over a limited period and have a specific, limited objective. They should be conducted according to the most appropriate principles, depending upon the type of operation.

3. **Non-combatant Evacuation Operations.** Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) are a form of limited intervention that seeks to quickly remove national citizens from a threatening situation in a foreign country. National or coalition forces may be required either to conduct or participate in operations to evacuate specified nationals from a conflict area. Certain pre-conditions should ideally be present. They include: the agreement of the local government to the evacuation; the provision of logistic facilities; the availability of suitable airfields or ports in the host or neighbouring country; and the availability of reliable intelligence. The deploying force should be prepared to provide security for the evacuees from their point of assembly to their final departure from the area of conflict. Such operations are normally joint. They are planned, commanded, and executed in the same way as other intervention operations. The evacuation should plan to possibly include citizens from other allied nations as required.
4. Other missions that are classified as limited intervention operations include humanitarian and disaster relief. Most domestic operations may be classified as limited intervention operations.

314. **FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS: LAND TACTICAL OPERATIONS OF OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, STABILITY, AND ENABLING**

1. Campaigns and operations are prosecuted through the conduct of tactical operations\(^{29}\) and activities. Land forces will undertake a wide range of tactical level activities in the prosecution of an assigned operation and the overarching campaign. They may be simultaneous or sequential depending upon the level of command. For example, a unit may be conducting an attack in one location, defending a vital point in another location, and securing a local populace and giving emergency aid in a third location.

2. Tactical activities are divided into **offensive, defensive, stability,\(^{30}\) and enabling operations** (see Figure 3-5). Together, they describe all tactical military activities conducted within a campaign.\(^{31}\)

   a. **Offensive Operations**: Offensive operations are tactical activities in which forces see out the enemy in order to attack him.\(^{32}\)

   b. **Defensive Operations**: Defensive operations are tactical activities that resist enemy offensive activities.\(^{33}\)

   c. **Stability Operations**: Stability operations are tactical activities\(^{34}\) and are defined as: "a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order." \(^{35}\) They allow for responsible government to function, development to occur and progress to be achieved.

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\(^{29}\) In order to avoid confusion over the term "operations," NATO refers to tactical level operations as "activities" only and does not use the overarching title of operations for each of the three tactical level sets of activities. See AJP 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operation and ATP 3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics.

\(^{30}\) "Stability operation" is defined as "a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order. (Approved by Army Terminology Panel, May 2007).

\(^{31}\) These are tactical level activities, assigned to and conducted by tactical level units and subunits. Thus, to state that a campaign will be a "stability operation" is a misnomer. The campaign will likely be peace support or COIN, but many of the tactical level activities undertaken in support of the campaign will be stability and defensive operations.

\(^{32}\) NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

\(^{33}\) NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

\(^{34}\) In the past the term "stability operations" have been used to describe operational level campaigns. This has been a misnomer. In its proper sense, stability operations refer to tactical level activities and tasks.

\(^{35}\) Army Terminology Panel approved May 2007. Stability activities are defined in NATO as: tactical activities that seek to stabilise the situation and reduce the level of violence. They impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. (NATO AJP 3.2)
d. **Enabling Operations**: Enabling operations are tactical activities that link, support or create the conditions for offensive, defensive and stability operations.36

3. Campaigns and operational plans are realized at the tactical level through the simultaneous and sequential conduct of these tactical operations and their constituent activities and tasks. Priorities and resources ebb and flow between these tactical operations as required by the situation and campaign theme, particularly as the campaign theme changes over time. For example, a force should begin to conduct more stability operations than offensive operations and be able to reduce defensive operations as a security situation improves. This simultaneous conduct of enabling, offensive, defensive and stability activities is termed **full-spectrum operations** (FSO).

4. Full-spectrum operations are defined as: “The simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.” 37

5. Generally, all types of tactical operations and activities may be conducted **simultaneously**, regardless of the campaign theme. For example, in peace support, which consists mainly of stability activities, there may be a requirement at some point to attack a recalcitrant adversary (offensive) or a constant requirement to defend a security base (defensive). The balance between types of activities gives a campaign its predominant character. Major combat may consist primarily of offensive and defensive activities, while COIN may have a complex mix of all three types. Enabling operations are never conducted in isolation for their purpose is to enable other operations.

6. Even when activities are sequential, it is important to plan them simultaneously as linkages between the different operations are important. If not coordinated, early actions may compromise subsequent operations. Examples include the destruction of bridges required later in an operation and offensive actions that in practice radicalize a civil population, whose support is required.

7. This combination of simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability activities that reflects a campaign’s predominant theme at any one time and place can be illustrated by the continuum of operations model. This model also demonstrates how this combination will change over time. (See Figure 3-5.)

8. The balance between the three types of operations will be dictated by the type of campaign, the principles by which the campaign is conducted, the situation at hand and the commander’s intuition in terms of how to best support the operational objectives. As a campaign moves to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, more effort and resources will be dedicated to stability operations, and less to offensive and defensive operations.

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36 NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.
37 Developed by the Army Terminology Panel January 2005.
In southern Iraq in 2003 and 2004, the continuum of operations varied widely. In early 2003, before the coalition attack on Iraq, coalition aircraft enforced the no-fly zone, which was effectively a peace support campaign. In March 2003, the campaign theme changed to major combat as the coalition initiated predominately offensive operations. These were declared complete by 1 May 2003. The transition to a peace support campaign started when coalition forces first occupied towns in southern Iraq and conducted stability and defensive operations. Initially, the environment was relatively peaceful, with coalition forces engaged mostly in stability operations. Later in 2003, an insurgency developed and the level of violence rose and the campaign changed its character to COIN. This transition was difficult to identify accurately and occurred over several months.

THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS—SOUTHERN IRAQ 2003 TO 2004:
315. **TACTICAL ACTIVITIES**

1. Offensive, defensive and stability operations, along with enabling operations, can be sub-divided into activities such as the attack, defend, exploitation, and pursuit. Land tactical activities are listed below in Figure 3-6. Each type of tactical operation has particular characteristics and principles. Principles for the offence differ from those of the defence, and they both differ from the principles of stability operations. In general, they are termed tactical activities and are tangible undertakings meant to create desired effects (results) and they can be assigned to units and subunits, usually through specific tactical tasks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICAL OPERATIONS</th>
<th>OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS</th>
<th>DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS</th>
<th>STABILITY OPERATIONS</th>
<th>ENABLING OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Activities</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Security and Control</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raid</td>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>Support to Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)</td>
<td>Advance to Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance</td>
<td>Tactical movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance to Other Agencies</td>
<td>Meeting Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Break-out</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Link-up</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feint and Demonstration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance in Force</td>
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<td>Retirement</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relief of Troops in Combat and Encircled Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**

1. Security and control refers to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, in which other non-military agencies may operate and assist in the operational and strategic objectives.

2. Support to civilian infrastructure and governance will see military forces, at least initially, conducting tasks that build/rebuild civilian infrastructure and conduct or assist with certain aspects of governance, such as provision of health care, rule of enforcement, and humanitarian aid.

3. Assistance to other agencies refers to military assistance to specific agencies, helping them to reach operational objectives. For example, military forces may be allocated to assist election organizers with security and logistical support.

4. Enabling operations link or lead to other tactical operations and their effects. For example, an advance to contact leads to an attack (and an eventual effects such as "seize"), and a withdrawal leads from one defence to another.

5. Each of the tactical activities is realized through tactical tasks and effects that normally comprise of a mission statement (see text on following pages). Enabling operations consist of activities, as given above, and these will be issued in mission statements in terms of “conduct...”. In order to prosecute them, enabling activities will be broken down into supporting or constituent tasks for subordinates. For example, security will be assigned as a covering force or guard force and supporting tasks assigned. See B-GL-331-002/FP-000 *Staff Duties in the Field* for further details.

Figure 3-6: Land Tactical Operations and Constituent Activities
2. Note that defensive operations include both the defence and the delay. Although their desired effects and aims may be different, the delay is conducted by the same principles and many of the same techniques as a defensive operation. Thus, they have been grouped together.

3. Stability operations and activities involve both coercive and cooperative means, but in the main, they seek to positively influence a target audience, such as the building of a school to engender support from a populace and to increase civic capabilities. Stability activities may occur before, during and after offensive and defensive activities, and may be the main effort of a campaign. Stability activities contribute to creating an environment in which the other instruments of power, that is, the diplomatic, civic and economic instruments, along with other elements and agencies in the JIMP framework, can work and predominate in cooperation with a lawful government.

316. TACTICAL TASKS AND EFFECTS

1. Tactical activities are accomplished through the assignment of tactical tasks and effects. Thus, an attack, for example, may be realized through units and subunits conducting assigned tasks such as, fix, seize, neutralize, support by fire, etc., all brought together through a plan in a complementary and synchronized fashion. This construct is well embedded into our format of the tactical mission statement. For example, a mission statement may read: A Coy will attack to (activity of attack is not always stated) seize Objective PAPER by 10:00 hrs in order to secure a line of departure for B and C Coys. The tactical offensive activity of attack has been delegated as a task of a first order effect to seize, while the purpose of the mission is to secure a line of departure, which is a second order effect.

2. Just as offensive and defensive tactical operations are accomplished through tactical tasks and effects, such as destroy, seize, or block, stability operations will be accomplished through a series of tactical tasks, such as vehicle check points, observation posts, presence patrolling, cordon and searches, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction, to name only a few. Some tactical tasks may be common to more than one tactical operation. For example, secure may be part of an offensive operation, or it could be assigned as a task for defensive or delay operations, or even for stability operations, such as secure a local market area from criminal activity.

3. Enabling operations and activities are normally assigned and conducted simply as activities, such as withdrawal or relief-in-place, and are not assigned in terms of tactical tasks and effects (although they will be conducted through a series of logical tactical tasks such as “be prepared to support by fire”).

4. Examples of the types of tactical tasks (often equating to mission task verbs) that support their respective tactical operations are given in the table at Figure 3-7.
### Tactical Operations, Activities, and Tactical Tasks (Not Inclusive)

5. Commanders must consider and potentially plan for the simultaneously conduct of each type of tactical operation regardless of the nature or theme of the campaign they are undertaking. Even during major combat, there will be a requirement to undertake or at least plan for some stability operations. As campaigns move to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, the opportunity for and requirement for stability operations will increase.

6. As noted previously, the simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive and stability operations is defined as full-spectrum operations (FSO). The higher levels of command (normally battle group and above) must be able to plan for and conduct simultaneous operations along the spectrum. Tactical level commanders and their subordinates must be mentally and physically prepared to transition rapidly between these types of operations and tasks.

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**NOTES**

1. Mission statements will be written with both the activity and the task or immediate effect, further described by the purpose, or secondary effect. The activity is not always stated in the mission statement, such as *(Attack to)* seize (object), *in order to*...

2. Mission statements relating to stability activities and tasks will use the transient verb “conduct” to assign the activity, such as, “*...will conduct security and control in order to...*”. This would then be allocated as tactical tasks and effects to subordinates, such as VCPs, framework patrols, etc. At the lower tactical levels, only the tactical tasks may appear in the mission statement, but again continue to use the verb “conduct,” such as, “*...will conduct framework patrols in order to...*”, or “*...will conduct humanitarian aid delivery in order to...*”. In this manner, they are similar to mission statements for enabling operations. See B-GL-331-002/FP-000 *Staff Duties in the Field* for further details.
317. TRANSITION IN CAMPAIGNS

1. Although some transitions in the campaign theme, such as the launch of a set of major offensive operations and the development of enemy manoeuvre forces, may be easy to identify, often a campaign will change its character slowly over time. An insurgent group may grow increasingly effective or there may be a gradual lessening of violence. In these cases, it may be difficult to identify precisely a single moment of campaign transition. However, changes in campaign themes will almost, of necessity, be tied to phases and accompanying changes in task organization, rules of engagement, etc.

2. Recognizing the changing circumstances, or conditions that require a change to the major theme of a campaign, is an intellectual challenge. This is part of the art of war. The intelligence system must be attuned to and look for indicators of shifts, and commanders must be able to interpret the key indicators that show a shift is taking place. They must act in a changing environment, either to prevent an escalation of violence, or facilitate a shift to a lower level of violence in a fashion manageable by the forces at hand.

3. As a campaign transitions to the less violent end of the spectrum of conflict the requirement for offensive and defensive activities should decrease and the need for and opportunity for stability activities should increase. Furthermore, the proportion of stability activities being conducted by organisations and agencies other than the military should increase. (See Figure 3-8.) The comprehensive approach to campaigns will involve a wide variety of agencies other than the military to address the range of issues with the environment and to create enduring solutions. Thus, as campaigns transition to reflect success, the non-military component of the comprehensive approach increases.

CAMPAIGN TRANSITION WITHIN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
318. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

1. Domestic operations are those that are conducted within the confines of the military force’s own nation. They will be classified under the same campaign themes as those given above although they will be conducted under specific legal titles, protocols, and frameworks.

2. An invasion of the nation by a conventional force will see the conduct of a major combat campaign to expel the foreign invader. The rise of a domestic insurgency will result in the conduct of counter-insurgency, undertaken in cooperation with a wide range of other security forces and government agencies. In most cases, domestic operations will take the form of a limited intervention, such as assistance in times of a natural disaster.

FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS—1 RRF, IRAQ, MARCH 2003

In Iraq in March of 2003 during the advance to Basra, Z Company, 1st Bn, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers conducted full-spectrum operations within a 48 hour period, 22 to 24 March 2003:

On the morning of 22 March, the battle group (BG) conducted a forward passage of lines with US forces in the push to capture Basra City. Each combat team (cbt tm) in the battle group (BG) was assigned the capture of a bridge leading to the City. Z Coy Cbt Tm consisted of two armoured infantry rifle platoons and two troops of tanks.

Z Coy Cbt Tm began with an assault against an enemy position on the near side of the bridge. (Offensive operation). Once secure, vehicles suppressed the adversary on the far bank, while a platoon cleared an Iraqi army barracks on the flank. After nightfall, another platoon attack was conducted to clear the far bank of the bridge. The cbt tm then adopted a hasty defensive position for the night of 22/23 March. (Defensive operations).

First light on 23 March brought a crowd of civilians attempting to flee Basra via the bridges. The formation HQ ordered that no civilians be permitted to leave the area for fear that enemy would attempt to ex-filtrate the area. Thus, the cbt tm was forced to conduct crowd control operations in the midst of their defensive position. (Simultaneous defensive and stability operations).

The hasty defensive position was maintained throughout the day and was harassed by enemy mortar fire. The cbt team also faced and defeated an armoured counter-attack consisting of three T-55s. (Defensive operations).

Later on the 23rd of March, the company, while maintaining the defensive position, used one platoon and two tanks to conduct a penetration and raid into Basra, destroying five T-55s and a number of infantry detachments en route (simultaneous defensive and offensive operations). The cbt team maintained the defensive position throughout the night of 23/24 March and then conducted a relief-in-place on the morning of 24 March. (Defensive and enabling operations).

The cbt team was withdrawn to an area in the depth of the BG and conducted a wide array of stability operations including: civilian route movement control; humanitarian aid distribution; the fighting of oil fires; and the prevention of looting and other criminal activities. (Stability operations).

While Z Coy Cbt Tm was conducting this combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations, other subunits in the BG were doing similar activities. Thus, both the 1 RRF BG, and at times Z Coy Cbt Tm, conducted full-spectrum operations.

Source: Memoirs of OC Z Company, 1 RRF, Major Duncan McSporan, RRF.
CHAPTER 4  
THE GENERATION OF FIGHTING POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORKS

SECTION 1  
INTRODUCTION

401. GENERAL

1. Military operations are the application of a force’s fighting power in order to achieve desired outcomes and end states. It exists at all three levels of command. Fighting power is not simply generated or created through a total sum of its constituent components. Aspects of fighting power take years, decades, and even centuries to develop. Fighting power is the total sum of capability. In order to understand how to conduct military operations, commanders must comprehend the fighting power that will be applied through those operations.

2. Notwithstanding the ability of a military force to use fighting power to create destructive or disruptive effects, it must be remembered that fighting power, that is, a military’s capabilities, can be used to undertake tasks that create effects other than physical and destructive. A military’s capability may be used to restore essential services, provide security for a local populace, assist other agencies to do their work, and create influence and engender support within a populace or other target audience.

402. THE GENERATION OF FIGHTING POWER

1. Fighting power is defined as the ability to fight, consisting of three essential, inter-related components: a physical component; a moral component and an intellectual component. Fighting power is measured by assessment of operational capability.  

2. Combat power is defined as: “The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.” Combat power is measured in physical terms and stems form the physical component of fighting power. In discussing the application of capabilities and resources to a target, it may be described in terms of applying combat power.

3. Fighting power is based upon and is generated through its constituent components: the moral component, which includes moral and cohesion and reflects the ability to have soldiers fight; the physical component, which is the means to fight; and, the intellectual component, which includes the conceptual elements of doctrine and education, and the perceptions for situational understanding and decision making. (See Figure 4-1.) The appropriate development and combination of these components provides the necessary basis for the generation of fighting power:

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38 Drawn from Allied Joint Publication 01(C) NATO Allied Joint Doctrine (Ratification Draft 2006), Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (Ratification Draft 2006), and UK ADP Land Operations AC 71819.

39 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP 6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006)
The Physical Component. The physical component of fighting power consists of the tangible elements of fighting power. It includes organizations, equipment, systems, and training.

The Moral Component. The moral component provides the ethical and cultural base from which we derive morale, cohesion, esprit de corps, and fighting spirit. It includes a cultural element that may be unique to a nationality, a service, a land force and a regiment, and it is often the reason for different approaches taken by different forces to the same situation despite similar structures and doctrine. These elements of the moral component are largely intangible, yet vital products of tradition, history, force preparation and generation. They may take years to develop.

The Intellectual Component. The intellectual component consists of the conceptual elements of education and doctrine, and the perceptions and understanding of the operating environment by the commander, his staff, the subordinates and the force as a whole.

(1) Doctrine and education consists of the knowledge of principle-based concepts for land operations. It provides an institutional understanding of the application of the other components of fighting power.

(2) The perceptual element of the intellectual component is the understanding and perception of the situation at hand, with respect to all the elements of the environment. It consists of a situational understanding and perception of the complex and perhaps chaotic environment in which land operations occur. It guides how combat power will be applied at a specific time and in a specific situation. It is the target of information operations that seek to influence the understanding, perceptions and ultimately the will and behaviour of the target. Decisions made by a force based on wrong or manipulated information or on another perception of the reality will lead to the ineffective use of combat power. Likewise, the perception of unavoidable defeat will undermine the moral component of fighting power and avoid attritional battle.

Therefore, even if the will and the ability to fight are well developed, deficits in either doctrine, education or perception will lead to ineffective or counterproductive application of combat power.

Hierarchically, doctrine consists of philosophies, principles, practices, and procedures.
5. Fighting power is the total sum of the capabilities of a military force. In short, the three foundational components of fighting power must be considered in a holistic manner and integrated with maximum synergy in order to attain effective and balanced fighting power. **Fighting power is generated by the integration of these three components.**

6. Fighting power is not built or changed through the mere arrangement of its components and their constituent elements. If developed, organized, understood, and nourished properly, the whole of a force’s fighting power will be greater than the sum of its parts. Any single change to one element of fighting power will likely have a **significant impact** upon other components of fighting power that may not be realized for some time after the fact.

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**CHANGES AND EFFECTS IN THE COMPONENTS OF FIGHTING POWER: SOMALIA 1993**

Prior to the late 1960s and early 1970s, infantry section commanders held the rank of corporal, having worked their way to the rank from private and lance-corporal. Section commanders are the only commanders in direct command of subordinates. Since this time, section commanders have held the rank of sergeant, that is, they have been senior NCOs and have thus been in a different mess than their subordinates and have lived separately. As a result of this structural change, they became physically and intellectually separated, loosing the “feel” for attitudes and emotions at the lowest levels. The end result was a broken chain of intimacy between a section leader and subordinates and it made it difficult to keep tabs on what was going on amongst the subordinates.

This was a structural change in organisation, that is, a change to the physical component of fighting power. Although not evident necessarily at the time, it eventually led to negative effects in the moral component of fighting power. Once the structure was placed under the stressful conditions of the Somalia campaign of 1993 and combined with other factors, it helped lead, in good measure, to a breakdown in discipline and standards. **Source:** David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996). Pg 63 and 79-80.
403. FRAMEWORKS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND APPLICATION OF FIGHTING POWER

1. Once generated, fighting power is organized and applied through three frameworks:

   a. The elements of the physical component of fighting power, that is, the forces, their activities and command structure, are organized in spatial and temporal orientation within the environment. This is a **battlespace framework**.

   b. Fighting power is then applied through the synchronized integration and execution of functional capabilities, which consist of the five operational functions and the core functions of find, fix, and strike (and exploit). This organization of activities in the environment is the **functional framework** and is realized through the assignment of tactical activities, that is, a tactical plan. It is a framework for **manoeuvre**.

   c. Fighting power is applied on the physical and psychological planes through assigned activities in order to achieve desired effects, that is, results. These effects are described as shaping, decisive, and sustaining. The arrangement of effects in relation to one another, the target, and the environment, is known as an **effects framework**. Many activities will be physical and have first order effects on the physical plane against a target and thus affects the target’s behaviour. Other activities will be intellectually or psychologically based, and will seek to influence understanding, perception, will, and ultimately, behaviour; that is, they will create first order effects on the psychological plane. These influence activities will be planned to create desired effects amongst a target, be it an adversary or a local populace. For example, to seize the enemy position (decisive), psychological operations (PSYOPS) flyers may convince enemy conscripts to flee (shaping) before a deliberate attack is launched. Likewise, reconstruction of civil infrastructure will help stabilize a population and engender support from them and other target audiences. (See Figure 4-2.)

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41 The five operations functions are Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain. They are discussed further in Section 3 of this Chapter.

42 Throughout this publication, the term “psychological plane” is used to refer to that level of existence commonly referred to as the “psychological plane.” The former term is used in order to be more encompassing and include psychological recognition and emotions.

43 Throughout this publication, the term “effects” is synonymous with “results.”

44 The effects framework was formally known as the operational framework. The name has been changed to better describe it and to avoid confusion with the operational functions outlined in the functional framework.
2. Fighting power has traditionally been thought of in terms of destructive force. However, it can also be applied to campaign problems that require other solutions, such as the secure delivery of humanitarian aid, or the reconstruction of essential services, in the fight to secure a population and its support, that is, to affect perceptions and the will of a target audience. In other words, fighting power is used to create effects on the physical plane and the psychological plane.

3. Details regarding the frameworks for application of fighting power are discussed in the following sections.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MORAL COMPONENT OF FIGHTING POWER

By late 1944, some Canadian Army personnel had served overseas for five years, and many in the combat arms had served on the frontlines in Italy for a year and a half. The toll of constant combat, casualties, a lack of leave, and time overseas was heavy, a palpable sense of disillusionment becoming obvious throughout the ranks. Heavy casualties had decimated the ‘old guard’ of the regiments, weakening the regimental ethos that traditionally served as a bulwark for the morale of those in the frontlines. In addition, the Canadian government had failed to anticipate the heavy casualties that resulted from combat in both Italy and Europe, leading to a shortage of trained replacements. The primary cause of this shortage was the conscription policies of the Canadian government of the time, which decreed that conscripted members of the armed forces could decline service overseas.

The men in the frontlines derisively termed the large body of conscripts serving in Canada “zombies.” The greater issue though was the effect the apparent lack of support from the home front had on the morale of those who had suffered through the oft-brutal combat in Italy and Europe. The effects on the morale of the men cannot be overstated; veterans today continue to express bitterness over what was rightly considered a betrayal by the Government of Canada. Several powerful passages written by Farley Mowat, who served in the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, underscore not only the effects on the morale of the men, but also the drain on military power, while accentuating the critical role played by regimental ethos as a key moral component of military power:

In Canada almost 100 000 Zombie conscripts lived a comfortable and pleasant life, secure in the knowledge that they would never be asked to face the enemy. As the days…drew on, awareness of the full scope of the betrayal on the home front wore deeply into men’s souls. There was only one antidote for it. The infantry scrubbed their khaki gaiters, pressed their worn uniforms, polished their cap badges and did what they could to keep the Regiment—their Regiment, their only home—as a living focus for their lives. It was the sole remaining source of strength for most of them and as it had not failed them in the past, it did not fail them now.

The seeming betrayal of those on the home front—the very country for which the men on the front lines risked and sacrificed their lives—undermined the moral basis of fighting power, causing morale to plummet. For many, the prospect of survival based on the shear odds of time in combat seemed so slim that a sense of hopelessness set in, some breaking down completely. In the end, they turned to that which was most familiar and trusted, that is, their pride and faith in their Regiment.

The moral component of military power is critical. Neither training, nor superb equipment can substitute for a sense of purpose and a belief in one’s place and importance in a greater organization, superior to immediate trends and challenges.

Sources:
# THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PHYSICAL COMPONENT OF FIGHTING POWER

In the fall of 1944 the Canadian Army was facing a severe shortage of trained infantrymen. Units fighting in the Scheldt estuary were under-strength, served by a woefully inadequate replacement system hampered by uniquely Canadian political problems, and constantly inaccurate casualty forecasts. A stopgap solution was implemented: army personnel serving in non-infantry trades would be re-mustered into the infantry to bolster front-line units.

Unfortunately the operational tempo at the time did not allow for anything more than perfunctory introduction to infantry tactics and individual field craft skills for re-mustered personnel. Consequentially, many of these replacements were lucky to survive more than a day or two in the front lines. Lacking a solid foundation of individual and collective training and equipment and weapon handling these men were of little use to hard-pressed infantry regiments. (This situation was aggravated by the obvious lack of moral cohesion that newly arrived soldiers experienced in their new units.)

Further drains on personnel were created by the need to set up echelons to provide a crash-course on infantry warfare. The fighting power and thus effectiveness on the battlefield for Canadian units was severely undermined by all of these factors.

The hurried echelon training implemented by one regimental commander, Denis Whitaker of the RHLI, incorporated all three facets of fighting power to include basic doctrine and field craft, equipment handling, regimental ethos (moral component) by discussing the history and victories of the regiment.

**Sources:**


THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTELLECTUAL COMPONENT OF FIGHTING POWER

Two of the principal factors that led to the carnage at the Somme in July 1916 were poor combined arms coordination between the infantry and artillery and ineffective Allied counter-battery techniques. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew McNaughton, appalled by the unprecedented casualty rates as well as the unscientific doctrine guiding the use of artillery, became determined to develop doctrine suitable to positional warfare operations. Appointed to the post of Counter-Battery Staff Officer at Canadian Corps HQ in January 1917, McNaughton began overhauling existing artillery doctrine by utilizing lessons learned, emergent technology, and knowledge gained by close liaison with allies. McNaughton developed a comprehensive combined arms and counter-battery doctrine that, for the first time, combined artillery fire and infantry movement in a synchronous manner, enabling the infantry to achieve their objectives. McNaughton’s complex doctrine took into account all possible variables, including environmental conditions (temperature, barometric pressure, wind, etc.), gun calibration, munitions supply, artillery manoeuvrability, wear and tear on equipment, human fatigue, and intelligence. McNaughton also created standard terminology to eliminate confusion. Moreover, McNaughton demanded improved intelligence gathering, analysis, and coordination, because of the direct relationship between good intelligence, casualty rates, and success. Finally, McNaughton constantly strived to improve his counter-battery doctrine, analyzing each engagement for lessons to be learnt. McNaughton’s efforts were fundamental to the Canadian Corps victories at, among others, Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, Amiens, and Arras. The development of innovative and flexible doctrine strengthened the conceptual component of fighting power of the Canadian Corps, and provided a decisive edge on the battlefield.


SECTION 2
THE BATTLESPACE FRAMEWORK

404. BATTLESPACE

1. Battlespace is defined as: “the area of interest that includes both the physical and moral planes and the electromagnetic spectrum.” A commander’s battlespace consists of his area of operations (AO), the area of influence (A of I), and the area of interest (AI). Of the three components of the battlespace, the AO is assigned to the commander by his superior and the commander’s assessment will lead him to identify the other components.

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45 Battlespace is defined within NATO AJP-3 (2003) as: “The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space environments, the include enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.”

46 The physical plane is inclusive of the air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic/cybernetic environments.

47 Definition developed by Army Terminology Panel 23 Jan 01. Note that the moral plane is synonymous with the psychological plane.
2. The battlespace framework is the tool used to facilitate decentralization of execution by identifying subordinate commanders and their AOs, and establishing command relationships for each phase of a campaign or operation. It will describe AOs and from this, the area of influence and area of interest will be identified. It is related to terrain and each AO is related to one or a number of lines or groupings of operation within the campaign plan. The battlespace framework is the arrangement of troops, resources and command and control in the environment.

3. The battlespace framework will also determine the disposition of forces through the descriptors of contiguous, non-contiguous, linear, and non-linear battlespaces. The layout of the battlespace framework should flow from the campaign design and may be related to specific lines of operation and activities.

4. In order to effectively conduct operations and create effects that support assigned objectives and ultimately achieve the desired end state, the commander must gain and maintain an understanding of his battlespace and all the elements and actors within it. This will be reflected in the knowledge base that will identify and assess all the interrelated systems, entities, and actors within his battlespace.

5. The battlespace must also be considered from a joint, inter-agency, multinational and public (JIMPP) viewpoint. Aims and objectives amongst the elements within the JIMPP framework will vary, and the onus may fall to the military commander to harmonize this myriad of objectives and their constituent activities and effects. This is best accomplished with a shared unifying purpose, and ideally, effort expressed as a unifying theme in the commander’s statement of intent.

6. A military force will project its fighting power throughout its AO and has potential to do the same throughout its area of influence. It may do so on both the physical and psychological planes. In doing so, however, it may create desired and/or undesired effects in the larger area of interest. For example, activities undertaken to engender campaign support from an ethnic minority in an AO may create additional support from that same minority in another region or country.

7. Thus, activities and their effects are not limited to the physical dimensions of the geographical area of influence. Activities that occur within an AO can have effects far removed from the geographical AO or area of influence. Tactical incidents may even have wide-ranging operational and strategic effects. For example, the accidental death of civilians from a particular ethnic group may well cause public outcry, undermine support for the force and its mission, affect the deployment of coalition forces from other nations, and engender negative reactions in other countries, particularly those with sympathetic ethnic groups. These removed areas are considered areas of interest. (See Figure 4-3.)

48 It is unlikely that non-military elements will come under military command in a campaign. However, through cooperation, shared goals and understanding, fostered by the personal efforts of the commander, military and non-military agencies may harmonize and even integrate their activities. Ideally, they will plan the campaign together.
Battlespace Illustrated

Figure 4-3: Battlespace Illustrated

405. AREA OF INTEREST

1. The area of interest is defined as: “the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.” This area also includes areas occupied by the adversary and interested neutrals, all of which could jeopardize or influence the accomplishment of the mission.

2. The understanding of an area of interest must be expanded beyond immediate geographical and temporal concerns. Areas of interest may include areas and activities that are affected by events in a commander’s AO, or conversely, may include external events and influences that affect systems or individuals in the commander’s AO.

3. Limited resources, time, and personnel will place limitations on the commander’s ability to collect and process information from the entire area of interest and its scattered influences. The commander must set priorities for monitoring the area of interest. Too narrow a view could render the force reactive rather than proactive, and too wide a view could hinder the force with a glut of irrelevant information. In assessing elements in the area of interest, links between those elements and systems and those within the more immediate areas of the battlespace (AO and area of influence) must be identified and analyzed.

4. The area of interest has different connotations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and commanders must understand the level or levels at which they are operating in order to prioritize information collection:

   a. Tactical. At the tactical level, the area of interest includes JIMP activities both within and adjacent to the AO.

49 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006).
b. **Operational.** At the operational level, the area of interest includes JIMP activities within and adjacent to either the joint operations area.

c. **Strategic.** At the strategic level, the area of interest includes global JIMP activities. With the speed and reach of modern information technologies, this is a vast concept. A policy announcement out of the United Nations Headquarter in New York, a posting on an Internet website originating from another continent, or a news story concerning an incident thousands of miles from the commander’s assigned AO, can have near immediate influence upon operations.

406. **AREA OF OPERATIONS**

1. An area of operations is defined as: “an operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities.”\(^50\) Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the land joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

2. At the tactical level, a commander may be assigned an area of operation (AO). This may be considered a geographical area, defined by lateral and rear boundaries, which is assigned to a commander by a higher commander. Within these boundaries the commander has authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission.

407. **AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY**

1. A higher, component commander assigns areas of responsibility (AOR) to his subordinates. An AOR is defined as: “geographical area of ground, sea or air under the command of a commander who has the necessary authority and power to exercise it. This responsibility is normally extended to intelligence collection, conduct of operations, control of movements and possibly the maintenance and protection of facilities, but it can also be limited to a specific domain.”\(^51\) Although an AOR is assigned to a commander by his component commander based on the latter’s assigned AO, the AOR of subordinate commanders are commonly referred to as AOs as well.

2. An AO/AOR is a permissive control measure that provides freedom of action within defined boundaries and increases flexibility in unit operations. Commanders can, in turn, partition their assigned AO/AOR and assign portions of it to subordinate formations, units and subunits. The design of an AO/AOR will evolve over time as a result of the continuous assessment process and changing circumstances.

3. Within assigned an AO/AOR, unless directed otherwise, the commander is responsible for the following:

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Army Administration Publication (AAP) 39 (2007). Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions. AAP-6 defines AOR as: “the geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to each regional command of Strategic Command Europe.”
Land Operations

a. conduct of operations;
b. coordination of fires;
c. control of movement;
d. development and maintenance of installations;
e. terrain management, to include installations;
f. force protection security;
g. maintenance of the common operating picture (COP); and
h. area of intelligence responsibility (AIR).  

4. When assigning an AO/AOR to a subordinate, the higher commander must ensure that the subordinate unit or formation has the means to influence the situation in that area in order to achieve the desired effects and objectives. Higher commanders will often specify constraints, restraints, and limitations when assigning an AO/AOR to a subordinate. These may be depicted as graphic control measures or tasks.

5. Commanders use graphic control measures to regulate manoeuvre, movement, airspace, fire support, and other aspects of operations within the AO/AOR. They are also a part of the combat identification construct. In general, all graphic control measures should be easily identifiable on the ground. It should also be noted that control measures will shift over time and should be continually monitored to ensure they reflect tactical requirements. Graphic control measures are specified in B-GL-331-003/FP-001 Military Symbols for Land Operations.

6. Many campaigns and operations will present significant geographical challenges. Many situations and AOs/AORs will not allow for a linear and/or contiguous deployment. Coordination, cooperation and mutual support between elements may be difficult. Mission command and the use of well-practised reserves at all levels become increasingly important under such circumstances. Referring to Figures 4-4 to 4-7, the four recognized types of AOs/AORs are:

   a. contiguous, linear;
   b. contiguous, non-linear;
   c. non-contiguous, linear; and
   d. non-contiguous, non-linear.

7. The label of an AO as linear is decided in relation to a located and identifiable adversary.

   52 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006). Area of intelligence responsibility (AIR) is defined as: “an area allocated to a commander, in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at his disposal.”

   53 Graphic control measures are used at all echelons and by all Services and are defined as: “a symbol used on maps and overlays to regulate forces and operational functions.” Refer to B-GL-331-003/FP-001 Military Symbols for Land Operations.
Abbreviations: FSCL = fire support coordination line; FLOT = forward line of own troops; and FEBA = forward edge of the battle area.

Contiguous - Linear Area of Operations

Figure 4-4: Contiguous, Linear AO

Contiguous - Non-linear Area of Operations

Figure 4-5: Contiguous, Non-linear AO
8. A commander will be assigned an AO/AOR within his higher formation’s AO. His estimate process will lead him to decide the configuration of his own AO/AOR, which may differ from the configuration of the higher commander’s. For example, a battle group (BG) commander may assign his manoeuvre subunits AORs such that he has a contiguous AOR. Following an estimate, one of the combat team commanders may assign each of his platoons separate AORs centred on specific villages with unassigned areas in between. He has thus created a non-contiguous AOR within the BG commander’s contiguous AOR, but the combat team commander remains responsible for the areas not assigned to his sub-subunits.
9. Factors affecting the assignment of AOs/AORs will vary by mission. Apart from geography, there are a wide range of factors that must be considered in the delineation and allocation:

   b. Targets and desired effects on those targets.
   c. Capabilities of own troops to create desired effects and conduct required activities.
   d. Assigned and implied tasks.
   e. Terrain.
   f. Threat.
   g. Time and space (particularly in terms of the size of AO, threat and movement capabilities).
   h. Cultural boundaries.
   i. Linguistic boundaries.
   j. Political and/or judicial boundaries and social power structures.
   k. Tribal, historic, ethnic and/or religious boundaries.
   l. Need for an economy of force.
   m. Presence of other agencies in the JIMP framework with which cooperation is planned.

408. AREAS UNASSIGNED

1. In non-contiguous AOs there will be areas that are not assigned to subordinate commanders. An area unassigned is the space not assigned to subordinate units within a higher headquarters AO/AOR. The commander remains responsible for these areas and for operations within them. He determines what resources he will assign to monitor these areas and to conduct activities in them when required. This may be done with reconnaissance forces in an economy of force concept.

409. AREA OF INFLUENCE

1. An area of influence (A of I) is defined as: “a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command or control.” It is the physical volume of space within which a commander can directly influence the situation by manoeuvre, fire support systems that are under his command or control, and through information operations that affect understanding, perceptions and will of target audiences.

54 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2006).
55 Information Operations refer solely to influence activities such as public affairs, CIMIC related activities, profile and posture of forces and PSYOPS.
2. The ability to influence, that is, create effects within the area of influence, exists on both the physical and psychological planes. The physical area of influence is measured by the limit of the physical effects that a commander may deliver such as the range of his weapon systems included electronic warfare (EW) means. These are first order effects on the physical plane and can be termed fires.

3. The targets and audiences that may be psychologically affected by a commander’s decisions and activities, that is, psychological effects of influence, may not be physically within the AO or adjacent geographical area. They may be physically removed from his immediate AO and local environment and located in another area. For example, activities to undermine or support a particular ethnic group in the AO may influence the behaviour of other audiences of the same ethnic group in another region or part of the world. Thus, although effects on the physical plane will be within the physical boundaries of an area of influence, the effects created on the psychological plane may be wide ranging in both space and time. **It is this linkage to psychological effects that in many cases will bind tactical level activities to operational and strategic effects.**

4. The area of influence has different connotations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels:

   a. **Tactical.** At the tactical level, the area of influence includes the physical space that a commander can influence with the means at his disposal. Operations within tactical areas of influence are synchronized within the functional framework through the higher commanders intent and operational plan.

   b. **Operational.** At the operational level, the area of influence includes the joint operations area that can be influenced by the military operations within the entire assigned area. Military operations and activities within operational areas of influence are synchronized along lines of operation and within a JIMP framework (particularly across multiple agencies) in order to create supporting effects and achieve operational objectives and end states.

   c. **Strategic.** At the strategic level, the area of influence can be global due to the ability to create psychological effects that are rapidly spread through information technology.

410. DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR—OPERATIONS IN SPACE AND TIME

1. Within the battlefield framework, the concept of deep, close, and rear areas and operations exist. They describe the placement of forces and the conduct of operations and activities in terms of space and time. These are described as follows:

   a. **Deep Operations.** Deep operations are: “operations conducted against forces or resources not engaged in close operations. They expand the battle area in time and space, help to shape the close battle, make it difficult for the enemy to concentrate fighting power without loss, and diminish the coherence and tempo

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56 Previously, deep, close and rear operations were considered part of the operational framework. However, they are linked to time and space and thus have been placed under the battlespace framework.
of his operations.”

Deep operations are those operations conducted at long range and over a protracted time scale against adversary forces or resources not currently engaged in close operations. They may be decisive operations, but in general they will be shaping. For example, a deep target engagement may reduce the combat effectiveness of the adversary’s reserve force prior to a main attack. At each level of command, the extent of the deep operations and related area is dependent upon the commander’s means of acquiring information and engaging targets. Deep operations include three principle activities: information operations; surveillance and target acquisition; and interdiction. They may be conducted on the physical and psychological planes, the latter seeking to create long term influences in a target audience. This may include, for example, delivering PSYOPS leaflets to conscripts in enemy reserve units, or building civil infrastructure so that subsequent generations of a region are better educated and more stable.

b. Close Operations. Close operations are: “operations conducted at short range, in close contact and in the immediate timescale.” Close operations are those that involve friendly forces in direct contact with the adversary or operations in which commanders anticipate direct contact taking place. The means used in close combat could range from physical destruction with lethal weapons, to arrest of detainees. They may be shaping, decisive, and even sustaining operations of forces in contact. Combined arms coordination is the hallmark of close operations. Close operations will normally occur on the physical plane, although there may be instances when they will occur on the psychological plane, independently or in addition to the physical plane. For example, a firepower demonstration may convince a belligerent commander not to manoeuvre his forces from a cantonment site, and a medical clinic for the local populace will immediately engender good will and local support.

c. Rear Operations. Rear operations are defined as: “operations which establish and maintain one’s own forces in order to generate the freedom of action to allow for the conduct of close and deep operations.” Rear operations are the largely administrative and logistic activities that occur out of contact with adversary forces, that is, behind the area in which close operations are occurring. Rear operations require security, particularly in campaigns involving an asymmetric, non-conventional adversary. In non-contiguous and/or non-linear battlespaces (that is, in areas with no identifiable rear area), there is a need to secure the lines of communications and critical centres. Rear area operations including the security and force protection aspect are normally sustaining operations (in terms of the effects framework).

2. Deep and close operations may also be identified in terms of time, for both execution and planning purposes. Normally, close operations will occur against adversary forces that will be encountered within 48 hours. Operations against adversaries that will be encountered by the forward line of troops not before 48 to 72 hours will normally be considered deep operations, depending upon the level of engagement. When operating to create effects on the

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
psychological plane, the scope of understanding and employment of the spatial, temporal, and purpose descriptors must be expanded. Deep operations may be conducted for months to years before they result in a close operation, if ever at all. For example, operations seeking to improve a local education system may create immediate support for a campaign, but they will not provide a result in terms of a cultural shift and social improvement for a number of years.60

SECTION 3
THE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK: OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CORE FUNCTIONS

411. GENERAL

1. Fighting power is applied through functional capabilities and activities. The operational functions are: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain. In organizing and applying fighting power through the operational functions, forces conduct activities known as core functions. Core functions are: find, fix, and strike, with exploit an implied function. Together, these two functional groupings comprise the functional framework. The functional framework is effectively the plan for an operation. It is a framework for manoeuvre of both physical activities (fires) and influence activities.

412. THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS61

1. The operational functions describe the functional capabilities of a military force, regardless of the type of unit or formal operational role. They apply to all levels of warfare, the tactical, operational, and strategic. The operational functions stem from the intellectual (doctrine) component, but our realized through the integration of all three components—physical, moral, and intellectual.

2. Fighting power is applied through the organization and application of the operational functions. The relative balance given to each function will dictate the nature of the effects created. The operational functions operate on both the physical and psychological plans. The operational functions are listed as: Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain.

413. COMMAND

1. Command is the operational function that integrates all the operational functions into a single comprehensive strategic, operational or tactical level concept. It provides vertical and

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60 Operations under the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia included the distribution of a NATO forces newspaper for the local population. One edition contained a children’s essay competition that asked the contestants to describe how they would welcome a child from a different culture or region moving into their neighbourhood. This was a deep operation, seeking to shape the future generation.

61 The operational functions (Command, Sense, Act, Shield and Sustain) are proper nouns. Through an interim period from 1997 to 2001 using six combat functions (command, information operations, manoeuvre, firepower, protection, and sustainment), they have replaced the common eleven tactical level orientated combat functions used prior to 1997 (command and control; information systems; intelligence; electronic warfare; close combat; aviation; fire support; engineer support and mine warfare; nuclear, biological and chemical warfare; air defence; and, combat service support), and now better speak to activities and effects on both the physical and psychological planes. All capabilities contained in the combat functions are inherent to the operational functions. Note, however, that while ABCA has adopted the five operational functions, in NATO doctrine, the combat functions have been retained.
horizontal integration through the planning, direction, coordination and control of military forces and other elements as allocated. It provides the means to unify and integrate the activities of the other functions in the finding, fixing and striking\(^{62}\) of adversaries or other targets.

2. The central component of the Command function is a philosophy emphasizing the importance of formulating and communicating the commander’s intent. A thorough understanding of the intent guides decision-making at all levels, and encourages both initiative and speed of action. It provides for a unity of purpose and effort on the vertical and horizontal planes and even between the military and other elements of the JIMP framework.

3. Command support processes are reliant upon robust communications, good intelligence, and an effective battle procedure process. Commanders will need the skills to operate in a fast-paced and highly technical environment while still ensuring personal dominance of the operations and decision-making process.

414. SENSE

1. Sense is the operational function that provides the commander with knowledge. This function integrates those assets that collect information and then provide the analysis to produce information and knowledge, which is then disseminated. By design, it leverages all sources of information. Sensor management and fusion must be centralized to gain full advantage of disparate systems found in the modern battlespace.

2. This operational function is inherently modular, capable of integrating additional systems and capabilities at every level: tactical, operational or strategic. The scope of the Sense function must be broad in order to firstly provide the commander with a broad and deep knowledge base of the operational environment, and secondly, to assess the effects of activities across all elements within the environment.

3. This view of the environment must not only include the physical characteristics of weather and terrain, but also the broad range of other systems, entities and power structures that exist and operate in the environment. The interrelated elements and systems of an environment that must be assessed in the broad knowledge base are the political, military, economic, social (including aspects of culture and religion), infrastructure, and information. These elements must not only be assessed by the Sense capabilities, but the effects of our activities upon them must be predicted to the greatest accuracy possible and then analyzed to ensure that the desired effects and objectives are being achieved.

415. ACT

1. Act is the operational function that integrates manoeuvre, firepower, and information operations (influence activities) to achieve the desired effects. It integrates fires and influence activities. The synchronization of manoeuvre, firepower, (fires) and influence is at the heart of manoeuvre warfare and allows the decisive concentration of effects against adversaries, other targets, and centres of gravity. Fracturing these centres of gravity will dislocate the adversary, breaking cohesion and the will to resist.

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\(^{62}\) Find, fix, and strike are the core functions in the application of combat power and are discussed in the following section.
2. Act functions engage a wide variety of targets in addition to an adversary. Information operations (that is, influence activities) such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) reconstruction or PSYOPS may be used to influence target audiences to support a campaign or to convince elements of an adversary to surrender. Thus, the functions inherent in Act are conducted on the physical and psychological planes in order to achieve desired effects. It is the complete combination of fires and influence activities synchronized and harmonized through manoeuvre and battlespace management.

416. SHIELD

1. Shield is the operational function that provides for the protection of a force’s survivability and freedom of action. Shield facilitates the friendly forces’ freedom of action. Shielding, at the strategic level, particularly in terms of the asymmetric threat to domestic populations, is a joint function that stretches from the theatre of operations to the domestic population.

2. At the tactical level, Shield includes protective measures through air defence, counter-mobility and survivability, such as the construction of defensives and the hardening of structures.

3. Shielding will become increasingly difficult as forces operate dynamically and are dispersed over an extended area in the face of an increased adversary ability to see and strike, or against a threat that utilizes asymmetric tactics and takes refuge amongst civilian populations.

4. The function of Shield also includes force protection measures, which is the responsibility of all forces and their commanders.

417. SUSTAIN

1. Sustain is the operational function that integrates strategic, operational and tactical levels of support to generate and maintain force capability. Sustain ideally takes an anticipatory approach that enables support services to be provided commensurate with an increased tempo in manoeuvre operations. Thus, it will move towards an intelligence push system based upon situational awareness and asset visibility.

2. The supply-based support system, centred on stockpiling within echelons, may evolve in certain campaigns to a distribution-based system where supplies are held within a “pipeline” and delivered on as required basis. The utility and effectiveness of an echelon system will remain extant.

3. Sustain function also incorporates health care and welfare systems and procedures.

418. THE SHARED FUNCTIONAL ASPECT

1. Certain military arms and services are more inclined by the nature of their inherent capabilities to operate predominately within a single operational function. However, most arms and services will operate across a number of operational functions. As examples: infantry forces, in addition to being an Act manoeuvre element, may be assigned a Shield function of convoy protection; reconnaissance (recce) forces, while mainly employed in a Sense role, may
be used at times to support manoeuvre with fire or to secure lines of communication; and, engineers, although mainly employed in Shield functions, will often support the Act function of manoeuvre.

419. THE CORE FUNCTIONS—FIND, FIX, AND STRIKE

1. Activities that seek to attack an adversary’s cohesion, or to affect the will of the adversary and other targets, are executed through three core dynamic functions. These are: find, fix, and strike. The need to be prepared to exploit is implicit. Finding and fixing the adversary or any other target will contribute to shaping. Striking and exploiting have the potential to be decisive. The function of fixing should not be limited to the tactical task “fix,” or confined to defensive operations to protect the force. Defensive or offensive operations designed to fix the target may set the conditions for offensive action to strike him. Likewise, the ability of an adversary to conduct information operations and influence elements of a population may be “fixed” through aggressive PSYOPS and public affairs (PA) activities. These core functions are normally carried out through the Sense and Act operational functions and their inherent capabilities.

2. Where circumstances permit, operations designed primarily to find, fix, or strike the adversary should be exploited. Operational experience indicates that finding, fixing, striking and exploiting should be conducted concurrently, or at least through seamless transition achieved from one to another.

3. The core functions have wide utility across the continuum of operations in all campaigns. In a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign, non-military and paramilitary adversaries are found by information gathering by the intelligence services, covert and overt elements of armed forces, and other government agencies. The uniformed military forces and the police, combined with diplomatic efforts and information operations, fix the insurgents and their influence on the populace through a combination of activities that have physical and/or psychological effects, such as security patrols and leaflets urging locals to report insurgents. Locally raised forces can also help to find and fix opponents, and have been employed in numerous campaigns to good effect. Special forces, military and police units, and the legal system contribute to striking insurgents. Influence activities such as PSYOPS and public affairs may strike at the legitimacy of insurgents. Exploitation involves taking advantage of a developing situation in accordance with the superior commander’s intent. In the COIN example, local tactical successes against insurgents may enable exploitation through the pursuit by military forces. It may be exploited by PSYOPS and PA messages, and further exploited for long term benefit, through the freedom of movement for civilian police, government officials and humanitarian workers, and thus allow these other agencies to begin long term solutions in economic and political development.

420. FIND

1. Finding the adversary or a potential target is a basic function that endures throughout an operation and is continually applied and assessed. It includes locating, identifying, tracking, and assessing the target, be it an adversary or otherwise. Forces may be directed specifically to fight for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. This will normally be a

63 The concepts of shaping and decisive effects are part of the effects framework and are fully discussed below.
sound investment when the situation is confused and seemingly chaotic. Whatever its source, information is never wholly reliable. It should be verified or corroborated with other sources.

2. A commander cannot know everything. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and recce (ISTAR) systems can produce so much information that they could overload a commander or analyst who tries to assimilate its vast amount, and it becomes a point of friction. These problems can be overcome by setting clear and succinct priorities for intelligence gathering, and directing ISTAR elements accordingly. This will be key in the “direction” step of the intelligence cycle.

3. Finding demands far more physical and intellectual effort than simply locating the adversary. A commander is far more likely to succeed if he knows the organization, location, and strength of an adversary force, its intentions, how it fights, and how it may react to friendly action. It is equally important to establish where the threat is not located, and to determine what he is unlikely to do within a given time, as this may provide opportunities for surprise and exploitation. Receiving information from a wide variety of sources contributes to the quality of the intelligence picture that helps a commander formulate his plan.

4. Within the battlespace and environment, the finding function includes identifying and analyzing those elements, other than an adversary, that affect a situation and may play a role in realizing the successful conclusion to a campaign. These include key players and elements in the environment, such as cultural influences, social ties, and religious and political leaders and clan groups, that may have to be engaged in pursuit of enduring campaign objectives and end states. The “find” analysis should indicate the role these environmental characteristics, individuals and groups play in the environment, their aims, and the ways in which they may be influenced to support the campaign.

5. In short, a holistic approach must be taken to the “find” function so that all key elements within the environment are found and analyzed for their role in achieving campaign success.

6. Although technological means will prove helpful in locating and assessing an adversary or other target, human analysis and experience is still required to assess likely intentions. It must be remembered that soldiers and others in contact with the adversary and local populace are sources of information, and often very accurate sources of information. Thus, key intelligence needs should be widely disseminated throughout the force, down to the lowest levels as appropriate, as standing priority information requirements.

421. FIX

1. To fix an adversary or another target is to deprive it freedom of action. This can be done by denying the adversary or target his goals, distracting the adversary from his goals, or by denying him information needed to obtain his goals. This may be done on the either the physical or psychological plane, or on both. For example, security presence patrols may fix an insurgent to operating within a limited area while electronic warfare (EW) assets block insurgent radio messages, yet allow alternative media messages to fix the spread of insurgent propaganda, thus fixing the insurgent’s ability to influence a population.

2. Fixing in physical terms involves the use of combat forces to hold ground against an adversary’s attack, to hold or fix an adversary in one location by firepower and/or manoeuvre, or to hold vital points by protecting against adversary intervention. Its object is to restrict an adversary’s freedom of movement and increase our own ability to manoeuvre. The fixing of manoeuvre forces may be done through a combination of shaping attacks, blocking positions
and deception, while the use of presence patrols, searches, and vehicle check points will help fix an insurgent force. Distracting and fixing the adversary is further achieved by embroiling him in subsidiary actions that divert him from his main purpose.

3. Deception and surprise is key to fixing adversary manoeuvre forces. Denying the adversary the opportunity to achieve his goals and putting him in a reactive frame of mind enhances our freedom of action. Resulting in distraction, this is done by deceiving, luring and surprising the adversary. When an adversary is deceived, he is certain how to react, but his decision is wrong. When he is lured, he is invited to take a course of action that will make him vulnerable. When he is surprised, he becomes uncertain how to react to ambiguous information until it is too late. Given such uncertainty, the adversary can be forced to cover all options, thereby dissipating his force and being distracted from his purpose. He is thus fixed.

4. Fixing on the psychological plane involves disrupting and preventing the adversary’s ability to influence the understanding and will of other elements in an environment, namely elements in a population and their leaders. The object is to restrict his manoeuvre on the psychological plane, that is, in shaping the perceptions, will, and behaviour of others. This is mainly done through information operations and may include, for example, the issue of timely media statements explaining the actual facts of an engagement before the adversary can issue propaganda seeking to undermine friendly force legitimacy.

5. Physical activities may have secondary effects to fix a target on the psychological plane. For example, the destruction or jamming of an adversary’s propaganda radio station will remove a capability and prevent the influence of the local populace.

6. The fixing of an adversary force will often be planned as a shaping effect in support of a simultaneous or subsequent decisive action.

7. Fixing an adversary with manoeuvre operations can quickly consume one’s own fighting power. Thus, a balance must be struck to ensure that the resources allocated to fixing do not unnecessarily reduce those required for striking. Likewise, on the psychological plane, the use of friendly PSYOPS and PA messages to fix those activities of the adversary must not reduce significantly the ability to produce one’s own messages and the means to influence target audiences.

422. STRIKE

1. Striking the adversary is achieved by attack and other offensive activities on the physical or psychological planes, or ideally, a combination of both. Striking activities may be decisive or shaping.

2. Striking in physical terms involves the attack on adversary forces to: seize or capture ground; destroy equipment, vital points, and installations; kill adversary personnel; or, gain a position of advantage. The objective is to manoeuvre forces or concentrate and deliver firepower to gain leverage over an adversary. Success, particularly in critical capabilities or areas, will lead to secondary psychological effects on the adversary, such as a decrease in morale and cohesion. Thus, striking activities should be aimed at the adversary’s weak points in order to gain positions of advantage and undermine his morale and confidence.

3. To strike and create first order effects on the psychological plane is to attack or engage a target’s understanding, perception, and will. Much of this striking, be it against an adversary or some other target group, will be done through information operations, that is, influence activities. A PSYOPS activity for example, may attack the support of conscripts following a
lengthy artillery battle that shaped the situation, and thus convince them to flee the battlefield. While security presence patrols may have fixed an insurgent force in a particular urban centre, the arrival of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the reconstruction of essential services may strike to affect the perceptions and will of the local populace and convince them to support the campaign. Striking an adversary on the psychological plane through influence activities requires good intelligence, sound analysis, specialist advice, and thorough coordination.

4. Ideally, activities strike the adversary simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes in a complementary fashion. It will involve selective attack upon his key capabilities, his understanding, and his morale and legitimacy within the environment. This would be a synchronized combination of fires and influence activities. Thus, striking will combine manoeuvre forces, special forces, EW, with PSYOPS, PA, CIMIC and other influence activities to create complementary effects in pursuit of the objective. The adversary should see his key capabilities destroyed, his position out-maneuvered and untenable, his ability to command, control and sustain reduced, and his ability to influence other elements of the environment including leaders and populations neutralized.

5. The combination of physical and psychological effects in striking the adversary must be complementary. If not carefully considered in comprehensive planning and targeting, the effects of physical activities may undermine those of influence activities generated through information operations. For example, if PSYOPS is used to convince conscripts or others to surrender, but manoeuvre forces close too quickly, which does not set the conditions to allow mass surrender or creates too much collateral damage, the effectiveness of the plan will be undermined and the legitimacy of the campaign and its forces will be reduced.

423. EXPLOITATION

1. Exploitation is the seizure of an opportunity to achieve a higher commander’s objective, or to fulfil part of his intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation requires action beyond the given mission. To achieve the overall intent, therefore, it may be necessary to supplant the task stated in orders. For example, a commander ordered to neutralize an adversary covering the approaches to his commander’s objective may find an approach that is not covered and simply move directly to the objective. Opportunities can occur at any time while finding, fixing, or striking.

2. Striking the adversary is intended to achieve the purpose of the mission. To turn success into a greater achievement, one needs the audacity and determination to seize fleeting opportunities. Exploitation relies upon offensive action, surprise and flexibility, along with a commander’s initiative and understanding of his superior’s intent. It should be supported by the concept and philosophy of mission command.

3. Recce is a key enabler for exploitation. Recce should be extensive, expansive, and continuous in order to find the opportunities for exploitation. Where recce forces are not strong enough to strike, they fix the threat, limiting his freedom of manoeuvre and permitting him to be struck by other elements. Recce forces should be prepared to lead any exploitation.

4. In seeking to tactically exploit a situation, commanders must keep in mind that tactical exploitation may have to be delayed or even sacrificed in order to support the overall operational objective. For example, forces may have to permit a fleeing adversary to escape in
order to secure an area or a populace affected by the recent engagement, thus supporting the operational objective of safeguarding the populace, preventing lawlessness, or securing vital sites.

5. Exploitation may occur on the psychological plane through influence activities of information operations. A successful attack against an adversary’s position may be exploited through PSYOPS and PA messages that undermine the public image and capability and legitimacy of the adversary and his supporters. Any such information operations messages must be carefully crafted so that they do not appear to be gloating or exaggerated.

424. COMBINING THE CORE FUNCTIONS AT ALL LEVELS AND ACROSS AGENCIES

1. Conflict includes the constant interaction of the core functions to find, fix, and strike on both the physical and psychological planes. They are not effective in isolation and must be coordinated by commanders. Although the capabilities employed may vary, these functions apply equally from section through to multinational joint forces. Finally, conduct of the core functions may be executed through other agencies in conjunction with military forces. Other security forces, the judiciary, and even agencies for reconstruction and development can fix and strike, not only an adversary and his capabilities, but also fix and strike the factors that motivate the adversary and allow him to influence others and engender support from a populace. For example, while security forces are fixing an insurgent force physically, his influence over the grievances of a population may be defeated through social and economic improvements.

SECTION 4
THE EFFECTS FRAMEWORK:
SHAPING, DECISIVE, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

425. GENERAL

1. The effects framework is used to describe and link tactical operations through the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre. The framework refers to the conduct of operations and their related results, and may be used at all levels of command to conceive the conduct of operations. It is the tool by which a commander may synchronize the activities of his forces, in the AO, by purpose over time and space. Hence, it is the arrangement of effects in the battlespace.

2. The effects framework provides a means of conceiving and articulating activities by purpose. The activities may be described in terms of purpose as: shaping, decisive, or sustaining.

3. Concepts of the effects framework, like those of the battlespace framework, should be described in relation to decisive points and lines of operation. For example, along a line of operation, there will be a number of shaping and decisive operations the lead to decisive points and progress along the line of operation. It must be remembered that the concept of shaping, decisive, and sustaining applies to both the physical plane and psychological plane.
426. DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

1. Every tactical operation has one of three purposes: decisive, shaping, or sustaining. The commander will define and express his intent and his scheme of manoeuvre in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. This framework allows formations and units to understand the relationship of their missions and tasks to those of other formations and units through the synchronization of all operations contributing to the higher mission.

2. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining are defined as:
   a. **Decisive Operations.** Decisive operations are those activities that will directly achieve the commander’s intent. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of operations or battles. There is only one decisive activity for any operation or battle. During phased operations, the main effort can change phase by phase, but there remains only one decisive operation. When the decisive operation is launched it should become the main effort.
   
   b. **Shaping Operations.** Shaping operations are those activities that favourably shape the adversary and battlespace for the decisive operation. They make an adversary or other target vulnerable to attack or another decisive action, and help dictate the time and place for decisive actions. Shaping operations can be phased to occur prior to, or simultaneous with, the decisive operation. Success of shaping operations is measured by the creation of specific desired effects that set the conditions for the decisive operation. Shaping operations can take time to have an effect, particularly if they are conducted as activities and effects on the psychological plane.
   
   c. **Sustaining Operations.** Sustaining operations are those operations that ensure that the force has adequate resources to project fighting power throughout and beyond the accomplishment of the decisive operation and any following exploitation. They include combat service support (CSS), force protection, establishment and protection of operating bases, and support for and protection of civilians and civilian establishments. They must be focussed to support the commander’s intent and follow his main effort. Unity of command is essential to coordinate the many functions of sustaining operations. The concept of sustaining operations may be extended to include the sustainment of support and legitimacy of a campaign from the local populace.

3. Identification of the main effort is a key component and aspect of the concept of operations within an operational order. Within the framework of shaping, sustaining, and decisive operations, commanders designate and shift the main effort.

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64 For more detail regarding the commander’s intent, see B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command. Note that the intent does not include a lengthy, detailed method or scheme of manoeuvre. The intent may be described by a single descriptor that details the effect to be created.
SECTION 5
INTEGRATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORKS: BATTLESPACE, FUNCTIONAL, AND EFFECTS FRAMEWORKS

427. GENERAL

1. The three frameworks—battlespace, functional and effects—are combined in the operational plan and scheme of manoeuvre to link the following:

   a. Arrangement of resources and command and control in the environment (battlespace framework).

   b. Arrangement of activities in the environment (functional framework).

   c. Arrangement of effects in the environment (effects framework).

2. The functional framework is the arrangement of activities in the environment. It incorporates the operational functions (Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain) and their constituent elements, along with the core functions (find, fix, and strike) in a coordinated fashion, or in other words, into an operational plan. It balances and arranges the application of fighting power through these functions. The functional framework links the battlespace framework to the effects framework. In other words, it links the troops, units, and resources to the planned and organized effects, through the activities that are to be conducted by the resources to achieve those effects. Thus, the functional framework will have some forces manoeuvring, thus striking and exploiting, some providing fire support, thus fixing, some conducting an intelligence function, thus finding, some resupplying, and some protecting. The effects created by these activities will be shaping, decisive or sustaining, and are organized as an effects framework.

3. The integration of the frameworks occurs at all levels from operational design to operational and tactical level planning. These three frameworks together reflect the model for the application of fighting power. See Figure 4-8.

4. These conceptual frameworks apply to both the physical and psychological planes in a simultaneous and complementary fashion. Just as the battlespace will include the social and political structures and populations within defined areas, the elements of the functional framework can be applied on the psychological plane to target audiences in order to create the desired outcomes of the effects framework. For example, based upon the operational objectives of a campaign, a particular group within a battlespace along with their aims can be identified (sense and find functions) and then can be fixed (undermined or supported depending upon their aims) by the application of forces or resources to influence them, and thus shaping that aspect of the situation. In another example, both preparatory fires and PSYOPS will shape the enemy commander and troops before a deliberate attack to strike them in a decisive operation. Likewise, presence patrols to stop adversary interference within a populated area may shape the situation, before decisive CIMIC activities take place to re-establish essential services.
SECTION 6

THE ELEMENTS OF INTEGRATION OF THE FRAMEWORKS

428. GENERAL

1. Fighting power is applied in activities through the integration of the operational and core functions. The balance in emphasis placed in an operational plan on the various activities and forces will change over time and will dictate the nature of an operation at any given time. The operational functions are integrated carefully to maximize fighting power in the execution of the core functions. Operational and core functions are integrated in time and space through the designation of a main effort and the use of synchronization and tempo.

429. MAIN EFFORT

1. The main effort is defined as: a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area and time, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. The main effort is the activity that the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at that time. Designation of a main effort is a clear and simple method of enabling the commander to direct the desired weight of his fighting power to one purpose. By focusing his efforts to strike hard at one of the adversary’s weak points or critical vulnerabilities, it can overthrow the adversary who may be, in total strength, more powerful.

2. Commanders will weight the main effort to ensure its success. The most common means of weighting the main effort is to allocate additional assets to the main effort (e.g., surveillance, fires, manoeuvre support, recce, sustainment, etc.)

3. The statement of main effort in orders allows a subordinate commander to focus his activities and resources on the commander’s aim, while giving him flexibility in achieving it. It is not a point on a map. The main effort is the activity the commander wants to use to achieve a decision. It should be qualified by location, time, and the force(s) directly involved. For ease of

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comprehension, the designated force is referred to as being “on the main effort.” Designation of the main effort helps to ensure that in the absence of detailed orders commanders can still act decisively within the framework of the higher commander’s intent, while clearly understanding the priority of effort.

4. There may be a different main effort for different phases of an operation. Initially, for example, the main effort may be fixing the threat as part of a deep operation, using part of the force. It may then switch to striking the threat in a close operation, involving the main body. Although the main effort for supporting forces must always reinforce the main effort of the unit or formation they are supporting, they will not necessarily coincide. For example, the main effort for sustainment forces may be the establishment of forward bases to support a subsequent exploitation of tactical success by forces currently out of contact.

5. The commander can reinforce his main effort through narrowing the AO, grouping extra combat power on the main effort, allocating priority for firepower, sustainment, mobility or information operations support, and planning options for reserve forces to support the main effort. Once defined at one level, main efforts should be designated at every subordinate level.

430. SYNCHRONIZATION

1. Synchronization is defined as: “the arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.” It is used to overload the adversary commander and his ability to suitably react. He is attacked or threatened from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time or to establish priorities. Facing menacing dilemmas about how and where to react, he is torn in different directions. Even if not totally paralysed, he finds it hard to respond coherently and in a timely manner.

2. If the effect is repeated simultaneously against enough levels of command, a cumulative effect on cohesion is felt throughout the adversary. His problems are compounded so that the response to one form of attack makes him vulnerable to others, or it exacerbates a different problem. In this way, the commander can, in the words of the US Civil War General William T. Sherman, put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma.” For example, the adversary may have his use of the electromagnetic spectrum curtailed, and he may be attacked simultaneously using firepower from artillery and the air at ranges he is unable to match. When this is synchronized with the manoeuvre of friendly forces, the adversary can be forced into a position from which he can neither fight effectively nor escape.

3. Synchronization is not useful for its own sake, but should be seen through the eyes of the adversary and judged by its effect on his actions. Over-control to achieve synchronization can stifle initiative and interfere with the desired tempo of operations.

4. Synchronization of activities on both the physical and psychological planes is essential to ensure that activities and effects are complementary, reinforcing and supportive of long-term objectives. For example, a tactical ground manoeuvre success against an adversary in a populated urban area must be quickly followed by emergency aid to support the local population, additional troops to secure and reassure the population, and an immediate restoration of essential services in order to maintain the support of that local populace and legitimacy of the campaign.

66 Ibid.
431. TEMPO

1. Tempo is defined as: *the rate of military action relative to the enemy.* Tempo consists of three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution, and the speed of transition from one activity to another. Tempo reflects the *competitive nature* of operations. The commander adjusts his tempo to ensure that he acts and reacts faster than the adversary. The commander may also have to measure and adjust his tempo to ensure that he can continue to support and sustain elements of his force.

2. The tempo of operations may not always occur in very short periods of time. In certain campaigns, such as a COIN, tempo may be considered over an extended period of time.

3. Tempo relates to the temporal integration of the operational and core functions to maximize combat power. Within tempo, the ability to reconstitute quickly is paramount. Therefore, forces should be organized to achieve a high tempo of operations by grouping, when necessary, at each level of command for independent action to the greatest extent possible. The ability to group and regroup quickly as required will enhance tempo.

4. Tempo seeks to keep the adversary off balance by posing new and different threats, so that the situation the adversary believes he is facing is repeatedly changed and his responses are inappropriate. This can be done by speeding up or by slowing down, or changing the type of activity. It can also be achieved not only by attacking the adversary, but also by attacking his plan and his decision-action cycle.

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**IMPORTANCE OF TEMPO IN CAMPAIGN PLANNING**

During the “Hundred Days” campaign of WW 1, the Canadian Corps found that after the first day of a successful attack, the infantry outran the artillery support; communications could not be maintained; and tank support faded resulting in erosion of physical cohesion. The lack of artillery support led to high casualties against the deep German defence as the attack slowly ground to a halt. In response to this, commanders decided to slow the tempo of the attack by inserting a pre-planned 4-6 hour delay to bring up artillery and tanks, re-establish communications and conduct re-supply and battle procedure. In this way the Canadians, and not the enemy, dictated the tempo of operations and were therefore able to preserve the cohesion of the attack and retain the initiative.

5. Tempo applies to activities across both the physical and psychological planes. Just as a manoeuvre unit commander will try to achieve key terrain before the enemy can achieve it and therefore create other threats to the adversary, a commander will seek to create better and more timely effects through CIMIC, PSYOPS and media messages, all synchronized with one another.

6. In all forms of conflict, each party assesses the situation, decides and acts, then reassesses to see what effect his actions have had. This is a decision-action cycle. This is the competitive nature of operations and he who consistently completes the cycle faster gains an advantage that increases with each repetition. The adversary’s actions become less and less appropriate to the real situation until he loses the cohesion needed to continue to fight. The adversary should be made to see that his situation is not only deteriorating, but also doing so at an ever-increasing and unstoppable rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, resulting in erosion of the adversary’s will to resist.

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67 Ibid.
7. Decentralization of decision-making authority consistent with the commander’s intent can also be used to increase tempo. This allows decisions to be made quickly and at the lowest practical level. If observations need to be passed up the chain of command before a decision is made, and the orders transmitted back down the chain, the decision-action cycle is going to be slow. This is true for both the physical and psychological planes. For example, a commander given the executive authority to issue PSYOPS messages within set parameters, but without the need to refer the message to higher echelons, can react quickly to an adversary’s propaganda.

8. Clear, simple and short orders that clearly state the mission, the commander’s intent, and the main effort can also help increase tempo. Well-known and understood doctrine and practised standing operating procedures will greatly assist in the transmission, understanding, and execution of orders. However, they should not be used to restrict initiative, but viewed as multipurpose tools that can be adapted to changing circumstances.

9. Tempo can be increased by avoiding battle unless absolutely necessary, consistent with the commander’s intent. Preparation, conduct, and recovery from battle all consume valuable time and disrupt the tempo of friendly forces. The aim should be to give battle only when success contributes directly to the operational end state, and the conditions to achieve success have been established.

10. Above all, to operate at a quicker tempo than the threat, the friction, chaos and uncertainty of the battlefield must be accepted. Fluidity of operations should be embraced as the norm.

11. To avoid having the adversary cut inside the commander’s decision-action cycle, patterns and formulas are to be avoided. The adversary should not be able to predict friendly actions and adapt his responses accordingly. New, imaginative, quick, and unexpected solutions are always required.

432. SUMMARY

1. Fighting power is the essence of a military force. It is founded upon three components—conceptual, physical, moral—that are applied through the integration of three organizational frameworks: battlespace framework, functional framework, and effects framework. The elements of these frameworks are integrated through main effort, synchronization, and tempo. Lastly, fighting power uses the core functions of find, fix, and strike to conduct activities to achieve effects on the physical and psychological planes with respect to the capabilities, understanding, perceptions, will, and the behaviour of various elements, individuals, groups, and systems in the environment.

*The soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle, and the soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of a decisive blow practicable.*

Sir Basil Liddell-Hart
CHAPTER 5
THE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

501. GENERAL

1. Military capabilities and combat power are applied as part of a campaign plan in order to reach operational objectives and to achieve a desired end state. In planning the campaign, the application of capabilities must be considered with the aim of reaching enduring objectives and end states that address the root causes of a conflict. While the application of violence against an adversary will always be the purview of the military and other security forces, it must be done in combination with a range of activities and other agencies to reach those enduring outcomes.

2. Combat power and capabilities are applied in a harmonized and complementary manner across all levels of command in order to achieve operational objectives, and in turn, strategic end states. It is applied through a comprehensive approach that sees the cooperative engagement, by all elements of power and agencies, of a wide variety of targets and systems that influence the environment and are key to achieving the overall end state and lasting solutions. Planning focuses on identifying and articulating desired effects that will lead to the required objectives and end states. Activities are then directed through plans to create those desired effects.

3. Activities that lead to enduring end states are created by a wide range of agencies, in addition to military forces, and together they address a wide range of systems and entities that affect the environment and the conclusion of the campaign. Thus, the concept of a target is greatly expanded to include any individual, element, adversary, system, or group that is engaged with activity.

4. The military working in harmonisation and synchronization with other elements of power and agencies is a comprehensive approach. For its part, the land force uses a wide range of capabilities to create desired effects. This includes physical activities that create obvious physical effects on a target's capability and thus affects the target's behaviour. It also includes activities that seek to influence a target to have psychological affects on understanding, perception, and in turn will ultimately affect behaviour. Often these will seek to influence target audiences other than an adversary to support operations, objectives, and end states. Thus, capabilities and activities are applied on both the physical and psychological planes.

5. The land force conducts its operations using an effect-based philosophy and process that ensures tactical level activities are linked, through the effects they produce, to operational objectives and the desired end state. This is supported through a manoeuvrist approach and the philosophy of mission command.

6. This chapter will explain in detail the substance of each of these concepts and how, when applied in unison, they apply combat power in a holistic, comprehensive, and complementary fashion that leads to enduring end states.
7. In order to understand the concepts discussed herein, it is necessary to discipline the use of the term “effects.” Effects are defined as: “changes as a result or consequence of actions, circumstances or other causes.” An effect is the consequence of one or more activities that contributes to one or more objectives. In short, an effect is a result of an activity. Effects are the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, result, or consequence that results from military or non-military activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. They occur on the physical and psychological planes. While understanding this, it must be remembered that an effect may be caused by inaction as well. For example, the failure to protect a civilian populace from exploitation or targeting will result in a loss of legitimacy and loss of popular support for the mission and force. At the tactical level, activities normally constitute tactical level operations and are assigned in mission statements and tasks. In simplest terms, an effect is a result, be it physical or psychological, of an activity or a series of activities.

SECTION 2
PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES (FIRES), INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES, AND EFFECTS ON THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANES

502. GENERAL

1. The object of conflict is the imposition of one’s will on an opponent and to alter the opponent’s behaviour. The organized application of violence by physical force against a target’s capability is one means to that end and may be seen as a traditional application of combat power. However, other activities may be undertaken that engage and affect an opponent’s or another’s will to fight or to support a particular activity. These may include, for example, psychological operations in the form of flyers aimed at convincing enemy conscripts to desert or to convince a population not to support an insurgent element. Thus, there is a combination of physical activities and influence activities that may be undertaken in the prosecution of conflict. Seen from this perspective, activities and their effects exist on two planes, the physical and the psychological, and activities fall into two categories, physical activities and influence activities.

503. THE PHYSICAL PLANE

1. The physical plane comprises the physical objects, actions and effects in the battlespace. It includes military forces, the electromagnetic spectrum, civilian populations, armed factions, logistical resources and infrastructure, as well as geography, oceanography, and meteorology.

2. On the physical plane, conflict is often a clash between armed combatants. Activities on the physical plane and their direct effects are tangible and measurable. The physical plane and related activities have the following attributes:

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68 UK Joint Doctrine Note 7/06 Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach. Definition proposed to Army Terminology Panel September 2007.
The Application of Combat Power

a. Each party in a conflict expends quantities of ammunition and other combat supplies, and each is supported by the industrial and economic power of their respective sides.

b. Activities and effects on the physical plane can generally be easily observed, understood, estimated, and measured with a degree of certainty over a short time period. Of primary concern are the material support requirements for manoeuvre and firepower. It is on this plane that the science of conflict predominates, including those activities directly subject to the laws of physics, chemistry, and like disciplines.

504. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE

1. The psychological plane constitutes the perception, understanding, motivation, conviction, emotions, commitment, and ultimately the will of individuals and groups. It may be referred to as the moral plane or cognitive plane.\(^{69}\) It represents the will that changes behaviour and enables individuals to overcome fear and adversity, as well as the cohesion that holds them together. It includes psychological aspects such as belief in a cause, indoctrination and judgement, as well as emotive responses such as patriotism, ethnicity, religious zeal, and esprit de corps. It also involves issues of self-interest.

2. On the psychological plane, activities create first order effects on the perceptions, understanding, will, and ultimately the behaviour of target audiences. It may include a struggle between opposing wills or a struggle for moral and intellectual support from a target audience. These are difficult to grasp and quantify. They are manifest in such intangibles as the resolve of adversaries, the support for a leader, the cohesion of a group, the willingness of a population to support a movement or idea, to name but a few. It also includes the manner in which forces, their commanders, other individuals, or various groups perceive and understand an environment and situation.

3. Activities on the psychological plane and their resulting effects may seek to: undermine an adversary’s cohesion and will (e.g., PSYOPS); influence a commander’s perception of a situation (e.g., deception); affect the perceptions and understanding of a populace and their leaders (e.g., the profile of forces and CIMIC projects to gain campaign legitimacy); and, inform a general public (public affairs). These activities may be termed influence activities, for they have first order effects on the psychological plane.

4. The psychological plane and related activities have the following attributes:

   a. Targets on the psychological plane will include more than simply an adversary. The target or target audience may include adversaries, their commanders, other individuals particularly leaders in a population, systems, and groups of people within the environment.

\(^{69}\) Moral plane and psychological plane may be used interchangeably as long as their use speaks to affecting a target’s perception, will, and in turn behaviour and actions. The use of the term “moral plane” and its concepts of right and wrong may cause some conceptual or intellectual challenges when dealing with different cultures, societies, and groups. The cognitive plane refers to knowledge and understanding but in terms of logic only. Psychological refers to understanding and perceptions based on both logic and emotion.
b. Activities and effects on the psychological plane should follow a targeting process identical to that used for activities on the physical plane. Targeting for each should be done simultaneously to ensure activities and effects are comprehensive and complementary.

c. Activities on the psychological plane are more difficult and require the greater investment in combat development and training. On this plane, the quality of military leadership, the morale of the fighting troops, and their cohesion and sense of purpose, are of primary importance. Secondly, intuitive judgement is required to affect a target’s understanding and will. Here, the art of conflict is dominant.

d. Activities and their effects on the psychological plane may have subsequent effects on the physical plane. For example, leaflets convincing adversary conscripts to desert will lessen the physical combat power of adversary forces.70 These are second order effects.

505. PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES—FIRES

1. Physical activities are those tangible undertakings that consume resources and produce immediate, first order effects on the physical plane through force. They will focus on the physical destruction, attrition, disruption, or denial of those things essential to adversaries through the application of lethal and non-lethal fires and manoeuvre throughout the depth of the joint operations area. They include all physical activities such as electronic warfare (EW). Physical activities affect capability in order to affect an adversary’s behaviour.

2. Physical activities may be termed fires. Fires are defined as: “the physical means deliberately used to create or support the realization of physical effects as first order effects. Note: They include lethal and non-lethal systems.” 71

3. The goal of applying fires is to affect a target’s behaviour through physically affecting his capability as a first order effect. It contributes to the defeat of opposing forces.

4. Fires should be planned and conducted so that they also have second order effects on the psychological plane, in terms of undermining will and shattering cohesion by denying the adversary the physical means or opportunities needed to achieve his objective. Thus, fires should aim to create first order effects on the physical plane, and second order effects on the psychological plane. These latter effects may prove to be decisive. For example, an artillery attack will reduce an adversary’s capability and affect his behaviour, and thus it has an effect on the physical plane. It may have a secondary effect on the psychological plane by reducing the morale and will of the adversary, and thus affect his behaviour.

70 Although much has been written regarding elements on an “informational plane,” this level of existence has yet to be truly identified and defined as being distinct from either the physical or psychological planes. Information that exists on information systems, on computer systems, or even in the form of electrons belongs to the physical plane, for it can be blocked, destroyed, or otherwise physically altered. Information that resides in an individual’s mind or in the collective opinion of a group of people, and thus affects their perceptions, will, and behaviour, exists on the psychological plane. They too can be altered, but through activities that seek to influence.

5. Non-lethal fires may be used against non-adversaries, such as crowd confrontation measures against violent demonstrators in order to maintain security and public order.

6. Destruction may be pursued to undermine an adversary's ability to conduct operations, but is often most effective when it is used to damage the adversary's morale, and increase his feelings of fear, desperation and hopelessness. That is, fires are most effective when they create significant second order effects on the psychological plane. Thus, fires affect an adversary's behaviour by attacking capability as a first order, and by affecting perception and will, and ultimately behaviour as a second order. This is the essence of the manoeuvrist approach to operations, that is, the shaping of understanding, the undermining of will, and the shattering of cohesion as the ideal result of fires.

7. Physical destruction may not in itself lead to success. The destruction, for example, of a large number of insurgents will not solve the underlying causes of an insurgency and may create new recruits to the movement. This would be a physical activity that leads to an undesired second order effect. Additionally, targeting the adversary could cause unnecessary collateral damage that in turn undermines the support of a neutral populace and the legitimacy of a campaign, and creates new opposition. Success criteria that rely on destruction must take into account the risk to public and political support that protracted and inconclusive battles and engagements entail. Therefore, physical destruction of the adversary by itself is not a wholly reliable means of achieving lasting success, even when it is aimed at secondary effects on the psychological plane against the enemy's will and behaviour.

506. INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

1. An influence activity is defined as: “an activity designed to affect the character or behaviour of a person or a group as a first order effect. Note: It affects understanding, perceptions and will, with the aim of affecting behaviour in a desired manner.”

2. Influence Activity seeks to predispose, persuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerce target audiences to adopt a particular course of action or to assist, encourage and reassure those that are following a desired course of action.

3. Since defeating an adversary by fires and their related effects alone has limitations and rarely leads to an enduring end state in many campaigns, land operations doctrine also encompasses activities that seek to create a direct, first order effect of influencing target audiences. These influence activities affect perception, understanding, and thus will, and ultimately behaviour of the target or target audience. Consequently, influence activities create first order effects on the psychological plane. In some cases, influence activities may create second order effects on the physical plane. For example, psychological leaflets that convince conscripts to flee an enemy position will, as a second order, reduce the combat power of the enemy.

4. Influence activities may be physical based psychological activities such as a feint or demonstration to deceive an enemy commander, a firepower demonstration to dissuade a former belligerent from violating a cease-fire, or the construction of infrastructure to engender support and stability amongst a local population. They will include physical demonstrations of commitment and credibility as reflected in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects, such as the reconstruction of infrastructure and social development, which are meant to demonstrate

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campaign legitimacy and gain support from political/social leaders and local populations. Even though these examples have a physical aspect to them, they create a first order effect of influencing perceptions and will.

5. Psychological activities may be **non-physical psychological** activities. They use or affect information to create perceptions, understanding and will, and behaviour. By way of example, they include: the use of flyers and radio messages to convince adversary conscripts to surrender, or to convince locals not to join an insurgency; the manner in which soldiers are directed to behave and dress during security patrols in order to develop support and trust amongst a populace; and, the release of media statements in order to provide information and generate understanding by the public audiences.

6. The key to employing influence activities is to decide the effect that is to be created. Commanders must understand and select the influence effects that they wish to create and then assign the activities required to create them. A wide range of activities will be used to influence a target. In the main, influence activities include the following:

   a. **Deception.** Deception may be applied to adversary commanders and forces in order to affect their perception of the threat and intent.

   b. **Psychological Operations.** Psychological operations (PSYOPS) use controlled messages to influence understanding, perceptions and will of targeted groups and individuals. Note that PSYOPS should never deceive or spread untruths, otherwise it will loose credibility and undermine campaign legitimacy.

   c. **Civil-Military Cooperation.** Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is realized through support to reconstruction of public services, social infrastructure, creation of governance, and social development activities.

   d. **Presence, Profile and Posture.** The presence, profile, and posture of troops in contact with a local populace will send a specific message. The manner (an obvious sign of commitment) in which troops interact with a local populace will send an important message to this audience, which will either undermine or engender support. The message may change over time from one of serious intent to one of approachable information collector.

   e. **Public Affairs.** Public Affairs (PA) is an influence activity in that PA activity facilitates the flow of information to various audiences through the media with the effect that information is provided and understanding is enhanced. Public affairs must not be directly associated with PSYOPS activities.  

7. Influence activities focus on promoting perceptions, attitudes, and understanding that influence will and affect the behaviour of governments, organizations, groups and individuals to support the achievement of the objective and ultimately the end state.

   

73 PA must not be associated with PSYOPs, although messages must be coordinated through an Info Ops forum such as an IOCC. The main difference between PA and PSYOPS is that PA does not control the medium, of its messages while PSYOPS does.
8. The target array or audiences for influence activities are wide in scope. They may be elements of the adversary, such as weak-willed conscripts that can be encouraged to flee the battlefield. Or possibly, they may include individual power holders, religious leaders, and segments of a populace that could influence perceptions and gain support for the campaign and its objectives. Such is the case in counter-insurgency (COIN) and peace support operations. They may also include allies and friendly troops in order to counter adversary propaganda and biased media coverage. In short, these target audiences will include adversary, friendly, and neutral individuals and groups.

9. In creating influence, selected activities convey information as well as physical evidence and indications to target groups and individuals, with the aim of influencing their emotions, attitudes, motives, perceptions, reasoning, and ultimately their will and behaviour. Although influence activities are conducted on the psychological plane only, they may have secondary results on the physical plane. For example, flyers that convince enemy conscripts to flee will have the first order psychological effect of causing them to flee, and the second order effect on the physical plane of reducing the adversary commander’s combat power. Moreover, it will likely have a third order effect on the psychological plane of undermining the commander’s confidence.

