

COMISAF Campaign Overview

NATO and ISAF Defense Ministers



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Commander
International Security Assistance Force
U.S. Forces, Afghanistan
June 2010



This slide is: **UNCLASSIFIED**

The overall classification of this Brief: **UNCLASSIFIED**

Purpose:

Provide an operational update of the campaign plan and explain the ISAF assessment process

Agenda:

- Campaign Overview
- Campaign Assessment Process
- Road to Lisbon and Beyond
- Risks and Challenges

Strategic Main Effort:
Grow the ANSF

Badghis-Ghormach

Kunduz-Baghlan

Operational Main Effort

Shaping/Supporting Effort

Economy of Force

Strategic Main Effort:
Grow the ANSF






Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman

Paktika, Paktiya, Khost and Ghazni

Central Helmand

Kandahar

Key Terrain District (81)	
Area of Interest Districts (41)	
Border Crossing Point	

- On path to:
 - ANA: 134K by Oct '10; continuing to 171.6K by Oct '11
 - ANP: 109K by Oct '10; continuing to 134K by Oct '11
- Self-sustaining Afghan Leader Development – #1 priority
- Reversed adverse trends in quality – challenges ahead
- Critically short on trainers – the essential resource required for quality
 - 2,325 authorized; 846 on ground; 660 pledged
- Maturing ministerial development – improving; more time required


July 2009

- No permanent partnering; some ANA kandaks conducted *ad hoc* partnered operations; reliance on mentor teams
- No partnering; 25% of Police mentored

June 2010


- 85% ANA kandaks have a permanent partnered relationship; remainder have mentor teams
- 46% of Police have partner or mentor

- Most significant Taliban influence over the population
- Protect the population in threatened or key areas
- Create time and space for governance to improve
- Create conditions for development, with freedom of movement and security along contiguous economic corridor




Demonstrable, near-term stabilization of the south is critical to success

Jun 2009




Jun 2010



- Central Helmand under insurgent control; Marjah insurgent-narco hub
- Restricted freedom of movement; Illegal checkpoints and IEDs
- Negative perception of GIRoA

- Initiative shifting to Coalition; presence in every major village
- Increased freedom of movement; IED threat remains
- Attitude of population trending positive


1 February 2010



ANSF		ANSF
2,734	+60%	4,794
ISAF	Increase	ISAF
2,107		3,157

Security Forces

1 June 2010



- Limited access by GIRoA officials
- Activities limited to provincial center

Governance

- District Governors in place
- Councils functioning; limited by tashkil growth

- Schools: Limited or no attendance; madrasses open
- Clinics: Limited access; open only in Provincial Center

Basic Services

- Schools: 81 teachers available; students returning to school
- Clinics: Many opening; two new clinics under construction

- Few bazaars open in Marjah and Nad' Ali
- Limited access to goods

Commerce

- Four major bazaars open in Marjah; 100 new shops
- Expanding availability of goods

Kandahar: Complex and Unique Challenge

- Heart of Pashtun south
- Historic Taliban capitol
- Hub of trade and commerce routes

Weak Government
and
Strong Powerbrokers

Economic Inequity

Multiple
contested
surrounding
districts


Highly
populated
(850K)
city center

Complex Damaged
Tribal Structure


Resilient and
Complex
Insurgency

Each is difficult; collectively a unique challenge

June 2009




Rising Tide of Security



• City – Expanded, partnered ANP

August 2010



• Gradual increase of GIRoA influence in surrounding districts


Political Reform


- Manage relationships: Powerbrokers and Political elite
- Protect, resource and empower District Governors, khans, maliks, mullahs
- Use the shura to gain trust and confidence of local communities

Economic Opportunity

- Address principal sources of corruption and grievance: contracting, private security companies, land disputes
- Significantly expand electrical supply to meet rising demand

Progress over months; process not an event





Kandahar, Helmand, Konduz, Takhar, Baghlan

Effects on the Insurgency

- In the Last **90 Days**:
 - 121 Insurgent Leaders Removed
 - 505 Insurgents Detained
- Instability among leadership is degrading insurgent operations
- Reduced efficacy of Taliban “shadow governance”
- IED networks being degraded

Operations:	22
Persons of Interest:	14
Enemy KIA:	69
Detainees:	51

- Focus of effort: Transition to Afghan lead
- New Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP) replaced Bagram facility
- Build Afghan capacity to assume DFIP responsibility by Jan 2011
- New detainee review process

“The detention and prosecution of suspects is the authority and responsibility of the Afghan government. We have to strengthen the security of our prisons and detention centers and expedite further the reform process within our justice system.”