10. The need to influence a target audience may be key to the long-term success of a mission. For example, key to success in a COIN campaign is the need to separate the insurgents from physical and moral support of the populace, and gain and maintain the support of the populace for the campaign. Commanders at the lowest levels must be made to understand the importance of such influence activities and the effects, positive and negative, that may be gained from them. The conduct of individual soldiers will influence the perceptions and support of local populations, and most notably, one incident of poor conduct can rapidly undermine, in an exponential manner, many positive influences.

11. Influence activities may be applied across the spectrum of conflict in any campaign. Some examples are given as follows:

   a. A demonstration by forces supported by false radio traffic will affect the enemy commander’s perception, influence him to incorrectly identify the main effort, and move his forces away from the true intended area of attack, thus affecting his behaviour, and secondly, his capabilities.

   b. A firepower demonstration during a peace support campaign may convince a belligerent commander not to manoeuvre his forces.

   c. PSYOPS may be used in the form of a public radio station to bring accurate news to a local populace and to encourage their support for a COIN campaign.

   d. CIMIC activities may assist in civil reconstruction to engender moral support from a government and its populace, and to enhance the perception of the campaign and its legitimacy amongst a local populace.

74 Although forces would unlikely use psychological operations on their own troops, they may launch internal public affairs campaigns to counter biased media reports and adversary propaganda.
e. PA messages may be issued to counter enemy propaganda, and to ensure local and international understanding and support for the campaign and its operations.

12. Influence activities may be conducted to create their own independent effects, or they may be conducted to support physical activities. For example, prior to a deliberate attack on an enemy position, PSYOPS flyers may be dropped informing enemy soldiers of the means to surrender and giving a promise of fair treatment.

13. Influence activities are a key part of full-spectrum operations (FSO). Influence activities are also a key component of information operations (see Section 4). Given their nature, their scope, the necessary resources, and the timeframe required, much of influence activities, particularly those related to CIMIC, will be created in conjunction with other agencies within the joint, inter-agency, multinational, public (JIMP) framework.

14. In order to understand what activities are required to create influences and thus the desired psychological effects and behaviour, a commander must understand the target audience and the cultural and environmental influences, habits, motivations, and practices that all affect the target’s psychological reasoning. In simple terms, he must understand how the target audience thinks and reacts, and avoid making assumptions or predictions based upon his own cultural viewpoint. Unless the target audience is properly considered, unintended negative effects may occur and do enormous damage to the campaign, and great effort must be made to avoid them. For example, the firepower demonstration conducted to convince a belligerent commander not to manoeuvre his forces may only serve to embarrass him in front of his supporters, and thus cause him to actually manoeuvre his forces. Likewise, activities taken to instil fear or dissuasion in a target audience may only create hatred instead. During planning and war-gaming processes, staff should play the role of target audiences in order to view the plans from the standpoint of the intended target so that likely reactions may be gauged and considered. Cultural and political experts will assist in such assessments.

15. The concept of conducting activities to influence understanding and perceptions is not a new concept, and has been colloquially articulated in the concept of winning hearts and minds, or more correctly, minds and hearts, in which perceptions and understanding are influenced (minds) in order to create a particular will and behaviour (hearts).

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75 Joint, inter-agency, multinational public framework incorporates all actors whose power and influence will be involved in reaching the strategic end state. They involve joint forces, allies, other governmental departments and agencies, indigenous agencies and departments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and private enterprises. See Chapter 2.

76 Unintended effects can be positive or negative.

77 An observation from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Joint Urban Warrior 2005 seminar war game noted that when insurgents are killed or captured, local media coverage should be maximized to dissuade members of the local populace from joining the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, consideration of the issue would lead one to believe that such a tactic could probably instil hatred, vice fear, in many members of the local population, and thus undermine support for the campaign and even encourage more to join the insurgents.
507. THE INTERACTION AND BALANCE OF ACTIVITIES ON THE TWO PLANES: COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. As discussed above, military forces will conduct a combination of fires and influence activities with resulting effects on the physical and psychological planes. Whereas, the fires and their effects on the physical plane may be quantified with some measure of effectiveness, influence activities and effects on the psychological plane are difficult to quantify and measure. Notwithstanding the difficulty in assessing effects on the psychological plane, it is ultimately in many campaigns that these effects will achieve the lasting objectives and end state. An adversary force with a strong will and moral fibre may continue to fight even asymmetrically once its material forces have been depleted; however, they will not continue to fight effectively once their morale and will have been destroyed or motivations removed.

2. Even when an adversary force is defeated in a physical sense, lasting peace will not result unless there is a moral will to support it and the means for sustaining it. Thus, much effort from the military and from other agencies will be expended seeking those lasting effects. Firstly, there will be a great deal of influence activity to engender support for the campaign and its objectives. Secondly, there will be much activity by the military, but ideally by other agencies, to build institutions and capabilities amongst the indigenous society to secure lasting stability and peace.

3. This comprehensive construct can be summarized as follows:
   a. Fires will help defeat an adversary through destruction of his capability on the physical plane. This will alter his behaviour for he cannot do what he wishes, and support the campaign objectives. Well-planned physical activities that destroy or threaten capability will, as a second order effect, alter the perceptions and will of an enemy and thus affect his behaviour.
   b. Influence activities will have a first order effect on the psychological plane that will influence perceptions, affect will, and thus the behaviour of a target audience that will include individuals and groups, be they friendly, adversarial or neutral. When aimed at leaders and local populaces, they may seek to engender support for a campaign and its long-term objectives. Some influence activities will have a second order effect on the physical plane, such as a situation in which PSYOPS have convinced conscripts to flee, thus reducing the fighting power of the adversary, or when deception causes the adversary commander to dislocate his reserve force.
   c. Many of the influence activities will be undertaken by agencies other than the military, but ideally in close cooperation with the military. These will seek to create the support, institutions, and capabilities for long-term stability and peace.

4. Therefore, physical and influence activities with first and second order effects on the physical and psychological planes are conducted together to alter a target’s behaviour, and to reach operational objectives. This is illustrated in the Figure 5-1 below.
5. The conduct of physical and influence activities are planned, targeted, and conducted simultaneously in a holistic, complementary fashion. Just as physical activities are conducted and effects created through \textit{manoeuvre on the physical plane}, influence activities are conducted and effects created through a form of \textit{manoeuvre}\textsuperscript{78} on the psychological plane. Thus, just as a commander may wish to manoeuvre his forces to reach a piece of key terrain and threaten the adversary’s position before the adversary reaches it, that same commander may wish to issue a media statement, launch a PSYOPS message, or build emergency infrastructure in a village before the adversary issues a propaganda statement, issues a false media message, or intimidates the local population into giving support. Thus, a commander creates desired effects through simultaneous manoeuvre on both planes. Together, they may be considered \textit{comprehensive operations}.

\textsuperscript{78} There are a number of definitions within NATO for manoeuvre, the most common of which is: "Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission." When considering a concept of manoeuvre on the psychological plane, one must accept a colloquial meaning for the word, but retain the idea of gaining a position of advantage.
6. **Comprehensive operations are defined as**: “the deliberate use and orchestration of the full range of available capabilities and activities to realize desired effects.” In many ways, this may be considered another conceptualisation for full-spectrum operations, but with the focus on the effects, or the reason for their conduct. Fires and influence activities are planned, targeted and conducted in a simultaneous and complementary fashion. They are organized and coordinated through manoeuvre and battlespace management. (See Figure 5-2.)

**Comprehensive Operations:**

![Figure 5-2: Comprehensive Operations: Physical Activities and Influence Activities Conducted Through Manoeuvre and Battlespace Management](image)

7. The balance between the two types of activities and resulting effects will be dictated by the campaign theme, the principles by which the campaign is conducted, and the objectives desired by the commander. For example, while a major combat campaign against a conventional adversary will require mainly fires supported by some influence activities, such as deception and PSYOPS, a COIN campaign may require only enough fires to neutralize the insurgents while the military and other agencies work to gain the confidence and support of the local populace through influence activities, such as infrastructure and economic development.

8. The coordination as to time and space of the application of physical and influence activities is accomplished through synchronized manoeuvre, on the physical and psychological planes, and battlespace management.

9. The application of the full range of capabilities to achieve desired objectives may be summarised and mapped out in a logical sequence. Objectives and desired effects are the basis for planning and will dictate the types of activities to be undertaken by allocated capabilities and resources. (See Figure 5-3.) Note that the commander and staff planners must always consider the second order effects of activities.

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508. DEFINING SUCCESS THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER

APPLICATION OF ACTIVITIES TO DEFEAT AN ADVERSARY

To attack the adversary’s will to resist, an understanding of the nature of human will is necessary. When an individual faces combat, the primary responses are to fight, flee, or surrender. In most cases, an attack on the adversary’s will to fight should be accompanied by measures that encourage the adversary to surrender or flee. This can be accomplished not only through fear generated by violent physical action such as massive firepower, but also by surprising him with unexpected threats. It can also be supported by influence activities such as the advertisement of fair treatment for prisoners and wounded, showing respect for the law of armed conflict, offering honourable surrender terms, or pursuing other methods that legitimize and encourage his surrender. If desirable, flight can be encouraged by offering an open avenue of escape, such as when dispersing a riot.

An individual’s will to resist is built on internal influences, those of the group, and those of the leader. Internal influences include personal motivation and emotions, such as hatred or revenge that motivate the individual to continue fighting even if alone. Often more dominant are the influences of the small group. Battlefield studies have shown that the primary reason individuals fight is the feeling of group loyalty or the fear of letting down other members of the group. The individual, and in fact the group, are also affected by the influence of leaders who can provide motivation and compulsion to fight and legitimize the efforts of individuals. These individuals may be moral centres of gravity.

It is difficult to alter strongly held personal beliefs, and closely-knit small groups are difficult to break up. Therefore, efforts aimed at attacking the adversary’s will to fight should focus on two areas. The first is to attack the leaders’ will to fight and the second is to disrupt the bonds between larger groups, and shattering the links between leaders and followers. In other words, the preferred method of attacking the will to fight is to render the adversary incapable of resisting by shattering the physical and moral cohesion of his force. This may be done by through overwhelming fires, and in part, through influence activities that attack perception, legitimacy, understanding, and thus will of the adversary.
1. In order to reach the desired lasting end state and thus the successful conclusion of a campaign, a number of agencies will be involved in addition to the military. This will ensure that all the elements of an environment that led to military intervention are addressed in order to establish a lasting stability and peace.

2. The primary roles of the military will be to employ its monopoly on force, and to counter threats of violence and military power posed by an adversary. The object of the use of force or threat of force is to impose the force’s will upon specific targets. In many campaigns, military capabilities will be employed to neutralize an enemy threat to allow other agencies to undertake their activities in a secure environment, which will address long-term solutions to the situation. In addition to this, military capabilities, in conjunction with those of other agencies and elements, will be used to create effects and support objectives in relation to a local populace and the supported government. For example, military forces may be used to build infrastructure or to support other agencies in such efforts. These will be done to create a better, more stable environment, and to engender support and stability from a populace and local authority; that is, they will create effects on the psychological plane. Thus, the campaign will employ a comprehensive approach that uses fires to deal with an enemy or potential adversary, and influence activities to create campaign legitimacy and engender support from a government or population, in a harmonized, complementary fashion, all in order to create enduring solutions to a crisis or situation.

3. Success is measured against predetermined criteria that support the decided end state. The end state is the result that must be achieved at the end of a campaign to conclude the conflict on favourable terms. The end state will likely have political, diplomatic, economic and social/psychological, as well as military aspects, and hence will require a multi-agency, comprehensive approach.

4. In military terms, victory in a campaign may not see the outright surrender of an opposing force. Rather than a pure military victory, the end state may often be defined in terms such as reconciliation, acceptance of the status quo, or agreement to a peace plan. In many campaigns such as a COIN, there may be no outright victory, but only a concession by the insurgents to pursue peaceful means to reach their political goals, or the development of an indigenous capability (physically and intellectually) to deal decisively with the insurgency on their own. Success, in short, will occur through activities and effects on both the physical and psychological planes.

**SECTION 3**

**THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO OPERATIONS**

**509. GENERAL**

1. Environments and battlespaces are complex and consist of a variety of players and entities that can be considered as interrelated systems that influence one another and the overall environment. They may be grouped together under the headings of political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), infrastructure, and information (PMESII).

2. Campaigns occur in complex situations that involve, to one degree or another, elements of these systems: local populations; urban areas; complicated social and political structures; informal, traditional power structures; and, extensive, interrelated problems that led to the need for military intervention. The various systems and elements of an environment are affected by the region’s history and culture. These must be understood if the environment and its constituent elements are to be understood and engaged effectively.
3. In order to reach successful and enduring outcomes, campaigns will have to deal with these interrelated systems and various players of the battlespace. This of course will require more than the application of military capabilities. Given the breadth of issues, and systems involved, along with the root causes and standing grievances that led to a crisis, a successful outcome in many campaigns will require the application of a wide array of agencies, elements of power and capabilities. Thus the military will work in concert with these other agencies to reach a successful conclusion. This multi-agency, coordinated method that addresses all issues and systems in the environment—military and non-military—may be termed a comprehensive approach.

510. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

1. The comprehensive approach is defined as: “the application of commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment. Note: The comprehensive approach brings together all the elements of power and other agencies needed to create enduring solutions to a campaign.”

2. The comprehensive approach is an overarching philosophy for the conduct of a campaign. It recognises that crisis situations and their surrounding environments are complicated and that an enduring solution cannot be reached by military forces alone, but requires the use of a wide range of powers exercised through a variety of departments and agencies in order to solve the root causes and aggravating grievances that led to the crisis. A comprehensive approach seeks to incorporate all the elements of power and agencies, and harmonize them, their capabilities, and their activities, in order to work to address the elements and complexities present in an environment, and reach enduring strategic and operational end states. Thus, it brings together all elements of power and applies them to engage all systems within the environment.

3. The comprehensive approach to campaigns and operations begins at the strategic level through the JIMP framework and sees the military, other elements of power, and other agencies working within a unifying theme to reach a common end state. In this way, the root causes of a crisis and the various systems within the environment that will influence the outcome are engaged to create operational objectives that build to the end state.

4. It does not mean to imply that a military authority is in overall charge of a campaign, but only seeks to ensure that military activities, effects, and objectives lead to the strategic end state and are complementary to those of any lead agency and other elements of power and agencies. A number of command structures or cooperative committee systems may be used to realise the comprehensive approach. This approach brings together not only other government agencies, but also other organizations, be they international, private or indigenous.

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80 Some NATO allies describe the same concept with slightly different terminology. The United Kingdom uses Comprehensive Approach; however, others, such as the United States, use Whole of Government Approach, Integrated Operations and Unified Action to describe generally the same concept or aspects of the comprehensive approach.


82 For a more detailed discussion on possible command and cooperation structures across different agencies, see B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-Insurgency Operations.
5. The comprehensive approach consists of three elements:

a. **Unifying Theme.** In striving towards a strategic end state, the lead agency should issue a unifying theme that is focused on long-term outcomes and end states. For the military, this should be pervasive throughout the campaign plan. It should be developed in the commander’s visualization of the campaign and articulated in his intent.

b. **Collaborative Working.** An effort is made to harmonize the activities, effects and objectives of all the elements of power in the JIMP framework so that all efforts are complementary and integrated towards common objectives and end states. This may occur under formal or informal arrangements.

c. **Comprehensive Response.** The activities and effects of all the elements of power are to be applied in a holistic approach to the situation to all the relevant elements, systems, and entities that are at work in the environment. This includes political, military, civil and economic facets to an environment, along with any other identified influences and systems. Furthermore, there occurs continuous assessment as to how campaign activities will affect each of these systems and entities, and how they will in turn affect one another as progress is made towards the end state. This comprehensive response includes the military’s role and the conduct of its comprehensive operations, that is, the combination of fires and influence, guided by the unifying theme and operational objectives. All activities at the lower operational and tactical levels of command should reflect the comprehensive approach and in some cases see cooperation between other agencies and the military at the subunit level. Many of the influence activities under comprehensive operations may be conducted in conjunction with other agencies.

6. Between the operational and tactical level, the comprehensive approach is realized as comprehensive operations. Here, tactical level fires are planned and conducted in a complementary fashion with influence activities across all elements of power in order to create the desired effects supporting operational objectives. Many of the influence activities, particularly those related to reconstruction, governance, and security sector reform (SSR), will be best conducted by other agencies with the military in support. (See Figure 5-4.)
While the military will focus on security and defeating, or at least neutralizing, an adversary, other elements of power and agencies will address those elements and systems of the environment that ensure lasting security for a populace—the political, social and economic elements. Although this is done to meet the long-term objectives of a campaign, it is also undertaken to ensure support from local populations and leaders who are likely key to long-term success and stability.

Thus, the campaign will consist of a number of operational objectives spanning all of these areas, which in turn can be grouped into a number of lines or thematic grouping of operations, such as security, economic/development, political, and social, to name some possibilities. A good number of these lines of operation and their objectives will be best pursued by non-military agencies. The military may be the lead or supported agency in some areas, such as security. The military will be a supporting agency in other lines of operation, such as reconstruction.

During the early stages of a campaign, the security situation may only allow for the military to undertake all aspects of the campaign. Hence, the military may undertake the initial reconstruction, economic and political development, and the reform of security services (many of these will be classified as Stability Operations—see Chapter 3). Once the security situation improves, other agencies should be able to assume the lead in these non-martial responsibilities. Eventually, the campaign may reach such a state that the military’s role will be reduced to a minimum and indigenous forces will be able to handle any residual threat to security. Indeed, the requirement for the military may end before the overall campaign is complete.

The campaign design may involve a formal unified structure with a lead agency and commander, and all agencies, be they military or civil, working within a single chain of command. Such constructs are ideal and work to ensure excellent harmony and cooperation.
between agencies. However, such situations will be rare.\textsuperscript{83} Usually, informal arrangements will have to be designed in order to ensure that all agencies work in a complementary manner toward the attainment of agreed objectives and end states. Often there will be a major onus on the military commander to ensure that genuine, cooperative and collaborative working environments are developed between the military and other agencies, be they national, international, local or unaligned non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Participants must work proactively by sharing their understanding of the situations, and conduct planning and activities on the basis of agreed favourable outcomes in the short, medium and long term. Hence, the comprehensive approach will rely as much upon personal relationships as upon formal arrangements.

11. Processes and structures may need to be adapted to reflect specific circumstances and situations. For example, a military headquarters (HQ) may have to accommodate the interface with non-military organizations and take the lead in coordinating objectives and efforts. The comprehensive approach must also consider actors and agencies beyond the government, such as NGOs, international organizations (IOs), local agencies and leaders, and others, all of which conduct activity and pursue objectives that have a bearing on the successful conclusion of the campaign.

12. By its very nature, the comprehensive approach should begin at the strategic level where all the elements of power can be brought together for collaborative planning and execution. Although the comprehensive approach begins at the strategic level, it should be viewed and implemented pervasively throughout all levels of command. Hence, it will be envisioned, designed, and ideally empowered, at the strategic level in order create strategic end states, but implemented and practised at both the operational and tactical level.

13. At the operational level, commanders will endeavour to ensure a holistic and complementary integration of military and non-military agencies in order to address all systems and elements within the environment, thus creating physical and psychological effects that support operational objectives. This comprehensive approach should be replicated as appropriate at the tactical level where unit and even subunit commanders will work with other agencies to create effects that support enduring objectives.

14. Through this comprehensive approach, the influence activities that create enduring effects on the psychological plane will be created by both the military and other agencies. This comprehensive approach uses all instruments of power to address all the systems—and the groups in individuals that comprise them—that influence an environment and the root causes for the crisis and campaign. Activities within an environment must be considered against more than simply an adversary. All systems—PMESII—within the environment must be identified and considered in terms of their power structures, interrelationships and influences on the desired objectives and end states. Activities planned and taken by all agencies including the military must be considered in terms of their effects on each of these systems in relation to the desired outcomes. \textit{Only in this comprehensive manner—using multiple agencies in addition to the military to address all the systems and elements in an environment—will long term solutions to campaigns be reached.}

\textsuperscript{83} Despite the rarity of such situations, examples of successful models include the British campaign in the 1950s/1960s Malaya, and the Australian experience in 2003 the Solomon Islands.
15. Although an environment may be described as a collection of systems, they consist of people—groups and individuals—who influence the situation and one another. These groups will co-exist either peacefully or in competition with each other based upon religious, ethnic, political, ideological, or clan/tribal lines. Human perceptions of issues of economy and security will affect the behaviour and thinking of the population. Cultural factors are dynamic and present both obstacles and opportunities. Knowing the groups, what relationships exist between them, how they relate to the infrastructure, and how each group will respond to an activity, is critical to success. Such information will be a key aspect to the broad knowledge base formed through intelligence collection and assessment.

16. In general, **four principles** should be considered in applying a comprehensive approach:

   a. **A Proactive Approach.** Ad hoc relationships formed at short notice in response to a developing crisis prove problematic, and although at times unavoidable, do not produce the best results in the shortest order and prove difficult in overcoming prejudices and previously held misconceptions. Rather, a comprehensive approach should be supported by standing agreements and strong personal and institutional relationships and early, shared analysis of an environment and battlespace.

   b. **Shared Understanding.** A shared understanding of the strengths, limitations, aims, and cultures of each element within the comprehensive approach will allow a harmonized and complementary application of capabilities. Secondly, a shared understanding of the operating environment and the threats to lasting stability and security will again help ensure a harmonized and complementary approach to the campaign across the various elements of power.

   c. **Outcome or End-state-based Thinking.** The unifying theme should serve to focus the elements within the comprehensive approach and ensure that activities conducted by all agencies are based and judged upon the achievement of progress towards the agreed objectives and end state. Each undertaking by an element of power should be considered against how it might further progress towards the shared end state.

   d. **Collaborative Working.** The comprehensive approach demands that military and non-military institutions—be they national or indigenous—work together with trust, transparency, and personal investment in order to be successful. This must be fostered at all levels. While some elements and their leaders, particularly those not familiar with the military, will not be comfortable with a collaborative or highly cooperative relationship, effort must be made to ensure that, at the very least, a coordinated and de-conflicted coexistence is established, vice a mutually exclusive relationship. In such circumstances, the onus may fall upon the military commander to foster and engender, through a dynamic, engaging and generous personality, an atmosphere of cooperation.

17. It should be noted that the levels of authority, experience, technical ability and understanding of the personnel within these, largely civilian, organizations might not always correspond to that of the land force. This will inevitably introduce frictions and uncertainties, which may exacerbate personality and institutional difficulties. Nor will a formal command relationship always exist between military and non-military agencies. The commander has a
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key role to play in harmonizing these relationships. When collaboration is achieved, significant advantages will include:


   b. Easier identification of, and agreement about, outcomes.

   c. Earlier identification of emerging opportunities as an operation progresses.

   d. Improved capacity for mitigating undesirable consequences.

   e. More efficient use of resources.

   f. Increased legitimacy for the campaign and its conduct.

18. Ideally, the comprehensive approach is applied pervasively in both spirit and practice so that even tactical level commanders understand the need to work with other agencies, take active measures to encourage it, and understand the effects that must be created to help realize the objectives.

SECTION 4
AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

511. GENERAL

1. Focus on end states and supporting objectives will be required to ensure appropriate activities are undertaken to build towards those objectives. Lasting solutions will demand that the root causes across all relevant systems will be addressed and therefore objectives and the activities through which they are realised must consider and address all aspects of the environment—political, military, social and economic. Furthermore, long-term success and stability will only occur with the support of the majority of an indigenous population. To the end, the Land Force follows an effects-based approach (EBA) in the planning, conduct, and execution of campaigns and operations.

2. An effects-based approach ensures that comprehensive operations—the combination of fires and influence activities—are planned and conducted in order to directly support operational objectives. It ensures the military’s role within a comprehensive approach is harmonised with the shared end state and contributes to, rather than undermines, the operational objectives, end state and campaign legitimacy.

3. An effects-based approach to operations is defined as: “EBA is the way of thinking and specific processes, integrated in both the physical and psychological plane, that focus on outcomes (effects) rather than activities to enable both the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach and the realisation of operational and strategic outcomes. The EBA process is the organization of activities to achieve planned, desired and measurable effects that will realize objectives and ultimately meet the mission end state.”
512. PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE

1. The **philosophy** behind an effects-based approach to operations stems from the premise and belief that successful campaigns require the holistic application of all instruments of power on both the physical and psychological planes. Thus, the military must work in a unity of purpose, and ideally effort, with other instruments of power and agencies in order to achieve enduring solutions to both the symptoms and root causes of a situation requiring intervention.

2. Additionally, it focuses on creating end states and supporting objectives before consideration of lower level military activities. The **purpose** of an effects-based approach to operations is to ensure that military operations and activities create the required effects in support of enduring operational and strategic objectives and end states, in harmony with other instruments of power, and in relation to all aspects of the environment.

3. Consequently, it considers the whole environment and the influence that each system has on the environment and the crisis at hand. It recognizes that the environment and its elements are complex, interrelated, unpredictable and adaptive, and that they require constant assessment and analysis in order to properly develop a plan and conduct operations in support of the desired outcomes. The systems of the environment are focused on people, as individuals and groups. This approach recognizes that enduring outcomes will require the support of populations and their constituent groups.

4. Based upon an understanding of the environment and the desired campaign outcomes, an effects-based approach links end states and objectives to activities that create planned, supporting effects (results) on both the physical and psychological planes. In order to ensure that the right activities are creating the planned effects in support of the desired objectives and end states, constant assessment and analysis and subsequent adjusting are required.

5. In short, an effects-based approach addresses the situation as a whole and decides end states and objectives in order to determine the required activities and effects on the physical and psychological planes. Commanders must assess and plan the effects they wish to create, through activities not only on the capability of an enemy (physical plane), but on the perceptions, understanding, will (psychological plane), and ultimately behaviour of all elements in the environment, namely individuals and groups. The effects-based approach sees all such activities—fires and influence activities—planned and executed together, in harmony with other agencies and instruments of power, and applied across the entire environment. It sees comprehensive operations supporting a comprehensive approach.

6. This effects-based approach does not introduce an entirely new method of conducting campaigns and operations. It builds upon and provides a better articulation for extant concepts such as mission command, the manoeuvrist approach, and a commander’s intuition, to improve upon operational design and campaign execution at all levels of command in order to address all aspects of an environment and to reach successful, enduring end states. It ensures that individuals at all levels understand the context of their operations, are aware of the effects of their activities, intended and unintended, and have the necessary guidance to contribute to the desired objectives.

7. As a general construct, the effects-based approach to operations may be summarized as follows:
a. A crisis that requires military intervention occurs in a complex environment affected by a range of systems, made up of groups and individuals.

b. A lasting solution must address the root causes of the crisis. Thus, a number of facets of the environment must be engaged: political, economic, social, and civil. This is best done through the military working in harmony with other agencies and elements of power—diplomatic, civil, and economic. These may be governmental, domestic, non-governmental, and/or private agencies.

c. Campaigns are best planned with a focus on end states and supporting objectives. These are realized through the assignment and conduct of activities, which create effects (results) that support the objectives. These effects must undergo constant assessment and analysis to ensure that the activities are indeed leading to the desired objectives. Activities are conducted by all the elements of power.

d. Because the environment and its systems are comprised of individuals and groups, their support is necessary for enduring end states. Thus, the military must understand that it functions and creates effects on two planes: the physical and the psychological through a combination of fires and influence activities.

8. It is a philosophy supported by methodology, and is merely an improvement to previous doctrine and concepts.

9. In order to properly apply effects there is a requirement for an analytical approach, to the greatest extent possible, using the coordinated application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities, to undertake activities and create effects in support of objectives and enduring end states. These effects are assessed and adjusted against predetermined measures of effectiveness, which ask the question, “Are we doing the right things to create the desired effects?” The effects, in turn, lead to objectives in achieving the desired end state. Adjusting the effects and the activities used to create those effects, based upon the assessment feedback, is vital to achieving campaign success.

10. In planning operations and articulating outcomes, commanders must clearly understand and express the following: the end state; the conditions needed to achieve it, that is, the objective(s); the effect(s) required to achieve the objective(s); and those activities required to create the effect(s) (see Figure 5-5.). Thus, in execution, activities are conducted to create desired effects that realize objectives, which in turn, support desired end states. This should be applied to all systems and facets of the environment. (See Figure 5-6.)
Basic Model for an Effects-based Approach to Operations

Figure 5-5: Basic Model for an Effects-based Approach to Operations

Effects-based Approach Applied to Various Systems in the Environment

Figure 5-6: Application of an Effects-based Approach to Operations Across Environmental Systems.
513. **PRINCIPLES**

1. The application of an effects-based approach should be guided by the following principles:

   a. **Long-term View.** Commanders and planners must take a long-term view of the campaign and the situation to deal with the symptoms, and more importantly, the underlying causes of the conflict and crisis. The solution to the root causes will usually take a long time to create and secure. It is important that political leaders understand this requirement as well. Ideally, this long-term approach will be shared by other elements of power that will be required, perhaps longer than the military element, to provide lasting solutions.

   b. **Whole Environment.** It must be realized that the environment in which a situation and conflict occurs is complex, adaptive, and often unpredictable. The environment must be viewed holistically, and the influence of all systems and actors with respect to resolving the conflict must be assessed and considered in planning. The interrelated nature of the environment in which the adversary, neutral, and friendly elements interact must be considered. Commanders must comprehend the relationships between activities and effects, particularly in relation to the elements and systems of the environment. The systems in the environment consist of individuals and groups, and this demands engagement on both the physical and psychological planes.

   c. **Focus on End State.** Planning must focus on strategic end state and objectives, and operational objectives and the conditions needed to realize them. Activities that lead to the objectives through the effects they cause should be planned last.

   d. **Collaboration.** All levels of command must work to create complementary effects that work towards operational objectives. Even lower levels of command must understand the effects, both desired and undesired, that their activities will create in terms of achieving or undermining the objectives and end state.

   e. **Complementary Application of the Instruments of Power.** In order to reach agreed objectives and end states, military activities must be harmonized with the contributions of different instruments of power and agencies within the battlespace and the environment. Planning and execution must be done within the context of a comprehensive approach that brings together all elements of power in a unity of purpose.

   f. **Continuous Analysis and Assessment.** Continuous analysis and assessment must be done in a holistic, iterative fashion to deepen the understanding of the environment and to modify the plan and execution as necessary to reach the operational objectives. Staff and commanders must continually assess the effectiveness of activities in creating the desired effects, and adapt accordingly.
514. KEY ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

1. An effects-based approach to operations acknowledges that conflicts and campaigns in the operating environment involve a wide variety of sources and issues and require that operational objectives address all facets concerned. To this end, a wide range of capabilities and activities are required in order to influence and affect systems and actors, including the indigenous population, in order to realise operational objectives.

2. In order to implement an effects-based approach, the following are key elements required:

   a. **Knowledge Base.** An effects-based approach to operations is predicated on a sound understanding of the battlespace and the actors, factors, and influences within it. Information and intelligence collection must be expanded in order to incorporate and assess the various elements and entities that interrelate within an environment—the political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), infrastructure, and information entities \(^{(84)}\) (PMESII). This knowledge base requires continuous analysis, in particular the manner in which the groups and individuals who comprise these systems will react to our activities and objectives.

   b. **Comprehensive Approach.** A comprehensive approach recognizes that more than the military element of power is required to address the root causes of a conflict and to establish enduring end states. It seeks to incorporate all the elements of power working to reach the strategic end state and harmonize them, their capabilities, and their activities. In doing so, it considers and addresses all the systems and influences within an environment that may have an impact upon long-term stability, and this is manifested in a range of lines or groupings of operation. The military may have the lead in many of these initially, but over time, should pass the lead to other elements of power in non-military lines of operation. The comprehensive approach comprises a unifying theme, collaborative working, and a comprehensive response.

   c. **Long Term Campaign Plan Focused on End State and Objectives.** The campaign plan must take a long-term view and focus on the desired end state and operational objectives. It should encompass and be developed with all the elements of power required to address all facets of the crisis and its causes, and to reach an enduring end state. The campaign will identify the supporting effects required for each objective. Only then should the activities of the military and other agencies be decided. The campaign plan is implemented through the continual issue of operational plans and orders that assess and adjust the implementation of the campaign on a regular basis to reflect progress made or frustrations encountered.

\(^{(84)}\) The environment is often referred to as a collection of systems, identified by the acronym PMESII. While all the elements represented by PMESII certainly exist within a society or environment, and they do interrelate and affect one another, it is believed that there are too many variables, including individual personalities, to allow a scientific “systems approach” to constantly and accurately predict exactly how they will react.
d. **Measures of Effectiveness.** A measure of effectiveness is defined as: “a criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected system behaviour or capabilities over time.” Measures of effectiveness indicate whether the right things are being done in order to create the desired effects. They are generally subjective and depend upon the situation and campaign. They are used to confirm that the correct activities are being undertaken and to adjust activities as necessary to achieve desired objectives.

e. Application of an effects-based approach to operations simply expands upon the current operational planning process and campaign prosecution in order to incorporate a broader scope of information, elements of power, capabilities, application, and assessment, all in order to reach enduring operational and strategic end states in complex environments.

### 515. UNDERSTANDING EFFECTS

1. **General.** To succeed in a complex environment, commanders must recognize that the activities they undertake will create effects that cannot be viewed in isolation. Applying physical force requires a precise ability to find, fix, and strike targets, while at the same time avoiding unintended consequences that may be counter-productive, such as collateral damage. Many campaigns require military commanders to consider activities in relation to more than simply an enemy force. Success in a complex environment requires that they understand the creation of effects and the range of elements and systems within the environment that affect the successful conclusion of a campaign.

2. **End States and Objectives.** At all levels, activities create effects that support desired objectives and build towards end states:

   a. **Strategic End State.** The strategic end state is the desired situation derived from policy direction. It is realized by the achievement of strategic objectives. A strategic end state will be multi-faceted, and a military objective and its end state—successful completion of the military contribution to strategic objectives—will only be a part of it.

   b. **Strategic Objective.** A strategic objective is a constituent of the desired strategic end state realized through the aggregation of agreed circumstances and conditions, generally specific to a particular element of power. Once all objectives are realized, the strategic end state will have been achieved.

   c. **Military Operational End State.** The military operational end state is the desired and enduring military situation (within the joint operations area) derived from strategic direction brought about by the campaign, which contributes to the achievement of the strategic objectives and takes into account the end state and objectives of the other instruments of power. It may be reached before the overall strategic end state. Upon achieving it, the military involvement in a campaign may cease or be reduced substantially.

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85 Measures of effectiveness are done in conjunction with measures of performance. The latter measures task accomplishment, that is, an assessment of whether or not the activity was done right.

86 Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel, May 2006.
d. **Operational Objective.** An operational objective is a constituent of the desired operational end state realized through the aggregation of one or a number of interrelated effects and circumstances.\(^{87}\) It may be described as a **decisive condition** for the realization of the operational end state. Operational objectives may be delivered by elements of power other than the military. Operational objectives may be grouped into thematic lines of operation.

e. **Supporting Effect or Decisive Point.** A supporting effect is a constituent part of an operational objective. It is a change brought about by the interplay of deliberate activities and dynamic circumstances that contribute to an operational objective. Supporting effects are created by activities and link a range of activities in time, space, and/or purpose. Using the taxonomy developed for campaign planning in a major combat campaign, one may view supporting effects as decisive points, for they build to the achievement of operational objectives. The traditional definition of decisive points will have to be broadened in order to conceive decisive points as being situations developed in time and space that lead to the attainment of operational objectives.\(^{88}\)

f. **Tactical End State.** A tactical end state is the tactical situation once a tactical mission, this is, activity, has been completed. For each specific mission, it is described in the concept of operations paragraph of the tactical order.

g. **Tactical Objective.** A tactical objective is a constituent part of the tactical end state and the immediate aim of a tactical mission as described by the mission statement. They result from the achievement of a tactical effect (result) or group of effects resulting from tactical activities.

3. **Effects.** Effects are changes as a result or consequence of actions, circumstances or other causes. Simply put, an effect is a result of an activity. An effect may be a physical or psychological result of an activity or series of activities, which may be conducted by a military or non-military (other agency) element. Effects can be categorized as follows:

a. **Direct Effects.** Direct effects are the first order consequence of activities (e.g., weapons employment results, populace informed through leaflets, etc.), unaltered by intervening events or mechanisms. They are usually immediate and easily recognizable. Direct effects occur within the same system or group engaged.\(^{89}\)

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\(^{87}\) It should be noted that some influences would not be within the purview of the operational commander to deliver, even if they may be necessary for the desired end state.

\(^{88}\) NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 defines decisive points as: “A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.” In order to be termed to refer to a supporting effect, the concept must be expanded to include a set of circumstances and perceptions that support an operational objective rather than simply a geographical point.

\(^{89}\) The term “engaged” does not mean to imply physical engagement with weapons systems only. Depending upon the target, the means, and the desired effect, it may mean engagement with PSYOPS, public affairs, or any other influence activity that will create an effect on the psychological plane.
b. **Indirect Effects.** Indirect effects are the consequences of an activity that are removed in time or purpose from the initial point of application and target. They occur in a target or system that was not the object of the activity. For example, if a successful attack on a village occupied by insurgents convinces insurgents in another village to withdrawal, the latter is an indirect effect. Indirect effects may be difficult to recognize.

c. **Intended and Unintended Effects.** Intended effects are those that are planned in relation to the activities conducted and support the desired objective. They may be direct or indirect. Unintended effects are those that were not foreseen and/or desired by the related activities. They too, may be direct or indirect. If they are undesired, they will likely undermine the attainment of the objective.

d. **Second, Third, and Subsequent Order Effects.** Second order and subsequent effects are consequences of a first order effect. As an example, dropping leaflets has the direct effect of causing enemy soldiers to desert. The intended second order effect is that the enemy’s fighting power is reduced or becomes ineffective, and a third order effect is that the enemy commander loses confidence and morale. Note that these subsequent effects cross between the psychological and physical planes.

4. **Activities.** Once the desired supporting effects have been decided, such as seizure of key terrain or the creation of a trained indigenous security force, activities that will create the effects may be issued to lower echelons. This is done through the creation of operation plans (OPLANs) and the issue of corresponding operation orders (OPORDs). Activities are tactical level undertakings, that is, missions assigned to formations and units and are realized through tactical tasks and effects. In line with the continuum of operations construct, activities are classified as offensive, defensive, stability, or enabling. The construct of a mission statement clearly articulates the tactical level effects that are required by an activity.  

5. **Unpredictability of Effects.** Note that effects are at times caused by circumstances that are beyond the foresight or control of a military commander, and result from the unpredictable dynamics of environmental systems and the individuals who comprise them. Thus, in such situations, an effects-based approach demands that a commander simply work through the situation and mitigate the unavoidable unforeseen undesired effects. Not all effects can be foreseen and therefore best efforts must be made to war game through operational plans in order to reduce uncertainty and avoid undesired outcomes.

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90 For example, in the mission statement, “A Company will attack to *seize* Objective DOG by 1300 hours in order to *secure* a line of departure for B Company,” the activity is to “attack” (often not stated in a mission statement) and the first and second order effects are to “seize” and “secure.” Thus, the objective is a secure line of departure and conditions to support B Company. The tactical end state will see A Coy prepared to support B Coy and its forward passage of lines. See B-GL-331-002/FP-000, *Staff Duties in the Field*, for more details.
SECTION 5  
APPLYING AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH  

516. GENERAL  

1. The concept and basic construct of an effects-based approach is applicable to all levels of command, including the tactical. At the operational level, an effects-based approach provides essential structure to the commander’s intuitive process so that operational design and campaign planning are conducted logically, linking the end state through objectives and effects, to corresponding activities.  

2. While the term “objective” has commonly been used to refer to a physical object against which action is taken, in an effects-based approach an objective may be something far more abstract, such as a set of conditions or circumstances that must be created, such as an independent, self-sustaining and responsive security apparatus. It should be considered as a goal to be attained or a decision condition to be created.  

3. Commanders and soldiers at all levels must appreciate and understand the effects that are required to meet their immediate superior’s intent and the overall objectives, and then undertake the activities that will create the desired effects. Secondly, they must realize that their activities will affect all systems in the environment and the people who comprise them, and that their activities will therefore result in effects on the psychological plane. Ideally, these are planned and will support the operational objectives.  

517. TACTICAL LEVEL APPLICATION OF AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH  

1. At the tactical level, the standard orders process and the principle of mission command will remain relevant. The desired “effect” of a mission statement is issued in the tactical task (often as a first order effect, e.g., “seize”) and in the purpose of the tactical task (in order to…), which may be a second order effect. Mission command allows a subordinate commander to assume tasks in support of achieving the desired effects and objectives. Indeed, an effects-based approach helps to more clearly define the commander’s intent and to focus the force on achieving it.  

2. The principles underlying the manoeuvrist approach remain appropriate at all levels and are reinforced by an effects-based approach. As discussed earlier, fires and influence activities are planned and conducted together and are enabled through simultaneous manoeuvre on the physical and psychological planes, and through battlespace management. The effects-based approach is applied at the tactical level through the manoeuvrist approach, with activities occurring simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes and organized through battlespace management and manoeuvre (in time and space). This combination of fires and influence activities to create desired complementary effects on both planes is comprehensive operations.  

91 For a more detailed discussion on the construction of a mission statement, see B-GL-331-002/FP-000, Staff Duties in the Field.
3. The models of an effects-based approach, with planned activities creating desired effects that build to objectives and end states, may be applied to the simultaneous execution of fires and influence activities coordinated and enabled through manoeuvre and battlespace management. (See Figure 5-7.) Note that the planning process begins with the desired end state and flows through selected objectives, supporting effects, required activities and allocated capabilities.

![Figure 5-7: Comprehensive Operations: Fires and Influence Activities Organised Through Manoeuvre and Battlespace Management](image)

4. It is important to note that activities on the physical plane may have an impact on the psychological plane and *vice versa*. This emphasizes the need to understand both the first and subsequent orders of effect, and to be aware of the possibility of undesired effects and the need to work to avoid them. For example, while an assault on an insurgent element in village X has a first order effect on the physical plane of the destruction of that force, the second order effect on the psychological plane is the increase in security of the local populace and the increase in their confidence and sense of legitimacy of the campaign. If, however, the attack resulted in civilian deaths and significant destruction, then the undesired effects on the psychological plane will be the loss of support for the campaign amongst the local populace, possibly better recruiting for the insurgents, and a perceived loss of legitimacy for the campaign.

5. The degree of risk acceptance imposed upon the commander, or that which he accepts, will in some cases determine the types of activities the commander will apply to achieve his desired end state. For example, the best means to defeat an opposing actor in area X may be to improve the economic conditions of the local population. However, the risk to agencies that
can best affect this may be too high at that time. Therefore, offensive activities aimed at the opposing force may have to precede actions by other agencies. In making this decision, the commander must weigh the potential adverse effect of any collateral damage in conducting offensive activities against the risk of casualties amongst the other agencies should they be employed first. The sequencing and synchronization of activities and effects will be critical to the overall attainment of operational objectives.

518. OPERATIONAL LEVEL APPLICATION OF THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

1. The effects-based approach is applied as a process at the operational level in order to ensure that the military acts in harmony with the other elements of power, and that all assigned activities support, through their effects, the operational objectives and end state. In campaign planning, it ensures that the tactical level activities assigned through OPPLANs support the operational objectives.

2. In operational design, the commander must reflect the comprehensive approach ideally begun at the strategic level, and incorporate to the greatest extent possible military activities with those of the other elements of power. In operational design, the commander and staff will assess the environment and identify what is needed to support the strategic end state. Commanders must then identify the operational end state and the conditions or objectives needed to create it, that is, the operational objectives.

3. Once the operational objectives are determined, such as a self-sustaining security apparatus, the supporting effects required for each objective may be chosen, such as Militia B defeated or police training re-established. Once the supporting effects have been identified, they may be realized through tactical activities assigned to the component commands by means of OPLANS and OPORDs. (See Figure 5-8.)

4. Although the construct of activities creating effects that lead to objectives is applicable at all levels of command, the link between its application at operational and tactical levels is through allocated missions in OPPLANs and OPORDs. At the joint and operational level, the following outline process will be applied:

   a. An operational end state will be identified.

   b. Operational objectives that support the end state will be identified. These are more than geographical or physical objectives, but may be a set of conditions or circumstances to be created. Once identified, they may be grouped into thematic lines of operation, such as “security environment” or “governance.”

   c. Supporting effects will be articulated that once created, will help realize these objectives. These supporting effects may be considered decisive points on the way to reaching or achieving operational objectives.

92 Within NATO Allied Administrative Publication, decisive points are defined as: “a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.” This idea must be expanded to see a decisive point as a conceptual point to reach in progress towards reaching or creating an operational objective.
d. The activities required to create these supporting effects will be identified and considered in light of ongoing factors analysis.

e. Supporting effects and their corresponding activities will be articulated and allocated to component commands (e.g., to the land component of the joint force) in the form of OPLANs and OPORDs.

f. The OPLANs will be executed through a series of activities assigned to subordinate elements of the component command.

g. Continuous assessment and analysis will allow activities and effects to be assessed, so that subsequent OPLANs will ensure that activities and supporting effects better meet the objectives.

5. Throughout this planning process, a focus must be placed upon the key centres of gravity within the environment and situation at hand. They will inform and shape the development of end state, operational objectives and decisive points/supporting effects, and even activities, depending upon the level being considered. For example, if the enemy’s armoured reserve is an operational centre of gravity, an operational objective may be its neutralisation so that it cannot manoeuvre; thus, a supporting effect of fixing may be allocated to air and artillery attacks (activities). Likewise, if an operational objective is enduring security situation in area X, a supporting effect may be the deterrence of a particular militia. This may be created through a combination of fires and influence activities such as PSYOPS and reconstruction to address grievances of the militia leadership.
The operational objectives and supporting effects will apply to a range of elements of power and agencies. Some will be the sole remit of the military, while some will be the sole remit of other elements of power that only need the secure environment provided by the military in order to operate and meet their objectives. Others will require a combination of elements and agencies in order to be successful. Operational objectives may be grouped into thematic lines of operation. Within these groupings, the military may be in a supporting or a supported role depending upon the nature of the objectives and supporting effects.

Good commanders have intuitively understood and applied a wide range of effects against all the elements in an environment that impact the overall objective. The Land Force effects-based approach is exercised through a number of means:

a. The adoption of campaign themes as articulated in the continuum of operations that acts to focus operations on long-term outcomes and end states. The campaign theme, along with the guiding principles for that particular type of campaign, inform the commander as to the balance required between physical activities and influence activities, that is, between effects on the physical plane and effects on the psychological plane.

b. The JIMP framework that harnesses the efforts and capabilities of other players within the operating environment in order to reach common end states.
c. Consideration of all the systems or entities that exist in a complex environment that impact upon the overall situation and successful conclusion to the campaign. These systems and entities, or at least their general classifications along with the role they play in achieving enduring outcomes, will help identify thematic lines of operation for the campaign (e.g., economic development).

d. Targeting considers the entire range of targets and target audiences within an environment, and plans their engagement using the full range of capabilities and activities, that is, comprehensive operations, to create complementary effects on the physical and psychological planes. The targeting of fires and influence activities together may be viewed as comprehensive targeting. It should encompass all elements of power and agencies involved.

e. The adoption of measures of effectiveness that allow for the continuous assessments of progress across a wider range of campaign lines of operation.

With these tools, the commander conducts his operations in a more comprehensive manner using the full resources available across the full breath of lines of operation.

8. This concept of comprehensiveness in all aspects of the plan and its execution enables commanders to more effectively address all aspects and influences of their battlespace and environment by incorporating, in a synchronized and complementary fashion, operations on both the psychological and physical planes to reach objectives and an enduring end state.

SECTION 6
EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH AS PART OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

519. GENERAL

1. In incorporating an effects-based approach to the extent that operational outcomes can be translated into coherent tactical activity, an effects-based approach is complementary to existing procedures, terminology, and practice at all levels of command. The significance of the commander’s unifying theme provides the focus for the operational design and resulting campaign plan.

2. The application of an effects-based approach is pervasive at all levels throughout the planning and execution of operations, from the campaign plan downwards. An effects-based approach to campaigns and operations provides a better focus and measurable progress. It provides just enough structure and process to the commander’s intuitive operational design and planning to ensure that tangible products are produced, end states and objectives are considered before activities, and the eventual activities link directly to desired objectives and end states.

3. Operational art, intuition, and command continue to have a major part to play, especially in uncertain conditions and in those situations where there is a compelling need to act. In all circumstances, operational freedom of action will be preserved and this is necessary for there will always be gaps in knowledge, and a commander’s intuition will still be required. Indeed, regardless of the lengths to which commanders and staff may go to anticipate all the actions and reactions of the systems in an environment, there remain too many variables, not the least
of which are individual personalities and motives, to allow an accurate prediction of all cause-and-effect relationships. Thus, a commander’s intuition and responsiveness to the unforeseen will remain key to successful operations and campaigns.

4. Terminology for campaign design will remain extant, but the application of it will have to be conceptually expanded. The steps involved in an effects-based approach are the same as those in any operational design and the operational planning process, however, the scope of these planning processes will need to be broadened beyond a focus on the enemy to fully encompass all the disparate, yet inter-connected systems and players pertinent to the situation. In other words, the planning will focus on enduring outcomes and operational objectives over the medium to long-term and involving all agencies and elements of power, vice focusing on short-term activities only.93

5. An effects-based approach to operational design and campaign planning will see the longer-term view taken by planners with a focus on enduring outcomes. While the strategic direction gives the long-term perspective, the campaign plan will provide the medium-term framework focusing on operational end states, constituent operational objectives, and the supporting effects required to reach the operational objectives.

6. The near-term to medium-term timeframe is covered through OPLANS and OPORDs, developed through the operational planning process. These OPPLANS and their OPORDs detail the activities that create the desired supporting effects. These undergo continuous assessment and analysis through measures of effectiveness (MoEs) and situational awareness. They are adjusted regularly (e.g., every six months) to ensure that the activities and their effects are leading to operational objectives and end states. Likewise, as the campaign progresses, adjustments may have to be made to the campaign plan.

7. Success in an effect-based approach to a campaign will likely be created through the application of more than just the military element of power. The comprehensive approach that begins at the strategic level is also exercised at the operational level, with all elements of power and various agencies within the environment—military, security, international, coalition, domestic, local—coming together, ideally in both planning and execution, to create the objectives for an enduring end state. Note that their timelines for involvement may differ from that of the military, but all agencies should be involved in planning from the outset. (See Figure 5-9.)

93 An effects-based approach to operations does not replace operational design or the operational planning process, but enhancing them by understanding the various environmental systems that will influence the campaign, using all agencies required to address the causes of the campaign and ensures that tactical activities are logically linked to operational objectives.
SECTION 7
ASSESSMENT—MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

520. GENERAL

1. Assessment is a key component in an effects-based approach and in the achievement of enduring end states. Only through continuous assessment and analysis will commanders know if they are conducting the correct activities in the correct manner to achieve the desired effects and thus reach the desired objectives. Assessment and analysis that continually provides feedback allows the commander and staff to adjust their plans and orders to ensure progress is made towards a successful conclusion.

2. Assessment and analysis remains the responsibility of intelligence staffs, however, resources and time must be dedicated to assessing the effect of operations on all systems and entities within an environment. Assessment of the effects on the psychological plane takes time to measure, and changes may be incremental and occur over an extended period of time. (See Figure 5-10.)

3. During planning, the means of assessment and analysis are decided. The means of assessment are classified as follows:
a. **Measure of Performance.** A measure of performance (MoP) is defined as: “a criterion used to evaluate the accomplishment of a task.”\(^94\) They ask the question, “Are we doing the things (activities) right?” MoPs are tied to task and task assessment. It assesses the quality of the conduct of the task itself, for example, the conduct of an artillery fire mission or the conduct of a framework security patrol.

b. **Measure of Effectiveness.** A measure of effectiveness (MoE) is defined as: “a criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected system behaviour or capabilities over time.”\(^95\) They ask the question, “Are we doing the right things, to create the desired effects?” MoEs are tied to effects and effects assessment.

4. Even if activities are done correctly and MoPs indicate successful completion of those activities, it will be for nought in terms of achieving objectives if those activities are not creating the desired effects necessary to realize objectives. Indeed, it may be detrimental to the overall attainment of objectives. The requirement of both types of assessment leads to the requirement to establish a deliberate process designed to assess progress in the:

a. Accomplishment of activities.

b. Creation of desired results/effects.

c. Achievement of operational objectives.

d. Attainment of end state conditions.

\(^94\) Definition developed by the Army Terminology Panel, May 2006.

\(^95\) Ibid.
521. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND THEIR SELECTION

1. MoPs are objective and relatively straightforward in their selection and application. They remain the responsibility of commanders in assessing the performance of their subordinates. Selection of MoPs is based upon battle task standards where applicable. MoPs are selected based upon three principles: they must be objective; they must be measurable; and, they must be directly linked to the activity.

2. MoPs apply to fires and influence activities and the same considerations apply in both cases. MoPs refer to the mechanisms of planning and execution. They assess how a task or activity was planned and completed. In the case of fires, MoPs may include: reaction times; accuracy of fire; performance of the technical equipment and ammunition; correct identification and assessment of target; and, suitability of engagement means, to name a few. In terms of MoPs for an influence activity, the same criteria may be used. In the case of a PSYOPS activity for example, the criteria may include: reaction time for the message and product crafting, and approval; correct identification of the target individual or audience; accuracy of the message; and, suitability of the message and engagement means, such as the correct dialect and broadcast range. MoPs are generally the purview of a commander to assess.
522. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND THEIR SELECTION

1. MoEs refer to the desired effects and whether or not the activities conducted have created those effects, that is, results. They apply to both fires and influence activities.

2. With respect to effects on the physical plane, MoEs remain relatively obvious. An attack may have been conducted well, but if it failed to seize the assigned objective or failed to achieve its purpose, then the MoEs were not met and the activity failed.

3. In influence activities and effects on the psychological plane, MoEs are applied to activities and the resulting changes in understanding, perception, the will, and the resulting behaviour of the target audience. Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making process, developing MoEs for influence activities and effects on the psychological plane may be one of the most daunting intellectual tasks facing a commander. Influence activities seek to work through external and internal filters in order to affect understanding and will. These filters are often culturally and socially based. Hence, the planning and conduct of these activities is an art requiring the commander’s subjective feel for their effect. The results of these influence activities require as defined a set of indicators as possible in order to detect changes in perceptions, understanding, attitudes, and behaviours. These indicators need to account for the effect of cultural and environmental influences.

4. In applying MoEs to the desired effects, it is vital that the correct activities be assessed. If for example, a joint fires strike is tasked to destroy 50% of an enemy armour reserve in order to preclude a counter-attack, and despite a higher than 50% destruction rate the counter-attack still occurs, the MoEs must be applied to the joint fires strike—which was effective in the first order effect—and to the planning and assessment process that calculated the insufficient requirement of 50% destruction to preclude the counter-attack—which was not effective.

5. MoEs will vary significantly between missions and even within missions. Commanders must clearly state the end state and ideally any milestones on the path to that end state. MoEs, using whatever means are most appropriate, measure and indicate progress in the target audience towards that end state. MoEs must be tailored to the specifics of not only the overall change desired, but to the environment, and in particular, the commander’s battlespace.

6. Because of the intangible factors involved and the subjective nature of influencing, the MoEs will almost certainly be subjective, and because behaviour influence is the aim, they require a significant amount of time to determine effectiveness. Therefore, they must be assessed as a set routine to attempt to recognize changes, trends and slight, yet significant indicators. The commander exercises judgement as to when an adjustment or change to an activity against a target must be made in reaction to the measured effectiveness.

7. A simple example may illustrate the application of MoPs and MoEs. During a COIN or peace support campaign, military presence patrols may be conducted in order to increase public security, return the society to normal activities, and engender support for the campaign amongst the populace. MoPs may be applied to the conduct of the patrols to assess their planning, timeliness, efficiency, and conduct of drills. MoEs assess the creation of the desired effects, and in this example, the criteria may include: a decrease in crime; an increase in local market activity; the reaction of locals to the presence of the soldiers; the flow of information and intelligence from local sources to patrols and other elements; and, the stated opinions of the local populace in informal and formal surveys.
8. In order to overcome the difficulties in their selection and application, some basic principles exist that can aid in the development of useful MoEs:

a. **Causality.** A definitive cause and effect relationship must be established between the activity and the effect attempting to be measured. Given the cultural and other variables present, there has to be a reasonable likelihood that the planned activity will create the desired effect. Secondly, commanders and staff must be able to assess any other extant factors that may be causing the effect other than their own activities. Likewise, they must ascertain if the measured effect is merely coincidental.

b. **Quantifiable.** A MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the subjectivity that plagues MoEs on the psychological plane. Quantification allows accurate trend measurement.

c. **Observable and Attributable.** When drafting MoEs, consideration should be given to the possibility that all of the variables influencing an activity and change in behaviour cannot be observed. The MoEs must be able to recognize a trend or change and confirm the connection or attribution to the activity. For example, if the presence or absence of negative graffiti is being used as an informal indicator of support for a campaign and military force in an urban area, observers will ideally be able to ascertain: its timing, that is, when it was done; its attribution to a particular group (e.g., political, criminal, military); their motive and whether it represents a minority or majority viewpoint; its attribution in terms of cause, particularly if it appears as a reaction to a specific event or action; and, its location in relation to the cultural makeup of the local environment.

d. **Correlated to Effects, Objectives and End States.** Just as activities are planned to lead to specific effects and objectives within a line of operation, MoEs should be selected to correlate to the achievement of each effect and be reflective of the level of employment. The strategic and operational levels require measures that occur throughout the length of a campaign and many MoEs at the operational and tactical level will measure the incremental progress through effects and objectives.

e. **Flexibility.** Although MoEs should be drafted at the planning stage, they should remain under regular review and commanders must be prepared to adjust them as required. They must evolve as a mission progresses, particularly as the consequence of their activities leads to the attainment of operational effects.

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98 Colonel Ralph Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” *Military Review* May-June 2006: 13-32. For example, during a tour in Iraq, 2 BCT, 1st Armored Division monitored and counted local and international media coverage of events in 2 BCT’s area of operations as an MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be identified, which contributed to discerning the effectiveness of ongoing activities.
Similarly, MoEs are likely not transferable from mission to mission. Even if a mission takes place in the same AO, the passage of time will force reconsideration of MoEs previously employed.

f. **Collection.** The commander must possess the capabilities to collect the intelligence necessary to apply a MoE and provide the direction and guidance to do so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoEs through all units in the AO as part of the G2 information collection plan. Collection may be assisted by other agencies, however, without a formal command relationship, this may have to be done informally. Notwithstanding, other non-military agencies may prove to be an effective gauge of progress in creating desired perceptions and will in a target audience. For example, increased cooperation with NGOs or other government departments (OGDs) may indicate a greater acceptance of the campaign.

g. **Relativity.** Improvements sought in a given environment must be relative to the specific environment and to what is considered normal for that particular environment and culture. Expectations for situational improvement must be reasonable given the starting state and the normal state of that particular environment. Improvements to a situation that will make it relatively normal for that environment may come quickly; however, systemic improvements in absolute terms may require cultural or social changes over a very long period of time. Expectations for change and the related MoEs should be set as incremental milestones so that improvement could be measured and demonstrated as tangible progress over time. For example, a decrease in criminal activity must be initially compared with the normal levels for the environment that existed before the security situation demanded military intervention.

9. Developing appropriate MoEs to assess effects on the psychological plane is a very difficult task. Willpower, perceptions, and beliefs are all less-than-completely-tangible variables that defy simple measurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a target audience’s attitude. Trends, however, require a definable baseline and this will be difficult to identify. Assessment in terms of MoE should be considered as part of the targeting process.

SECTION 8
THE KNOWLEDGE BASE AND THE SPECTRUM OF RELATIVE INTEREST

523. **GENERAL**

1. An environment consists of a number of systems and other elements, each of which will play a role to one extent or another in shaping and affecting the campaign and its outcomes. As discussed above, a broad knowledge base that defines and analyzes all the elements, actors, and systems within an environment that may influence the outcomes, is a key aspect of an effects-based approach to operations.
2. Noted earlier in the chapter, it must be remembered that the systems, often described as political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), infrastructure, and information (PMESII), may be complicated to understand, but they consist of people, in groups and as individuals. Therefore, each system may be affected physically and psychologically through the activities of the campaign. In many campaigns, success will require the support or acceptance of the campaign conduct and outcomes by the majority of the individuals within these environmental systems.

3. In order to understand the environment, its constituent systems, individuals and groups, a broad knowledge base regarding the environment and its systems must be established. This knowledge base must analyze each element of the society, along with the key members of each element, and understand the role they play in the environment, their aims in relation to the campaign and overall success, and the influence they have on other systems within the environment. Only in this way, will the commander know what, who, and how to engage within the campaign to move towards the desired objectives and end state.

4. The systems or elements of each environment comprise the nation or society at hand. As illustrated in Figure 5-11, they may be viewed as strands of a single rope that are closely intertwined. Each strand must be considered individually and as part of a greater whole. Its relationship with the other strands and the overall campaign end state must be assessed. At the centre of each strand or system is the history and culture of the society that has helped shape the strands. This must be understood and appreciated in terms of its influence on the perceptions, understanding, and actions of the members of the society. It will affect how individuals and groups view and interpret the campaign’s activities.
5. Only through a knowledge base that analyzes all these systems in the context of history and culture will a commander be able to effectively engage targets on the psychological plane within the society/environment to create the desired effects. The overall campaign and the engagement of all such systems are conducted through a comprehensive approach that uses all elements of power and multiple agencies in addition to the military to engage and create effects across all systems of the environment.

6. An effects-based approach is predicated on a sound understanding of the battlespace and the actors and influences within it, that is, on a sound knowledge base. The knowledge base facilitates an effects-based approach to campaigns and operations.

7. The development of the knowledge base will take time and must be guided by an intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process designed for the complexity of the operating environment, and that includes modifying the way a campaign planner and tactical commanders look at the adversary and all other factors, systems, and entities that affect the environment and a successful conclusion to the campaign. Hence, it requires a broader classification of all the actors, which range from the adversary through hostile and neutral to friendly forces and allies within the battlespace, as they relate to the interests and objectives of the friendly force. This has been labelled the spectrum of relative interest, and where these actors fit along the spectrum in relation to the desired end state will weigh heavily on the commander’s consideration of what activities and effects he will apply to modify their position and align them with his interests. (See Figure 5-12.) Some of these effects will be physical, but
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many others, specifically those seeking to engender support from the target, will be psychological effects. They are all targets or target audiences for engagement, either on the physical plane, the psychological plane, or both.99

8. This approach requires a cultural understanding and stems in part from the need to engender support from local populations and to engage other elements of an environment. In order to support this approach, the knowledge base must gain insight into the psychological plane and the intent, motivations, and relationships of elements in the battlespace in order to out manoeuvre them or to move them, through an effect of influence to a position of acceptance, cooperation, or even support. The assessment and analysis that leads to this categorization supports the targeting process, for each of the audiences on the spectrum of relative interest is assessed with respect to how they may be influenced and moved to a position of support or acceptance.

9. Each of the groups within an environment may be plotted along the spectrum of relative interest, and an assessment may be made as to what activities are required to either maintain their support or to move them to a position of support, that is, to produce psychological effects on their perceptions, understanding and will, in support of the end states of the campaign.

99 With respect to the term “targets,” a broader understanding the term must be used. Targets will include adversary elements, friendly and allied elements, and neutral audiences. Nothing nefarious is meant by the term, but it should be viewed in the sense of a business advertisement “targeting” a particular audience. Thus, all target engagements are considered together in a complementary and comprehensive fashion.
10. This approach must also recognize the paradigm shift in information acquisition. In major combat operations, a significant part of the information required to establish understanding by the commander might flow from national or higher echelon sources. However, in peace support and COIN campaigns—campaigns in which the support of the populace is crucial for success—this shifts towards an information flow model that is more bottom-up, with soldiers in direct contact as the key source of information. In many such circumstances, actionable intelligence regarding adversary targets and the motivations for their support will come from contact with the local populace. Furthermore, such contact will provide useful input for MoEs, particularly in terms of gauging the reaction of the local populace to the campaign's activities and conduct. Thus, an understanding and application of an effects-based approach down to the lower tactical levels is critical to its overall success.

11. This approach is also supported by the use of experts and advisors to the commander. Just as commanders have used political advisors to help steer campaigns in the past, they may also use advisors in the other environmental systems, particularly cultural, in order to better understand the society and its constituent groups and individuals. Additionally, it must be remembered that the need to influence an element or social group within an environment may be done indirectly. Messages will be better received and more effective in terms of influencing perceptions, understanding and will, if the messages are delivered through proxies, who are trusted leaders within the society.

SECTION 9
INFORMATION OPERATIONS

524. INTRODUCTION

1. Information operations (Info Ops) are defined as: “coordinated actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one’s own.”

2. Info Ops are not an operation unto itself. Rather, the doctrinal construct is a coordinated collection of capabilities related to maximizing the use of information while at the same time denying it to the adversary. It includes a wide range of activities, both physical and cognitive. They seek to affect the understanding, will and/or capabilities and ultimately behaviour of a target or target audience. Thus, Info Ops include a wide range of activities spanning, for example, from physical attacks against enemy command posts, to building schools, to issuing media statements, to running a public radio station, all in order to affect information, capability, perceptions, will, and ultimately behaviour.

3. Info Ops doctrine has developed to include a wide and disparate collection of capabilities, linked by a concept of information control and exploitation. It was motivated by

100 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 3.10 (AAP-3.10) Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, ratified by NATO nations in 2007. This definition is ideal for Canadian Land forces concept of information operations construct. Note; the Information Operations Policy for CF International Operations defines Information Operations as "actions taken in support of national objectives that influence an adversary’s decision makers by affecting others information and/or information systems while exploiting and protecting one’s own information and/or information systems and those of our friends and allies.”
rapid technological advances in information processes, but lacked a fathering and guiding holistic philosophy and set of principles. Reconsideration of the doctrine has allowed it to be refined and disciplined, with the focus on those activities that influence understanding, perceptions, and affect motivations and behaviours.\textsuperscript{101}

4. This section outlines the broad Info Ops doctrine generally accepted across the NATO alliance in order to place it in the perspective of coalition operations. While this section will embrace the Counter Command Activity (CCA) and Information Protection Activity (IPA) components of Info Ops Doctrine\textsuperscript{102}, the main focus of land Info Ops is Influence Activity. This new construct is the doctrinal construct for Canadian Land forces.

525. CORE ACTIVITY AREAS

1. Info Ops are conducted in three core activity areas: influence activity, which is the primary means of influencing will; counter-command activity, which counters information and command related capability; and, information protection activity, which safeguards friendly information, thereby inhibiting an adversary’s understanding. It is important to note that CCA, IPA and IA are not necessarily stove piped as the arrows in Figure 5-13 portray. Rather, there can be crossover effects for an activity. For example; CCA will certainly affect capability by destroying an adversary’s communications, however, it will certainly degrade his situational awareness (understanding) and as a consequence likely undermine his morale.\textsuperscript{(See Figure 5-13.)} These are summarised as follows:

   a. Influence Activity. Influence activity comprises any activity for which the primary purpose is to influence the understanding, perception and will of the target audience, be it friendly or hostile. It may include a wide range of diverse activities such as demonstrative fires to indicate intent and the use of a PSYOPS radio station to inform a local audience of the legitimacy of a campaign. In either case, its first order effects are psychological. Influence activities may be stand-alone activities seeking a particular effect, or they may be supporting other activities. In short, these activities affect the information, understanding and perception of adversaries and others, and thus affect their will and behaviour in order to facilitate friendly force objectives.

   b. Counter-command Activity. Counter-command activity (CCA) seeks to physically alter an adversary’s command and control (C2) capability. It affects the flow of information to and from a decision-maker, thereby affecting understanding or influencing will. CCA seeks, within rules of engagements (ROE), to disrupt, degrade, usurp, deny, deceive, or destroy an adversary’s information, command, propaganda, and associated systems, processes and networks through kinetic or non kinetic activities. In targeting such systems, commanders must assess the secondary and long-term effects as well foresee and mitigate unintended negative effects.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} The ABCA Armies’ Program Capability Group Act, Information Operations Project Team paper, October 2006.

\textsuperscript{102} Both CCA and IPA are frequently referred to collectively as the elements of Information Warfare to obtain battlspace Information Superiority.

\textsuperscript{103} Long-term effects may include the removal of a command and control system that will be required by coalition forces later, or by civilian populations.
c. **Information Protection Activity.** Information protection activity (IPA) comprises any activity that prevents an adversary from gaining information relating to friendly operations. IPA includes operations security (OPSEC), counter-intelligence (CI), information security (INFOSEC), and counter-intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (C-ISTAR). The C-ISTAR function includes the technical and non-technical elements of an adversary’s information gathering capability, and may include preventing a third party from receiving or relaying essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). In short, these activities deny the adversary information and thus affect his understanding and capabilities.

**Construct of Information Operations**

Figure 5-13: Three Core Activity Areas for Information Operations

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526. **KEY ACTIVITIES WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

1. Info Ops coordinates activity and is not a capability in its own right. The three core Info Ops activity areas can make use of all or any capability or activity that can exert influence, affect understanding, protect one’s own information, or have a counter-command effect against an adversary. However, there are several capabilities, tools, and techniques that form the basis of most Info Ops activity. They include PSYOPS, presence, posture and profile (PPP), OPSEC, INFOSEC, deception, electronic warfare (EW), physical destruction, and computer network operations (CNO). Clearly, many of these tools and techniques, such as physical destruction, have a much wider application than Info Ops, but can be drawn upon by Info Ops. It is important to note that only when tools and techniques are used directly to influence will, affect understanding, or affect a decision-maker’s command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability, they can be deemed part of Info Ops activity. Furthermore, the activities are conducted based upon the desired effect. Not every campaign will utilize all the tools available.

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104 This has been taken from Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3-10 (Study Draft 5 May 2003) NATO Information Operations Doctrine.
2. Note that the first five key activities are those influence activities that create first order effects on the psychological plane. The remainder are those physical activities that concern counter-command activities or information protection activities, that is, they have first order effects on the physical plane. Coordination of the following critical components of Info Ops is crucial to the successful implementation of the commander’s objectives. The coordination venue is normally the Information Operations Coordination Cell.

   a. **Psychological Operations.** The primary purpose of PSYOPS is to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with Info Ops objectives. Unlike public affairs (PA), PSYOPS retains direct control over contents and dissemination, and focuses on a specific audience(s). Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of resources, analysis, and planning. PSYOPS products will utilize a wide variety of means including print, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face contact, the Internet, faxes, text messaging, pagers, and mobile telephones.

   b. **Presence, Posture, and Profile.** The appearance, presence and attitude of a force and its soldiers may have significant impact on perceptions and attitudes, particularly on neutral or potentially adversarial audiences. This PPP concept is applicable at all command levels, and all elements of the force contribute to it. It seeks to send or support a message by means of the manner in which troops deal with the populace, and thus create a perception that supports that overall objective. For example, the decision to wear berets instead of combat helmets and body armour can make a considerable difference to the perceptions of both the adversary and local people. The public profile of commanders at all levels will impact on perceptions; therefore, the public role of the commander must be carefully analyzed and opportunities used to transmit key messages. Commanders must understand and assess the attendant risk, which accompanies any decision regarding posture and profile, against the need to send a particular message.

   c. **Civil-military Cooperation.** CIMIC is a coordination and liaison function that facilitates operations in relation to civil authorities and non-military organizations. CIMIC has moved from supporting operations under a G9 function, to being operations, that is, conducting activities that deliver an effect in support of objectives. CIMIC and the related activities (e.g., reconstruction, governance development, etc.) are considered influence activities because of their ability to inform, demonstrate, influence, and persuade. Thus, CIMIC and its resulting activities are a key aspect of Info Ops. They provide information in the form of physical evidence of psychological issues such as commitment and situational improvement, and thus engender support from target audiences. CIMIC related activities, therefore, need to be coordinated within the overall operational plan in

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105 Even those activities that deal with information protection, electronic warfare, and computer networks are classified as physical activities, for they use physical means that have primarily but not exclusively physical effects.

106 Civil-military cooperation is defined as: “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between commanders and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” (NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 [AAP-6], *Glossary of Terms and Definitions* [2006]).
terms of impacts upon civil audiences and their leaders, in order to ensure that activities work to support overall objectives.

d. **Public Information.** The aim of PA or media operations is to protect the credibility and legitimacy of operations and promote widespread understanding, through the ensured distribution of truthful information, thereby gaining support for military operations while not compromising EEFI. PA is a capability within a unit and formation that delivers the effect of information provided and understanding. It communicates and facilitates information to audiences through the medium of local, national, and international media and other communication means. PA is an activity that has an effect on the psychological plan for it creates understanding in audiences. Hence, PA is a key aspect of the operational plan. PA staff may work under the G3 and G5 to plan and conduct operations; the PA officer and imagery technicians operate in the battlespace, indeed, manoeuvre on the psychological plane in order to create this effect of understanding. To avoid giving the false impression that the media are being manipulated in any way, a distinction must be maintained between PSYOPS and PA.\textsuperscript{107}

e. **Deception.** Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by manipulation, distortion or falsification. Operational Deception may be a complex art, which demands considerable effort, a high level of security and coordination, and a sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking. Operational Deception must be used sparingly and usually is used only once decisively during a campaign, otherwise it will seriously undermine the credibility of all subsequent Influence Activities. The aforementioned restriction should not preclude the use of tactical deception, which includes basic measures such as camouflage (e.g., measures taken to make an armoured vehicle blend into a tree line). Operational Deception is normally used to dislocate the attention and fighting power of an adversary, but may be used as part of information protection, that is, to conceal friendly force intentions and capabilities. Operational Deception will likely use a combination of physical means (e.g., a feint or demonstration) supported by other information cues such as false radio traffic.\textsuperscript{108}

f. **Physical Destruction.** Physical attacks on an adversary's C2 systems will affect the capability of an adversary, and thus, his understanding, perception and behaviour. It should also be remembered that the use of force in certain situations sends a strong psychological message, and consequently, will have significant psychological impact as a second order effect. Carefully applied force can play a major role in coercion and deterrence and in reducing an adversary's ability to exercise command. In using physical destruction, it must

\textsuperscript{107} In order to counter adversary propaganda and biased media reporting, internal public affairs may be required.

\textsuperscript{108} A classic historical example of Operational Deception was Operation during World War II, which deceived the German forces into believing that the imminent allied invasion would take place at Calais vice the intended landing in Normandy. Thus diverting considerable amount of German combat capability away from Normandy.
be remembered that undue collateral damage and unnecessary casualties will have an adverse effect on public support. This must be considered, particularly if the enemy is using civilian infrastructure to support his C2 requirements. If physical destruction is required to achieve the desired effect, the commander must consider and balance the potentially negative impact that it may cause with the expected benefits, keeping in mind that negative impacts generally outlast, in people’s memory, positive impacts.

g. **Operations Security.** OPSEC is used to identify and protect information that is critical to the success of the campaign, described as essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).\(^{109}\) It aims to deny the identified EEFI to the adversary decision-maker, thereby affecting understanding and capability. EEFI will need to be protected throughout its lifecycle. Adversarial understanding and capability are targeted to maintain the security of EEFI, using a combination of passive and active techniques. It will include a wide range of physical activities including counter-reconnaissance patrols, clearing patrols, and security measures for HQ positions.

h. **Information Security.** The goal of information security INFOSEC is to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information through a variety of procedural, technical, and administrative controls. INFOSEC includes a range of measures that are applied on a routine basis under the auspices of security policy to protect information. INFOSEC includes elements of physical security, such as personnel and document security, and information assurance (IA). IA includes a range of electronic techniques, such as computer network defence and communications security (COMSEC) incorporating emission control (EMCON), defensive monitoring and technical inspection techniques, counter-eavesdropping, limited electronic sweeps and vulnerability analysis.

i. **Electronic Warfare.** EW\(^{110}\) has wide application in military operations. The effect of EW activity can be temporary or permanent and it has the potential to minimize the use of force, hence, avoiding unnecessary casualties and collateral damage. EW will be used to affect critical information of the adversary or the systems by which it is transmitted. Electronic attack enables CCA and attacks on information technology (IT). It also supports influence activity by enabling deception and PSYOPS, including broadcasts to target audiences. Conversely, EW can be used to defend systems and information. Electronic defence, in conjunction with spectrum management, contributes by helping to counter an adversary’s CCA and protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Lastly, it has the capability to provide MOE feedback and adversary Info Ops messaging to Info Ops.

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\(^{109}\) EEFI is defined as: “critical aspects of a friendly force that, if known by the adversary, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore must be protected from adversary detection.” (Army Terminology Panel)

\(^{110}\) EW is defined as: “Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.” (AAP-6).
j. **Computer Network Operations.** The opportunity for, and effectiveness of, CNO is proportional to the adversary’s dependence upon IT. CNO comprises attack, exploitation, and defence:

1. **Computer Network Attack.** Computer network attack (CNA) includes the means to attack computer systems. Software and hardware vulnerabilities allow computers, storage devices, and networking equipments to be attacked through insertion of malicious codes, such as viruses, or through more subtle manipulation of data, all in order to affect the understanding and ultimately the actions of the adversary.

2. **Computer Network Exploitation.** Computer network exploitation (CNE) supports Info Ops by the ability to get information about computers and computer networks, and the adversary, by gaining access to hosted information and the ability to make use of the information and the computers and computer network itself.

3. **Computer Network Defence.** The purpose of computer network defence (CND) is to protect against adversary CNA and CNE. CND is action taken to protect against disruption, denial, theft, degradation, or destruction of information resident in computers and computer networks, or of the computers and networks. CND is essential to maintain decision-making capability and confidence.

![Figure 5-14: Key Info Ops Activities](image)

**527. TARGETS FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

1. Based upon the above, the activities listed under Info Ops may be classified as either: influence activities; counter-command activities; or as information protection activities. Influence
activities create effects amongst target audiences on the psychological plane in order to influence understanding, perception, attitudes, will, and behaviour. Activities classified as either counter-command activities or information protection activities are physical activities that create effects primarily on the physical plane.111

2. Targets for Info Ops may thus be grouped in accordance with the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence Activities:</th>
<th>Counter-command Activities and Information Protection Activities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targets on the Psychological Plane</td>
<td>Targets on the Physical Plane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human:</td>
<td>Links:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Political leaders</td>
<td>◆ Couriers and dispatch riders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Religious and social leaders</td>
<td>◆ Land line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Groups of a population, such as tribes or clans</td>
<td>◆ Radio and other informational links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Adversary leaders/commanders</td>
<td>Nodes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Adversary troops and sub-groups such as conscripts</td>
<td>◆ C2 Centres and command posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>◆ Friendly troops and allies to counter adversary propaganda</td>
<td>◆ Physical plant, including radios, computers and other information processing means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Satellites</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-15: Targets for Information Operations

528. INFLUENCE ACTIVITY

1. Influence Activities are meant to influence and affect understanding, perceptions and will, cannot be considered separately from other operations, for they themselves are operations, that is, they are tactical activities undertaken to create desired effects. The deception of an enemy commander, the use of flyers to convince conscripts to flee, the building of civilian infrastructure to take support away from an insurgency and win the support of a populace, and other such activities seeking psychological effects are all tactical activities that must be conceived, planned, and targeted as part of an overall plan, simultaneous with and complementary to fires. Like physical activities, they may be classified in the functional and effects frameworks and described by their effects of shaping, decisive, or sustaining.

111 Although some debate has occurred regarding the "information plane," and some segments of allied doctrine refer to such a level of existence, all elements that may be considered under such a description actually fall to either the physical or psychological planes. Information itself exists on the physical plane if it can be attacked or physically affected (e.g., attacked, blocked by EW, etc.), or on the psychological plane if it rests in an individual’s mind and thus affects perception and behaviour.
2. As stated earlier land forces must utilize the full spectrum of Info Ops, which includes CCA, IPA and IA. However, the main effort of Land Ops Info Ops is the Influence Activity spectrum. Accordingly, the following outline shall be considered the Influence Activity construct for Canadian Land forces:

a. Influence Activities consist of: PSYOPS; presence, profile and posture; deception; CIMIC; and PA. These influence activities create first order effects on the psychological plane. Other activities may be conducted for the purposes of influencing a target audience, and thus may be considered Influence Activities, so long as their first order effect is on the psychological plane.

b. The following is a description Influence Activities: “coordinated activities to create desired psychological effects on the understanding, perception, attitudes and will of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of overall objectives.”  

c. Influence Activities are to be considered operations just as fires, such as an attack or a defence, are considered operations. Influence Activities are to be planned, targeted, and executed in conjunction with any other activity in a complementary and holistic fashion. Info Ops staff, led by a G3 Info Ops senior officer, are to be completely integrated into G3 and G5 staff branches and element commanders, and the Info Ops capabilities (PSYOPS, CIMIC, PA detachments, teams, etc) are to be considered line elements.

d. In formation HQs, the G3 and G5 staff branches may contain specialist staff for operations and planning in such areas as PSYOPS, CIMIC, and PA. All staff functions other than the G3 or G5 support and enable operations, but do not conduct them. Thus, with Info Ops considered “operations,” no specific staff branch other than the G3 or G5 have Info Ops responsibilities. Staffs who have Info Ops responsibilities (PSYOPS, deception, CIMIC, and PA) will come under the G3 and G5 branches for operations and planning respectively but coordinated by the G3/G5 Info Ops senior officer. The G9 CIMIC staff branch, if used, is for purely liaison functions. In some HQs, depending upon size, there may only be a G3/G5 Info Ops officer. He will coordinate the planning and operations of all Info Ops activities, taking advice from the various Info Ops related elements (team or detachment) commanders.

e. The PSYOPS, CIMIC and PA element commanders will be considered line commanders. They and their capabilities (teams and detachments) will be considered line elements, with their activities and effects occurring on the psychological plane. Specialist advice to the commander in the constituent areas of Info Ops will either be through the G3/G5 Info Ops Senior officer.

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113 When the G9 CIMIC branch was created, CIMIC functions supported operations in a major combat construct. It concerned itself with support to offensive and defensive operations, such as liaison for refugee control and the acquisition of civilian equipment for military purposes. However, with CIMIC assuming a responsibility to actually conduct operations, mainly stability operations, then its planning and operations must come under the G5/G3 staff branches, and the CIMIC detachment commanders must be considered line unit commanders.
f. At the lower tactical levels, such as battle group (BG), the detachment commander may fulfill multiple roles, akin to the responsibilities of an anti-armour platoon commander. Thus, the detachment commander will advise the commanding officer, assist the staff with planning and orders, and then command and maneuver his detachment or element.

g. Influence activities are to be conceived, planned and conducted in unison with fires. In some ways they will be shaping, such as the issue of PSYOPS flyers to enemy forces just prior to an assault, encouraging them to surrender, or the conduct of a feint to deceive the enemy. In other aspects, they may be decisive, such as the re-establishment of key infrastructure to secure the support of a populace.

3. Influence activities, that is, those activities conducted to create first order effects on the psychological plane, must be planned, coordinated and executed in conjunction and harmony with fires. (See Figure 5-16)

![Figure 5-16: Information Operations as Part of Comprehensive Operations](image)

4. Info Ops, that is, influence activities, and fires, along with their respective constituent activities are all organized in a complementary fashion together through maneuver and battlespace management. (See Figure 5-17.)
5. Although all units may play a role in creating influences (e.g., the posture of troops conducting security presence patrolling or the use of EW to create deception), the *manoeuvre units* for specific influence and psychological effects, that is, for manoeuvre on the psychological plane, may be considered PSYOPS elements, CIMIC units and resources, and PA teams. *Manoeuvre on both planes must be considered together in the creation of complementary effects and achievement of tactical and operational objectives.*  

529. INFORMATION OPERATIONS PHILOSOPHY

1. Land forces conduct activities to create effects in order to achieve assigned objectives. Info Ops incorporate influence activities that focus on achieving a psychological effect on individuals and groups by affecting their understanding, perception, will, and behaviour. Although they create effects on the psychological plane, they are considered operations in the same context as activities that create effects on the physical plane. They may be classified using the same taxonomy: offensive, defensive, stability, and enabling. They are conceived, planned and conducted simultaneously with activities that create physical effects, that is, fires. Together, they may be considered comprehensive operations that consider the whole environment. As operations, they come under the direct responsibility of the commander. This is fundamental to an effects-based approach to operations and a comprehensive approach to operations.

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114 The formal concept of manoeuvre (movement supported by fire) must be expanded here to include the obtainment of a position of advantage on the psychological plane. For example, forces may wish to issue a public affairs statement before the adversary issues a propaganda message, thus gaining an advantage in time over the adversary.

115 All doctrinal concepts begin with a philosophy, then broaden to a set of guiding principles, and then develop as practices and procedures.
2. Failure to incorporate fires and influence activities together, that is, effects on both the physical and psychological planes, will preclude the conduct of full-spectrum operations (FSO).

3. Many of the effects sought by influence activities will be beyond the capability and capacity of military forces, at least for an extended period. Thus, the military will seek to conduct influence activities within the JIMP framework so that activities, such as reconstruction and economic development and the long-term solutions to a conflict, may be fully realized through those elements of power best suited to conduct them.

530. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. As discussed earlier, target types on the psychological plane can be defined along a spectrum of relative interest as it relates to achieving the end state. This spectrum can be broadly broken down into any number of groups that may be generally described along the following lines: the adversaries; the inactive hostile; the unsupportive; the neutral; the friendly but uncommitted; the supportive; and, allies. The boundaries between these groups may be blurred. Each group may be influenced in different ways using different activities. The amount of effort and type of activity needed to influence them will depend upon the situation, the relative size of the target audience, the disposition of the audience on the spectrum (i.e., supportive to hostile), and the importance of ensuring popular support for the success of the campaign.

2. The actual influence activity undertaken as part of Info Ops may fall under any of the three tactical operations: offensive, defensive, and stability. Although activities such as CIMIC will be classified as stability operations, deception through feints and demonstrations are part of offensive operations, and a PSYOPS message may be incorporated into the defensive battle.

3. With regard to creating the effect of influencing the understanding, perceptions, and will of target audiences, Info Ops activities may be viewed as being either of an offensive nature or of a defensive nature. Info Ops will seek to defend or sustain the support of those target audiences that are supportive of the campaign. These may be considered defensive Info Ops. On the other hand, some Info Ops will seek to create an influence on target audiences that are not supportive of a campaign. The activities may seek to persuade them towards, or dissuade them away from, a particular behaviour or course of action. Info Ops activities against these target audiences may be considered offensive Info Ops. (See Figure 5-18.)
531. PRINCIPLES IN THE APPLICATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. As with all types of military activities, information operations should be planned and conducted based upon certain key principles:

   a. **Commander’s Direction and Personal Involvement.** The commander’s personal involvement drives Info Ops and exercises control over all Info Ops activity, through the G3, within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and down the chain of command. Without the clear guidance of the commander’s unifying theme and intent, the Info Ops effort will lack focus and not achieve the desired effects in harmony with other activities.

   b. **Close Coordination and Sequencing.** The very nature of Info Ops and the large, diverse target set means that there needs to be very close integration, vertically and horizontally, within a command in terms of creating complementary effects in support of common objectives. Contradictory messages or inaccurate information will undermine credibility and legitimacy. All Info Ops plans and activities must be closely coordinated in relation to other activities throughout the echelons and ideally across multiple agencies. This is the responsibility of the commander, assisted by targeting staff, advisors, and subordinate commanders.
c. **Accurate Intelligence and Information.** Successful Info Ops must be founded upon good intelligence support and the development of a deep and broad knowledge base in which all elements, systems, and entities within an environment may be assessed. This intelligence must include timely, accurate, and relevant information about potential adversaries, the other approved parties, and the operating environment. Assessment must be made with respect to how targets will view, interpret, or perceive activities. The Info Ops staff and element commanders should work closely with the intelligence staff to define requirements necessary to plan, execute, and assess the effectiveness of Info Ops. IPB should include analysis of human factors—culture, religion, languages, etc.—decision-making infrastructure and power structures. As intelligence staff are closely involved in battle damage estimates on the physical plane, so too must they be closely involved in measures of effectiveness on the psychological plane.

d. **Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution.** Due to the requirement for close coordination of Info Ops activity, the principle of centralized planning and decentralized execution applies to Info Ops at all command levels. However, centralized execution may be required for certain types of targeted information activities when all involved force elements are required to adhere rigidly to a plan, or when strategic assets are used. The approval level and process for PSYOPS messages must be as low and as streamlined as possible to ensure messages are timely and relevant to the environment at hand. Ideally the approval level should be vested with the Info Ops Officer who can ensure that the task force commander’s arcs of fire are adhered to and all influence messages are synchronized while providing timely approval.

e. **Comprehensive and Integrated Planning and Targeting.** At the operational level, planning and targeting starts with a detailed understanding of the operational environment, its constituent systems and entities, and the commander’s objectives. Commanders and staff identify the Info Ops effects required to achieve the desired objectives and a range of activities that, when integrated into the overall OPLAN, will achieve those effects. It is important to realize that any element of targeting activity may influence a range of target audiences and create unintended effects. The targeting staff, therefore, has to analyze the impact of such activity and propose appropriate measures to avoid or mitigate negative unintended effects. Info Ops planning and targeting must not be done separately from the planning and targeting of physical activities and effects, but in conjunction with them so that the effects are complementary. Thus, Info Ops staff is attributed to the G3 and G5 staff branches. Ideally, the fires officer and the Info Ops officer would synchronize and execute physical and psychological effects through a targeting venue after a comprehensive and integrated planning process.

f. **Early Involvement and Timely Preparation.** Info Ops planning must start early because both planning and execution take time and results can be slow to emerge. Hence, a commander’s intent and direction must be viewed right from the start in relation to Info Ops capabilities and maintained throughout the planning process. Planning and targeting staff and advisors need to be fully involved in the planning process to integrate Info Ops into the overall plan.
g. **Monitoring and Effects Assessment.** The successful prosecution of Info Ops relies upon continuous monitoring and assessment of the short and long-term effects of interrelated activities. This is achieved by the collection of all-source intelligence and other feedback on the Info Ops activities. MoEs must be included in the Info Ops plan and are integrated in the intelligence collection activities.

h. **Establishing and Maintaining Credibility.** In order for Info Ops to be successful in creating effects on the psychological plane, the source of the Info Ops must have significant credibility in the eyes of the target audience. This credibility must be built on a foundation of truthful messages from all of the influence enablers. Over time target audiences will come to rely on these messages as an accurate source of information. In this context, influence enablers will be able to leverage the truth through synchronized messages to achieve the desired effects. The credibility of a force may have to be established in a planned, incremental fashion and will take time. If lacking credibility, a force will require the engagement of indigenous proxies such as social or religious leaders, who have established credibility with target audiences, in order to spread the desired messages.

i. **Timely Counter-information Operations.** Even the most effective Info Ops plans will be frustrated in execution if deliberate activities are not taken to counter the Info Ops actions of the adversary and neutral parties. With respect to influence activities, the advent of real-time communications technologies forces the commander to constantly observe and counter the enemy’s attempts to influence target audiences, locally and internationally. There are numerous examples, from Kosovo to Lebanon to Afghanistan, of a militarily weaker opponent effectively conducting an Info Ops campaign that has influenced foreign and indigenous populations. Failure to adequately counter the contrived story in a timely and credible fashion can undermine not only a public’s morale, but it can also bolster an adversary’s popularity, and rally public opinion against the campaign. Info Ops planning must dedicate resources to monitoring adversary Info Ops and remain flexible enough to counter erroneous information. Timeliness is paramount, and in terms of PA, the first side to get their story out into the public domain often holds the public high ground.

532. **TARGET AUDIENCE FILTERS AND INNATE PERCEPTIONS: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND INTERNAL PERCEPTIONS**

1. To create effects on target audiences in terms of understanding, perceptions, will, and behaviour, there is a need to understand the target audiences on the psychological plane and the filters through which a message to the target will pass.\(^{116}\) This includes the external influences, such as culture and religion, and individual internal perceptions, such as personal biases, through which they view and interpret activities. Understanding of these filters helps to determine the activities needed to create the desired effects and the manner in which they should be conducted. This is far more difficult on the psychological plane than on the physical plane.

\(^{116}\) On the psychological plane, targets are people, either individuals or groups. They include national and regional leaders, military commanders, social and religious leaders, troops, and segments of a population.
2. It is important to appreciate that targets on the psychological plane will act according to their own interests, shaped by perspectives and values, which may be significantly different from one’s own. As well, every activity on the psychological plane will have a different response time and a different set of information filters that can (potentially) alter the interpretation of the message (see Figure 5-16 below). These filters will differ with each situation and target, and will be a result of the target’s external influences and internalized individual traits and perceptions.

3. Commanders and planners, with the help of cultural advisors, must understand the manner in which these filters will affect the target’s interpretation of the planned activity. Once this understanding is gained to the greatest extent possible, then activities may be conducted, avoided, or conducted in a certain manner or by a certain element so that the desired message is sent and the desired influence or effect is gained.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>INFORMATION FILTERS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Collective External Influences:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>◆ Cultural Bias and Values</td>
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<td>◆ Social Pressures</td>
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<tr>
<td>◆ Family</td>
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<td>◆ Religious Institution and Constructs</td>
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<td>◆ Political Influences</td>
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<td><strong>Individual Internal Perceptions:</strong></td>
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<td>◆ Emotions</td>
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Figure 5-19: Information Filters for a Target: Individual and Collective

4. External filter variables include culture, society, family, media, government institutions, and decision-making processes. External filters, therefore, include variables that limit behaviour to what is socially, culturally, and legally acceptable, informed by information sources such as media, government, group, and informal communications networks. Individual internal filter variables include personal values, beliefs, hopes, fears, and experiences. Without an understanding of these filters and their effects, messages or activities may provoke unintended actions.

5. Additionally, a decision-making process may be unique to an individual or group. What appears to be a rational process to one person may seem irrational to another. The rationale may have a cultural or religious basis, or it may be unique to that one particular personality trait.

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6. All the filters modify information input to the target audience. Targeting must be sophisticated enough to understand and manipulate, or at least work through, these variables to achieve the desired effect on the intended target. They are a key consideration for Red Teaming\textsuperscript{118} during the planning and war gaming process. Activities seeking to influence must specifically focus on \textit{what and how the target perceives something within the environment}, and be adjusted to suit it to achieve the desired effect. For example, a message delivered or an action taken by a military leader in a society distrustful of those in uniform may not be effective. However, the same message delivered by a religious leader or a civilian of similar cultural background may gain the desired effect. Therefore, significant effort should focus on altering the environment or influencing perception through means specifically tailored to the environment. \textbf{The impact of influence activities is their ultimate effect on decision-making processes.}\textsuperscript{119}

7. Care must be taken in deciding the activities to be undertaken to create desired effects. For example, measures taken to intimidate may simply result in animosity and hatred by the leaders or local populations. Such reactions will be difficult to gauge, but a study of both external and internal filters may help predict and mitigate such reactions.

8. In order for commanders and staff to plan activities to create the desired effects, it is important that they make use of cultural advisors and experts. Just as commanders have employed political advisors (POLADs) in the past, they must consider the employment of experts in social, cultural and economic fields as well.

533. THE MESSAGES AND MESSENGERS

1. Info Ops is based in influencing by sending a message by means of some sort of messenger. Not only will the message be judged, but the target audience will judge the chosen messenger as well. How the target audience perceives the messenger will affect how they perceive and accept the message. The following points should be considered with regard to the way Info Ops are conducted:\textsuperscript{120}

   a. Influencing a target audience requires “delivering the goods” not simply sending the message. Thus, if a promise is made, it must be kept. If a message is sent, it must be fulfilled.

   b. Cultural awareness is vital, and the adversary often has more cultural credibility. Ideally, key individuals or groups within a target audience receive the message, accept it, and then deliver it or spread it through the larger audience. This will add credibility to the message.

   c. Maintain message discipline and do not be thrown off by erratic media reports. In short, the message has to be sustained to be believed and must be consistent over time and across different levels of command and across different activities.

\textsuperscript{118} Red Teaming is utilized to provide counter-intuitive or counter-factual perspectives in campaign analysis and war gaming, regarding the reactions of neutrals, aligned and non-aligned actors, as well as the traditional focus on the adversary.

\textsuperscript{119} Adopted from Dragon, \textit{Wielding the Cyber Sword: Exploiting the Power of Information Operations}, 18.

\textsuperscript{120} Adapted from Professor Dennis Murphy, \textit{Information Operations and Winning the Peace: Wielding the Information Element of Power in the Global War on Terrorism}, (Carlisle PA: US Army War College, Centre for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 14-05, December 2005).
d. A central strategic theme is essential, however, subordinate themes and messages (and deeds that reflect the message content) must be categorized, assigned, and tracked against different target audiences. In the ubiquitous media environment at least two cultures must be addressed: that of the adversary/indigenous population, and that of committed friendly forces.

e. Mounting casualties puts additional stress on troops and may lead to mistakes in conducting Info Ops. They must be anticipated and handled proactively. Risks may have to be taken in order to support messages and to keep them constant.

f. Whichever news story breaks first will be pre- eminent, at least initially; therefore, publicize anything that highlights the legitimacy to the campaign.

OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS: OP ARCHER, AFGHANISTAN, 2006

A crucial component of COIN efforts in Afghanistan is persuading local populations that the authority of the Central government is legitimate and that the role of coalition forces is one of security, not occupation. Islam plays a pivotal role in Afghan culture and society. Furthermore, tribal and village elders occupy a central cultural and religious leadership position in Afghan society and power structures. Thus, offensive information operations in Afghanistan must target tribal and village elders while being mindful of the role of Islam in the day-to-day lives of the local populace.

In the spring of 2006 the CF incorporated a Muslim imam who is also a member of the CF in select meetings with village and tribal leaders. Through recitation of Koranic verse and Islamic prayers, the military imam used religious language to persuade Afghans that the Taliban do not hold the moral high ground, that the Islamic government in Kabul is worthy of support, and that the Western forces in their midst are not occupiers, but operate with the goal of establishing security and peace within the parameters of an Islamic society.

The unique use of an imam to influence societal and religious leaders in Afghanistan by the CF is a superb example of an offensive information operation conducted on the psychological plane. Undermining Taliban claims of moral superiority based on religious piety was assessed by many as a critical step in defeating the insurgency, particularly in the Taliban’s former strongholds in Southern Afghanistan.


Note. It should also be noted that the CF imam in this case was of Turkish decent. Before his insertion into operations with local leaders occurred, an assessment would have been necessary regarding the views of local Afghans with respect to those of Turkish heritage in order to confirm that the target audience would receive the message in a positive light.

534. ASSESSMENT—MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

1. As with any military activity, the results of Info Ops are assessed using MoPs—are things done right—and MoEs—are the right things being done—to create the desired effects?

2. MoPs for Info Ops refer to the mechanisms of planning and implementation. They can be viewed in the same manner as the delivery of indirect fire: reaction times, quality of product, correct identification and assessment of target, and suitability of engagement means, to name a few.
3. MoEs refer to the desired effects and whether or not the activities conducted have created those effects, that is, modified will and behaviour. Many MoEs will be subjective and take a considerable amount of time to measure. The results of these influence activities require as defined a set of indicators as possible, in order to detect changes in perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours. Some attempt may be made to use quantifiable MoEs. For example, if activities have been undertaken to increase the population’s sense of security, measurements may be used to evaluate an increase in the number of locals on the streets at night, or the level of activity at the local market. Other measures may be more subjective and seek to ascertain attitudes directly. Thus, the level of interaction of locals with soldiers on patrol and a survey of their attitudes may be used as MoEs.

4. Deliberate procedures may be undertaken to apply and analyze MoEs. At other times, MoEs may be standing information requirements (IRs) issued to patrols and other elements of the forces, such as, “What is the reaction of locals in area X to the presence of patrols and is there a change over time?” The intuition of commanders at all levels will play a role in creating MoEs based upon their daily interactions with leaders and those in daily contact with the populace.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: OP ARCHER, AFGHANISTAN, 2006

The absence of domestic or international support for a mission can undermine both the legitimacy of a mission as well as the morale of CF personnel. Therefore, one of the tasks in-theatre commanders may be called upon to undertake is the education of the domestic and international publics, most likely through the media. It may become necessary to clarify policy or inform the public about a mission or a specific component of that mission in order to explain its reasoning and to bolster support for the desired end-state.

One of the dilemmas that confronted the Canadian government and military from the outset of operations in Afghanistan was the disposition and disposal of enemy personnel captured during combat. The typical foe encountered by the CF in Afghanistan does not meet the definition of “members of armed forces” as established by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in that most do not carry arms openly, do not abide international laws and customs of war, and are not readily identifiable by the wearing of a uniform or distinctive insignia.

On 18 December 2005 the Government of Canada signed an agreement with the Government of Afghanistan concerning the transfer of enemy captured in Afghanistan by the CF. Five months later, Ottawa declared that captured al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters would not be afforded formal PW status as defined by the 1949 conventions.

This policy, combined with concerns that detainees transferred to Afghan custody would not always be treated in accordance with international human rights standards, caused the Canadian media, some experts, and members of the general public to express concern that Canada’s policies abrogated international law.

Despite declarations in parliament and in the media by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Brigadier-General David Fraser, Commander Multi-National Brigade for Regional Command South in Afghanistan, felt compelled to clarify government policy by granting an interview to a member of the Canadian media only days after the detainee policy was announced. Brigadier Fraser covered all aspects of the Canadian detainee policy to include: the role of the Afghan government; the fact that the spirit of the 1949 Conventions was to be followed in dealing with detainees; and, the role of respected international organisations such as the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] to oversee the handling. All this reinforced that Canadian policy conformed to international law.

The actions of General Fraser involved a complex legal, policy, and moral issue, targeted both the undecided and friendly components of the influence spectrum, and simultaneously emphasised the sovereignty of the nascent democratic government of Afghanistan.

Sources:
5. The assessment and analysis of MoEs is a G2 staff branch function. Certain Info Ops elements, particularly PSYOPS, will have their own analysis teams. If deemed appropriate, these may be incorporated into G2 and intelligence staffs in order to collate assessment and share analysis tools.

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, BAGHDAD, IRAQ 2003-2004**

To be effective, offensive Info Ops must target an appropriate audience, be focused on a limited number of themes, and be timely. Technology allows almost immediate diffusion of information and minutes can make a difference in countering or pre-empting enemy Info Ops.

Colonel Ralph Baker, USA, commanded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division in 2003-2004. 2 BCT’s AO encompassed the Karkh and Karada districts of Baghdad. The operational environment in this AO was extremely complex, given that the resident population is an amalgam of Shiite, Sunni, Christian, secular business and academic elites, and the diplomatic district of the Iraqi capital. Moreover, the AO encompassed Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Kaddamiya, where a sizable pro-Baathist element continued to lurk. A final complicating variable was the rumour-centric nature of Iraqi society.

Once it became apparent that US forces were facing a full-blown insurgency, Col. Baker quickly realized that “IO (sic) is critical to successfully combating an insurgency. It fights with words, symbols, and ideas, and it operates under the same dynamics as all combat operations.” The greatest problem facing 2 BCT with regards to Info Ops was that the insurgents consistently dominated activities on the psychological plane, successfully shaping the environment before US elements could respond. Without fail, the various insurgent groups were able to engage the most important mediums (television & internet) through the most important media outlets in a rapid and effective manner, often before US or coalition Info Ops teams could even begin to respond.

The Info Ops staff of 2 BCT took a number of steps to rectify the Info Ops deficiency in the AO. In the first place, three broad categories of Iraqi citizens were identified to lend greater focus to targeting. The groups were: those who would never accept the coalition’s presence; those who accepted the coalition’s presence; and, “the vast majority of Iraqi’s who were undecided.” It was this last group that was the specific target of the majority of 2 BCT Info Ops, firstly because those in this group were generally more susceptible to influence, and secondly, because a successful insurgency only requires the acquiescence of a population, not outright support. A final group that was targeted was 2 BCT’s own personnel, who were at times demoralized by “inaccurate [and] slanted news” from US media outlets.

Once targets were identified and prioritised, two broad themes were adopted to focus the information and messages that were critical to a successful mission outcome: discredit insurgents and terrorists, and highlight the economic, political, social, and security efforts of the coalition forces. Next, synchronization of all available brigade Info Ops assets was pursued to end counter-productive and often conflicting messages (Info Ops fratricide).

Specific groups of targets within the “undecided” category of Iraqis were identified so that they would in turn spread the message. These groups were the local and international media, local imams and religious leaders, tribal and clan leaders, governmental officials, and university and lower-level school leadership. This last point is particularly important, for it is far more effective that someone from the target audience spread the desired message because it is much more likely to be accepted and trusted.
Finally, 2 BCT identified a number of measures of effectiveness (MoE) by which the progress of brigade Info Ops could be evaluated. The MoEs are necessarily subjective and lack rigorous quantification. Given that Info Ops on the psychological plane seek to influence people’s attitudes, this should not be surprising. Nevertheless, some MoE is required. For 2 BCT, these included the number of accurate/positive stories published or aired by all media sources, the number of negative press, the number of tips provided by the local populace, the “wave” factor (who and how many local residents waved to coalition troops during patrols), observance of the tone of graffiti in the AO, the tenor of sermons at local mosques, and the willingness of the local populace to openly work with coalition forces.

Although lacking an effective Info Ops doctrine, Col. Baker and his brigade Info Ops team quickly developed an effective plan to counter and pre-empt enemy Info Ops. Understanding that an effective Info Ops plan was critical to a successful COIN operation, Baker and 2 BCT rapidly implemented Info Ops doctrine that enabled the tactical leader, by providing a clear commander’s intent and end state goals. From their experiences, Col. Baker drew a number of essential observations relevant to all Info Ops:

1. Info Ops must tailor themes and messages to a specific target.
2. The press must be engaged; you have no influence if you do not talk to them.
3. Credibility and the ability to improve the quality of life of the local residents is directly related.
4. Developing trust and confidence between your forces and local residents should be a primary Info Ops goal. Hence, messages must be based on the truth.
5. Commander’s vision and intent must be clear and concise.
6. Messages must be few, simple, and repetitive.


SECTION 10
MANOEUVRE WARFARE

535. MANOEUVRE DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION

1. The concept of *manoeuvre warfare* is defined as:

   A war fighting philosophy and approach to operations that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. (NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39 [AAP-39], Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions).\(^{121}\)

2. Manoeuvre warfare is often referred to as the *manoeuvrist approach*. It is realized through the following activities and effects against an adversary:

\(^{121}\) The manoeuvrist approach is defined in similar manner in other NATO sources, such as Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (Ratification draft May 2007): “An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality, is combined with a resolute determination to succeed.”
a. shaping understanding;

b. attacking and undermining will; and

c. shattering cohesion.

3. Cohesion is seen as the glue that solidifies individual and group will under the command of leaders. Cohesion allows military forces to endure hardship and retain the physical and moral strength to continue fighting to accomplish their mission.

4. This manoeuvrist approach to operations seeks to attack the adversary’s will to fight, and thus undermine and even shatter his cohesion, usually but not necessarily, by avoiding trials of strength and targeting the adversary’s vulnerabilities or weakness. An adversary’s will, and thus cohesion, may also be affected by the shaping of his understanding. For example, if the adversary’s C2 ability is neutralized, he will fail to understand his environment, or he will misunderstand his environment and thus lose his will and cohesion. Likewise, if conscripts are convinced to surrender or flee, the will and cohesion of the entire adversary force are affected.

5. As a result, the focus is to defeat the threat by shattering its moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. It is equally applicable to all types of campaigns from peace support through major combat.

6. The manoeuvrist approach is not only applied through physical activities (fires) that effect will and cohesion as second order effects. It is also applied through psychological activities that may affect the will and cohesion as first order effects. That it, it is applied through a combination of fires and influence activities. For example, PSYOPS radio messages to a defending adversary may encourage conscripts to flee the battlefield, thus affecting the enemy’s cohesion directly. Deception through a demonstration of forces and false radio traffic will confuse the enemy and undermine his confidence, will, and cohesion. The manoeuvrist approach is therefore conducted simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes in a complementary fashion. For example, just as a commander may wish to reach a piece of vital ground in order to make the enemy’s defence untenable, and thus undermine the enemy’s will and cohesion, the same commander may wish to issue highly effective PSYOPS messages to undermine conscripts, provide emergency aid to locals suffering occupation, and issue accurate and timely PA statements, all in order to out-manoeuvre the enemy in time, space and influence.

7. The manoeuvrist approach traditionally incorporates three core activities and effects: shaping understanding, undermining will, and shattering cohesion. In applying the manoeuvrist approach to both the physical and psychological planes, a wider conceptualization must occur. In understanding this application, it must be remembered that when applied to certain target audiences, such as a friendly, neutral or unsupportive audience, activities may be undertaken to inform, assist understanding, and shape perceptions, but in an effort to strengthen will and

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122 The manoeuvrist approach must not be confused with tactical or operational “manoeuvre,” which is an element of the Act operational function and is defined as: “employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.” (AAP-6).
enhance cohesion (particularly of campaign supporters). It sees the idea of manoeuvring, in competition with the adversary and others, on both the physical and psychological planes and applied to a wider range of targets other than simply adversaries. Thus, for example, a COIN campaign plan may envision attacking key insurgent strongholds in order to undermine his will and cohesion (i.e., manoeuvrist approach on the physical plane) while providing better economic and social development for the local populace, and advertising these activities quickly in the local media (i.e., manoeuvre on the psychological plane to shape understanding and engender support from the populace). (See Figure 5-20.)

8. In many campaigns, the manoeuvrist approach is applied in dealing with a wide array of targets that includes more than simply an adversary. There will be individuals and groups who support the campaign, those who are neutral or undecided, those who oppose the campaign, and those who are even hostile to it. In all cases, influence activities (i.e., manoeuvre on the psychological plane) will be applied against these targets to shape understanding. (See Figure 5-20.) In some cases though, particularly for those groups that support the campaign, the aim of the activities will be to strengthen will and reinforce cohesion. This will likely be achieved through defensive Info Ops. Such activities can be summarized as follows:

a. Against an adversary and his supporters, the manoeuvrist approach uses fires and influence activities (and thus effects on the physical and psychological planes) to shape understanding and attack will and shatter cohesion.

b. With respect to other target audiences, particularly those who support or potentially support the campaign, the manoeuvrist approach uses influence activities and their psychological effects to shape understanding, strengthen will, and reinforce cohesion.

c. Activities with respect to all target audiences are planned and conducted simultaneously, with a common objective in mind, so that activities seeking to shatter the will and cohesion of an adversary, do not negatively affect the will and cohesion of those groups that support the campaign. Thus, while attacking an adversary, the legitimacy of the campaign must be maintained in the eyes of the supporters and potential supporters.

d. Depending upon the campaign theme, it may be possible to influence some of the adversaries and opponents to become supporters of the campaign. This will necessitate activities that address the root causes of the crisis and conflict itself, the complementary application of activities on the physical and psychological planes, and the considered and judicious use of physical violence.
9. The manoeuvrist approach is most effective when applied against a conventional adversary. In some campaigns, such as a COIN, involving a fanatical insurgent movement, the manoeuvrist approach in terms of fires will have little effect. No amount of force or threat of force will convince the core insurgents to surrender, or to break their will and cohesion. Indeed, martyrdom becomes an ideal situation for them and only acts to stiffen their resolve. In such cases, the manoeuvrist approach on the psychological plane will be the only real manner in which to realize an enduring outcome. The majority of the populace and the less fanatical members of the adversary must be persuaded through influence activities not to support the insurgency. Thus, activities must counter adversary propaganda and media operations; they must build legitimacy and confidence in the campaign; and they must address the root causes of any reason for support to be given to the adversary. Eventually, the adversary will become so isolated that he cannot operate effectively in the environment, and his appeal to any group or system will be removed.

SECTION 11
APPROACHES TO ATTACKING WILL AND COHESION

536. GENERAL

1. Attacking the adversary’s cohesion, on both the physical and psychological planes, is the key to manoeuvre warfare. It is done using both fires and influence activities. There are three approaches to attacking will and cohesion, in order of preference: pre-emption, dislocation, and disruption.
537. **PRE-EMPTION**

1. To pre-empt the adversary is to seize an opportunity, often fleeting, before he does, and deny him an advantageous course of action. Pre-emption relies upon surprise above all, and requires good intelligence and an ability to understand and anticipate the adversary’s actions. Its success lies in the speed with which the situation can subsequently be exploited. The purpose of pre-emptive action is to prevent the adversary from gaining his objective or establishing his influence. Pre-emption is used to produce a sufficient and suitably located threat to the adversary that: causes confusion and doubt; destroys confidence by foiling his plans; and, makes his intended course of action irrelevant. Pre-emption denies initiative to the adversary.

2. Whether offensive or defensive, pre-emption demands a keen awareness of time and a willingness to take calculated risks that offer a high payoff. These risks may be reduced with the benefit of intelligence derived from real-time sensors that provide a more accurate assessment of the adversary’s true situation. **Pre-emption can also be achieved by allowing subordinates at all levels the initiative, consistent with the commander’s intent, to seize opportunities as they arise.** This applies to activities on both the physical and psychological planes.

3. Establishing air superiority or establishing control of the electromagnetic spectrum at the start of operations can achieve pre-emption. On the psychological plane, the threat can be pre-empted by use of a proactive PA programme. This may also include actions to secure the support or neutrality of third parties before the adversary can do so.

538. **DISLOCATION**

1. To dislocate the adversary is to deny him the ability to bring his strength to bear. Its purpose is much wider than disruption, and goes beyond the frustration of the adversary’s plans. Its purpose is to render the strength of elements of the force irrelevant. It seeks to avoid fighting the adversary on his terms. This is done by avoiding and neutralizing his strengths so they cannot be used effectively. A dislocating move is usually supported by actions to distract the adversary and fix his attention.

   > It is through ‘distraction’ of the commander’s mind that the distraction of his forces follows. The loss of freedom of action is the sequel to the loss of his freedom of conception.
   > Captain Liddell-Hart

2. Envelopments or deep penetrations into the operational depth of an adversary, even by small military forces, may cause dislocation of adversary elements by attacking reserves, lines of communications, and C2 networks.

3. In terms of influence activities, deception can be used to lure the adversary into making incorrect deployments, inappropriate use of reserves, and inadequate preparations for operations. Furthermore, on the psychological plane, actions may be taken to dislocate the influence of the adversary amongst a local populace if this is a key aspect of the campaign. The adversary’s means of propaganda may be shut down, or his psychological hold on a populace may be dislocated through friendly force actions that address the root causes of the conflict and remove the motivations for supporting the adversary, so that a moral superiority may be seen with the campaigning forces.
539. DISRUPTION

1. To disrupt is to attack the adversary selectively to break apart and throw into confusion the assets that are critical to the employment and coherence of his fighting power. It is a deliberate act that requires sound intelligence. The purpose is to rupture the integrity of the adversary's fighting power and reduce it to less than the total of its constituent parts. Identifying and locating the most critical assets may not be easy. Key strategic and military targets might include command centres, high-value base facilities, air defence systems, weapons of mass destruction, choke points, and critical logistics and industrial facilities. These can be disrupted by getting into the adversary’s lines of communication, seizing or neutralizing what is important to him, surprising and deceiving him, presenting him with unexpected situations, using PSYOPS, and attacking his plans and preparations.

2. In many campaigns, such as a COIN, it will be important to disrupt the influence and intimidation that the adversaries have over a populace or sector of the populace. This must be done early. It may be accomplished, at least initially, through simply establishing a continuous presence of troops amongst the populace in order to protect them and increase their sense of security. It should be complemented by influence activities that encourage support for the campaign and undermine the legitimacy and capability of the adversary. In time, this disruption will offer opportunities to dislocate the adversary from the populace by taking actions that demonstrate the legitimacy of the campaign and address the root causes of the conflict.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

OPERATION OVERLORD, 6 JUNE 1944

During the initial stages of the landings in Normandy, the Allies' main fear was a rapid and concentrated German counter-attack before the beachhead was secured. Actions were taken to break the cohesion of the German response by pre-emption, disruption, and dislocation.

Pre-emption

Allied troops were parachuted into German rear areas and on the flanks of the landings to seize bridges and other points vital to both sides. This denied mobility to the German troops moving to repel the invaders. At the same time, Ranger and Commando units were employed to seize key emplacements that dominated the landings.

Dislocation

Part of Operation OVERLORD was the construction of the First United States Army Group (FUSAG) under Gen George S. Patton. This army, an elaborate fake, helped deceive the Germans into believing that the Normandy landings were a feint. The plan used a minimal number of Allied troops to hold German reserves in the Pas de Calais region. This dislocated the main component of the Axis reserves so that their full strength was not brought to bear against the Allied invasion.

Disruption

French resistance forces, carefully coordinated with Operation OVERLORD, destroyed key portions of the railway net in France. At the same time, Allied air forces bombed other targets on the lines of communications. This disrupted the German transport system, and damaged the ability of the Axis commanders to redeploy their forces to meet the Allied invasion, and to supply their forces in the field.
540. APPLICATION OF MANOEUVRE DOCTRINE: MAINTAINING COHESION AND ATTACKING THE ADVERSARY’S COHESION

1. Cohesion is unity and it is derived from all three components of fighting power: the physical, the intellectual, and the moral. It is the quality that binds together constituent parts of a military organization and brings a measure of quality to its fighting power. With a cohesive force, a commander can maintain unity of effort in imposing his will on the adversary or other target audiences. Cohesion comprises the general identification with a common aim or purpose (conceptual component), the means to concentrate force in a coordinated and timely manner (physical component) and the maintenance of high morale (moral component). Cohesion reflects the unity of effort in the force. It includes the influence of a commander’s intent focussed at a common objective, the motivation and esprit de corps of the force, and also the physical components necessary to integrate and apply combat power. Cohesion, therefore, has both moral and physical components.

2. A breakdown in cohesion will lead to isolation, fear, confusion, and a loss of the will to fight. The adversary will be unable to apply his full combat power and his component parts can be defeated in detail. Ideally, the result is an adversary made up of a collection of individuals and small groups lacking motivation, direction, and purpose. This loose collection can be more easily defeated since its ability to fight effectively as a force has been eliminated.

3. Although a focus on attacking the adversary’s will and cohesion is vital for a successful campaign, a commander must also focus on building and maintaining the will and cohesion of his own force, both the physical and moral cohesion. Additionally, many campaigns will focus on maintaining the will and cohesion of elements that are required to support the campaign, mainly key groups within the environment’s populace.

4. Manoeuvre warfare plays as much upon the adversary’s will to fight and his ability to react to a changing situation, as upon his material ability to do so. It is an approach through fires and influence activities that emphasizes an indirect and direct targeting of the adversary’s will and cohesion, rather than simply his physical component. It requires a flexible and positive attitude of mind by commanders who must seek opportunities to exploit adversary vulnerabilities, both physically and psychologically, while maximizing their own strengths. The focus is the adversary’s centre(s) of gravity, the source of his freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight, and how best to attack, neutralize, or destroy it. It focuses on objectives and end states rather than actions and their immediate physical results.

5. The physical application of violence is still critical, but is conducted selectively. Rather than conducting an operation as a toe-to-toe slugging match between two boxers, it should be fought like a bullfight where a stronger opponent can be worn down, confused, and disoriented by the picadors and the elusive and flexible cape of the matador until the latter delivers the final blow with a thrust to the heart.

6. Physical cohesion can be attacked by separating commanders from their subordinates by severing, disrupting, or jamming communications, attacking lines of communications, destroying elements of the force, and interfering with control measures.

7. To attack the adversary’s moral cohesion, components of the adversary force should be isolated from their C2. Opposing commanders should be cut off from their sources of information. The lack of information will force bad decisions and cause a loss of credibility, motivation, and the will to fight for a “losing” commander. This creates a lack of faith in
adversary leaders, so that their effectiveness and competence, as well as the legitimacy of their cause, will come into question. This takes away the adversary’s sense of purpose and induces fear. The ultimate goal is to produce panic and paralysis by presenting the adversary with sudden, unexpected and dangerous change, or a series of such changes to which he cannot adjust.

8. The adversary’s cohesion may also be directly attacked on the psychological plane by undermining his moral justification and his legitimacy, in his own eyes, and in the eyes of potential supporters. The cohesion may be attacked directly through PSYOPS and PA operations that attack the legitimacy of the adversary, his leaders and his cause, and his influence over the populace. The target audience for such activities will be supporters of the adversary, his own members, and potential supporters.

9. Breaking the adversary’s cohesion, however, may only be a temporary or transitory effect, and the adversary could regroup and recover if pressure is not maintained. Where physical and moral cohesion is shattered and resistance continues, such as by fanatical individuals or groups, physical destruction may be the only alternative. This, however, should be seen as a last resort. In the end it may be enough to simply make such fanatics irrelevant and completely isolated, both physically and morally.

10. Operations under a manoeuvrist approach should be dynamic and multi-dimensional. It requires a balance between mass, time, and space across both the physical and psychological planes. By speed of action, commanders attempt to pre-empt adversary plans, dislocate adversary forces, and disrupt their movement and their means of C2. Combat forces are pitted against the adversary’s strength only if this is required to hold and neutralize the adversary’s forces, or to set up the conditions for decisive action against a critical vulnerability. Normally, combat power is directed against adversity weakness, particularly any vulnerabilities in his cohesion.

11. Where possible, existing weak points are exploited. Failing that, they must be created. Weak points may be physical, for example, an undefended boundary or approach. They may also be less tangible, such as vulnerability in passage of information. They are often produced when an adversary is over-extended or suffering the effects of a high tempo of operations. They may exist on the psychological plane, such as the adversary’s inability to claim legitimacy or to represent all groups of the environment’s populace. Exploiting weak points requires agility, flexibility and anticipation, and low-level freedom of action.

12. Tactical battles are not an end in of themselves, but only a building block within the framework of a larger campaign that uses surprise, deception, manoeuvre, and firepower to break the adversary’s will to fight, primarily through attacking moral and physical cohesion.

13. The concepts of manoeuvre warfare apply equally to activities and effects on the psychological plane. The effects should shape an adversary’s understanding, undermine his will, and shatter his cohesion. Manoeuvre through information operations, for example, may undermine the support that an insurgent or belligerent military commander receives from the local populace or media. This, in turn, will affect the adversary’s will and cohesion.

14. At the same time, manoeuvre on the psychological plane must seek to reinforce the will and cohesion of those groups that support the campaign and oppose the adversary. This includes activities undertaken to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt adversary propaganda aimed at the local populace, the international media, and one’s own troops. This is vitally important in campaigns that rely upon the will of the majority of a populace or a particular group for success.
15. Activities, be they fires or influence activities, must be done in a complementary fashion with all other activities. Operations are planned and targeted together in a harmonized, simultaneous fashion. For example, actions taken to defeat an adversary must be planned with an understanding as to how the actions will be interpreted by those elements of the populace whose support is required.

16. In summary, combat power must be applied through activities, with a view to shattering the adversary’s moral and physical cohesion, while bolstering that of the allies and neutral elements. In order to accomplish this, activities must be undertaken on both the physical and psychological planes in a complementary and synchronized fashion. Commanders manoeuvre simultaneously against a wide range of targets on both the physical and psychological planes. Much of the manoeuvre on the psychological plane will be conducted through Info Ops that seek to influence target audiences and create desired psychological effects. This psychological manoeuvre will be used to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt the Info Ops and psychological manoeuvre of the adversary.

17. All forms of manoeuvre, physical and psychological, are considered operations and are therefore the direct responsibility of the commander and his G3 staff branch. The commander will strike the correct balance between fires and influence activities, that is, between manoeuvre on the two planes based upon the campaign theme, its guiding principles, and the need to create effects that will realize enduring objectives and end states.

18. In keeping with this concept, it must be remembered that the manner and principles by which tactical activities are conducted, should not violate the overarching principles of the campaign. For example, an attack on an insurgent stronghold may follow the principles of offensive operations, but its conduct should not contradict the principles of a COIN campaign. Any collateral damage resulting from such an attack, for example, must be minimized or repaired immediately in order to maintain the support of the local population. This combination of fires and influence activities, applied to all targets and target audiences, is comprehensive operations.

541. ENABLERS FOR THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

1. The manoeuvrlist approach to operations is enabled through:
   a. A comprehensive and effects-based approach to operations that provides a unifying theme and purpose, expressed as the commander’s intent to all the elements in a JIMP framework, to address all the threats and consider all influences faced in the operating environment (political, military, economic, social, etc.) and a clear articulation of the end state and the objectives required to realize that end state.
   b. Identification of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the adversary and his supporters.
   c. Identification of the vulnerabilities of the campaign and its supporters or neutral parties to the adversary’s influence activities (propaganda).
   d. Identification of the adversary’s centre(s) of gravity and its/their relative importance to reaching the desired end state.
e. The commander’s ability to conceptualize and direct the harmonization of the operational functions in order to apply combat power on both the psychological and physical planes in a mutually complementary and supporting manner.

f. Comprehensive targeting that considers the complementary and synchronized application of fires and influence activities.

g. Mission command.

h. A unity of effort across all forces and agencies created through the shared understanding of superior commanders’ intent, two levels higher.

542. PRINCIPLES OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE

1. Manoeuvre warfare is a mindset for applying combat power and the resources to defeat adversaries, build and reinforce the cohesion of the campaign, and address sources of conflict. There is no prescribed formula, however, certain principles can provide guidance:

a. Concentrate on the Adversary’s Vulnerabilities. With the objective being to attack the adversary’s will to fight and cohesion, activities and their effects should be planned against vulnerabilities, vice strengths. Plans should focus on exploiting the adversary’s vulnerabilities and not on seizing and holding the ground. The purist application of manoeuvre warfare is to disarm or neutralize an adversary before the fight. Vulnerabilities must be identified and attacked on the psychological plane as well, mainly through aggressive Info Ops, in order to sow seeds of doubt and discord amongst the adversary and his supporters.

b. Mission Type Orders. Mission type orders focus on the effects to be achieved. This involves de-centralizing decision-making and letting decisions be taken at the lowest possible level. It is essential that commanders know and fully understand their commander’s intent two levels up. Subordinates must understand what is on their commander’s mind, his vision of the battlefield, and what end state is desired. Mission orders allow commanders, at all levels, to react to situations and to capitalize on opportunities as they arise. The commander directs and controls his operation through clear intent, tasks and desired effects, rather than detailed supervision and control measures or restrictions.

c. Agility. Agility enables a commander to seize the initiative and dictate the course of operations that is acting quicker than the adversary can react. Eventually, the adversary is overcome by events, and his cohesion and ability to influence the situation are destroyed. Agility is the liability of the commander to change faster than the adversary can anticipate. Quickness and intellectual acuity are the keys to effective agility. Commanders must be quick to make good decisions and to exploit developments on both the physical and psychological planes. Commanders and units must be able to respond quickly to physical and psychological developments. Just as a unit will move to exploit a sudden gap on the battlefield before the adversary can reposition to close it, a commander must be quick to exploit through Info Ops a public relations error made by an insurgent force. Getting inside the adversary’s decision cycle is the essence of tempo. Well-rehearsed battle drills and standing operating procedures enhance the agility of a formation. Agility also allows a commander
to quickly counter the adversary’s Info Ops and his attempts to undermine the legitimacy of, and support for, the campaign.

d. **Focus on Main Effort.** The main effort focuses combat power and resources on the vital element of the plan and allows subordinates to make decisions that will support the commander's intent without constantly seeking advice. This way, the commander is successful in achieving his goal and each subordinate ensures his actions support the main effort. It is the focus of all, generally expressed in terms of a particular friendly unit, activity or effect. While each unit is granted the freedom to operate independently, everyone serves the ultimate goal, which unifies their efforts. In certain campaigns, the main effort may be focused on influence activities in the psychological plane, while activities on the physical plane are supporting and may seek only to maintain a secure environment for other elements and forces.

e. **Exploit Tactical Opportunities.** Commanders continually assess the situation (mission analysis) and then exercise the necessary freedom of action to be able to react to changes more quickly than the adversary. Reserves are created, correctly positioned and grouped to exploit situations that have been formed by shaping the battle to conform to friendly concepts of operations.

f. **Act Boldly and Decisively.** Commanders at all levels should be able to deal with uncertainty and act with audacity, initiative, and inventiveness in order to seize fleeting opportunities within their higher commanders' intent. They not only accept confusion and disorder, they generate it for the adversary. Failure to make a decision surrenders the initiative to the adversary. Risk is calculated, understood and accepted. In doing so, commanders must keep in the foremost of their minds the overall objective. It must be remembered that at times tactical success may have to be sacrificed in order to meet or maintain the overarching operational objective.

g. **Command from a Position to Influence the Main Effort.** Commanders place themselves where they can influence the main effort and ensure that the desired effects are created to realize the desired objectives. If the main effort of a campaign rests with influence activities that seek to engender security and support from a populace, then the commander must position himself to influence the unity of effort between all the available elements of power and within the local populace.

**SECTION 12**
**MISSION COMMAND**

**543. DEFINITION AND TENETS**

1. Mission command is defined as “The philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative to subordinate commanders.”

123 For this definition and a full discussion of mission command, see B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command.
2. Mission command focuses on decentralised command and is intended for situations that are complex, dynamic and adversarial. It allows for and accepts that the successful application of surprise, shock and high operational tempo against an adversary is best executed through rapid and timely decision-making at all levels of command in response to the unexpected or fortuitous occurrence of both threats and opportunities.

3. Mission command supports an effects-based approach to operations as applied to activities on both the physical and psychological planes. An objective may be reached through fires, influence activities, or through a combination of both. While the term objective has commonly been used to refer to a physical object against which action is taken, in an effects-based approach an objective may be something far more abstract, particularly if it is on the psychological plane or a set of circumstances or conditions to be created.

4. Mission command underpins manoeuvre warfare and the effects-based approach with three tenets:
   a. The importance of understanding a superior commander’s intent.
   b. A clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil that intent.
   c. Timely decision making.

5. While subordinates must exercise initiative under mission command, it is imperative that they understand the higher-level objectives that must be obtained and the influence, positive or negative, that their actions will have on the attainment of those objectives. There is little sense in commanders achieving short-term tactical success, even if it supports the immediate objectives of his superior, if it will undermine the legitimacy of the campaign and the achievement of operational objectives and end state.

544. CREATING A MISSION COMMAND ATMOSPHERE

1. Under the mission command philosophy, commanders must:
   a. Give orders in a manner that ensures that subordinates understand intent, their own tasks, and the context of those tasks.
   b. Tell subordinates what effect(s) they are to achieve by their tasks and the reason why or purpose, which may be a second order effect or objective. Examples include: “seize in order to…”or “conduct security patrols in order to…”.
   c. Provide those orders and tasks within the context of a unity of effort that is shared horizontally and vertically within the formation, and across other elements of power. This reflects a pervasive comprehensive approach.
   d. Ensure subordinate commanders, as appropriate, understand the operational objectives applicable to their line of operation and the overarching campaign principles, both of which their tactical activities should not undermine or violate.
   e. Allocate appropriate resources to carry out missions and tasks.
f. Use a minimum of control measures so as not to limit unnecessarily the freedom of action of subordinates.

g. Allow subordinates to decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions, tasks, and planned effects.

2. Mission command applies to activities on both the physical and psychological planes. At its essence is freedom of action, trust, and confidence. When all else goes awry and subordinates cannot obtain new direction for the changing situation, they can always use the commander’s clearly stated intent, with the desired effect and end state, to guide their decisions and actions.

545. UNITY OF EFFORT AND COMMON INTENT

1. Balanced against the tenets of freedom of action and decentralized decision-making is the requirement to harmonize all activities and effects within a unity of effort. Unity of effort is vital for a force as it harmonizes the actions of the constituent elements of force, at times both military and non-military.

2. Unity of effort stems from a number of interrelated means: the commander’s ability to articulate a unifying theme through clear intent and mission statements; the use of common doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; a common language of command; a high standard of collective training and teamwork; and the designation of main effort. In short, together they generate a common understanding across a force, and indeed, across other elements of power as well, and harmonize and coordinate their actions, particularly at times of confusion and disorientation.

3. Within an operation, unity of effort is enhanced when subordinates understand the intentions of their immediate superiors and of those two levels up. This vertical integration allows subordinates to nest their own plans and activities within those of their superiors. The unity of effort shared amongst subordinates gives horizontal integration and allows subordinates to understand how their missions interact with those of others. A well-established unity of effort also supports the manoeuvrist approach to operations.

4. Ideally, unity of effort is shared through the commander’s unifying theme with other elements of power so that all together they may address the root causes of a crisis, engender support and commitment from indigenous populations, and create enduring end states.

5. Unity of effort is largely based upon a commander’s explicit (stated) intent. It is understood in the context of a common doctrine, language and training. However, complete unity of effort and mission command implementation must be based upon the establishment and maintenance of common intent: the sum of shared explicit intent as expressed in a commander’s verbal or written statement, plus operationally relevant shared implicit intent. Implicit intent is understood through a web of shared connotations, that is, a common understanding of doctrine, shared values and beliefs (culture), and social norms and

\[124\] Main effort is defined as: a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. (B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command). It works to achieve a unity of effort across all subordinate and supporting forces and maximizes combat power.
expectations. In other words, it stems from the intellectual and moral components of fighting power and should enhance the unity of effort by binding activities on both the physical and psychological planes.

546. SUMMARY

1. Mission command is a key element of the manoeuvrist approach and therefore a key element of the effects-based approach to operations at the tactical level. Expressed intent and a unity of effort, combined with the effects-based approach planning process, will help to ensure that tactical level activities support operational objectives.

2. It is vital that in exercising mission command, subordinate commanders understand the operational objectives and the principles of the applicable campaign theme, so that their activities may be properly planned and conducted within those contexts.
CHAPTER 6
THE PLANNING OF LAND OPERATIONS

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

601. GENERAL

1. Land operations are planned and conducted in accordance with doctrinal principles in order to fulfil strategic and operational end states. They are realized through the conduct of tactical level activities that create effects to meet the operational objectives and end states.

2. It must be stressed that operations involve much more than opposing military forces. Although there will remain a requirement for combat operations that only military forces are capable of conducting, objectives will be met in many campaigns through a wide array of activities, involving the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework, that is, both military and non-military elements.

3. This chapter will develop the understanding of the planning and execution of land operations by explaining the process of operational design, planning and battle procedure.

602. CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY

1. The authority of a force, whether military or a force consisting of multiple agencies, to conduct a campaign is reflected in the perceived legitimacy of the force, its mission, the manner in which the force conducts itself, and the manner in which it delivers expectations. A campaign will generally have campaign legitimacy, and thus authority, if the population most directly affected by the campaign supports it. In many campaigns, ultimate success will rest upon the establishment and maintenance of popular support, and in turn, campaign legitimacy and authority.

2. Campaign authority is defined as: “the total perceived public legitimacy and authority of a force to conduct a campaign. Note: It is measured through four criteria: perceived mandate; the manner in which it is prosecuted; the consent of affected parties; and the management and satisfaction of the expectations of the affected parties and other audiences. It may be measured at international, national, regional and local levels.”

3. The perceived campaign authority may be illustrated through relative measurement of the four criteria. (See Figure 6-1.) Changes over time may also be indicated.

4. During any campaign, and particularly those in which the support of population groups is vital for success, commanders must strive to build and maintain campaign authority. This is not meant to highlight or advertise the campaign and its own goals for its own sake. Rather, it is done to build the legitimacy of the campaign in the eyes of those who are affected by it, and most importantly, whose support is required for successful conclusion.

5. Not all of the criteria need be satisfied in order to hold significant campaign authority. For example, if a humanitarian crisis demands intervention, an intervening military force that immediately relieves suffering and prevents a further deterioration of the situation will likely be viewed as having legitimacy and thus campaign authority, even though no international mandate may have been issued by an international forum.

6. Apart from building campaign authority through the actual conduct of the campaign and the achievement of success, campaign authority may be built and maintained through influence activities, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and public affairs (PA). This will provide both information and evidence of campaign progress and the resolution of sources of conflict. In many cases, these will be defensive information operations (info ops) that seek to protect campaign legitimacy from adversary propaganda. Influence activities, such as PSYOPS and PA, should not be conducted in such a manner that they will be perceived to be propaganda. They must simply highlight the aim and objectives of the campaign, its benefit for indigenous populations, and its moral justification.
7. In the end, a campaign that is not seen to be legitimate or conducted in a legitimate manner will likely fail as a result of a loss of popular support. This is particularly true for those campaign themes that require popular support to succeed, that is, peace support and counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns.

SECTION 2
OPERATIONAL ART, OPERATIONAL DESIGN, AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

603. GENERAL

1. **Operational art** is defined as: “the skill of employing military forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” 126 Operational design, including campaign planning, is realized through the application of operational art.

2. Operational art is the skillful employment of military forces to attain objectives through the design, organization, integration, planning and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. It applies to all aspects of operational design including campaign planning. It is not dependent upon the size of the committed forces.

3. It requires a clear understanding of the consequences of operational level decisions, and their impact at both the tactical and strategic levels. Commanders must have broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and an understanding of the relationship between end states, their supporting objectives, and the activities and effects needed to realize them.

4. Using operational art, commanders at all levels apply intellect and intuition to the situation to establish and verbalize, in the form of a commander’s intent, their vision of what is required to achieve the end state. This should include a unifying theme to which all agencies in the campaign could work.

5. **Operational design** is the process of expressing operational art. It examines the whole situation and constituent elements of an environment, along with the nature of the problem at hand, in order to conceive a framework that can be used to meet the desired strategic and operational end states. It consists of: an operational estimate including mission analysis; a series of concepts for articulating the campaign plan; and the campaign plan itself including supporting operation plans and orders. It is the manner and process in which the campaign plan is developed. Note that an effects-based approach is used to conduct operational design.

126 B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command in Land Operations. NATO Allied Administrative Publication 39 (AAP-39) NATO Glossary of Tactical and Logistical Land Operations Terms and Expressions, defines operational art in similar terms: “the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.”
6. **A campaign** is defined as: “a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.”¹²⁷

7. **A campaign plan** is defined as: “a plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.”¹²⁸ The campaign plan should focus on the operational end state, operational objectives, and supporting effects or decisive points to reaching the operational objectives. It should not focus on detailed activities.

8. Campaign planning is part of operational design and applies established procedures and a commander’s intuition to solve the problem. In general, “design” is problem setting while “planning” is problem solving.

9. Operational design provides a means to gain understanding of a complex problem and environment, along with insights towards achieving a workable solution. Although design should precede planning, design is continuous throughout the operation, constantly testing and refining to ensure the relevance of military action to the problem. In this sense, design guides and informs planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It allows for adjustments to be continually made to the campaign plan as required.

10. Campaign planning focuses on the operational objectives and on the physical and intellectual activities intended to have a direct effect on the threat or environment. A commander is typically assigned a mission and a set of resources, and required to devise a plan to use those resources to accomplish that mission or achieve the desired objective.

### 604. PLANNING LEVELS ACROSS CAMPAIGN THEMES

1. Campaigning forces have traditionally planned at a level reflective of their level of command and employment. Thus, tactical level formations have been limited to the conduct of tactical level planning and subsequent activities. In planning processes, units have conducted the estimate process while formations have performed the formal staff-assisted operational planning process. Elements of campaign planning have rested solely at the operational and strategic levels. Furthermore, combat support elements rested mainly at the higher tactical and formation levels, and joint resources have been normally controlled at the higher formation and operational levels. Finally, integration with other agencies has traditionally been conducted only at the highest levels and has been limited in scope.

2. Much of this paradigm will remain extant during campaigns of major combat. However, many campaigns, such as a peace support or COIN, will have particular characteristics such as: the involvement of other elements of power to achieve success; the requirement to deal with environmental elements and actors in addition to an adversary; the limited involvement from alliance or coalition members, such as the commitment of units or brigades only; forces working in expansive areas of operations (AO); and, the use of joint enablers at tactical levels.

¹²⁷ NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

3. In such situations, there will be a compression of this paradigm that will see tactical level commanders undertaking responsibilities and processes associated with higher tactical and operational level headquarters (HQ). Thus, units and lower level formations will work closely at all levels with other agencies, they will deal with a wide array of actors and influences within the environment in addition to adversary forces, they will undertake long-term operational planning, they will be responsible for the conduct or coordination of all aspects of the alliance’s campaign within their large AOs, they will be responsible to implement their own national campaigns, they will work on multiple lines of operation, they will be allocated a wide array of combat support enablers (e.g., PSYOPS detachments at battle group level), and their tactical level activities will be directly linked to operational objectives and end states.

4. As a result of this compression, elements of campaign planning, operational planning and interagency operations are forced down to the tactical levels where they are incorporated, or at the very least, must be understood and factored into tactical planning. This is illustrated in Figure 6-2.

![Figure 6-2: Compression of Planning Levels By Campaign Theme](image)

5. The level, to which a tactical commander is planning in terms of incorporating elements of campaign and operational planning, will depend upon the type of campaign being conducted. Major combat operations will be relatively straightforward with a focus on a likely conventional adversary. Peace support and COIN campaigns will demand much more complicated planning considerations at lower levels. This compression in certain campaigns of operational planning down to tactical levels stems from certain environmental characteristics and campaign demands, which may include some or all of the following:

   a. The environment and nature of the campaign requires a multi-agency, comprehensive approach to the campaign to reach enduring outcomes. This will see lower tactical levels planning and working with other agencies to restore or create civil structures and institutions. Thus, the military tactical level forces will share lines of operation and objectives with non-military agencies.
b. Operational objectives are planned so that there is a direct and intimate link between them and tactical level activities. For example, tactical level forces may assume tasks to maintain civil order in a specific area, assist in the stabilization through the creation of civil structures, and train local security forces.

c. There is a need for tactical level commanders to understand the direct relationship between their tactical level activities, the effects, both desired and undesired, created by their activities, and the resulting impact on the achievement of operational objectives.

d. Tactical commanders must understand the influence that their activities will have on the various actors and groups within the environment, and plan for this accordingly.

e. Tactical level commanders may be allocated joint capabilities, such as CIMIC or PSYOPS detachments, that normally reside at higher echelons of command.

f. The complexity of the campaign lines of operation requires harmonization of the actions of other agencies and elements at the lowest levels. For example, tactical level commanders will have to coordinate their activities and effects with other non-military agencies.

g. Some alliance member commitments will only occur at the tactical level and therefore their understanding of, and influence in, the allied campaign will come from the tactical level.

SECTION 3
THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

605. GENERAL

1. The purpose of operational design is to map out the framework for the campaign plan and its detailed development. Operational design expresses operational art and consists of the operational estimate, the operational concepts for articulating the campaign plan, and the campaign plan itself. Operational design provides the guidance for the planning of major operations or campaigns, based upon an analysis of the nature of the problem and desired end state. It results in the commander's visualization of the campaign's conduct, and thus, leads to operational campaign planning, including the continual issue of orders and directives.

2. Operational design relies upon a number of operational concepts to support campaign planning.

3. While strategic and operational objectives remain consistent throughout the joint operating area (JOA), the capabilities, activities and effects used to accomplish them can vary significantly from one AO to another.
606. OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE AND MISSION ANALYSIS

1. The operational estimate will produce the campaign plan, followed by the operation plan (OPLAN) and operation order (OPORD) needed to initiate the campaign plan. Sequence:

   a. The operational estimate begins with an assessment of the environment and the issues that led to the crisis or decision to undertake a campaign and intervene with military forces. It is here that all elements and systems of the environment—political, military, economic, social (including culture and religion), information and infrastructure (PMESII)—are identified and assessed. Here, thought can be given to other elements of power and agencies that are best suited to deal with these systems.

   b. Mission analysis is the logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior’s order the requirements necessary to fulfil a mission. At the operational level, it places in context what objective and supporting effects are to be achieved by the campaign:

      (1) The commander conducts a mission analysis of the strategic and operational direction issued to him, which should include a strategic end state and objectives, including the military strategic objective. From this he identifies the military operational objectives that must be fulfilled in order to support the end state. In doing so, he must focus on the strategic objectives as the guiding elements of operational design.

      (2) During mission analysis, the commander must analyze and discuss the strategic directive with senior military or governmental leaders to ensure that the policy goals are clear, and that the national level authorities are made fully aware of the consequences of committing military forces to a campaign.

      (3) Planning in a crisis will be an iterative process with political and diplomatic activity occurring in parallel. Even in domestic operations, the ideal content of a strategic directive is unlikely to be available at an early stage. In some cases, it must be acknowledged that contingency planning and some preparations may begin without a politically approved mission. If a clearly enunciated strategic directive is not forthcoming, the commander should prepare options for approval.

      (4) The mission analysis should consider what other instruments of the JIMP framework will be used to achieve the overall objective or be available for coordination in the field.

2. The operational commander’s mission analysis allows him to provide planning guidance to his staff. It should clearly state the key operational objectives to be achieved and the key supporting effects and activities in their realization. At this point, the commander should be able to vocalize his visualization of the campaign through a unifying theme in the form of his commander’s intent. Together, the commander and his staff develop the campaign plan.
3. Once the campaign plan is developed, the initiating OPLANs and OPORDs are conceived. Based upon the commander's direction, a number of courses of action will be developed, validated and compared.

4. The commander will select the preferred course of action and resulting plan. These will be refined and issued as OPLANs and OPORDs. As the campaign progresses, the OPLANS will be continually modified and issued to reflect progress and developments in the campaign and environment.

5. Flexibility and adaptability in operational design and planning are essential as each new campaign or development during a campaign brings unforeseen complexities and opportunities for which there may be no pre-planned solutions. Commanders must anticipate developments, plan for them, and act in parallel with JIMP activity. This will ensure the effective application of combat power.

607. THE CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING

1. The elements of operational design provide a framework for analysis of the mission. They help commanders visualize the operation and shape their intent. The elements of operational design are as follows:
   a. end state and military battlespace conditions to be achieved;
   b. centre(s) of gravity;
   c. objectives;
   d. decisive points;
   e. lines of operation;
   f. culminating point;
   g. operational reach, approach and pauses;
   h. simultaneous and sequential operations;
   i. linear and non-linear operations; and
   j. tempo.

608. END STATE

1. The strategic end state is the situation the government/higher authority wants to exist when operations conclude, both military operations, as well as those in which the military is in support of other instruments of power. It is the desired situation derived from national policy direction. It is realized by the achievement of strategic objectives. A strategic objective is a constituent of the desired strategic end state. The strategic end state and supporting objectives are used to determine the military operational end state and objectives.
2. At the operational level, the operational end state is the desired military situation derived from strategic direction, taking into account the end state and objectives of the other instruments of power. At the operational and tactical levels, it is the set of conditions that when achieved accomplish the assigned mission and meet the desired objectives that support the end state. It may be reached before the overall strategic end state. Upon achieving it, the military involvement in a campaign may cease or be reduced substantially.

3. An operational objective is a constituent of the desired operational end state and is achieved through the aggregation of one or a number of operational effects, created through one or more activities. The operational objectives are the military goals needed to produce the desired operational end state. Determining the operational end state and supporting operational objectives, by use of mission analysis, are the critical first steps in operational design using an effects-based approach.

4. Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders determine the operational end state for campaigns or joint major operations, and set the operational objectives necessary to accomplish them. Operations at the theatre level focus on achieving the operational objectives necessary to achieve the commander’s end state. They are used to develop campaign lines of operation that link decisive points or effects leading to the fulfilment of those objectives. These campaign lines of operation should focus and harmonize military activities with those of the other JIMP elements, particularly the other agencies. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are identified at the outset in order to ascertain the effectiveness of activities in meeting the desired effects and objectives in the ultimate fulfilment of the end state.

609. CENTRE OF GRAVITY

1. A centre of gravity (CoG) is a source of strength or power. It has been defined as: “characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.” Centres of gravity exist at all levels of command for any military force. They are strengths that create effects; therefore, they are better defined in terms of people—individuals or groups—that can create effects. They may benefit from characteristics or certain localities but are tangible. They may be a moral leader, such as a political or religious leader, or a group, such as an operational armour reserve, or a particular tribe supporting an insurgency.

2. An alternative, more accurate definition for a CoG is: “a dynamic and powerful physical or moral agent of action or influence that possess certain characteristics and capabilities, and benefits from a given location or terrain.”

3. A CoG is an agent from which an adversary or force will gain his strength, either moral or physical, or both. A CoG will exist at each level of command, and an adversary may have more than a single CoG. A CoG will exist wherever forces are most concentrated and where there is significant cohesion. It may be a centre of power and influence and/or a collection of physical capabilities.

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129 NATO AAP-6.
130 “What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” by Dr. J. Strange, USMC War College and Colonel R. Iron, UK Army, 2006. Much of this section is taken from this source. The NATO AAP-6 definition has been derived from an interpretation of the original concept proposed by the military theorist Clausewitz. Instead of capabilities or locations, a centre of gravity is a strength that can create an effect.
4. In short, a CoG is a main centre of strength, be it physical, moral or both. A CoG can deliver a significant effect, again be it physical or moral. Thus, a CoG exists because of the effect that it can have on an adversary or situation (from the striking of a blow), not because of its inherent capabilities. Certainly, a CoG needs certain capabilities, characteristics and locations to achieve the effect, but it is the effect this is key in determining a CoG. CoGs may change over time.

5. CoGs are people, groups or individuals, which create a physical or moral/psychological effect. A CoG may be a military force or a key component of a military force, such an elite, highly trained manoeuvre force. Physical CoGs function as active agents that endeavour to destroy the adversary’s capability and will to resist. Moral CoGs function as active agents that influence or control physical CoGs. It may be a leader, a key ruling element, or a population segment capable of creating a motivational effect.

6. A CoG is a key strength of an adversary or military force. It is important only in terms of its relationship to another military force, normally its adversary, and the effect that it can create. A powerful military formation may only be a CoG if it is suitably capable, by virtue of its relative strength and location, to strike the blow and create the significant effect against its adversary. If for example, the adversary’s armour reserve is an operational CoG, but it cannot manoeuvre to be effective because all bridges have been destroyed, then it is no longer a CoG. Hence, CoGs are determined and identified based upon their relationship to the adversary and the potential to create significant effects against him.

CENTRES OF GRAVITY IN RELATION TO THE ADVERSARY

In the American Civil War, the Army of Northern Virginia was a centre of gravity not because its soldiers were particularly key, but because of the threat it posed to Washington DC and its ability to block the Union Army of the Potomac’s march on Richmond, the Confederate capital. This was a combination of capabilities, location and time.

In 1991 the Iraqi Republican Guard was a centre of gravity because of what it could potentially do to VII Corps, not just because it was well trained with capable armour. In 2003 the Republican Guard was once again identified as an Iraqi centre of gravity, key to the defence of “Fortress Baghdad”. In retrospect, the Saddam Fedayeen turned out to be the more worrisome threat, at least for a short while, because of their ability to maintain Saddam’s grip on numerous cities along the Coalition’s supply lines running back to Kuwait. Yet the Kurdish peshmerga, would likely have relished fighting the Fedayeen on their terms. For the Kurds it was the Republican Guard with their superior firepower, mobility, and protection that was a much more potent centre of gravity. This is a graphic example of how centres of gravity are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries. The Iraqi operational centre of gravity may have been the Republican Guard against the Kurds; but was likely to have been the asymmetric forces of the Fedayeen against the Coalition, against which the Republican Guard could not survive in open combat.


7. Moral centres of gravity will be focused upon people and their will. One can defeat an opponent’s army, destroy the economy and occupy the land, but victory will unlikely be lasting if the will to resist remains strong amongst the populace. In any campaign, the moral CoGs must be identified. They are normally strategic. The two key elements of a moral CoG are the will to fight and the ability to command the resources to fight.
8. In order for a campaign to achieve a long lasting settlement such as self-sustaining peace, one must undermine the adversary’s strategic CoGs, especially the moral CoGs. There must be clear linkage between the campaign objectives at the operational level, and undermining or defeating the moral CoG(s) (the adversary’s moral resistance) at the strategic level. This will take more than just the military instrument to achieve—the total strategy should embrace all the instruments of national power, military and non-military, along with other agencies capable of creating the campaign objectives and attacking moral CoGs. In other words, a comprehensive approach will be required to harmonize the activities of all elements of power to attack and defeat the moral CoGs. Military operations should not stand-alone; otherwise, it is unlikely that the defeat of an adversary’s physical operational CoG will lead to undermining the strategic moral CoG(s), which may stem from standing grievances.

9. In many cases, an individual moral CoG is difficult to destroy in only physical terms. Someone else would likely replace him. It is better, albeit a more time consuming, to remove the legitimacy or claim to legitimacy from the moral CoG. In many cases, this will involve solving the reasons that led to the conflict in the first place.

10. A moral CoG in many campaigns may be the will of the majority of a population, or the will of a particular segment of the population. Such will be the case in a COIN campaign. The key battle between the insurgent and the campaigning forces will be to win the enduring support of the populace.

11. Thus, a successful campaign plan must first appraise, as accurately as possible, the moral and physical character of the opponent to include his moral and physical CoGs. There is no alternative and there is no short cut or analytical model that can make up for an inaccurate assessment of the adversary when deciding upon CoGs. It is a matter of careful assessment and the art of command to accurately assess physical and moral CoGs.

**MORAL CENTRES OF GRAVITY**

The outcome of the 1991 Gulf War was a resounding military victory that achieved the Coalition’s limited objective, the liberation of Kuwait, by defeating Iraq’s operational centre of gravity, the Republican Guard. But Saddam Hussein, a strategic moral centre of gravity, remained undefeated. Saddam held the position of a moral centre of gravity for his ability to command both military forces and a large mass of the populace, and to control through fear other elements of the populace.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Saddam was effectively neutralized early in the war, and the information operations undermined the will of the population (another potential strategic centre of gravity) to fight on his behalf. Thus, the enemy’s moral centre(s) of gravity was neutralized simultaneously with defeating his operational centers of gravity—the Republican Guard and the Fedayeen. The Coalition was thus able to achieve its operational objectives: the seizure of Baghdad; and, the toppling of the regime. However, neutralizing a strategic centre(s) of gravity is not the same as defeating it, which is necessary for the much wider strategic objective of achieving lasting peace. The failure to quickly achieve the support or will of overwhelming majority of the populace to support/accept the Coalition strategic post-war objectives fuelled the insurgency that erupted shortly after the major combat was complete.

**Source:** “What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” by Dr. J. Strange, USMC War College and Colonel R. Iron, UK Army, 2006.

12. Physical centres of gravity tend to be easy to visualize—armies or units, things that resist an opponent. Moral CoGs are sometimes less obvious, and less easy to grasp. Yet, it is essential to understand moral CoGs, for these are likely to be the most important ones at the strategic level.
13. **A moral centre of gravity** is linked to people, be they individuals or groups, for only people can create and maintain moral will and resistance. This focus on people may be classified as follows:

   a. **An Individual.** This is normally a leader, military or intellectual or both. A strong-willed individual who has the will to develop, lead and sustain an opposition to a potential adversary, along with the ability to exert his will through an armed force and/or people. Such an individual might be Saddam Hussein in 1990-91 and Winston Churchill in 1940-41.

   b. **The Ruling Elite.** Ruling elite is normally a closed group, within which the real power of the state or entity resides. This group will direct policy and wield control over the armed forces and/or people. The group may be ideologically focused or claim a special, exclusive inheritance within the society, and thus seek their legitimacy through their key role in spreading this ideology or claiming a special social status. An example would be the clerical elite of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

   c. **A Strong-willed Population.** The moral CoG may rest within a large group of people who share a common belief that is held strongly enough to engage in conflict with an adversary. Examples include both the Palestinians and Israelis in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

14. Ideas themselves do not form a CoG because they cannot create an effect on their own. However, they may be the key characteristic or root of a CoG in terms of its motivation, authority and legitimacy. The motivating ideas will be embodied and empowered by individuals who are the proponents of the ideas and who wield influence over a populace and control over an armed force. If successful, the ideas will be adopted by a large segment of a population, thus making that segment of the populace a CoG. This is the aim, for example, of the narrative formed by insurgent forces. The ability of an idea or ideology to motivate a population will differ with culture, and any intelligence assessment of potential CoGs must take this cultural aspect into consideration.

15. In general, CoGs will be:

   a. Active, dynamic agents capable of creating an effect. They will be people, in either units or formations, or individual leaders or groups with moral authority and will.

   b. Obvious. This will be more so the case with physical CoGs, but intelligence must work to identify both types.

   c. Powerful and capable of striking or directing significant blows.

16. Within a campaign there will be both strategic and operational CoG. During an insurgency, for example, a strategic CoG may be an individual or a segment of the populace while an operational CoG will be their related armed element.

17. An adversary will likely have a number of CoGs, some more critical than others. It may be difficult to identify CoGs. In attempting to identify them, the commander will develop an understanding of the complex interplay between all of the relevant entities and dynamics of the
particular environment, including those aspects of the situation that are imperfectly recognized or understood. This will allow the identification of key vulnerabilities on both the physical and psychological planes, along with key objectives to reaching the desired end state. As the situation becomes better understood, one of these objectives may develop to be a CoG.

18. Commanders must plan campaigns in such a manner that allows their forces and actions to attack adversary CoGs, both physical and moral. Lines of operation that attack a physical CoG will normally be fairly straightforward. The CoG need not be destroyed, but may only be neutralized until it no longer possesses a capability or relative location from which to strike a significant blow.

19. Operations against moral CoGs will be much more difficult to plan and may take a significant amount of time. Leaders or elites and their ideas may be attacked in a number of ways. As individuals, they may be eliminated, but they will likely be replaced; indeed, their elimination may only enhance the moral influence that is assumed by their successors. Their physical means of communication and control may be destroyed, thus limiting their capabilities. The legitimacy of the individuals and groups and their ideas may be attacked or alternative ideas and leaders may be offered. In order to successfully defeat a moral CoG, a number of measures on both the physical and psychological planes will likely be required. Long-term and enduring solutions will come from the intellectual defeat of these CoGs, or at least their neutralization, to the point that they become irrelevant. Much of this will be done through influence activities that persuade individuals and groups to support the campaign.

20. Destruction or neutralization of the adversary CoG(s) is the most direct path to achieving the end state. The adversary will recognize this and shield his CoG(s), and commanders must examine many approaches, direct and indirect, on both the physical and psychological planes. Once the CoG(s) have been identified, they become a focus of the commander’s intent and operational design.

21. Commanders must not only consider the adversary CoG(s), but also identify and protect their own CoG(s).

22. Lines of operation group similar operational objectives and may be devised to attack or neutralize the CoGs and reach those operational objectives. Although CoGs are vital considerations in operational design, they are not the sole focus of activities and operations. The lines of operation should work towards the desired end state, while defeating, neutralizing and protecting the identified CoGs.

610. OBJECTIVES

1. An objective is defined as “a clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an enemy’s force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed.”

2. Objectives are the constituent elements, which when combined achieve the end state at the strategic and operational levels as described above. They also apply at the tactical level, but are realized in more immediate time frames and are often tied to geographic features.

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131 NATO AAP-6.
3. Objectives exist on the physical and psychological planes. In the former context, an objective may be the destruction of an adversary force. In the latter context, an objective may be to convince a hostile populace to accept a temporary military presence, or to stop supporting an insurgency.

4. An operational objective is a constituent of the desired operational end state realized through the aggregation of one or a number of interrelated effects and circumstances. It may be described as a **decisive condition** for the realization of the operational end state. Operational objectives may be delivered by elements of power other than the military. Operational objectives may be grouped into thematic lines of operation.

### 611. DECISIVE POINT

1. A decisive point is defined as: “a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.”

2. As with other taxonomy, the complications of many operating environments and an effects-based approach to campaign planning require a broader conceptualization and application of the concept of decisive points. Just as lines of operation have been expanded to be thematic groups of operational objectives, the concept of decisive points must be viewed in relation to the operational end state and objectives.

3. Decisive points will exist on the psychological and physical planes, and may be achievements or circumstances to be created on the path to an operational objective, vice a point from which to attack a CoG. Although, they will likely be planned in consideration of assessed centres of gravity.

4. Decisive points are supporting effects to be created by the conduct of activities on the path to an operational objective. For example, the achievement of an effective ministry of defence, or an operational command and control (C2) system, may be decisive points or supporting effects en route to reaching the objective of establishing a competent military force.

5. Some decisive points are geographic, such as a port facility, a bridge crossing site, a transportation network or node, or a base of operations. Other physical decisive points include elements of an adversary force, such as units, command posts, fire support units capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or important communications sites. Events, such as the commitment of the threat operational reserve, may also be decisive points. Once identified and selected for action, decisive points become an effect, groups of effects, or a set of circumstances or conditions to be achieved. A decisive point may be a single effect to be achieved, or a collection of related effects on the way to achieving an operational objective. See Figure 6-3.

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132 It should be noted that some effects would not be within the purview of the operational commander to deliver, even if they may be necessary for the desired end state.

133 NATO AAP-6.
6. Where decisive points exist on the psychological plane, they may be somewhat intangible and the linkage between them harder to define. For example, to reach the objective of wide spread domestic support for a campaign, a decisive point may be the establishment of essential services to slum areas of a population centre.

7. Normally, a situation presents more decisive points than the force can effect with available resources. Operational art enables the commander to select decisive points that will most quickly and efficiently overcome the threat CoG and/or reach the operational objectives. Decisive points shape operational design and allow commanders to select those that are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. A good number of them will require the support of other agencies.

8. While strategic and operational objectives remain consistent throughout the JOA, the decisive points may vary from AO to AO, particularly in campaigns that require all elements of the JIMP framework for success.

9. Once decisive points have been identified, they may be plotted logically and sequenced accordingly in a path to create operational objectives. The groupings of similar operational objectives and the path of decisive points leading to their realization may be termed lines of operation. Some decisive points will be conducted sequentially or simultaneously depending upon their nature, the available resources, and the logical sequence required for the building of successful outcomes. See Figure 6-4.
612. **LINES OF OPERATION**

1. A line of operation is defined as: “in a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity.”

2. Operational objectives correspond to and are reached by lines of operation. Although the traditional definition for a line of operation places it in context of moving to attack a CoG, the complexities of the operating environment and an effects-based approach to operations have expanded this concept, so that a line of operation will thematically group similar operational objectives and lead, through decisive points or supporting effects, to the realization of the operational objective and eventually the desired end state. They link decisive points and provide a logical, sequenced progression of activities. See Figure 6-4.

3. Lines of operation dealing with conventional threats will be rather straightforward and seek to defeat the adversary. Lines of operation that deal with operational objectives other than the defeat of an adversary force, such as the creation of self-sustaining governance, will be more difficult to conceive and will likely require the support of a variety of elements of power.

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134 NATO AAP-6.
4. A campaign may have single or multiple lines of operation. A single line of operations concentrates forces and simplifies planning. Multiple lines of operations increase flexibility and create several opportunities for success. The best approach may be to use multiple lines, attaining a multidimensional effort where several attacks converge upon and defeat the threat CoG. Each potential option further complicates the adversary’s situation and stresses his C2 system. The synchronization of multiple lines of operations can overload the adversary commander by presenting him with several threats at the same time. The tactical agility of Land forces allows for simultaneous operations along multiple lines of operations.

5. Lines of operation that consider approaches on both the physical and psychological planes are key in harmonizing the activities of the military with those of other elements within the JIMP framework, and illustrating how each may complement and support the other. Note that a line of operation may span both the physical and psychological planes and involve a combination of fires and influence activities in order to achieve the successive decisive points.

6. When considering combat operations against a conventional threat, the lines of operation that counter the adversary conventional forces may still be viewed as either interior or exterior:

   a. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate threat forces than the threat forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the threat force by shifting resources more rapidly than the threat.

   b. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the threat. Operations on exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile threat; however, they require stronger or more mobile forces.

   c. The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends upon the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces.

   d. An adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force; however, that advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force manoeuvres to a position between larger but less agile threat forces, the friendly force may defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

7. Where the decisive points are physical, lines of operation can be defined in physical terms. A military force can be manoeuvred from its base of operations to tactical and operational objectives. In geographical terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to the control of the objective or the defeat of the adversary force.

8. Where decisive points exist on the psychological plane, lines of operation will likely involve a mix of fires and influence activities, with the focus likely on the latter. The creation of a decisive point on a governance line of operation, for example, will require the creation of an institution supported by the education of its members and the populace at large.
9. When assigned operational objectives, the commander must determine how to define them, what decisive points or supporting effects will lead to them, and thus what activities must be assigned to create those effects, the locations and targets where they must occur, and the subordinates who will conduct them. This results in the development and issue of OPLANs and OPORDs.

10. Lines of operation that seek more than simply the destruction of an adversary force will be complicated, will require careful visualization, and will involve a mixture of activities, both fires and influence, and thus conducted on both the physical and psychological planes. Decisive points may require the use of military forces alone, non-military agencies, or a combination of the two. For example, a line of operation dealing with the security environment of a region may include the following: military forces to provide the physical security framework and neutralize belligerent forces; other agencies to create a domestic constabulary; and a combination of military and non-military forces to create a national, indigenous security force with a civilian department in charge.

613. CULMINATING POINT

1. The culminating point is that point in an operation or campaign at which a force’s fighting power is about to be exhausted and any further operations will risk tactical or even operational failure. At the culminating point, the current situation can just be maintained, but not developed to any greater advantage. Nor can the force react sufficiently to a new or unforeseen threat.

2. A culminating point has both operational and tactical relevance. It may exist for a force regardless of the campaign’s predominating theme. Culminating points exist on both the physical and the psychological planes.

3. In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and space at which the attacker’s effective fighting power no longer exceeds that of the defender, or the attacker’s momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. Beyond their culminating point, attackers risk counterattack and catastrophic defeat, and would continue the offence at great peril.

4. Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend successfully, or they can no longer counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defence. The defensive culminating point marks that instant when the defender must withdraw to preserve the force.

5. On the psychological plane, the culminating point may result from a lack of national will (politically or amongst the national population), a decline in the support from the local populace, a loss of legitimacy, or a lack of force protection leading to high casualties, and thus, a loss of support and will. In some campaigns, the will of a national populace may be a strategic CoG. The culminating point of this national will must be carefully monitored and measures taken to avoid it.\(^{135}\)

\(^{135}\) For a more detailed discussion of the role played by domestic populations, see B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-insurgency Operations.
614. OPERATIONAL REACH, APPROACH AND PAUSE

1. **General.** Good operational design balances operational reach, operational approach, and operational pauses to ensure the force achieves its objectives without overextending its fighting power. Commanders carefully assess the physical and psychological condition and capabilities of friendly and adversary forces, anticipate culminating points, and plan operational pauses if necessary. They commit the required forces and conduct operational risk assessments. Commanders aim to extend operational reach while avoiding culminating points and operational pauses.

2. **Operational Reach.** Operational reach is the distance over which activities and effects can be successfully achieved or conducted. It will vary depending upon the situation as fighting power, sustainment capabilities, and the geography surrounding and separating friendly and threat forces all influence it. Operational reach can be extended by: locating reserves, bases, and support forward; increasing the range of weapons systems; echeloning and disciplining supply; and improving lines of communications (LOC). A limit in operational reach will limit the projection and effects of fighting power. The operational reach of a force will be an important consideration in campaigns such as COIN and the conduct of an “ink spot” technique to extend the influence and presence of campaigning forces. 136

3. **Operational Approach.** Operational approach is the direct or indirect manner in which a commander attacks the threat CoG. The direct approach applies combat power directly against the threat CoG or the threat’s principal strength. The indirect approach attacks the threat CoG by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that avoid threat strengths. When possible, commanders choose an indirect approach where they manoeuvre to avoid threat strengths and degrade threat capabilities, and refuse combat when the situation is unfavourable or the outcome does not significantly affect the operation. An effective operational approach, whether direct or indirect, focuses symmetric and asymmetric activities on the objective. Direct and indirect approaches apply to activities undertaken on the psychological plane. For example, reconstruction activities undertaken for a local population sees the key effect of winning public support and legitimacy created indirectly by providing basic needs of the populace. This, in turn, will undermine the legitimacy of the adversary and his claims to moral superiority.

4. **Operational Pause.** An operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to assist in achieving operational objectives. It can be used to consolidate gains, reinforce influences, extend operational reach, or prevent culmination. An operational pause may occur because the force has culminated, because the character of the operation has changed (e.g., by the intervention of another threat), or through a combination of other factors. If the situation requires an operational pause, the commander should consider the designation a new main effort. Land forces coordinate operational pauses with other components so that the joint force is able maintain the initiative and momentum. If an operational pause is required for a particular line of operation, activities on other lines of operation should continue. Ideally, the requirement for operational pauses is foreseen and planned.

136 For a more detailed discussion of the role played by domestic populations, see B-GL-323-004/FP-003 Counter-insurgency Operations.
615. SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS

1. Operational objectives are not generally attainable through a single activity, so the operational commander would normally design his campaign to comprise a number of related phases. He must therefore have a clear understanding of the relationship between events in terms of time, space, resources and purpose. Without this, he cannot establish which events can be done simultaneously, which have to be done sequentially, and in what order.

2. Simultaneous operations employ combat power against the entire adversary system and its supporting systems by concurrently engaging as many decisive points as possible. On the physical plane, simultaneity exploits depth and agility to overwhelm threat forces. It threatens opponents with immediate consequences throughout the AO. The presence of multiple threats overloads threat C2 systems. Adversary commanders confront many decisions within a very short period. Secondary effects also occur on the psychological plane for such intensity also undermines the threat’s confidence and overall moral cohesion.

3. Simultaneous decisive and shaping operations should be planned so as to complement one another. They may occur simultaneously on the physical and psychological planes. For example, measures seeking to increase public security in a COIN campaign, or to dissuade former belligerents from breaking peace agreements, should be explained to the local populace as a shaping info ops campaign. This, in turn, helps maintain the legitimacy of the military presence and operations.

4. Simultaneous operations place a premium on information superiority and on the ability to employ overwhelming combat power. In practical terms, the force size and force projection constraints may limit the ability of Land forces to achieve simultaneity. Effective operational designs employ complementary and reinforcing joint and service capabilities to achieve maximum simultaneity.

5. Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the threat’s CoG. It can also be thought of as the staging of decisive points along lines of operation leading to the threat CoG or to key objectives.

6. The sequence of operations is closely related to the use of resources and capabilities, and limits here will often force operations to be conducted sequentially. In this regard, commanders must synchronize subordinate unit activities in time, space, and effects in order to link the theatre strategy and design of joint major operations to tactical execution. Without this linkage, operations deteriorate into haphazard battles and engagements that waste resources without achieving decisive results or operational objectives.

7. Operations may also be sequenced to ensure one decisive point or supporting effect is realized before the next one is attempted in the logical sequence that leads toward the operational objective.

8. Sequential operations achieve the operational objective by phases. Commanders concentrate combat power at successive points over time, achieving the mission in a controlled series of steps. Often the scale and scope of the campaign or major operation, together with the resiliency of the threat, compel commanders to destroy and disrupt the threat in stages, exposing the CoG step by step. On the psychological plane, an effect may take time to create and thus must be done in stages.
616. LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR OPERATIONS

1. Linear operations are the traditional form of combat against a conventional opponent in which there are clear front lines and manoeuvre units operate in contiguous AOs. Each force directs and sustains combat power toward the adversary in concert with adjacent units. The ratio of forces to space and the array of manoeuvre forces emphasize geographic positioning and tends to create a continuous forward line of own troops (FLOT). This protects and simplifies LOC. Protected LOC, in turn, increases the endurance and operational reach of land forces and ensures freedom of action for extended periods. A linear battlefield organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favour linear operations include those in which land forces lack the information needed to conduct non-linear operations or are severely outnumbered and thus must resort to sequential operations. Linear operations are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned adversary force, or when the threat to LOC reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to more easily concentrate and synchronize combat power. Coalition operations may also require a linear design.

2. Non-linear operations are those in which manoeuvre units usually operate in non-contiguous areas throughout the AO. Even when operating in contiguous AOs, manoeuvre forces may orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. They are the norm in the many peace support and COIN campaigns, and must be considered in the various aspects of operational design.

617. TEMPO

1. Tempo is the rhythm and rate of activities in operations. Controlling or altering that rhythm and rate is necessary to retain the initiative and avoid culmination. Land forces adjust tempo to maximize friendly capabilities. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. When the sustained friendly tempo exceeds the threat's ability to react, friendly forces can maintain the initiative and have a marked advantage.

2. Combat forces generally pay a price for rapid tempo through greater fatigue and resource expenditure. Commanders judge the capacity of their forces to operate at high tempo based upon resources and deteriorating performance. They design the campaign for various tempos that take into account the endurance of the force.

3. Commanders complement rapid tempo with three related concepts: firstly, through the use of simultaneous operations rather than a deliberate sequence of operations; secondly, by avoiding needless combat; and thirdly, by the use of mission command to allow initiative by subordinate commanders.

SECTION 4
CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH

618. GENERAL

1. Campaign planning applies established procedures to solve the largely understood problem developed through operational design. It establishes an operational end state and details the operational objectives and supporting effects needed to realize the end state.
2. Once this is done, the campaign plan is implemented through a series of OPLANs and corresponding OPORDs. These allow the commander to map out the tactical activities necessary to achieve the supporting effect, decisive points, and operational objectives. They are developed through the operational planning process (OPP).\textsuperscript{137}

3. In the development of the campaign plan, a comprehensive approach is used, along with an effects-based approach to planning. This will help incorporate all elements of power and agencies needed to reach a successful conclusion to the campaign. Secondly, it will help ensure that the tactical level activities eventually planned and conducted will directly support the operational objectives. It will ideally preclude the conduct of tactical activities for their own sake, or as a natural assumption on the part commanders, as to their view of the role of the military. In incorporating an effects-based approach to the extent that operational outcomes can be translated into coherent tactical activity, an effects-based approach is complementary to existing procedures, terminology and practice at all levels of command. The significance of the commander’s unifying theme provides the focus for the operational design and resulting campaign plan.