*President Hamid Karzai
Inaugural Speech
November 19, 2009*



- Comprehensive view; high-operational & strategic level perspective

Is the Campaign Plan working?

Is it working fast enough?

When can we begin to transition to Afghan lead?

Is Afghan governance and development capacity and capability improving?



Assessment Products

Assessment process produces monthly and quarterly reports that communicate where we are in order to:

- Report progress; tell the broader story
- Promote transparency & credibility
- Inform ISAF, higher headquarters, & IC

Oct-Dec 2009




Jan 2010



Feb 2010



Jan-Mar 2010



Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force
Kabul, Afghanistan

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT REPORT (January-March 2010)

Executive Summary

This report provides a periodic assessment of conditions in Afghanistan and an update of ISAF progress. ISAF, in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations, enables an expanded and effective Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.

Conditions in Afghanistan remain UNSATISFACTORY. There are, however, some positive trends in a number of areas that indicate the campaign is on track and moving in the right direction. Persistently declining security needs in some areas of the country have been reversed while trends elsewhere have started to advance in a positive direction. Further evidence suggests that initial security and governance gains in Central Helmand Province have bolstered GIRoA's credibility. Long-term prospects for sustainability, however, are viewed with guarded optimism and need to be "temporary." Current trends remain uncertain until more permanent and effective governance is established in areas being secured. Enduring military success is dependent on the GIRoA's ability to deliver credible local governance, deliver essential services and expand economic opportunities for its people.

Table 1. Campaign Effect Ratings¹

Effect	Rating	Direction	Sustainability
SECURITY	UNSATISFACTORY	Advancing	Temporary
GOVERNANCE	NEEDS IMPROVEMENT	Stable	Temporary
DEVELOPMENT	NEEDS IMPROVEMENT	Stable	Temporary


The operational campaign to separate insurgents from the population and secure the heartland of the insurgency in the south was accelerated when Operation MORTARHEAD kicked-off in mid February 2010. The increased operational tempo (operations) and expanded security presence in designated key districts resulted in a significant increase in insurgent activity during the period. As the ANSF lead efforts to expand the security zone in the south and over this summer, the continued growth of coalition forces will help build momentum in GIRoA's effort. That momentum, however, cannot be maintained unless GIRoA has the capacity to deliver effective governance and development in key areas being cleared.

The Afghan Government grows more capable each day but is heavily dependent on support from the international community (IC). Smaller government initiatives, largely missed by last year's national elections, have started moving again. The March 21st approval of a Sub-national Governance Policy will allow Parliament to maintain a host of laws that will strengthen government

¹ ISAF Mission from COMISAF/AFNAN 3030, Revision 4, approved 23 September 2009.
² See Annex D for detailed description of ratings.

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April 2010



NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
29 May 2010

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT REPORT - APRIL 2010

ISAF, in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations, enables an expanded and effective Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.¹

COMISAF STRATEGIC FOCUS
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
GIRoA NATIONAL CAPACITY

First Unclassified Report

The ISAF Campaign is "on-track" but much work remains to be done in all areas to achieve the campaign's success are the Afghan people's confidence in the government and believe that their government is the most positive trends needs. Fifty-nine percent of the population believes the most positive trends are headed in the right direction, an increase of 8% over September 2009.² While popular perception of GIRoA is improving, the Afghan people believe that development is too slow. And many Afghans, particularly in Central Helmand, still generally mistrust Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Afghan National Police (ANP) and view them as corrupt.