4. Despite the formal campaign planning process, operational art, intuition and command will still have major parts to play, especially in uncertain conditions and in those situations where there is a compelling need to act. In all circumstances, operational freedom of action will be preserved. This is necessary for there will always be gaps in knowledge, and a commander’s intuition will still be required. Indeed, regardless of the lengths to which commanders and staff may go to anticipate all the actions and reactions of the systems in an environment, there remain too many variables, not the least of which are individual personalities and motives, to allow an accurate prediction of all cause-and-effect relationships. Thus, commander’s intuition and responsiveness to the unforeseen will remain key to successful operations and campaigns.

5. The application of an effects-based approach is pervasive at all levels throughout the planning and execution of operations, from the campaign plan downwards. While the strategic direction gives the long-term perspective, the campaign plan will provide the medium-term framework, focusing on an operational end state, constituent operational objectives, and the supporting effects required to reach the operational objectives. The near to medium term timeframe is covered through OPLANs and OPORDs that issue the activities that create the desired effects. Assessment of the situation, the environment and the progress of the campaign are continuous and inform subsequent iterations of the OPLAN. Each successive OPLAN adjusts operations to reflect the progress made during the campaign. This is illustrated in Figure 6-5.

\textsuperscript{137} It is important to recognize that the commander may not complete the mission or complete his assigned tasks in the time that his unit or formation is deployed to a campaign. The operation plan that the commander must develop to accomplish or further the accomplishment of his assigned mission objectives does not replace the campaign plan, but is an adjunct to it, tailored specifically for the commander’s assigned area and situation.
An effects-based approach to campaigns and operations does not significantly alter the process of operational design and planning, but it provides a better focus and a measurable progress. An effects-based approach provides just enough structure and process to the commander’s intuitive operational design and planning to ensure that tangible products are produced, end states and objectives are considered before activities, and the eventual activities link directly to desired objectives and end states.

Terminology for campaign design will remain extant, but the application of it, on both the physical and psychological planes, will have to be conceptually expanded. The steps involved in an effects-based approach are the same as those in operational design and the OPP; however, the scope of these planning processes will need to be broadened to fully encompass all the disparate, yet interconnected systems and players pertinent to the situation. In other words, the planning will focus on enduring outcomes and operational objectives over the long term and concerning all aspects of a society, vice short-term activities focused on an adversary’s military capability.

EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH CONSTRUCT FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING

An effects-based approach will be used in the development of the campaign plan. The effects-based approach is a planning philosophy combined with specific processes that enable, firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military contribution within a comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the realization of operational objectives. In simple terms, it ensures that the military activities are integrated with those of other agencies, and secondly, it ensures that military activities are directly linked to operational objectives. That is, the results or effects of the activities directly contribute to operational objectives.

2. An effects-based campaign plan follows a series of steps. However, the process is flexible and allows for the exercise of intuition throughout. The steps produce a coherent, mid to long-term outline, which guides the development of the OPLANs and OPORDs that put the campaign plan into action.

620. **STEP 1—ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION**

1. Apart from studying the obvious problem at hand that has led to military deployment and intervention, all elements of society must be examined to ascertain the role they play in the situation and crisis, and in the achievement of a successful campaign outcome. The analysis should view these elements from the environment’s cultural and historical perspective. The following aspects of an environment should be examined in as much detail as possible from a historical or background perspective, and in terms of the current situation:
   
   a. administration and governance;
   b. politics and diplomacy to include official power structures;
   c. economy, wealth distribution and commerce;
   d. humanitarian and health issues;
   e. social structures to include traditional tribal or informal power structures and criminal elements;
   f. ethnicity and religion;
   g. information, including media control and pervasiveness of access; and
   h. military capability, including both conventional and irregular forces.

2. The result of this step should provide the commander and his staff with an appreciation of the human environment that has led to the current situation, and the root causes in the society that have led to it or aggravated it. It should also indicate the various power structures and leaders that exist within the society, including any potential moral CoGs. This will form the **broad knowledge base** that will inform the remainder of the operational and tactical planning processes.

621. **STEP 2—IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OR CRISIS**

1. The second step is broken down into two parallel processes. The commander will conduct a mission analysis to ascertain the mission and operational end state. Meanwhile, the staff will review the various factors within the environment, and current situation in particular, building from Step 1. The two processes are then brought together and further analyzed. This will allow the commander to identify and select the major building blocks of the campaign plan and issue initial campaign guidance. The steps:
a. **Step 2(a)—Mission Analysis:**

(1) The mission analysis in terms of campaign planning must have a specific focus on the desired operational end state. This will be a constituent of the strategic end state. At this level, the questions and considerations in mission analysis are somewhat broader:

(a) Superior commander’s intent with respect to outcomes and end state.

(b) The outcomes that the campaign plan and the campaigning force are to achieve (specific and implied) that will realize the superior commander’s intent.

(c) The freedoms, capabilities and authority to realize the specified and implied outcomes. This will lead the commander to examine the role of other agencies and the elements of power that may be needed to ensure successful outcomes in certain areas or systems in the environment.

(d) Continuous monitoring of any environmental or situational changes that may affect the overall intent or the plan.

(2) This step allows the commander to begin framing initial campaign guidance, a provisional operational end state, and some of the operational objectives. It will also be to develop the commander’s planning guidance, commander’s critical information requests (CCIRs), requests for information (RFIs), constraints, clarifications and questions.

b. **Step 2(b)—Evaluation of the Factors:**

(1) The staff will conduct an evaluation of the factors, specifically those that have led to the current situation and those that will play a role in its resolution. This step should also seek to examine the situation in its fullest sense, including but not limited to terrain, infrastructure, meteorology and oceanography, and also population distribution, economic and agricultural factors, religious and ethnic distribution, and centres of cultural importance. Economic and logistical factors must also be thoroughly comprehended, together with the factors most amenable to change.

(2) It includes a detailed study of own, opposing, aligned and neutral elements that influence the conduct of operations and the final outcome. This understanding can be developed through an analysis of the critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities of the various systems, in order to better understand how to influence and change understanding and will, or how to affect capability.

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139 For a detailed discussion of the conduct of mission analysis, see B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command in Land Operations.*
(3) The aim here is to understand the physical and psychological characteristics of all the actors, systems and attitudes within the environment. The staff should back-brief their findings but should distinguish between the factors that will have an enduring influence through the campaign, and thus become a focus of the campaign plan, and those that have immediate or near-term importance and therefore will be addressed in the OPLAN and OPORD.

c. **Step 2(c)—Commander’s Analysis and Planning Guidance:**

(1) The commander and senior staff conduct analysis of the factors to discern the major building blocks of the campaign plan.

(2) They will select and analyze the CoG(s) that dominate the situation, along with their critical requirements and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, they will confirm the desired operational end state, and most importantly, what is required to realize it. This must include consideration of the various elements in the environment that hold influence over the CoG(s).

(3) Based upon the key CoG(s) the commander and staff will determine the operational objectives needed to achieve the end state. Analysis will occur throughout in order to confirm the validity of the decisions. Deductions from pervious analyses should be viewed in light of the selected CoG(s) in order to confirm their validity and importance. This may also lead to an adjustment of the CoG or selected operational objectives.

(4) The selected operational objectives should be viewed as the major building blocks of the campaign. Once selected, they should be viewed to confirm that they are coherent, focused on the operational end state, focus on or address the identified CoG(s), and address all the issues identified in the earlier analysis.

(5) The commander will issue campaign guidance to his staff. The requirement to incorporate other elements of power and agencies, if not already begun, must be identified and articulated at this point. This should include a unifying theme in his commander’s intent.

### 622. **STEP 3—FRAMING THE CAMPAIGN PLAN AND THE INITIAL OPERATION PLAN**

1. The analysis and outputs to this point will allow the commander and staff to develop the campaign plan itself. This will lead to the development of the initial OPLAN that will implement the campaign plan in the short to near-term:

   a. **Step 3(a)—Developing the Campaign Plan:**

      (1) The operational end state and building blocks—operational objectives—are used to develop the campaign plan itself. Decisive points or
supporting effects, which build to each operational objective, are identified in the process.

(2) Operational objectives may be grouped thematically into lines of operation, which would help with the visualization of the campaign, as they illustrate the direction and progressive movement towards the operational end state.

(3) The lines of operation will indicate where the military has primacy and where it supports other instruments of power. Note that all lines of operation—regardless of the primary agency involved—move towards the operational end state.

(4) Once the framework has been established, the commander and staff analyze the operational objectives to determine the supporting effects required at each operational objective.

(5) The measures of effectiveness (MOE) associated with each supporting effect should be identified and recorded.

(6) Careful judgement will be needed regarding the number of supporting effects selected so that subordinate units and staff do not become overwhelmed in trying to assume the required activities beyond their capabilities.

(7) Lines of operation in many campaigns in a complex operating environment will incorporate a large array of objectives, effects and activities. Together, the lines of operation will span diverse, but interrelated aspects such as security, governance and development. Some will be prosecuted by a single element of power while others, such as governance, will be shared by several agencies, none of which may be military.

(8) A campaign directive should be issued at this point. Figures 6-6, 6-7 and 6-8 illustrate the thematic lines of operation that may exist for a campaign plan, along with the supporting effects/decisive points illustrated graphically and in a tabular format.

140 Decisive conditions may be viewed and termed as supporting effects. They will be the results of activities that build to realize operational objectives.
Figure 6-6: A Campaign Plan with Four Lines of Operation

A lasting peace in which the threat of violence and civil war has been removed and Nation X has stable political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure, governance and regional leaders, providing prosperity and security for all of its people.
**OPERATIONAL END STATE**

A lasting peace in which the threat of violence and civil war has been removed and Nation X has stable political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure, governance and regional leaders, providing prosperity and security for all of its people.

**Figure 6-7: Lines of Operation with Supporting Effects Plotted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMEATIC LINES OF OPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISIVE POINTS/SUPPORTING EFFECTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transitional government is established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial governments re-established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reforms for distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia B defeated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6-8: Supporting Effects for Operational Objectives and Thematic Lines of Operations**
There is no standard format for a campaign plan. The campaign plan should be concise. It should describe (to subordinates and superiors alike) the following:

(a) The intent of the campaign.
(b) The operational end state.
(c) Operational objectives.
(d) The overall concept and intent of the campaign.
(e) The strategic and operational centre(s) of gravity.
(f) Supporting effects (decisive points) needed to be created for each operational objective.
(g) Lines of operation that have thematically grouped the operational objectives and their supporting effects.
(h) Concept for the prosecution of the campaign including its initiation and its development through successive OPLANS.

b. **Step 3(b)—Framing of the Initial Operation Plan:**

(1) While the campaign plan lays out the long-term plan, the initial OPLAN and OPORD will address the short to medium term and will initiate the campaign itself.

(2) The staff will select the supporting effects most relevant to the immediate situation that should be created first and are most likely achievable. This will be based upon the analysis of the factors that occurred earlier.

(3) Selection and prioritization of supporting effects will develop a number of options for the design of the initial OPLAN. These will be presented to the commander for a decision based upon his intuition and analysis.

(4) The commander will select what he assesses is the best option in terms of design of the initial OPLAN, specifically the supporting effects that are to be developed first. He issues initial planning guidance including a general scheme of manoeuvre. The manner in which the supporting effects are to be created in terms of time and space may be represented schematically in a number of ways.

At the conclusion of this step, the commander and staff will have developed a campaign plan and the means by which it will be initially implemented, that is, an OPLAN.

**623. STEP 4—DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPERATION PLAN**

1. With the commander’s guidance and outline scheme of manoeuvre as to the initiation of the campaign through the initial OPLAN and OPORD, staff may develop the OPLAN itself in detail. The commander’s scheme of manoeuvre will have broadly described the implementation of the campaign and initial supporting effects. It will not have described in detail how those supporting effects will be created.
2. The development of a detailed OPLAN will come to task subordinate components, formations and units with specific missions and activities that will create or help to create the initial supporting effects. This will follow an OPP:

a. **Step 4(a)—Development and Validation of Courses of Action:**

   (1) The identification and sequencing of the activities required to create the supporting effects will be considered along with the allocation to formations and units of those activities. This will be developed through detailed courses of action.

   (2) The prioritized supporting effects to be implemented through the initial OPLAN are considered and analyzed by the staff, if possible in conjunction with subordinate HQ or other elements of power and agencies as applicable. This will determine what activities are needed to create these supporting effects. They are guided by the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.

   (3) In accordance with the OPP, different possibilities for the implementation of the plan will lead to the development of different possible courses of action (COAs). A full concept of operations (CONOPS) will be developed for each considered COA.

b. **Step 4(b)—Course of Action Evaluation:**

   (1) The considered COAs are compared using a number of techniques or options including comparison of each against the Principles of War and through war gaming. The evaluation must assess each COA for suitability, adequacy, feasibility, and the likelihood of creating the supporting effects desired.

   (2) This evaluation process will provide feedback to the selection and prioritization of supporting effects and may indicate that some supporting effects are not feasible within the allocated resources and constraints. They may therefore be moved to subsequent OPLANs.

c. **Step 4(c)—Commander’s Decision and Development of the Operation Plan:**

   (1) A decision brief regarding the various COAs will allow the commander to select his preferred COA and to give direction for its refinement.

   (2) Direction is issued for further plan development and the creation of products including the OPORD.

3. With the campaign plan devised and the initial OPLAN and OPORD issued, the campaign may commence. The environment and the achievement of supporting effects en route to operational objectives are closely monitored, particularly through the application and assessment of measures of effectiveness (MOE). As the campaign progresses, subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs are issued and are adjusted to reflect the situation and the progress of the campaign. This may be timed with a subsequent rotation of forces into theatre.
Land Operations

Commanders must realize that unless deployed indefinitely, they will not conduct the entire campaign, but will only contribute to its incremental progress towards achieving operational objectives and the end state. The progress that they create and the refinement of the campaign should be briefed during the relief-in-place process.

4. In the early stages of a campaign, the military may assume a role in each or at least most lines of operation. As the security situation improves, the responsibilities for non-security related lines of operation should be passed to those other agencies best suited to conduct them. For example, initial reconstruction of infrastructure may fall to the military. However, as the security situation improves and other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) arrive in theatre, such responsibilities should be assumed by them.

5. Commanders may not necessarily have all the integral resources required to generate the effects they envision. By leveraging and synchronizing the resources and capabilities across the JIMP framework, they can produce the right combination of effects on the right lines of operation to lead to the desired end state. This places particular emphasis on the collaboration required at all levels with JIMP participants. Some lines of operation may be conducted only by the military, while others will be the sole responsibility of other agencies, and others may be shared between the military and others. In either case, a campaign seeking to establish enduring solutions for conflicts in complex environments must accept a long-term view and the requirement for a range of instruments of power to be employed.

We have seen that is only by a close combination of civil and military measures that insurgency can be fought, so it is logical to expect soldiers whose business it is to know how to fight, to know also how to use civil measures in this way. Not only should the army officers know about the subject, they must also be prepared to pass on their knowledge to politicians, civil servants, economists, members of the local government and policemen where necessary.

General Sir Frank Kitson
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN PLANNING

“Peace enforcement (sic) is wearing everybody out…This is much harder [than combat].”

LtCol. Jeff Ingram, TF 2-70 AR

Substantial evidence exists indicating that much of the post-conventional military operation conflict in Iraq could have been avoided if greater attention had been paid to Phase IV (“post-hostility operations”) strategy during the campaign planning stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Telic in 2002. For numerous and primarily political reasons serious attention was not given to post-combat stability operations during the campaign plan construction prior to the invasion of Iraq despite the existence of a voluminous US State Department study from 2002 dedicated to that very subject. Without a serious plan to follow, US administrators made several grievous errors in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Most notably, the political and administrative structure of the former government was dismantled and the Iraqi army was disbanded. The latter error caused 400 000 military-age men to become unemployed with no viable means of support for their families. With the stroke of a pen the Coalition Provisional Authority dismantled a political-military landscape that had existed for 30 years without providing a viable replacement. The resultant vacuum sowed the seeds for the multi-faceted insurgency and sectarian conflict which now afflicts Iraq. In the contemporary operating environment as much attention must be paid to stability operations as warfighting operations. Failure to do so may induce serious errors that produce a longer than desired campaign or outright failure.


624. EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES

1. Special forces are troops selected, trained, equipped and organized to conduct specific, special operations in pursuit of strategic or other high-level operational objectives. They may operate in support of conventional forces, or independently.

2. The principal roles of special forces may include: special reconnaissance, including information reporting and target acquisition; direct action, which includes direction of air, artillery and naval gunfire, designation for precision guided munitions, and raids; work with specific portions of indigenous populations; very important person (VIP) protection; combat search and rescue; and, hostage rescue. Use of special forces outside of these roles is a waste of valuable resources particularly when line units are available.

3. Special forces extend the conflict in depth. The effects may be purely physical through destruction, or they can achieve effects on the psychological plane by creating confusion, uncertainty and surprise through unexpected actions and operating in threat rear areas. Their influence will often be out of proportion to the size of forces involved. The mere existence of a special forces threat can have a significant adverse impact on the threat’s morale and cause an increase in the level of threat forces dedicated to rear area protection. Similarly, special force support can significantly bolster moral and the physical efforts of friendly indigenous factions.
4. Special forces should be employed on high value tasks, exploiting their potential while limiting their vulnerability. They should be commanded at the highest appropriate level, and be tasked using operational directives that allow maximum freedom of action for the conduct of operations. Special forces operations, however, must be coordinated with tactical conventional operations. They rely heavily upon surprise and must also have access to the highest level of intelligence to conduct operations and facilitate precision targeting. Consequently, their operations require tight security measures, as compromise may come with serious penalties. Public information plans should normally neither confirm nor deny special force activity.

5. Special forces must be employed in line with the campaign plan and in direct support of the operational objectives and supporting effects. As with the application of any other capability, their employment must be done in manner that seeks to avoid undesirable effects. For example, there is likely little net value in special forces seizing a key adversary leader (who will likely be quickly replaced) if the operation creates collateral damage and casualties that lead to the alienation of campaign supporters or neutral parties.

625. PLANNING HORIZONS

1. Formation commanders are faced with the decision of how far ahead to plan without planning becoming irrelevant to preparation and execution. Planning too far into the future may overwhelm staff capabilities, especially those of lower-echelon staffs. However, not planning far enough ahead may result in losing the initiative and being unprepared.

2. A planning horizon is a point in time that commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events. Planning horizons will be relative to the level of command.

3. The concept of time horizons can help commanders organize and resource their planning efforts. Time horizons depend upon the type of operation being conducted; they can range from hours to months. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the farther out the time horizon.

4. A useful way to use time horizons is to associate general time periods (based upon the situation) with the planning effort’s purpose. The planning efforts are long-range, mid-range, and short-range. Refer to Figure 6-9.
626. **LONG-RANGE PLANNING HORIZON**

1. Long-range planning is the initial purview of the campaign plan for it looks out to the operational end state. Short to medium-term plans are reflected in sequential OPLANs and OPORDs.

2. Formations and units will have relatively shorter planning horizons, particularly if they are not deploying for the entire duration of the campaign. In such cases, the long-range planning at these lower levels may consist of planning for an end state at the end of tour that represents progress towards the operational objectives.

3. These time horizons are common in limited intervention operations.

4. Long-range planning occurs in the plans centre using the OPP, and at the higher levels, operational design. The plans centre develops solutions to problems and passes them to the operations centre if a fragmentary order (FRAGO) is needed. If a full OPORD is required, the plans centre performs the OPP as time allows and issues the OPORD. Responsibility for integrating the OPORD is transferred to current operations during preparation.
627. MID-RANGE PLANNING HORIZON

1. Mid-range planning is focused at the next decisive point and may range from hours to
days and weeks. Mid-range planning includes branch planning and the refinement of products
from long-range planning, such as branches in concept form and OPLANs.

2. The mid-range time horizon addresses planning for short-range operations not
anticipated in the long-range plan. These operations may last weeks or a few months. This
horizon includes major branches of ongoing operations. They are frequently separate, clearly
identifiable missions with a distinct mission statement, starting time and end state. They require
OPP to develop COAs and control mechanisms for the operation. Mid-range planning remains
the responsibility of the plans centre.

628. SHORT-RANGE PLANNING HORIZON

1. Based upon changes to the situation and an assessment of the operation’s progress,
commanders perform short-range planning to modify the current OPORD. The focus of short-
range planning is on the immediate future. It may be represented in hours and days. The
resulting product of short-range planning is a FRAGO. Depending upon the complexity of the
problem and the time available to plan, short-range planning may involve representatives from
all operational functions, or include only selected staff members and the commander. It is
normally performed in the operations centre. Situations may dictate that it be performed in the
plans centre.

2. Regardless of the problem being addressed in short-range planning, all plans and
activities must continue to support the operational objectives and their supporting effects.

3. A common characteristic of short-range planning is that it is done rapidly in a time-
constrained environment. The staff may use the OPP modified for time-constrained conditions.
These include situations arising outside the normal decision or assessment cycles that demand
immediate action, such as opportunities and threats that commanders must exploit or counter.
Failure to recognize such situations and act without delay may result in lost opportunities or the
destruction of the force.

4. Situations of this type constitute a particular challenge to commanders. They must
recognize that situations outside the normal decision or assessment cycle exist. Situational
awareness and forecasting in the staff estimates aid such recognition. Then, they must swiftly
organize resources within the HQ to address the problem and perform planning to implement
the decision for resolving it. The operations centre leads the short-range planning process,
although it may receive support from the plans centre.

629. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. Options must be built into a campaign plan to anticipate opportunities (or reverses) and
preserve the commander’s freedom of action. Required changes can usually be reflected in
subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs.

2. Despite the issue of OPORDs, contingency planning gives the lower level commanders
the flexibility to retain the initiative and to meet unexpected challenges or exploit opportunities.
The planned sequence of events to the desired end state is not immutable. Therefore, a
commander must be prepared to adjust the sequence, quicken or reduce the tempo, or develop
new options to seize unforeseen opportunities that unfold themselves.
3. Contingency plans will most likely be applicable at the formation level and below. They will be issued in the form of OPORDs, or possibly as FRAGOs if time is short and the need immediate.

4. Continuous contingency planning will keep a range of options available for commanders to maintain agility and tempo. These options may be incorporated into the initial plan, enabling a commander to adjust his lines of operation and vary his plans to offer or decline battle on his own terms. Contingency planning should give the commander the freedom of action to maintain the initiative, or to regain the initiative if a developing situation results in its loss. This can be accomplished by developing branches and sequels.

5. **Branches** are contingency options built into the basic plan for changing the disposition, orientation, or direction of movement, and for accepting or declining battle. **Sequels** are subsequent operations based upon the possible outcomes of the current operation. Sequels should reflect the current situation and the progress to date in the campaign.

6. Branch plans and sequels will support each line of operation within the overall campaign plan. Sequels will have to reflect anticipated and actual transitions in campaign themes, with the shifting balance between offensive, defensive and stability operations.

7. As campaigns develop, their predominant themes will shift and ideally improve in terms of the levels of violence and their relative place on the spectrum of conflict. The continuous assessment should identify such shifts. The continual planning element of battle procedure, supported by the assessment and direction of the commander, will allow the lines of operation within the campaign to be adjusted to meet the shifting campaign theme and continue to meet the desired objectives. This will cause a shift in the balance between the tactical activities of offensive, defensive and stability operations.

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**SECTION 5**

**BATTLE PROCEDURE**

**630. GENERAL**

1. Battle procedure is defined as: “the entire military process by which a commander receives his orders, makes his reconnaissance and plan, issues his orders, prepares and deploys his troops and executes his mission.”

2. Battle procedure has become entrenched in the lexicon and in the training and operational activities of the Land Force. It is the procedure of decision-making that transcends the levels of command, from the lower tactical levels that are characterized by commanders who do not possess staff in support, to levels of command that employ staff to provide focus in multi-dimensional planning for the commander in relation to the complexities of the operating environment.

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141 For complete details regarding the operations process, battle procedure and their constituent elements, see the following publications: B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command in Land Operations*; B-GL-331-001/FP-000 *Command Support in Land Operations*; and, B-GL-331-002/FP-000 *Staff Duties for Land Operations*.

142 B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command in Land Operations*. 

B-GL-300-001/FP-001 6-37
3. At subunit level, battle procedure is usually a set drill. It ensures tactical commanders consider and address all the pertinent issues required for the effective planning and conduct of tactical activities.

4. Higher echelons of command require the integration and synchronization of varied tools and processes (e.g., planning and targeting) that, as greater emphasis is placed upon these functions in the contemporary operating environment, need a battle procedure that provides a clear model for understanding and incorporating them along with other command and HQ’s responsibilities.

631. THE BATTLE PROCEDURE MODEL AND THE CONSTITUENT PARTS

1. The overarching battle procedure model is a simple three-step process: plan; prepare; and, execute. Throughout battle procedure, continuous assessment is conducted of the situation and the interrelated influences of all the elements existing within the environment (i.e., PMESII). At the centre of the process is the commander, whose lucid direction guides every element. Battle procedure is applied to the overall campaign or operation, and to each line of operation therein.

![Figure 6-10: Battle Procedure Model](image)

2. As depicted in Figure 6-10, battle procedure is a process of planning, preparing and executing, with assessments conducted throughout. It is a command-centric procedure such that it places the commander at the centre as the executive authority responsible for C2. The

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143 Chief of Defence Staff, *Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command* (NDHQ, 14 Nov 05) 2-3. The CF command structure, shall “be command-centric with a clear and unambiguous chain of command from the strategic to tactical level (sic), with commanders at all levels clearly understanding their assigned authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities.” It “will be shaped by the doctrine of mission command with commanders at every level possessing a comprehensive understanding of their commander’s explicit and implicit intent and an overriding operational focus dedicated to the realization of this intent.”
commander is the focus of all command support activities. The commander directs and influences each of the aspects of battle procedure. At the lower tactical levels, C2 resides solely with the commander. At the higher echelons of command, the staff provides the commander with the means to exercise control.

3. Planning, preparing, and executing do not necessarily have distinct start and end points. Planning is continuous. While preparing for or executing one mission, the unit/formation is planning (at least refining) the branches and sequels to the current mission, or for the next operation or mission. Preparation, by virtue of training and structuring, is also continuous anytime a unit is not executing an operation.

4. Within each of the constituent parts of battle procedure, there will be a number of activities and subordinate processes that either enable decision-making (i.e., command support activities) or result from it. See Figures 6-11, 6-12 and 6-13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSESS</th>
<th>PLAN</th>
<th>PREPARE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimate (for Commanders without Staff)</td>
<td>Rehearsals</td>
<td>Assessing the current state and forecasting progress of the operation</td>
<td>Making execution and adjustment decisions to account for unforeseen threat actions and to exploit opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Planning Process (for Commanders with Staff)</td>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>Directing actions to apply combat power to accomplish the mission</td>
<td>Ongoing C2 Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary Movement</td>
<td>Subordinate Planning and Preparation</td>
<td>Battlespace Management</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISTAR\textsuperscript{144} Activities</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Fire Support Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Force Protection Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revisions and Refinements to the Plan</td>
<td>Revisions and Refinements to the Plan</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Information Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination, Liaison and Re-grouping</td>
<td>Coordination, Liaison and Re-grouping</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Systems Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command and Information Systems Preparation</td>
<td>Command and Information Systems Preparation</td>
<td>Information Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Figure 6-11: Battle Procedure and its Constituent Activities</td>
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\textsuperscript{144} Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.
### Battle Procedure Drill

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASSESS</th>
<th>PLAN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Receive Warning Order</td>
<td>Coordinate Activities and Requirements of Subordinates</td>
<td>Execute the Mission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct Quick Map Study and Time Estimate</td>
<td>Supervise Deployment</td>
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<td>Receipt of Orders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct Mission Analysis</td>
<td>Coordinate Activities and Requirements of Subordinates</td>
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<td>Issue Initial Warning Order</td>
<td>Supervise Deployment</td>
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<td>Make a Detailed Time Estimate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct Detailed Map Study and Prepare an Outline Plan</td>
<td>Coordinate Activities and Requirements of Subordinates</td>
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<td>Prepare a Recce Plan</td>
<td>Supervise Deployment</td>
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<td>Conduct Recce</td>
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<td>Complete the Estimate</td>
<td>Coordinate Activities and Requirements of Subordinates</td>
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<td>Issue Supplementary Warning Order</td>
<td>Supervise Deployment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prepare and Issue Orders</td>
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**Figure 6-12: Battle Procedure for Commanders Without Staff**
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Planning Process</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Plan Review</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Orientation</td>
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<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Plan Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land Force Targeting</td>
<td>Decide</td>
<td>Detect</td>
<td>Deliver</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Track</td>
<td>Assess</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Cycle</td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Collection</td>
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<td>Processing</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Dissemination</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISTAR Process</td>
<td>Draft Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) / Target Areas of Interest (TAIs)</td>
<td>Information Collection by Sensors</td>
<td>Battle Damage Assessment (as required)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Draft High Value Targets (HVTs) / High Payoff Targets (HPTs)</td>
<td>Assessment of Information</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Draft ISTAR Overlay</td>
<td>Information Disseminated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Finalize ISTAR Overlay, HVTs, HPTs</td>
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<td>Complete ISTAR Matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk Management Process</td>
<td>Identify Threats</td>
<td>Supervise and Review</td>
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<td>Assess Threats</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Implement Controls</td>
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Figure 6-13: Battle Procedure for Commanders With Staff

632. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Fundamentally, a commander exercises C2 by planning for a mission or operation, enabling preparation activities, and directing the execution of the mission or operation. Throughout, the commander continually assesses activities against the ever-changing operating environment in order to make the best decisions possible.
2. Commanders exercise control over the force to achieve unity of effort using control measures to synchronize activities. The following control measures are applied during battle procedure:

   a. commander’s intent;
   b. commander’s planning guidance;
   c. commander’s critical information requests (CCIRs);
   d. allocation of main effort;
   e. delegation of authority;
   f. plans and orders, to include the assignment of missions and tasks, target lists and supporting plans;
   g. graphic control measures;
   h. force and unit standing operating procedures (SOP);
   i. applicable laws and regulations.

633. ECHELONING AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF BATTLE PROCEDURE

1. The elements and activities of battle procedure are closely synchronized and echeloned with one another across different levels of formations and units. Agility and the initiative in operations are achieved through the synchronization of activities. Concurrent activity between and within echelons of command is imperative. Battle procedure facilitates this concurrent activity through ongoing and concurrent activities conducted throughout the staff and the subordinate echelons of command.

2. Planning will include the issue of orders to subordinate formations and units, which is the executive authority to begin planning and preparation. Warning orders will be issued before the planning stage is completed, and hence subordinate elements will begin their own planning, and even preparation stages, before those of their superior are completed.

3. Likewise, the execution of some supporting plans, such as ISTAR activities, will commence while planning and preparation for the decisive operations continues. Thus, those units assigned such activities will be in the execution stage of battle procedure while their superior echelons continue within planning and preparation stages. Those subordinate units executing their respective operations must be allocated time and resources to permit their own planning and preparation. The early execution of ISTAR activities will support the continuous assessment function.

4. A range of activities relating to battle procedure—plan, prepare and execute—occur concurrently with the activities of higher and lower echelons of command and within their own echelon of command. The tools that higher echelons of command use to direct and guide concurrent activity are warning orders, orders and fragmentary orders, along with other control measures.
CHAPTER 7
THE CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the 'Principles of War,' listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. "Don't bother your head about all them things, me lad," he said. "There's only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain't lookin'!"

Field Marshall Sir William Slim

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

701. GENERAL

1. The implementation of the campaign plan will guide the conduct of the campaign towards achievement of the desired objectives and end state. The overriding consideration in conducting the campaign is an unwavering focus on the requirements of the strategic objectives and end state. This is done by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing effects to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating activities and applying resources to create and sustain those effects.

2. Command at the operational level involves deciding when, where, for what purpose, and under what conditions operations against the adversary are to be conducted. This includes deciding when to give battle, when to decline engagement, when to engage with intellectual activities, and when to use lethal or non-lethal force. The operational level governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from combat, and the sequencing of successive tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives.

3. This chapter contains a wide array of material that links the operational and tactical levels of campaign implementation and execution. It discusses:
   a. the preparation, deployment, command and conduct of a campaign;
   b. the targeting process;
   c. offensive operations;
   d. defensive operations;
   e. stability operations;
   f. enabling operations; and
   g. concluding a campaign.
702. PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT

1. The first stage of conducting the campaign, whether it is for domestic or overseas operations, includes the preparation and deployment of the force. This entails establishing a point of entry, securing a base of operations, building-up the force, and preparing to execute the campaign.

2. Coordination of movement and logistics support during deployment is essential. Deployment is primarily a strategic responsibility. However, the flow into the theatre should be monitored, and where facilities (e.g., airfields or ports) are limited, it should be coordinated by the operational commander. All deployment planning should be based upon the commander's intent so that the right equipment and personnel arrive at the proper time. The commander must insist on the correct phasing and balance of the combat functions to develop operations in line with the campaign plan. The force may be vulnerable in the early stages of a conflict, and therefore, it must have satisfactory combat power, robust command and control, and infrastructure elements to adapt to changes in the situation.

3. Early in the campaign, and prior to deployment, the knowledge base of the operational environment must be assessed and developed to the greatest extent using all available resources. This knowledge base must extend well beyond an assessment of military adversaries, and consider all the aspects of the operational environment that will influence operations, affect stability of the area, and that will be affected by operations. Apart from real or potential adversaries, the elements to be assessed include political aspects and power structures, social and cultural structures, economic influences and practices, informational and media systems, and the status of local infrastructure. These must be assessed not only in terms of how they will affect the campaign, but also in terms of how they relate to one another and how they will be affected by the campaign's activities. This activity must continue throughout the campaign.

4. Information operations (info ops) may be started prior to arrival of campaign forces in the theatre. They should seek to influence the local populace and potential adversaries regarding the arrival of campaign forces and the aims of the campaign. Activities, such as the extension of information networks, deception, electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOPS), and public affairs (PA) often take time to produce results. They can be conducted with resources split, where the majority of resources are located in Canada or another forward location and the remainder deployed to theatre only when required. Info ops also give the commander flexibility to begin the conduct of operations without committing irretrievably to a particular course of action.

5. The conduct for the deployment of the force will differ, depending upon whether or not the entry is opposed. If it is, then movement will be tactical with formed combat units leading. If unopposed, movement may be administrative with units subdivided to make the most efficient use of the available transport.

6. Preparations for the campaign will also include preparing personnel for the mission through realistic pre-deployment and in-theatre training. The operational commander must provide direction to his subordinates to facilitate focused training in line with the commander's intent. He must also train the senior commanders and staff, and get to know them personally. This fosters trust and mutual understanding, and can rectify weaknesses and misunderstandings.
7. It is likely that the deployment will be part of a coalition operation. In such cases, pre-deployment preparations should include early liaison with those other forces, particularly those that will exercise operational control (OPCON) over our forces and those that will be under our command and control. Operational objectives, standing operating procedures (SOP), area of operations (AO) assignment, delegation of responsibilities, coordination of functions, and communication infrastructure will all have to discussed and planned in the earliest stages. Standing coalition agreements and procedures, such as NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) and the ABCA\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Coalition Operations Handbook} should be used to assist in planning and coordination.

**SECTION 2**

**COMMAND OF LAND OPERATIONS**

703. ESTABLISHING POSITIVE CONDITIONS

1. The operational commander focuses his efforts on establishing positive conditions for the achievement of the operational and strategic objectives and end states in accordance with his campaign design. He does this by employing a number of tools to shape the battlefield and will often allocate them to the tactical level commanders. These include, but are not limited to:

   a. the use of tactical and operational reserves;
   
   b. air interdiction;
   
   c. special forces;
   
   d. major airborne, airmobile and amphibious forces;
   
   e. theatre level intelligence assets, such as counter-intelligence (ci) detachments and human intelligence (humint) teams;
   
   f. operational level info ops; and
   
   g. control over the allocation of theatre level logistics stocks.

2. The operational commander must look beyond the immediate battlefield in both time and space to make the best use of resources.

3. The commander must plan and prepare for the reception and introduction of other elements from the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework into the campaign. This will apply to a wide range of elements, but his initial responsibility will likely focus on the integration of other elements of governmental power from international organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS), and the domestic government. Furthermore, the commander must take the lead in integrating those local agencies, such as local security forces, with the operations of his own military forces and other resources. This may include local security forces, political institutions and the civil service.

\textsuperscript{145} American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Standardization Programme.
704. **EARLY USE OF INTELLIGENCE**

1. The comprehensive intelligence picture and knowledge base\(^{146}\) developed during preparation, which assessed all the environmental elements, systems and actors that will influence and affect the campaign, will undoubtedly have been incomplete. Once the campaign begins, the commander must ensure that an emphasis in placed on further development of the comprehensive intelligence picture. This will confirm the make-up of the various interrelated elements and systems within the environment (i.e., political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, informational [PMESII]) that will affect the operational and tactical situations and will be affected by the friendly force actions. With a more fully developed comprehensive intelligence picture, the commander will be able to better understand the effects that his actions will have across all these systems in relation to achieving the operational objectives.

2. This appreciation for the broader aspects of the intelligence assessment, and the effects of the interrelated systems of the environment, must be understood at the tactical level, particularly in operations short of major combat that may involve a wide variety of conventional and unconventional adversaries and systems. Actions at the tactical level will have an effect on systems other than purely military ones, and thus commanders at this level must keep this in mind when planning and conducting their tactical activities.

3. As the campaign forms the framework for combat, the tactical activities and effects shape the conduct of the campaign. The continuous comprehensive intelligence assessment will help ensure that those tactical results support the campaign plan and its operational objectives. At the operational level, the task is to exploit tactical effects to strategic advantage and to minimize, nullify, or even reverse the strategic effect of tactical losses and undesirable effects. The commander attempts to create the most favourable conditions possible for those activities, both physical and intellectual, that he chooses to undertake. Tactical results will impact on the progress of the campaign, so he must have the flexibility to react to any changes, that is, to exploit or reinforce success or to ameliorate the influences of undesirable effects. He seeks to anticipate the results of both physical and intellectual activities and to be prepared to exploit them to the greatest operational and strategic advantage.

4. In assisting the tactical level commanders to create desired effects that support operational objectives, the commander must assess the need or desirability to allocate operational level assets to support tactical level commanders. This may include assets such as CI teams, EW detachments, funds or assets for reconstruction, and HUMINT specialist detachments. While these assets will undoubtedly maintain priority commitment to the commander’s critical information requests (CCIRs) and other requirements of the commander, their allocation or at least co-location with the tactical level will potentially reap significant benefits, to include:
   
   a. increased force protection, particularly through CI and EW detachments supporting deliberate tactical activities;
   
   b. the ability to support the intelligence requirements of the tactical level commanders, such as target identification and the development of named areas of interest (NAIs) into target areas of interest (TAIs), particularly when dealing with unconventional adversaries;

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\(^{146}\) See Chapter 5, Section 2, Effects-based Approach to Operations, for a discussion of the knowledge base formed prior to deployment and enhanced during the campaign.
The Conduct of Land Operations

705. OBTAINING AND ALLOWING FREEDOM OF ACTION

1. To allow freedom of action for subordinates, the operational commander must first obtain maximum freedom of action for himself from the strategic authority. Military freedom of action is ultimately built upon the trust of the public and therefore the government. It is enhanced through the following:

   a. diplomatic, economic and informational efforts at the strategic level;
   b. sufficient logistic and personnel resources;
   c. reasonable and clear limitations;
   d. information technology; and
   e. operations security (OPSEC).

2. An internal adversary to freedom of action is the capability, through information technology, to exert minute-to-minute control of tactical operations from the operational and strategic level, especially when they have a high media profile. This tendency must be avoided to allow subordinate commanders to maintain an appropriate degree of authority and the flexibility to respond quickly to changing circumstances.

3. Operational and tactical freedom of action, within the logical and legal constraints anticipated at the outset of any campaign, is necessary for the successful conduct of the campaign. Tactical commanders cannot normally sit idle while awaiting strategic level approval for activities that should be logically expected for the prosecution of the campaign. Fleeting targets that are characteristic of unconventional adversaries can only be engaged if tactical level commanders are afforded freedom of action. Likewise, the opportunity to assist other elements within the JIMP framework, such as local security forces, will be missed if commanders are not allowed the executive authority to provide such support within the framework of the mission. Furthermore, the credibility of the force in the eyes of other JIMP members, and in particular other military forces, will be undermined without suitable freedom of action for a commander.

4. Once the degree of freedom of action has been obtained at the operational level, the commander must decide how much freedom of action that subordinates can be allowed at various stages of the operation. In doing so, the commander must likewise find the correct balance between centralization and decentralization.

SECTION 3
FUNDAMENTALS IN THE CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

706. INTRODUCTION

1. The conduct of land operations includes a good number of vital facets that come together to build towards the successful conclusion of a campaign. A number of these facets
stem from the campaign planning process and must continue throughout the prosecution of the campaign itself. The commander and his subordinates must keep these key fundamentals at the forefront of their minds throughout the campaign for action on both the physical and moral planes, through both physical and intellectual activities.

707. SEIZING AND MAINTAINING THE INITIATIVE

1. The key to success at both the operational and tactical levels, whatever a theatre or campaign theme, is the early seizure of the initiative, and keeping it, so that the adversary and other elements of the environment are compelled or convinced to comply with the commander's will. This must be done on both the physical and moral planes, against the adversary, the potential adversary, and neutral audiences.

2. At any level, the commander that has the initiative will be able to pursue his desired course of action. He will be able to foil the adversary's plans and ideally force him to conform to his own campaign plan. This will lead to a rapidly deteriorating situation for the adversary as the adversary is forced to react to the commander's actions and be unable to determine when and where tactical battles and engagements will occur. Therefore, it is a fundamental concern of the commander to seize the initiative, maintain it, and regain it if it is lost. Only by doing so could he dominate and begin to impose his will on the adversary.

3. The initiative can be seized by a combination of fixing upon the adversary's strengths and striking the adversary's weakness on both the moral and physical planes of conflict. A campaign may be designed to fix the adversary initially by denying him his objectives, robbing him of his freedom of action, undermining his ability to influence a populace, and shaping events in preparation for subsequent action. Consequently, commanders should plan to strike the adversary through pre-emption in order to seize and exploit the initiative, then to defeat the adversary at successive decisive points, and move toward the achievement of the operational objectives.

4. At all levels, commanders attempt to: ascertain the adversary's intentions; identify his main effort; isolate and target elements critical to his cohesion; manipulate his perceptions; delay adversary reinforcements by interdiction; and, degrade critical adversary functions such as command and control, air support or logistics.

5. In dealing with unconventional adversaries, efforts must be made to understand the power structures and influences that exist between various systems within the environment. In taking the initiative, the commander must identify the desired effects on the adversary and other environmental systems that will support the operational objectives, and then assign the tactical activities that will create these effects.

6. Commanders conduct these activities in coordinated defensive, offensive and stability operations, all of which aim to create the desired effects in support of achieving operational objectives. Activities related to the functional framework are planned to occur simultaneously, or in sequence, throughout the battlefield framework, thus overloading and putting the adversary commander off balance. All three types of tactical operations—offensive, defensive and stability—must be planned and conducted in a harmonized fashion exploiting where possible all elements of the JIMP framework. The three operations will complement and reinforce each other. For example, in many campaigns offensive operations will likely occur from a defended base, and successful engagements will likely be reinforced with control over civilian populaces, emergency humanitarian aid where necessary, and long term reconstruction to ensure continued support and stability.
708. FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

1. Full-spectrum operations (FSO) are defined as: “the simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.” As described in Chapter 3, a commander must plan for, and be prepared and able to conduct a wide range of tactical activities, simultaneously at various points along the spectrum of conflict.

2. In accordance with the continuum of operations model, a military force will likely be conducting offensive, defensive and stability operations simultaneously. By their own nature and in line with the overall campaign theme, these tactical level activities will occur at different points along the spectrum of conflict, that is, they will involve different levels of violence and will require different levels of force from the tactical elements.

3. A commander at any level must be able to use offensive, defensive and stability operations in combination, conduct them simultaneously and sequentially at various levels, and flow seamlessly from one to the other. For example, he may use economy of effort through defensive action in one sector to allow for a concentration of force for offensive action in another sector. An operational level defensive may incorporate tactical level offensive actions and vice versa. Stability operations will likely occur in harmony with the other operations in order to secure gains, infrastructure and local populations. In essence, the three operations are each part of the same continuum and have a common purpose—to defeat the adversary by shattering his moral and physical cohesion and capabilities. The commander must find the balance across these activities. He must always be ready to take action to seize the initiative, maintain it, and regain it if lost.

4. The importance of, and emphasis placed upon, each type of operation will shift during the campaign and between campaign themes. In certain campaign themes, the decisive operations may be stability operations that, contrary to the physical destruction of an adversary force, establish viable local institutions, reliable infrastructure, capable security forces, and responsible government that over the long course undermine the influences of the adversary forces, dislocate their power, and dispel their claims to legitimacy. Offensive and defensive operations will still be required and will continue to occur, but they will unlikely be the main effort or decisive operation. Indeed, too much emphasis on offensive and/or defensive operations may undermine the long-term goals of the campaign.

709. TEMPO

1. A faster relative tempo will allow the commander to seize the initiative and dictate the conduct of operations. Tempo incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. By increasing and varying the tempo, or rhythm of operations, the commander seeks to impose his will to which the adversary is increasingly unable to react. It is focused on completing the decision-action cycle faster than the adversary such that his responses are made increasingly inappropriate. The operational tempo will reflect the force’s ability to conduct FSO, either simultaneously or consecutively, or both as appropriate.

2. The tempo will be affected by the need to balance offensive, defensive and stability operations. Slowing the operational and tactical tempos may support long-term successes to

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147 Army Terminology Panel approved...
secure seized areas, protect populations, or gain the trust of neutral elements in the environment. **Long-term objectives, not the desire for short-term tactical success, must dictate tempo.**

### 710. MAIN EFFORT

1. The purpose of designating a main effort is to achieve unity of effort and maximize combat power through the integration of the combat functions, and ideally, across all elements in the JIMP framework. The use of the term “main effort” must therefore be understood and applied in an appropriate way at all levels of command. Once the commander has established his main effort as that crucial activity that is essential to the success of his mission, and he has ensured that his subordinates know it, it is their duty to do their utmost to support that main effort.

2. Initially, the main effort may be to fix the adversary at his point of strength, prior to shifting the main effort to striking him at a point of relative weakness. However, the commander will not plan to shift his main effort lightly, and can only do so if he has the means available and the time required to affect the shift. Repeatedly shifting the main effort may cause confusion and have the undesired effect of dissipating combat power instead of achieving concentration. On the other hand, a failure to shift the main effort at the appropriate time will result in an inflexible plan, incapable of adjusting to the chaos and uncertainty of operations.

3. Within the contemporary operating environment (COE), the main effort in many campaigns is unlikely to be combat related, at least for extended periods of time. The main effort may focus on stability operations at the tactical level, such as reconstruction and security in public areas, and a combination of physical and intellectual activities for all elements in the JIMP framework in order to effect a change in the social and political structure of a campaign theatre.

### 711. SYNCHRONIZATION WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

1. A key role of commanders is to oversee the effective synchronization of operations and activities across the operational framework, in terms of purpose (shaping, decisive, sustaining), in terms of time and space (deep, close and rear), by means (physical and intellectual), and in terms of the plane (physical and/or moral). Operations and activities should be planned to occur simultaneously to the greatest extent, or in rapid succession; should be complementary and reinforcing to one another; and, should appear to the adversary as one continuous operation against him. This all requires continuous coordination of a variety of assets, across and between all levels.

2. Many operations will set the conditions or shape for decisive operations. However, an adversary is best fought if he is engaged simultaneously in various locations, deep and close, physically and intellectually. With respect to major combat operations, attacking adversary formations in depth disrupts, dislocates, or reduces adversary combat capabilities, degrades cohesion and hastens adversary defeat. These operations enable friendly forces to choose the time, place, and method of conducting close operations. In other operations, an adversary force may have to be engaged physically, while other elements of the environment that may support an adversary force are engaged with other means. Whatever the campaign or operation, all
activities must be planned such that their effects are complementary and come together to achieve a common operational objective.

3. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing friendly manoeuvre and air interdiction produces significant advantages, especially at the operational level. Potential responses to synchronized manoeuvre and air interdiction can create a dilemma for the adversary. If he attempts to concentrate his forces against the manoeuvre, he can be exposed to unacceptable losses from air interdiction. If the adversary disperses to reduce air interdiction losses, his forces may not be able to respond to the manoeuvre.

4. The synchronization of operations is a complex undertaking that must be balanced with the requirements of a command philosophy that emphasizes decentralization. It requires a clear understanding of the commander's intent and main effort throughout the force, stimulating both command and staff initiative. Continuous synchronization is neither possible nor desirable and the emphasis should be on using synchronization to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time and place.

SECTION 4
THE TARGETING PROCESS

712. INTRODUCTION

1. Targeting is a vital component of the conduct of operations. Within the COE it is vital that the concept of what constitutes a target and the ensuing targeting process be broad enough to include and consider targeting through physical and intellectual activities on both the physical and moral planes.

713. DEFINITIONS

1. **Target.** A target is an area, structure, object, person, organization, mindset, thought process, attitude or behavioural pattern that can be suitably and effectively influenced by a capability.\(^{148}\) They can be physically or mentally altered.

2. **Targeting.** The targeting process involves more than the application of fires. It is the process of selecting, prioritizing and creating effects. This is achieved through the execution of the appropriate activity to create that effect and assessing the result. In doing so, it accounts for the operational environment and force capabilities. Targeting has utility across the spectrum of conflict, on both the physical and moral planes, utilizing lethal and non-lethal activities. The targeting function links targets with effects throughout the battlespace and provides a logical process that ensures consistency with the commander's intent. This process supports commanders in decision-making.

714. FUNDAMENTALS OF TARGETING

1. The fundamentals of targeting are:

\(^{148}\) NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.9 (AJP-3.9) *Allied Joint Targeting*. 
Land Operations

a. **Focused.** The process is focused on achieving the commander’s objectives.

b. **Economy of Effort.** Effects are designed to be achieved with the minimum expenditure of resources.

c. **Risk Management.** Targeting must be conducted within the limits of acceptable risk as detailed in the commander’s intent or planning guidance. Targeting and the resulting effects should be achieved with minimum risk to friendly forces and to others elements in the JIMP framework and civilian populace.

d. **Interdisciplinary.** The targeting effort relies upon the coordinated activities of the elements of the JIMP framework.

e. **Systematic.** Targeting is a rational and iterative process that seeks to manage effects in a systematic manner.

715. **THE LAND FORCE TARGETING CYCLE**

1. **Targeting and Effects.** Effective targeting is distinguished by the ability to identify lethal and non-lethal targeting options to achieve the desired effect. Targeting decisions lead to activities on either the physical or moral planes that subsequently create effects that in turn realize defined objectives. These effects have been defined as follows:

   a. **Direct Effects.** Direct effects are the consequence of activities (e.g., weapons employment results, populace informed through leaflets, etc.), unaltered by intervening events or mechanisms. They are usually immediate and easily recognizable. Direct effects occur within the same system or group targeted.

   b. **Indirect Effects.** Indirect effects are the consequences of an activity that occur as a result of the application of a direct effect that is removed in time or purpose from the initial point of application. Indirect effects are often difficult to recognize due to subtle changes in adversary behaviour that may hide their extent.

   c. **Intended and Unintended Effects.** Intended effects are those that are planned in relation to the activities conducted and support the desired objective. They may be direct or indirect. Unintended effects are those that were not foreseen by the related activities. They may be direct or indirect and will likely undermine the attainment of the desired objective.

   d. **Second, Third and Subsequent Order Effects.** These are the effects that relate to consequences of a direct effect. As an example, dropping leaflets has the direct effect of causing adversary soldiers to desert. The intended second order effect is that their unit becomes ineffective, and a third order effect is that a particular area becomes undefended.

2. **The Targeting Cycle.** Targeting focuses capability to create specific effects in order to achieve the commander’s intent. The targeting cycle provides a systematic approach to enable the generation of the right activities at the right times against the right targets to create the desired effects. It is a dynamic process that allows activities to be rapidly adjusted to meet changing situations when required. Targeting is based upon the commander and his targeting board performing a continuous cycle of steps: Decide, Detect, Track, Deliver and Assess. Staff
officers whose functions are to harmonize and synchronize planning and targeting on both the physical and moral planes support the targeting cycle and the entire planning process. See Figure 7-1.

THE TARGETING CYCLE

| COMMANDERS |
| MISSION - DIRECTION - INTENT |

| DECIDE FUNCTION |

ASSESS FUNCTION

COORDINATE

| DETECT FUNCTION |

| TRACK FUNCTION |

3. **Analysis of Targets.** Within the targeting cycle, at each step the targets are continually analyzed against the operational environment within a given geographical area to ensure currency and applicability. This allows for the prosecution of targets as opportunities arise. The process is supported by the knowledge base, enhanced by the products of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) (e.g., NAIs and TAIs), and utilizes a comprehensive approach through the JIMP framework.

4. **The Decide Function.** The Decide function is the initial most involved step in the cycle and will take the greatest staff effort. Based upon his vision and analysis, it is initiated by the commander who makes preliminary decisions with respect to the targets and the desired effects. It continues as part of the planning process and the intelligence collection effort (i.e., IPB), and sets priorities for intelligence collection. **It is key to establishing the CCIRs, the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), along with essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), etc.** This function will:

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149 These staff officers will be allocated to J5 Targeting Coordination cell. Three such officers will conduct this function within a Brigade HQ Plans cell. One will oversee the entire targeting process, one will focus and coordinate targeting for fires, and one will coordinate targeting with non-fires means, such as civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), PSYOPS, and public affairs.

150 The knowledge base that identifies and assesses all the interrelated systems and actors within an environment is a key component to an effects-based approach to operations. For more details regarding the IPB process, see B-GL-357-001/FP-001 *Intelligence Field Manual.*
a. **Identify Target Types.** Target types and categories will depend upon the nature of the operation and the range of effects desired (e.g., armoured reserve on the physical plane, and hostility towards the government on the moral plane). Target lists are developed as targets are identified and will be further refined through intelligence collection and the need to manage the dynamic nature of the commander’s operational requirements.

b. **Identify Target Areas.** This considers the AO and identifies areas of targeting interest that are not identified in the IPB process. All dimensions of the battlespace environment should be considered and limitations, such as protected areas, taken into account. This will focus engagement efforts on both the moral and physical planes (e.g., routes for the armoured reserve on the physical plane, and a disenfranchised ethnic group on the moral plane). This will augment the intelligence collection process.

c. **Establish Target Accuracy.** The required accuracy to effectively engage the target will dictate the sense and delivery capabilities tasked. This considers technical and procedural limits of the capability in order to establish engagement parameters. This aids in the allocation of specific capabilities to targets.

d. **Input to Intelligence Collection Plan.** Targeting input to the intelligence collection plan provides a focus for the management of detection systems. The input will identify priority targets, how they may be detected, and whether target tracking is required.

e. **Develop Criteria for Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness.** Criteria for a successful engagement must be decided early in the process and consist of measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) as defined. This will include recommendation of the sensor capabilities required to measure these criteria. On the physical plane, battle damage assessment (BDA) provides an objective measure, and on the moral plane, the assessment will be primarily subjective measure.

f. **Develop Attack Guidance Matrix.** The attack guidance matrix (AGM) provides a consolidated, tabulated support tool for targeting decisions and is the culmination of the Decide phase of the cycle. The matrix is intended to act, as far as practical, as an executive document allowing rapid engagement decisions to be made during current operations. The AGM should be developed for each phase of an operation and for different operations.

5. **Decide Function Products.** The result of the Decide function should be a focused targeting effort supported by the following products:

a. **High Value Target List.** High value targets (HVTs) are those, the alteration of which will significantly damage the opponent's capability and/or will to achieve his intentions. The HVT list (HVTL) is derived from consideration of the mission, the opponents’ intentions and vulnerabilities, and the direction provided by the formation/manoeuvre commander arising from the formation planning process. The intelligence staff normally generates the HVTL.
b. **High Payoff Target List.** The high payoff target list (HPTL) identifies those HVTs whose alteration will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly commander’s mission. The HPTL may change according to the phase and nature of operations, and may be used to focus the intelligence collection effort. The HPTL is a command decision and should be disseminated accordingly.

c. **Target Selection Standards.** Target selection standards (TSS) are pre-established criteria that are applied to targets to determine what degree of accuracy and timeliness is required from detection systems to enable the selected means of delivery to achieve a successful engagement. If there is a change to the TSS, the target may still be valid; however re-assessment will be required prior to engagement.

d. **Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness Criteria Issued and Means of Collection.** Criteria and allocated assets for the application of the MOP and MOE are applied following an engagement. This product should be able to illustrate the MOP, and particularly the MOE, in a readily understandable fashion that will clearly indicate where success is being met.

e. **Attack Guidance Matrix.** The AGM provides detail on specific HPTs, when and how they should be engaged and any restrictions. It allocates assets to targets and facilitates future planning. The AGM may also identify target-tracking requirements.

6. **The Detect Function.** During detection, the ISTAR\textsuperscript{151} coordination cell supervises and coordinates the efforts of assets to execute the intelligence collection plan. Some assets can identify targets, while others produce information that must be processed to identify targets. The targeting priorities developed during the Decide function are used to expedite the processing of target information. The information collected and processed is used to update and amend the HPTL and AGM as necessary. The practical application of this function is the execution of the intelligence collection plan. Targeting staff should be active in this process in order to maintain the dynamic nature of the targeting cycle.

7. **The Track Function.** Target tracking supplements the Detect function, but is distinct from it since target tracking requires specific asset management decisions. Many of these tracking decisions will have been agreed in the Decide function and will be articulated in the AGM. Once detected, HPTs that cannot be immediately engaged, which are planned for engagement during a later phase, or which require validation, must be tracked to ensure that they are not lost and to maintain a current target location. Targeting staff must bear in mind that systems used for tracking will generally be unavailable for other target detection. On the moral plane, this may consist of surveys to track public attitude and perception. Targeting staff should be active in the execution of the intelligence collection plan (e.g., ISTAR matrix) in order to: maintain the dynamic nature of the targeting cycle; to ensure that targets are not lost prior to engagement; and to ensure that sensor handoff is accomplished.

\textsuperscript{151} Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.
8. **The Deliver Function.** The primary activity during the Deliver function of the targeting cycle is the engagement of targets to generate the desired effects in accordance with the AGM. Important targets may appear outside the Decide function. These targets are processed in the same manner as planned HPTs. Targets, not on the HPTL, are first evaluated to determine when and if they should be attacked. The decision to engage opportunity targets is based upon a number of factors, such as the activity of the target and the potential target payoff compared to other targets being processed for engagement and systems available. The final decision is to confirm the selection of an appropriate capability for engaging each target in line with the AGM. For planned targets, this decision will have been made as part of the Decide function. Nevertheless, a check has to be made to ensure that the selected capabilities are available and can conduct the engagement as planned. If not, the targeting board must determine the best available means for the engagement. In some cases, more than one asset may be used to engage the same target.

9. **The Assess Function.** Assessment is the concluding step in the targeting cycle and is the determination of the effectiveness of the engagement. Assessment will be a dynamic process and will be a constant feature of the staff effort. It consists of measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE):

   a. **Measures of Performance.** A MOP is defined as: "a criterion used to evaluate the accomplishment of a task." A MOP is the timely and accurate assessment of an activity (Did we do things right?) and is conducted as a matter of course. For specific HPTs, the criteria for MOPs are determined as part of the Decide function and the requirements are recorded on the AGM. These should be replicated in the intelligence collection plan. As part of the targeting cycle, MOP help determine if further engagements on selected targets are necessary. Commanders use this information to allocate, or redirect, engagement systems to make best use of available combat power.

   b. **Measures of Effectiveness.** A MOE is defined as: "a criterion used to evaluate how a task has affected selected system behaviour or capabilities over time." They are used to evaluate how activities have affected target behaviour or capabilities (Are we doing the right things to create the desired effect?). If the MOP were met (things were done right), but the MOE were not, there will be a requirement to a change to the activities or the manner in which they are conducted. Note that on the moral plane, MOE are mainly subjective and it may take a significant amount of time to determine effectiveness. Hence, these MOE must be assessed routinely and an attempt made to recognize changes and trends. The commander exercises judgement as to when an adjustment or change to an activity against that target must be made. **It must be noted that on the moral plane, the time required to complete the cycle can be significantly longer.**

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152 Combat assessment, which comprises battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness analysis (MEA), and re-attack recommendations.


10. **Command, Control and Coordination.** Targeting is a command responsibility that requires the personal time, energy and attention of the commander. The commander has to give clear direction for the aims, priorities and degree of effort to be accorded to targeting. The targeting board will require a detailed understanding of how effects are created in order to determine the required activities and their synchronization. The commander delegates the detailed control of targeting to the chairman of the targeting board. The composition of the targeting board is multidisciplinary in order to provide the required expertise for activities on both the physical and moral planes. The appropriate headquarters (HQ) coordination centres and the G5 targeting coordination staff (e.g., the fire support coordination centre [FSCC], or the targeting coordination cell) conducts the detailed coordination of the targeting activities.

11. **Allocation of Targets.** Targets may be allocated by higher formations. These targets must be included in the targeting decisions of the targeting board. They will have a direct impact on the detection, tracking and engagement assets available. Conversely, activities beyond the capability of the formation are passed to and coordinated with the higher formation.

12. **Legal Considerations.** Targeting at all levels will always be governed by the parameters set by the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and rules of engagement (ROE). In addition, there must be consideration of the distinction between military and civilian targets, as well as between civilians and combatants. For these reasons, there is a requirement for legal advice throughout the targeting cycle.

13. **Implications from Laws of Armed Conflict.** The concepts of LOAC that have particular relevance to targeting are:

   a. **Military Necessity.** This means that belligerents are justified in applying force to that extent which will ensure the submission of the adversary at the earliest possible moment, with the least possible cost and using methods and means of warfare that are not prescribed by international law in attacking a military objective.

   b. **Unnecessary Suffering.** This relates to the means of warfare and methods of combat whose foreseeable harm would be clearly excessive in relation to the military advantage to be gained. In relation to a civilian population, it means whether the risk of incidental injury to the civilian population caused is so indiscriminate as to constitute a direct attack on the civilian population.

   c. **Proportionality.** The commander should have an expectation that a military action will make a relevant and proportional contribution to military objectives. In relation to civilians, this concept means that incidental civilian casualties and damage to civilian property cannot be excessive in relation to the military advantage to be gained.

14. ROE will define when, where and how force may be applied. All commanders must instruct their forces carefully on the ROE. It is essential that the targeting board know the ROE and are able to apply them correctly.

155 Detailed composition of the targeting board, its responsibilities and its procedures may be found in B-GL-331-002/FP-000 *Staff Duties in the Field.*
716. INTELLIGENCE LED OPERATIONS

1. Intelligence and targeting processes should guide all tactical level operations. Indeed, the tempo of a campaign or particular operation may have to be reduced to ensure the thorough development of intelligence sources and information. At times, however, particularly in those campaigns that are short of major combat, operations can become routine when conducted over a lengthy period of time or conducted without a great deal of detailed, specific intelligence. Such is often the case with stability operations activities with its common application of framework patrolling.

2. Whenever possible, specific and detailed intelligence should be cultivated in order to give these routine operations focus and purpose. Standing PIRs should provide a backdrop for all such activities, and specific IRs for particular activities and regions within an AO will help focus routine activities, with a view to turning NAI s into point TAI s for prosecution by deliberate operations. This may take an extended period of time, particularly when adversaries are concealed in local populations and operate below the normal detection thresholds.

### INTELLIGENCE LED OPERATIONS

On 20 August 2006, units of 1st Bn, The RCR and the Afghan National Army used timely and actionable intelligence to decisively defeat a Taliban attack. On 19 August a sizeable force of insurgents occupied dwellings Southeast of Panjwai village. The insurgent’s intent was to attack government offices and interdict traffic on Highway 1, a main MSR [main supply route]. Coalition forces were postured to counter the planned insurgent attack based on the intelligence and recognized patterns of behaviour that the insurgents had followed in past actions. Coalition elements were arrayed against enemy weaknesses to disrupt the enemy ability to manoeuvre or bring accurate fire against friendly elements.

The detailed intelligence-driven planning helped to inflict a significant defeat on the attacking insurgent force. Caught unawares and drawn into a pitched battle against superior forces, the insurgents lost approximately seventy of their number.

There are several lessons to be gleaned from this action. First, intelligence driven operations allow the battlespace to be shaped. Conditions can be set in order to shape the battlespace, thus facilitating the decisive tactical activity of striking the enemy force. Second, intelligence driven operations can, as in this instance, enable allied forces to operate inside the decision-making cycle of the enemy to disrupt his operations. Thirdly, they facilitate measures of effectiveness. In this case, the intelligence that enabled this operation came from a local villager and thus indicates some degree of support for the central government and the coalition forces.


During Op HALO in Haiti, 2004, I Coy, 2 RCR framework patrols were tasked to develop named areas of interest into point targets for execution. Soon after deployment, patrols learned from locals that a local gang member, Ti Paille, had been responsible for much of the murder and attacks against police and weapon smuggling in the area. This was confirmed with higher sources and through CI and HUMINT sources.
Patrols were tasked within this area of over 20,000 civilians to locate the gang leader’s exact location and possible weapons caches, effectively creating a point target for prosecution. It took three weeks for patrols to locate, through local contacts, an unmarked brothel associated with the gang in question. A cordon and search operation did not result in an immediate seizure of weapons or individuals, but did bring forth more intelligence. A HUMINT source was able to provide a report from within the buildings just prior to execution along with a sketch of the layout.

Exploitation of CI [counter-intelligence] and HUMINT sources over the next three weeks indicated the gang leader’s temporary residence. A cordon and search operation in conjunction with Haitian police forces resulted in the arrest of the gang leader and his eventual prosecution.

This operation concluded successfully not through happenstance nor a single intelligence source, but through directed and planned intelligence gathering by a number of complementary sources (HUMINT, CI and framework patrols) that allowed a large NAI to be developed into a point target for prosecution. The long term effects were an improvement in security levels and enhanced legitimacy to both coalition forces and local police.

Source: I Coy, 2 RCR post-deployment AAR.

SECTION 5
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

717. TACTICAL LEVEL OPERATIONS—GENERAL

1. Tactical level operations may be classified as offensive, defensive, stability, or enabling. Every campaign is conducted through a balanced combination of these tactical operations and their constituent activities, tasks and effects, as dictated in the continuum of operations construct.\textsuperscript{156} The resources and emphasis placed on each type of operation will depend upon a number of situational factors and will reflect the nature of the campaign.

2. Offensive operations will be key to defeating an adversary. It must be remembered, though, that long-term operational and strategic objectives and ultimate success may actually depend more upon the conduct of stability operations and their effects on the psychological plane.

718. PURPOSE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the adversary through the use of violence. Offensive action, on both the moral and physical planes, through a combination of physical and intellectual activities, is the decisive operation of war and ultimate success is achieved through it.

\textsuperscript{156} See Chapter 3, Section 4.
2. Offensive operations defeat the adversary either by breaking his cohesion, by physical destruction or both. The real damage to the adversary's will is caused by destroying the coherence of his operations and fragmenting and isolating his combat power, and its moral, conceptual and physical components. By so doing, the adversary's capability to resist is destroyed.

3. Other subsidiary purposes and effects of offensive operations include:
   a. Gaining information through reconnaissance in force activities.
   b. Depriving the adversary of resources.
   c. Pre-empting the adversary in order to gain the initiative.
   d. Disrupting the adversary's offensive action and other activities such as command and control (C2) systems (through offensive information operations).
   e. Dislocating the adversary's forces through decisive engagement or deception.
   f. Seizure of ground.
   g. Fixing the adversary as an economy of force activity.
   h. Influencing or changing the perceptions of commanders and other, possibly neutral or hostile, target audiences. This may be done through physical or intellectual activities.

719. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. General. In offensive operations, the key to success is seizing and retaining the initiative. In doing so, a commander maintains momentum, keeps the adversary off-balance, and prevents him from blocking penetrations, mounting counterattacks, and reforming his reserves. Selecting the location, target, time and direction of offensive operations seizes the initiative.

2. Principles of War. The following principles of war are important considerations during the planning and conduct of offensive operations:

   a. Offensive Action. Offensive action aims at defeating the adversary's will to resist. This implies manoeuvre, speed and aggressiveness. By wresting the initiative from the adversary, one acquires freedom of action and a distinct psychological advantage. Exploiting success and taking advantage of adversary’s weakness must be foremost in the minds of all commanders. This requirement for offensive action also applies, through info ops, to both physical and intellectual activities on the moral plane. Consequently, there is a need to develop a proactive info ops plan that seeks to positively influence targets in support of the operational objectives.

   b. Concentration of Force. A commander must strive to concentrate combat power superior to that of the adversary at a decisive time and place. Concentration not only implies massing of forces but also massing of firepower. The ability to concentrate is dependent upon movement, flexibility and communications.
c. **Surprise.** Surprise can create success out of proportion to the size of the force used. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and speed. Surprise must be exploited.

d. **Security.** Security is a condition that gives a commander sufficient freedom of action to fulfil his aim. Security is manifested in the offence by having a firm base for the assembly, preparation and launching of operations. It includes securing the line of departure (LD), the flanks of an attacking force, and the lines of communications (LOC). During counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and certain peace support operations, forces will require a secure base from which to operate. Once the desired effects have been created in these base areas, the campaign can be extended, like oil spreading in water, to less secure areas.

e. **Flexibility.** Offensive operations demand a high degree of flexibility in order to enable plans to be altered to meet changing situations, unexpected developments, and to exploit fleeting opportunities, particularly against unconventional enemies. Its elements are flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision-making on the part of a commander and his subordinates, to ensure that time and opportunities are never lost. It is achieved through simplicity of plans, unity of effort, and maintenance of balance. Implicit in this requirement is freedom of action for the commander.

### 720. FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. In addition to the *principles of war* that merit special consideration in offensive operations, there are several fundamentals that must be applied:

   a. **Information Gathering.** Offensive operations, particularly at operational level, must be supported by a broad knowledge base that assesses the interrelated systems within an environment and anticipates the effects that will be created from offensive actions, to ensure that operational objectives are met. A great deal of information gathering at all levels is required to support this knowledge based. At the tactical level, both desired effects and undesired effects must be understood. Information gathering at this level will support the knowledge base, although the fundamental element of information gathering at this level has a more specific aim. Knowledge of the adversary’s dispositions, strengths and intentions is vital to success in the offence. As well, commanders at all levels need detailed information on the terrain over which their troops will fight.

   b. **Simplicity.** Plans must be kept simple. Complex manoeuvres and intricate arrangements lead to confusion and misunderstanding. A clear concept of operations supported by a simple plan gives subordinate commanders an opportunity to apply their own judgement and initiative in response to changes in the local situation. Simplicity enhances agility and allows better control of tempo. For info ops, messages to the target audience should be kept simple and straightforward with obvious links in logic and links to operational objectives. Simplicity of plans and linkages to desired objectives will also make assessment through MOE easier.
c. **Shock Action.** Shock action is achieved by the bold handling of combat forces, be they armour, mechanized infantry, or rapidly moving light forces to break into the adversary’s defences and drive deep into his area. Fire support is essential and is used during all stages of the operation to reinforce the shock action.

d. **Depth.** Depth is required both in the organization of offensive forces and in the selection of objectives. Organizing in depth contributes to shock action and allows continual operations to occur. It permits a commander to maintain constant pressure on the adversary and to exploit penetration. The securing of objectives in depth breaks the framework of the adversary’s defence.

e. **Balance.** A balanced force is one that is grouped in such a way that a commander can concentrate combat power to take advantage of a sudden opportunity or to react to the adversary’s action at the decisive moment. In reaching operational objectives, a balance may have to be created between activities on the physical and moral planes in order to create complementary effects. The initial grouping of forces and allocation of activities must ensure that:

1. The covering force can cover the frontage of the area of influence if the battlespace is organized in this manner, or may cover key NAIs.
2. Leading tactical elements have a suitable force mix to deal with likely opposition.
3. Forward observation officers (FOOs) and forward air controllers (FACs) are well forward to provide continuous fire support.
4. Requirements for engineer support are anticipated and resources are readily available, with engineer reconnaissance parties well forward.
5. Reserves are constituted, maintained and normally deployed beyond the range of most adversary artillery, so that they can be committed rapidly to battle. In campaigns and operations short of major combat, reserves are still required and are adjusted to the adversary and possible, unanticipated requirements. They are often termed as a quick reaction force (QRF).

f. **Reserves.** Reserves are required to meet the unexpected. They may be committed to influence the battle, to exploit success, or to respond to countermoves. Reserves provide a commander with flexibility and balance. Once he has committed his reserves, the commander must reconstitute it as soon as possible. Operations that lack a detailed intelligence picture, or that may meet unanticipated situations, should hold significant forces in reserve if possible.

721. **TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES**

1. There are a number of different types of offensive activities with specific purposes. They are closely related and often lead from one to another. The types of offensive activities are as follows:
a. attack;
b. raid;
c. reconnaissance in force;
d. exploitation;
e. pursuit;
f. ambush;
g. breakout of encircled forces; and
h. feint and demonstration.

722. ATTACK

1. To attack is to take offensive action against a specified objective. The primary purpose of an attack is to destroy the adversary's capability to resist. An attack may be a separate operation or may be carried out in conjunction with other types of operations. A commander undertaking an attack possesses the initiative, in that he decides the location, time, direction and weight of combat power to be concentrated. Once the attack is launched, flexibility and speed in the employment of combat power are paramount. The attack must be executed vigorously, exploiting any favourable developments and reallocating resources to areas where there appears to be an opportunity for success. Momentum must be maintained in order to keep the adversary off balance, and the attack must not be delayed in order to align units or adhere rigidly to a plan. Indeed, few attacks will develop as planned and commanders must actively seek to turn unexpected successes to their advantage and to cope rapidly to reverses. To be able to do this they must be well informed.

2. The requirement for flexibility demands simple plans, adjustable fire support, engineers well positioned, reserves uncommitted and close at hand, and sustainment options flexible enough to be adjusted to support the offensive operation. Each discrete attack should not be viewed as its own entity, but as part of the continuous process to break the adversary's cohesion. Commanders should be planning to exploit success well before they have achieved it.

3. An attack is often preceded by an advance to contact and seeks to seize and maintain the initiative. Additionally, a hasty attack may occur as a result of a meeting engagement. Counterattacks are also employed by a defending force to exploit opportunities to strike the adversary at a decisive time and place in order to defeat him. Assuming that the attack has been successful, the force will consolidate, and if possible, exploit success through continued offensive action. Types of attack:

a. Hasty Attack. A hasty attack is an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity. It seeks to take advantage of the adversary's lack of preparedness, and involves boldness, surprise and speed in order to achieve success before the adversary has had time to improve his defensive posture. In order to maintain momentum or retain the initiative, minimum time is devoted to preparation, and the forces used for the attack are those that are readily available. There will be little time for reconnaissance and none for rehearsal. The element of surprise created by a speedy action will act
as a force multiplier. Such attacks must, wherever possible, be mounted from an unexpected direction and supported by the concentrated fire of every available weapon. Commanders should issue brief orders and then position themselves well forward to react rapidly to the development of the attack. If momentum is lost, a deliberate attack may be necessary. Properly performed IPB may identify areas for a hasty attack from the advance, thereby allowing some more detailed planning before the advance.

b. **Deliberate Attack.** A deliberate attack is a type of offensive action characterized by planned and coordinated employment of firepower and manoeuvre to close with and destroy or capture the adversary. When a well-prepared adversary defence must be defeated, a deliberate attack may be required. The emphasis is on preparation at the expense of speed and time; therefore, methods other than speed will be required in order to achieve surprise.

c. **Counterattack and Spoiling Attack**

(1) **Counterattack.** The purpose of a counterattack is to defeat an adversary that becomes vulnerable by his own offensive action, by revealing his main effort or creating an assailable flank. It is likely to be conducted as part of a defensive operation by a reserve or lightly committed forward elements, and it affords the defender the opportunity to create favourable conditions for the commitment of combat power and a switch to offensive action.

(2) **Spoiling Attack.** The spoiling attack is similarly directed at adversary offensive operations but with the limited aim of disruption. It attempts to strike the adversary while he is most vulnerable or while he is on the move prior to crossing his LD. A spoiling attack is pre-emptive in nature, as it attacks the adversary’s plans, and hence, his cohesion. When the situation permits, however, commanders can exploit a spoiling attack like any other attack.

d. **Attack by Fire.** To attack by fire is an action to engage an adversary with direct fires, supported by indirect fires, without closing with him.\(^{157}\) Attack by fire excludes assaulting or occupying the objective. Although it is a form of an attack, as a tactical activity, it is often used as a tactical task in support of a larger tactical activity. It may be given as a “be prepared to” task against a possible adversary, such as the approach of a mobile reserve.

723. **RAID**

1. A raid is defined as: “an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.”\(^{158}\) The wider purpose of a

\(^{157}\) B-GL-331-002/FP-000 *Staff Duties in the Field*.

\(^{158}\) NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*. 
raid is to disrupt the adversary usually through destruction, or the capture of a vital asset or capability. It is based upon detailed intelligence, generally involves swift movement into hostile territory, and ends with a planned withdrawal. Because raids will often be carried out over a short distance and time period, only a limited amount of supplies need be carried and maintenance will be confined to minor crew repairs. Fire support systems are required to support the raiding force so as to reduce the adversary's ability to react. Armoured reconnaissance, airmobile, airborne and amphibious forces, and dismounted infantry, particularly if supported by aviation fire support, are well suited to this type of attack.

724. RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

1. Reconnaissance in force is defined as: “an offensive operation designed to discover and/or test the enemy’s strength or to obtain other information.” The purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to compel the adversary to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action. The adversary's reaction may reveal weaknesses in his defensive system that can be attacked or strengths that should be avoided. Commanders may conduct reconnaissance in force as a means of keeping pressure on the defender by seizing key terrain and uncovering adversary weaknesses. They must also be prepared to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success.

2. A formation or unit may conduct its own reconnaissance in force, or do so at the direction of a higher HQ. It must be conducted in enough strength to force the adversary to react, though it may be necessary to place restrictions on commanders to avoid actions that may precipitate a decisive engagement. If the force is still engaged once the actual reconnaissance is completed, it may be tasked to fix the adversary, attack, or withdraw as directed.

725. EXPLOITATION

1. Exploitation is defined as: “an offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth.” As a tactical task, a rapid advance against lessening resistance characterizes exploitation. The purpose is both physical and moral. Physically, the aim is to retain the initiative by preventing the adversary from reorganizing his defence or conducting an orderly withdrawal. The moral effect of exploitation is to create confusion and apprehension throughout the adversary command, reducing his capability to react and lowering his morale. This may be decisive in itself.

726. PURSUIT

1. A pursuit is defined as: “an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.” It may commence when the adversary force is demoralized and its units are beginning to disintegrate under pressure. Alternatively, it may originate in an operation in which the adversary loses his ability to operate effectively and attempts to disengage.

159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
727. AMBUSH

1. An ambush is an operation aimed at destroying or capturing by surprise an enemy element in movement. The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the adversary while denying him an opportunity to counterattack, principally through surprise. It is often conducted in the same manner as a raid and often within territory controlled by the adversary. Normally, the ambushing force lies in wait for the adversary force.

728. BREAKOUT OF ENCIRCLED FORCES

1. In a breakout operation, an encircled force takes offensive action to link up with a main force. The breakout should attempt to surprise the adversary, and is more likely to be successful if it is conducted at the earliest opportunity. Other forces attempting to fix the encircling adversary may support the breakout operation.

729. FEINT AND DEMONSTRATION

1. A feint and demonstration are offensive info ops in that they conduct physical activities with the aim of distracting and possibly deceiving the adversary. Thus, their initial effects occur on the moral plane, while their secondary effects will occur on the physical plane, in that they will persuade the adversary to react in a desired fashion (e.g., move a reserve). Both may seek to fix an adversary force and may be supported by other deceptive info ops:

   a. **Feint.** A feint seeks to distract the attention and action of an adversary force by seeking combat with it. Its intent is often to support the development of the main effort elsewhere on the battlefield, normally by fixing an element of the adversary. Feints must be of sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired adversary reaction. It is most effective when it supports the adversary's expectations, when it appears as a definite adversary to the adversary, or when there are several feasible courses of action open to the attacker.

   b. **Demonstration.** A demonstration seeks to distract the adversary's attention without seeking combat. It may be part of a broader deception plan. Demonstration forces use firepower, manoeuvre and C2 warfare. It should also be aimed at a vital sector of the adversary's defences if he is to be successfully misled.

730. OFFENSIVE (PHYSICAL) INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. In addition to the operations described above, offensive info ops are conducted to physically destroy, attrite, disrupt or deny the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and its supporting infrastructure. These may stem from a physical attack as described above (e.g., raid, attack) against a C2 system, or from an attack via the electromagnetic spectrum. The aim is to contribute to the defeat of opposing forces by rendering them unable to accurately perceive situations, make decisions, or direct actions in a timely manner to carry out their intentions.

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*Feint and demonstration are extant doctrine, but the concept of them as information operations is a new addition. They use physical activities to create effects on the moral plane (e.g., deception) and thus secondary effects on the physical plane (e.g., movement of forces, etc.).*
SECTION 6
FORMS OF MANOEUVRE

731. GENERAL

1. Offensive operations may be directed against the front, flank or rear of the adversary and may be conducted from the land, air or sea. Any combination of these is possible. Normally, the point of main effort is placed where the adversary is weakest or where the terrain offers possibilities of breaking deep into his defensive area. This is done through the manoeuvre of forces. Manoeuvre is defined as: “employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.”

2. The forms of manoeuvre are frontal, penetration, envelopment (which includes flank attacks and attacks against the adversary’s rear), and turning movement. To manoeuvre is to gain a position of advantage relative to the adversary. It often requires physical movement. Movement against an adversary’s flanks and rear may have an impact on his morale, and thereby, his will. It may assist in the achievement of surprise and shock if conducted at high tempo; that is, before the adversary can react effectively. Some forms of manoeuvre, such as single and double envelopment or a turning movement may disrupt and dislocate the defence. The envelopment may have a more direct aim: to gain a position of advantage, which is the desired objective. Many, if not all, of the forms of manoeuvre can apply at all levels. In general, though, at brigade level and below the most common forms of manoeuvre are the frontal attack and the flank attack.

732. FRONTAL

1. In this form of manoeuvre, the main effort is directed against the front of an adversary’s position. It can be effective against a weak, disorganized adversary, or it may be used to overrun and destroy him or to fix him. A frontal form of manoeuvre is often required to support a penetration or envelopment. Unless supported by a heavy weight of fire, it may not be successful, but if successful, it may result in an unnecessarily high number of casualties. A commander must, therefore, consider these factors carefully before executing a frontal attack.

733. PENETRATION

1. Penetration is a form of offensive manoeuvre that seeks to break through the adversary’s defence and disrupt the defensive system. Penetration seeks to reach the depths of an adversary’s position on one or a number of narrow sectors. It will destroy the continuity of a defensive position. The main effort is made on a relatively narrow front or on a number of narrow fronts.

2. Successful penetration requires the concentration of superior combat power at the point selected for breaking into the adversary’s defences. Such points include gaps in his defences and boundary locations. The concentration must be such that the force can break through quickly, widen and secure the breach, and maintain momentum while seizing the deep objectives. It is a suitable manoeuvre when strong combat forces are available and the adversary is over-extended or if his flanks are firmly secured.

163 NATO AAP-6.
3. It has two principal variants—deep and multiple penetrations. Both may be employed in the same operation. The fundamental tactic is to seek the depth of an adversary’s position as rapidly as possible, preferably without fighting. This requires adversary forces to be bypassed by design. That creates a risk that the penetrating force may itself be attacked in its developing flanks. The fear that this might happen may cause forces to move cautiously when boldness is required. Personal example and determination will be required of commanders. The protection of the flanks of the penetrating element is critical to success, although at times protection can be afforded by the sheer speed of the penetrating force. Types of penetration:

a. **Deep Penetration.** Deep penetration aims either to seize features or to destroy specific objectives deep in the adversary’s rear. In doing so, it perforates the adversary’s positions, introduces a force behind the adversary, and thereby causes fear and uncertainty. It may of itself persuade an adversary commander that he has lost, particularly if the objective is critical to him. Such objectives may include river crossings behind his position.

b. **Multiple Penetrations.** Multiple penetration aims to disrupt and dislocate the cohesion of a defensive position. In doing so, it achieves simultaneity, presenting the defender with a number of adversaries. It creates multiple opportunities for surprise and shock. However, it risks dispersion of forces for little overall effect if it is not generally successful and reinforced quickly.

c. **Combination of Multiple and Deep Penetration.** Multiple and deep penetrations may be combined to produce dramatic effects against the adversary on both the physical and moral planes.

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On the Sinai front in 1967, a total of eleven Israeli brigades, operating on up to six separate axes, routed a force of about seven Egyptian divisions in less than four days. The Israelis repeatedly achieved shock and surprise; they reconnoitred aggressively; and they achieved and exploited control of the air from the opening minutes of the campaign. The destruction of command posts and offensive electronic warfare also contributed to the Egyptians’ panic and collapse.

*From UK Army Doctrine Publication ‘Land Operations’ AC 71819*

4. Each penetrating force will normally require at least two elements. The leading element is tasked to penetrate to the objective or the limit of exploitation as rapidly as possible, bypassing any opposition. The second element is tasked to follow the first in order protect its flanks and rear. Subsequent elements are reserve or echelon forces. They are tasked to destroy bypassed adversaries, take over the lead of the advance, or exploit beyond the immediate objective. Penetration is unlikely to succeed against an adversary who is more agile; that is, more mobile and flexible. Conversely, it has often succeeded against a more numerous but less agile adversary. See Figure 7-2.
734. **ENVELOPMENT**

1. An envelopment is defined as: “an offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear.”

Envelopment is a basic form of manoeuvre designed to apply force against an adversary’s weakness, and will normally require diversionary attacks against the adversary’s main defensive front. The main effort during envelopment is made against the adversary’s rear or flank. Its aim is to seize objectives in the adversary’s rear, making his main defensive position untenable. Avoiding the adversary’s strength en route to the objective, the main attack is conducted by striking him from an unexpected direction. The forces conducting the envelopment must have good mobility, be deployed in depth, and have secure flanks. See Figure 7-3.

2. Considerable speed of movement and the identification of weak points is required if the enveloping force is to be able to reach its objectives in depth. The envelopment may cause the adversary to redeploy or to withdraw. It may cause disruption to his C2 or logistical systems, or open the way to objectives that he was trying to defend. It may be undertaken in order to outflank or trap adversary forces, possibly against a geographical feature. Airmobile or airborne forces may be employed as part of an enveloping force. This is known as a vertical envelopment.

3. An envelopment manoeuvre will take one of the following forms:

   a. **Flank Attack.** This type of envelopment occurs when the main effort is directed at the adversary’s flank; the attack seeks to strike at a more vulnerable point of the adversary’s position where his concentrated firepower can be avoided. Flanking attacks aim at surprising the adversary and should be the preferred attack at brigade level and below.

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164 NATO AAP-6.
b. **Rear Attack.** When the main effort is directed at the adversary’s rear, forces are passed around one side, both sides (double envelopment) or over (vertical envelopment) the adversary’s main defensive position with the aim of securing key terrain **within direct fire range of his rear**. This action leads to his destruction or makes his position untenable.

c. **Double Envelopment.** Double envelopment is an envelopment operation mounted on two axes that is designed to outflank an adversary from both sides with a view to forcing him to abandon of his intentions or withdraw, or as a prelude to encirclement and destruction of the trapped forces. See Figure 7-4.

d. **Encirclement.** If the arms of a double envelopment are strong enough to meet after trapping a force and to prevent it from breaking out, large forces may be neutralized or destroyed with all their equipment. Large encirclements may be costly operations in terms both of troops and the time taken to reduce the trapped forces. Encircled forces will likely be capable of resupply only by air. Unless an early decision to relieve them by breakout or break-in is made, then resources may be inadequate to force a breakout or fight their way back to rejoin the main body.
735. TURNING MOVEMENT

1. In this form of manoeuvre, a force passes around or over the adversary’s main defensive positions to secure objectives deep in his rear beyond the range of his direct fire weapons. The aim of this manoeuvre is to compel him to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the adversary. A turning movement should make those forces more vulnerable to attack, and may allow the use of an approach dominated by the abandoned positions. The force attempts to avoid contact with the adversary en route to its objective.

2. The attacking force is organized into a turning force, a main body and a reserve. The turning force’s manoeuvre causes the adversary to leave his positions. The main body may initially distract the adversary from the turning manoeuvre. It should subsequently exploit the success of the turning force. The turning force is normally smaller than the main body and should be able to operate independently, beyond the supporting range of the main body. Either the turning force or the main body may conduct the decisive operation. See Figure 7-5.

Figure 7-5: Turning Movement

736. INFILTRATION

1. Infiltration is penetration based upon stealth. It may be used to occupy an objective in depth, or as a precursor to an attack mounted on an objective in depth. It may be single or multiple. It is not the sole preserve of veteran troops: on the night of 9-10 July 1944 the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, a militia battalion, occupied Hill 195, a key feature on the approaches to Falaise, through infiltration on its first night in battle.

737. INTEGRATING FORMS OF MANOEUVRE

1. Although individual operations or forms of manoeuvre may lead directly to the achievement of the mission, it may be necessary to integrate them into a larger scheme of manoeuvre. Similarly, forms of manoeuvre will often need to be divided into separate tactical tasks. For example, encirclement will typically require at least two penetrations, exploitation into the adversary’s depth, and a link-up operation. A defence of the outer flanks, and either an attack or defence on the internal flanks, may follow the encirclement. Physical manoeuvre
allows the manipulation of both the adversary and the use of force. Operations against the
flanks or the rear to bypass or to penetrate allow the creation of shock and surprise at several
levels, and hence the possibility of command paralysis and collapse. Any penetration is an
opportunity for aggressive exploitation. Manoeuvre is not limited to offensive operations—the
most skilful counterattacks have often, in effect, been turning movements. Such movements
compel an attacker to desist from his attack, and create an adversary to the rear of his forces.

738. STAGES OF THE ATTACK

1. An attack can be divided into a number of distinct, but closely related stages, which will
tend to merge into one another. Indeed, to the participants, the stages are unlikely to be clear-
cut, especially if they are involved in other actions in support of the offence. These stages are:

   a. Mounting. During the mounting stage, which occurs prior to H-hour,
      preparations are completed. Activities may include intelligence gathering,
      rehearsing, ammunition dumping, route improving, preparing for the crossing
      and breaching of obstacles, moving to assembly areas, grouping, replenishing,
      firing preparatory fire, deploying, and possibly, conducting a forward passage of
      lines. Concurrently, commanders complete their battle procedure. The force
      may also carry out infiltration.

   b. Assault. In this stage, the assaulting element crosses the LD, breaks into the
      adversary’s defensive position, and fights through the objective to destroy the
      adversary or cause his surrender.

   c. Consolidation. Following an assault, a force must consolidate quickly so that it
      is prepared to meet adversary counterattacks or undertake a new task.
      Consolidation is normally done forward or to the flanks of the former adversary
      position. It may be followed by exploitation.

2. Mounting. Attack forces should be held well back, as long as possible, to complete the
battle procedure and to assist in maintaining security. Some preliminary grouping may take
place. During mounting, a number of activities will take place, to possibly include:

   a. Information Collection. Information is collected in accordance with the
      intelligence collection plan. This activity is initiated early and continues
      throughout the operation, primarily by reconnaissance forces. Active counter-
      reconnaissance will also take place in order to secure friendly movement,
      preparations and activities, and to achieve surprise. This input to the knowledge
      base should consider not only adversary forces, but also the other elements or
      systems that will be affected by this tactical offensive activity. This should lead
      to risk assessment and the assessment for the possible creation of undesired
      effects through such things as collateral damage.

   b. Route Maintenance. There may be a requirement for route maintenance for
      the move to assembly areas and for deployment. Security may preclude work
      forward of the assembly areas early in the mounting stage, however, work may
      be possible in the rear area. If so, engineers must be amongst the first troops to
      move forward.
c. **Selection of Assembly Areas.** Assembly areas are selected with regard for concealment, grouping and tasks, and the location of the LD. Assembly areas, attack positions, and lines of departure should be secured by protective elements prior to their occupation by assault forces.

d. **Move to Assembly Areas.** The move to assembly areas is planned as a tactical road move. Preferably, it should be conducted under radio silence during periods of reduced visibility. This move should be planned to take place as late as possible in the mounting stage to assist in maintaining security.

e. **Obstacle Crossing and Breaching.** Preparations for crossing or breaching are completed.

f. **Preparatory Fire.** Preparatory fire may involve heavy ammunition expenditure. Insufficient fire may jeopardize surprise, while neutralizing the adversary for only a short time. It may be better to concentrate resources on covering fire or to carry out brief, but intense, preparatory fire on selected targets. If a large expenditure of ammunition is planned, a dumping programme may be required.

g. **Infiltration.** A commander must plan to move his infiltration force by stealth from its assembly area to their attack positions in the adversary area. Infiltration forces may be required to conduct an assault and hold their positions until a link-up can be affected or they may be directed to assault and subsequently disperse.

h. **Rehearsals.** If security and time permit, commanders at all levels should reconnoitre the ground over which they will attack and conduct rehearsals, preferably with all the elements of the force.

i. **Deployment.** Planning for deployment ensures that assault forces move from assembly areas, deploy into formation on the move and cross the LD at H-hour. If a deployment on the move is not possible, assault troops should pause only briefly in the attack position to shakeout. When a forward passage of lines is involved, the LD is usually the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The formation adopted when crossing the LD depends upon the ground, distance to the adversary, expected adversary resistance, and the effectiveness of the suppression of the adversary. A short approach to the objective over open terrain with considerable fire support, including smoke, against a relatively weak adversary favours adopting an assault formation when crossing the LD. Otherwise, it is adopted in an assault position just prior to closing with the adversary.

j. **Security.** During the approach to the LD, flank security/protection and a covering force/guard will likely have to be established. The LD should be secured prior to the arrival of the main assault force. This can be a task for reconnaissance forces.

3. **Assault.** The assault is conducted as follows:

a. Lead elements cross the lines of departure at H-hour. Tanks and infantry move together or on different axes. The lead may change during the approach and
final assault depending on the ground. The infantry dismount short of, on, or beyond the objective depending on the ground, the disposition and strength of the adversary, the number of anti-armour weapons, the extent and nature of obstacles, and the degree of surprise achieved. The aim is to retain momentum and protection until the infantry are required to fight through the position on foot.

b. At the same time, fire support resources suppress the adversary on the objective and in depth, mask his observation, and neutralize or destroy the adversary from deploying counter-move forces. As assaulting troops close with the adversary, the major fire support effort is directed at the break-in points.

c. In order to break-in, assaulting troops should concentrate only when they come into close contact with the adversary. Preferably supported by tanks, infantry and engineers breach the last of the adversary forward obstacles and break into his defensive system. At this point, close fire support shifts to the depth of the objective and then to targets on the flanks and objectives in depth. Throughout the break-in, momentum must be maintained so the adversary is unable to react.

d. Once the break-in is made, it is vital to maintain the pressure of the attack; not only when assaulting the adversary position to seize initial objectives, but also when fighting through to take the objectives in depth. Sometimes, determined action by troops in the initial assault can clear a position, thus avoiding the use of a much larger force later on when the adversary has had a chance to recover. Attacking forces must move as rapidly as possible between areas of adversary resistance, particularly in a nuclear environment. When fighting through objectives, support weapons and command posts are priority targets. Demolition teams destroy adversary bunkers. Tanks that are not accompanying the assault forces manoeuvre to cut-off positions to prevent the adversary from withdrawing or being reinforced. Frequently, smoke is employed to the rear of an objective to hamper supporting fire adjusted by the adversary’s reserve or depth forces.

e. Throughout the assault, a commander seeks to reinforce success, exploit favourable situations, and achieve maximum penetration into the adversary’s defences. He does this primarily by committing his reserves and shifting supporting fire. His decision to commit his reserves must be made quickly but judiciously, as once they are committed it is difficult, if not impossible, to disengage them or direct them to a new task. Once the reserve is irrevocably committed, a commander must reconstitute or obtain a new reserve as quickly as possible; otherwise he loses his major capability to influence the battle.

4. **Consolidation.** Consolidation begins immediately after the adversary has been defeated and/or the objective has been taken. This includes: deploying protective elements and possibly laying protective minefields; digging in, normally forward and to the flanks of the former adversary position; bringing forward additional support weapons; altering or completing the defensive fire plan; replenishing combat supplies, particularly ammunition; and evacuating casualties and prisoners.
5. **Exploitation.** An attack frequently creates short-term opportunities to maintain pressure on the adversary. Exploitation may prevent him from mounting counterattacks, reorganizing his defence, or conducting an orderly withdrawal. A commander should plan for exploitation and be prepared to adjust his plan as the situation develops. If exploitation is possible, it must be carried out quickly so as not to give respite to the adversary. It may even begin simultaneously with consolidation to ensure that momentum is maintained and the adversary is kept under pressure. A commander must decide whether to commit depth forces earmarked previously for exploitation, or direct main attack forces to exploit. He bases this decision primarily on the condition of the main attack forces, strength of the adversary, and the difficulty of moving depth forces forward.

739. **CONTROL MEASURES**

1. **General.** The organization for combat should provide for coverage of the area of the attack from well behind the LD to the objective and beyond, and should include the designation of any measures necessary to control the attack. These will depend on how the attack is to be mounted, and on how the commander wishes to control his forces, and may include the use of the following control measures. Control measures should include appropriate link-up drills and the combat identification (CID) measures deemed appropriate.

2. **Battlespace Management Including Airspace Control Measures.** Battlespace management is the means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronization, prioritization and de-confliction of activity across all dimensions of an assigned area of operations within the battlespace. Note: It comprises dimensions of land, sea, air and space, electromagnetic spectrum, information and time. Proper battlespace management will ensure the appropriate allocation of three-dimensional space and the electromagnetic spectrum to the various competing users. Allocations will be made on a priority basis, but it must harmonize the requirements in a complementary and mutually supporting fashion that will avoid conflict, confusion and fratricide. Exploitation of the airspace over the AO must take account of all potential users—offensive air support, helicopters, air defence (AD), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and artillery. Requirements for flight routes and areas of restricted/specialized air operations must be coordinated, usually through the combined air operations centre.

3. **Assault Line.** A control measure used to coordinate the movement of a unit or subunit out of the assault position and into the final stage of an attack.

4. **Assembly Areas and Approach Routes.** If time permits, forces which are to be brought together or moved up for an attack use an assembly area where they should remain only for as long as required for their administrative preparation or regrouping. These areas should be out of range of most of the adversary artillery and located so that the approach march from them to the LD can be affected smoothly, quickly and using concealed routes.

5. **Attack Position.** The attack position is the last position held by the assaulting force before crossing the LD. It is an area to which troops deploy immediately before an attack and in which they may adopt their assault formations. It is occupied for as short a time as possible, although final orders or briefings may be given or orientation carried out. It must be reconnoitred and secured before the assaulting force moves in. The area chosen should be easily recognizable, not under direct fire or observation and not a known or likely adversary artillery target.
6. **Axes and Routes.** Axes and routes are used to indicate the course of the movement to be followed and the degree of freedom of manoeuvre permitted en route to the objective(s). Axes establish only the general direction of movement. The subordinate commander is permitted to manoeuvre freely between assigned unit boundaries. Designation of a “route” establishes the specific direction or course which movement will follow.

7. **Boundaries.** A boundary between adjacent units will always be given in order to facilitate coordination between the units and to establish responsibility for movement, fire, reconnaissance and security.

8. **Consolidation.** In offensive operations, in preparation for further offensive operations, or to repel a possible counterattack, the process of regrouping and adjusting takes place upon the capture of an objective. A consolidation area is a zone in which consolidation takes place.

9. **Fire Base.** A fire base is in an attack, a support element that, from an assigned position, engages the target by direct fire in support of the assault group’s advance and assault.

10. **Killing Zone.** An area in which the adversary is forced to concentrate by use of natural and/or artificial obstacles and adequate concentration of resources, so as to create the most suitable conditions for his destruction.

11. **Limit of Exploitation.** In offensive operations, a line beyond which subordinate commanders may not exploit the success of earlier stages of an attack.

12. **Line of Departure.** The LD serves to coordinate the movement of the attacking forces at the start of the attack.

13. **Objectives.** Objectives are the physical object of the action taken, for example, a definite tactical feature, the seizure and holding of which is essential to the commander’s plan.

14. **Objective Area.** A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by the military forces. A competent authority defines this area for the purposes of command and control.

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**SECTION 7**

**FORCES AND TASKS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

740. **GENERAL**

1. In order to conduct offensive activities a commander will assign various roles, responsibilities and tactical tasks to subordinate elements. The offensive activity is conducted by a series of mutually supporting tactical tasks, such as “support by fire,” “block,” and “seize,” all linked together with a purpose or desired effect.\(^\text{165}\)

741. **ASSAULT FORCE**

1. The strength and type of combat forces that are available to strike the adversary will be a decisive factor in determining the task, the objectives and the task organization to be adopted.

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\(^{165}\) See NATO STANAG 2287 for a complete listing of tactical tasks.
An assault force should include depth in order to reinforce local success or maintain the overall momentum. It should include the appropriate balance between infantry and direct fire support, be it armoured forces, integral fighting vehicles and other direct fire support systems. The composition of the assault force will be determined in part by the adversary’s make-up and the terrain involved:

a. **Armoured Forces.** Armoured forces are particularly suitable for wide-ranging attacks, or quick, powerful counterattacks. They are capable of thrusting deep into adversary positions particularly in rolling, lightly covered terrain. Tanks or armoured/mechanized infantry may lead an attack depending upon the strength and position of the adversary and the terrain. Infantry and armour will likely be grouped together and operate in intimate support of one another, particularly in terrain with limited fields of vision or during periods of poor visibility. In close terrain, such as urban areas, infantry may dismount and provide local security to the armoured vehicles that are providing intimate support. If possible, light armour or light forces should be reinforced with armoured elements to give them covering fire and to neutralize adversary armour. It may be necessary to adjust the organization of the attacking force as the attack progresses.

b. **Light Armour and Light Forces.** Non-armoured forces are used most effectively where the terrain is heavily broken or covered, although, when faced by a similar, non-armoured adversary, they are capable of operating successfully in more open terrain. Their value is also dependent upon the type of operation in which they are employed. If the opportunity arises they could be used to infiltrate through gaps in the adversary lines to engage him in the flank or rear. They may also be employed to create conditions suitable for an attack by armoured troops.

c. **Armed Helicopters.** By attacking the adversary and immediately exploiting any gains, armed and attack helicopters (AH) in a manoeuvre role (air manoeuvre) can conduct close, deep and rear operations in support of the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre. Helicopters can create favourable conditions for the advance of ground manoeuvre forces by controlling the ground ahead through domination by direct and indirect fire. Helicopters can be allocated their own AO. They can be given manoeuvre missions in their own right or in concert with ground forces. Helicopters can attack static or mobile adversary forces and are particularly effective in exploiting gains during a pursuit operation. Helicopters can also be given missions such as flank protection, guard force, or route and area clearance.

d. **Airmobile Forces.** Airmobile forces can be employed to get past obstacles, to take an important objective by surprise, or they may constitute a reserve that can be deployed at great speed. Air mobility provides an additional dimension for ground force manoeuvre (air manoeuvre) and may also be conducted as part of an amphibious operation.

e. **Airborne Forces.** Airborne forces are specifically organized, equipped and trained for delivery by airdrop or air landing into an area to seize objectives or conduct special operations. They may, for example, be delivered ahead of an attacking force to seize and hold an important objective, such as a piece of key terrain, until either reinforced or relieved by other forces. In offensive activities, they can also be used to conduct an attack on the rear of the adversary
positions to cut off his reserves in combination with offensive action by other
ground forces, cover a flank, or to create a sense of insecurity in the adversary's
rear areas.

f. **Amphibious Forces.** Amphibious forces are employed in operations launched
from the sea by naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile
shore. They may be combined with an air manoeuvre, airmobile or airborne
operation.

742. **FLANK SECURITY AND PROTECTION**

1. Forces must be allocated to security and protection tasks that may include flank
protection and the covering of gaps between units. These elements may also be required to
provide firepower, to deal with bypassed adversary forces, or to provide protection from
adversary ground attack against support and sustainment units, particularly when areas to the
rear of attacking echelons have not been cleared.

2. Forces allocated security tasks are usually light or light armoured forces; hence, they
can alert the main body of an adversary threat but will be unlikely to destroy it. In order to be
allocated a protection task, forces must have enough protection and firepower to destroy,
neutralize, or at least suppress a threat until the protection force can be reinforced.

743. **ECHELONED FORCE OR RESERVE**

1. Forces must be held in reserve to deal with the unexpected and to maintain the
momentum of the attack by exploiting success when the opportunity is presented. A
commander may also need to increase the size of an assaulting force to allow it to constitute a
reserve. Once the original reserve has been committed, another one must be constituted, even
if this means a change in the task organization. Reserves should be located so that they can be
deployed swiftly in any direction, but are able to avoid becoming engaged prematurely. They
are held out of contact from the adversary until committed. An airmobile reserve may also be
maintained to provide flexibility in the exploitation and pursuit as well as for flank protection.
Care, however, must be taken to distinguish between these forces and forces specifically
designated for any subsequent phase or phases. These echelon forces can be used to prevent
the adversary from penetrating the attacking force, to secure terrain gained by the assault
forces, to protect LOC, to destroy bypassed resistance and to block adversary reinforcements
into the area of the assaulting force. Their most common use is for exploitation and pursuit.
Where there are insufficient forces to permit the commander to retain an uncommitted reserve
then some form of double earmarking may be required.

744. **EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES**

1. **Fire Support.** The success of the attack depends upon the close coordination of the fire
support from all the weapons available to the attacking forces, and the overall commander must
ensure constant coordination of fire support across the whole attack front. The weight of fire is
switched, as necessary, and concentrated in accordance with the commander's plan. The
following considerations should be borne in mind:
a. If the attack is to use surprise, fire support may be withheld until adversary resistance is encountered, unless it forms part of the deception plan.

b. Some adversary positions may be neutralized or masked by smoke in accordance with the attack plan.

c. If the adversary position is particularly strong, preparatory fire may be necessary. The purpose of this will be to destroy as much of the adversary force as possible before the start of the attack.

d. Interdiction fire may be used to prevent movement from or into the immediate battlespace.

2. **Artillery.** The correct use of artillery and the other elements of fire support are key to the success of the attack. Artillery may be deployed forward during preparations for the break-in battle, and once the attack commences, will follow the combat troops in such a way that there is no break in the supporting fire. It is vital that the whole ISTAR system is coordinated and directed towards the acquisition of critical targets and linked to the fire support systems able to strike them as soon as they are located. Only by destroying key battlefield functions in the adversary’s deployment will friendly forces be able to launch an attack with a reasonable chance of success. During the attack, the artillery may be required to carry out a number of specific tasks including:

a. **Preparatory Fire.** Preparatory fire may be used to:

   (1) neutralize or destroy adversary artillery;

   (2) mask adversary observation;

   (3) suppress adversary AD; and

   (4) illuminate the battlefield.

b. **Covering Fire.** Covering fire may be used to:

   (1) isolate the close battle;

   (2) neutralize the adversary at the point of breaking-in;

   (3) give fire support to combat troops as they fight through the adversary in depth;

   (4) destruction of adversary armour; and

   (5) be on call during consolidation.

c. **Defensive Fire.** Defensive fire will seek the following effects:

   (1) neutralize threats from the flanks;

   (2) engage adversary counter attack forces; and
(3) block through the use of scatterable mines.

3. **Naval Gunfire Tasks.** If available, naval gunfire can contribute extensively to the overall fire support of the operation, performing the same tasks as land based artillery.

4. **Air.** Air support is a vital component in the conduct of offensive operations. It is capable of providing a favourable air situation for deployment and movement, and can identify, disrupt and destroy adversary forces at long range. It achieves this through the following activities:
   
   a. **Air Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations.** Before the attack takes place, air intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Air ISR) operations should provide intelligence on the adversary, and during the attack, it should allow the early detection of adversary countermeasures.
   
   b. **Counter Air Operations.** Local air superiority will be essential for large-scale offensive operations. All counter air resources should be integrated to achieve this local superiority.
   
   c. **Air Interdiction.** Air interdiction (AI) will support land force offensive operations by preventing the adversary from reinforcing and strengthening his defence. AI is defined as: “air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.”

   d. **Close Air Support.** Close air support (CAS) is an important fire support asset for ground forces. CAS is defined as: “air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”

5. **Aviation.** Helicopters may support offensive activities through air mobility to exploit opportunities by seizing key terrain ahead of attacking forces. They may also be used for the following:
   
   a. command and control missions;
   
   b. reconnaissance and surveillance of flanks and gaps;
   
   c. logistic support, including casualty evacuation;
   
   d. insertion and extraction of patrols and observation detachments; and
   
   e. fire support from armed and attack aviation (close combat attack).

6. **Air Defence.** During the preparation stage of an attack, AD cover will be given to assembly areas, the approach routes and assets critical to deep operations. During the attack, the priority shifts to protecting the attacking force; however, as the attack progresses the protection of reserves and LOC may take on increasing importance.

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166 NATO AAP-6.

167 Ibid.
7. **Engineers.** In offensive activities, engineer support will be required to maintain the momentum of attack. Mobility support is therefore paramount. Counter-mobility tasks, particularly the protection of flanks and rapid protection against counterattacks, are also important. Other engineering support:

   a. Engineers will be required to support attacking forces by any or all of the following actions:

      (1) Breaching or opening own minefields.

      (2) Marking and breaching adversary minefields.

      (3) Providing the means of crossing dry and wet gaps (e.g., rivers) and other obstacles.

      (4) Securing the flanks by means of minefields, demolitions and other obstacles. These also help to shape and structure the battlespace, and may allow commanders to use economy of force measures for force protection.

      (5) Preparing and maintaining routes for follow-up echelons.

      (6) Supporting the consolidation on the objective with the construction of field fortifications, laying minefields and creating obstacles.

   b. The achievement of these functions depends upon adequate reconnaissance, timely provision of the necessary equipment and stores, and the proper grouping and control of engineer elements, particularly minefield breaching and gap crossing armoured vehicles.

8. **Electronic Warfare.** In offensive activities, EW provides the commander with a means to acquire information to prepare his estimates and plans, and a weapon to delay the adversary's response to the attack. EW operations may be used for the following:

   a. the detection, location and disruption of adversary surveillance and target acquisition systems, in particular ad, counter-battery and counter-mortar radars;

   b. the detection and location of the reserve and counterattack elements;

   c. electronic isolation of selected adversary units or formations by disruption of communications with their flank units, higher formations and reserves;

   d. detection and location of adversary electronic countermeasures elements so they may be eliminated by physical attack; and

   e. deception, either alone or in conjunction with feints and demonstrations.
745. **PLANNING**

1. **Planning Process.** Once a commander has received his mission and analyzed it, he will make a full estimate, consider the following factors in particular, and take account of time/space. At the unit level, the commander assisted by his operations staff will conduct the estimate. At command levels with staff, an extensive operational planning process (OPP) will likely occur based upon the commander’s initial direction. In periods of severely limited time, the commander will give more detailed direction in terms of course of action development and the process will be shortened.

2. **Consideration of Factors.** Apart from the assigned and implied tasks, the estimate process will consider the following factors that influence the situation:

   a. **Adversary.** The layout of his defence, his capabilities and likely intentions.

   b. **Environmental Factors:**

      (1) In planning for offensive activities and operations, terrain has to be analyzed by considering cover and concealment, observation, fire positions, obstacles, dominating ground and avenues of approach.

      (2) The place to attack is the location that offers the greatest likelihood of success. Terrain chosen for the main effort should allow for rapid movement into the adversary rear, although occasionally, an attack on less suitable terrain may be necessary to achieve surprise. The effect of terrain on the forward movement of combat support and combat service support (CSS) elements must also be considered.

      (3) Weather must be considered in terms of its influence on mobility, visibility, air support, troops and equipment, and the effects of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

   c. **Friendly Forces.** The commander must consider the strength, type and condition of available troops, the tasks required to be fulfilled by his available troops, and any additional forces required. Implicit is a need to examine the force ratios including combat effectiveness to ensure that they are favourable. An examination of friendly forces also includes consideration of the CSS requirements for the operation, and the restraints that may be imposed by a lack of such resources.

   d. **Security.** The commander must consider how he may make best use of deception and OPSEC in order to achieve surprise and to protect both his plans and troops. In offensive activities and operations, it is particularly important to conceal his intentions so that the main force can manoeuvre into a position from which to strike the adversary.
The Conduct of Land Operations

3. **Development of Courses of Action.** Consideration of the factors will have identified tasks that must be fulfilled in order to conduct a successful offensive activity. These will include assault, fire support, blocking, flank protection, security, depth, reserves, etc. These may be put together in varying forms and combinations to produce a number of possible schemes of manoeuvre or plans, known as courses of action (COAs).

4. **Consideration of Courses of Action.** The COAs are compared to one another and the most favourable course is chosen or formulated as the decision. From this decision, the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the detailed operation plan (OPLAN) are developed.

5. **Plan.** The plan may contain or provide for:

   a. **Task Organization.** The organization of forces for the conduct of the offensive operations.

   b. **A Concept of Operations.** The CONOPS will outline the plan and include the commander’s intent, a scheme of manoeuvre, a desired end state, and the designation of the main effort.

   c. **Tasks.** The allocation of missions and constituent tasks to subordinate commanders.

   d. **Phasing and Control.** This details the sequence the attack will follow with particular attention to coordination.

   e. **Timings.** Timings will assist the commander to control the phasing and coordination with flanking formations.

   f. **Manoeuvre Plan.** Details of the movement and manoeuvre plan may be required for coordination and will include a bypassing policy.

   g. **Fire Support.** This will include indirect fire support, aviation fire support, and close air support.

   h. **Electronic Warfare Support.**

   i. **Reserves.** The possible tasks for reserves will be designated in order of priority.

   j. **Reconnaissance.** It is important that the reconnaissance effort should be continued throughout the operation so that adversary reaction and movement can be identified and evaluated.

   k. **Tactical Security and Protection:**
(1) Specific measures for camouflage and concealment, deception and electronic counter-countermeasures must be laid down.

(2) The line of departure (LD) must be secure.

(3) Flank protection should be provided forward of the LD.

l. **Consolidation.** Plans must detail the action once the objective has been seized. The area must be secured against adversary counterattack and the force reorganized for the next operation or phase.

m. **Exploitation.** The commander’s intentions for exploitation must be stated.

n. **Combat Service Support.** Details for CSS priorities and activities should include:

   (1) Action to be taken before the attack.

   (2) Provision for continuous support of the operation.

   (3) Provision for collecting, consolidating and controlling prisoners of war (PWs) and refugees.

o. **CBRN Defence.** The commander must specify which CBRN dress category is to be worn for an attack, balancing the degradation in performance that will be caused by wearing CBRN protection against the disruption that will occur if troops have to take protective action during the course of the assault. If the terrain is contaminated it may slow down or even stop an attack. CBRN reconnaissance teams should, therefore, be deployed forward to give warning of any contamination. The reorganization plan must take into account the possible use of NBC weapons against the objective once it has gained, and when this is possible, must include early deployment of detectors and alarms.

746. **PREPARATION**

1. Preparation will occur during the mounting stage of any attack or other offensive activity. The extent of preparations will depend upon the time available and the requirements calculated during the estimate. The time required for the essential preparations is often a factor to be considered in deciding the time of an attack. Subordinate commanders should be told as soon as possible, normally by a warning order, how much time they have to make their own preparations. Preparations include:

   a. **Preliminary Movement.** Preliminary movement is a controlled move that positions the forces in or near the assembly areas depending upon the timings.

   b. **Preliminary Deployment.** Preliminary deployment involves the elements of the various combat and combat support forces coming together in the task organization for battle. To ensure they are fully combat ready, they also receive logistic replenishment at this stage. Moreover, any CSS elements that are to move with the attacking force join their designated formation or unit at this stage.
c. **Infiltration.** Infiltration can be used, under favourable conditions, for reconnaissance, attacks in depth, the capture of specific terrain features, or the disruption of communications. Infiltration, however, requires accurate intelligence and is time consuming.

d. **Preparatory Fire.** If the commander has decided to use fire support prior to H-hour, then a plan for preparatory fire will be implemented.

### 747. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

1. **General.** The commander must be kept informed of the progress of the attack, adversary reactions, and the situation confronting subordinate units. During the attack, he may increasingly decentralize control to subordinate commanders to permit them to react more rapidly to changes in the situation. At critical times, he may place himself at the point of the main effort. Through the knowledge of their commander’s concept and the changing situation, subordinate commanders implement the plan and modify it as necessary.

2. **Orders.** The following orders are issued:

   a. Warning orders should be issued to ensure maximum use of the time available for preparation and concurrent activity. Written operation orders (OPORDs) may cover in detail only the initial phase of a deliberate attack. For subsequent stages, a commander may be able to provide only broad instructions. Orders are written within the philosophy of mission command. Subordinates should be told what effects and end state they are to achieve, all synchronized in a CONOPS and its scheme of manoeuvre. The commander will make his CONOPS clear, but leave the execution to subordinate commanders. Key will be a clear intent for the operation to achieve.

   b. As the situation develops, he will supplement and amend his original order with fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). The success of the operation will depend increasingly upon the initiative of subordinate commanders, especially in the exploitation and pursuit.

3. **Location of Commander.** A commander will decide for himself where he is best located at any time. Often the range and reliability of communications enable him to see the whole picture at his principle HQ, where he has the support of his full staff and his specialist arms and services advisers. At some crucial moments, however, he will be required forward at critical points in order to assess the full, immediate situation and in order to spot opportunities that will allow him to exploit the situation faster than the adversary commander. In short, it will allow him to impose his will at the critical time and to personally influence the immediate battle.

4. **Positioning of Headquarters.** The moves of HQ must be arranged to meet the requirements of the commander and planned in advance so that early reconnaissance can be made and communications sites selected as far as practical. Normally, a formation HQ will establish itself forward immediately before the attack. This makes communications easier when the attack starts and ensures that the commander and his staff are near the assembly area at the critical period. As the attack progresses, the command elements also move forward to enable the commander to exercise control.
5. **Communications.** Communications security (COMSEC) is of the greatest importance prior to the attack. The implications of any restrictions on the use should be considered in advance. Radio communications will be essential for effective C2 during the attack. Provision for alternative communications should be made in case communications become unavailable or lost for any reason.

748. **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1. **General.** Continuity of sustaining operations is vital to the success of offensive activities and operations. Indeed, success in pursuit and exploitation may hinge upon the ability of CSS elements to react quickly and flexibly. The commander and his staff must, therefore, carefully consider the availability of supplies and the capability of the CSS support elements to deliver the supplies and to provide other necessary support to units.

2. **Specific Considerations.** While all aspects of CSS must be considered in planning an operation, the availability of ammunition, fuel and maintenance support must be given the most emphasis:

   a. **Forward Positioning.** To offset the strain on the transportation system, the commander must consider pre-positioning supplies and support facilities well forward. Where possible, these should be kept mobile so that they can be deployed forward as the attack progresses.

   b. **Ammunition/Fuel Supply.** Due to the large volume that must be moved and the often-limited transportation resources available, adequate planning is necessary to ensure an uninterrupted flow of ammunition/fuel to the front.

   c. **Maintenance.** To effectively maintain the force, repairs must be carried out as far forward as tactically feasible. This reduces the demands on the evacuation facilities, and permits the return of combat equipment to the battle in the shortest possible time. The forward positioning of major assemblies will greatly assist in the battlefield repair of combat vehicles. In the main, vehicle maintenance will consist of the replacement of complete assemblies rather than repair. There will need to be a well-practised system in place capable of restocking the system with assemblies.

   d. **Medical Support.** When planning the medical support for an offensive operation, the following important factors must be considered:

      (1) Medical units must be employed as far forward as the tactical situation allows.

      (2) Plans must be flexible, since medical units are normally not held in reserve.

   e. **Traffic Control.** Control on routes will be important to ensure that the approach march, replenishment of committed forces, evacuation of casualties, and the deployment of reserves is not impeded. This will be particularly important at the crossing points for breached obstacles.
SECTION 9
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

749. PURPOSE

1. The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat or deter an adversary’s offensive actions, and to hold ground. They are generally intended to provide the right conditions for offensive action. Defensive operations alone generally do not achieve a decisive conclusion to a campaign, which often requires offensive operations. However, defensive battles have on occasions been decisive to the conduct of a campaign. Defensive operations include delay operations.

2. Defensive operations are normally undertaken when the adversary has the initiative, to prevent him from seizing terrain or breaking through into a defended area. In countering manoeuvre forces, they aim to break the adversary attack, destroy his forces and stop him from accomplishing his aim, and in so doing, to establish the conditions for maintaining the initiative through offensive action.

3. While a classic defence in unlikely in the COE, the application of the fundamentals will ensure a solid defence is undertaken when required in a fluid situation or as part of a campaign short of major combat. Indeed, the fundamentals and considerations of a defence apply to many other activities, such as the requirement for local security at a roadblock and check point.

750. CONCEPT OF THE DEFENCE

1. Offensive action is fundamental to the defence. The defence should be creative, with every opportunity being taken to grasp the initiative and so disrupt the adversary’s cohesion. For example, by holding terrain, or undermining the adversary’s efforts and resources in one area, a commander may be able to establish the conditions for decisive action in another. The object will be to force the adversary into action that narrows his options, reduces his fighting power and exposes him to a decisive offensive action. An effective defence is therefore rarely passive, and it is desirable to incorporate aggressive offensive action to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt the adversary whenever possible. This may be done by fixing the adversary by deception and encouraging him to make inappropriate plans, luring him into situations where one can exploit surprise, denying him information, and striking at his cohesion. Deep operations may be conducted to fix the adversary by denying him freedom of action, and striking in order to dislocate his potential for offensive manoeuvre, and disrupt his ability to pass orders.

2. Defensive operations should not be merely reactive. They aim to create the right conditions for achieving desired effects and objectives. A key aim will generally be to limit the adversary’s freedom of action and to develop the conditions for future offensive operations.

3. A defensive operation may be required to:
   a. Destroy the adversary’s offensive capability and cause his attack to fail.
   b. Fix the adversary in order to allow friendly forces to strike elsewhere.
   c. Gain time in order to complete the preparation for other operations including a counter-offensive.
d. Retain terrain and prevent the adversary from breaking through.

4. An attacker normally determines the time and location of his attack and can mass his forces whenever he wishes. He will normally seek out centres of gravity, attempting to disrupt the tempo of current operations and the planning and preparation of future ones.

5. Defensive operations will play a major role in many campaigns that do not involve a great deal of major combat. Initial footholds and firm bases during a COIN or peace support operation all have to be secured, and depending upon the adversary, vital points such as key civilian infrastructure may have to be secured. The principles of the defence will still apply.

751. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. General. A commander must consider many principles and fundamentals when planning and conducting a defence. They are frequently in conflict with one another, and consequently, the commander must determine the degree to which each will be stressed.

2. Principles of War. The following principles of war require emphasis during the planning and conduct of defensive operations:

   a. Concentration of Force. The commander must be able to concentrate his force at the adversary’s point of main effort. Concentration not only implies massing of forces but also massing of firepower. It includes such elements as movement, flexibility, and communications. At the lowest levels, concentration includes siting weapons and creating fire plans to mass fire effects on the attacker. Concentration cannot be achieved by being strong everywhere. Trading ground for time, or economy of force elsewhere, may be necessary to obtain an advantage at a decisive point. The defender uses deception, concealment, counter-battery fire, screening forces, and AD in order to minimize the risks of vulnerability through concentration of force.

   b. Offensive Action. Commanders must maintain the offensive spirit in the defence. This implies manoeuvre, speed, and aggressiveness, the particular characteristics of armour. Patrolling and counterattacking are also elements of offensive action.

   c. Security. Security is the ability to meet an attack from any direction. It is achieved by the employment of covering forces, coordination and mutual support at all levels, maintenance of surveillance, and the ability to concentrate forces.

   d. Flexibility. The defender will strive to avoid or counter the adversary’s attacks, while preparing to seize the initiative and turn defensive operations to his advantage. This requires an ability to develop new plans rapidly, a willingness to shift the main effort, and a readiness to move swiftly to the offensive without loss of tempo.


752. FUNDAMENTALS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. In addition to the principles there are several fundamental elements of defensive operations that must be given specific attention:

   a. **Information Gathering.** Information about the adversary is vital to the conduct of defensive operations. It must be obtained prior to and during the battle to give commanders the ability to judiciously concentrate their forces and firepower at the correct place and time. Information is gathered from four sources in defensive operations:

      (1) covering forces;

      (2) ISTAR elements, including target acquisition systems;

      (3) patrols; and

      (4) troops in contact.

   b. **Use of Terrain.** The strength of a defence depends to a large extent on the selection and use of terrain. A commander’s ability to analyze the terrain, determine the approaches, select vital ground and key terrain, and deploy his forces quickly determines the outcome of an operation. The selected terrain should allow the approaches to be covered by fire. It should also offer the defender concealment, protection and movement, while restricting the adversary’s observation and deployment capability. Preferably, a defence area contains natural and/or man-made barriers that can be incorporated into the plan and reinforced by man-made obstacles. Terrain is classified as:

      (1) **Open Terrain.** Open terrain is relatively flat and unencumbered by forests, built-up areas, waterways, and other natural barriers. It is covered easily by surveillance and can be dominated by fire. Such terrain requires the construction of barriers to restrict the movement of adversary forces. Armoured forces and elements equipped with long-range direct fire weapons defend these areas best.

      (2) **Close Terrain.** Close terrain may have considerable relief and may be broken by extensive forests. It will include jungle and built-up areas. This terrain restricts an attacker’s movement and provides good concealment and protection for the defender. Natural obstacles can be improved to further delay the attacker and canalize his movement. Forces strong in infantry defend these areas best.
(3) **Key Terrain and Vital Ground.** Vital ground is defined as: “ground of such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success of the mission.” Key terrain is defined as: “any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.” A commander must designate his vital ground, that is, that ground which, if lost, makes the defence untenable. He then identifies the main approaches to his vital ground and the key terrain that dominates or blocks those approaches. Key terrain is ground that offers the holder a marked advantage. From this assessment, he identifies the key terrain that is to be held. He then groups and tasks his force accordingly. This process is repeated at each lower level of formation and leads to coordinated dispositions that fit the overall plan. Normally, vital ground is relative to the level of command but once identified, it remains constant for all subordinate levels of command. For example, a brigade commander’s vital ground may only be key terrain from the perspective of the division commander; however, in situations where the corps vital ground is in a brigade area, the same ground is vital to both the brigade and to the division. Regardless, if the defence within a specified sector is to continue, the vital ground must be held, or if lost, recaptured. A commander selects his vital ground, key terrain, and killing zones by:

(a) identifying obstacles in various locations, including the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) and likely avenues of approach;

(b) determining approaches, assessing them, and ranking them in terms of likelihood of use;

(c) anticipating the adversary’s objectives; and

(d) identifying obstacles in the main defence area (MDA).

c. **Disruption.** The adversary’s offensive operations should be disrupted throughout its conduct, so that the adversary is frustrated in his attempts to manoeuvre and concentrate his combat power. This should be done throughout the depth of his force. Disruption can be achieved by: defeating or blinding his reconnaissance; attacking his cohesion and slowing his tempo through fixed defences and aggressive counterattacks; and, destroying critical assets through deep attack.

d. **Coordination.** All aspects of the defence require coordination, including passage of lines by covering and counterattack forces, boundaries, liaison, barrier plan, fire support, AD, airspace control, and CSS. Reserve forces must conduct extensive coordination, including rehearsals, once allocated the task. This must consider likely reinforcement options and focus on ways to avoid fratricide. Coordination takes place during planning and throughout the conduct
of an operation. It is a never-ending task to which a commander and his staff must devote considerable effort. Coordination is particularly important during multinational operations. Often, the adversary seeks to attack along boundaries that may be shared by different nations. A commander achieves and maintains coordination by:

(1) Understanding the superior commander’s concept of operations (CONOPS).

(2) Understanding the tactics, methods and procedures of JIMP partners. This is aided across military forces by using common doctrinal manuals, such as the ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook and NATO publications.

(3) Selecting boundaries and lines of operation so that they do not intensify any coordination difficulties.

(4) Selecting coordinating points along boundaries or lines of operation.

(5) Exchanging planning information and liaison detachments, and planning mutual support.

(6) Rehearsals, particularly for reserve forces.

(7) Any other means that the commander deems appropriate and prudent for the situation.

e. **Mutual Support.** Mutual support in the defence is achieved when the gaps between defended positions are covered by fire, preferably direct fire, so that the attacker cannot assault one position without being subjected to fire from at least one other. The degree of mutual support achieved depends upon the terrain, visibility and range of weapons. Ideally, the frontages that units must defend are related to their ability to provide mutual support. A commander must balance the need for mutual support with the requirements of depth, dispersion and mobility. Mutual support increases the strength of the defence and therefore influences the selection of boundaries and the location of battle positions. It also gives another advantage to the defender, since an attacker must disperse his covering fire to neutralize the supporting positions.

f. **Depth.** Defence in depth causes an attacker to execute successive stages of his operation without detailed reconnaissance. It also helps to surprise an attacker and draw him into committing his next echelon or reserve. It absorbs the attacker’s momentum and thus prevents a breakthrough. It also localizes penetration and facilitates blocking. Finally, it allows a defender time to determine the attacker's main thrust and to counter it. The depth of the defence area should be proportional to the strength, mobility and firepower of the attacker and the frontage to be defended. Depth is obtained by:

(1) Employing protective elements well forward to cover approaches and likely adversary areas.
(2) Employing long-range resources, including EW elements and tactical air support, to engage deep in the area of influence, targets which are important to the continuity, momentum and C2 of the attacker.

(3) Siting battle positions and obstacles in depth throughout the area.

(4) Positioning and moving reserves, fire support elements and CSS elements.

g. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre may be a decisive element of a defence. By combining movement with fire, the defender can make the best use of terrain to inflict losses on the attacker. Manoeuvre enables a commander to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve superiority over the adversary.

h. **Firepower.** The effectiveness of the defence is based primarily on the planned and mutually supporting fire of all weapons. The fire of manoeuvre units, indirect fire support, aviation, and tactical air and naval elements must be complementary, coordinated, and applied at the right time and place. Firepower also assists or enables a commander to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve superiority over the adversary.

i. **Use of Reserves.** Reserves are uncommitted forces that a commander requires to maintain freedom of action to deal with anticipated and unexpected developments. They provide flexibility and balance. Their main functions are to reinforce, block, counterattack, replace other units, and protect flanks and rear areas. Once the reserve has been committed, a new one must be constituted or obtained. It may be necessary to reconstitute a reserve from troops in areas least threatened, or from depth forces that are not in contact with the adversary. Although this entails risk, it must be weighed against the requirement to retain the ability to concentrate decisive combat power.

2. It must be remembered that these fundamentals apply not only to defensive positions against manoeuvre forces, but equally to the defensive aspects of other activities. For example, coordination will be vital for the effective defence of a forward operating base during a COIN campaign, and depth by an over-watch position will be vital for the local defence of a vehicle checkpoint position.

**753. TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION**

1. There are two principle types of defensive operation:

a. **Defence.** The purpose of defence may be to defeat an adversary force or to hold ground. Generally, both will require a fixed element that denies the adversary freedom of manoeuvre, and a moving element to counterattack the adversary. The balance between these two forces depends upon the mission and the relative capabilities of the attacker and defender.

b. **Delay.** Delaying operations are those in which a force being pressed by an adversary trades time for space, reducing its opponent’s momentum and inflicting damage without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay may be conducted to slow an adversary’s advance, reduce his fighting power, gather
information about adversary intentions, or protect friendly deployments. Delaying operations also allow the commander to shape the battlefield, and to create the conditions for a counterattack. A delay operation is usually closely associated with a corresponding defensive position that is being prepared while the delay is being fought. It is best fought with well-protected, mobile forces that can engage the adversary at range from mutually supporting battle positions and then withdraw quickly before becoming decisively engaged.

754. DEFENCE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE

1. The commander must also consider defence on the psychological plane. He must guard his force’s sense of purpose, cohesion and morale. Although the moral component of a force’s combat power will be established before (even years before) actual deployment, commanders must take active measures throughout a campaign in order to ensure that this element of his combat power is protected.

2. Furthermore, the commander must defend his force’s image amongst a civilian populace and amongst the JIMP environment, and defend how others perceive the commander and his forces. Adversary forces, particularly those involved in an insurgency, will go to great lengths to undermine support for the campaign and to turn the public’s perception against the campaigning forces and their justification for being involved. Part of this defence will consist of ensuring commanders and soldiers, even down to the lowest levels, understand the need to be seen as legitimate, effective and positive by local forces and populations. The poor conduct of a single soldier at a vehicle checkpoint, for example, can due great harm to public support.

3. Many of the defensive measures taken to defend both a force’s moral component and its image amongst the local populace and JIMP environment will be in the form of information operations, that is, defensive influence activities, in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the campaign, to defend against adversary propaganda, and to advertise the benefits of the campaign to a local populace. To this end, the commander will wish to integrate his force with other JIMP partners and clearly harmonize his force’s actions with their lines of operation.

SECTION 10
FORMS OF THE DEFENCE

755. GENERAL

1. There are two forms that are used in the conduct of defensive operations: area defence and mobile defence.

756. AREA DEFENCE

1. The purpose of an area defence is to hold ground or deny it to an adversary. It focuses on the retention of terrain by absorbing the adversary into an interlocked series of positions from which he can largely be destroyed by fire.

2. Unlike mobile defence, a force committed to area defence does not seek the destruction of the attacking force. Instead, it relies upon a separate but coordinated attack by other forces to deliver tactical success. In area defence, commanders employ their forces in a framework of
static and mutually supporting positions, supported by counterattacks at all available levels. The balance between static and counterattack elements is largely dictated by terrain. The closer the terrain, the greater the proportion of counterattacking forces and the lower the level at which they should be employed.

3. Area defence may be conducted in varying depth depending upon the mission, the forces available and the nature of the terrain. See Figure 7-6.

Figure 7-6: Area Defence

757. MOBILE DEFENCE

1. In a mobile defence a fixing force denies the adversary his freedom of action while a striking force manoeuvres in order to defeat him. Commanders conducting a mobile defence use terrain, obstacles, depth and deception, together with fire and manoeuvre, to encourage an adversary to focus on the wrong objective. This renders the adversary vulnerable to attack. Therefore, depth, time and the ability to manoeuvre are particularly important factors in the conduct of mobile defence. Successful mobile defence requires rapidly switching between activities, and a readiness to concede ground where appropriate.

2. Mobile defence focuses on the destruction of the attacking force by permitting it to advance to a position that exposes it to counterattack and envelopment. The emphasis is on defeating the adversary rather than retaining or retaking ground. Mobile defences employ a combination of offensive, defensive and delaying action necessitating the forward deployment of relatively small forces, and the use of manoeuvre supported by fire and obstacles, to wrest the initiative from the attacker after he has entered the defended area. Consequently, the defending force must have mobility equal to or greater than the adversary’s and the ability to form a large reserve that will conduct the decisive counterattack. See Figure 7-7.
DEFENCE BY AN ENCIRCLED FORCE

1. An encircled force may breakout, exfiltrate towards friendly forces, attack deeper into the adversary, or defend itself. The purpose of defending an encircled force may be to retain ground or draw away adversary forces as part of a larger manoeuvre, or to preserve the combat power of forces unexpectedly encircled and unable to breakout or exfiltrate. An encircled force may conduct either an area defence, or a mobile defence if it has sufficient fuel. The key consideration in organizing the defence of an encircled force is to anticipate how the adversary will attempt to split the force and reduce it piecemeal.

SECTION 11
THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE

759. GENERAL

1. The planning and preparation for defensive operations will take considerable time. Commanders ideally site positions two echelons below them. Hence, a battle group (BG) commander will site platoon positions. However, time may not exist for such detailed planning and preparation. Commanders should then focus on describing the effects that defensive positions must create at subordinate levels in order to achieve the tactical objective of the defensive operation. Subordinates will then use the available time to site their positions so that the desired effects are created.

2. During the early stages of a defensive operation, the defender will usually have the advantage of fighting from positions of his choosing. Preparation includes positioning forces in depth, using and improving ground, conducting reconnaissance and security operations, developing plans for counterattacks, and initiating deception measures. These should conceal dispositions and intentions, and misdirect the adversary’s efforts.

3. Detailed coordination will be of utmost importance during the planning of the defensive operation and will consume considerable time. It should include back-briefs by subordinates to their commanders to ensure that the sited positions will create the desired effects.
760. STAGES OF THE DEFENCE

1. The defence is a single battle, fought in two stages leading to an offensive operation. These stages are:
   a. covering force battle; and
   b. main defence battle, including countermoves (reinforcing, blocking and counterattacking).

761. LAYOUT OF THE DEFENSIVE AREA

1. The covering force area and the defence area are separated by the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). However, the responsibility for the conduct of operations will often change forward of the FEBA, at the handover line.

2. The covering force area is the area extending forward from the FEBA as far as forces are deployed to observe, engage, intercept, delay, disorganize and deceive the adversary during his advance to the FEBA. It is within this area that the covering force must conduct its tasks and responsibilities. In doing so, it may use delay tactics. The main defensive force must be able to engage forward of the FEBA in order to help the covering force break clean from any adversary forces pursuing the covering force’s rearward passage of lines.

3. The defence area extends rearwards from the FEBA; it is that area in which it is planned to fight the decisive defensive battle.

4. The rear areas extend from the rear boundaries of formation/unit areas to their subordinate formation/unit rear boundaries. It is here that the reserve forces of the formation/unit are normally located. In addition, some long-range fire support units, organic and attached combat support, and CSS units will often be found in this area. In the allocation of deployment areas, consideration must be given to the areas needed for the overall concept of defence as well as areas required for CSS troops and installations. See Figure 7-8.
Figure 7-8: Corps Defence Area of Operations (with the Covering Force under Corps Control)

**Note**: This diagram illustrates a corps defence area of operations in very basic outline. It should be remembered that within a non-linear and/or non-contiguous battlespace the lines will not always be straight and there may be large gaps between one corps or division area and another.

762. COVERING FORCE BATTLE

1. **General.** A covering force fights a battle of movement and there will seldom be time to prepare battle positions. Maximum destruction is inflicted on the adversary so that he arrives at the main defence area (MDA) disrupted and disorganized. Although the task of the covering force is very demanding, casualties and delay can be imposed on the adversary out of all proportion to the size of the covering force if it is handled skilfully and makes use of favourable ground. In so doing, the covering force can deceive the adversary as to the location of the MDA and even lead him to give away his intentions.

2. **Planning Considerations.** A formation, even down to brigade level, may have to provide its own covering force. It may alternatively be part of a higher formation’s defence plan acting as the covering force itself, or as part of the main defence force with another formation or unit acting in this role. Similarly, a brigade can act as the covering force for a division or a corps. In any case, there will be only one designated covering force beyond the handover line as this negates the need for multiple handovers between successive levels. This, however, still
provides a commander the option of employing his own “covering force” in the main defensive area up to the handover line with his superior formation. When a formation is responsible for the covering force battle, it must understand how it is related to the main defence battle and the impact that the conduct may have on the higher commander's intent and CONOPS in the main defence area. Planning must incorporate contingencies to account for unexpected results or difficulties of the covering force battle.

3. **Tasks.** The commander will normally establish a covering force to form the first echelon of a defence in depth. A commander avoids assigning conflicting tasks to a covering force. The primary tasks may be:

   a. gaining information on the location, direction and weight of the adversary attack (its main effort);
   b. gaining time;
   c. attrition—inflicting casualties on the adversary;
   d. providing security;
   e. counter-reconnaissance; and
   f. disruption—causing damage to the adversary's cohesion.

4. **Size and Composition.** The size and composition of the covering force will depend upon the mission, adversary, terrain and available forces. Wherever possible, the forces used as a covering force should not be required immediately in the MDA. The covering force should be an all-arms grouping that is self-contained in all respects. These factors take on added significance and complexity depending upon the course of action chosen by the adversary, the depth and width of the area available for the covering force battle, and the time required to prepare the positions in the MDA. It must have enough mobility and firepower that it can avoid decisive engagement and break contact from the adversary using its integral resources. The conduct of the covering force battle will depend upon the assigned tasks. If it must gain time to support the completion of the MDA, then it may be conducted as a delay battle.

5. **Battle Handover.** Forces in the MDA assume responsibility for the battle at the handover line. In planning and conducting the handover of a battle, a number of issues must be considered:

   a. As the covering force approaches the handover line, it may become necessary to increase the intensity of the fire support from the defence area to allow the covering force to disengage. Both direct and indirect fire assets from the main defence force will provide support to cover the redeployment of the covering force and to cover lanes in the obstacle barriers. This rearward passage of lines through the forward positions in the MDA must be carefully planned and coordinated, particularly if the covering force is to break clean and if friendly fire incidents are to be avoided.

   b. The covering force passes through the MDA forces as quickly as possible to minimize their vulnerability to adversary fire. Combat support and CSS resources of the covering force should move to the rear as early as possible to avoid hampering the movement of the combat forces.
c. In non-contiguous AOs, commanders must consider the partial redeployment of the covering force. Ground should only be yielded under pressure, and the requirement for information may dictate that elements of the covering force remain forward of the MDA.

763. MAIN DEFENSIVE BATTLE

1. **General.** The main defensive battle is fought in the MDA. Here, the effects of deep operations and covering forces, coupled with the efforts of rear operations, are combined with those of the main defence force to defeat the adversary. The aim of the main defence battle is to stop the adversary’s advance by a combination of firmly held battle positions within the MDA, together with the use of obstacles and reserves. Tactics in the MDA will vary and there can be no set course of action. Much of what occurs will depend upon a flexible plan incorporating the principles of mobile and/or area defence.

2. **Counter-reconnaissance.** Common to all defensive operations is the requirement to destroy or neutralize (e.g., by deception and the use of EW) adversary reconnaissance. Plans must be made for its early destruction in all sectors of the battlefield, but these plans must not result in the premature disclosure of key elements of the defence. Success against adversary reconnaissance will help maintain the security of reserves, achieve surprise in offensive action, and retain the integrity of fire support systems and command and logistic infrastructures. Measures that can be taken against adversary reconnaissance include:

   a. Use of the covering force to destroy or neutralize it as early as possible so that the dispositions in the MDA are not disclosed. This requires the coordination of surveillance and target acquisition systems with direct and indirect weapon systems.

   b. Protection of friendly dispositions through camouflage, concealment and defensive C2 warfare in order to deny information to the adversary. This is particularly important once adversary reconnaissance has penetrated the covering force. Adversary reconnaissance should be engaged within a framework of patrols and ambushes, forward of and between battle positions.

   c. The use of aviation may be considered if sufficient assets are available, although targets are likely to be dispersed and exposed only for short periods.

   d. Indirect fire can be effective in terms of neutralization and destruction, but it is more likely to be committed to larger and higher priority targets. Assets are likely to be limited and “unmasking” will jeopardize security. Special care needs to be taken to protect the security of reserves and high value targets (HVTs). Camouflage and deception measures should be employed, but critical reserves may require forces assigned to them specifically for protection against adversary reconnaissance.

   e. In the rear areas, there is a requirement to be diligent in seeking out and destroying reconnaissance elements. Reconnaissance and reserves may be used if they are not committed to other tasks.

   f. When adversary reconnaissance forces adopt unconventional tactics and blend with local populations, measures must be taken to counter this adversary.
Troops conducting static defence or framework patrols must watch for suspicious activities, monitor those with cellular telephones and conduct shadow patrols. Suspected individuals should be stopped and investigated, keeping in mind the need to avoid alienation of the local populace.

3. **Battle Handover.** Gaps or lanes in barriers that have been left for the redeployment of the covering force must be guarded and arrangements must be made to close them. Once the covering force has completed its handover of the battle to the main defence force, the commander must consider the subsequent employment of the covering force. He may decide to employ it immediately as his reserve, which will allow him to release his initial reserve for other tasks. It may be some time, however, before the covering force is ready for commitment. A more likely option, therefore, is to designate it as the formation reserve once it has been reconstituted. Much will depend upon how the main defence battle is progressing.

4. **Initial Actions.** Once the adversary has reached the MDA, he will try to find weak points and attempt to force a passage, possibly by a series of small-scale attacks. As the adversary attack begins to develop, the forward units will engage the adversary. As the battle progresses, the adversary advance may be slowed and he may become concentrated by the barriers and the battle positions, thus presenting good targets for defensive fire and offensive air support. The maximum weight of fire must be brought to bear at this stage of the battle.

5. **Conduct of the Battle.** The battle will be fought by the formation’s subordinate units using direct fire, indirect fire and manoeuvre against the assaulting adversary forces. The commitment of reserves must be controlled. The conduct of deep operations against echeloned adversary forces must be coordinated. The employment of engineers and of sustainment resources must be clearly defined.

6. **Penetration.** Undefended areas may be unavoidable between battle positions, but they must not be left where the probable main adversary effort is expected. They must be kept under surveillance, covered by fire, or where possible, blocked by barriers. These responsibilities must be clearly defined. If the adversary succeeds in penetrating the MDA, the defender must block the penetration immediately and destroy this adversary force as soon as possible, hence the need for reserves with battlefield mobility. Action may be extended in depth in order to counter adversary penetrations that cannot be stopped further forward. In a mobile defence the commander may allow penetration in a selected area in order to launch his striking force at the appropriate time and place. Any decision to redeploy must take into account the situation prevailing in adjacent defence areas.

764. **EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES**

1. **General.** Commanders must earmark mobile forces as reserves for offensive tasks, which are an integral part of the defence concept. If it becomes apparent in the course of the battle that the cohesion of the defence cannot be maintained, the next higher commander may assign additional reinforcing, blocking or counterattack forces from his own resources. Once a reserve force is committed, it must be reconstituted from other forces not in contact. The movement of reserves will be a priority target for the adversary and thus protection will be vital. Where the adversary air threat is particularly high, there will be a requirement for AD assets to be assigned to the security of reserves.
2. **Purpose.** The primary purpose of a reserve is to preserve the commander's freedom of action. The reserve is an uncommitted force, at least initially. It may have a series of contingencies, although a commander will not commit his reserve until he has a reasonable understanding of the adversary's intentions. If the commander must commit his reserve in order to counter an unexpected adversary action, then he must advise his superior commander who must then reconsider the employment of his reserve and the impact this will have on his superior commander's intent. Reserves are commonly used for:

a. **Counter-moves:**

   (1) **Reinforcement.** Forces that are engaged in combat are provided with additional combat power from the designated reserve unit or formation, or from any uncommitted forces.

   (2) **Blocking.** Blocking is the deployment of forces to stop the attacking force that has broken through the forward positions. The timing of the deployment of a blocking force will depend upon the way the adversary action develops, with particular regard to his strength, speed and direction of advance. This must be analyzed and related to the location and size of the blocking force available, its reaction time, and the time available to prepare blocking positions. Often, it is only by blocking that the adversary can be halted in preparation for a counterattack. Airmobile forces are often particularly suited to this role allowing an armoured reserve to be retained for the counterattack.

   (3) **Counterattack.** The counterattack exploits opportunities to strike the adversary at a decisive time and place in order to defeat him. The opportunity to launch a counterattack will be fleeting and therefore a commander and his forces must be mentally and physically prepared for the task. Its planning is a basic and essential part of the defence and it must be updated as the situation develops. Possible options in a counterattack include the cutting off or destruction of adversary units, recovery of lost ground, or any other action that seeks to restore a situation. Once the commander has decided that a counterattack can be mounted, he will launch it with the full force of all available resources necessary to ensure success.

b. **Spoiling Attacks.** A reserve may be employed in carrying out a spoiling attack with the intention of preventing or delaying adversary attacks. They are normally launched against adversary forces that are forming or assembling for an attack. Spoiling attacks are usually conducted against opportunity targets with the objective of destroying adversary personnel and equipment, not to secure terrain. The following basic considerations affect the use of the spoiling attack:

   (1) The commander should designate the size of the force to be employed and the acceptable risks.

   (2) Spoiling attacks should not be conducted if the loss or destruction of the force jeopardizes the ability of the reserve to accomplish its primary mission.
Land Operations

(3) Mobility of the force available for the spoiling attack should be equal to or exceed that of the adversary force.

(4) Deep operations may be necessary to ensure the success of the spoiling attack.

3. **Reserves in the Mobile Defence.** If the commander decides to conduct a mobile defence he will still need to designate a reserve. It may be called upon to carry out any of the above tasks in order to help the fixing forces shape the battlefield. Attack helicopters may be ideal for this role. The striking force is then committed to strike a decisive blow.

4. **Commitment of the Reserve.** The decision on how and when a reserve is to be committed is one of the most important a commander must make. Reserves should be located where they are best able to react when they are required. Routes may need to be planned and prepared to cover likely deployment options. The commander will designate his decision criteria to assure the timely commitment of his reserves. These will need to be updated as the battle progresses and the adversary's intentions become more apparent. When it is committed, the reserve action may well become the formation's main effort. The success of the reserve action is likely to depend upon its timely commitment, mass, surprise, speed and boldness.

**765. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE**

1. **Preparations.** Preparations for the defence should take place concurrently at all levels and include such important activities as:

   a. reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance within the formation's area of operations;

   b. planning and shaping the battlefield through the integration of natural and artificial obstacles;

   c. planning the coordination of direct and indirect fire support;

   d. deciding the employment of AD;

   e. establishing liaison between flanking and subordinate formations;

   f. continuous refinement of the plan by war-gaming, if time permits;

   g. rehearsals of all activities such as battle handover and counter-moves, if time permits; and

   h. production of intelligence in order to determine the time that the adversary will attack, his main effort, and locations of his C2 systems.

2. **Deep Operations and Shaping Operations.** Considerations:

   a. Throughout the battle, adversary forces in depth will be attacked to prevent or delay their deployment. Indeed, deep, close and rear operations will be fought simultaneously and there is a requirement, therefore, for the commander to assign priorities, particularly for combat support and CSS. Likewise, shaping, decisive and sustaining operations may be conducted simultaneously.
b. The commander must prevent the adversary from concentrating an unacceptable level of combat power at any given point by pre-emptive, systematic and sustained attacks on adversary echeloned forces. Adversary forces not yet in contact will be monitored throughout the commander's area of interest and engaged throughout the depth of his area of influence. In so doing, the commander intends not only to destroy and delay the adversary force, but also to disrupt the adversary commander's plan and seize the initiative. This attack on the adversary's forces in depth is complementary to both the covering force and main defence battles. Integration of the available combat support assets to conduct this disruption requires extensive and continuous coordination between air and ground commanders, but will yield a significant capability to see and strike deep targets, and is vital to the successful conduct of deep operations.

3. **Siting.** Battle positions should, whenever possible, be mutually supporting. They should be sited such that they are hidden from direct adversary observation and fire. The defender should avoid positions that are easily identifiable and easy to engage, such as forward edges of woods, isolated villages, and other obvious features. Battle positions should dominate the local area by direct fire. Such positions provide a framework for mobile forces operating between them.

4. **Strongpoints.** A strongpoint is a fortified battle position. It is essentially a concentration of direct fire weapons, particularly anti-armour, that cannot be easily overrun or bypassed. The adversary may defeat a strongpoint, but only with the expenditure of much time and overwhelming forces. It will be located on a terrain feature critical to the defence, or one that must be denied to the adversary and can be used to shape or contain the attacker. Extensive engineer support may be required in the preparation of strongpoints.

5. **Obstacles.** Whatever the form of defence, the skilful use of natural and artificial obstacles will be essential to success. Their purpose is to enhance the tactical commander's own plans by denying the adversary the freedom of manoeuvre he requires in order to gain and maintain the initiative. The integration of obstacles with firepower will be used to support the commander's manoeuvre plan and to shape and restrict the adversary's manoeuvre options. Artificial obstacles will be used to shape the battlefield. The principles to be observed are:

   a. Barrier control measures must be coordinated at all levels, but subordinate commanders will confirm detailed siting.

   b. Obstacles must complement and not dictate the design for battle. As such, the commander's intent for obstacles, that is, to fix, disrupt, turn or block, must be clearly enunciated.

   c. Wherever possible, obstacles must be covered by direct fire. When this is not achievable, observers able to call for indirect fire must at least cover them.

   d. Artificial obstacles must not hinder the ability of forces to operate. Counterattacks and the rearward passage of covering forces must be granted particular attention.
6. **Killing Zones.** Killing zones are designated by commanders at all levels based upon their mission and the analysis of the terrain and adversary. They are areas where the terrain, reinforced with artificial obstacles, allows the defender to fix and destroy adversary forces that have been forced to concentrate. As such, they are an integral part of the close, deep and rear battles, and their purpose and location must reflect the commander's plan and the ability of the terrain to support the shaping of the battlefield, the fixing of the adversary, and the concentration of the required combat power.

7. **Direct Fire Planning.** When planning the layout of a defensive position, direct fire weapons, particularly those that will defeat an adversary's armoured force, are the first to be considered and sited. The remainder of the defensive position is then built around them. The commander himself must coordinate the plan. The following points should be applied when siting direct fire assets:

   a. **Depth.** The various ranges in the family of direct fire weapons provide an opportunity to have depth in the killing zone with over-lapping arcs of fire. In addition, so the mobile systems may have multiple engagements against an attacking force that is not destroyed in the initial engagements, the anti-armour and support weapon plan should have depth deployment positions on all likely adversary approaches.

   b. **Mutual Support.** The anti-armour plan should ensure that a force attacking any position could be engaged with support weapon direct fire from adjacent and mutually supporting positions. Thus, the availability of positions for this mutual support should be a consideration in the selection of battle positions. Coordination of all weapon systems in battle positions is a constant requirement. Direct fire weapons are employed in pairs or groups to allow for mutual support in providing local protection, observation and covering fire, as well as to allow disengagement and movement. Note that the systems themselves do not have to be co-located, but the effects they achieve (e.g., beaten zone) should be paired.

   c. **Security.** In battalion and BG AOs, mobile direct fire support weapons normally operate outside of the company battle positions. They must therefore provide their own local protection and have the ability to react to an adversary. Although weapon systems have small crews, they do have good surveillance capabilities and good mobility. Hence, they not only enhance their own protection, but also contribute to the security of the AO and the forces within it. Direct fire weapon sections can be used to patrol or picket areas instead of reconnaissance troops. Their sighting systems, firepower and mobility will allow them to be used as screen, guard or cover forces. Furthermore, when not manning their battle positions, mobile direct fire systems should be held back in hides, on suitable notice-to-move footings.

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170 Direct fire weapons refer to support weapons, including anti-armour weapons. Within the contemporary operating environment (COE), direct fire weapons will engage a wide array of targets, and ideally, weapons with an anti-armour capability will also be able to provide other supporting fires, such as wall breaching.
d. **Integration of Direct Fire Weapons.** Direct fire weapons must be carefully integrated with all the other means of achieving the destructive effects against adversary forces. In this way, the integrated use of all weapon systems enhances the effectiveness of each to produce a greater net effect. For example, the combination of anti-armour weapons firing into killing zones, with minefields to canalize and inhibit movement, supported with artillery and mortars to keep the armour closed down and thus their observation restricted, coupled with smoke to further reduce their visibility, and with aviation to engage from unexpected approaches, enhanced by dismounted troops in defensive positions, produces a significantly better overall effectiveness than the employment of each system alone. It also degrades the adversary's ability to defeat our systems that would be vulnerable if employed alone. Short-range direct fire weapons should be integrated with other weapon systems in battle positions. Furthermore, direct fire weapons should be integrated into the surveillance and target acquisition plan both to contribute to observation capability and to receive information about the location, type and number of targets. Since direct fire weapons rely greatly upon their redeployment capability, the anti-armour plan should be coordinated with the barrier and movement plans to ensure they are compatible.

e. **Concentration.** The anti-armour plan should allow for the concentration of sufficient killing power at the locations and times that provide the greatest advantages. This must be accomplished without the adversary being able to detect and counter the concentration. A coordinated plan, secure communications, covered approaches, speed of movement, good drills and rapid dispersion are some of the requirements for effective concentration of direct fire systems. The uses of tank hunting patrols and of helicopter insertion of dismounted direct fire weapons are means of achieving concentrations at unexpected places or times. By concentrating selectively on one of the adversary's critical assets, such as his armoured personnel carriers, his engineer vehicles or his C2 vehicles, it is most likely that his cohesion will be degraded.

**SECTION 12**

**FORCES AND TASKS FOR THE DEFENCE**

766. **GENERAL**

1. The concept of the defence to be adopted will be influenced to a great extent by the type of combat forces, armoured or non-armoured, available. The adversary, the terrain and the weather may in themselves further dictate the number and type of forces to be used. Time may also be a major factor as non-armoured forces usually require more time than armoured forces to prepare defensive positions, and unless they are airmobile, more time to move between them.

767. **ARMOURED FORCES**

1. Where the majority of the forces available are armoured, the defence can be conducted with greater flexibility and full use can be made of mobility. Operations will include defence from selected positions, delaying actions and counterattacks, all of which can be conducted in
defensive sectors of greater depth and width than in a defence with non-armoured forces. Armoured combat troops have a high degree of protection from adversary fire, and consequently are capable of going into action rapidly and effectively even in a CBRN environment. This makes them highly suitable for use as reserves.

2. Armoured forces use defilade positions to strike the adversary in the flank, forcing him to canalize so that he may be destroyed by the full weight of the firepower of the defence. In addition, armoured troops can manoeuvre to delay the advance of strong adversary forces and then immediately change from a mobile to a more static form of action, or to conduct offensive action. Due to their importance in defence, armoured combat forces will always be primary targets for adversary air attacks. Skilful use of cover, concealment, dispersion and local air support can considerably reduce the effect of this threat, and wherever possible, AD forces should be assigned to cover operations by armoured units.

768. NON-ARMOURED FORCES

1. Non-armoured forces are capable of staging an effective defence only from prepared positions, therefore, will be employed primarily in a more static role. Their defensive positions should make the best use of barriers and be located where the terrain offers scope to employ the firepower and the full range of their anti-armour weapons. They are, therefore, particularly suitable for use in close country. The positions selected should be covered from observed fire for as long as possible, thus enabling them to retain their effectiveness. In most cases, they must be well supported by armoured and combat support resources.

769. ARMED AVIATION

1. Air manoeuvre in defensive operations is very similar in character to air manoeuvre in offensive operations. Helicopters have, however, an important role in defensive operations by causing early attrition of the adversary in the deep battle and by disrupting, delaying and shaping the adversary for the close battle. Helicopters can be effectively employed where a commander does not wish to irrevocably commit ground forces; forward of a reserved demolition or obstacle for example.

2. Armed aviation can be effective in closing gaps in a defence plan, possibly in conjunction with pre-planned joint fires prior to relief by ground forces. Helicopters are also able to counter adversary activity in the rear area, and in particular, airborne or airmobile forces. Some helicopters may be equipped for air-to-air combat. Provided weather and visibility conditions allow, their mobility, firepower and independence from the ground will make them a useful means for:

   a. operations against adversary penetration;
   b. containment of adversary attacks;
   c. support of counterattacks; and
   d. support of airmobile operations.
770. ARTILLERY

1. The artillery commander prepares and executes the fire plan in accordance with the mission and with his commander’s CONOPS, coordinating artillery fire with the operations of combat troops, helicopters, air support and with the barrier plan.

2. In view of its long ranges and the high flexibility of its fire, artillery is a powerful weapon to assist in neutralizing an adversary attack. In order to be fully effective, however, it must have the link to sensors that will acquire targets in-depth.

3. In defence, the tasks of artillery are:
   a. During all phases of the defence, give fire support to troops in contact.
   b. Attack adversary forces in depth before they can be committed to the main battle.
   c. To coordinate fire support to maximize combat power. Fire support will also be coordinated with influence activities.
   d. More specific tasks include:
      (1) support of the covering force;
      (2) disruption of adversary preparations for attack;
      (3) separation of attacking adversary tanks from dismounted infantry;
      (4) attacking adversary artillery and forward AD elements;
      (5) covering barriers, gaps and open areas;
      (6) neutralizing or isolating adversary forces that have penetrated the defensive area and impeding the movement of adversary reserves;
      (7) supporting counterattacking forces;
      (8) assisting in battlefield surveillance and target acquisition;
      (9) as a last resort, defending own gun positions by direct fire; and
      (10) the use of scatterable mines to block adversary approach routes.

771. AIR SUPPORT

1. Air ISTAR Operations. Air reconnaissance is extremely important in all phases of the defence, particularly during the early stages, to help determine the strength and direction of the adversary advance.
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2. **Counter-air Operations.** Counter-air operations are conducted to destroy, disrupt or limit adversary air power as close to its source as possible and to assist in reducing the air threat against friendly land forces. Ground forces may aid these operations by suppressing adversary forward air defences.

3. **Close Air Support.** Close air support (CAS) will be vital to a defending force, for both immediate threats and for those in depth. It is more economical and effective to locate and attack adversary forces while they are concentrated in depth preparing for an attack or advancing along LOC, than when they are deployed in the battle area. CAS, if properly planned however, allows the commander to concentrate fire rapidly on targets in depth and in proximity. As much pre-planning as possible should occur in order that commanders may determine and request the exact number of sorties required.

772. **SUPPORT HELICOPTERS**

1. In defence reconnaissance, utility and transport helicopters can support ground force operations through their employment in:
   a. airmobile operations;
   b. C2 tasks;
   c. reconnaissance and target acquisition missions; and
   d. logistic support, including casualty evacuation.

773. **AIR DEFENCE**

1. Priorities for the allocation of AD artillery resources will be based upon the commander’s estimate of the situation. In addition to airspace management, AD artillery will be required to protect important areas and points. It is normally used to cover the following:
   a. troops in forward areas;
   b. C2 facilities;
   c. supply facilities;
   d. critical assets and vital points;
   e. airfields;
   f. reserve forces; and
   g. demolitions.

774. **ENGINEERS**

1. There will seldom, if ever, be sufficient engineer resources to meet all the requirements of a defence plan. The commander must therefore establish priorities in accordance with the determination of his main effort, and apply his limited resources as necessary. Engineers will be assigned a wide range of tasks:
a. **Counter-mobility Tasks.** Counter-mobility tasks serve to disrupt, turn, fix or block adversary forces. They will be carried out in conjunction with combat forces and be coordinated with direct and indirect fire weapons to deny the adversary the mobility he requires and to cause casualties to his attacking forces. Counter-mobility measures must be covered by fire and closely coordinated with fire support assets. Counter-mobility tasks include:

1. **Barriers.** The maximum effect is obtained from barriers when as many minefields and other obstacles as possible are employed in combination, and when they are kept under surveillance and covered by fire. Barriers are likely to include the use of natural and man-made obstacles; they must be coordinated with host nation advisors when appropriate and comply with Host Nation Agreements. The barrier plan is part of the overall defence plan that will require continuous adjustment as barriers are improved and supplemented, as time permits, and as the battle proceeds. Barrier restricted areas may be declared in order to retain the required freedom of movement. The restriction may involve time, location or type of obstacle.

2. **Demolitions.** The system for the control of demolitions must be conducted in accordance with agreed standards and procedures. The number of reserved demolitions must be kept to a minimum, as they tie down large numbers of combat troops as demolition guards and engineers in firing parties.

b. **Survivability Tasks.** The avoidance of detection and destruction will require frequent movement and rapid terrain preparation (this includes digging and use of cover, concealment and camouflage to enhance survivability). Survivability can be enhanced by the use of concealment, deception, dispersion and fortification. Engineer protection or survivability tasks will include assistance to other arms in:

1. **Field Fortifications.** Engineer work in this area includes the use of equipment to assist in the preparation and construction of such fortifications as trenches, command post shelters, artillery fire positions, and anti-tank weapon and armoured combat vehicle positions. Additionally, fields of fire can be cleared for all weapon systems. Engineers also assist in the construction of strongpoints, which are heavily fortified positions that cannot be overrun quickly or bypassed easily by adversary forces.

2. **Protection of Combat Supplies.** Combat supplies should be protected in particular against blast, shrapnel, incendiaries and CBRN contamination. By giving advice to the logistic management on the selection of the most suitable storage sites, the requirements for engineer support can be considerably reduced.

3. **Camouflage, Concealment and Deception.** Major positions, facilities and operational sites may require special camouflage stores and measures that could be undertaken by engineers. Deception measures often include the use of camouflage, and special engineer deception.
measures can include the construction of dummy positions and decoys, which must be carefully planned and coordinated within the framework of the tactical plan and real positions.

c. **Mobility Tasks.** During preparations for defensive activities, engineers will reconnoitre, improve and open routes for use during battle, in preparation for the withdrawal of covering forces, the main body’s withdrawal, and for the use of reserve forces and counterattacks. During the main defensive battle itself, mobility tasks include:

(1) **Routes.** The maintenance and improvement of routes will be a major engineer task as the defensive position is subjected to fire from adversary artillery and air. This may necessitate the deployment well forward of assault bridging, trackway and engineer heavy equipment.

(2) **Minefield Gaps and Lanes.** Careful coordination will be necessary to ensure that the required lanes or gaps are left in minefields for the redeployment of troops.

(3) **Support to Countermoves.** Close support engineers will be required in support of offensive operations to overcome obstacles produced by the adversary.

(4) **Counterattacks.** Gaps must have been left in major obstacles for the passage of counterattack forces.

d. **Electronic Warfare.** EW has the following functions in support of defensive activities:

(1) Its primary function will be to continue gathering information on the adversary and to update information databases. EW resources will thus concentrate on the provision of vital information on the adversary’s:

(a) intentions;

(b) grouping, location, and axes of advance of its lead elements, main body, supporting artillery and engineer units, and forces in depth;

(c) CBRN delivery means; and

(d) AD systems.

(2) As the adversary closes to the MDA, jamming resources will be concentrated on the neutralization of adversary fire control, and target acquisition and intelligence gathering systems, while information-gathering resources continue to provide intelligence and steerage for own jamming systems.

(3) EW resources will also attempt to locate adversary jamming assets so they may be eliminated by physical destruction.
775. COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES IN THE DEFENCE

1. In planning the defensive operations, commanders should reconnoitre the area of responsibility or review the terrain analysis before he determines his CONOPS and plans the layout. Furthermore, he should maintain personal contact with his subordinates. In times of stress, a visit or a person-to-person conversation will do much to instil confidence and to impress the commander’s personality upon his command.

2. Close liaison and good communications are prerequisites to a successful defence. The following should be noted:
   a. Coordination points will be designated and liaison established at key levels.
   b. In coalition operations, it is particularly important that commanders of temporarily assigned units make personal contact with their superior commander as soon as the situation permits. Higher echelons must be prepared to provide communications detachments to subordinate HQs from other nations in order to provide a secure communications link.
   c. Before contact is made with the adversary, electronic emissions must be kept to a minimum. Forces not in contact with the adversary should be on radio silence. Nevertheless, alternative communications must be maintained at all levels.
   d. In situations in which there is an EW adversary, cable and radio relay communications are a vital means of communication. After adversary contact and the relaxation of radio silence, radio communications will become significant, but traffic should still be kept to a minimum.

3. The following control measures may be employed in defensive operations:
   a. boundaries and control lines, such as the handover line and phase lines;
   b. fire support coordination measures;
   c. airspace control measures;
   d. coordination points;
   e. barrier restricted areas;
   f. battle positions, blocking positions and assembly areas;
   g. killing zones; and
   h. controlled routes.
SECTION 13
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE DEFENCE

776. GENERAL

1. The CSS plan must be flexible. Particular points of note are:
   
   a. In the defence, it should be possible to preposition stocks and maintenance resources and to establish medical facilities beforehand, and it is from these resources that troops may be supported in the first days of combat. In this way, provision is made for supplies to be available in the event of a surprise adversary attack. Possible delay in establishing CSS due to the length of LOC may impose, upon commanders, a special responsibility to exercise economies until the resupply chain is established.
   
   b. CSS facilities are usually further to the rear than in offensive operations, both to avoid interfering with tactical operations and to obtain a degree of protection, although delivery should be as far forward as possible.
   
   c. Consideration must be given to the location and security of service support areas and traffic control within these areas.
   
   d. Planning must take into account the requirements of a transition to the offence. Mobility and flexibility in CSS operations must be maintained to support subsequent counterattack and other offensive operations.

777. SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. Specific consideration should be given to the following points:
   
   a. Rear area security and protection.
   
   b. The high consumption of ammunition, particularly artillery rounds, may necessitate special delivery programmes. Bulk ammunition should be delivered as far forward as possible.
   
   c. Fuel should be transported, as far as practicable, by pipeline, rail, and road tanker or by inland waterways.
   
   d. Repair should be conducted within defensive positions if possible, in order to minimize movement.
   
   e. The siting of medical resources, including evacuation facilities, should be as far forward as is practicable to ensure the rapid treatment and evacuation of casualties. However, to avoid collateral damage, they should not be located near to likely targets (e.g., other logistics installations).
   
   f. Coordination of CSS in multinational operations.
g. The location of supplies should emphasize dispersion, good access to supply routes, and stock levels, and should be conducive to resupply defensive operations.

h. The priority of supplies assists in allocating scarce transportation assets.

778. SUMMARY

1. The defence plan must be carefully conceived to ensure that the adversary’s attack can be halted and that an opportunity be found to seize the initiative and undertake offensive operations. The importance of cohesion to the overall effectiveness of the defence is particularly significant if the defence is to remain viable. The commander must be prepared to adjust the layout and the manoeuvre plan in order to meet changes in the adversary.

SECTION 14
THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE DELAY

779. PURPOSE AND CONCEPT OF THE DELAY

1. The delaying operation is: “an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged.” \[171\] It is usually conducted in advance of a defensive position in order to give the forces the needed time to prepare the position, mass forces, and to attrite the advancing adversary forces.

2. The delaying force commander is normally given a mission of imposing a stated amount of delay upon the adversary and/or a specific amount of attrition upon the adversary. He may also be ordered to preserve a specific portion of his own combat power. The delay will often end with a breaking of contact, a battle handover to an in-place defending force, and a rearward passage of lines.

3. The delay is likely to be carried out in less than ideal conditions. The air situation may well be unfavourable and the initiative will tend to be with the adversary. Nevertheless, in order to enhance the chances of success, every opportunity should be taken to initiate aggressive action, to seize the initiative from the adversary, and to force him to adopt a defensive posture. This type of operation is arguably the most difficult to conduct and needs to be thoroughly understood by all involved.

4. Delaying operations can be conducted independently or within other operations, principally as a prelude to a defensive battle. A covering force can conduct a delay. It is also possible that enabling activities will be involved, the most likely being a withdrawal and a rearward passage of lines. It is also conceivable that other enabling activities, such as a meeting engagement, could occur.

5. A delaying operation is likely to be conducted in one of the following circumstances:

\[171\] NATO AAP-6.
Land Operations

a. as a covering force for defending or withdrawing main bodies;
b. the advance guard or covering force when encountering superior forces;
c. an economy of force operation conducted to hold an adversary attack on a less critical avenue of approach;
d. a deception measure to set up a counterattack; and
e. as part of a mobile defence.

780. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN THE DELAY

1. In a delay, a commander attempts to inflict heavy losses on the adversary while preserving the combat power of his own forces. No decision is sought, as the commander is attempting to gain time. In doing so, he must always determine whether the time to be gained justifies the reduction of his combat power. The following principles of war are of particular concern in the delay:

a. **Offensive Action.** In order to force the adversary to deploy, to delay him and to attrite him, offensive action must be taken. It will be required not only to force the adversary to deploy, but likely will be required to disengage with the adversary and to cover the withdrawal to subsequent battle positions. The delaying force should create and seize opportunities for offensive action. Adversary forces that overreach themselves or expose a flank are particularly vulnerable. Limited attacks are undertaken when losses or damage can be inflicted on the adversary with low risk.

b. **Security.** The commander must preserve his force throughout the delay, firstly in order to be capable of causing the required attrition and delay, and secondly, retain sufficient combat power to fulfil subsequent tasks following the force’s handover and withdrawal. Thus, security of his force will be a constant concern, and measures and precautions must be constantly taken to ensure that the force can break contact and avoid envelopment by the advancing adversary.

781. FUNDAMENTALS OF DELAY OPERATIONS

1. In addition to the principles of war that merit special consideration, there are several fundamental elements that must be applied in the planning and conduct of a delay:

a. **Manoeuvre.** A delaying force uses manoeuvre so that maximum fire can be applied at long range to surprise and confuse the adversary and to make him pause and deploy. Such fire imposes caution and causes casualties without revealing the disposition of the delaying forces. A delaying force also uses manoeuvre to disengage and move to new positions when the adversary concentrates superior combat power.

b. **Balance.** The force must be organized so that it can deal with unexpected situations. This requires a judicious balance amongst those troops maintaining surveillance, conducting reconnaissance, engaging and delaying the adversary, withdrawing to new delay positions, and acting as reserves.
c. **Maintenance of Contact.** A delaying force must maintain contact with the adversary to avoid surprise, estimate his rate of advance and determine his main point of effort. This can be done by reconnaissance forces, or by target acquisition means giving real-time information “feeds,” such as unmanned aerial vehicles.

d. **Use of Terrain.** A delaying force must use the terrain to enhance its engagement, add to its security, and cause the adversary to conduct time-consuming and costly operations in order to advance. The terrain selected should have natural or easily improved obstacles that can be used to canalize the adversary or slow him down. It should also offer good observation and fields of fire and allow easy disengagement.

e. **Time and Space.** A commander should know either the minimum length of time that he must delay based upon the requirement of friendly forces to prepare positions, the percentage of adversary forces that must be destroyed, or the percentage of his force that he must preserve based upon his subsequent tasks. The area allocated must have sufficient depth to allow for the conduct of delaying operations; otherwise, the duration of the delay must be shortened, the strength of the force increased, or risk decisive engagement with the high potential for losses. A lack of sufficient manoeuvre space may cause the delaying force to become decisively engaged.

f. **Security and Protection.** Security and protection are vital to preserve the force to allow it to meet its task. They are achieved through concealment, camouflage, deception, COMSEC, EW, CI, and the protection of bridges, crossing sites and critical points along axis required for rearward movements.

782. **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE DELAY**

1. The delay does not fit neatly into a series of stages. Rather, it comprises a series of coordinated offensive and defensive actions, each being broken off when the adversary presses too hard and close to the point where the delaying forces are at risk of being decisively engaged. Forces manoeuvring to engage the adversary from previously selected positions in depth, and then disengaging and moving to the next position before the adversary can concentrate sufficient combat power to overrun or bypass friendly forces, fight the action. High tempo is particularly significant in delaying actions. The delaying action ends with the final disengagement and breaking of contact by the delaying force at the handover line. An in-place force may have to assist in achieving disengagement.

2. In a delaying operation, a commander faces several conflicting requirements. He attempts to inflict heavy losses on the adversary, but seeks to preserve the combat power of his own forces. He attempts to gain time, but seeks to avoid decisive engagement. He must constantly determine whether the time to be gained justifies the reduction of his combat power. To make these decisions, he must be told either the minimum length of time that he must delay the adversary, or the percentage of his force that he must preserve based upon his subsequent tasks. As stated previously, the area allocated must have sufficient depth to allow delaying operations to be conducted; otherwise, the duration of the delaying operation must be shortened, the strength of the force increased, or risk decisive engagement with the high potential for losses.
3. A delaying operation is conducted by a combination of defensive and offensive action. Initially, a commander establishes contact with the adversary across the front using reconnaissance elements. At the same time, he prepares a series of delay positions in depth to the extent that time permits. Depending upon the mission, forces occupying the delaying positions should be sufficiently strong in combat power to mislead the adversary into believing that he has encountered the battle positions of a MDA and must be sufficiently strong to cause the desired delay. In the selection of delaying positions and the organization of the delaying force, the commander will consider creating opportunities for offensive action.

4. The delay is conducted through a series of successive battle positions sited to be mutually supporting. As the adversary pushes the reconnaissance elements back, he is engaged with maximum fire at long range from elements of the delaying force that manoeuvre in the first line of delay positions. This fire is applied to surprise and confuse the adversary, to make him pause and deploy, to impose caution and cause casualties, and to compel him to make time-consuming and costly preparations for an attack. While the adversary is engaged at long range, other elements of the delaying force may conduct countermoves, especially against forces that have overreached themselves or exposed a flank. Limited attacks are undertaken when losses can be inflicted on the adversary at low risk.

5. When a decisive engagement is imminent, the commander manoeuvres to disengage or to fight his way back to the next line of delay positions. Contact is re-assumed by the reconnaissance elements, which in the meantime have been repositioned for the task, or is maintained by the forces fighting their way back. Contact must be maintained in order to avoid surprise, to estimate the adversary's rate of advance, and to determine his main effort. Crossing sites, particularly bridges, and other critical points along routes or axis required for rearward movement should be protected.

6. The same general sequence of activity is repeated until the mission is accomplished. At the handover line, the delaying force attempts to break contact and the in-place force assumes responsibility for dealing with the adversary. The in-place force must site itself and task forces to assist with the delaying force's breaking of contact.

783. ORGANIZATION OF THE TERRAIN

1. In the delay, the delineation of the AO is similar to that of the defence. The difference is the fact that the rear boundary is defined by a handover line where responsibility for the adversary is passed to another force. Unit and formation frontages will tend to be larger than in the defence. The commander of the delaying force has to decide which parts of the assigned AO he will use, which parts he may abandon earlier than others, and which ones need only be monitored.

2. Flank boundaries between elements of the delaying force must be clearly delineated, but elements of the force must be prepared to give mutual support across boundaries. The delay and the terrain over which it will occur will be broken into a number of battle positions from which the engagements will occur. The battle positions will be manned on order and will act as the key control measure for the conduct. They must be mutually supporting. Ideally, commanders will have time to reconnoitre the battle positions beforehand and plan each engagement and disengagement in detail.

3. A delaying force will not only make use of the depth of the area assigned but it will also attack the adversary in his depth. If there is no opportunity to attack the adversary's flank or rear, it may be sufficient to position combat troops so that they can engage the adversary along
his most likely approaches. Gaps must be kept under surveillance and provision must be made for quick reaction, should the adversary decide to utilize them for his advance.

784. DELAY TACTICS

1. The commander must take into account that he may not always have a clear picture of the adversary and that the situation may change frequently and rapidly. He must therefore ensure that he has a continuous flow of sound and timely intelligence, well-organized reconnaissance, uninterrupted communications and a strong reserve. By these means, the commander can ensure that he maintains his freedom of action. He must utilize the forces and means available to him in such a way that the adversary is repeatedly faced with unexpected situations. This requires flexibility and agility, as well as strong reliance upon the subordinate commanders’ capabilities to determine on the spot the most suitable action to be taken. Combat troops will normally conduct the delay by a combination of techniques, both offensive and defensive.

2. The commander will employ a range tactics to impose delay upon the adversary and preserve his own forces, including the following:
   a. To slow down the adversary's advance by inflicting casualties, which reduce his offensive capability, in order to gain time for subsequent operations.
   b. To manoeuvre the adversary into areas where he is vulnerable to attacks/counterattacks, thereby gaining the initiative.
   c. To avoid combat under undesirable conditions.
   d. To determine the adversary's main effort.

3. The tactical plan must focus on control measures and the effects to be imposed upon the adversary, be it delay, attrition or both. The plan must include a clearly articulated intent, a detailed CONOPS, measures to be taken to cover gaps and flanks, and detailed control and coordination measures. While a main effort is designated, it may change during the delay depending upon the adversary’s intentions.

SECTION 15
PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE DELAY

785. PLANNING

1. Before a commander can make his estimate of the situation for a delay he must be very clear of the intention of his superior commander and what he wishes to achieve by deploying the delaying force. Once this is understood he will make his estimate of the situation, develop his CONOPS and prepare his plan to cover the entire action from initial deployment to its termination. The CONOPS and the plan will pay particular attention to:
   a. **Tasks.** The allocation of tasks to the forces available. In the delay, tasks must reflect the integral firepower and mobility of the forces considered.
   b. **Phasing.** The separation of the activity into phases, all parts of which must be completed before another phase can start, where this is necessary. Indiscriminate use of phasing can unnecessarily slow operations.
c. **Terrain.** The selection of battle positions from which to delay the adversary will be key to success. The terrain must be selected in order to maximize the long-range fires and mobility of the delaying elements and to restrict the mobility of the adversary (e.g., natural choke points, defiles, etc.). Selected terrain should also facilitate an easy break and withdrawal for the delaying forces.

d. **Barriers.** Planning should exploit natural barriers and select best positions for artificial barriers that will achieve maximum benefit with the least amount of required work.

e. **Fire Support.** The use of long-range fire to inflict early casualties on the adversary and avoid decisive engagement.

f. **Covering of Gaps.** Gaps are a feature of operations. However, commanders must be aware of their existence and plan to ensure that they do not pose an unnecessary threat.

g. **Flank Security and Protection.** Flank security and protection will be a constant concern for delaying forces. The commander must try to select positions that offer natural flank protection, or establish as a minimum, flank security that will allow early enough notification to allow withdrawal. Flank protection may be essential to maintain the battle positions that will impose the required amount of delay upon the adversary.

h. **Deployment in Depth.** The force must also be deployed in-depth to counter penetration between the forward units, and to guard against airborne or helicopter-borne assaults on defiles and reserved routes.

i. **Control of Fire and Movement.** Report and phase lines are used to control the movement of forces. Orders can be given to fill any gaps or to adjust the lines should there be a danger of a breakthrough.

j. **Coordination.** Careful coordination between adjacent units, including measures to avoid fratricide.

k. **Demolition Control.** The need to carry out demolitions early can hamper the deployment of friendly forces. It is, therefore, essential that the planning, particularly for preliminary demolitions, minefield gaps and reserved demolitions, is closely coordinated with movement and manoeuvre.

l. **Denial Measures.** The denial plan will be closely coordinated with host nation authorities.

m. **Surveillance.** The maintenance of surveillance coverage of the entire area of intelligence responsibility is normally a considerable undertaking that encompasses imagery, EW and all human collection resources. It requires careful planning and coordination.

n. **Combat Service Support.** The support of highly mobile operations conducted over considerable distances requires foresight and flexibility.
2. The amount of delay to be ordered will depend upon the commander's estimate of the situation, the requirements for the main defensive position, and the overall objectives and aims. The duration of the delay to be obtained is then laid down in the mission.

3. Additionally, or in place of a delay time, the mission may entail a certain percentage of destruction that must be imposed upon the adversary as part of the delay operation.

SECTION 16
FORCES AND TASKS

786. GENERAL

1. Given the nature of the delay, the forces best suited to delay operations will be those that possess integral firepower, protection and mobility. In selecting and grouping the delay force, the balance between these characteristics will depend upon the type of adversary to be delayed and the terrain. It will likely require some sort of all-arms grouping with integral long-range fire support and CSS assets.

2. All commanders to the lowest level possible will benefit greatly from detailed reconnaissance of the route to be used and the assigned battle positions from which the delay will be imposed. Rehearsals will be essential, as will close coordination, particularly for all arms groups not accustomed to working together.

787. EMPLOYMENT OF MANOEUVRE FORCES

1. Armoured Forces. Forces composed of tanks, armoured infantry and armoured reconnaissance elements are highly suitable for delaying operations in most types of terrain. Their firepower permits them to engage the adversary effectively at long ranges; their mobility permits them to move quickly between successive positions or to a flank, while the protection afforded by their vehicles facilitates disengagement. Similarly, their mobility, firepower and superior communications give them the capability of launching counterattacks when opportunities exist.

2. Mechanized or Light Armoured Forces. Mechanized or light armoured forces will be suitable for delay operations depending upon the adversary faced and the terrain. Their employment characteristics and CONOPS will be similar to the employment of armoured forces in the delay; however, they will likely hold their vehicles, depending upon the type of vehicle, to the rear of their battle positions in order that they do not lose them to adversary direct fire. They may be forced to engage for shorter periods of time in order to ensure a successful withdrawal from battle positions. They will likely require extensive barrier plans and intimate support from armed aviation.

3. Non-armoured Forces. Non-armoured combat forces only have a limited capability to carry out delaying operations except in broken, close or built-up terrain with extensive use of barriers. They will fight from a succession of suitably prepared defensive positions, in each case forcing the adversary to deploy for a coordinated attack before they withdraw to their next position. Their lack of protection will demand greater attention to the operations of disengagement and movement between positions, which should be carried out under cover of fire support and using routes that are concealed from the adversary. Similarly, non-armoured troops are not particularly suitable for conducting a fighting withdrawal. However, such an
activity is feasible against a dismounted adversary in close terrain, which offers cover for movement and is favourable for ambushes and raids. Non-armoured forces can also participate in stay-behind operations.

4. **Airmobile Forces.** Airmobile forces can be employed in delaying operations although they face the same restrictions and problems as other non-armoured forces. They are capable, however, of rapid deployment and redeployment, permitting quick concentration of combat power at key locations. Similarly, they are capable of rapid dispersal to reduce vulnerability. They can also be used as a reserve force to permit the commander to commit a larger part of his other forces to the operation, as well as acting as flank protection. The selection and reconnaissance of landing and pick-up sites will be essential to their employment.

5. **Airborne Forces.** Airborne forces have a more limited capability in delaying operations than airmobile forces because of their lack of mobility and firepower once on the ground and the need for assistance in extrication. They can, however, be employed in area interdiction operations with the aim of preventing or hindering adversary operations in a specific area. Terrain that is heavily wooded, hilly or dominated by a river or other obstacles, and which hinders the adversary's off-road mobility, is best suited to this type of operation.

6. **Armed/Attack Aviation.** Air manoeuvre in delaying operations is very similar in character to air manoeuvre in offensive operations. Helicopters play an important role by disrupting the adversary's progress through the use of rolling ambushes that produce a fluid and mobile defence throughout the adversary's depth, which will delay and shape the adversary for the close battle. Armoured attack helicopters can effectively support delaying ground forces by engaging adversary armour, preferably from the flanks or long range. They may be used to achieve rapid deployment of the anti-armour defence, including deep attacks to cover the disengagement of combat forces and to achieve surprise. Helicopters can also be effectively employed where a commander does not wish to irrevocably commit ground forces to the delay, such as forward of a reserve demolition or obstacle.

### 788. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES

1. **Artillery.** Considerations:
   a. Artillery can make a major contribution to delaying operations by striking the adversary with concentrated fire at maximum range. Its capability to defeat a wide variety of targets in a short time and to deliver scatterable minefields should not only be used to inflict casualties and weaken the adversary's offensive capabilities, but also to create situations which permit aggressive manoeuvre of combat forces. Interdiction fire against follow-on forces can restrict the immediate battle to the adversary's committed forces.
   b. Artillery will be key to allowing delaying forces to break contact with the advancing adversary and to break clean at the handover line.
   c. By providing immediate and accurate support, the artillery can halt the leading elements of an adversary attack, and by delivering suppressive fire during the disengagement of friendly forces, it can prevent the adversary from closing with the delaying force.
d. The artillery must be organized and positioned so that it can provide uninterrupted fire support throughout the delaying operation.

2. Air. Air operations contribute to overcoming the adversary's initial advantage in freedom of action in the following ways:

   a. **ISTAR.** ISTAR operations contribute to identifying the adversary’s strength and disposition at an early stage, allowing the commander to concentrate his forces in favourable positions.

   b. **Counter-air Operations.** It may be necessary to gain local air superiority to enable delaying forces to move.

   c. **Interdiction and Close Air Support.** Interdiction and CAS, particularly at defiles and crossings, can delay, destroy or neutralize adversary follow-on forces on their approach routes, and thereby assist in gaining time to defeat the adversary's leading elements. Often, it is only through the employment of aircraft that adversary penetration through an area or gaps can be delayed until ground forces can be moved to engage them. CAS in certain situations will make it possible to create an additional concentration of fire. In this, as with all forms of tactical air support, close cooperation with all airspace users must be assured. CAS will also assist in the breaking of contact as forces prepare to abandon a battle position.

   d. **Aviation.** Armed or attack aviation can provide intimate support to ground manoeuvre forces and be key to the destruction of lead adversary armour and other forces. Reconnaissance, utility and transport helicopters can play an important part in delaying operations by:

      (1) providing command, control and communications facilities;

      (2) providing reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition;

      (3) moving demolition guards, firing parties and barrier munitions;

      (4) lifting non-mechanized infantry, particularly before the delaying activity and during their disengagement;

      (5) laying scatterable mines;

      (6) evacuating casualties; and

      (7) moving supplies, spare parts and maintenance working parties.

3. **Air Defence.** Delaying activities are likely to be conducted in conditions of an air threat. Good coordination and close liaison between manoeuvre and AD forces is the key for successful protection against attacks during delaying operations. Movement through choke points and the reception of the delaying force are critical. Detailed planning is required to ensure the timely provision of AD for these actions. There are unlikely to be sufficient AD resources available to provide adequate cover throughout the AO. Priorities of tasks, therefore, must be established and redeployment planned to ensure there is effective AD at critical times and points.
4. **Engineers.** Considerations:
   
a. Engineers support delaying operations primarily by preparing barriers including minefields and demolitions. Situational minefields with a predetermined effective time in combination with anti-tank weapons contribute decisively to reducing the adversary's offensive potential. Difficult terrain may make it necessary to give some priority to improving and maintaining routes for the manoeuvre of the delaying force.

b. Engineers are employed on request of the combat forces. They should be given the maximum time to plan and accomplish their tasks.

c. The responsibility for barriers must be carefully laid down in orders to include the detailed arrangements for their security and closure. All delaying forces must know which gaps through barriers and crossing sites will be kept open for their use, and the commander responsible for the closure must be clearly designated.

d. Engineers will also be required to give advice and help in the preparation of defensive positions and in the clearance of fields of fire, particularly in built-up areas.

e. Armoured engineers should move with the troops closest to the adversary to undertake route denial, fire demolitions, and lay or scatter mines.

5. **Electronic Warfare.** The delaying force should employ EW resources to disrupt and confuse the advancing adversary; using jamming and deception against reconnaissance elements, command nets and fire control nets. These actions should be carried out in all phases of a delay and they may greatly assist in supporting disengagement, counterattacks and relief of forces. EW resources will continue to provide information on the adversary.

789. **COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES**

1. In spite of the adverse characteristics of a delaying operation, the frequent and fast manoeuvre of troops, the frequently changing types of combat, the unclear air situation, and at least the initial freedom of action of the adversary, the commander must focus on the superior commander's intent and planned end state. To this end, the following must be noted:
   
a. The commander must command his forces so as to maintain a coherent, cohesive operation. This will require continuous direction to restore critical situations and to try to gain the initiative. Good communications will be essential.

b. There is a requirement for centralized, coordinated planning, but decentralized control of the execution.

c. Arrangements must be made by the formations in the rear for the control of the movement back from the handover line by the delaying elements.

2. The following control measures may be employed in delay operations:
   
a. boundaries and control lines, such as handover lines and phase lines;
b. fire support coordination measures;
c. air space coordination measures;
d. movement control measures, such as routes and check points;
e. barrier coordination measures;
f. battle positions, blocking positions and assembly areas for reserves;
g. objectives;
h. timings;
i. liaison measures; and
j. denial measures.

790. EXECUTION OF THE DELAY

1. **Reconnaissance.** The delaying force requires timely and continuous information about the adversary. This necessitates the employment of reconnaissance elements that immediately establishes and maintains contact. These elements should be of sufficient strength that they cannot be easily brushed aside by the adversary, and that it can provide security through the conduct of counter-reconnaissance. At the start of hostilities, these forces may be the only elements on the ground that can provide accurate information to identify adversary activities. As the battle develops, a part of the reconnaissance element may be used to provide security and protection of flanks and the gaps between the main elements of the delaying force.

2. **Conduct.** The delay should be executed along the following lines:
   
a. At the earliest opportunity, the delaying force will engage the adversary, inflicting casualties by providing maximum fire in combination with mobile actions, including quick and limited counterattacks against adversary troops who have overextended themselves or have exposed an open flank. Opportunities are most likely to occur when the adversary has just crossed an obstacle or is temporarily separated from his follow-up troops.

b. Every advantage offered by the terrain should be exploited. The rapid advance of the adversary, particularly along roads, should be impeded, causing him to bunch and offer himself as target. Every opportunity must be taken to surprise him and to ambush him, avoiding becoming decisively engaged, by timely manoeuvre.

c. Even if elements of the delaying force are in danger of being overrun, or seriously outflanked, they will not disengage unless ordered or unless it is in accordance with the commander’s intent. However, it is an important responsibility of the commander, through timely disengagement, to prevent parts of his force from being cut off and destroyed.

d. The fluid situation prevailing during delaying operations will necessitate constant and close coordination between adjacent units to ensure that:
Land Operations

(1) positions and manoeuvre of own troops is known;
(2) mutual support of fire is possible;
(3) beginning and end of specific operations are known; and
(4) awareness of the situation and probable intention of the adversary are known.

3. **Disengagement.** Troops withdrawing from a position must attempt to break contact with the adversary. Withdrawing through a position occupied by another unit, or suddenly breaking off the engagement when the adversary is unable to immediately follow-up, can achieve this. The important decision is to judge the correct moment when to withdraw from each position. The withdrawal must not occur too early, as it would result in a failure to achieve maximum delay; and not too late to risk unnecessary casualties or of being overrun. Counterattacks may be necessary to achieve disengagement.

4. **Breaking Contact.** The final disengagement from the adversary will be the complete breaking of contact to occur upon the move of the delaying force into an area where another force takes over responsibility. This is a critical operation, especially if the delaying force experiences difficulty in breaking clean from the adversary. The overall commander will specify a handover line. If a defence is following the delaying operation, elements from the defending force may have to be deployed to assist the delay force in breaking contact. The adversary should be given as little indication as possible of the intention to break contact. The move back into the MDA must be planned and coordinated in detail as a rearward passage of lines. The withdrawing force must provide timely information to in-place force on its planned withdrawal and on the battle situation. Liaison elements will be detached to the in-place force to identify withdrawing units as they approach and pass through.

5. **Employment of Reserves.** Reserves are important for the maintenance of the cohesion and continuity of delaying operations, particularly where the adversary has been able to outflank or to penetrate through gaps between delaying force elements. In order to maintain flexibility over varying terrain, it will often be necessary to establish local reserves rather than relying upon one concentrated reserve force. At a lower level, reserves will be minimal or simply consist of the employment of an element of the force that is not actively engaged. At higher echelons, forces may be specifically designated as reserves. Tasks for reserves may include:
   
a. **Blocking.** Containing the adversary in the area where insufficient forces have previously been deployed.

b. **Counterattacks.** Normally, these will have limited objectives. It may be necessary to use reserves to counterattack into gaps or to achieve the disengagement of heavily committed forces.

c. **Covering Actions.** Reserves may also be used in prepared positions to cover withdrawing forces to enable them to continue the engagement in more favourable terrain.
791. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE DELAY

1. CSS considerations for delaying operations are similar to those for the defence and include the following:

   a. Support elements and stocks should be echeloned rearward on successive positions; whenever possible, supplies should be kept mobile. Careful consideration should be given to the OPLAN before stocks are deployed in pre-positioned dumps.

   b. The evacuation of supplies and equipment that have been pre-positioned should be planned as early as possible; those, which cannot be moved, should be destroyed. Medical support must provide for the rapid evacuation of casualties to rear area medical facilities. Medical supplies and equipment, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, must be marked as such and left in place if they cannot be evacuated.

   c. Maintenance should be concentrated on the equipment required to conduct delaying operations and withdrawal. Unserviceable equipment that cannot be repaired immediately should be evacuated to rear areas. Recovery vehicles should be positioned at critical locations to keep routes open.

   d. Transportation priorities should be given to the movement of combat troops and their supplies, the movement of material used to impede the adversary, and the evacuation of casualties and repairable equipment.

2. A major consideration is to sequence and coordinate the movement of CSS to ensure that the delaying force has continuity of support. After crossing the handover line the delaying force will often need to be refurbished.

792. SUMMARY

1. To delay is a common tactic to gain time. It is a difficult operation to undertake, particularly over a wide area with limited assets available to carry it out. Every opportunity must be taken, however, to seize the initiative from the adversary and to force him to proceed with caution and endure attrition, thus slowing him and achieving the time required to prepare the main defensive position.

SECTION 17
STABILITY OPERATIONS

793. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE

1. Stability operations are defined as “tactical operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved.”

172 Army Terminology Panel approved October 2005.
2. The fundamental premise underpinning the continuum of operations (see Chapter 3) is that military forces are likely to be simultaneously engaged in a range of tactical activities—offensive, defensive, and stability. Together, they constitute the range of military tactical operations that will be conducted by military forces within a campaign.

3. Long term security and stability are impossible without meeting the immediate needs of local populations, such as the provision of essential services, humanitarian aid and responsible governmental institutions. Thus, there is an enormous role for other elements of the JIMP framework to assume these lines of operations on the path to operational and strategic objectives and end states. This will involve a combination of governments, regional organizations, multilateral bodies, international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There is therefore the requirement for these disparate organizations to define responsibilities, to develop a shared understanding, reduce redundancy, maximize resources and synchronize activities, all within a single campaign, to achieve a strategic objective and end state. In short, they must be linked by a unifying theme. The application of an effects-based approach at all planning levels will identify the operational objectives, the effects through which they are realized, and the tactical tasks needed to create those effects.

4. Multi-agency involvement in campaigns is impossible without adequate security and the provision of a permissive environment for their operation and freedom to work. A lack of security will hamper and even preclude the activities of those lines of operation conducted by other agencies: humanitarian work; infrastructure reconstruction and development; economic development; and governmental development. This required security is provided by military operations.

5. The purpose of stability operations\textsuperscript{173} is to establish and maintain the conditions for normal civic activity and responsible government. It provides the security and control over areas to allow this development and the freedom of manoeuvre for other elements of the JIMP framework to bring lasting security, particularly for local governments and populations. The security and control provide freedom of manoeuvre for a local populace so that normal civil activities such as local markets may take place.

6. In certain campaigns or at the early stages of many campaigns, the military may be the only organization capable of operating in the security environment. Yet the need for reconstruction, humanitarian aid, policing and other such activities will exist. Thus, the military may have to assume initial tactical responsibility, with their existing organization, for some lines of operation that are best conducted by civilian organizations. It is therefore essential that such situations are planned, force packaged, trained for in advance, and coordinated with other agencies so that initial military efforts are complementary to longer term plans.

7. In due course, these responsibilities should be assumed by other elements of the JIMP framework best suited to conduct them. Even if military forces first initiate these lines of operation and constituent activities, their planning and design should be done in conjunction with those other agencies that will eventually assume responsibility for them. This will ensure a unifying theme and overall guidance, and allow the initial military efforts to be complementary to later efforts by other JIMP elements.

\textsuperscript{173} It must be remembered that the term “stability operations” does not describe a campaign theme. It is, however, the group of tactical operations that will predominate in such campaigns as peace support and counter-insurgency. Even during major combat operations, there will be a requirement to undertake some stability operations.
8. Stability activities will create effects on the moral and physical planes. The delivery of humanitarian aid, the reconstruction of essential services and the provision of public safety through framework patrols will not only create physical effects, but will improve the confidence and security of the populace, and thus their acceptance of the military forces and their mission.

9. Stability operations and their associated tactical activities will play a role in all campaign themes, even in major combat. For example, following a major offensive, there will be a need to establish security for a local civilian populace, stop any looting and provide emergency humanitarian relief. The import and emphasis placed upon stability operations will vary with the campaign and within each campaign. Stability operations will drive the predominant tactical activities within the campaign themes short of major combat.

10. The military should be engaged at all levels at the earliest stage possible of both the planning and conduct of the campaign in order to ensure that a security vacuum is not allowed to develop. Therefore, at the tactical level the military must, in cooperation with other agencies, conduct planning to ensure that security is enforced and maintained through a balance of tactical activities relevant to the adversary. Failure to do this opens a window of opportunity for destabilizing elements to disrupt progress towards the strategic end state that underpins the campaign.

11. The development and maintenance of a safe, secure and stable environment remains the underlying reason to conduct stability operations.

794. STABILITY OPERATIONS—TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

1. A comprehensive approach will be applied to campaigns to include all elements of the JIMP framework, working within a unifying theme, to consider and address the full range of influences and factors in a destabilized environment. The military strategic end state is likely to aim to promote and maintain a safe and secure environment. Stability operations are conducted throughout all campaigns in conjunction with offensive and defensive operations. In achieving order, security and control, the range of operations is likely to involve both coercive and cooperative actions.

2. Stability operations include a wide range of tactical activities. The chief activity relates to security and control so that the military and other agencies may freely operate and undertake additional activities, and so that civilian populaces and local governments are free to undertake the normal activities of a civic society. It will allow the other instruments of power—diplomatic and economic—to predominate. In short, the tactical activities all seek to set the conditions for good governance and long-term stability.

3. Stability operations consist of the following tactical activities:

   a. Security and Control. The provision of general security and control allows the civilian populace and other elements of the JIMP framework the freedom and safety to conduct normal civic activities and to build institutions that support a lasting stability.

   b. Support to Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration. This activity, referred to as DDR, involves the standing down of former combat forces and their reintegration to civil society or a newly structured military force. It will require the involvement of a range of agencies and ideally will include
programmes to avoid the creation of a large mass of unemployed, possibly embittered, former soldiers. Military forces will have a key role in assisting and securing the process. It is important to note that the DDR process may only apply to a portion of a military (e.g., conscripts), while the remainder may undergo security sector reform (SSR).

c. **Support to Security Sector Reform.** SSR is a key aspect for the long-term stability and development of a nation. It is the reformation of the various elements of a nation’s security sector, and like DDR, will involve a multi-agency approach with other governmental and international agencies dealing with the judiciary and police forces. The military will have a key role in reforming/developing the nation’s military capabilities.

d. **Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance.** Ideally, the reconstruction of essential services and the provision of governance will fall to JIMP agencies other than the military. In the early stages of a campaign, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves. Additionally though, the military may wish to pursue some of these tasks, particularly on the tactical levels, in order to engender ongoing support from local populaces, that is, create effects on the moral plane.

e. **Assistance to Other Agencies.** At times, military forces may choose to, or be required to, provide assistance to other agencies. These are likely to be “P” elements of the JIMP framework, to include NGOs, public volunteer organizations (PVOs), and international commercial organizations. The provision of such assistance should be done with the aim of creating desired effects on both the physical and moral planes.

4. These tactical activities are realized through a series of tactical tasks, which are discussed in detail further on in this chapter.

**795. PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

1. Although all the *principles of war* may be applied to the conduct of stability operations, the following are of particular relevance:

   a. **Cooperation.** Stability operations will likely be carried out in conjunction with other agencies in the JIMP framework, and often in direct support to them. A spirit of cooperation will be vital and should be done in line with the unifying theme that brings all lines of operation towards the desired objectives and end state. Because the non-military members of the other agencies will likely have little understanding of military means and methods, the onus will be on the military commander to ensure sound cooperation between military and civilian agencies, particularly when along a shared line of operation.

   b. **Security.** The conduct of stability operations will see military elements working amongst civilian populations, likely in urban areas, at the lowest tactical levels, spread thinly over vast AOs. They are vulnerable, as are other elements of the JIMP framework. Stability operations, particularly those requiring the assistance of non-military agencies, must be conducted in an environment that is reasonably safe from attack. This security framework may be imposed through
a robust posture, with adversaries against stability countered in a timely manner utilizing precision and the most suitable means. In many campaigns, such as peace support or COIN, the fundamental of “minimum use of force” must still be followed. Furthermore, the need for security must be balanced with the need to work amongst populations, collect information and conduct info ops.

c. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. A strategically driven campaign plan defining the theme, clear end state, objectives, measures of success, expected tactical operations, and dedicated resources will be needed to ensure that the aim is clearly identified from the outset and can be maintained throughout the campaign. The campaign plan should identify the types of stability operations envisioned to help reach the operational objectives. Training and required resources to undertake these activities will be identified.

d. Economy of Effort. Stability operations, particularly the need to provide a continuous framework security presence and the defence of vital areas, are demanding in terms of personnel and time. Best efforts must be made to reduce tasks and allow other agencies to assume them whenever possible.

796. FUNDAMENTALS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. The fundamentals for the conduct of stability operations are:

   a. Unity of Purpose. It is vital that all military and non-military agencies working in the theatre are linked in unity of purpose and coherency of action. This should exist between military, political and civilian agencies. Ideally, it will be articulated in the commander’s intent by way of a unifying theme. It should reflect the comprehensive approach taken to create the desired effects on the moral and physical planes, working towards the operational objectives. The conditions and mindsets for this unity must be established at the outset of campaign planning.

   b. Effective Synchronization with other Tactical Operations. Stability operations must be effectively synchronized and integrated with offensive and defensive operations. Efforts and resources will shift as required during the campaign in order to reach the desired end state. An imbalance of resources towards one type of tactical operation will preclude long-term success. For example, a continual attempt to engage insurgents in a COIN, while ignoring the root causes of the insurgency and the needs of the populace, will lead to campaign failure. Likewise, the poor synchronization of tactical operations will jeopardize overall success. For example, the failure to quickly repair collateral damage following offensive actions will lose public support for the campaign.

   c. Legitimacy. Stability operations must be taken from a position of legitimacy. The operations must be legitimate in terms of meeting justifiable campaign objectives, and they must be seen to be legitimate by the local populace. A well-planned info op will be required to support this position.
d. **Effective Coordination and Synchronization of Indigenous Security Infrastructures and Forces.** Ideally, many tactical stability operations will be conducted in conjunction with local security forces. This will add to the legitimacy of the operations and the military forces; add to the legitimacy of the local security forces (if they are not completely supported by the local populace); and, act as a training venue for the indigenous forces. This synchronization and coordination with indigenous security forces, the reason for it and the limitations to it, and the limit of their capabilities must be understood at the lowest levels. Even if the indigenous forces cannot complete the tasks to the same standard as the campaigning forces, the long-term effects of giving them ownership of the tasks will be more important.

### 797. TACTICAL TASKS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. Each of the tactical activities that constitute stability operations will be comprised of a wide variety of tactical tasks that can be assigned at the unit and subunit level. Just as the attack within offensive operations will be realized through tactical tasks (e.g., destroy, secure, support by fire, etc.), the conduct of stability operations will be realized through a collection of associated tactical tasks. By way of illustration, Figure 7-9 offers a breakdown of the three categories of operations and links them to their parallel tactical operations and tasks. The list of tactical tasks is not all encompassing.

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174 In many cases, the indigenous security forces will be operating in conjunction with sections and platoons. The commanders, therefore, must understand the reasons for the joint operations and the limitations and capabilities of the local security forces, including OPSEC concerns.
# The Conduct of Land Operations

## Tactical Ops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offensive Ops</th>
<th>Defensive Ops</th>
<th>Stability Ops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Security and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack by Fire</td>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>Support to Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)</td>
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<td>Raid</td>
<td>Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)</td>
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<td>Ambush</td>
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<td>Exploitation</td>
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<td>Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance</td>
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<td>Pursuit</td>
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<td>Feint</td>
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<td>Assistance to other Agencies</td>
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<td>Demonstration</td>
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## Tactical Tasks and Effects (Not Inclusive List)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Offensive Ops</th>
<th>Defensive Ops</th>
<th>Stability Ops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destroy</td>
<td>Block</td>
<td>Cordon and Search</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>Occupy</td>
<td>Observe/Monitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secure</td>
<td>Counterattack</td>
<td>Vehicle Check Points</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support by Fire</td>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>Framework Patrols</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fix</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Delivery</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Retain</td>
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<td>Train Indigenous Security Forces</td>
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## Notes:

1. Security and control refers to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, in which other non-military agencies may operate and assist in the operational and strategic objectives.

2. Support to civilian infrastructure and governance will see military forces, at least initially, conducting tasks that (re)build civilian infrastructure, and conduct or assist with certain aspects of governance, such as provision of health care, rules of enforcement and humanitarian aid.

3. Assistance to other agencies refers to military assistance to specific agencies, helping them to reach operational objectives. For example, military forces may be allocated to assist election organizers with security and logistical support.

4. Mission statements relating to stability activities and tasks will use the transient verb “conduct” to assign the activity, such as “…will conduct security and control in order to…” This would then be allocated as tactical tasks and effects to subordinates, such as vehicle check points (VCPs), framework patrols, etc. At the lower tactical levels, the tactical tasks may only appear in the mission statement, but again continue to use the verb “conduct,” such as, “…will conduct framework patrols in order to…,” or “…will conduct humanitarian aid delivery in order to…”. In this manner, they are similar to mission statements for enabling operations. See B-GL-331-002/FP-000 Staff Duties in the Field for further details.

**Figure 7-9: Tactical Operations, Activities and Constituent Tasks and Effects**
2. The various tactical tasks that constitute stability operations will apply to more than one type of operation. For example, a rifle company will use vehicle check points (VCPs) in controlling civilian movement in the search for insurgents and will employ them when providing security for civic elections.

3. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the tactical tasks will vary and are published in other doctrine. The tactical tasks are often planned and conducted using the principles from offensive and defensive operations. For example, a VCP is planned and sited using the principles of the defence, such as depth and mutual support. The manner in which stability operations and their associated tasks are conducted will be a command decision based upon the assessment of the general situation, level of adversary, and most importantly, the effect ultimately required.

4. It is the results that these types of tactical tasks have on the development of security that is vital to transitioning between campaign themes. The sensible domination and control of areas provides reassurance to populations when seen to be legitimate and conducted in an impartial manner. All operations will be supported by info ops, thus internally and externally reinforcing the legitimacy and providing acceptance of the operation.

798. SECURITY AND CONTROL

1. During a campaign, military forces will be responsible for the provision of an overall security framework in which other agencies and the public may operate. This will require the military to conduct tactical operations that will provide security and control over routes and areas. This will help stabilize the security situation and allow for the normalcy of daily civic activities. Indigenous security forces may be able to assist.

2. An aspect of a secure environment may be the requirement to exercise a degree of control over an indigenous population, their security forces or former warring factions. This may be conducted by tactical measures such as checkpoints, curfews, movement restrictions and the like.

3. This security framework is manpower intensive and sees military forces conducting low-level tactical operations in a virtually pervasive sense, while maintaining the ability to react quickly to adversaries against the stability of the situation, normally by use of reserves, possibly as a quick reaction force (QRF).

4. The requirement to provide general security and control will decrease as operations are undertaken and the causes of instability are defeated, disrupted, dislocated or solved. In terms of removing physical adversaries against stability, the situation will likely improve initially during daylight hours, but security during hours of darkness will take more effort.

5. The conduct of control and security tasks is an excellent opportunity for the collection of HUMINT since soldiers are likely in constant contact with the civilian populace. All efforts should be made to transfer responsibility for maintaining security to the indigenous security forces as they become available and competent. This will reduce dependency and support the legitimacy of such forces. A period of transition will likely be required with forces mentoring indigenous forces through joint operations.

6. Security and control operations will require the tactical tasks tabled at Figure 7-10, and supported by relevant TTP.
Security and Control

Tactical Tasks:

- Framework Patrolling
- Route Control (Vehicle Check Point [VCPs])
- Curfew
- Crowd Confrontation Operations (CCO) Areas
- Separation of Hostile Forces
- Observation
- Cordon and Search
- Enforcement of Restricted Areas

Figure 7-10: Tactical Tasks for Security and Control (Not an all-inclusive List)

799. SUPPORT TO DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

1. The DDR of armed elements—be they formal military forces, gangs, para-military militias, etc.—will rely upon strategic direction and detailed OPLANs. It will be a multi-agency endeavour, but the military forces will have a key role to play, particularly in the early stages. The DDR process may apply to military, police and para-military forces, but most likely and most immediately to illegitimate factions such as insurgent groups, criminal gangs, private armies and the like.

2. In many instances, established military forces should not go through a DDR process as they provide a source of recognized security or control for a populace. Although conscripts called up for a particular conflict may undergo the DDR process, the standing army of a nation should likely go through a process of reform (i.e., SSR).

3. DDR is discussed more fully in Annex A. In general, military forces supporting a DDR process can expect to undertake some or all of the tasks tabled at Figure 7-11. Other partners within the JIMP environment will be responsible for long-term reintegration of the former combatants.

Support to DDR

Tactical Tasks:

- Disarmament of security forces, militias and/or illegally armed groups.
- Weapons collection and accounting.
- Weapons destruction.
- Protection, escort and transportation of demobilized personnel.
- Assistance in the selection of a new security service.

Figure 7-11: Tactical Tasks for Support to DDR (Not an all-inclusive List)
7100. SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1. SSR flows from strategic direction and will require an operational level plan that will incorporate the roles of multiple agencies addressing the various aspects of the entire security sector. It will include, but is not limited to, the future military forces to be developed, policing, penal and judiciary reform, border security, customs control, and other such aspects of the overall security structure. The military will have a supporting role in some undertakings and a lead role in others, specifically in the training and organization of new military forces.

2. SSR is discussed more fully in Annex B. In general, military forces supporting an SSR process can expect to undertake some or all of the tasks tabled at Figure 7-12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to SSR</th>
<th>Tactical Tasks:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection and recruitment of future security force personnel.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility to indigenous military, and in the short term, other security forces such as police and border guards.</td>
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Figure 7-12: Tactical Tasks for Support to SSR (Not an All-Inclusive List)

SECTION 18
SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE

7101. GENERAL

1. Depending upon the situation and the adversary, military forces may be required to undertake tactical tasks to support civilian infrastructure and governance. These are effectively information operations tasks, in that they seek to influence the populace by providing long-term benefit and stability. They will help ensure that the local populace remains supportive of the military campaign and detract from the growth of dissatisfaction with, and resistance to, the campaign itself. Commanders and their staff are responsible for identifying and assessing the infrastructure and governance requirements, and they are enabled through civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) resources.

2. These tactical activities may include reconstruction of essential civil services and infrastructures (or even construction if they did not exist in the first place), such as the provision of water sources, essential medical assistance, and repairs to roads, ports and airports.

175 Governance is defined as the “action or manner of governing.” To govern is defined as “control of the laws and affairs of a state, organisation or community” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Ed). Governance is sometimes referred to as “nation building” although the term governance should be used.
3. In terms of governance, military forces may be required to fill, temporarily, a void in certain areas of civil governance. For example, military forces may have to assume low-level economic development, school establishment and management, border security, the management of essential health services and key humanitarian aid. Governance may be defined in the broadest sense and include aspects of economic institutions (both public and private) and educational institutions.

4. Initially, military forces may be the only agency able to work in the security situation. In such a case, very limited infrastructure and governance activities can be undertaken and will focus on life-essential services, such as the delivery of humanitarian aid and the provision of clean water. In other circumstances, civilian agencies may be available to assume some operations, but may well be supporting an overall military lead.

5. As the security situation improves and non-military agencies and departments arrive and are capable of assuming and expanding infrastructure and governance activities, the military forces move to a supporting role. As the situation continues to improve, the demand for military resources and security will decline and other agencies and departments will assume most, and ideally all, of these infrastructure and governance activities. It must be remembered that even when other agencies and departments begin to assume responsibilities and governance, they may not bring sufficient resources and personnel. Thus, the military may continue to provide infrastructure and governance until sufficient personnel and resources are imported, or are developed domestically.

7102. SUPPORT TO INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Support to infrastructure includes the initial restoration of essential services and facilities. Although it will be undertaken to varying degrees by all arms, it is primarily the domain of military engineers and medical services. Support to infrastructure may be conducted for two reasons. Firstly, they may be done in support of our own troops, such as route and airfield repair to enable mobility, or the provision of street lighting to help minimize troop levels needed to maintain security at night. Secondly, they are conducted to improve the quality of life of the local population and thus create beneficial effects on the moral and physical planes for the local population and other agencies. The former will assist short-term tactical support; however, the latter reason will support long-term success and stability, and thus operational and strategic end states.

2. Effects may include helping to “fix” the population and influence its support for the mission and the mandate. This can be done through such means as the provision of safe drinking water at specified locations, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the restoration of electrical power, and minimizing political problems through the avoidance of humanitarian disasters. Initial restoration to infrastructure may be temporary and improvised, in advance of a more permanent solution by contractors or others in the JIMP framework, in the medium or longer term. In general, military forces providing support to infrastructure restoration can expect to undertake some or all of the tasks tabled at Figure 7-13.
Support to Infrastructure & Governance

**Tactical Tasks for Infrastructure Restoration:**

- Provision of mobility on roads, railways and waterways.
- Restoration of airfields, harbours and ports.
- Provision of essential water, fuel and power.
- Restoration of essential health and public buildings and services; including sewage and waste.
- Limited medical assistance/advice.
- Enabling of humanitarian aid.
- Securing key national infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 7-13: Tactical Tasks for Support to Infrastructure Restoration (Not an all-inclusive List)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Support to infrastructure tasks may include the preparation of an emergency infrastructure plan and the securing and safeguarding of discrete national infrastructure assets, such as oilfields, which will be vital to the economic viability of the nation.</td>
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<td>4. Infrastructure restoration will be costly in terms of resources and manpower. Wherever security allows, maximum use should be made of the skills and knowledge of local workers and contractors in restoring and running local infrastructure in order to ease the burden on the military, as well as in helping to develop the local economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Such tactical activities will not only be planned at the operational level, but will be conducted at the lower tactical levels as well. Units and subunits will undertake low-level tasks, such as repairs to school well pumps or repairs to a local orphanage, not only for the altruistic reasons, but also for the sake of engendering support amongst the local officials and populace. The provision of CIMIC funds at the tactical level will benefit this practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ultimately, support to infrastructure will contribute to the longer-term campaign objectives of allowing the nation to recover and become self-sustaining in terms of stability.</td>
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**TACTICAL LEVEL SUPPORT TO INFRASTRUCTURE RESTORATION—OP HALO 2004**

During operations in Haiti in early 2004, 8 Regiment, USMC undertook garbage removal from the main MSRs [main supply routes] of Port au Prince. The main reason for the task was to clear the MRSs for the mobility of the coalition forces. Secondarily, however, it assisted the local population and helped return the situation to its normal conditions. Although the regiment used its own resources, it also contracted local trucks and workers, and provided security for them. The task was conducted only during the hours of darkness, which avoided upsetting the daytime activities of the local populace and provided an additional security presence at night.

*Extracted from the Op HALO After-Action Report of I Coy, 2 RCR*
7103. SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

1. Military expertise may be sought to support various governance activities. In the early stages of a campaign the military may be the only agency capable of assuming such responsibility due to its innate ability to operate in a non-permissive environment, to assist in planning and management, and to provide communications, command and leadership. Indeed, certain campaigns may require a distinct line of operation dealing with governance. This type of stability activity is difficult to categorize and will depend upon the situation and the requirements. Ideally, planning and the conduct of governance related tasks will be done in conjunction with those other JIMP agencies that hold an expertise in these areas.

2. Governance operations provide leadership and management for basic public services while helping to develop an effective, participatory local public management capacity. Governance operations at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the transition to other agencies, and ultimately, to civil authority.

3. Specifically, governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not normally reside within a conventional military organization. They require blending interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by effective societal intelligence.\textsuperscript{176} The introduction of competent civilian agencies to assume governance tasks should be done as early as possible.

4. Requirements for interim governance by military forces may include the following:
   a. commercial support and economic institutions (e.g., establishment of local markets, banks and village business cooperatives);
   b. public transportation nodes, such as ports and airports;
   c. management of essential services and industries;
   d. educational institutions and infrastructure;
   e. public civil service institutions, to include refuse, health, customs, media, etc.;
   f. political institutions, particularly at the local, municipal level, such as a mayor’s office and support staff;
   g. humanitarian assistance and aid distribution;
   h. enabling political negotiation at local level;
   i. providing pan-agency C2 framework;
   j. rule of law implementation, specifically policing duties against criminal activity and border control; and
   k. support to elections.

5. It is unlikely that the military will completely run these institutions, but it will have to assume a leadership, organizational and mentoring role for the local populace employed in such institutions.

7104. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR SUPPORT TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE

1. Ideally, the requirement for support to infrastructure and governance will be foreseen in the campaign planning process. In conducting such operations, the military must ensure:

a. That the operations be planned and conducted within the available resources and that appropriate priorities and additional requirements are identified.
b. That they are planned within the JIMP framework to be in concert with the agencies that will assume ultimate responsibility.
c. That they not encourage a dependency. They should be conducted with a view to enabling the domestic populace to take control of the activity.
d. That promises are not made that cannot be kept or that are significantly delayed in their fulfilment. This will only undermine the campaign, undermine the population’s support for the campaign and cause great resentment, even to the point of creating active resistance to the campaign.

2. Infrastructure and governance activities can be better realized through a unified command structure; that is, with all agencies working to a single commander. In the earliest stages, this single commander may be a military authority. As civilian authorities arrive and assume responsibilities, overall command may be passed to a civilian agency lead, and then ideally to a domestic lead.

During Op IRAQI FREEDOM, a US Army Battalion commander assumed the role of interim major of the city of NAJAF. During this period, the commander was placed within two chains of command: his military chain of command and the command of the Central Provisional Authority (CPA). At times, orders were contradictory and caused conflict and confusion. Ideally, a single chain of command would have existed. The transition plan would have ideally seen the military commander hand-over the mayor responsibilities to a CPA authority, and then to a domestic authority, who would, along with subordinate civilians, have undergone a mentoring process with the CPA.

Taken from USMC Joint Urban Warrior Conference, 03 April 2006

7105. ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES

1. Within the JIMP framework, there will be agencies operating that may require military assistance. This assistance may include the provision of transport and security to select NGOs or other such assistance to their operations. This assistance must be clearly linked to the info ops being conducted concurrently to ensure a unified message and effect are created. They must be inline with operational and strategic objectives. They also provide additional opportunity for information collection and the development of situational awareness.
7106. PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AS PART OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING

1. Planning for any campaign must give consideration to the requirement to conduct stability operations. The emphasis given will depend upon the type of campaign envisioned, but it must be remembered that even major combat will see a requirement for stability operations that will only grow over time.

2. In planning, lines of operation will be formulated that will consist mainly of stability activities and their constituent tasks. These lines of operation will be shared between military and civilian forces, with ideally, the latter assuming complete responsibility in due course for these lines of operation. Thus, it is vital that these other elements of the JIMP framework be involved in the planning from the outset.

3. Planning will require careful analysis to define the nature of the problem and the remedial action to be taken. The population’s needs in various areas should be considered and other agencies will be of great assistance in ascertaining those needs. The challenge in effecting lasting changes to improve stability in these circumstances further reinforces the requirement for a harmonized response, coordinated between the political, economic, military, security sector, and the potential plethora of supporting agencies from the international arena. Coordinated activities to improve the security and control of a state are likely to be similar whether disruptive influences have developed or not. Such activities are conducted within a context dominated by the following factors, which should be considered in the planning process:

   a. the environment (e.g., urban, rural, urban/rural interface, infrastructure, media);
   b. the adversary (e.g., lack of law and order, any insurgents’ aims, capabilities and degree of support from the population);
   c. the political situation (e.g., stable, fluid, transitional, democratic);
   d. historical and social linkages (including past alliances, religion, demographics and economic dependency);
   e. the cultural norms (e.g., the education or employment of women in some societies may be more of a destabilizing rather than stabilizing effect);
   f. the economic and social situation (e.g., full employment, acceptable standard of living, or poor conditions providing fertile ground for the recruitment of activists); and
   g. the security environment (e.g., active, effective and respected civil police, functioning judiciary and penal system).

4. Consideration of the above factors will identify areas where external support will be required to assist in the restoration of stability in pursuance of the strategic end state. Such analysis will provide guidance on the cultural aspects relevant to operations at all levels, and will provide direction for information and intelligence strategies and operations.

177 While this is a complicated analysis, consideration of Maslow’s theory might be a suitable start point.
5. During the targeting process consideration should be given to the degree to which infrastructure may be affected and a careful review should be conducted to:
   
   a. Avoid, where possible, targeting infrastructure that will be required to restore the nation.
   
   b. Minimize the long-term damage to any infrastructure that must be targeted in order to achieve the required effect during offensive or defensive operations.
   
   c. Protect infrastructure that may be vulnerable to other adversaries, yet will be required to restore the nation.

6. The level of instability will relate to the adversary, conventional or unconventional, and potentially include disorder, criminality, acts of terrorism, and the existence or development of an insurgency. Consideration of the state of the existing political situation and indigenous security apparatus will determine the need for the application of military forces. This will dictate the task organization of the military component and the initial lead instrument determining whether the military are supported or in a supporting role.

7. Consideration should be given during the planning process to those tasks that will be conducted within the JIMP framework when the security situation allows. This will ensure the correct allocation of responsibilities and funding to assist in future plans for transition. For example, the provision of initial medical assistance without a guarantee of another organization eventually accepting responsibility may see a dependency develop which would have an adverse effect on the disengagement of the military. The consideration of responsibility and plans for transfer of responsibility is a vital planning consideration at all levels of command requiring close liaison between agencies.

8. As with all operations the situation must be constantly monitored and assessed, and measures of effectiveness employed to determine where, when and how progress is being made. Security and control are easily affected by adversarial forces, or by the general attitude and reaction of the population to events or a perceived overly aggressive posture by military forces. Situational changes will require re-evaluation and potentially significant changes in posture, force level and type of operations and tactics.

9. Finally, planners must remember that promises made to civilian populations and their governments, in terms of support and infrastructure development, that are not kept will only lead to resentment and even hostility to the campaign. Early and continuous commitment of resources to stability operations will be vital to securing a lasting security.

SECTION 19
APPLICATION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS IN CAMPAIGNS

7107. MAJOR COMBAT CAMPAIGNS

1. The majority of operations conducted in a campaign where major combat is the predominant theme, are likely to be a combination of offensive and defensive. In the achievement of success in a major combat phase, strategic planning will consider the pursuance of those subsequent objectives leading eventually to “stability.” To that end, major combat operations may be planned with a view to minimizing civilian casualties and damage that will require later reconstruction; however, these considerations must not detract from the
achievement of the combat objectives. Stability operations, planned for at the operational level and anticipated and conducted at the tactical level, should therefore, be conducted primarily after success of the offensive operations, and must be considered during the planning process from the outset.

2. Stability operations planned and conducted at the operational and tactical level during major combat will simply sow the seeds of transition towards the strategic end state. Effective stability operations will produce positive results, upon which success can be built, rather than antagonize populations and create adversarial feelings.

3. The manner in which seized areas are controlled is vital to providing an initial feeling of legitimised security to a population. This does not mean that future offensive operations are not mounted if the need arises, or that strict controlling methods such as segregation or curfew are not applied. But, if such measures are implemented, then the populace should consider them as legitimate control measures put in place for sound reasons. They will have to be supported by sound info ops.

4. Furthermore, it is vital that the basic expectations of the populace be met, such as security of criminal activities and emergency humanitarian aid. Failure to meet basic expectations will only undermine support and legitimacy and frustrate long-term goals.

5. The DDR of prisoners and detainees is another function that immediately follows offensive success. The manner in which defeated soldiers are treated can have significant effect. Bad treatment, or simply failing to deal with them efficiently, could produce willing insurgents in the future and discredit the security force. Proper treatment initially and eventual reintegration could be the precursor stage for future SSR activity. Particular care must be taken when dealing with civilian suspects. Poor treatment may polarize large segments of the population into passive or active resistance.

6. While civil reconstruction is unlikely during major combat operations it is probable that limited activities such as humanitarian assistance may be conducted. It also facilitates the coordination of effort between agencies, brings credit to the military forces and supports effective information operations.

7. Effective stability operations within major combat enable a defeated adversary, if required, to be effectively disarmed, with a view to their eventual reintegration. Furthermore, they should ensure that the population within the area secured understand the legitimacy of the action, appreciate the levels of security provided and have hope for future development.

7108. COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

1. In an insurgency, the focus for tactical level operations will be to support a COIN campaign theme in line with the appropriate principles. In order to separate the insurgent from his support, insurgents should be denied information, logistics, recruits, safe bases and popular support. This can be achieved through physical separation and developing governmental control from a firm base through a series of expanding secure areas. Stability operations, supported by info ops, will assist in isolating the insurgent on both the physical and moral planes.
2. Neutralizing the insurgent is key to a successful COIN campaign, particularly the neutralization of the insurgent leadership. Methods include killing, capturing, demoralizing, deterring and promoting desertions. Stability operations, particularly as control and security activities, will pre-empt, disrupt and dislocate the insurgent and his operations.

3. While offensive operations may have a significant impact on insurgents, real success in a COIN will be achieved through a predominance of stability operations. The continued prosecution of stability operations to improve security by control of areas and routes, the development of indigenous security forces by investment in SSR, and the initiation of improvement by reconstruction and governance activities, will enhance legitimacy and support efforts to isolate any insurgents. The opportunities for offensive action in a COIN must be balanced against the need to maintain an acceptable level of security and individual freedoms for the population.

4. The fundamental of “minimum use of force” must be respected. Furthermore, during an insurgency the interest of the national and international media will be sharply focussed, reinforcing the requirement for operations to be legitimate. The application of stability operations will assist in both these concerns.

7109. PEACE SUPPORT CAMPAIGNS

1. Stability operations will play a key role in a peace support campaign, and apart from some force protection activities, may be the only tactical operations undertaken. However, the ability, real and perceived, of military forces to switch to effective offensive operations will be vital to ensuring the continuance of the peace process and a permissive environment. Military presence can act as a deterrent to potential destabilizing elements, and if required, can be employed in support of other security sector agencies if in existence, or in isolation, should the need develop. Military presence will continue to provide security and confidence that encourages participation in political and social activity.

2. In addition to providing the overarching security framework, the military may have a role to play in ensuring that any emerging (indigenous) military force is properly organized and trained. This falls within the requirement of SSR and the military should prepare for this throughout any demobilization and disarmament process. The reintegration aspect of DDR is the future employment of demobilized soldiers either into the security sector or back into a regenerated civilian economy. All such operations will require a comprehensive approach incorporating various JIMP agencies in addition to military forces.

3. While most military forces should not normally be expected to take on major rebuilding tasks due to lack of civil engineering experience and resources, this does not preclude the military from becoming involved in civil-military projects that utilize expertise and adds legitimacy to their continued presence. This has relevance at both the tactical and operational levels. Further, the military organizational, logistic and communications resources are often essential to providing an overarching C2 framework for the initial stages of inter-agency coordination.

4. Most peace support campaigns will see a wide range of JIMP agencies operating throughout the battlespace, particularly as the campaigns mature. Apart from working together in a comprehensive approach to bringing lasting peace to a region, the military forces will be expected to undertake the defence of other JIMP agencies should the security situation deteriorate.
5. Having achieved an enduring permissive environment where political and civilian agencies can continue to contribute to the enduring tasks to bolster both political and economic stability, the military presence can be reduced or withdrawn.

7110. PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

1. Peacetime military engagement (PME) can vary from the permanent presence of personnel in a training and advisory role to infrequent joint exercises or liaison. Given the overall security situation in such campaigns, other stability activities such as infrastructure and governance development will likely be conducted by other members of the JIMP framework.

2. Permanent positioning of forces and embedding personnel in training or advisory roles allows a close level of observation and influence over the military. Further, the commitment of forces through permanent posting or joint exercise sends a positive message to the population. It demonstrates continued interest in both their national and regional stability.

7111. LIMITED INTERVENTION

1. The military’s deployment for a limited intervention may require little or even no conduct of stability operations, or may be solely dedicated to stability operations. This will depend entirely upon the type of mission undertaken and the objectives.

2. A mission, such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), will only focus on securing an expatriate population for evacuation from a particular region. It may involve emergency aid, including medical assistance, but will be very limited in both scope and duration. Other missions, such as a disaster relief mission, will consist mainly of stability operations, including emergency food and water delivery, rescue of victims from dangerous situations, and the construction of temporary accommodations. Coordination with civilian agencies and NGOs will be a key feature of most limited interventions.

7112. FORCE EMPLOYMENT FOR STABILITY ACTIVITIES

1. It is anticipated that stability activities will occur at the same time as offensive and defensive combat activities. Hence, while one element of a unit or formation is conducting offensive or defensive activities, other elements may be conducting stability activities, such as the distribution of emergency humanitarian aid to, or providing security and stopping looting amongst, those recently freed from an adversary occupation.

2. All military forces will be employed in the conduct of stability activities. Combat forces not immediately involved in offensive or defensive activities can expect to undertake emergency stability activities (e.g., local security, distribution of humanitarian aid) in order to support overall objectives. These may occur immediately following the completion of offensive or defensive activities, or they may be carried out independently should there be no requirement for the other tactical activities at that given point in time.

3. No military force should expect to deploy to a campaign and conduct only stability activities. Even during campaigns, such as low-threat peace support campaigns in which there is not a great expectation of a requirement for offensive, defensive and enabling activities, and the main effort is on stability activities, military forces must be prepared to conduct offensive and
defensive activities. The nature of the campaign may unexpectedly change and a threat to the forces or indigenous population may require the conduct of increased defensive and even offensive activities.

SECTION 20
ALLOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES TO STABILITY ACTIVITIES

7113. GENERAL

1. All forces can expect to be employed in the conduct of stability activities, but no military force should be structured and trained only for the conduct of stability activities. They must be prepared and capable of conducting FSO and their role in offensive and defensive activities, be it combat, combat support or CSS. However, some forces are more suited to the conduct of certain aspects of stability activities (e.g., engineers for reconstruction).

2. In planning and execution, stability activities must be considered, planned and targeted using the same processes and with the same operations staff as for offensive and defensive activities. There will, of course, be additional requirements when planning stability activities to conduct liaison and cooperation with other agencies and local authorities.

7114. FORCE EMPLOYMENT IN STABILITY ACTIVITIES

1. Certain types of forces, particularly those specialized in construction and material management and support to infrastructure, will be in high demand during those campaigns that require large scale stability activities. There will be a heavy reliance upon the ability to repair and reconstruct, and even construct, services and facilities for indigenous populations and their local authorities.

2. Despite the requirement for specialist forces, combat and combat support forces will still play a valuable role in stability activities. The majority of tasks for the creation of local security and control will fall to combat and combat support forces. However, combat and combat support forces may assume low-level reconstruction tasks within their AO and provide manpower to support specialists in the conduct of larger scale reconstruction tasks. It should be remembered that combat units deployed amongst indigenous populations will be a good source of information regarding the expectations and requirements of different sectors of the local environment.

3. As security situations improve, other non-military agencies will assume responsibilities and military forces should expect to work in cooperation with such agencies in the conduct of stability activities.

4. Land force units may be employed along the following lines to execute stability activities:

   a. Combat Forces. Combat forces can perform a range of functions in support of stability activities:

      (1) Security and control over areas and routes, and for the security and stability of indigenous populations, will be a common responsibility for combat forces not employed in offensive or defensive activities. Such
security provides manoeuvre capability for other agencies and local authorities.

(2) Non-infantry forces such as armour, combat engineers or artillery may be employed in dismounted infantry-type roles should their core capabilities not be required at any given time. They will assist in meeting the demand for troop concentrations in such activities as security in an urban area.

(3) They may provide point security for other forces conducting stability activities such as local security for a medical clinic held to assist the local population.

(4) They may undertake low-level reconstruction projects such as assisting a local school to rebuild. Although such undertakings do not make enormous differences in the overall situation and welfare of an indigenous population, they do support the info ops objectives of providing legitimacy and support for the campaign.

(5) Tasks will be assigned in support of the SSR and DDR processes. This could include the provision of security to disarming former combatants (particularly those who have disarmed before other former combatants), control of demobilized weapons and equipment, and the provision of training teams, mentors and advisors for the reform and development of indigenous military and security forces.

(6) Security and assistance for other agencies, such as convoy escort for humanitarian NGOs and assistance in the conduct of elections.

b. **Combat Support Forces.** Combat support elements can assume a large range of stability activities. Some of their unique skill sets make them suitable for specific requirements:

(1) Engineer forces can expect to play a major role in stability activities, and in particular, in reconstruction tasks to include:

(a) airports and airfields;

(b) seaports;

(c) repairs and maintenance to municipal services such as water supply and electricity;

(d) road repair and construction;

(e) emergency supply of potable water using integral resources;

(f) infrastructure construction such as the building or repair of schools;

(g) training and mentoring of local security forces in the conduct of engineer related tasks; and
(h) leading mine, improvised explosive device (IED), and unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) clearance teams, and training and monitoring indigenous forces or others in this role.

(2) Communications and signals units will support stability activities through a number of means, but their expertise in communication nodes and links may be exploited to assist indigenous populations with the establishment of local communications networks.

c. Combat Service Support Forces. The integral capabilities of CSS units will render them valuable to the conduct of a wide range of stability activities. The contribution of these forces will be most valuable in the info ops goals, specifically in terms of engendering support from the local populations and their leaders, and in influencing their opinions and actions. CSS units will support stability activities along the following lines:

(1) Assistance in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

(2) Security and control in the rear areas or in areas around their own operating bases.

(3) Training and mentoring of indigenous CSS forces and of their HQ CSS staff.

(4) Military police will assist with local control and security duties, and will assist in the training and mentoring of indigenous security forces, particularly civilian police and military police. Ideally, the training of civilian constabularies can be passed to other agencies specifically qualified for such roles.

(5) Assist with civilian transport routes and control measures, including air traffic control and support to harbour operations.

(6) Medical units may provide emergency medical care for an indigenous population, and conduct clinics for the population. Such interactions with the local populace and the favourable conditions they create are good opportunities for HUMINT teams to exploit in terms of cultivating casual contacts and information.

(7) Other CSS units will provide advice and expertise in the governance of local institutions, such as hospitals, schools and other governmental services. Military officials may even hold positions of governmental authority until local authorities are prepared to install their own leaders.

d. CIMIC Advisor/Commander. Staff conversant in CIMIC matters or CIMIC element commanders will provide the liaison and cooperation function that will support and enable many of the stability activities. Supported by the intelligence staff, they will enable stability activities in the following manner:

(1) identify the local leaders and power holders, and advise on linkages in power structures;
(2) coordinate infrastructure and governance requirements with the local authorities;

(3) assess needs independent of the claims of local authorities;

(4) recommend priorities for the conduct of stability activities in terms of reconstruction and governance;

(5) gather information regarding potential threats;

(6) identify and assess other agencies including NGOs and IOs in the area, and their capabilities and requirements for military support and protection; and

(7) facilitate coordination with NGOs and IOs, and help ensure complementary activities and tasks are being conducted.

e. **PSYOPS Advisor/Commander.** Staff officers and PSYOPS element commanders should be able to support and enhance the conduct of stability activities. They will, for example, implement public announcements regarding the activities and will advertise their benefits to indigenous populations through various media means.

f. **Targeting Cell.** The planning and targeting processes for stability activities are done concurrently with those for all other tactical activities in a holistic, comprehensive manner, and by the same staff and commanders in the pursuit of the objectives. For example, if an offensive activity such as an attack is planned in an area in which civilians live, and in which a valuable natural resource is located, the plans for the attack must be considered along with the plans to provide aid and security for the civilian population, and with the plans to immediately remediate any damage done by a withdrawing adversary (such as fires caused to oil wells).

### 7115. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN BUILDING INDIGENOUS CAPACITY

1. **General.** In order to facilitate the building of indigenous capability, particularly through interim governance and restoration of essential services, there will be a significant requirement for close cooperation with the civil agencies within the AO.

2. **Civil-military Organizations.** In order to coordinate the activities of the military and other agencies, commanders may either be directed to form or assist in the formation of civil-military bodies, or they may create an ad hoc organization. Depending upon the campaign and local situation, these civil-military groupings will aim to build indigenous capacity in infrastructure and civil institutions. The lead of such bodies will be dependent upon the situation. It may be military, it may be civil, or it may simply be a cooperative structure.
SECTION 21
COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR STABILITY ACTIVITIES

7116. GENERAL

1. The command and control of forces as they conduct stability activities will differ little from any other activity. The allocation of tasks will result from the same sort of planning and estimate process, albeit the tasks will obviously differ.

2. Notwithstanding the altruistic reasons that may exist for the conduct of stability activities, they are planned and conducted with the aim of creating effects on the moral plane; that is, they seek to influence individuals and groups to think and act in a particular manner, namely to support the campaign and to reject support to the adversary.

3. During the conduct of stability activities, commanders must ensure that due consideration is given to the prevailing threat and that the stability activities themselves will likely be targeted when faced with an unconventional threat. The massing of civilians at certain stability activities, such as the conduct of a medical clinic, will present an attractive target to some adversaries. Therefore, planning for stability activities must always include consideration of the need for local security and intelligence assessment.

7117. UNIFIED COMMAND AND COORDINATION

1. Successful, long term stability activities that meet the expectations and eventual demands of an indigenous population will only be met through the work of non-military agencies who have the expertise, resources, funding and ultimate mandate for such activities. While the military forces may begin stability activities at the outset of a campaign, all effort must be made to quickly encourage and incorporate non-military agencies into the campaign plan.

2. While the responsibility for certain stability activities, such as security and control and training of indigenous military forces will always remain the remit of military forces, other stability activities, such as infrastructure development and governance activities (e.g., judiciary reform, hospital management, etc.), will best be conducted by other, non-military agencies. The military may continue to support and assist, but responsibility for their conduct must be passed as quickly as possible.

3. This is part of the comprehensive approach in which all agencies work in harmony and in a complementary fashion to achieve common objectives and a common end state. This comprehensive approach can be better realized through a unified command structure; that is, with all agencies, military and non-military, working to a single commander. In the earliest stages, this single commander may be a military authority. As civilian authorities arrive and assume responsibilities, overall command may be passed to a civilian agency lead, and then ideally to an indigenous lead.

4. Such a unified command structure will take some time to develop and in many campaigns it never will materialize. However, the underlying philosophy of cooperation in achieving complementary and reinforcing effects to realize shared objectives can still be practised. The onus may rest with military commanders who through their personal intervention facilitate the maximum amount of interagency cooperation possible to ensure that activities are coordinated and complementary. Additionally, efforts may have to be made in situations in
which NGOs or other agencies have little experience with or understanding of military operations, and may even distrust the military’s intent.

5. Much of this relationship development, even done informally, will be facilitated through CIMIC staff cells. Joint coordination centres for interagency cooperation and coordination may be established so that best use may be made of available resources, and military forces may be made aware of the security concerns of non-military agencies.

6. Such cooperation should prove to provide much valuable information and intelligence to military planners regarding the overall security situation, the adversary’s intentions and influences, power structures within the indigenous population, and the opinions and attitudes of the local populace.

7118. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are the criteria used to determine if activities conducted are creating the desired effects. It tells commanders if they are doing the right things to achieve the desired objectives and end state. They are the real measure of progress in terms of moving the campaign to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

2. MOE must be carefully selected and regularly assessed in order to ascertain the value of time and resource intensive stability activities. For example, if military forces are conducting security and control related activities in order to allow a civilian populace to return to normal civic routine, commanders must ensure that an assessment is continually done to ensure that this effect is being achieved through the issued tasks. For example, if local markets open and remain open without attacks, then the effect has been achieved. Should the same markets close at night for fear of attacks, the commander must adjust his plan to conduct more security activities during the hours of darkness.

3. MOE are subjective for the most part and will vary with each situation and desired effect.

7119. TRANSITION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. The transition between campaign themes is difficult to determine with precision. As adversaries are defeated or causes for instability addressed, levels of violence and instability should decrease and campaign themes should transition appropriately. This shift should be reflected in less of a requirement for offensive and defensive operations and an increase in opportunity and need for stability operations.

2. Stability operations themselves will assist in moving a campaign down the spectrum of conflict, and thus improve the overall security situation. As the situation becomes more permissive, military forces will reduce offensive operations and defensive operations to the maintenance of security. Such a reduction of offence and defensive operations will see stability operations expand and the increased sharing of those stability operations with other agencies. This should include support to reconstruction and governance, DDR, SSR and overall control and security. Eventually, civilian and governmental agencies and indigenous security forces will assume the majority of stability activities. See Figure 7-14.

3. The decrease in violence and the creation of stability will allow other agencies to assume an increased portion of stability operations and to expand nation-building activities.
planning and conduct of all military reconstruction and assistance to other agencies must consider the manner in which military activity is complementary to future civilian work, and must plan for handover to those other JIMP members. As this occurs with improved security, military involvement and support should decrease.

Figure 7-14: Transition of Stability Operations Between Campaign Themes

SECTION 22
ENABLING OPERATIONS

7120. GENERAL

1. Enabling operations link other operations and support the transition between different types of tactical activities. They may be conducted to make or break contact with the adversary or they may be conducted out of contact. An enabling activity is never carried out in its own right. Its execution must lead to the active prosecution of another type of tactical operation. The successful and rapid execution of these activities relies upon such factors as the devolution of decision-making, the co-location of HQ, liaison and a simple plan.

2. The effective execution of enabling activities will help ensure the following:

   a. the ability to make a transition between phases without a loss in tempo;
   b. the forces taking over the battle having the most up-to-date information;
   c. fluid movement;
   d. fire control so as to use all weapons to further the aim and to avoid fratricide; and
   e. quick regrouping.
3. Enabling operations consist of the following activities:
   a. reconnaissance;
   b. security;
   c. advance to contact;
   d. tactical movement;\textsuperscript{178}
   e. meeting engagement;
   f. link-up;
   g. withdrawal;
   h. retirement; and
   i. relief of troops in combat and encircled forces.

\textbf{7121. RECONNAISSANCE}

1. Reconnaissance operations are those activities undertaken to obtain information about the adversary, terrain, or the indigenous population of a particular area. Area, point and route reconnaissance are common tasks.

2. Doctrine concerning the conduct of reconnaissance activities is contained in a wide range of supporting publications. Tasking of reconnaissance forces must be done with care. They normally execute their missions while planning is ongoing for the forthcoming mission and are then re-tasked to support follow-on missions with little or no opportunity for recovery.

3. The employment of reconnaissance forces must be closely tied to the intelligence cycle. Key is the rapid dissemination of information gained, particularly to those units in contact or potential contact.

\textbf{7122. SECURITY}

1. Security operations provide early and accurate warning of the adversary’s dispositions and operations. Depending upon their mission and structure, they may provide an element of protection for a main body force or gain time for the preparation of other deliberate operations. Security operations are normally conducted as part of a larger enabling operation or in support of another type of tactical operations such as the defence.

2. Security operations consist of screen, guard and cover, and are defined as follows:

\textsuperscript{178} Tactical movement refers to the movement of forces from one location to another, but is not an advance to contact. Although moving forces do not expect contact, they move in a tactical fashion that ensures they are prepared to counter and defeat any contacts.
a. **Screen Force.** A screen force is defined as: “a security element whose primary task is to observe, identify and report information and which only fights in self-defence.”\(^ {179}\) A screen force will normally consist of reconnaissance elements, possibly supported by indirect and tactical air fire support controllers. It will be key to finding the adversary for subsequent fixing and striking. A flank screen may also provide security\(^ {180}\) for a main body against a flanking or surprise attack.

b. **Guard Force.** A guard force is defined as: “a security element whose primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information.”\(^ {181}\) Apart from gaining time for the commitment of the main body, the guard force, depending upon the circumstances, may contribute to the attrition of an adversary, may conduct counter-reconnaissance tasks, or may fix an adversary element for striking by the main force. Guard forces may also deploy to the flank of a main body to provide protection.

c. **Covering Force.** A covering force is defined as: “a force operating apart from a main body for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the covered force.”\(^ {182}\) Based upon the definition and the intent of deploying a covering force, the force must consist of enough combat power to meet the commander’s intent. A covering force may be required to fight a delay battle in support of a main defensive position.

3. The composition of any security force will be determined by its mission and the intent that the commander has in terms of effects to be created by its commitment.

### SECTION 23
ADVANCE TO CONTACT

#### 7123. PURPOSE

1. The advance to contact seeks to gain or re-establish contact with an adversary under the most favourable conditions. To achieve this, forces may be employed in both supporting security and reconnaissance missions. The advance to contact is normally executed in preparation for a subsequent offensive operation and therefore ends when the main force is positioned for the subsequent operation. The mission assigned to the main force will determine subsequent operations. This may also be determined from the posture of the main body when contact is made with the adversary.

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\(^{179}\) NATO AAP-6. A second definition provided by AAP-6: “any body or detachment of troops that provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defence, or by any combination of these methods.” Either definition may be applied depending upon the circumstances and commander’s intent.

\(^{180}\) There is a key difference between security and protection. A force that is providing security will only be able to give warning of an adversary’s activity. It can do little to pre-empt or disrupt it. A force that is tasked to provide protection must be able to alert the main body to the adversary, and must be capable of defeating or disrupting the adversary force long enough for the main force to take appropriate action.

\(^{181}\) NATO AAP-6.

\(^{182}\) Ibid.
2. By advancing to contact, the force seizes and maintains the initiative. The operation may involve destroying or forcing the withdrawal of an adversary's elements and seizing ground of tactical importance.

7124. CONDUCT

1. Planning. The primary consideration in planning for an advance to contact is anticipating actions that may occur during the operation and the requirements for manoeuvre and fire support when contact is made. Contingency plans should be issued prior to commencement that anticipate possible contact and required actions. During the advance to contact, the commander will need to analyze the situation continually using current reports and intelligence from all sources. The mission, particularly the anticipated employment of combat forces, dictates the positions of units and groupings in the formation. CSS units are integrated with the movement of combat forces to provide support but without interfering with tactical movement.

2. Situational Awareness. While reconnaissance forces and other ISTAR capabilities (such as forward deployed UAVs) will provide a good deal of situational awareness, the advance to contact will never be conducted with full situational awareness. This is particularly true in close terrain and situations involving unconventional adversaries. The commander will adjust plans such as the speed of advance and formations used, depending upon the level of awareness provided, the adversary, and the overall amount of risk he is willing to accept.

3. Scheme of Manoeuvre. The commander will task, array and commit his forces as demanded by his assessment of the situation:

   a. Covering Force Action. The advance to contact will be led by a covering force that normally contains reconnaissance forces. The covering force will assist in finding the adversary and other information to support subsequent fixing and striking. Whenever possible, the axis of advance should be given in the most general terms to the leading elements. The axis of advance should be allowed to develop as the battle unfolds so that success can be exploited. Possible tasks of the covering force may include the following:

      (1) Locate and determine the strength of the adversary's positions.

      (2) Find and exploit gaps so as to provide information on possible routes for enveloping or bypassing action by the main body.

      (3) Obtain information on routes, obstacles, terrain conditions affecting movement, as well as civilian population distributions.

      (4) Conduct deep penetration either to disrupt adversary communications and logistic units or possibly to seize a crossing site, in particular a bridge or defile. Integral engineer support will be required to "make safe" and remove any demolitions on the crossing, and the main force must follow very quickly.

      (5) Provide security for the advance guard and main body by conducting counter-reconnaissance.
(6) Support subsequent operations such as an attack by securing lines of departure, identifying attack positions and fire bases, etc.

b. **Advance Guard and Main Body.** An advance guard may be deployed to provide additional security for the main body, to counter unexpected situations and to fix adversary forces for subsequent striking by the main body. The tactical handling of the advance guard and the main body will depend upon the number of routes available. The rate of advance will vary across the front and will depend upon the terrain, the location and strength of adversary positions and the possibility of bypassing the opposition. Advances through urban areas will be particularly slow if advancing across a wide frontage or using an urban saturation technique. The grouping within the main body must be sufficiently flexible to allow elements to:

(1) Assume the advance guard role.

(2) Change direction or route of any of the elements of the main body either to bypass adversary positions or to take advantage of better routes.

(3) Deal with the adversary that has been bypassed or is holding up the main force.

c. **Flank Guards and Rearguards.** The deployment of the flank guards and rearguards will depend upon the assessment of the adversary. Flank guards normally travel on routes parallel to the route of the main body, moving either continuously or by successive or alternating bounds to occupy key positions on the flanks. In some situations, flank protection may be provided by a flanking formation. Armoured reconnaissance units are suitable for flank protection of the advancing force by moving on a route parallel to the main axis of advance, or by picketing likely adversary approach routes. These reconnaissance forces are unlikely to be able to deal with a strong adversary force, but will give early warning of an adversary approach, which can then be dealt with by reserves. Attack or armed helicopters are particularly effective in this instance. Mobile AD units are particularly effective against the helicopter adversary. The rearguard follows the main body.

d. **Action on Contact.** On contact, speed of manoeuvre and initiative may overcome the adversary before he can react. The sequence of action on contact may be as follows:

(1) Within its capabilities, the covering force destroys adversary forces that can interfere with the movement of the main body and pickets or blocks those that it cannot destroy. It should be prepared to handover quickly to the advance guard and to resume its assigned tasks.

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(2) The covering force should develop the adversary picture and inform the commander of the main body of terrain that will support a subsequent offensive action, such as positions for attack and the fire base.

(3) Elements of the advance guard or of the main body may be committed to reduce pockets of resistance contained or bypassed by the covering force.

(4) Any elements of the covering force tasked with containing such pockets initially are relieved as rapidly as possible and rejoin the covering force to avoid dissipating its strength.

(5) The commander monitors the progress of the leading and engaged combat forces and anticipates their requirements. When resistance is encountered, he commits forces from the main body in order to maintain the momentum of the advance.

e. **Maintenance of Momentum and Subsequent Actions.** It is of the utmost importance that the momentum of the advance be maintained. Whenever possible, adversary positions should be outflanked. The commander must lay down whether they are to be bypassed and cleared by follow-up forces, or to be taken by the leading elements. A commander may well decide that a hasty attack by troops in contact is to his advantage, while another part of the force continues the advance. In either case, if the adversary established a continuous front and the strength and width of his positions preclude an outflanking move, an attack may be mounted to force a gap.

f. **Bypassing Policy.** The bypassing policy must be carefully considered and clearly specified. It will always be extremely difficult to determine the exact strength of a position, and much will depend upon accurate reconnaissance and intelligence.

g. **Routes.** Once routes have been opened it may be necessary to employ forces to ensure their security, particularly if small pockets of adversary have been bypassed and remain to the rear of friendly forces. If possible, routes used for logistic traffic should be kept separate from those used by combat forces. These routes are especially vulnerable to adversary action and require security against land and air attack. CSS assets may require planned convoy security particularly when dealing with a non-contiguous battlespace and an unconventional adversary.

h. **Airmobile and Airborne Forces.** Airmobile or airborne forces achieve surprise and maintain momentum by being deployed ahead of the covering force to seize key terrain, including defiles, bridges and crossing sites, and to overcome obstacles. The ground force can then link up with them and continue the advance without the need to undertake an operation that may slow the momentum of the advance. Such forces must not be deployed too far ahead and against targets that they are unable to overcome, as they may be lost before assistance arrives, and momentum will suffer.
i. **Transition to Other Operations.** The advance to contact ends either when the intended posture is achieved or when adversary action requires the deployment and the coordinated effort of the main body.

### 7125. COMBAT SUPPORT IN AN ADVANCE

1. **Artillery.** Immediate and effective fire support will enable the force to engage the adversary, retaining freedom of action to bypass or to attack. A heavy volume of fire will reduce the need to deploy troops in contact with the adversary. As the nature of the advance to contact is one of sustained movement, a high degree of fire support coordination is required. Artillery, mortars and ships providing naval gunfire must move in such a way that maximum support is available at all times. Forward observers must accompany leading elements and units on exposed flanks.

2. **Air and Close Air Support.** Tactical air support is required in the advance to contact to:
   a. assist in protecting advancing units from adversary air attack;
   b. provide information and intelligence about the adversary;
   c. provide close air support to supplement artillery, particularly when it is not possible to concentrate its fire; and
   d. interdict adversary units attempting to withdraw or reinforce.

3. **Aviation.** Helicopter support is used mainly for the following purposes:
   a. surveillance and reconnaissance;
   b. flank protection;
   c. exercise of command and control;
   d. seizure of critical points and key terrain features; and
   e. resupply and medical evacuation.

4. **Air Defence.** AD weapons must keep up with the advance. To achieve this, ground based AD must have a priority for road movement. Likely tasks will include the protection of vulnerable points on the route and cover for critical operations such as an attack, river crossing or breaching operation.

5. **Engineers.** The main role of engineers in the advance is to open and maintain routes using specialist engineer equipment. They also have the tasks of assisting the leading troops to overcome obstacles and to clear mines, and of helping in the protection of the flanks. Engineers and their heavy equipment should be positioned so that they can be deployed quickly when required. An engineer reconnaissance element must move with the leading troops and engineer resources may have to be well forward.

6. **Electronic Warfare.** Emphasis will be placed on the employment of passive EW (intercept and direction finding) resources in order to detect and locate the adversary.
7126. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AN ADVANCE

1. Commanders should move well forward so that they can quickly influence the battle and make the most of fleeting opportunities. Distances and rapid movement will strain normal command arrangements. Command posts will be on the move, particularly at lower levels, as follows:

   a. As the main body normally moves on radio silence the problem of maintaining coordination along the routes will require special arrangements and may also cause a restriction on the use of AD assets.

   b. Special arrangements may be required to provide additional radios for relay purposes.

   c. Extensive use will have to be made of liaison elements.

   d. Coordination with supporting air forces will present special problems.

   e. The command responsibilities for each route and for traffic control must be established.

   f. Traffic control systems should be able to:

      (1) easily rearrange the order of march on routes allocated;

      (2) improve measures to keep routes open; and

      (3) assist in regulating the flow of traffic to help units reach their destinations in a timely manner.

   g. The command relationship between the various elements of the force must be established beforehand.

7127. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN AN ADVANCE

1. CSS must provide for the requirements of the advance and for the anticipated requirements of any subsequent mission. The support problem in the advance is that of sustaining forces that are moving and thus extending the supply lines. Because there will seldom be sufficient transport, a careful calculation of anticipated requirements must be made and priorities established.

2. At the start of the operation, units should be as self-contained as possible and arrangements made so that they can be refuelled during the move. Engineer stores for bridging and route repair are likely to be a large transport commitment. It is important that maintenance and recovery resources and traffic control are deployed to keep routes open and assist units.

3. Medical units should move with the force and be able to provide immediate treatment during movement. When contact is made with the adversary they should rapidly establish second line (Role 2) medical facilities. As the LOC may become extended, helicopters should be available for the evacuation of high priority casualties.
7128. TACTICAL MOVEMENT

1. Tactical movement is an enabling activity that involves tactical movement between locations by combat and other forces, without the expectation or seeking of adversary contact, albeit prepared for contact.

2. It differs from an advance to contact in that forces conducting the march are prepared to counter adversary activities, but are not expecting nor seeking to make contact en route.

3. Forces moving from one location to conduct other tactical activities, such as stability activities in a given area, may use tactical movement. It is generally used in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces in which the adversary is unlikely to be located in a fixed location. During the march, forces do not actively seek contact but are prepared for adversary contact. The greatest threats to forces on the march will be ambushes and IEDs.

4. Movement is done tactically and schemes of manoeuvre and the use of security activities will reflect the tactical situation and adversary’s profile.

5. The conduct and planning considerations for the advance to contact may be applied to the planning and conduct of tactical movement. Given the possibility of contact during the march, the commander will assess the need for the security of the force throughout the activity, and will take the necessary precautions, such as the deployment of security forces and the clearing of defiles and danger areas.

SECTION 24
MEETING ENGAGEMENT

7129. PURPOSE

1. The meeting engagement is a combat action that may occur when opposing forces seek to fulfil their mission by offensive action. It will often occur during an advance to contact and can easily lead to a hasty attack. In offensive, defensive or delaying operations it will often mark a moment of transition in that the outcome may well decide the nature of subsequent operations. For these reasons, a meeting engagement is described as a transitional phase. Even when the main part of a force is attacking, defending or delaying, individual elements may find themselves in situations that have the characteristics of a meeting engagement.

2. The meeting engagement differs from the advance to contact in that it occurs unexpectedly, whereas in the advance to contact the commander is deliberately seeking to establish contact with the adversary.

3. A meeting engagement may occur in various circumstances:
   a. When a force that is moving makes contact with an adversary about whom the friendly force has little or no information.
   b. When both sides become aware of the each other and decide to attack without delay in an attempt to obtain positional advantage, gain ground of tactical importance, maintain momentum, or assert dominance over the other.
   c. When one force deploys hastily for defence while the other attempts to prevent it from doing so.
7130. CONDUCT

1. It will not be possible to plan in detail for a meeting engagement. However, a force that is properly deployed in accordance with recognized tactical principles will be poised to react to most situations. Meeting engagements will invariably force a commander to reconsider and often adjust his plans. The basic principle is to seize and retain the initiative. This will give the commander the freedom of action he needs, whether to accomplish his mission as he originally intended or to change his plan to suit the new situation. High tempo is at a premium and success depends, to a large extent, upon the speed of reaction of the commander and his forces. The commander can then decide how to develop the meeting engagement into a subsequent offensive or defensive action.

2. While commanders can make no firm plans, they should make use of the IPB process. In particular, they should study the terrain and the map to deduce areas that are favourable to a meeting engagement. Additionally, they should take particular note of the latest situation or intelligence reports and assessments concentrating on likely adversary capabilities, objectives, and avenues of advance, movement, and natural obstacles.

3. Meeting engagements are such that there will not normally be enough time for a complete battle procedure to take place as the two opposing forces close. Assuming a reasonable balance of forces, victory will go to the side with the higher tempo. The commander, who reacts more quickly, strikes the first blow and keeps the adversary off balance. In the planning stage, this implies careful reconnaissance, balanced grouping, forward command, and responsive indirect fire support on call. Planning in this type of battle should never be so detailed as to lead a commander into a preconceived course of action, as a plan is not a substitute for initiative and bold leadership that overturn material superiority.

4. The commander whose forces make contact with the adversary in a meeting engagement must immediately decide how he wants to fight the battle. In deciding on a course of action he must not lose sight of his original mission and of his superior commander's intent. On the other hand, he must not shirk his responsibility to act independently. He must notify his superior commander immediately of his decision.

5. One of the commander's first tasks in a meeting engagement is to determine the adversary's strengths and dispositions. In particular, he should ascertain the situation on the adversary's flanks. The identification of, and an attack on an assailable flank, will generally disclose the adversary's dispositions more rapidly than a frontal attack, and will give more opportunity for tactical surprise and decisive results.

6. Often, it may not be immediately possible to use all the forces that the commander may wish to deploy. In this case, he must establish an order of priority for deployment early in the operation. Throughout the operation, he must keep a clear picture of the location and status of all elements of his force.

7. The commander's decision on how to continue a meeting engagement should, wherever possible, be based upon his personal assessment of the situation. However, he must not sacrifice valuable time to obtain detailed information. He must realize that he is in a race with the adversary commander for time and space. It is, therefore, extremely important that before the operation starts the commander evaluates possible routes for movement and assesses any area of terrain that may be useful, and that he keeps these in mind while his force is moving.
8. The speed of reaction and considerable firepower of armed/attack helicopters, allows the
force to be committed very quickly against the adversary in a meeting engagement. In
particular, early deployment of reconnaissance and AH in a combat, as opposed to a combat
support role, will nearly always give a commander an advantage.

7131. COMBAT SUPPORT IN A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

1. Artillery. The amount of initial fire support available to the forces that become involved
in a meeting engagement depends upon the organization for movement laid down by the
commander. It is, therefore, particularly important that there is fire support available to support
the leading elements of a moving force. Forward artillery observers must be allocated to the
leading elements of a combat force. A meeting engagement is also an ideal situation in which
to make use of scatterable mines to restrict the adversary’s freedom of manoeuvre.

2. Air Defence. AD weapons should be positioned along adversary air avenues of
approach to over-watch forces on the move. Adversary ground forces will often be supported
by armed helicopters, or they may approach under air cover, or by air transport.

3. Engineer. The rapid deployment of engineers can be crucial in transitional phases of
the battle. Engineer reconnaissance must be well forward, as must armoured engineers.
Combat engineers must be readily available for mobility or counter mobility tasks. An
appropriate and quick employment of engineer equipments can ensure freedom of movement
and deny it to the adversary. Engineer planning of scatterable mines, for example, can provide
responsive counter-mobility support if the assets are available.

4. Electronic Warfare. EW (intercept and direction finding) resources will provide
additional information on the adversary. Once battle is joined, jamming of adversary C2 and fire
support communications will assist the commander in achieving his aim.

7132. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

1. A meeting engagement will create a number of challenges for a commander in terms of
command and control:

   a. Initially, he will have little intelligence on the strength, location and intention of
      the adversary. It may even be necessary for him to confirm the locations of his
      own forces. Immediate and clear situation reports from lower commanders are
      essential to allow him to make his plan.

   b. The HQ may be on the move, and therefore, its effectiveness may be restricted.
      The staff may be dispersed or the commander separated from them. Characteristically, units will be moving in radio silence and it will take time to
      activate communications between HQs.

   c. If a meeting engagement is likely, therefore, it is vital that commanders are well
      forward and able to speak to each other, even if their HQs temporarily cannot.
7133. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN A MEETING ENGAGEMENT

1. CSS must enable the commander to seize and maintain the initiative and must be capable of responding quickly to the rapid changes in plans. Because of the limited information available when a meeting engagement occurs CSS commanders must be ready for the unexpected. Ensuring that combat supplies and materiel levels are maintained at the maximum practical level is one means of achieving this readiness.

2. In a meeting engagement, speed is the major criterion and CSS planning is subordinated to achieving that. At the level above that which is in contact, CSS should concentrate on directing its efforts on the formation or unit involved both during and after the battle. This may include:
   
a. ammunition for the battle if there is time, and certainly after reorganization;
   
b. refuelling after reorganization;
   
c. move forward of medical support and the development of a casualty evacuation plan;
   
d. ensuring maximum availability of equipment during the engagement and in preparation for subsequent operation; and
   
e. planning for the recovery of battle-winning equipments.

SECTION 25
LINK-UP

7134. PURPOSE

1. Link-up is conducted to join two friendly forces in adversary-controlled territory. It may therefore be necessary to destroy the adversary between these forces before a link-up is established. It is followed by another operation such as a forward passage of lines, a withdrawal or a relief. Both forces may be moving towards one another, or one may be stationary or encircled. They may have the same or different missions. A link-up operation could occur under the following circumstances:

   a. A link-up between two forces engaged in converging attacks may take place when each force captures adjacent objectives, thus completing encirclement.

   b. A link-up with encircled or cut-off forces may take place on the perimeter of the defensive position established by that force. When the link-up is combined with a breakout action, it may take place at another designated objective. The encircled force should try to breakout, or at least mount some form of diversionary action in order to ease the task of the relieving force by diverting the adversary’s attention.

   c. A link-up operation with an air delivered or infiltrated force may take place on the perimeter of its defensive position. In this case, the link-up is normally followed by a passage of lines or by a relief of the forces involved.
7135. CONDUCT

1. The requirement for the link-up may be part of the CONOPS from the outset. Alternatively, a link-up may become necessary in the course of an operation and must be planned as the situation develops. In any event, details of the plans must be passed to all concerned in due time, without undermining security.

2. Link-up operations are generally offensive in nature. The requirements of the link-up as well as those of the subsequent mission will determine the size and composition of the force.

3. The mission to carry out a link-up operation should always be given in the context of a subsequent mission for the forces involved. It will normally state the location where the link-up will take place. Frequently, a time will be stipulated for the link-up.

4. When planning a link-up operation, particular attention should be paid to:
   a. the coordination of manoeuvre forces involved;
   b. command relationships;
   c. communications; and
   d. control measures.

5. Link-up operations may occur when one force is moving to link-up with a stationary force or when both forces are moving. The following planning and execution considerations and procedures apply:
   a. A major consideration in this type of activity is speed in establishing the link-up in order to reduce the possibility of adversary reaction and to minimize the period of vulnerability.
   b. For the moving force in a link-up, the operation may involve deliberate attacks, or if circumstances permit, the more rapid movement of an advance to contact deployment.
   c. Ground link-up points must be coordinated at locations where the axis of advance of the moving force intersects with the security elements of the stationary force.
   d. Restrictive fire control measures are required to coordinate fire from the converging forces.
   e. During the last phase of the link-up operation the speed of advance of the forces must be carefully controlled; reconnaissance elements must seek to establish contact with the other force as early as possible, and additional information will be obtained to confirm/adjust earlier plans.
   f. When the link-up is made, the moving force may join the stationary force or pass through or around and continue to attack the adversary. If they join to continue activities, a single commander for the overall force must be designated.
Subsequent activities must be launched as quickly as possible to exploit the success achieved by the link-up.

g. Primary and alternative link-up points are established on the boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge.

h. As they move closer to one another, the need for positive control to avoid incidents of fratricide is important and must be coordinated to ensure that the adversary does not escape between the two forces.

i. The leading elements of each force should monitor a common radio net.

7136. DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT DURING A LINK-UP

1. To avoid losses, fire control must be carefully exercised until a link-up has been achieved. Link-up forces will use normal fire control measures. Specific coordination must be established, however, for any phase when the fire of one force may affect the operations of the other.

2. Particular attention must be given to the control of CAS/AH in the link-up area between the forces as they approach.

7137. ENGINEERS

1. In link-up operations, it is critical to provide mobility support to the forces that are moving to link-up. Clearing of routes and adversary barriers is essential for the timely completion of the operation.

7138. ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. Employment of EW must be carefully coordinated in order to avoid mutual interference and duplication of tasks.

7139. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A LINK-UP

1. The convergence of friendly forces in the area of the link-up may present particular problems that require the appointment of a single commander in the area. This procedure will also be normal when there is a significant difference in the size of the two forces taking part in the operation. Where this is the case, this commander must be designated beforehand and in sufficient time to allow for concerted action to be planned. The time or conditions under which command is assumed must be clearly stated.

2. The following control measures require emphasis:
   a. axis of advance or boundaries for the link-up;
   b. objectives to be held and/or to be captured by each of the forces taking part;
   c. the locations where contact between the two forces will be established;
d. the timings of the operation for the forces involved; and

e. fire coordination lines to avoid fratricide, particularly as the two forces are converging.

3. Liaison between the forces taking part and with the overall commander is very important. Communications in these circumstances can normally be maintained by radio only. The majority of detail for liaison and communications will be laid down in the overall commander’s plan; where that is not possible, these arrangements must be judiciously expedited on the initiative of the two forces carrying out the link-up operation. The measures include:

a. liaison teams;

b. passwords and visual identification signs;

c. measures for combat identification;

d. report lines and reference points; and

e. contact frequencies, radio authentication procedures and codes.

7140. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DURING A LINK-UP

1. Apart from taking account of the requirements of the link-up force itself, the commander has to consider the need to provide CSS for the force with which it is intended to link-up. In principle, CSS considerations are generally the same as those for offensive operations.

7141. LINK-UP OF A MOVING FORCE WITH A STATIONARY FORCE

1. In an operation where one force is moving to link-up with a stationary force, the following planning procedures apply:

a. A major consideration in this type of operation is speed in establishing the link-up to reduce the possibility of adversary reaction and to minimize the period of vulnerability.

b. Ground link-up points must be coordinated at locations where the axis of advance of the moving force intersects with the security elements of the stationary force.

c. A restrictive fire line (RFL) is required to coordinate fire from the converging forces.

d. For the moving force in a link-up, the operation may involve deliberate attacks, or if circumstances permit, the more rapid movement of an advance to contact.

e. When the link-up is made, the moving force may join the stationary force or pass through or around and continue to attack the adversary. If they join up to continue operations, a single commander for the overall force must be
designated. Subsequent operations must be launched as quickly as possible to exploit the success achieved by the link-up.

7142. LINK-UP OF TWO MOVING UNITS

1. Link-up between two moving forces is a difficult operation to successfully conduct and is normally undertaken to complete the encirclement of an adversary force. Primary and alternative link-up points are established on the boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge. During the last phase of the link-up operation, reconnaissance elements must seek to establish contact with the other force as early as possible, and additional information will be obtained to confirm/adjust earlier plans. As they move closer to one another, the need for positive control to avoid incidents of fratricide is important and must be coordinated to ensure that the adversary does not escape between the two forces. Leading elements of each force should monitor a common radio net.

SECTION 26  WITHDRAWAL

7143. PURPOSE

1. A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from an adversary force in accordance with the will of its commander. It seeks to disengage its combat forces from the adversary although contact may be maintained through other means such as indirect fire, reconnaissance or surveillance. The withdrawal may be followed by another specific operation such the defence in a new location.

2. The order to withdraw will not normally be given by the commander without the agreement or direction of his superior commander. A withdrawal may be undertaken for the following reasons:

   a. If the objective of the operation cannot be achieved and the force is faced with defeat.

   b. The objective is achieved and there is no further requirement to maintain contact.

   c. To avoid battle in unfavourable tactical conditions.

   d. To draw the adversary into an unfavourable posture, for example, to extend his LOC.

   e. To conform to the movements of adjacent friendly forces.

   f. To allow for the use of the force or parts of the force elsewhere.

   g. For CSS reasons; that is, the force can no longer be sustained.

3. The withdrawal should be conducted so as to minimize adversary interference and preserve fighting power. The ability to move rapidly to offensive or defensive operations should always be retained.
4. The withdrawal will take place either in or out of contact with the adversary. Whichever the case, the commander's primary concerns in planning and conduct will be:

   a. to disengage;
   b. to retain an intact frontline by the deployment of strong covering troops;
   c. to safeguard withdrawal routes; and
   d. to maintain balance throughout the operation.

5. Success will depend upon the maintenance of morale, tight control and secrecy. A commander must also be ready to take the offensive if the opportunity arises, albeit with only limited objectives.

6. The commander's mission will normally be to disengage his force. If the mission is the deliberate intention of a higher commander, the mission will be included in a complete OPORD. If, on the other hand, the decision has been forced upon the commander by highly unfavourable circumstances, the order to withdraw may contain nothing more than the authority to do so and give only minimal direction.

7. The scheme of manoeuvre must be simple and normal organizations should be retained as far as possible. Regrouping during the operation should be avoided. Particular attention should also be paid to:

   a. surprise and deception, possibly including noise coverage by artillery;
   b. maximum use of cover and concealment to achieve protection; and
   c. allocation of routes and an appropriate movement control system.

7144. ORGANIZATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL

1. A withdrawing force should normally be organized into:

   a. a protective element that covers the withdrawal; and
   b. a main body protecting itself with advance, rear and flank guards.

2. The withdrawing force's subsequent mission will have an influence on its organization and on the sequence of the withdrawal. Depending upon the subsequent tasks, there will likely be a requirement to send an advance party, often under the command of a second-in-command, in order to conduct the reconnaissance and planning for the next task.

3. Forces not required for immediate operations, including CSS elements and the wounded, should be moved out early to keep routes clear and allow for a rapid withdrawal.

7145. PLANNING

1. The commander's estimate of the situation should consider:
The distance to be moved.

b. The weather/ground conditions and the degree and duration of darkness. To maintain secrecy, achieve surprise and reduce casualties from the air, withdrawals are generally better carried out at night, although, against an adversary with a good surveillance capability, darkness will not hide movement. Bad weather conditions, however, such as heavy rain, mist or fog, may enable a withdrawal to be carried out effectively by day. Difficult ground conditions may make a withdrawal in daylight the only practical way to avoid loss of control.

c. Possibilities of impeding the adversary’s mobility, particularly by barriers.

d. Adversary ground strength.

e. The situation on both flanks.

f. The mobility of the force.

g. The air situation.

h. CSS.

2. The scheme of manoeuvre must cover the entire operation. It must be simple and normal organizations should be retained as far as possible. Regrouping during the activity should be avoided. Particular attention should also be paid to:

a. The plan being simple to permit flexibility.

b. Grouping for the withdrawal remaining the same, if possible, throughout the operation.

c. Surprise and deception, possibly including noise coverage by artillery.

d. The maximum use of cover and concealment to achieve protection.

e. Allocation of routes and an appropriate traffic control system.

3. The withdrawal is coordinated and controlled through key timings:

a. The time at which thinning-out may occur.

b. The time until when the position must be denied. This is the main coordinating timing of the withdrawal plan.

c. The time to be clear of the current position.

d. The time to be clear of any specific coordination line. This will be needed for the coordination of supporting fires; and

e. The time by which the subsequent task (such as manning a new defensive position) is to be completed.
4. The preparation of demolitions and other obstacles along the withdrawal routes must be carried out as early as possible. This is particularly important for preliminary demolitions, which must be carefully coordinated with the plan for the withdrawing force. The preparation of denial measures should be carried out as soon as possible and their execution carefully coordinated with the plan for the withdrawing force.

5. Along boundaries, the appropriate higher-level commander should coordinate the preparation of denial measures. Execution should be carried out carefully and in accordance with the plan of the withdrawing force. The higher commander will make the final decision on the execution of any denial measures after consultation with adjacent commanders.

6. A withdrawal will either be conducted directly to a new main position, or indirectly through one or more intermediate positions. The decision to use intermediate positions will depend upon the distance, the strength of the force, the state of the adversary and the delay required to prepare the new position. In this case, a rearward passage of lines will be required in order to check the adversary at the intermediate position.

7. Considerations when planning and selecting intermediate positions are:
   a. They must be strong enough to force the adversary to deploy early and to undertake time consuming preparations for an attack. This will mean selecting positions that incorporate natural obstacles and deploying long range direct and indirect weapon systems.
   b. They should be far enough from one position to the other to force the attacker to move his artillery each time to engage.
   c. The time before which there will be no rearward movement except for normal traffic and reconnaissance parties.
   d. The time up to which the position has to be denied to the adversary.
   e. The time at which troops may start thinning-out equipment and supplies to the rear.
   f. The time by which all troops will be clear of a line behind the position. This will be needed for the coordination of supporting fires.

7146. CONDUCT—SCHEME OF MANOEUVRE AND SEQUENCE OF WITHDRAWAL

1. Based upon the timings issued in the superior’s orders (for such activities as thinning-out, time the position must be denied, and time for the crossing of any coordination lines), the sequence for the withdrawal from a position may be:
   a. Reconnaissance parties move back and all non-essential vehicles and equipment are cleared from the position.
   b. Covering forces take up station behind the position and reserves move to the appropriate locations.
c. Troops on the position withdraw through the covering troops. By night, when surprise is easier to achieve and a commander considers a disengagement possible, rear elements should pull out first leaving those forces deployed forward until later. Where disengagement is not possible, forward troops will move first covered by those in depth.

d. The task of the protective force is to prevent the adversary from engaging the main body.

e. The main body withdraws on order. At the lower tactical levels, the plan must include a staggered withdrawal of one element moving while covered by another element until a clean break with any adversary has been achieved.

f. As soon as the main body has disengaged and is at a safe distance, the protective elements start their disengagement, although they could remain in their original position until the adversary attacks in force, so as to achieve the maximum deception and delay. If the adversary launches a strong attack, they will continue their protective task with a delaying operation. If the distance to be moved is great and the adversary is expected to react quickly, a portion of the protective force may occupy a number of intermediate defensive positions in the rear of the position being abandoned before the withdrawal of the main body.

g. If the protective element is not able to disengage or to prevent the adversary from closing in on the main body, it must either be reinforced by elements from the main body, or the overall commander must commit the majority, or all, of this force. In this event, the withdrawal must be resumed at the earliest possible time. If the protective element has disengaged, it will follow the main body and continue to provide security. In this case, it will maintain surveillance of the adversary until ordered to break contact completely or until this task is taken over by another force.

h. This sequence is repeated at each intermediate position. The withdrawal is terminated when a force is ready to assume its next task.

7147. COMBAT SUPPORT IN THE WITHDRAWAL

1. **Artillery.** Artillery must be organized and deployed so that it can cover the entire operation. Long-range artillery will be withdrawn early and placed far enough back so that it can cover the withdrawal. Artillery elements remaining with the protective elements will endeavour to maintain the previous fire support cover for as long as possible.

2. **Air Support.** Air interdiction and CAS may play an important part in harassing the adversary following up the withdrawal or attempting to bypass the withdrawal forces. CAS will be particularly useful, especially where withdrawing artillery causes a reduction of, or interruption to, indirect fire support. Forward air controllers (FACs) will be required with the protective element. Defensive counter air (AD) effort may be needed for protection against adversary ground attack aircraft.

3. **Aviation.** Transport helicopters can enhance the speed with which withdrawal operations can be carried out. Helicopters in a reconnaissance role may be used to observe adversary activity during the withdrawal. Helicopters can also be used to extract stay-behind forces. Armed/attack aviation may be used to provide a covering force to assist with disengagement and a delay of any advancing adversary.
4. **Air Defence.** There are unlikely to be sufficient organic AD resources available to provide comprehensive cover throughout the AO, so priorities of tasks must be established. The deployment plan of AD units should ensure that they are effective at critical periods to cover locations where the withdrawing forces are likely to be particularly vulnerable, or areas that the adversary may select as landing sites for air delivered forces.

5. **Engineers.** Engineers will be heavily committed in the withdrawal. Many will be used in preparing a new defensive position to which forces are withdrawing. Some, however, may remain to assist with the withdrawal in the following ways:
   
a. **Mobility.** Withdrawal routes must be cleared and maintained. The main body and rear echelon elements are assisted in breaching unforeseen obstacles and crossing restrictive terrain.
   
b. **Counter-mobility.** Demolitions and obstacles are prepared to delay adversary forces near the withdrawing forces.

6. **Electronic Warfare.** EW assets will be particularly useful in executing the deception plan, as well as in disrupting adversary C2 communications.

7148. **COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A WITHDRAWAL**

1. Control measures of particular importance in the withdrawal are:
   
a. liaison elements;
   
b. routes/axes;
   
c. report/phase lines;
   
d. traffic control measures;
   
e. check points; and
   
f. timings as required for critical phases or sequences.

2. The purpose of the operation must be understood by the whole force in order to maintain morale. During the withdrawal, every opportunity should be taken to maintain morale.

3. Good communications are vital, and the policy for radio and electronic silence must be clearly stated. Communications links, methods of operation and density of communications traffic should remain unchanged for as long as possible to avoid disclosing, to the adversary, the intention to disengage. The creation of radio traffic by forces remaining in contact will add to the overall deception of the adversary. Elements, which have disengaged from the adversary, will normally be ordered to keep radio silence.

7149. **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE WITHDRAWAL**

1. **General.** The CSS plan should ensure that the requirements of the withdrawing force are met and that useful materiel, particularly fuel, does not fall into the adversary’s hands. It may take considerable time to evacuate stocks. The supply of ammunition to protective elements and artillery must be guaranteed.
2. **Planning Considerations.** The adversary must be denied the use of the military equipment and supplies of own forces, other than medical equipment and supplies (see para 460). Maintenance is to be concentrated on the readiness of materiel required to conduct the operation. Recovery equipment is to be marshalled at critical locations to keep routes open and to recover all materiel possible.

3. **Supply.** Before rearward movement begins, the forward stocks will be reduced by stopping forward supply, and when possible, back-loading any unnecessary forward stocks. Mobile distribution points should be established to meet urgent needs and changes in the OPLAN. Losses of equipment may exceed normal wastage rates and special arrangements for replacements may have to be made.

4. **Medical.** Primary concern should be given to the evacuation of casualties. Visible evidence that casualty evacuation is operating effectively will help maintain morale.

5. **Military Denial of Equipment and Stocks.** This must be coordinated with the timings used in the OPLAN so that tactical security is not prejudiced. The plan should provide for the denial of any equipment or dumps that cannot be back-loaded. However, under the Geneva Conventions it is not permitted for medical equipment to be destroyed.

6. **Traffic Control.** To expedite rearward movement military police may be deployed at critical junctions and potential defiles.

### 7150. RETIREMENT

1. A retirement is different from a withdrawal. It is a movement away from the adversary by a force out of contact with the adversary. It is completed in generally the same manner as a withdrawal, however, since the force is out of contact, it is unlikely that there will be a requirement for a robust covering force.

### SECTION 27

#### RELIEF

### 7151. PURPOSE

1. When combat activities are taken over by one force from another, this is referred to as the conduct of relief operations. Relief operations are undertaken when forces:

   a. are unable to continue with their mission;
   
   b. are required for operations in another area;
   
   c. have accomplished their mission;
   
   d. are due for rotation to avoid exhaustion; and
   
   e. are not suitable to accomplish the new task.

2. The types of relief are as follows:
a. **Relief in Place.** A relief in place (RIP) is a relief in which all or part of a force is replaced in a sector by an incoming unit. In certain circumstances, the force being relieved may be encircled by adversary forces and unable to breakout.

b. **Forward Passage of Lines.** A forward passage of lines is a relief in which a force advances or attacks through another that is in contact with the adversary.

c. **Rearward Passages of Lines.** A rearward passage of lines is a relief in which a force effecting a movement to the rear passes through the sector of a unit occupying a defensive position. Normally, a delay force would be expected to conduct a rearward passage of lines.

3. A relief is normally undertaken in order to sustain the overall level of combat power. Inherent is the transfer of operational responsibility for a combat mission. The requirement is that this transfer should take place while maintaining the required level of operational capability. Commanders normally co-locate to affect the handover.

4. The commander’s intentions, the type of operation the force has been engaged in, the type of adversary force involved, and its anticipated course of action will determine the mission.

5. During any relief, there is a period when congestion increases the vulnerability of the forces involved. The possibility of confusion is inherent, as two parallel command systems will be operating in one area at the same time. The complexity should not be underestimated, but by contrast, the beneficial and possibly decisive effects to be gained from successful synchronization of the combat power of both forces should not be forgotten.

**7152. INTEROPERABILITY**

1. It is quite possible that a relief operation will involve forces of different nationalities. In this instance, the following additional points should be considered:

   a. dissimilar unit organizations may require special adjustments in some areas, particularly during an RIP;

   b. control of fire support may require special liaison;

   c. language difficulties may require the increased use of guides/interpreters; and

   d. special communications arrangements may be required including additional liaison teams and communications detachments.

**7153. GENERAL PLANNING FOR A RELIEF**

1. In planning for any relief, the following should be considered:

   a. **Security and Protection.** The intention to conduct a relief must be concealed from the adversary. Deception measures should include the continuation of normal patterns of activity. Additional protection may be required due to the increased vulnerability during such operations.
b. Early Liaison. Close cooperation and coordination are required at all levels and at an early stage between the troops in position and those that are moving. As much detailed reconnaissance as the tactical situation allows must be made by the incoming force.

c. Allocation of Routes for Movement. Incoming and outgoing forces should, where possible, be allocated separate routes.

d. Allocation of Areas. This will include the allocation of areas for staging and deployment, including areas for artillery.

e. Timings. The detailed timing of the operation will be made within the guidelines set by the overall commander.

2. Fire Support. The in-place force will always provide fire support for the moving force.

7154. RELIEF IN PLACE

1. Circumstances. An RIP is normally conducted in defensive operations and may occur in the following circumstances:

   a. when the existing force is depleted or exhausted and needs to be replaced;

   b. when troops of one capability or role need to be replaced by troops of a different role; and

   c. for routine rotation of troops.

2. Mission Transfer. The incoming force normally assumes the mission of the relieved force, usually within the same boundaries, and at least initially, with a similar disposition, assuming the types of formation are the same. The transfer should take place without a loss in operational capability.

3. Planning. Once begun, all RIP operations take place as quickly as possible. Where possible, the operations should take place at night or during periods of reduced visibility. Detailed planning and preparation for an RIP is preferable if the operation is to be conducted successfully. The incoming force should conduct a thorough reconnaissance if time permits. If time is limited, the RIP is planned and executed from oral or FRAGOs. The liaison personnel are left by the outgoing formation to assist with the coordination. Personnel from combat, combat support and CSS units remain with the incoming force until barrier, fire support, counterattack and CSS plans are coordinated.

4. Timings. The detailed timings of the operation will be made within the guidelines set by the superior commander commencing with a timely warning order. Ideally, sufficient time must be allowed at all levels for detailed handovers of essential information including:

   a. current tactical situation and intelligence assessment;

   b. current OPORDs and OPLANs, including the deception plan;

   c. organization of the area and location of facilities and routes;
d. CSS plan;
e. sequence of the RIP;
f. location of other units that will not be replaced;
g. timings, particularly the time of the transfer of command; and
h. details of the intelligence collection plan and location of sources where appropriate.

5. **Execution**. After the planning is completed at formation level, execution can be decentralized. The RIP then consists of a series of relief operations conducted by formations and monitored by the respective superior HQ:

a. The RIP depends essentially upon the time available and the local conditions. It can take place simultaneously over the entire width of the sector, or it can be decentralized and staggered across the formation with regard to time and place. If forces are relieved simultaneously over the entire width, a shorter time is required, but the readiness of the defence is considerably reduced and the adversary is more likely to be able to detect the higher level of movement. By contrast, a relief staggered with regard to time and place takes longer, but a larger element of the outgoing forces is combat ready at all times and concealment is easier.

b. Combat support troops should not be relieved at the same time as combat troops.

c. In general, night and limited visibility will be exploited for the relief, particularly when close to the adversary. If possible, the advance parties of the incoming unit will conduct a reconnaissance in daylight. If this is not possible, or if the incoming unit needs assistance from the outgoing unit to quickly familiarize itself with the local conditions, rear parties of the relieved unit will carry out the orientation.

d. Communications links must be maintained, unaltered if possible, for the entire duration of the relief.

e. CSS troops of the outgoing unit will be sent back as early as practicable. Pre-positioned common user bulk supplies and barrier materiel will normally be taken over by the incoming unit.

f. The relief then consists of a series of relief activities conducted by formations and monitored by respective superior HQs. Once the relief has started, commanders and staffs are concerned with:

1. timings and the movement of formations and units;
2. coordination of transportation resources;
3. movement control;
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(4) current activities;
(5) having constant surveillance and intelligence collection capability;
(6) having a coordinated AD plan involving air, aviation, AD and all arms AD resources; and
(7) the availability and notice to move of reserves.

6. **Route Allocation.** Careful route planning and movement control are essential to avoid congestion. The movement control plan must be simple in concept, but in sufficient detail to ensure that it meets the aim. Movements in opposite directions will be conducted on separate roads and tracks if possible, and lateral movements will be avoided. Where possible, incoming and outgoing formations and units should make shared use of transport allocated for the operation.

7. **Defence Plan Review.** The assumption of responsibility for an existing defensive position and barrier may force the new commander to fight the previous commanders plan, unless significant adjustments are made. A full review of the barrier plan, fire support plan and manoeuvre plan must be conducted to ensure that the new commander's intent may be met.

7155. **RELIEF OF ENCIRCLED FORCES**

1. The purpose of relieving encircled forces is to break through adversary positions to reach an encircled force, thus restoring its freedom of action. In such a situation, it is unlikely that the encircled force will have the combat power necessary to breakout of the encirclement, even with support from another force. The break through will result from a deliberate attack, followed by a link-up operation with the in-place, encircled force, and then the relief.

7156. **EXTRAUDED RELIEF IN PLACE**

1. During campaigns that are short of major combat (such as peace support operations and COIN campaigns), an RIP being conducted between units or formations may be conducted over an extended period of time. They still follow the same procedures and principles, but will require additional time for incoming commanders to learn and understand the complexities of the AO, such as its key political leaders, persons of influence, power structures, aims and desires of local populations and tribes, cultural habits, and conventional and unconventional adversaries. In short, the RIP will include a handover of the knowledge base that considers all aspects of the AO that influence the achievement of the operational and strategic end states.

2. Incoming commanders must gain an understanding of the end states and objectives sought, and the current lines of operation driving towards those objectives. During the period of relief, they will be able to reflect upon the prosecution of these lines of operation and begin to make an assessment as to how they may be adjusted if necessary.

3. Much of the information that will support an RIP may be passed to the incoming/moving force by the in-place force during the period leading up to the relief as part of the battle procedure of the incoming force. The in-place force can also dispatch trainers and advisors to the relieving force in order to assist in their battle procedure and training.
7157. **FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES**

1. **Purpose.** During a forward passage of lines, a moving force passes through an in-place force in order to assume the latter's mission or a new mission. The force in contact (in-place force) remains in place and must provide the advancing force with as much assistance as possible including tactical and logistical support. A forward passage of lines will be used when:
   
a. An attack is to be continued with fresh or more suitable forces.
   
b. A moving force is required to pass through an area held by another force, such as a bridgehead or crossing site.
   
c. The advancing force has to take possession of suitable terrain in order to continue the battle.

2. **Planning.** The planning procedures for a forward passage of lines are similar to those for an RIP, although less physical reconnaissance may occur. The plans for the moving force take priority. Upon receipt of the warning order, the commander and staff of the moving force establish liaison with the in-place force. The moving formation/unit will normally co-locate its tactical or main HQ with that of the in-place force. All levels of command should exchange liaison personnel.

3. **Responsibilities.** Responsibilities for the various planning requirements will be split between the different HQs involved in the operation. They are detailed below. The list is not exhaustive and any given operation may require a different allocation of responsibilities:

   a. **Controlling Headquarters:**
      
      (1) Overall plan including timings, control lines, routes and rendezvous points.
      
      (2) Arrangements for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties.
      
      (3) Fire support coordination including tactical air support.
      
      (4) Deception plans, including emission control (EMCON) and EW, and restriction on forward reconnaissance.
      
      (5) Movement.
      
      (6) Airspace control measures and coordination of AD.
      
      (7) CSS including criteria for handover of equipment, combat supplies and medical support.

   b. **In-place Force:**
      
      (1) Intelligence, including adversary dispositions and topographical information. This will also include information concerning the local populace, key figures, attitudes, aims, intentions and power structures.
(2) Coordination of reconnaissance.

(3) Liaison where required. Normally the moving force provides liaison to the in-place force.

(4) Security of the line of departure (LD) of the moving force. Selection of the LD should be done in line with the plans of the moving force.

(5) Selection, security and maintenance of routes and movement control.

(6) Allocation of terrain for the moving force, such as harbours, hides and waiting areas.

(7) Provision of AD cover, essentially up to the LD, and desirably, forward of it.

(8) Guides.

(9) Fire support until the pre-H hour fire plan starts. Thereafter, the provision of fire support while still in range. Ideally, the in-place force will be able to position assets to support the moving force across the LD.

(10) Forward replenishment, especially fuel, after the move forward and before the commitment of the moving force.

c. Moving Force:

(1) Provision of a HQ, to be co-located with the HQ of the in-place force. There should be representatives from the staff, and artillery and engineer advisors.

(2) Timings for the move forward and control of movement.

(3) Agreement with the existing force over the provision of terrain, especially for gun areas, concentration/assembly areas and attack positions.

(4) Liaison officers to subordinate HQs or units of the in-place force.

(5) Assistance with movement control.

4. Timings. The detailed timings of the operation will be made within the guidelines set by the superior commander commencing with a timely warning order. Time must be allowed for:

a. planning, initially at force level and then at subordinate levels;

b. movement and co-location of command elements;

c. movement of reconnaissance, advance and combat support elements;

d. battle procedure; and

e. movement of the main body.
5. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The following guidelines apply:

   a. **General.** The moving force will take advantage of the security provided by the
      in-place force to deploy for the attack. The entire movement from the rear
      through the in-place force should be completed as a single fluid movement in
      order to avoid congestion. The indirect fire support elements of the attacking
      force may be deployed in the in-place force’s area prior to the arrival of the
      manoeuvre force.

   b. **Grouping.** Whenever possible, regrouping should be carried out before the
      move forward. Regrouping in a forward assembly area should be avoided. The
      moving force will be organized so that the mission can be carried out/continued
      after the passage of lines.

   c. **Order of March.** The order of march will generally be reconnaissance
      elements, followed by combat support units, which may have to move early in
      order to support the move of the combat units, followed by combat units. The
      combat support elements may initially lead and deploy amongst the in-place
      force to support the crossing of the LD and the launch of the moving force.

   d. **Forward Assembly Area.** A forward assembly area may be necessary for the
      replenishment of vehicles, rest for crews and any final orders on regrouping.

7158. **REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES**

1. **Purpose.** The rearward passage of lines is an operation in which one force passes
   through the static position of an in-place force. It normally passes back, rearward from the
   direction of orientation, through a defensive position. Although there may appear to be little
   difference between this operation and a withdrawal, the distinction is that in a rearward passage
   of lines a force passes through another, whereas in a withdrawal this does not happen. A
   rearward passage of lines may occur for various reasons including the following:

   a. As the final phase of a delaying operation in which the moving force has
      completed the delay, breaks clean from adversary contact and passes through
      an in-place force manning a defensive position.

   b. As a means of changing the type of force facing the adversary.

   c. When terrain can be abandoned.

   d. As a means of relieving a force unable to continue with its mission.

   e. As part of a withdrawal operation. Forces withdrawing may have to conduct a
      rearward passage of lines when moving back through new or intermediate
      positions manned by other forces.

2. **Planning.** The planning procedures of forward and rearward passage of lines are
   similar although movement to the rear is likely to be more difficult because:

   a. The desire for speed and lack of troops will make detailed liaison,
      reconnaissance and recognition of friendly troops difficult.
b. If the moving force has been in action, its soldiers and units will be tired and possibly disorganized.

c. The adversary may be pressing the moving force hard, trying to overtake or cut it off from withdrawing.

3. **Responsibilities.** The planning responsibilities of the various HQs are:

a. **Controlling Headquarters.** The orders for the passage of lines issued by the controlling HQ will determine, as a rule:

   (1) The location of the crossing areas or points.

   (2) Task organization and mission of the in-place force in relation to support for the moving force and for subsequent tasks and intentions.

   (3) The time by which the force's defences are to be ready.

   (4) **Control lines** (including the handover line), areas at which the moving force will assemble or deploy, and the allocation of sufficient routes for the moving force.

   (5) The responsibility for the closure and activation of barriers.

   (6) The passage of command for the conduct of operations and new command relationships.

   (7) Communications, identification and recognition signals.

   (8) The subsequent employment of the moving force.

b. **Moving Forces and In-place Forces:**

   (1) Plans must be coordinated for fire in support of the moving force. If necessary, the in-place force must occupy gun positions forward of their main position in order to give maximum coverage and help guarantee a clean break for the moving force from adversary contact. In any event, the in-place force will be prepared to provide fire support for the moving force.

   (2) The in-place force must physically show all obstacles, and the routes and gaps through them, to the moving force. They must also be prepared to provide guides and movement control.

   (3) Control of movement to the rear of the handover line is the responsibility of the in-place force. The number of routes back should be considered against the requirements for dispersion and the need to close routes to improve the effectiveness of barriers.

   (4) The moving force requires information about routes, obstacles and fire support, whereas the in-place force requires information on the adversary.
(5) The moving force provides liaison detachments at all crossing sites that will see elements of the moving force coming through the in-place force.

(6) Planning must include mutually agreed recognition measures for day and night. This must include passwords, visual and audio signals, and the exchange of liaison personnel.

(7) There should be checkpoints for the moving force to enable tight movement control to be exercised and to inform commanders of when the passage of lines is complete. If possible to avoid congestion, there should be no pause by the moving force in the forward areas.

4. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The following guidelines apply:

   a. The moving force must be prepared to disengage from the adversary, and move through the in-place force to a new concentration or deployment. Movement should be at night or in conditions of poor visibility if at all possible. Before the operation starts, casualties, non-essential vehicles, equipment and supplies should be evacuated early so that routes are kept clear for the movement of the main force.

   b. The first elements to move will normally be CSS units that must clear the forward area at an early stage. Vulnerability to adversary attack is reduced by selecting areas or points of passage that permit the moving formation to pass around the flanks of the formation in position and by designating release points well to the rear of these positions. The moving formation must have priority on an adequate number of roads and facilities to ensure its rapid movement through the defended area.

   c. The in-place force must be deployed so that it can carry out its task when it assumes responsibility for the continuation of the mission. It must ensure that its elements in location to cover the handover line are of sufficient strength to conduct a temporary defence and to hold open crossing sites, passages and other defiles until the rearward passage of lines is completed.

   d. Protective elements in position must be of sufficient strength to conduct a temporary defence until the rearward passage of lines is completed.

   e. It may be necessary for elements of the moving force to be placed under operational control (OPCON) of the in-place force to deal with a critical situation caused by adversary action. Additionally, it must facilitate the disengagement of the moving force by providing routes, guides and traffic control.

   f. The movement across the handover line, where responsibility changes, must be without interruption.

   g. The commander of the moving force is responsible for identifying the last of his forces as it passes through the in-place force, and for reporting his force clear to his formation’s commander and to the in-place force’s commander.
7159. COMBAT SUPPORT IN A RELIEF OPERATION

1. **Artillery.** Firing positions of incoming artillery should be sited so that further redeployment is not necessary. They should not be in positions that have already been located by the adversary. In a forward passage of lines, the fire support units of the outgoing force should not normally redeploy as long as they can provide support from their positions.

2. **Air.** Local air superiority will reduce the vulnerability of the forces during periods when congestion cannot be avoided on the ground. For RIP operations, there will be situations where CAS could assist the successful completion of operations.

3. **Aviation.** Helicopters may be required to save time in the deployment of liaison and reconnaissance parties. Otherwise, they are used in their normal operational role.

4. **Engineers.** Whether conducting a forward or rearward passage, the in-place force has the responsibility to provide mobility for the passing unit along cleared routes or corridors through its sector. Creating lanes through the in-place units' obstacles requires permission from the force commander who is in command of both the stationery and moving forces. Tasks will include:
   
   a. **Relief in Place.** Assistance with survivability tasks and the takeover of the existing barrier plan.
   
   b. **Forward Passage of Lines.** Opening and maintaining routes, including the crossing of obstacles.
   
   c. **Rearward Passage of Lines.** The maintenance of routes and counter-mobility tasks, including the closure of routes and the destruction of crossing points to impede the adversary.

5. **Air Defence.** The unavoidable concentration of units during relief operations will increase vulnerability to air attack. This may require the adjustment of the AD posture.

6. **Electronic Warfare.** EW assets will support the deception plan, as well as continuing to provide information on adversary locations and intentions.

7. **CBRN Defence.** CBRN defence units will monitor units passing to the rear for contamination and to conduct decontamination operations to prevent the spread of contamination.

SECTION 28
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A RELIEF OPERATION

7160. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. **Relief in Place.** The outgoing commander is responsible for the defence of the sector until command passes. The moment when command is to pass is determined by mutual agreement between the two formation/unit commanders within the overall direction of the superior commander. Both commanders should be co-located throughout the operation. Following the passing of command, the incoming commander will assume the appropriate
control of all elements of the outgoing unit that have not yet been relieved. The change of command will be reported to the overall commander.

2. **Forward Passage of Lines.** The overall C2 of the operation should be with the superior HQs of the forces involved. Normally, the commander of the incoming forces assumes responsibility for the conduct of the operation beyond the LD at the time the attack begins.

3. **Rearward Passage of Lines.** The following responsibilities apply:
   
a. The movement control of elements of the outgoing force will be in accordance with the higher commander’s direction and will normally be the responsibility of the incoming force.

b. The actual transfer of responsibility will normally be agreed between the two commanders executing the operation. This can be carried out most effectively if they are co-located. Where appropriate, as the operation progresses lower level commanders may also be co-located.

c. The incoming commander reports the change of responsibility.

d. The commander of the outgoing force will report when the rearward passage of his forces is completed.

e. During a rearward passage of lines, liaison is to be established from the outgoing (moving) to the incoming (in-place) force.

### 7161. COORDINATION

1. In general, the higher HQ directing a relief operation will stipulate the following details:
   
a. the time frame in which the operation is to be conducted;

b. designation of control lines and routes;

c. arrangement for liaison, reconnaissance and advance parties;

d. fire support;

e. tactical air support of land operations;

f. deception plans;

g. airspace control means;

h. AD; and

i. CSS including criteria for handover of equipment and combat supplies.

### 7162. COMMUNICATIONS

1. In order to conceal the presence of another force from the adversary, the communications plan must support the deception plan.
2. The communications plan should include all those details that the two involved forces will require for coordinated operations. Equipment incompatibility will have to be overcome through the use of liaison teams.

7163. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN A RELIEF OPERATION

1. During a relief operation, the in-place force should assist, whenever possible, with casualty evacuation, traffic control, vehicle recovery, fuel and ammunition. A force taking over responsibility for further operations should be fully replenished.

2. The higher commander may direct that the outgoing force handover stocks that are not required for their subsequent mission. Stocks must be checked for interoperability prior to any such operations as this may influence the plan.

3. CSS units may have to move early to be in location upon arrival of the combat forces. Alternatively, if CSS units are following, plans will have to take account of a reduction or discontinuity in sustainment; in both cases logistic coordination is essential.

4. Conclusion. A rearward passage of lines is difficult to execute well. If the forces are not well balanced and well supported, an alert adversary may be able to outflank or overrun formations and units, or severely disrupt operations by the use of nuclear or chemical means. Careful planning and reconnaissance and clear directives and orders will be necessary to ensure that the operation proceeds smoothly. C2 must be of the highest order if confusion and casualties are to be minimized. Early liaison by those in authority is crucial. The plan for the changeover of command must be clear and known to both formations.

SECTION 29
CROSSING AND BREACHING OF OBSTACLES

7164. INTRODUCTION

1. An obstacle is a natural or man-made restriction to movement that will normally require special equipment or munitions to overcome it. A coordinated series of obstacles is known as a barrier. The crossing and breaching of obstacles is considered an enabling operation. However, it involves a large variety of tactical tasks that are offensive in nature.

2. Forces require an ability to cross obstacles in order to continue movement in support of operations. Although crossings normally occur during offensive operations, they may also be necessary during defensive or delaying operations. They can occur throughout the combat zone and along LOC further to the rear. Often they involve a passage of lines.

7165. TYPES OF OBSTACLES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

1. Inland Areas of Water or Waterways:
   a. Areas of water are normally obstacles after the destruction of fixed bridges.
   b. Detours are not normally possible.
c. The need for crossing operations can normally be foreseen from existing geographical data and confirmed by ISTAR assets.

d. Assault boats and some other types of vehicles may cross without engineer assistance.

e. Crossing difficulty will depend upon climatic and terrain conditions.

2. **Minefields**:  

   a. Normally cause attrition.
   
   b. Are covered by observation and fire.
   
   c. Detours/bypassing may be possible.
   
   d. The need for a breach may not be anticipated.
   
   e. Normally engineer assistance is required for a breach.

3. **Other Obstacles**:  

   a. Rough, soft or marshy ground, terrain covered by deep snow.
   
   b. Craters and ditches.
   
   c. Vertical steps and slopes.
   
   d. Contaminated areas.
   
   e. Abatis, extended wire entanglements, debris, including collateral damage from the effects of weapons.
   
   f. Existing and reinforcing obstacles including craters, mines, landfalls and avalanches. Bypass will almost always be difficult or impossible.
   
   g. Artificially induced flooding and inundation.

**7166. TYPES OF CROSSING AND BREACHING**

1. **Hasty Crossing/Breaching**. A hasty crossing/breaching takes place from the line of march, with little preparation, using resources immediately available. The intent of conducting such an operation is to execute a crossing before the adversary has the opportunity to fully prepare his defensive position.

2. **Deliberate Crossing/Breaching**. A deliberate crossing/breaching requires thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning, extensive preparations, rehearsals, and heavy or special engineer equipment. It is conducted because of the complexity of the obstacle, or when a hasty crossing/breaching has failed.

3. **Assault Breaching**. This type of breaching operation provides a force with the mobility it needs to gain a foothold in an adversary defence and to exploit success by continuing the assault through the objective. The assault breach allows a force to penetrate an adversary's protective obstacles and destroy the defender comprehensively.
4. **Covert Breaching.** The covert breach is a special breaching operation used by dismounted forces in conjunction with an infiltration during limited visibility. It is carried out silently to achieve surprise and to minimize casualties.

SECTION 30
GENERAL PLANNING CONCEPTS AND FACTORS

7167. CONCEPT

1. Any obstacle can be overcome given sufficient resources and time. A commander should aim to seize a crossing site or minefield lane or gap intact, or to conduct a hasty crossing/breaching of the obstacle before the adversary has time to react.

2. Bypassing an obstacle is often more expeditious, even if forces have to travel greater distances. On the other hand, bypassing an obstacle may comply with the intentions of the adversary.

3. If obstacles cannot be bypassed, it may be useful to overcome them in places where the adversary does not expect it. Combined with deception measures, it may be possible to surprise the adversary and to avoid losses.

4. The movement of troops and equipment across the obstacle and their deployment on the far side must be strictly controlled to maintain momentum, avoid congestion, provide flexibility and establish sufficient force to defeat any adversary counter-action.

5. Limited visibility creates favourable conditions for overcoming obstacles while impeding observed adversary fire. The protective effect of limited visibility may be reduced by modern surveillance and fire control means, while our use of night vision aids allows for use of periods of limited visibility with an advantage; speed, situational awareness and ability to conduct operations may be greatly improved.

6. If the obstacle is defended, successful breaching must be proceeded by the suppression of adversary fire, obscuration of the adversary or screening friendly movement, and securing the breach/crossing site by either fire or force as necessary.

7168. PLANNING FACTORS

1. The following factors are applicable to all crossing and breaching operations:
   a. Adequate and timely intelligence and reconnaissance will:
      (1) Confirm the existence and nature of any obstacles.
      (2) Assist the commander’s decision to bypass or mount a hasty or deliberate operation. From this decision, the requirement for any deployment of engineer equipment and other forces will be established.
   b. Effective movement control measures including timings.
   c. Maximum use of deception to achieve surprise.
d. Adequate AD and fire support, particularly tactical air support and counter-battery fire.

e. Adequate CBRN defence measures must be undertaken.

f. Adequate logistics support for clearing/breaching the obstacle.

SECTION 31
CONDUCT OF WATER CROSSING OPERATIONS

7169. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. General. Water crossing procedures are fully described in various publications and reference should be made to them.\textsuperscript{184}

2. Phases. Once the near side of the obstacle has been secured, a crossing of a water obstacle is be done in three phases:

   a. Assault. To gain a lodgement on the far side of the obstacle. This phase is not required for an unopposed crossing.

   b. Build-up. To extend the lodgement into a bridgehead.

   c. Consolidation. To establish a firm base within the bridgehead from which to breakout and continue the overall operation.

3. Crossing Sites. If possible, crossings should be conducted on a broad front with multiple crossing sites. Areas selected for the crossing of obstacles should have, either naturally or through engineer development, the following features:

   a. A suitable number of crossing sites, with alternatives, which are dispersed to reduce vulnerability and to provide flexibility. The number of crossing sites established is normally twice that required by the desired traffic flow. This is necessary, as time does not normally allow other sites to be started, should the initial ones fail. In addition, the threat may dictate moving to another site.

   b. Cover from observation.

   c. Routes to and from crossing sites, to include lateral routes that have the required load classification and capacity.

   d. Waiting areas that provide cover for units and subunits.

   e. Sufficient space for the establishment of a bridgehead.

   f. Locations for elements providing support by direct fire and observed indirect fire.

\textsuperscript{184} NATO standards and procedures for the conduct of water crossing operations are contained in Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2395.
g. Assembly areas located some distance from the obstacle where forces wait to move to the crossing site. The assembly areas need to be dispersed, have good routes to the crossing sites, and good cover and concealment.

4. **Selection of a Bridgehead.** The bridgehead is secured on the far (adversary) side of the obstacle by the assault crossing forces. In selecting areas for the establishment of a bridgehead, the following should be considered:

   a. Defensible terrain of sufficient extent that the adversary cannot seriously interfere with the crossing. The bridgehead should be sited so as to remove all adversaries from positions of direct fire and observation onto the crossing site and bridgehead area.

   b. Sufficient crossing and movement facilities to avoid congestion.

   c. A base for the continuation of the overall operation.

5. **Crossing Area.** The tactical commander—generally the commander of a brigade or higher formation—will order a crossing area only if the tactical situation or the nature of the obstacle requires it. The depth of the crossing area is normally not very great. However, its depth will depend upon the size of the obstacle and the terrain. The area’s near and far boundaries should be positioned within the closest lateral routes approximately 3 km from the water, or on easily recognizable terrain features that run parallel to the obstacle. There may be a number of crossing locations, or sites, within the crossing area.

6. **Equipment Reserve.** Selected items of equipment must be held in reserve, ready for short notice replacement or to maintain crossing sites and equipment. Once a crossing is completed, equipment must be recovered for reuse or replaced with permanent equipment as soon as possible.

7. **Liaison.** The tactical commander must keep the engineer commander informed of his intentions and plans. Thus, the engineer commander is able to make his estimate of the situation and advise on the resources available, the number and location of suitable crossing sites, the assistance needed from other elements, and the time required for preliminary work. Additionally, this allows the crossing area commander and the crossing site commander to operate away from each other in times of reduced communications or changes in the situation or threat.

7170. **EXECUTION**

1. **Forces and Tasks.** Normally a force conducting a crossing must pass through an in-place force that has cleared and secured the near side of the obstacle. A crossing force consists of a bridgehead force and a breakout force:

   a. **In-place Force.** The in-place force secures the near or friendly side of the obstacle in order to support a forward passage of lines and the assault onto the far side of the obstacle. It provides fire and other support to the bridgehead force during the crossing. Within its area, it has normal responsibilities regarding security, including defence of the obstacle and the home bank (near or friendly side).
b. **Bridgehead Force.** The bridgehead force consists of an **assault echelon** and a **main body**. Its mission is to seize or to control ground in order to permit the continuous embarkation, landing or crossing of troops and materiel. It will also provide the manoeuvre space needed for subsequent operations:

1. The **assault echelon** is tasked to gain the lodgement, normally seizing intermediate objectives. This must be done so as to prevent adversary ground observation and direct fire onto the obstacle, and thus allow crossing sites and equipment to be prepared and operated with minimum interference to bring the main body and breakout force to the far side.

2. The **main body** of the bridgehead force conducts the build-up, including the seizure of the objectives on the bridgehead line, and consolidation. Within its area, the bridgehead force has normal responsibilities for security, including the defence of the far side of the obstacle.

c. **Breakout Force.** The breakout force is tasked with the continuation of the operation. In some situations this may be an additional task for the bridgehead force.

2. **Assault Phase.** Once the near bank is secured, and plans for the assault crossing and preparatory movements completed, the bridgehead force may commence the conduct of the assault phase.

   a. The **assault echelon** of the bridgehead force establishes a lodgement on the far side of the obstacle to eliminate adversary direct fire and observation of the crossing sites. The lodgement is achieved either by:

      1. infiltration;

      2. boating, swimming, fording or snorkelling a force; or

      3. air lifting.

   b. At H-hour, the assault echelon crosses the LD, which is normally the near bank, and proceeds across the obstacle. Fire and other support are provided by elements of the in-place force on the near side of the obstacle. Normally this support includes direct and indirect fire support and the protection of crossing sites from air attack and from attacks along the obstacle by divers, sabotage squads, vessels, mines or drifting objects.

3. **Build-up Phase.** The build-up phase is achieved as follows:

   a. Once the assault echelon is across the obstacle and secure on the objectives, the tactical commander orders the crossing area into effect. Engineers complete their preparation of crossing sites and means, and movement control elements complete their deployment and control the move of the main body across the obstacle, in accordance with the crossing plan.

   b. The crossing area organization must be flexible, for once the adversary detects a crossing site, it is extremely vulnerable. Equipment, such as bridging, may
have to be dispersed at short notice and alternative means and sites may have to be used. In some cases, it may be necessary to split a bridge into rafts, or alternatively, use smoke to obscure the site.

c. Once across the obstacle, the lead elements of the main body pass through or around the assault echelon and carry on to secure the final objectives in the bridgehead. Once these have been secured, the bridgehead is established.

4. **Consolidation Phase.** This phase is an extension of the build-up phase. Adversary pockets of resistance are eliminated and the remainder of the main body and assault elements of the breakout force are moved across the obstacle. Crossing sites are improved and preparations are made for the breakout and the continuation of the overall operation, which must be resumed as quickly as possible.

**7171. WATER CROSSINGS AS PART OF THE DELAY BATTLE**

1. During a delay battle, there may be a requirement to withdraw back across a water obstacle once the required amount of delay has been imposed. The delaying force will, once the delay objective has been reached, cross back over the obstacle and conduct a rearward passage of lines with a friendly force on the home bank, likely manning a deliberate defensive position. This home bank or in-place force will support the delaying force in breaking contact with the adversary as follows:

   a. **Preliminary Withdrawal and Rearward Passage of Lines.** During a delay battle, those units and forces not required to actually conduct the delay should be withdrawn over the crossing as early as possible. Maximum use should be made during this phase of existing bridges (if these are available) as directed by the tactical commander. Bridges or ferries may be ordered as part of the withdrawal plan.

   b. **Delaying Battle and Withdrawal of Delaying Force.** Once the desired delay has been imposed or the delaying force is ordered to do so, the delaying force with break contact with the advancing adversary, withdraw and cross the obstacle to conduct a rearward passage of lines. The forces engaged on the adversary bank are withdrawn under cover of supporting fire from armoured and infantry elements on the home bank. The tactical commander would coordinate his phase. The rate of crossing is dependent upon the pressure from the adversary: the commander may risk employing all the crossing means available concentrating on those bridges which are best concealed. By the end of this phase, all bridges should, if possible, have been withdrawn or dismantled, or destroyed.

   c. **Withdrawal Phase.** During this phase, obstacles to movement on either side of the crossing are improved or activated. The last vehicles are withdrawn by ferries or on pontoons, or by swimming or snorkelling (if the river bed and banks are suitable). An infantry screen supported by artillery and mortars provides protection. The last troops are transported by boat, helicopter or any available means.
Land Operations

7172. COMBAT SUPPORT IN AN OBSTACLE CROSSING

1. **Artillery Support.** Artillery and mortars are usually positioned so that they can provide continuous support during all phases of a crossing. The primary task of both these weapons is to provide supporting fire to troops in the bridgehead. They should also mask adversary observation of the crossing sites and employ counter-battery fire to neutralize adversary forces defending the obstacle. Deception fire can also be used in order to draw the adversary’s attention away from the actual crossing site.

2. **Air.** As it may be possible to achieve only local air superiority for a limited period, the time and location of the crossing must be carefully coordinated with air support.

3. **Aviation.** Helicopter forces could have much to contribute to obstacle crossing, as armed/attack helicopters and other helicopters can be used to secure the approach to the obstacle during the assault phase. AH also provide the commander with additional and flexible fire support.

4. **Air Defence.** Forces conducting a crossing present a particularly attractive target to the adversary. Although each force is responsible for its own AD, special arrangements may be made for the actual crossing sites, and the routes to them, because of their importance.

5. **Engineer Support.** Nearly all crossings require engineer support. The main task of the engineers is to enable the bridgehead force to cross the obstacle. As a secondary task, they may be required to prepare obstacles to protect the flanks of the crossing force. Usually most personnel and equipment committed to both of these tasks are drawn from forces not involved in the crossing or subsequent operations, as these forces require their own engineers for the assault and tasks in and beyond the bridgehead. Operations may be restricted by the amount of specialized crossing equipment available. Additionally, engineers are required to support the follow-on forces.

6. **Electronic Warfare.** EW support to crossing operations will be based initially on passive measures to aid intelligence gathering. Electronic deception and jamming may be used to support the main operation.

7173. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN AN OBSTACLE CROSSING

1. **Replenishment.** The assault echelon commander should ensure that his force is self-sufficient in combat supplies, as during the assault phase his force will be temporarily separated from its full CSS. Provision should be made for emergency replenishment, possibly by helicopter. Within the crossing plan, it is important that ammunition and fuel replenishment vehicles cross early to ensure timely replenishment.

2. **Repair and Recovery.** Repair and recovery resources must be included in the movement control plan to ensure that routes, particularly at defiles and crossing sites, are kept open. Resources should be positioned on both sides of crossing sites. Special consideration must be given to the arrangements for the repair and recovery of vehicles in the process of crossing the obstacle.

3. **Medical.** The movement control plan must include medical arrangements, particularly for the evacuation of casualties. Medical facilities with casualty evacuation assets should be
established each side of the water obstacle crossing, and there may be a need to deploy a medical holding facility on the other side of the obstacle. Aviation is particularly useful in this situation.

4. **Provost.** Traffic control will be vital at crossing points and defiles to prevent them from being congested with static and exposed vehicles.

**7174. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AN OBSTACLE CROSSING**

1. The need for a clear command organization, which plans and executes a complete but simple crossing plan, is paramount in all water crossing operations. The controlling HQ must provide a flexible organization and make the best use of the resources available to react to any changes in the crossing flow and the tactical situation.

2. The basic requirements for control are:
   a. a crossing control organization with clearly defined responsibilities;
   b. a movement control organization; and
   c. a command and control communications network.

**7175. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE OBSTACLE CROSSING**

1. The commander has overall responsibility for C2 of the crossing operation and will issue the Crossing Plan:
   a. In certain areas, particularly in rear areas, the commander may be a national territorial area commander, not part of the NATO, UN or coalition command chain. In operating the movement control net, he exercises control for the movement of deploying formations based upon priorities.
   b. In areas in which tactical operations are occurring, the commander is normally the overall tactical commander. His task is to guarantee the movement of any unit/formation in or through his area of responsibility. He will likely exercise OPCON for this particular operation.

**7176. DIRECTION**

1. The commander may select, determine and allocate the following:
   a. crossing areas;
   b. crossing sites;
   c. assembly and waiting areas; and
   d. deployment routes.
2. The commander may also issue special instructions for the crossing and times, and if necessary, the organization of convoys.

7177. CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS

1. The commander for a major crossing operation may form a special controlling HQ, at which the following elements will be represented:
   a. movement control; and
   b. engineers.

2. It may also be necessary to have the following represented:
   a. logistics;
   b. communications and EW; and
   c. liaison elements from the crossing formation/units.

3. For major crossings, a Crossing Area HQ and several Crossing Site HQs may be required.

7178. ENGINEER COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Each level of command in an obstacle crossing operation will have an engineer who is responsible for the technical aspects of executing the crossing.

2. Engineer commanders are responsible at their respective levels of command for:
   a. giving advice on all engineer matters;
   b. ensuring that there is an adequate communications network for engineers involved in the operation; and
   c. assigning crossing site commanders.

7179. CROSSING SITE COMMANDER AND HEADQUARTERS

1. The Crossing Site Commander is normally an engineer appointed by the appropriate level of command who will normally provide the crossing site HQ. The Crossing Site Commander has the following responsibilities:
   a. to develop and maintain the crossing site including entrances and exits;
   b. to construct, operate and maintain the means of crossing;
   c. movement across the water at his or her crossing site, including the giving of orders to troops during the crossing;
d. advice to the Waiting Area Controller on movement to his or her crossing site; and

e. all technical aspects of maintaining the survivability of his or her crossing site and crossing equipment.

7180. CROSSING FORMATIONS AND UNITS

1. When a force is required to conduct a move that is controlled and supported by another authority (e.g., a Command or Nation), it is mandatory for this force to liaise as early as possible at its respective level of command within that authority. The purpose of this liaison is to exchange relevant documents and to be briefed on:

   a. the movement control organization;

   b. organization and procedures of any water crossings;

   c. reporting details for movement and for water crossings; and

   d. status of convoy commanders and drivers of isolated vehicles.

7181. CROSSING PLAN

1. The crossing plan should include the following items:

   a. tactical situation;

   b. commander’s intentions, special directives and any arrangements for delegating control;

   c. protection, security, reaction to adversary attacks, and instructions for denying the crossing;

   d. designation of crossing sites, alternative crossing sites, and routes leading to and from them;

   e. the grouping and tasks for the engineers;

   f. the boundaries of the crossing area;

   g. the movement control plan, to include routes to and from the obstacle, lateral routes, movement control posts and waiting areas;

   h. a crossing schedule that provides a timetable for the crossing as well as:

      (1) movement credits per unit; and

      (2) priorities for the crossing.
i. any limitations such as the capacity, speed and military load classification (MLC); and

j. nicknames for each crossing site.

2. The detailed layout of an obstacle crossing area and sites is illustrated in Figure 7-15.

![Figure 7-15: A Schematic Diagram of a Divisional Crossing Plan](image_url)

**Notes:**

1. The tactical commander will normally be at the crossing control organization HQ, which is co-located with the Movement Control HQ. This is represented as the Divisional HQ.

2. The commander may deploy forward to the Crossing Area HQ.

3. Crossing site HQs are not shown.

**SECTION 32**

**CONDUCT OF BREACHING OPERATIONS**

**7182. GENERAL**

1. The breaching of a minefield or other man-made obstacles and barrier plans will be conducted in a manner similar to that of the deliberate crossing of a water obstacle.
7183. PLANNING

1. Seizure of minefield lanes intact or any opportunity for a hasty breaching must be exploited. If this fails, a deliberate breaching will be necessary.

2. For breaching to have a reasonable chance of success the minimum information required is the minefield depth, its front and rear edges, and details of adversary weapons covering the minefield.

3. The aim must always be to breach paths and lanes through adversary minefields from the very beginning in order to enable dismounted infantry and combat vehicles to cross the barrier. Whether paths may be prepared in advance will depend upon the situation, terrain, type of barrier and breaching equipment available. Paths are to be enlarged rapidly to form lanes. As many lanes as possible should be breached. As a minimum, two breaches should be attempted.

7184. EXECUTION

1. For adversary obstacles, reconnaissance should include, if possible, the breaching of a patrol path or lane through the minefield.

2. If the adversary situation allows, dismounted troops cross the minefield and establish a lodgement on the far side, although this may not always be possible. In either case, it is necessary to form a breaching force to open lanes for the personnel and vehicles of the assault echelon.

3. If friendly forces have prepared the minefield, it is crossed using existing gaps or lanes, or newly breached lanes.

4. Once lanes are open, traffic control posts at both ends of the lanes are required. In addition, recovery posts will be established at the approaches to all lanes, and occasionally, on both sides of the minefield.

5. With the assault echelon across the minefield and secure, engineers complete their preparation of breaching sites to include marking. Movement control elements complete their deployment to control the movement of the main body across the minefield. Complete clearance of barriers requires a considerable amount of time and resources. Therefore, usually complete clearance can only be justified if operationally necessary.

7185. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN BREACHING OPERATIONS

1. Similar considerations to those required for water crossings apply. The scale of support for breaching operations tends to be lower than that for water crossing.

7186. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BREACHING OPERATIONS

1. The level of command is likely to be lower than for water crossing. Minefield breaching may involve a number of independent simultaneous actions each with its own commander,
whereas water crossing is a centralized operation. The breaching commander is the commander who has the tactical responsibility for operations in that area.

7187. CONDUCT OF OTHER OBSTACLE CROSSING

1. Considerations. The considerations that apply to the conduct of other obstacle crossings are the same as those for water crossing operations and minefield breaching. The major difference is normally one of scale. Therefore, the crossing of other types of obstacles is conducted at lower tactical levels. Nevertheless, the tactical commander must ensure the appropriate engineer support is available to maintain his mobility.

SECTION 33
CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN

7188. GENERAL

1. Military operations are conducted in accordance with the strategic objectives and end state. Knowing when to end a campaign and how to preserve the end state are vital aspects of operational art. Since campaigns are conducted for political aims, it is only successful when such aims, or end states, are achieved. Success within the battlespace does not always lead to success in conflict. Ensuring that it does requires the close collaboration of political and military leaders and clearly understood strategic goals.

2. In many campaigns, the achievement of the strategic aims will also require close collaboration with other members of the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) framework. In some cases, a military end state will be reached before the ultimate strategic end state is realized. Consequently, the non-military elements of the JIMP framework may continue the work while the military scales back its participation and eventually withdraws. The timing and method of transition from military forces to non-military forces and elements will require careful consideration and planning as part of the operational art.

3. It is always possible that for political, diplomatic or economic reasons the campaign may be terminated before the originally envisaged military end state and strategic end state are reached. The commander must consider the consequences of a premature termination and advise his superiors of the long-term ramifications from his perspective.

7189. CAMPAIGN TRANSITION AND CONCLUSION

1. Rarely will forces fight a major conflict and then withdraw from the theatre. Military forces may be the only source of stability in the area and may have to restore communications facilities, essential services, and provide humanitarian relief. The operational commander may have to be the conduit for negotiations with the belligerent political and military leaders as part of the initial conflict termination process. Although many of these tasks may have occurred during major conflict as part of full-spectrum operations (FSO) within the continuum of operations, the military, following major combat, will come to focus on such stability activities. Thus, a campaign involving major combat will likely transition to a campaign of peace support until such time as a new government is firmly established, new security forces are prepared to assume duties, and immediate humanitarian needs are satisfied.

2. Rarely will the transition between campaign themes occur simultaneously throughout a theatre of operations. It will likely be much more phased; with one area of a theatre transiting to
focus on stability operations while other areas of the theatre remain focused on major combat. Anticipation and appropriate planning during earlier stages will smooth the transition during the critical period immediately after the fighting ends. Planning should also consider the use of information operations (info ops), especially civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), public affairs (PA) and psychological operations (PSYOPS), to assist in the transition to post-conflict activities and the cementing of operational and strategic objectives.

3. Despite the fact that military forces are well suited to the conduct of stability operations, the conclusion of a campaign and the attainment of the military end state will only be achieved through the handover of many of these responsibilities to civilian agencies and other members of the JIMP framework.

4. In an ideal situation, the responsibilities of a military force will eventually reduce to those that only a military force can accomplish, such as framework security where necessary and the training of newly formed indigenous security forces. See Figure 7-14.

5. The transition of stability operations activities to civilian and other governmental agencies may be a slow and difficult process depending upon the situation. It may not be uniform throughout a theatre or across all functions. For example, some governmental agencies may be prepared to assume a role creating a new indigenous government and civil service immediately following major combat or while an insurgency is ongoing, but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations (IOs) may not be willing to assume responsibilities until the overall level of violence is lowered and a level of lasting stability has been created. In such cases, the military may have to continue to fulfil certain stability operation activities.

6. In other situations, the military may be able to handover most stability operations to other agencies, but will still be required to maintain a significant presence to ensure a framework of security, even if the majority of destabilizing influences have dissipated. Continuous efforts should be made under security sector reform (SSR) to create competent indigenous security forces capable of defeating possible adversaries to security and stability.

7. Ideally, a campaign will reach a military end state when the necessity for combat operations has ceased, all stability operations have been turned over to civilian or other governmental agencies, and the indigenous security forces are capable of dealing with any current or near term adversaries to stability.

7190. REDEPLOYMENT

1. At the campaign's end, the operational commander must consider the redeployment of the force. Redeployment should not be considered as a final activity, but merely as a transition to future operations. Formation and unit integrity should be maintained during redeployment whenever possible, and the commander should always keep in mind the reconstitution process for the next operation. This will include finalization of post operation reports and submission of observations as potential lessons learned.

2. Consideration must also be made for the reintroduction of troops into a peaceful society and domestic setting following their service in war-torn areas where they witnessed widespread pain, suffering and death. The efforts spent to build and preserve cohesion within a force prior to and during operations must be continued after redeployment. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the successful integration of their troops into post-conflict routine.
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 7
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OPERATIONS

SECTION 1
DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

1. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process is often undertaken following a major combat campaign or as part of a campaign to secure a failing state or region. It is effectively, the dismembering of a military force and its return to other aspects of society (which may include to a certain extent, integration with a newly formed military force). Note that in many instances, a standing army should be allowed to remain intact, as a potential force for stability in a developing nation. Conscripts may be demobilized, but many elements of a standing army and other legitimate security forces may move straight to a reform process.

2. DDR is a multi-agency undertaking and will likely be a significant operational objective of a campaign plan. The military forces’ involvement is classified as a type of stability operation and the military will likely be assigned specific tactical tasks to assist in the DDR process.

3. DDR is defined as:

   A stability operation that involves the handing over of arms and equipment, the disbanding of military structures, and the return to civilian life of military and paramilitary personnel. Note: This process marks the beginning of long-term transformation processes, demilitarizing economies, communities and lives.\(^{185}\)

4. The end-state of this process is the enhancement of peace, security, stability, and economic growth, at the regional, national, and local levels. At the completion of DDR, former combatants are fully reintegrated into mainstream society and conditions are set for successful peace building and Security Sector Reform (SSR).

5. The constituent parts of the DDR process are defined as follows:

   a. **Disarmament.** Disarmament is the controlled process of taking weapons away from military forces. (Demilitarization and disarmament usually take place within the framework of demobilization operations).\(^{186}\)

   b. **Demobilization.** Demobilization consists of those operations that are undertaken by a Coalition Task Force to reduce the number of factions’ forces and their equipment in the area of operations to the level as agreed in the peace agreement.\(^{187}\)

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\(^{185}\) New draft definition submitted for Army Terminology Panel approval May 06. It is somewhat narrower than the draft ABCA Armies Programme draft definition: A series of major operational tasks that occur following a conflict, peace support campaign, or national crisis that move a standing military, paramilitary, and other combatant forces from an active combatant status to a state of reintegration into the community

\(^{186}\) AJP 3.4.1 Glossary

\(^{187}\) AJP 3.4.1 Glossary. At times, there may not be a formal peace agreement in place.
c. **Reintegration.** Reintegration is the process of returning former combatants and other selected non-combatants to a civilian identity within the social, economic, political, and psychological life within the community.  

6. The DDR plan may be a key aspect within the overall campaign plan to realizing the desired end-state. Its success necessitates a comprehensive approach. DDR is a multi-agency function with the military conducting many of the tactical tasks in support of it, along with other agencies. It will include a number of decisive points relating to various issues, including military, political, economic, security and communications. Coordination and cooperation amongst relevant organizations is therefore a fundamental requirement.

7. Coalition forces should be prepared to accept lead agency role, especially in the initial stages. It is highly likely that they will support another lead agency in the DDR process. Military forces are not normally resourced and structured to complete the entire DDR process. Initially, the military will likely take the lead, beginning with such basic aspects as Prisoner of War (PW) handling. Eventually, particularly at the point of reintegration, other agencies will assume the lead whilst military forces provide the security framework.

8. Key to success will be the support of the host nation (HN) or newly established regime. Early recognition of roles, responsibilities and tasks will not only contribute to the mission success and the achievement of operational end-states, it will also assist in the transition of authority from the military, Coalition or Lead Agency to HN resources. In this respect, military forces will play a key role, as a critical precursor for the conduct of DDR (dependant as it is on inter-agency involvement and non-military effort), requires the establishment and maintenance of a permissive security environment.

9. Support to the DDR process is a key aspect in the conduct of stability operations. For example, effective stability operations (in this case DDR) within the context of MCO enable a defeated enemy, if required, to be effectively disarmed, with a view taken towards their eventual reintegration. Furthermore, they should ensure that the population within the area secured understands the legitimacy of the action, have appreciated the levels of security provided and have hope for future development. In the achievement of such success in a major combat phase, strategic planning will consider the pursuance of those subsequent objectives leading eventually to 'stability'. This reinforces the requirement to plan early and in harmony with campaign objectives.

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**SECTION 2**

**PRINCIPLES**

1. The guiding principles for Stability Operations apply to the successful conduct of DDR. These principles, with appropriate amplification specific to DDR as appropriate, are outlined below in priority order:

   a. A strategically driven Campaign Plan defining the theme, clear end-state, objectives, measures of success, and with dedicated resources:

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This description was developed within ABCA Armies Programme March 2006. Note that some selected members of the demobilized military may be returned to a newly formed military.
(1) Political will and tangible economic support for reintegration is required. Soldiers who have been demobilized should not be returning to their communities with no hope for employment or support.

(2) The overall DDR and its ways and means should be supported by information operations to encourage voluntary compliance.

(3) There should be sufficient means of incentive for disarmament and reintegration.

(4) There should be credible levels of expectation for both the DDR agencies and for those personnel being demobilized.

(5) There must be perseverance through the resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives (which may be of a longer-term social, economic and political nature).

b. Unity of purpose and coherency of action between the military, political and civilian agencies:

(1) The military will likely take a lead role at the outset of disarmament and demobilization.

(2) Supporting plans (e.g. economic) must be realistic, progressive and achievable, with a clear delineation of responsibilities.

(3) Reintegration is the desired end-state and therefore must be planned from the outset, including other agencies—diplomatic/political, economic—that need to clearly articulate their desired end-state.

(4) The initial reintegration may include basic work in support of reconstruction projects that will assist both economic stimulus and re-establishment of societal structures.

(5) The plan must be supported by the HN authority.

c. A position of legitimacy:

(1) It is vital that the DDR process has the advertised support of the HN and respected members of the civil society. The process must be transparent and supported by information operations.

(2) Flexibility at the operational and tactical levels is needed in successfully supporting the change management process.

(3) Success must reflect the expectations of the civil populace.

d. Imposition of security through a robust posture with threats to stability countered in a timely manner utilizing precision and the most suitable means:

(1) This security will extend to the protection of other agency personnel and equipment.
(2) The populace must have an appreciation for the DDR process and feel that it will continue to have a reasonable level of security despite the demobilization of the military on which it may have previously depended.

e. Effective integration of indigenous security infrastructures and forces:

(1) This is the lead-in to SSR and thus it is important to identify the elements of the subject forces to be maintained.

f. Effective synchronization with offensive, defensive and other stability operations tasks:

(1) The tasks undertaken in DDR must be balanced with other demands for offensive and defensive operations. Ideally, those units committed to the DDR process will not be expected to assume deliberate offensive operations.

SECTION 3
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7A01. GENERAL

1. DDR needs to be fully planned and addressed within the campaign plan as a specific operational objective. Actions to support DDR extend throughout the campaign plan and should be continuously assessed as the campaign progresses. The campaign plan should indicate the point at which DDR will begin and should indicate the various decisive points along the way to the successful end-state. The major DDR functions operate on a continuum and in support of one another to be fully effective. They are not necessarily separate and distinct operational tasks in execution. For example, DDR may be conducted at various times and stages in the campaign in different regions of a nation.

2. DDR clearly fits within the framework of the campaign planning approach to achieve sustainable peace and security within a nation and region. It can be viewed in four stages: planning; disarmament; demobilization; and reintegration. Although disarmament may be conducted by lead forces, the other stages may be conducted by follow-on forces. All stages should be linked in a comprehensive and pervasive plan.

3. Recognizing the transitions between campaign themes and adapting the DDR plan to suit the operational environment will be of critical importance. Transition to SSR may occur as a concurrent activity in the later stages of the DDR plan. Although disarmament and demobilization can occur rapidly, the extensive requirements for reintegration may be a protracted activity. Over time, the requirement for military forces support should be reduced to a minimal requirement for DDR and Stage 4 reintegration may very well be an aspect of SSR.

4. Cooperation between agencies will be of paramount importance. Political leadership is essential to providing the planning and resources, the eventual size and shape of future security forces, and the parallel economic development. Within security parameters, the co-location of military and political planners is essential for successful harmony in the realization of the DDR process and should be considered. Unity of effort is required to ensure all organizations are aware of the requirements and have agreed on the end-states to be achieved. Early liaison and
coordination within the planning process will be required, as will subsequent formalization of arrangements at later stages. Coalition forces must be prepared to take a lead role, particularly if DDR is occurring as part of a larger effort within a major combat campaign theme. Within other campaigns such as Peace Support or Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN), agencies such as the United Nations (UN) can be expected to undertake the lead agency responsibilities. Also of primary importance will be establishing and maintaining relationships with the HN, with an eye to eventual transition of authority to the HN on meeting the successful end-states of DDR.

5. Whether as a lead or supporting agency, military forces will be required to develop a comprehensive DDR plan, ensuring the DDR end-states are complimentary to the overall campaign and political end-states.

7A02. STAGE 1—PLANNING

1. Planning for DDR should commence during Campaign pre-deployment. It should be identified as a campaign operational objective and decisive points along the appropriate lines of operation should be identified. It is fundamental for the commander and staff to understand the end-state conditions as they affect DDR and what responsibilities the force has with respect to DDR. The DDR planning must reflect campaign plan phases and end-states. It is also crucial that the commander and staff understand what responsibilities any Follow-on-Force (FOF) has with respect to DDR, and therefore what DDR responsibilities must be transferred. The following are key considerations that must be taken into account during the DDR planning stage:

a. **Analysis of the HN.** An assessment of the risk of reversion to conflict should be considered as part of the early stages of planning:

   (1) the Nation’s martial history of conflicts and underlying causes;
   (2) per capita Gross National Income (GNI) that is present and projected;
   (3) the HN’s or region’s dependency on a few primary commodities exports;
   (4) the present and future political stability situation. This should include analysis of state structures and history of breakdown of law and order;
   (5) the status of civil and political rights;
   (6) the militarization history and status;
   (7) the ethnic dominance, profile and regional relationships;
   (8) any active regional conflicts; and
   (9) any previous history of the HN with members of the coalition.

b. **Pre-Conditions for Effective DDR Execution.** The following pre-conditions should be considered during the planning stage along with the campaign end-state conditions so that an effective DDR plan may be developed:
(1) Formal peace agreement or surrender or capitulation conditions/terms established;

(2) Clear and unambiguous leadership and defined roles for all participants involved in DDR (Lead nation, regional organization, supporting agencies or UN leadership);

(3) Coordination and cooperation among coalition military forces, HN and other combatant forces, parties to the conflict, non-governmental organizations (NGO), IO, and UN agencies;

(4) Financial and other resources for near term, mid term, and long term DDR actions;

(5) Personnel expertise and commitment; and

(6) International and regional support for DDR plan and actions including HN support.

c. **Broad DDR Planning Considerations and Requirements.** Outlined below are the broad requirements and considerations in developing the DDR plan:

(1) political framework and/or governmental framework for near term and mid term support of DDR;

(2) military support requirements and operational mission requirements;

(3) economic rebuilding programmes;

(4) requirement to conduct Information Operations to focus on those undergoing the process, the local populace and the international community;

(5) funding and donor support programmes;

(6) operational concept for increased security conditions and the Rule of Law in the near term;

(7) specific operational plans for the DDR process with supporting tactical tasks to units;

(8) NGO and IO agencies that will be in support of the DDR;

(9) lead agencies, regional organizations, and international organizations with significant support requirements of the DDR processes;

(10) integration plan for how the military command will integrate all the actors, players, and supporters of the DDR plan;

(11) time line and envisioned military support requirements for the DDR plan to support refining the force structure of the military command to support redeployment and deployment planning; and

(12) consideration for potential PW exchange and/or release.
7A03. STAGE 2—DISARMAMENT

1. The disarmament stage may be a fundamental task for the military forces, and as such may be included as a separate phase in the campaign plan. In other circumstances, disarmament may be an implied task, which is part of the overall DDR process. Disarmament of warring parties is an inherently risky operation and therefore the military responsibilities in this regard must be clearly articulated. A clear disarmament plan must be developed, that includes the appropriate element of force protection for the disarming party and international personnel, the possible inclusion of amnesty and incentive programmes as appropriate, and robust verification measures.

2. Planners must also consider any requirements to provide security and protection for those who have disarmed. This will be a consideration should the coalition force be attempting to apply DDR to two or more formerly opposing forces. Failure to do this may greatly impede the success of the process.

3. The following are some planning considerations for the planning and conduct of the disarmament stage:

   a. Eligibility Criteria. Eligibility criteria for disarmament should be clearly defined. Some options include:

      (1) Individual. An individual system for disarmament can be effective in luring individuals away from belligerent groups. It can be considered aggressive and unfriendly by belligerent commanders.

      (2) Collective. Collective disarmament has proven to be faster and more efficient, but has allowed commanders to falsify the number of combatants and/or weapons being turned in.

      (3) Combination of both.

   b. Weapon Systems. The verification and control of weapons systems during all stages of the disarmament process will be critical for the success of the overall DDR process. The following are some key considerations for the disarmament process:

      (1) Types. There will be a need to clarify disarmament procedures for different weapon systems. Key systems that need to be considered separately include (not in priority order):

         (a) small arms;
         (b) light weapons;
         (c) heavy weapons;
         (d) armoured vehicles;
         (e) aircraft;
(f) naval vessels;
(g) missiles;
(h) mines, minefields, or unexploded ordnance; and
(i) ammunition (including existing ammunition storage magazines).

(2) Identification and Verification. All weapon systems will need to be declared by all combatant parties as part of the disarmament process. These weapon systems will need to be identified by the overseeing military force and a system for verification will need to be established. Some options for identification and verification include:

(a) cantonment;
(b) use of electronic tag systems;
(c) safe storage areas;
(d) destruction or disposal; and
(e) registration and/or license.

c. Priority of Disarmament. A priority for disarmament will need to be established by the lead agency. The priority for disarmament will be based on the commander’s guidance, and may take into account the following key concerns:

(1) force protection;
(2) mission accomplishment;
(3) end-state;
(4) parity of disarmament between combatant parties (as appropriate) to ensure impartiality; and
(5) re-allocation of weapons and personnel.

d. Security. Security during the disarmament process will be a critical issue for those disarming and for those agencies conducting the DDR process. Planners must take precautions to ensure that the disarmament process does not re-initiate the conflict. A strong sense of security during the disarmament process will be critical for force and process credibility and confidence building. Key issues for security will be:

(1) security of weapons storage and disposal areas;
(2) secure transfer of weapons in the Area of Operations (AO) from disarmament to storage areas, and from storage to disposal areas;
(3) security presence;
(4) inspections/inventory control;
(5) multiple agency force protection; and
(6) demining/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

e. Disarmament Options. The commander and staff need to explore different options for conducting disarmament. Plans should consider options for amnesty and reward programmes. Disarmament options may include:

(1) centralized disarmament;
(2) decentralized disarmament; and
(3) combination of both.

7A04. STAGE 3—DEMOBILIZATION

1. The demobilization stage includes the selective release of ex-combatants from duty and return to the civil community. The demobilization stage has a number of considerations, including:

   a. Economic and Stability Situation. Planners should not immediately assume that demobilization of a nation’s military forces is the appropriate near term solution. Based upon the economic and stability situation, it may be prudent to keep some elements of the forces intact and mobilized because immediate support at the local level for demobilization actions may be non-existent. Military forces can have their mission redirected to national support programmes, infrastructure improvement, and/or public works programmes, etc. Considerations include the following:

   (1) Funding for continued military employment in support of national economic and developmental programmes is critical to maintaining a cohesive force, organization and motivation.

   (2) Disarmament should be accomplished to the degree required to maintain security requirements.

   (3) Some military units can be retrained for other governmental support requirements such as local police, security guard elements.

   (4) For large-scale military forces, demobilization plans should be instituted on a draw down basis commensurate with the economic and stability situation present within the host nation.

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Amnesty programmes must be in line with strategic and operational level plans and cannot be adopted independently at the tactical level.
b. **Categories of Military and/or Ex-Combatant Personnel for separation.** It is critical that personnel be separated by categories for demobilization to support the special needs of high-risk groups that require special support and care.Outlined below is a start point for this categorization:

1. **Military personnel with short service, normally conscript (generally 24 months service).** This requires well thought out demobilization actions but not extensive support and reintegration actions. Many will have jobs or skills to which they can return.

2. **Military personnel with longer service, normally professional, career soldiers (generally, more than 24 months service).** This situation requires full demobilization and supporting actions to ensure full reintegration and the continuance of follow-on service support and entitlements. This may possibly include dependent support programmes. Those soldiers who have been professionalized in the services will require a planned and phased return to society, to ensure that they have economic support and jobs. This will help occupy and motivate them and ideally prevent them from moving to paramilitary or insurgent employ.

3. **Special status combatants.** Some combatants may be harder to demobilize due to their special status with a previous regime or ideology. These include political or religious troops, secret police, and so forth. These types of combatants may require additional security or screening. Some may be wanted for international war crimes.

4. **Female combatants.** Specific support should be considered for the demobilization of female combatants and their reintegration and that of combatant families that may also require support.

5. **Child combatants.** Support for child combatants should be in accordance with extant international guidelines. These include:
   
   - (a) immediate separation from adult combatants;
   - (b) counselling;
   - (c) education and vocational training; and
   - (d) family reunion.

6. **Disabled combatants.** Support for disable combatants should be based upon:
   
   - (a) immediate medical attention to save life; and

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190 Military forces may be delineated along the lines of conscripts (usually brought into the military only for the recent conflict), professional or career soldiers, and irregular forces that may be as much a criminal element as a military element.
(b) planning the transfer of responsibility to another non-military agency, for the commencement of longer term rehabilitation and other social services as required.

(7) Irregular combatants. Demobilization of irregular combatants requires similar levels of support as for regular combatants. The reintegration of this group of combatants is critical and must be supportive of job creation and reinsertion within the community. Training and re-education are critical components for addressing irregular forces’ reintegration. In an ideal situation, many of them will have jobs or trades to which they can return.

7A05. STAGE 4—REINTEGRATION

1. Reintegration returns military personnel and other selected ex-combatants to a civil identity within the social, economic, political, and psychological life within the community. Reintegration is a longer-term process that may take years to fully realize. The lead agency will likely be civilian. Therefore it is likely that although the military forces may assist with the initial reintegration process, it is more likely that the responsibility for reintegration will be handed over to another lead agency. Reintegration commences with the reinsertion of the ex-combatants back into the community, and it is this process that the military forces will likely assist. Military forces will provide the ongoing framework security, and may be required to assist with other reintegration aspects such as:

a. reinsertion back into the local community;

b. initial local reception and welcome plans;

c. basic education, training, and peace education;

d. provision of daily services to discharged military;

e. system(s) for reintegration into local town and society as whole;

f. job creation, promotion of economic activities, local development project;

g. information operations support;

h. counselling (for both ex-combatants and local communities);

i. full application of all local community organizations to assist in reintegration; and

j. programme assessments.
7B01. DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND

1. Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become a general term for a series of reviews, reforms, and the reconstruction of security forces and structures around the world. Within the Continuum of Operations, SSR is viewed by the military as one aspect of Stability Operations. SSR covers a wide spectrum of reform to provide a nation’s security. Comprehensive security requires the relevant internal state organizations to uphold the Rule of Law in terms of judiciary, effective policing, as well as the means to maintain territorial integrity by having some form of armed force. Further, these three strands (Judiciary, Police, Armed Forces) require a security infrastructure that delineates responsibility, controls and resources for these functions. The formation of an effective security sector is vital to the long term stability and growth in the economic and governance areas of a state and potentially the geographic region.

2. SSR, in its broadest, multi-agency, sense can be defined as:

   A stability operation that develops security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security\(^\text{191}\).

3. SSR is a multi-agency undertaking. In terms of the military’s role, it is classified as a stability operation. The military will be responsible for the transformation or establishment and training of Host Nation (HN) armed forces, within the strategic guidelines set for the reformation of the security sector, and within a permissive environment.

4. Due to the diverse nature of SSR, the tasks required cannot be left to the military alone due to the areas of expertise and resources required. However, key to success is that any reform is conducted ideally within a permissive operational environment. The military may be required to maintain security and control over an area before indigenous forces are trained and introduced to take lead responsibility.

5. Due to the diverse nature of such reform, it is essential that a mutually supporting, comprehensive approach is adopted utilizing political, economic and military input, guided by a shared unity of effort, and underpinned by a common information campaign. A clear requirement for the security sector must be developed from analysis of the threat, historical precedent, cultural requirements, economic sustainability and most importantly, the aspirations of the HN. The formation of a security sector is a strategic level task, shaped at the highest level but ultimately the eventual ownership of any programme must lay with the HN government.

6. The requirement to conduct SSR might occur at any stage throughout the Spectrum of Conflict, ranging from post-major combat operations, to requested assistance during peacetime military engagement. The most demanding situation will occur when the provision of a permissive environment is paramount and will see the military initially taking the lead. Such a

\(^{191}\)Draft definition by Army Terminology Board, Oct 2005. ABCA Coalition draft definition is as follows: The transformation or establishment of security institutions (Judiciary, Police, Armed Forces) so that they play an effective, legitimate and accountable role in providing internal and external security.
situation is likely to see the military maintaining security and control over regions and potentially conducting disarmament and demobilization of adversaries as a precursor to reintegration and potentially SSR.

7. As the situation allows, the military should concentrate on maintaining security, and establishing and training indigenous Armed Forces within a comprehensive reform program where other agencies apply their expertise to other areas of the security sector. As indigenous forces are trained, validated, their capabilities developed and they are introduced to conduct operations as necessary, the coalition military will be expected to reduce the level of operations and supervision.

8. Due to the diversity of skills and expertise required to reform the whole Security Sector, planning for SSR must be conducted at the earliest stage of campaign planning, at a strategic level. This plan must be informed by all instruments of power. This will delineate responsibilities once the environment allows, allocate resources and ultimately transfer structural ownership to the HN. Broad guidance for the military contribution to the wide task of SSR is provided below.

7B02. PRINCIPLES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1. The guiding principles for Stability Operations apply to the conduct of the military’s contribution to SSR. The military must judiciously select and employ forces to create a secure environment for stability operations to continue unimpaired. During the conduct of stability operations, military forces retain the ability to resume offensive or defensive operations. Ideally, those forces conducting the SSR will have this as their sole responsibility; that is, other forces will be responsible for framework stability operations and other duties.

2. Long-term consideration is especially important in building HN self-sufficiency. The campaign planners must understand that the ultimate responsibility for security reform rests with the HN. The civil-military team provides a temporary capability, capacity and expertise to the HN.

3. The principles for Stability Operations, with appropriate amplification specific to SSR as appropriate, are outlined below in priority order.

   a. A strategically driven campaign plan defining the theme, clear end-state, objectives, measures of success, and with dedicated resources:

      (1) The Host Nation must identify (with assistance as required) the requirements, force structures and the design for the new security force. Desired capabilities of new forces must be clearly identified and articulated in relation to internal and external threats. They must consider these threats, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors when developing the military plans to support SSR. Overcoming the tendency to use an outsider’s frame of reference is important. This potentially damaging tendency can result in unsuitable equipment, training and infrastructure for the nation receiving outside assistance and

192 Dependant on the situation and role required of HN police forces, the military might be involved in training police forces to a certain extent as well.

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the situation will be unsustainable once the coalition leaves the nation or region. There is a clear need to respect and understand the views and interpretations of the HN regarding the design of its security architecture.

(2) The new force must be a comprehensive professionalized institution that supports the security needs of the legitimate government and is part of its overall governmental structure. It must be appropriate for the operational environment, economically viable and self-sustainable with an appropriate institutional framework linking it to an overarching democratic system. (e.g. Ministry of Defence structures, all staff functions and capabilities).

(3) The campaign force’s initial priority may be to establish security and a permissive environment. Once this is accomplished the campaign’s focus progressively switches to the creation and training of indigenous security forces.

b. Unity of purpose and coherency of action between the military, political and civilian agencies:

(1) Decision points need to be identified as early as possible for the hand-over of security responsibilities (e.g. border security assumed by newly established military, followed by civilian authority). This clearly requires careful co-ordination with the other developing strands of SSR (Judiciary, Police).

(2) All agencies and military forces involved must agree to the delineation and assignment of responsibilities such as political violence, insurgency, organized crime, and terrorism. This must be based on the resources, culture, and capabilities that each agency brings to the campaign or operation.

(3) Within a coalition, it is preferable that doctrinal coherency is achieved at all levels from the outset.

c. Effective synchronisation with offensive, defensive and other stability operations tasks:

(1) SSR should be conducted, ideally, within a permissive environment. Units undergoing reform should not be involved in ongoing operations until they reach an appropriate level of training. Likewise, when practicable, those military forces conducting SSR should not be responsible for other tactical operations.

d. Imposition of security through a robust posture with threats to stability countered in a timely manner utilizing precision and the most suitable means:

(1) The development through the SSR process of physical capabilities must be complemented by the development of the intellectual facet of the new security forces. New security forces, both the leadership and the rank and file, must be made to understand their role in sustaining a democratic and responsible government and society.
While some military forces and other agencies are conducting SSR tasks, other forces should be responsible for other tactical operations that stabilize and secure the overall security environment.

Eventually, indigenous security forces will come to assume responsibility for security operations. The formal mentoring process and level of cooperation must be considered and directed. Once indigenous security forces begin to conduct operations, it will be important that their trainers and mentors continue to support them, to the point of conducting combined operations. Forces can be combined even at the lowest tactical levels.

e. A position of legitimacy:

(1) The moral authority for SSR stems from the HN government, and those forces acting within the Rule of Law.

(2) The process must be transparent and supported by information operations to manage, inform and influence internal and international perceptions. Success must reflect the expectations of the civil populace.

f. Effective integration of indigenous security infrastructures and forces:

(1) Newly developed forces must gradually be assigned tactical and operational responsibilities whilst the training and mentoring process continues. This reinforces the legitimacy of the process and the HN. It demonstrates continued moral support for the new security forces by the military forces conducting the SSR.

7B03. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. **General.** Sustainable SSR is based on a good capability analysis at the outset. A capability analysis for the HN security framework and its Armed Forces to be developed under SSR should include the considerations listed in the following text.

2. **Threats and Operating Environment.** The capability analysis should be founded on an assessment of the types and nature of threats that the HN is likely to face. This will include external threats to the HN territorial integrity and internal threats that may necessitate the HN using military force to resolve as required and within the Rule of Law. A determination of the types of forces required by the HN will also stem from an analysis of the operating environment. For example, the types of terrain over which the land forces will operate will be a factor in determining if they are to be predominantly a light, motorized or mechanized force.

3. **Delineation of Responsibility.** The delineation of responsibility for security sector tasks is necessary to identify the roles and capabilities that are appropriate for military forces, and those that should be the responsibility of other Government Agencies.

4. **Cultural Influences and Factors.** An assessment of cultural factors and influences is necessary to ensure the Armed Forces of the HN will become a mechanism for creating and maintaining national unity and stability. These considerations will shape the organization and customs of service for the HN Armed Forces. It is important to ensure that the make up of the
Armed Forces reflects the cultural composition of the HN. It is also important to account for the HN historical influences, including those that may have shaped previous iterations and equipping of the HN Armed Forces. Furthermore, the education and technological sophistication of the HN population should be considered when determining how the new force is structured and equipped.

5. **Host Nation Involvement.** Capability analysis should be based on the premise that ultimate responsibility for security reform rests with the HN. There is a clear need to respect and understand the views and interpretations of the HN regarding the design of its security architecture, based on its perception of the threat. This will help ensure that the forces developed under SSR will be enduring, appropriate to the needs of the HN and will enjoy the trust of the HN government and public.

6. **Sustainability.** The long-term ability of the HN to sustain the Armed Forces that will be developed under SSR, needs to be considered. Continuous dependency by the HN on external resources to maintain its security forces must be avoided. Therefore, consideration of the economic capabilities and demands is paramount. This will include fiscal resources, economic potential, the industrial base and manpower resources. Basically, the SSR process should create a force that the HN can support with its own resources.

### 7B04. REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

1. **Force Development.** The forces and capabilities to be developed will stem from the capability requirement analysis and will reflect HN aspirations. The various forces within an SSR programme that the campaign military forces may assist to develop are detailed below.

   a. **Military Forces.** These should be designed and built to counter external threats to the host nation and certain types of internal threats based on the analysis of the potential threats and capability requirements. The following should be noted:

      (1) Forces to be developed may be joint forces and therefore, this portion of the SSR programme must be undertaken from a joint perspective.

      (2) Within the services, specific disciplines should be used to develop and train their counterparts in any new force. For instance, military police should develop and train military police. This provides an appropriate skill development and a better mentoring process.

      (3) Special Forces may have a limited role to train specific, special operations skills to indigenous forces, such as VIP protection and hostage rescue. Line units are best employed to train line units in the developing security forces. This will create a better mentoring process as nascent military forces will likely better identify with line troops. Furthermore, the basic infantry and military skills required of a new force are best instituted and developed through adherence to a regimented discipline, structure and hierarchy that is part and parcel of line units.

   b. **Police Forces.** Internal constabularies are a vital component to a democratic security framework. Although the military may be initially involved in the development of civilian police forces, this task should be assumed by appropriate civilian police forces from any coalition nations as soon as possible. The application of specific, professional police trainers will create better capabilities,
support a mentoring process and ensure the force development within a civilian, democratic framework. It will also ensure a separation of forces between the military and police. International funding for police forces is generally more forthcoming if de-linked from armed forces reform.

c. **Other Security Sector Forces.** There may be a requirement for the development of other forces within the security sector construct. This may include such forces as coast guard and border control forces, if the latter is not assumed by the police or combined with customs forces. This will depend upon the situation and the HN requirements. Until specific forces are developed for specific roles, other security forces may have to assume responsibilities outside of their domain. For example, until a border security force is established, the army and air force may have to assume this responsibility. Ideally, such requirements are synchronized in the overall SSR programme from the outset.

2. **Delineation of Roles and Separation of Powers.** The roles of the newly developed security forces will reflect the capabilities for which they have been designed. There may at times be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed and established. For example, the army may be responsible for crowd control operations until the police are ready to assume this responsibility, under the guidance of SSR mentors. There is a requirement to educate the forces and their political leadership in the appropriate roles for each element of the security forces. Military forces should be restricted to their role as a force of last resort (notwithstanding the need to train for Full Spectrum Operations) and their employment within the constitutional Rule of Law. A clear separation of powers and responsibilities must be defined and educated from the political and strategic level, downwards. This hierarchy of application of force provides a framework linking together all aspects of SSR.

3. **Security Force Structure.** A holistic, logical approach must be taken to the design and capability development of the security forces, from the political and strategic levels down to the tactical level. Whilst it is important that the new security structure have all capabilities and requirements represented, structures should be kept simple. In planning the security force structure, the following should be considered:

   a. Political oversight and control in the form of a ministry or department of defence will be necessary. This is a political, strategic aspect. This must be designed to link the political direction of the government to strategic direction.

   b. A national military headquarters will have to be established to provide overall command and translate government and strategic direction to the operational level. This may be a joint structure.

   c. Depending upon the size and capability requirement, land, navy and air force national headquarters may be required.

   d. Depending upon the size and capability requirements identified, operational headquarter(s) may be established. These may be regionally based, capability based or a combination of the two, depending upon a number of factors.

   e. All staff disciplines may be required at all levels, from strategic to tactical.

   f. The structure of the security forces will have to take into careful consideration the ethnic and cultural factors that exist.
g. The size and structure of tactical units will depend upon a wide-variety of considerations. Tactical forces must be developed to meet all the operational and combat functions required, including sustain and shield. The considerations and factors guiding tactical force size and structures will include the following:

(1) Capability and role/employment. This may include consideration of the need for mechanized, medium and light forces. These requirements will stem from a threat analysis and consideration of the potential operating environments, such as jungle or mountain.

(2) Historical lineage and traditions (their positive and negative influences).

(3) A realistic assessment of resources, including manpower, available in the near and long term.

(4) The assessed learning capability of the security force elements and leadership.

4. **Moral and Intellectual Aspects.** The development of the new armed forces cannot be limited to the physical structures and capabilities. In order to avoid a repetition of historical problems and sources of past instability, the moral and intellectual realms of a reliable and politically subordinate security force must be addressed. In short, the proper and accountable role and conduct of an armed force within a democratic and legitimate architecture must form the backdrop and context to all other training, and must be a part of the training itself. Forces conducting SSR must ensure higher standards of deportment and conduct amongst the forces and their leadership.

5. **Equipment and Resources.** An integrated and synchronized plan must be developed for equipment and resource issues, to include the funding, procurement, allocation and distribution. This will be a multi-agency task, with the military providing advice and guidance in terms of realistic requirements and a distribution plan synchronized with individual and collective training requirements and milestones. Training plans must not only include how to use the equipment and resources but how to maintain them. Likewise, equipment procurement must include sustainability plans at the tactical to strategic levels.

6. **Infrastructure.** Forces will require suitable infrastructure from the outset of their development. Best use will be made of existing infrastructure, but resources may have to be allocated to improve and/or expand them. A plan must be developed for the handover of any campaign force infrastructure to HN agencies.

7. **Geographical Force Dispositions.** Factors that must be considered in deciding geographical force dispositions will include regional requirements, force role and capabilities, terrain and existing infrastructure. Other considerations will include differing cultural regions, tribal ties and historical lines of power and authority.

8. **Recruitment and Selection Policies.** Planning for SSR, and indeed, part of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), must include policies for the recruitment and selection of future security force personnel. Consideration has to be given to those who will be placed in the higher levels of command in order to achieve an acceptable cultural/ethnic balance. Consultations with HN authorities will be required in order to avoid inaccurate assumptions and unsupportable structures and practices. Former military personnel and commanders may be incorporated into a new force, once appropriate consideration of all factors has occurred.
7B05. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SSR PLAN

1. The implementation and development plan for the SSR programme should include the following:

   a. Priorities and synchronization for capability development across all facets of the security sector and force. These must be:

      1. agreed upon by HN and the coalition force;
      2. progressive and balanced between requirements of HN and the capabilities of the coalition;
      3. attainable;
      4. demonstrative of success and able to be disseminated through information operations; and
      5. inclusive of training and development at ministry or department level, not just for formations and units.

   b. Identification of baseline doctrine that:

      1. reflects capability requirements desired by the HN;
      2. reflects current or planned equipment for use by HN;
      3. preferably utilizes existing doctrine, historical linkage or doctrine agreed between coalition forces and the HN; and
      4. ensure consistency of doctrine at all levels of training.

   c. Development of training objectives that are:

      1. appropriate, progressive and realistic;
      2. achievable in an agreed and/or realistic timeframe and reflective of experience and education levels; and
      3. allow for HN forces to continue the training in the future (e.g. train the trainers).

   d. Identification of measures of effectiveness that:

      1. begin with an identified set of baseline standards;
      2. reflect levels of operational capability desired (e.g. small unit v.s. formation level operations);
      3. test and evaluate against simulated situations (e.g. exercises);
(4) reflect ability to achieve and maintain readiness/preparedness requirements; and

(5) reflect ability to administer, maintain and resource the force at all levels.

e. Identification of resources for training, operations and subsequent maintenance of the HN force capability:

(1) identify HN, Coalition and donor resources;

(2) include governance and due diligence measures/procedures and processes when planning the use of the resources;

(3) identify procurement budgeting and resource distribution plan;

(4) identify infrastructure requirements and transition arrangement for ownership; and

(5) future acquisition and maintenance.

f. Identification and timely tasking of the SSR training elements. This must be conducted during the planning phase:

(1) development of the training programme and standards for the training force prior to their commitment to SSR, including cultural awareness;

(2) development of a SSR training force command and control structure; and

(3) allocate and task SSR training elements as appropriate, to reflect their capability, culture and experience. This should also include suitable specialists for technical and specialist capability development.

g. Planning for transition to HN security responsibility at all levels that is progressive and linked to the measures of effectiveness:

(1) this should include a period of mentoring, particularly if the conflict is ongoing;

(2) handover of responsibilities should be progressive and synchronized with a measured disengagement plan;

(3) contingency plans for the re-engagement of SSR forces as required, should difficulties develop with the new security forces; and

(4) this should be preceded by, and continually supported by, an Information Operations campaign.
CHAPTER 8
INTRODUCTION TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONS AND SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

801. GENERAL

1. The elements of campaign design and planning, and the principles by which a commander conducts offensive, defensive and stability operations within any campaign remain valid and extant regardless of the geographic environment in which the campaign is conducted, and irrespective of the tactical deployment means utilized. However, the planning and conduct of campaigns in specific environments and using specific deployment means will require special consideration, planning and training.

2. Specific operations that require special consideration, with respect to their integral strengths and weaknesses, are as follows:
   a. Airmobile operations.
   b. Airborne operations.
   c. Amphibious operations.
   d. Operations by encircled forces.

3. Certain environments pose specific challenges to the successful conduct of military operations. They normally stem from the physical nature of the surroundings and require careful consideration. Ideally, units deployed in such environments will have undergone extensive training in the specific environment concerned. In-theatre training will be valuable if possible. Environments requiring special consideration are as follows:
   a. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) contaminated environments.
   b. Operations in mountains.
   c. Operations in urban areas.
   d. Operations in jungles.
   e. Operations in forests.
   f. Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions.
   g. Operations in deserts and extremely hot conditions.

4. Despite the special considerations, it must be remembered that operations in urban areas have become routine in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and thus all forces deploying should be prepared to, and capable of, conducting full-spectrum operations (FSO) in both urban and rural terrain.
SECTION 2
SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

802. AIR AND SEA INSERTIONS—GENERAL

1. The ability to move forces about the battlefield in a rapid and flexible manner is an important factor in a commander's development of his plan. Both fixed and rotary wing aircraft have a major role to play in the deployment of forces. This is particularly true in campaigns that involve large areas of operation (AOs). Similarly, the deployment of forces from the sea offers a commander the ability to maximize mobility, flexibility and surprise in the concentration of force. The nature of airmobile, airborne and amphibious operations is such that they will often become the focus of attention for the commander and his staff even if they do not constitute the main effort. It is important, therefore, that they distinguish between the requirement for close coordination, and the need to keep such operations in perspective in relation to the main effort and other activities. Similarly, airmobile, airborne and amphibious operations will often attract undue attention from the adversary who may find himself distracted away from the friendly force's main effort by such actions. This section examines briefly the employment considerations for the use of airmobile, airborne and amphibious forces. Detailed planning and conduct considerations for forces using insertion methods by air or sea will be found in publications specific to each type of operation.

803. AIRMObILE OPERATIONS—GENERAL

1. An airmobile operation is defined as: “an operation in which combat forces and their equipment manoeuvre about the battlefield by aircraft, to engage in ground combat.” The movement of the force is done normally using helicopters, under the control of a land force commander. It should not be confused with air movement, which is the air transportation of troops, supplies and equipment, which do not necessarily have either tactical integrity or the ability to engage in immediate combat.

2. Airmobile forces may be employed independently or in conjunction with other land forces. They permit a commander to react quickly to a threat over his whole AO. The threat they pose may cause the adversary to protect important installations and key terrain in his rear areas, which would be difficult to attack by land movement alone.

804. THREAT

1. In addition to the normal threat faced by land forces, airmobile forces may expect a threat from adversary air defences, both from the ground and from the air. There is also a threat from electronic warfare (EW), particularly jamming. Usually, airmobile operations are executed in undefended or lightly defended areas. Operations in adversary-controlled areas may be very difficult, and in some cases, impossible against a well-prepared adversary with sophisticated air defence (AD) systems.

193 NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
**805. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES**

1. Airmobile forces may be organized as follows:
   
   a. A formation or unit that has organic aircrafts in a sufficient quantity to enable it to undertake airmobile operations without requiring the assistance of additional aviation forces. This is an airmobile formation.
   
   b. A formation or unit that has insufficient organic aviation assets and thus requires reinforcement. Some joint training may be required with these newly allotted aviation forces to make the formation truly airmobile.
   
   c. A formation or unit that has no organic aviation forces and which must have the necessary forces allotted to it before it can undertake airmobile operations. A major consideration in this case is the requirement for joint training before the commitment of the force.

2. Any combat arms should be able to undertake airmobile operations, but some units will require more preparatory training than others. Light forces, in accordance with their definition, and by virtue of their concept of employment, equipment tables and routine training, are ideally suited for airmobile operations.

3. An airmobile force is capable of the following:
   
   a. Attacking from any direction, striking objectives in otherwise inaccessible areas, over-flying barriers, and bypassing adversary positions, to achieve surprise.
   
   b. Rapidly deploying and redeploying, permitting quick concentration of combat power at key locations. Similarly, they are capable of rapid dispersal to reduce vulnerability.
   
   c. Giving the commander the ability to reinforce or relieve his forces quickly and over long distances.
   
   d. Enabling the commander, under certain circumstances, to commit a larger part of his force while relying upon a small airmobile reserve.
   
   e. Conducting operations independent of a ground line of communication.

**806. TASKS**

1. An airmobile force may be assigned various tasks, to include the following:
   
   a. To seize and retain key terrain, including defiles, bridges and crossing sites.
   
   b. To overcome obstacles.
   
   c. To conduct raids.
   
   d. To engage or destroy air delivered adversary forces and guerrilla forces.
Land Operations

e. To exploit the effects of nuclear weapons.

f. To conduct reconnaissance missions.

g. To conduct security missions, such as providing a screen on possible adversary approaches or as a rear area security force.

h. To support deception operations.

i. To block or to assist in the containment of adversary penetrations.

j. To reinforce encircled forces.

k. To insert or extract long-range patrols.

807. LIMITATIONS

1. Airmobile operations are vulnerable to a number of threats and conditions and thus may be limited in their application by any of the following factors:

   a. Weather conditions.

   b. Vulnerability to adversary fire and the effects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, particularly between assembly and take-off and during approach and landing.

   c. Vulnerability during air movement to adversary AD, including aircraft.

   d. Local air superiority in the objective area.

   e. Inadequate suppression of adversary ground fire and AD weapons, including the related command and control (C2) systems along the flight route.

   f. Type and quantity of supporting weapons and other heavy equipment, including vehicles that can be airlifted. Not only are the aviation assets vulnerable, but also the forces once landed will lack firepower and protection if facing mechanized or well armed adversary forces.

   g. Difficulties in maintaining the flow of supply, including the need for an early link-up by ground forces or safe air resupply.

808. PLANNING

1. An airmobile operation is planned in the reverse order of its execution. The planning sequence consists of:

   a. The Ground Tactical Plan. The ground tactical plan covers the employment of the assault force and support units once they have landed.
b. **The Landing Plan.** The landing plan covers the introduction of the airmobile force into the objective area at the right time and place and in the proper sequence to execute the ground tactical plan.

c. **The Air Movement Plan.** The air movement plan consists of the flight route and the air movement table. It also includes information concerning the flight formation, altitudes and speeds, weather, fuel, maximum load capacity, radius of action and procedures for airspace control, AD and tactical air support.

d. **The Loading Plan.** The loading plan identifies the pick-up zone, provides guidance for its establishment and control specifies the priority of landing and states the order of march of troops, supplies and equipment to the pick-up zone.

e. **The Staging Plan.** The staging plan details the control area(s) and provides guidance on the repositioning of the units, supplies, and equipment required.

2. Airmobile forces can be moved rapidly over long distances and can therefore be used as a very flexible reserve or manoeuvre force in their own right. The types and numbers of available helicopters will determine the tasks that they can undertake. Indirect fire support will be required from any artillery within range and combat service support (CSS) for periods longer than 48 hours must be supplied by the host formation. Airmobile operations require rapid joint planning by the ground and air forces involved together with comprehensive and well understood operating procedures.

### SECTION 3
**AIRBORNE OPERATIONS**

#### 809. GENERAL

1. An airborne operation is defined as: "an operation involving the movement of combat forces and their logistic support into an objective area by air." Airborne forces are specifically organized, equipped and trained for delivery by airdrop or air landing or a combination of both into an area in order to carry out operations. Note that these operations are only feasible under conditions of local air superiority. The success of such operations is dependent upon strict security in order to achieve surprise. Note that the term “airborne” refers to parachute or fixed wing air transported delivery as opposed to tactical aviation mobility.

2. Airborne forces provide a commander with flexibility by virtue of their reach and responsiveness, and they permit him to operate throughout his AO. They may be initiated either independently, or in conjunction with the forces operating on the ground. The nature of their role is such that once on the ground they are lightly equipped with only limited means of fire support and mobility. Their capability to sustain operations after the initial assault is therefore governed by the ability either to resupply, probably by air, or to link-up with them on the ground. If this is not possible, they will need to be extracted.

3. Although the COE sees few circumstances when a large-scale airborne operation is required, parachute operations remain a viable tactical option. Troops may be delivered to

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194 Ibid.
remote areas within a large AO by parachute, and they and those delivered by other means, may be resupplied by parachute, particularly when distances and asymmetric threats combine to make ground operations difficult. The effectiveness of parachute operations is improved with modern means of aerial precision and these should be employed whenever possible.

810. CAPABILITIES

1. Airborne forces offer the commander the following capabilities:
   
   a. Rapid deployment over considerable distances, crossing obstacles and difficult terrain in the process. They can be tools for deep operations, potentially capable of striking at an adversary's centre of gravity (COG).
   
   b. Achievement of surprise, particularly as the adversary cannot easily predict the AO.
   
   c. Theatre entry assault (like amphibious forces), having been launched out of theatre from the home base or from an interim forward mounting base.
   
   d. Employability as light infantry forces, and are particularly well suited to doing so in environments characterized by close terrain.
   
   e. A psychological effect on the adversary and on the mind of the adversary's commander, by virtue of their element of surprise and the speed and depth to which they may operate. This will far outweigh their actual physical capability. This capability may force an opponent to concentrate far more on his own rear operations than he might otherwise wish to do.

811. TYPES OF OPERATION

1. Airborne forces can be employed to carry out one of three types of operation:
   
   a. **Seize and Hold Operations.** Airborne forces may be required to seize and hold objectives until either reinforced or relieved by other forces.
   
   b. **Interdiction Operations.** Interdiction operations are intended to dislocate or disrupt adversary operations in a specific area. Terrain that hinders the adversary's off-road mobility (i.e., featuring wooded areas, hills, rivers or other obstacles) is best suited to this type of operation.
   
   c. **Airborne Raids.** The airborne raid is a tactical, operational or strategic level operation, normally of short duration and is characterized by its boldness of concept and execution. They fulfill the same purpose as dismounted raids: to destroy adversary installations or positions; to capture adversary personnel; or to harass or disrupt adversary operations. Because of difficulties of control and CSS, such operations are usually limited in size.

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195 “Air interdiction” has recently changed to plainly read “interdiction.” NATO AAP-6 defines the former in air power terms only.
812. TASKS

1. In conducting any airborne operations, airborne forces may be given the following tasks:
   a. The seizure and retention of key terrain until link-up with ground forces.
   b. The capture of airfields and beaches to form airheads and bridgeheads.
   c. The collection of information in adversary controlled territory.
   d. The conduct of raids on headquarters (HQ), fire support positions, lines of communications (LOC), administrative and CSS installations. This will serve to create a sense of insecurity in the adversary's rear areas.
   e. The reinforcement of encircled forces.
   f. The conduct of an attack on the rear of adversary positions, or cut off of his reserves in combination with offensive action by other ground forces.
   g. The coverage of a flank or possible adversary approach route.
   h. As a reserve to counter adversary deep operations in friendly rear areas.

813. LIMITATIONS AND VULNERABILITIES

1. Due to their light nature and mode of delivery, airborne operations will be subject to a number of limitations and vulnerabilities:
   a. Transport aircraft are vulnerable to adversary fire, both en route to the objective and in the landing/drop zone itself. They may be further restricted by poor weather conditions. Local air superiority will be essential and adversary ground-based AD will need to be neutralized or suppressed.
   b. After landing, airborne forces have limited mobility, organic fire support and combat support, and they may require time to organize and reach full combat effectiveness.
   c. Reinforcement, redeployment or extraction may be considerably more difficult than with other ground forces.
   d. Air resupply may be subject to disruption. There are particular difficulties in maintaining logistic balance in an operation that crosses the forward line of own troops (FLOT). It is difficult to sustain a force via an air bridge, particularly with respect to bulk fuel and ammunition.

814. PLANNING AND EXECUTION

1. Planning for an airborne operation is best carried out in the reverse order of execution:
   a. The Ground Tactical Plan. The ground tactical plan details missions and objectives, and sets out the type, strength and organization of combat forces.
and support required to accomplish the assigned mission. For most operations it also designates the AO, other reconnaissance and security forces, boundaries, and provides for a reserve.

b. **The Landing Plan.** The landing plan, in conjunction with the ground tactical plan, indicates the sequence, the method of delivery, locations of drop/landing zones, and the assembling of the different components of the airborne force and materiel in the objective area.

c. **The Air Movement Plan.** The air movement plan, in conjunction with the landing plan, includes detailed information concerning the air movement of all airborne forces from the departure airfields to the drop/landing zones.

d. **The Loading Plan.** The loading plan is based upon the likely requirements in the landing plan and establishes the priority of loading.

e. **The Staging Plan.** The staging plan is based upon the requirements of the air movement plan. It deals with the problems of dispersion of the airborne forces in the area of the departure airfields, and also covers the briefing and preparation of the units for the forthcoming operation.

2. In planning for air delivery of combat supplies, only the necessary steps are followed.

3. An airborne operation generally falls into four interrelated stages:

   a. **Mounting.** This includes all activities from receipt of the warning order until loaded aircraft take off on the operation. During this stage, joint planning is completed, intelligence is analyzed, stringent security measures are maintained, troops, equipment and supplies are assembled and marshalled, and aircrafts are loaded.

   b. **Air Movement.** This stage begins with the take-off of loaded aircraft and ends with delivery of the force to the drop/landing zone.

   c. **Assault.** The assault stage covers the assault landing of the force on the drop zone/landing zone, assembly, securing the objective and reorganization.

   d. **Subsequent Operations.** By the very nature of airborne operations, the initiative is seized. The force should seek to maintain this advantage while operating in adversary territory although any subsequent operations must be in accordance with the commander's overall plan.

SECTION 4
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

815. **GENERAL**

1. An amphibious operation is defined as: “a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the
landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.\textsuperscript{196} Amphibious forces constitute a major force multiplier, as the adversary must commit a significantly greater number of forces to secure coastlines and all other possible entry points. Once committed, however, this force multiplier capability is much reduced.

2. Amphibious operations exploit the element of surprise and capitalize upon adversary weaknesses. Mobility, flexibility and current intelligence are fundamental requirements. This is achieved through the application of the required type and degree of force at the most advantageous locations at the most opportune times. This may require the amphibious force to pause for an unspecified time before landings take place, and immediately before and during landings, it may need to switch direction rapidly in order to achieve surprise, mask its real objective, or simply capitalize on its tactical mobility.

3. Amphibious operations may be used as an enabling process to seize an entry point for the landing of heavier follow-on forces, in support of other land operations, in support of wider maritime operations, or as an independent operation. The landings and subsequent operations can be supported by the ships of the amphibious task force without the use of fixed installations such as ports and airfields. It can also be sustained by its shipping and integral CSS organization until such time as it transfers to a land command, and draws its support from there.

816. CAPABILITIES AND TYPES OF OPERATION

1. Amphibious forces are capable of carrying out four principal types of operation:
   a. \textbf{Amphibious Assault}. This is the principal type of amphibious operation and involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The requirement to be able to create a rapid build-up of combat power ashore accounts for the organizational and technical differences between amphibious and land warfare.
   b. \textbf{Amphibious Raid}. The raid is a landing from the sea onto a hostile shore, involving a swift incursion into, or temporary occupation of, an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Raids may be conducted to:
      (1) Inflict loss or damage.
      (2) Obtain information.
      (3) Create a diversion.
      (4) Capture or evacuate individuals or equipment.
   c. \textbf{Amphibious Withdrawal}. This is the withdrawal of forces by sea in naval ships or crafts from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
   d. \textbf{Amphibious Demonstration}. An amphibious landing may be conducted to deceive the adversary to force him take up positions that will put him at a disadvantage and dislocate his combat power.

\textsuperscript{196} NATO AAP-6.
817. PLANNING AND CONDUCT SEQUENCE

1. An amphibious operation will normally be conducted in the following sequence:
   a. **Planning.** The planning stage covers the period from the issue of the initiating directive to embarkation. Although planning continues throughout the subsequent stages, it is necessary to identify command relationships at this stage because there are significant changes in command relationships in the other stages.
   b. **Embarkation.** The embarkation stage is the period during which the forces embark and are allocated to ships with their equipment and supplies.
   c. **Rehearsal.** The rehearsal stage is the period when plans are rehearsed for the purpose of:
      (1) Testing the adequacy of the plan, the timing and the combat readiness of participating forces.
      (2) Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans.
      (3) Testing communications.
   d. **Movement.** The movement stage is the period during which the amphibious force moves to the AO. This move may be made via staging and/or rendezvous areas.
   e. **Assault.** The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious force in the AO and the accomplishment of their mission. Once the force has landed, normal doctrine for offensive operations comes into play.

818. TERMINATION

1. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the mission of the amphibious task force. This is usually once the force is firmly established ashore. The landing force will then become involved in subsequent land operations.
2. The landing force is regarded as being firmly established ashore when, in the opinion of the land component commander:
   a. The beachhead is secure.
   b. Sufficient combat and supporting forces have been established ashore to ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel required for subsequent operations.
   c. Command, communications and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established ashore.
Introduction to Specific Operations and Specific Environments

d. The land component commander has stated that he is ready to assume the responsibility for subsequent operations.

3. Even if the landing force assumes follow-on operations once firmly landed, the amphibious task force may be required to continue to support the force. CSS may be retained on board and pushed forward as required. Additionally, the overall C2 of the operation may remain afloat. This may be the case in a limited intervention campaign such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).

819. CONCLUSION

1. Amphibious operations require joint planning and execution. Amphibious forces can be moved long distances and with all necessary ground support. Movement by sea is slow when compared to movement by air, but the amphibious force can be transported together, and arrives as a formed unit capable of immediately conducting combined arms operations. Amphibious forces may also be used to bolster political intent and demonstrate capability while awaiting the decision to carry out the operation.

SECTION 5
OPERATIONS BY ENCIRCLED FORCES

820. GENERAL

1. The adversary may encircle a force during either offensive or defensive operations. This situation restricts the freedom of action of the commander of the encircled force and that of his superior commander. It threatens the destruction of the force for it is highly vulnerable to attacks from any direction and resupply is difficult or impossible. Short of surrender, a reinforcement (followed by a link-up and possibly withdrawal) or breakout is the only options. The prime concern of commanders is the preservation of combat effectiveness, particularly the maintenance of morale. A high standard of leadership is demanded.

2. Once a force is encircled, the immediate responsibility of the superior commander is to decide if its mission should be changed. His decision is based upon an estimate of how long the force can fight on its own, the importance of its mission and the resources he has available to assist it. He must decide if the encircled force should defend (and await relief) or breakout. He must also decide if it should do so alone or with additional support, particularly fire support. A breakout operation may be done in combination with a supporting attack and/or a link-up.

821. DEFENCE

1. General. As soon as a force is encircled, a commander and his superior must take action, including: establishing communications and a command structure; organizing defensive sectors and fire support; constituting a reserve; and reorganizing and consolidating CSS elements. In the absence of direction from the superior commander, the senior officer present takes command of the force and establishes a command structure. If the superior commander does not provide additional resources, or if there are no communications between the two commanders, the commander of the encircled force organizes the defence using his own resources.
2. **Planning.** A commander selects a defence area based upon the terrain, the troops available and the original or revised mission. He plans his defence so that: surveillance is established to cover the entire perimeter; reconnaissance provides information on adversary activity and intent; forces are assigned to cover likely adversary approaches; a relatively strong mobile reserve is available to reinforce threatened sectors; and fire support from inside and outside the perimeter is coordinated. The following matters require specific attention:

   a. **Fire Support.** There must be a single artillery commander responsible for fire support. Firing positions for elements within the perimeter are selected to enable fire to all parts of the perimeter. Fire support from outside the encirclement is coordinated with that from within. A superior commander may have to deploy some fire support elements further forward than is normal. Often, close air support (CAS) and tactical aviation are the only means by which he can provide fire support. To do this, he may have to deploy additional forward air controllers (FACs) to support the encircled force.

   b. **Air Defence.** The limited manoeuvre space of encircled forces makes them particularly vulnerable to air attack, and consequently, they are unusually reliant upon AD. Reserves should be given high priority for coverage. A superior commander may be able to compensate for deficiencies in AD capabilities by arranging for air support and by providing the encircled forces support from outside the encirclement.

   c. **Engineer Support.** The normal tasks for engineers apply, but with particular emphasis on counter-mobility and protective digging. A greater proportion of engineers may have to be earmarked to deal with unforeseen threats.

3. **Conduct.** A commander must react immediately with defensive fire and reserves to block and contain any significant penetration. It may be difficult to identify the adversary's main effort, but any serious threat to the cohesion of the defence must be blocked to prevent the piecemeal destruction of the force. A commander may have to shrink his perimeter progressively to prolong his defence.

### 822. BREAKOUT OPERATIONS

1. **General.** A breakout occurs when an encircled force creates an opening in adversary lines and extricates itself to join with friendly forces. In this operation, it is essential to maintain momentum while retaining the integrity of the force. Normally, a superior commander orders a breakout. If no communications exist between the superior commander and the commander of the encircled force, the latter makes his decision to breakout based upon his superior's intent.

2. **Organization.** The breakout force is organized to provide: an assault element to create and maintain the opening; a security element to provide protection and deception on the perimeter; and security elements to cover the front, flanks and rear of the main body while it is moving. If it is impossible for the force to fight its way out, breakout by stealth (i.e., ex-filtration) is the only remaining option. Usually in this situation, the force is organized into small elements that move on separate routes to join with friendly forces.

3. **Planning.** The responsibility for planning a breakout rests with the commander of the encircled force. Any activities by outside forces in support of the breakout must be in response to his plan. Planning is similar to that for a deliberate attack. A commander must plan the
activities of regrouping, deception, assault, and subsequent movement to join friendly forces and conduct a link-up. The main body must move protected by advance and flank guards or screens, and a rearguard. The security elements on the perimeter disengage last and may be tasked as the rearguard in the final stage. The following matters require particular attention:

a. **Point of Break-out.** The point of breakout must be selected in relation to the adversary's disposition, routes for subsequent movement, and the next mission of the force.

b. **Breakout Routes.** The most direct routes may not be the best. Adversary weaknesses must be exploited and attempts made to avoid him by the use of less direct routes, difficult terrain and periods of reduced visibility. Advance and flank guards or screens provide information on adversary locations. The number of routes used depends upon the terrain, location of the adversary, size and composition of the force, and fire support available. The number of routes available to an armoured force is likely less than those for a non-armoured force. Use of a single route simplifies C2 and provides depth for any subsequent attack, thereby maintaining momentum. On the other hand, if the lead elements are stopped, there is a danger of the following elements concentrating and presenting a large target with open flanks. Although the use of more than one route may complicate C2, it offers protection through dispersion and greater flexibility. If there are lateral routes, units can be shifted from blocked routes to maintain momentum. Normally, it is preferable to have at least one alternative route.

c. **Fire Support.** There are times when organic fire support is limited due to movement, particularly just after the breakout opening is established and the main body starts moving. There may be a need for increased fire support, including CAS and tactical aviation support, from outside the encircled force.

d. **Engineer Support.** Engineer support is required to breach adversary obstacles and to clear or breach lanes in friendly obstacles. Some engineer resources should be in the rearguard to carry out counter-mobility tasks. They can also assist in the denial of equipment and supplies through their destruction.

e. **Aviation Support.** If helicopters cannot extract the entire force, any limited support available may be used to position forces on key terrain along breakout routes to act as security forces. Aviation fire support may be critical to support the initial attack at the breakout point, to provide flank protection of the main body, and to prevent adversary manoeuvre. Ideally, it will be placed under the tactical control (TACON) of the encircled force.

f. **Combat Service Support Elements.** CSS elements are grouped with combat and combat support elements within the main body for their own protection and for immediate resupply as required.

4. **Conduct.** A breakout is conducted as a deliberate attack, followed by movement, with the overall objectives of avoiding the adversary and joining friendly forces. A breakout by stealth is conducted similarly to an infiltration.
SECTION 6
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE

823. GENERAL

1. Although the threat from CBRN elements has diminished in the COE, there are nations and organizations that have or desire and may acquire CBRN related weapons. Accordingly, operations must be planned and conducted against a background of the risk of the employment of such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our forces. Additionally, across the whole spectrum of conflict, there may be a risk of release of harmful substances from damaged industrial plants or reactors as a result of accidental or unlawful action. Our forces must, therefore, be able to defend against conventional attacks, and must also be able to conduct sustained operations over protracted periods of CBRN environments resulting from the use of WMDs or from the release of toxic industrial hazards. This will require commanders to assess the threat and take effective defence measures to meet it.

824. FUNDAMENTALS OF CBRN DEFENCE

1. The following fundamentals form the basis for CBRN defence. These measures interrelate and must be considered together to minimize the effects from such threats:

   a. **Hazard Avoidance.** Hazard avoidance consists of the policies, doctrine, equipment and procedures necessary to detect, identify, warn, report and predict the hazards associated with CBRN weapons and toxic industrial hazards, to enable personnel to survive and continue to operate in a contaminated environment.

   b. **Protection.** Protection consists of the policies, doctrine, equipment and procedures necessary to provide individual, collective and casualty protection and medical countermeasures to enable personnel to survive and continue to operate in a contaminated environment.

   c. **Contamination Control.** Contamination control consists of the policies, doctrine, equipment and procedures necessary to control the spread of contamination and decontamination to remove or reduce the hazard.

825. FACTORS FOR PLANNING

1. The application of the fundamentals will be dependent upon several factors. No single solution can be automatically applied to every situation anticipated in the CBRN threat environment. Each commander must assess the following factors in determining the proper course of action:

   a. Assigned mission.

   b. Identification of the type, degree and persistency of the hazard.

   c. Influence of weather and terrain on the hazard.
d. Impact of casualties and equipment damage on the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.

e. Effect of operations in partial or full CBRN protection on morale and physical capability of personnel.

f. The time required and available to react to a nuclear, biological and chemical attack or toxic industrial hazards release.

g. Estimate of effort necessary to eliminate or reduce the contamination hazard.

h. Capabilities of the unit itself, or availability of specialized nuclear, biological and chemical unit assistance for hazard reduction.

i. Vulnerability to and probability of follow-on CBRN attacks or deliberate or accidental toxic industrial hazards releases.

j. Exploitation by the adversary of conventional forces immediately following CBRN attacks or the deliberate release of toxic industrial hazards.

826. HAZARD AVOIDANCE

1. Hazard avoidance refers to those pre-attack and post-attack actions leading to individual and collective measures taken to detect, identify, avoid, and minimize the aspects of immediate and residual CBRN hazards. It is the primary means of defence and will reduce and sometimes eliminate the need for protection and decontamination. The following should be considered in developing a hazard avoidance plan:

   a. **Intelligence.** Intelligence must be capable of identifying a risk or threat, including delivery systems and political and military intentions.

   b. **Adopting Passive Defensive Measures.** Our forces will implement passive defensive measures to include deception, camouflage, position selection related to risks, communications security (COMSEC), and tone down of materials and infrastructure. Dispersion, use of shelters and protective covers and concealment will be continuously exercised.

   c. **Adopting a Protective Posture.** The normal protective measures for a given threat level are given in standing operating procedures (SOP). These may be modified on the judgement of the commander.

   d. **Detecting, Identifying and Marking the Contaminated Areas.** Capabilities to detect, identify, and mark contaminated areas are required by each organization to provide timely alarms and warnings of CBRN hazards to avoid unnecessary exposure to such hazards. Advance warning is a vital component of hazard avoidance. Each unit and even subunit, depending upon the tactical situation and threat, should conduct its own CBRN reconnaissance to detect, locate and identify hazards. Armoured reconnaissance units conduct specialized CBRN reconnaissance and survey to locate and mark contaminated areas. They supplement reconnaissance efforts of unit nuclear, biological and chemical survey teams and perform these tasks for forces not possessing an organic reconnaissance capability.
e. **Warning and Reporting.** Operations and intelligence personnel and appropriate levels of command should report CBRN activity and reconnaissance information by automated systems as a standard, continuous function. Specialist staff should form part of HQ when necessary to provide technical assistance in the analysis of data. NATO standard formats and procedures for reporting apply.

f. **Relocating or Rerouting to an Uncontaminated Area.** Movement of forces to an uncontaminated area may be necessary to minimize continued exposure to residual CBRN hazards. If the hazard were non-persistent (e.g., blood agent), the unit can continue its mission in place and maintain its protective posture, as the hazard should dissipate within minutes. If the hazard were semi-persistent or persistent (e.g., nuclear fallout, suspected biological agents, or liquid chemical agents), the unit would maintain its protective posture, minimize further exposure to the hazard and continue its mission. The commander would rapidly analyze the situation to determine when relocation to a clean alternative position is possible. The unit or formation should, however, relocate to a clean position as soon as possible after the end of the current mission. Normally, a unit cannot be expected to fight dirty for more than 24 hours with an upper limit of 36 hours. To prevent the spread of contamination to the alternative position, such movement should include at least the operational decontamination of personnel and equipment prior to occupying the new position.

### 827. PROTECTION

1. Prior to the arrival of a CBRN hazard, commanders should evaluate the vulnerability of their unit. It must include an assessment of both attack and industrial contamination. Based upon this analysis, mitigation techniques and appropriate levels of individual and collective protection should be established. Individual and collective protection enhances survivability, so individuals must be trained and equipped to defend themselves against the immediate and residual effects of CBRN weapons and toxic industrial hazards, and to perform their duties while fully encapsulated. Medical countermeasures must be put into effect before the threat is realized.

2. Protection will be both individual and collective. Individual protection comes from prophylactic or preventive compounds (e.g., immunizations, medications) as well as other pre-treatment measures (e.g., skin barrier sprays or repellents) and from individual respiratory protection systems, protective clothing, antidotes, and decontamination kits. Collective protection in land operations is limited to essential functions that must continue unhindered in a CBRN environment. Well-constructed fighting positions and bunkers provide excellent protection against all the effects of a nuclear detonation. Prepared positions and rooms inside buildings may have their biological, chemical and toxic industrial hazards protection capabilities enhanced quickly by adding simplified specialized systems.

### 828. CONTAMINATION CONTROL

1. Contamination control consists of those measures taken before, during and after a CBRN release to limit the spread of contamination and avoid putting other individuals, equipment and areas at risk.
2. Decontamination is the process of making any person, object or area safe by absorbing, destroying, making harmless or removing toxic industrial hazards, biological or chemical agents, or removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. Decontamination aims at: minimizing casualties and saving lives (immediate decontamination); sustaining operations and reducing the contact hazard and limiting its spread (operational decontamination); and, reducing or eliminating the need for individual protective equipment (thorough decontamination). The three categories of decontamination are defined as follows:

   a. **Immediate.** Decontamination carried out by individuals upon becoming contaminated, to save life and minimize casualties. This may include some decontamination of personal clothing and/or equipment.

   b. **Operational.** Decontamination carried out by the individual and/or a unit, restricted to specific parts of operationally essential equipment, materiel and/or working areas, in order to minimize contact and transfer hazards and to sustain operations. This may include decontamination of the individual beyond the scope of immediate decontamination, as well as decontamination of mission essential spares and limited terrain decontamination.

   c. **Thorough.** Decontamination carried out by a unit, with or without external support, to reduce contamination on personnel, equipment, materiel, and/or working areas to the lowest possible levels to permit the partial or total removal of individual protective equipment and to maintain operations with minimum degradation. This may include terrain decontamination beyond the scope of operational decontamination.

829. **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS**

1. Residual contamination poses as great a problem to CSS organizations as to combat forces. CSS planning and defence systems must address all aspects associated with operations in a CBRN contaminated environment. These include:

   a. Requirements, priorities and procedures for decontamination and evacuation of materiel at supply, maintenance, and personnel support sites.

   b. Resupply of expended detection equipment, protective clothing, decontaminants, and medical supplies.

   c. Evacuation priorities, decontamination, and treatment of nuclear, biological and chemical casualties or conventional patients who have been contaminated with chemical/biological agents, toxic industrial contaminants (TIC), or radioactive particles.

   d. Decontamination of food and water sources for human consumption.

   e. Graves registration procedures for moving, decontaminating and marking hazard contaminated remains.

   f. Movement of both personnel and organizational replacements through contaminated areas.
Land Operations

830. MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. The medical support system must provide for the evacuation and management of casualties in a CBRN environment. Unit medical personnel will conduct initial medical triage to determine the extent of injury and treatment necessary. These medical personnel will recommend a course of action to the commander to include the need for decontamination, treatment, return to duty, or evacuation.

2. Decontamination will normally be the responsibility of the parent unit prior to evacuation in the medical evacuation chain. Patients will continue to wear their protective clothing during evacuation and at intermediate medical treatment facilities unless it must be removed for decontamination purposes or emergency treatment. The chemical agent, patient, protective wrap (casualty bag) should be used for the further transportation of clean or decontaminated patients who have had their protective clothing removed.

3. The medical treatment facilities for casualties in a CBRN environment will provide separate areas and control procedures for the required medical care, while controlling contamination.

SECTION 7
URBAN OPERATIONS

831. GENERAL

1. Within the COE, military forces must be prepared to conduct FSO in dense, urban areas as a normal practice. Operations in urban areas follow the same principles as all other operations, but there are certain limitations and characteristics that must be considered in planning and execution.

832. CHARACTERISTICS

1. Operations in built-up areas are characterized by:

   a. Three-dimensional aspect to operations, at street level, on rooftops and in buildings, and underground in sewers and subway systems.

   b. Restricted fields of fire and observation and thus the limitation on employing weapons to their maximum effective ranges.

   c. Protection, cover and concealment for troops and equipment from view and from fire.

   d. Restricted space for manoeuvre, particularly for mechanized units, but increased possibilities for infiltration and bypassing.
e. Increased demand for manpower. Urban operations, be they offensive, defensive or stability, are manpower intensive due to the interaction with the local population, the high level of casualties, and the three-dimensional density of the terrain.

f. Difficulty in locating adversary fire and activities. This is particularly so for an adversary that hides amongst a local population.

g. Close-quarter combat including the increased vulnerability of vehicles to short-range attack and the limitations this imposes upon the employment of weapons at their maximum effective ranges.

h. Restricted vehicle movement and requirement for intimate support for all vehicles.

i. The presence of a civilian population, which can very seriously limit military actions and whose support may be lost due to collateral damage.

j. Difficulties in command, control and communications due to the close terrain and its physical density.

k. Prolonged effects of CBRN related weapons and threat from planned targeting or collateral damage of toxic industrial areas.

l. Effects of devastation, including effects on the moral plane on both friendly and neutral elements.

m. Increased threat from mines and booby traps.

n. Higher rates of consumption of ammunition and combat supplies.

o. Increased reliance upon sound, human intelligence.

p. Requirement for high levels of initiative and quality leadership in order to overcome the physical and moral challenges of urban operations.

833. PLANNING

1. All aspects of FSO conducted in urban areas are manpower intensive, due in part to the requirement to deal with the local population and due to the density of the terrain.

2. The nature of the terrain forces planning to be centralized, but the conduct of operations to be decentralized, with a significant emphasis made on initiative, low level leadership and sound, detailed coordination. Control measures assume an increased importance and the tempo of an operation, particularly offensive, must be controlled and possibly slowed to maintain firm control and avoid undesirable collateral damage and the engagement of friendly forces.

3. Operations in urban areas will very in scale. Some may be pervasive and attempt to apply combat power throughout the entire urban centre. This will be the case in very large-scale operations, such as a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign focused on controlling urban centres, and large-scale offensive operations, such as the clearing of a large adversary force from a major city. Other operations in built-up areas may be much smaller in scale, such as the capture of only key nodes in a large city, or the capture of small hamlets or farm complexes in mainly rural areas.
4. Regardless of the scale, planning for operations in built-up areas must always consider the presence of civilians in the objective areas. Measures must be taken to minimize collateral damage and to avoid civilian casualties, even if this means a slowing of the operational tempo and even an increased risk to friendly casualties. Plans must be made for the immediate conduct of stability operations simultaneous with and following offensive and defensive operations. This will include emergency humanitarian aid, control of movement, anti-looting measures, and the restoration of essential services. Military forces may be required to conduct emergency repairs to infrastructure damaged or burned by withdrawing adversary forces. This may include a need to fight fires.

834. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. The sequence for tactical offensive operations in a built-up area remains applicable to offensive operations at any level, be it a brigade assault on a sector of a large city, to a platoon or section clearing a building or farm complex. The sequence consists of the following stages:

   a. **Investment or isolation.** The objective to be seized must be isolated from reinforcement and dominated to the greatest extent possible. Reconnaissance forces and direct fire assets are best suited to the task.

   b. **Break-in.** The aim of this stage is to assault and seize a foothold in the built-up area. The infantry, supported by integral fire support, engineers, additional direct fire assets (e.g., armour) and indirect fire normally conducts the break-in.

   c. **Securing objectives.** This stage of the operation should be launched from the foothold secured by the break-in. The aim is to secure objectives that provide a firm base from which to launch an assault on the next objective, or to unhinge the adversary's defence. Objectives should be seized that allow the force to dominate approaches to defeat any counterattack and to support the movement of other forces.

   d. **Clearance.** This stage is a methodical clearance of the whole area of the operation. The aim is to clear all remaining adversary from the area. As securing objectives is paramount, this task may be carried out by follow-up troops. Infantry, supported by direct fire assets and engineers will be the main troops to conduct this stage. The clearance may be conducted in a linear, contiguous fashion, or may be delayed until key nodes throughout the urban area have been seized and the adversary’s overall defensive plan unhinged, thus undermining the will of the adversary forces being cleared.

   e. **Consolidation.** In general terms, the consolidation is no different from that of any other offensive operation. Preparations must be made to consolidate successes and to defeat any counterattack. The consolidation may include the requirement to undertake stability operations to relieve the plight of civilians remaining in the area, and to prevent instability and lawlessness for which military forces may be eventually blamed if not prevented. Consolidation is also a time to collect vital information from local inhabitants regarding remaining adversary dispositions, booby traps left behind and the need for follow-on stability operations.
**835. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

1. At the higher tactical and formation levels, defensive operations are conducted in a number of stages. Activities may ebb and flow across these stages as attackers are repelled and areas are recaptured. The sequence consists of the following stages:

   a. **The Perimeter Force Battle.** The perimeter force consists of mutually supporting posts (i.e., temporary fighting positions) on the perimeter of the urban area that prevents the adversary from bypassing the defensive area. They provide updated information and begin the destruction of the adversary forces. They withdraw or shift when they can no longer influence the battle and the adversary commits to an assault.

   b. **The Disruption Force Battle.** A mobile and coordinated force disrupts the adversary assault as it attempts to break-in, establish a foothold and clear immediate objectives. The force and its tactics cause attrition, delay, disruption, and draw the adversary towards selected killing zones.

   c. **The Main Defence Area Battle.** The main defence area (MDA) is based upon a series of defended localities with mutually supporting strongpoints sited in depth and with the aim of defeating the adversary in selected killing zones. A local reserve should be designated in each sector or area. This battle should consist of aggressive, offensive tactics with counterattacks at all levels preventing the adversary from grouping or regrouping, and from encircling any defended localities.

   d. **Reserve.** As in any defensive operation, a central, mobile reserve (combined arms) is essential.

**836. STABILITY OPERATIONS**

1. In line with the construct of FSO and the realities of the COE, forces will be expected to conduct stability operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations. Forces at the lowest tactical level, even those well forward in the battle, may be expected to do so. For example, a platoon consolidating an initial objective may be required to provide emergency first aid to civilians, extinguish fires, and control the movement of civilians attempting to flee the area.

2. Tactical level commanders and their troops must be able to quickly change between tactical profile levels and use of force. Forces having just engaged and defeated an adversary force must be able to quickly shift, physically and mentally, to assisting or controlling local inhabitants, and to distinguish between threats and non-threats in confusing circumstances.

3. In conducting these activities, care must be taken to avoid allowing combatants to hide or escape amongst the civilian population.
SECTION 8
OPERATIONS IN FORESTS

837. GENERAL

1. The close terrain and density featured in heavily forested areas has an obvious and significant effect on tactical level operations. The term "forests" will be used to describe expanses of terrain which are completely covered by forests or where the majority of the area is wooded and where vehicle movement is largely restricted to roads, clearings and fire breaks, necessitating different tactics to those employed in more open terrain.

838. CHARACTERISTICS

1. Operations in forests have characteristics that are similar in many ways, due to the density of the terrain, to operations in built-up areas:
   a. Fields of observation and fire are limited, and therefore, fighting often takes place at short range.
   b. The tempo of operations is greatly reduced.
   c. Protection, cover and concealment for troops and equipment from view and from fire.
   d. Restricted space for manoeuvre, particularly for mechanized units, but increased possibilities for infiltration and bypassing.
   e. Threat of fire during periods of dry weather.
   f. Difficulty in locating adversary fire and activities. This is particularly so for an adversary that hides amongst a local population.
   g. Close-quarter combat including the increased vulnerability of vehicles to short-range attack and the limitations this imposes upon the employment of weapons at their maximum effective ranges.
   h. Restricted vehicle movement and the requirement for intimate support for all vehicles. The size of trees will dictate the ability to move armoured vehicles through the forested areas.
   i. Higher rates of consumption of ammunition and other combat supplies.
   j. Difficulties in command, control and communications.
   k. Limited visibility will have psychological effect on the troops who are employed in operations in forests for extended periods of time.

2. Forested areas have the effect of splitting up and canalizing an attack force. They favour troops engaged in defence or delay. Characteristically, the battle will be a series of isolated small unit actions. The maintenance of a cohesive posture will be extremely expensive in troops; commanders may find it necessary to accept gaps. Because of the excellent concealment for operations, there are increased opportunities to envelop, infiltrate and ambush, and a small force can have an influence on the battle out of proportion to its size.
3. The nature of forested areas makes them effective for use in delaying operations. Also, unlike open terrain, they provide good opportunities to employ non-armoured forces.

839. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

1. Given the nature and characteristics of forested areas, offensive and defensive operations in forests are conducted in the same manner as those operations in built-up areas, following the same methods and stages. The requirement for stability operations will likely be much less given the lack of a civilian populace in forested areas.

SECTION 9
OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS

840. GENERAL

1. Mountainous terrain is characterized by a marked difference in elevation with steep slopes and valleys over an extended area. Weather conditions will also vary considerably over a small area. It may include built-up areas and plains between mountain ridges, plateaus, passes and the mountainsides themselves.

841. CHARACTERISTICS

1. The important characteristics of mountainous areas with respect to military operations include the following:

   a. Sharp differences in elevation provide excellent observation or may totally mask large areas of ground. Mutual support will be difficult and at times impossible.

   b. Mechanized forces will be limited in mobility and manoeuvre. The ability to reinforce rapidly will be greatly limited.

   c. The structure of the terrain will normally be such that it will follow a distinctive pattern or grain with the road and track network tending to follow the drainage pattern. This will have a major impact upon manoeuvre, as the bulk of the forces will be forced to operate with the grain of the country.

   d. The road network will be limited, and cross-country movement in the higher regions will frequently be extremely difficult or impossible. The roads will be dominated by high ground, often covered with vegetation; hence, there will exist innumerable places for ambush.

   e. The important built-up areas will be concentrated in the valleys.

   f. The higher elevation will typically be exposed rock and any digging will be time consuming, requiring specialized equipment.

   g. The weather is normally unstable and changes very rapidly.

   h. Given the terrain and the likely focus on dismounted operations, there will be a significant reliance upon aviation assets for insertion and resupply.
i. Operations in mountainous areas are likely to be more exhausting for the troops, particularly for dismounted troops, when moving. Careful consideration must be made regarding the level of combat supplies that must be carried, with respect to the planned threat and the ability to quickly resupply.

j. In many mountainous areas, there is forest cover, particularly on lower slopes.

k. Communications are difficult due to screening.

2. Success in operations in mountains is usually achieved by the forces that gain control of key terrain, such as mountain and ridge tops, valley outlets, mountain passes, defiles and routes. Some of these will have a canalizing effect and can be controlled by forces on dominating heights around them. The battle for the heights will, therefore, be the governing factor in operations in mountains. Accordingly, they will be likely objectives in an attack and will be the key terrain upon which the defence will be based. Due to the restricted mobility of ground vehicles, the use of helicopters for tactical mobility, reconnaissance, resupply and evacuation may have decisive importance.

3. Campaigns in mountains that focus upon peace support or COIN operations will likely focus forces and resources on the small, scattered villages or other urban centres. This will place an emphasis on subunit level operations with a strong reserve held to reinforce and to control unassigned areas. Influence and control can then be spread out to the more remote areas between the centres.

842. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. Due to the nature of the terrain, self-contained task organizations may be required for effective and decisive offensive operations that can be achieved without the requirement for additional support or reinforcement. The forces required will be relatively greater than in operations on level terrain in order to overcome the advantages enjoyed by the defender in mountainous areas. The ability of the commander to influence the battle will be enhanced if he has a centralized reserve that can be moved quickly, ideally by aviation.

2. Plans for offensive operations should be based upon seizing the dominant terrain features as objectives. Early in the battle, particular effort may be necessary to capture vantage points for observation.

3. The attacker is likely to meet the strongest resistance on the few available routes. He should avoid attacking the adversary from the front and obtain access to these routes by envelopment. Engineers will likely be well forward in the order of march to quickly clear obstacles, which given the nature of the terrain are easier for the adversary to create, and will be more effective than on open terrain.

843. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. The defence will be more static in nature and characteristically be conducted in a number of isolated actions. The advantages that the terrain offers the defender may allow for an extension of the normal defensive sector width. It will be difficult for the defender to change the main effort.
2. Points to consider in planning and conducting defensive operations in mountainous areas are as follows:

   a. Dominant terrain provides the defender with good observation and firing positions, but it will be difficult to achieve a completely cohesive position.

   b. There may be areas that seem to be impassable or extremely difficult for ground forces to use, however, the ability of an adversary to overcome such obstacles should never be underestimated.

   c. The scarcity of roads places restrictions on the employment of tanks or other combat vehicles, and makes them vulnerable.

   d. At smaller unit levels, a defender can deceive the adversary as to his exact strength, purpose and dispositions. Signature weapons such as machine guns can be used to indicate false positions forward of a main position, thus causing the adversary to expose flanks in their manoeuvre.

   e. It is difficult to move reserves quickly unless helicopter lift can be used. In such situations, they become vulnerable to weather conditions and all arms AD by the adversary.

   f. The rocky ground in many mountainous areas will force defences to be constructed vertically, vice dug into the ground. This may require additional time.

3. The close terrain and limited, easily dominated routes will be an advantage to forces conducting delay operations. However, flank security/protection and continuous surveillance are essential to prevent adversary infiltration or bypassing. Close coordination is required to prevent portions of the delaying force from being cut-off.

844. STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. Units conducting stability operations in support of a campaign occurring in mountainous terrain will focus on the semi-rural villages, towns and hamlets likely scattered throughout the area. Given the likely remoteness of these areas, infrastructure needs will likely be of a fairly basic nature such as basic medical aid, basic school supplies, fresh water pumps and electrical supply. Significant effects can be gained on the moral plane by providing those basic aspects of governance and infrastructure that are often missing from remote rural population clusters.

SECTION 10
OPERATIONS IN ARCTIC AND COLD WEATHER CONDITIONS

845. GENERAL

1. Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions demand special techniques, training and equipment. The cold, the usual remoteness of the regions, ice and snow and the lack of mobility combine to create challenges and conditions that need special consideration in planning and execution.
846. CHARACTERISTICS

1. The important characteristics of arctic and cold weather conditions with respect to military operations include the following:

   a. In arctic areas, long hours of daylight in the summer and long nights in winter.
   b. Extreme cold in winter, which will hamper operations and equipment, and which will affect the mind as well as the body.
   c. Snow and snow cover in winter.
   d. High winds that increase the wind chill factor and may seriously reduce visibility.
   e. In large parts of northern areas, there is a scarcity or total absence of road and rail networks. In winter, cross-country vehicles will offer increased mobility, but for much of the arctic summer, ground movement, other than with specialized vehicles, may be impossible.
   f. The local resources available will be extremely limited due to a lack of populated areas.
   g. The disrupting effects of natural phenomena on communications, such as aurora effects with atmospheric static.
   h. While some areas may be forested much of the area will be without tree cover.
   i. During arctic winter conditions, the weather is normally unpredictable and may change rapidly.
   j. Degradation and reduced effectiveness of vehicles, weapons and equipment, especially batteries, engines, and petroleum and oil products.
   k. Construction and maintenance of shelters and utilities for troops and equipment will be crucial.

847. CONCEPTS FOR PLANNING AND EXECUTION

1. Forces operating in arctic/cold weather conditions should be capable of operating effectively in all types of operations provided they have received relevant and extensive training. It should be understood, however, that the execution of these would be more difficult than in temperate conditions. The critical aspect of operations in arctic winter or extreme cold weather conditions is that a force must be able to live and survive in the environment if it is to operate effectively. Success will depend, to a large extent, upon adequate training and equipment.

2. Operations in arctic/cold weather conditions require a greater proportion of support units to maintain operational capability. Small units will normally fight these operations in a dispersed manner. Task organizations suitable for the entire operation should be established at the outset. It will be difficult to adjust these subsequently.

3. In extreme cold, practically every task requires more time to execute, and allowance for this must be made in planning. Individual preparation for an operation requires great attention to details, such as clothing and equipment. Personnel operating in these conditions require additional time for rest and an increased intake of high calorie foods.
4. Because of the limited local resources in the Arctic, forces are even more dependent upon their LOC than in the temperate zone. Severing its LOC and denying it the use of alternative routes or means of supply may defeat an adversary force.

5. Under winter conditions, it is impossible to dig into frozen ground, permafrost or ice without specialized equipment or explosives. Over much of the area there will be little tree cover for concealment. Defensive positions may have to be built up, above the ground and this will require additional time and resources.

848. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. During the planning and conduct of offensive operations, the following should be considered:
   
a. In extreme cold, separating adversary units from their CSS elements will greatly reduce their effectiveness.

   b. Manoeuvre may at times be restricted by difficulties of weather and terrain.

   c. Due to widely dispersed zones of action, frequently flanks and rear areas will be lightly protected and present excellent opportunities to outflank or cut-off the adversary.

   d. Heavily falling snow, blizzards and fog may present excellent opportunities for surprise attack.

   e. While waterways, lakes and marshes are normally obstacles to an offensive operation, when frozen, they cease to be obstacles and may provide good avenues of approach, even for heavy equipment.

   f. In arctic summer conditions, ground movement may be seriously hindered or even become impossible due to the water/mud/swamp conditions.

2. There are only short periods of daylight in the arctic winter and this means that movement in conditions of low visibility will become the rule rather than the exception. To achieve surprise, envelopment and infiltration will be frequently used, taking advantage of gaps between adversary positions.

3. After seizing an objective there must be immediate consolidation. The assaulting dismounted troops may be exhausted, overheated and sweating from the exertion of the attack, and provision must be made to prevent them from becoming “cold” casualties.

849. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. During the planning and conduct of defensive operations, including the delay, the following should be considered:
   
a. Frequently, the limited number of troops committed will make it impossible to maintain a cohesive posture. Units must, therefore, be prepared to fight in isolation with all round defence or to move to alternative positions.
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b. Airmobile forces will be particularly valuable in delaying operations.

c. Seasonal changes will affect defensive positions (e.g., man-made obstacles may be made useless by heavy or melting snow).

d. Because of the time taken and the special techniques involved to create obstacles on adversary approaches, greater reliance will have to be placed upon other combat support elements in delaying and deterring the adversary.

e. As there will be gaps in the defence, the adversary will be able to infiltrate elements that may attack support facilities and LOC. Special attention will, therefore, have to be paid to the security of LOC and to the flanks.

f. Once deployed, adjustments to forces will be difficult.

2. Where the defender is unable to maintain his mobility, troops will be obliged to fight from their initial position, conducting the defence from isolated locations. The deployment of observation posts may be necessary to monitor the gaps between positions and act as the prompt for the timely deployment of reserves. Restrictions to mobility and the resultant slowness of reaction time may necessitate the decentralization of reserves.

3. During delay operations, particular emphasis must be given to advance preparations of any planned position, and rearward movement. Troops should destroy any abandoned shelters that could otherwise be used by the adversary.

850. MOBILITY AND COUNTER-MOBILITY

1. On frozen ground, with minimal snow cover, units can achieve excellent mobility. Marginally frozen soils, tundra, and thin frozen crust rapidly breakdown under traffic, reducing mobility. Engineer snow removal may be critical during heavy snowfalls. Float bridging and rafting operations are difficult or impossible across frozen rivers and streams. Ice bridges may be constructed at temperatures below -12° C. Countermine operations are different in winter environments due to frozen mine fuses and the loss of mine detector effectiveness.

2. If a thaw occurs, many areas of previously solid ground will be unusable by vehicles. Ice routes over waterways may be closed by demolitions or artillery. More time must be allowed for preparation of obstacle systems in cold temperature. Arming conventional mines is difficult in freezing weather. Minefields emplaced before a snow cover forms can become neutralized by snow, depending upon the snow’s depth and density.

SECTION 11
OPERATIONS IN DESERT AND EXTREMELY HOT CONDITIONS

851. GENERAL

1. Operations in desert and extremely hot weather conditions demand special techniques, training and equipment. The extreme heat, the large distances, the open ground and the general lack of inhabited areas provide opportunities and challenges for forces and must be considered in planning and execution.
852. CHARACTERISTICS

1. The important characteristics of desert and extremely hot conditions affecting military operations are as follows:

   a. Troops operating in these conditions must be physically, mentally and professionally prepared to meet the challenge. They must also be acclimatized before starting robust operations.

   b. Desert and extremely hot weather condition areas are similar in terms of environment and temperature, but differ in vegetation and terrain structure. Deserts are arid, barren regions and vary from high mountains to tracts of sand and salt marshes incapable of supporting normal life due to lack of fresh water. Populated areas are widely dispersed and centred on sources of water. Few roads and railways exist.

   c. In deserts, temperatures can be extreme in summer rising to between 50°C (122°F) and 70°C (158°F), and in winter falling to -45°C. The diurnal range may exceed 20°C.

   d. Extremely hot weather and desert can affect the normal movement of combat vehicles and the operation of weapons and communications systems. High ambient temperatures have significant adverse affects upon rotary wing aircraft lift performance, resulting in reduced troop/cargo payloads.

   e. In desert, visibility is often excellent allowing good observation and long fields of fire. Vegetation is poor in the desert, and generally, camouflage will be by artificial means. A moving unit is more likely to be seen due to the dust created.

   f. On the rare occasions that rain falls, it is normally torrential. Flash floods occur and areas of dried-up watercourses (wadis) are very dangerous in these conditions.

   g. Desert winds can achieve hurricane force. Dust and sand suspended within them can make life almost intolerable, movement and maintenance very difficult and can severely restrict visibility.

   h. In desert operations, manoeuvre units tend to consume greater quantities of combat supplies and spare parts than in temperate climates. Routine maintenance checks and servicing will also become much more important. Water supply is very important due to the lack of water sources and increased consumption.

2. In the desert, operations will be conducted by armoured and mechanized forces, and on occasions, airmobile and air-landed forces. Operations are likely to take place over a very large area and may principally be battles of manoeuvre with the aim of concentrating sufficient forces to defeat the adversary. The ability to fight in such conditions will depend upon what is logistically possible.

3. Forces employed in desert terrain have long fields of fire and observation. In most deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain may force the adversary to leave at
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least one flank open to attack by manoeuvre forces, tactical air forces and artillery fire, or mobile reserves. Large numbers of mines (ground and aerial delivered) may be used to enhance effectiveness of defensive positions. Additionally, the capability to communicate and to perform intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) tasks may be improved owing to improved lines of sight.

853. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. Attacks launched in desert and hot weather conditions will require comprehensive plans. In most deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain means that the adversary flanks may be vulnerable. The attacking force should seek an exposed flank and attempt to manoeuvre around it into the adversary rear before the adversary can react and block the envelopment with mobile reserves. Successful offensive operations depend upon bold, rapid manoeuvre, seeking a vulnerable adversary flank.

2. In the desert, a moving unit is more vulnerable due to the lack of concealment. Therefore, reconnaissance forces should be deployed well ahead of the main body. Similarly, flank and rear security/protection are essential.

3. Close cooperation between ground and air elements is essential. Desert terrain is suitable for all operations as it allows broad envelopment and encirclement with armoured, mechanized and helicopter units. The disadvantages caused by the limited concealment can be decreased by surprise, rapid movement, suitable deployment of troops, communications security and deception techniques.

854. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

1. The important defensive areas are ports, key logistic installations, roads, railways, water pumping stations, airfields, wells, mountain passes, and key terrain. In desert conditions, it is rare to find positions where both open flanks of the defended area can be protected by natural obstacles. Therefore, aggressive manoeuvre at all levels is the best way to destroy large numbers of adversary without being destroyed in the process.

2. In delaying operations, good fields of fire allow engagement at the maximum effective ranges of direct fire weapons systems, and therefore disengagement before the adversary can begin to close on the defender’s position. However, dust clouds raised by a moving force may make it necessary to disengage under cover of smoke and darkness. Even a sand storm can be used to advantage. Field artillery, aircraft and aviation can also be used to allow a ground manoeuvre unit to disengage and move rapidly to the next position. The problem of accurate navigation and the possibility of the adversary approaching from an unexpected direction require that attention must be paid to communications, the identification of vehicles, routes and the coordination of movement.
SECTION 12
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

855. GENERAL

1. Outside of Canada, it is most likely that Canadian military forces will work within a multinational force. A single component or a joint force may be deployed within a multinational chain of command. Although the term “multinational” refers to ad hoc arrangements, deployments abroad will rarely fall within the exclusive construct of a formal, standing alliance. An alliance may take the lead command of a joint force deployment, but for each campaign, a multinational force will likely be formed. Multinational operations bring great advantages to any campaign, including shared risk and greater combat power through multinational forces; however they also introduce specific challenges.

856. UNITY OF EFFORT AND COHESION

1. Successful multinational operations require unity of effort. It is unlikely that all the nations in the multinational force will share exactly the same strategic goals. To complicate this, the military contingents participating in a multinational operation, although under tactical (TACON) or operational control (OPCON) of the multinational force commander, are ultimately responsible to their own national chain of command. In this environment, friction will occur, detracting from unity of effort. To diminish this, the member nations must agree to mutually attainable military objectives, in particular those regarding resolution or termination of the conflict.

2. Unity of effort in multinational operations is built upon consensus. This unity requires a clear recognition and understanding of other nations’ capabilities and perceptions, as well as concessions to accommodate them as appropriate. Compromise will inevitably be required if consensus is to be achieved. Nations may reassess their objectives, both political and military, as the conflict progresses. Therefore, strategic and operational commanders must be concerned with maintenance of consensus throughout campaign design, planning, and execution.

3. The cohesion of the multinational force may be its COG and could be targeted by the adversary. Appropriate military and diplomatic efforts may be required to maintain solidarity.

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING MULTINATIONAL COHESION

During the first Persian Gulf War, Iraq launched SCUD attacks into Israel hoping for reprisals that would alienate the Arab members of the multinational force and erode cohesion. Aggressive joint and multinational military actions, including “SCUD hunting,” and the deployment of PATRIOT missiles to Israel, demonstrated that multinational diplomatic efforts were successful in retaining the cohesion of the force.

During the multinational operations in Iraq following major combat, insurgents bombed trains in Spain days prior to the Spanish national elections, killing over 200 civilians. The effect was to cause an anti-multinational political party to win the election, and in turn, to withdraw Spanish forces from the US led multinational.

4. The solidarity of the multinational force may be a critical vulnerability, but it is also a key to the legitimacy and public support of the force’s actions. Efforts to maintain the consensus are extremely important, but this should not unnecessarily distort the actions of the multinational
force commander. If all participating nations clearly understand the stated military objectives and have trust and confidence in their leaders, unity of effort can be sustained. Building cohesion and teamwork and establishing trust before, during, and after the battles and campaign are vital to success. Canadian commanders and staffs can greatly assist in maintaining cohesion in multinational operations by acting as a bridge between the dominant and smaller partners. To preserve this special status, it may be necessary to maintain an independence of thought from the lead nation of the multinational force.

SECTION 13
CHALLENGES IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

857. CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES

1. A multinational force may be formed from nations with different cultures, language, moral and ethical values, and incompatible social and economic outlooks. Sources of national pride and cultural sensitivities will vary widely, yet the multinational force commander must accommodate them. Differences in work ethic, standards of living, religion, and discipline affect the way nations approach campaigns.

2. Difficulties in language differences will have to be accommodated and additional time and resources must be allowed for staff and commanders to absorb and action both written and verbal communications.

858. STANDARDIZATION OF DOCTRINE

1. Standardization or at least harmonization of SOP, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and doctrine in general will be difficult and will take time to realize. This is particularly true for capabilities that are shared across nations, such as information operations (info ops) or reconnaissance. Assistance may be found in the use of accepted multinational procedures and the issue and use of multinational handbooks.  

859. EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

1. Difficulties such as incompatible communications and differences in the cross-country mobility of vehicles should be expected and considered and accommodated in planning. Shared cryptology and secure communications systems will be difficult and will require national approvals. These should be sought at the earliest possible time. Forces may have to provide communications detachments between subordinate and superior HQs in order to facilitate communications between different national contingents.

2. As well, certain multinational units may have some systems similar to that of the adversary, making measures to avoid fratricide vital. International standardization efforts in peacetime under the auspices of NATO or other international organizations (IOs) will also greatly increase interoperability of equipment, ammunition, doctrine and procedures.

197 Such handbooks include the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Standardization Programme (ABCA) Coalition Operations Handbook.
3. Certain national contingents may deploy with limitations placed upon them in terms of capabilities and roles/functions to be assumed. These limitations or restrictions, often imposed by home governments, must be considered at the forefront of campaign planning. Within these limitations, suitable roles and functions for these forces must be found that will continue to support the overall effort.

860. INTELLIGENCE

1. National restrictions on intelligence sources and methods may prevent some intelligence from being shared amongst members of the multinational force. Such intelligence information should be provided as much as possible by sanitizing it to separate it from the sources and methods used to obtain it. Special arrangements should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence information within the multinational force. Whenever possible, these arrangements should be agreed and exercised well before operations commence.

861. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Not only will intentions for employment differ amongst national contingents, but also rules of engagement (ROE) will vary. The ROE of any lead nation or national element with which Canadian elements will work must be studied in order to understand employment limitations, and to avoid areas of potential conflict or the creation of undesired or unintended effects.

862. CANADIAN ASPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL CAMPAIGN DESIGN AND PLANNING

1. In multinational operations there will be multinational strategic objectives, as well as corresponding Canadian strategic objectives and limitations that may affect the employment of Canadian troops. Canadian commanders must ensure that they understand the Canadian strategic direction within the context of the multinational force strategic objectives. Therefore, it is essential for the operational commander to keep the government informed of all pertinent aspects of operations. This will foster trust and mutual understanding between the military and the government to ensure adequate support for operations.

863. COMMAND IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. In any multinational operation there will be both multinational and national chains of command. Lines of responsibility and limitations must be clearly delineated and good communication, including the early warning of pending operations, will be essential to ensure that national chains of command may be advised and consulted if necessary.

2. The multinational force commander will discuss specific issues with national commanders on a bilateral basis as part of the planning process and throughout the campaign. In this way, they can avoid competition, detect problems early, and in particular, be made aware of any national concerns or sensitivities. This allows the multinational force HQ to produce plans that will be acceptable well in advance and to coordinate activities to achieve unity of effort. National contingent commanders, although operating at the operational level, will have influence over tactical level plans and activities, but this should be restricted to their national interests or politically imposed limitations.
3. Command and control may be exercised in multinational operations either through a multinational headquarters or through that of a lead nation. Longstanding alliances such as NATO, where the countries have common procedures, tend to use a multinational HQ, as do international organizations such as the UN. Multinational HQs are most effective when well-established command procedures have been developed and practised, and a consistent quality of staff is available. The lead nation concept recognizes that one nation will be assigned the lead role and its C2 system will predominate. This method contributes to unity of effort and can avoid duplication and confusion.

864. NATIONAL COMMANDS

1. The national dimension in multinational operations is a key factor. This is particularly true with the realization that the senior national commander of each contingent within a multinational force, irrespective of his rank or the size of his nation's military contribution, will be effectively commanding at the operational level from a national perspective.

2. In all cases when elements of the Canadian Forces operate as part of a multinational force, a Canadian national commander will be designated. The Canadian national commander provides the interface between the employed forces (normally the tactical level) and the strategic level (Chief of the Defence Staff and national/joint staff) to ensure national prerogatives are not usurped and that support is effective. The national commander's role will be to: provide administrative support to the Canadian contingent of the multinational force; to liaise with the multinational force HQ concerning the employment of Canadian forces; and to monitor the employment of Canadian elements to ensure that it is in line with Canadian strategic and operational objectives.

3. A national HQ, known as the National Command Element (NCE), will normally be established in the theatre of operations to provide national C2 and the commander with the facilities and resources to accomplish these roles. A second line support element, or National Support Element (NSE), may also be established in a theatre to provide various levels and types of support. These levels and natures of support will differ with each campaign and will depend upon the support provided by multinational partners and lead nations.

4. The Canadian national commander may be responsible for the coordination with other elements of the joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) environment and their interplay with the multinational HQ. This will include the establishment of liaison with Canadian diplomatic representatives in the theatre of operations.

5. The Canadian national commander is generally delegated operational command (OPCOM) over Canadian forces participating in a multinational operation. The national commander may then transfer operational control (OPCON) of the force to the multinational force commander. In certain cases, for example in NATO operations, the national commander may transfer OPCOM. In either case, the national HQ will not normally have the capability to plan, organize and conduct major operations, which will generally be the responsibility of the multinational HQ. However, the national HQ may be required to step-up to one capable of planning and conducting major activities, such as withdrawal operations, if required.

6. The relationship between the NCE and the command of our forces allocated to multinational coalition formations will be dependent upon the situation. However, once forces are allocated to a coalition formation, the NCE should not presume to exercise minute-to-minute control of them.
7. If a Canadian contribution to a multinational force is of a joint nature, the NCE will be designated a joint HQ.

8. At times, the NCE may assume a role within the multinational chain of command and be tasked with a specific multinational responsibility or area of responsibility. In such a situation, all Canadian elements may remain under the NCE commander and not need be allocated OPCOM or OPCON to a multinational commander. Specific staff positions may still be required within this HQ to deal with Canadian only issues (e.g., certain G1 staff).

865. LIAISON

1. Proactive and robust liaison is essential to developing and maintaining unity of effort in multinational operations. Liaison officers are the lubricant that reduces internal friction in the multinational military machine. Effective liaison fosters understanding of missions, concepts, doctrine and procedures, provides for the accurate and timely transfer of vital information, and enhances the mutual trust, respect and confidence that are important in maintaining cohesion. Liaison officers must be selected with care and will often require specialized training. If they do not speak the language of the force to which they are attached, a competent interpreter should accompany them.

866. CONCLUSION

1. Nations build multinational forces and alliances on mutual trust, understanding and dependence, which bind the multinational force together. Teamwork and shared respect are essential to the successful conduct of multinational operations. Members of the multinational force should work with their partners to exploit the unique capabilities of the various national forces available.