Assessment Summary

♦ Security - unsatisfactory but no longer declining. 46% of the population in key areas is relatively secure. Security operations are making the most significant progress, which is essential to set the conditions for enhanced governance and expanded development. Coalition forces are contesting the insurgency more effectively, in more places, and with more forces. Still, we face a resilient and resourceful insurgency that has in the past several weeks resumed activity in Marjeh, expanded its capacity throughout Central Helmand, and carried out numerous high-profile attacks in Kandahar City. This renewed activity has disrupted governance and prompted several NGOs to plan withdrawal from the area. Kandahar City is not under Taliban control. Accordingly, Coalition and ANSF operations in that area are

designed to incrementally expand with a rising tide of security. This will create the time and space required to improve governance.
♦ GIRoA Capacity - governance needs improvement and lags security efforts; rated as satisfactory for 40% of the population in key areas. While progress is being made, the scope of the challenge, lack of infrastructure and suitable workforce capacity, and in some areas security conditions, are delaying the delivery of basic services and achievement of tangible improvements. The Afghan Government's District Delivery Program is struggling. The civil service base is insufficient, and corruption remains an impediment to connectivity between the government and its people. One area of focus beset with deficiencies is border control. Some improvement is emerging due to the deployment of trainers and mentors from the Border Management Task Force to key border crossings. This has improved security, throughput and revenue collection where the revenue from Tokham, for example, has increased from \$8 million to \$14 million per month.

Working with Security Forces

The success or failure of the effort depends, first, on effectively and continuously securing the population end, second, on effectively re-establishing a low level of confidence that positive trends will be sustained over the next six month period.

Counterinsurgency Field Manual, December 2006


¹ ISAF Mission Statement from COMISAF/AFNAN 18100, Rev. 4, approved 25 September 2009. See last page for campaign summary.
² Relative to our 2010 key objective of raising the narrative from the insurgency, ISAF "on-track" "satisfactory" is assessed by Headquarters ISAF Campaign Assessment Update, 15 April 2010. Quantifiable metrics are used to measure progress toward achievement of specified decisive conditions and progress relative to time along five key areas of operations in the COMISAF/AFNAN. "Temporary" indicates a low level of confidence that positive trends will be sustained over the next six month period.
³ Afghanistan Worldwide Survey, Wave 7 (March 2010).

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
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
Kinetic Density 2010



- Nationally, 88% rise in violence compared to May last year
- Violence and security varies regionally; violence focused in localized areas
- Assessments of Key District Security are improving slightly
- 84% of Afghans polled believe security in their area is fair or good




- Growth accelerating
- Challenged by attrition and retention




Promising Growth, Challenges Remain

- Growth on track for 2010;
 - ANCOP attrition enduring concern
 - Entering historical summer lull
- ANA quality improving, however;
 - Leader development lagging
 - Officer & NCO shortages persist
- Keys to arresting ANP attrition:
 - Recruit-Train-Assign Model
 - Pay-Partner-Predictable Cycle
 - Leader Development & Literacy
- Ministerial capacity improving – projecting self sustaining in 2012



ANA Rating	Feb-10	Apr-10
Effective	3	3
Dependent	10	12
Not Effective	0	0
Recently Fielded	2	3
Total	15	18





ANP Rating	Feb-10	Apr-10
Effective	1	2
Dependent	7	11
Not Effective	6	4
Not Assessed	3	0
Total	17	17


- Growth **on track** for 134K (ANA) and 109K (ANP) by Oct '10
- ANA effectiveness **improving** but time is required to mature the force; 30% of fielded brigades and corps rated as effective
- ANP lags behind ANA; 12% of ANP in key provinces rated as effective
- “Have you heard of or seen the police in your district doing anything improper” (% yes): June 2009 – 18.2%; March 2010 – 13.4%

Governance

Development



- Key district assessments in Governance and Development *improving slightly*
- Since Dec 2008, perceptions of GIRoA's performance *improving*
 - "How does the government do its job" (well / very well): then 36%; now **45%**
 - "Government is going in the right direction" (yes): then 43%; now **59%**



- July – Kabul Conference
- September – Parliamentary Elections
- October – Foreign/Defense Ministerials & NATO Military Committee
- November – Lisbon Summit

- **ANSF growth accelerates and partnering deepens within Joint Force**
- **Priority COIN Operations ongoing in Central Helmand and Kandahar**

Critical Risks :

- *Governance*: Ineffective or discredited
- *Pakistan*: Insufficient steps to curb insurgent support and sanctuary
- *Afghan ownership*: Inability to mobilize and share responsibility

Key Challenges :

- Civ-mil disconnect in clear-hold-build campaign
- Divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines
- Waning domestic (coalition) political support
- Rejection of reconciliation by 'spoilers'
- Resilient and growing insurgency
- Rejection or stagnation of ANP

- Past Year in Review
- Outlook for Next 12 Months
- Critical Vulnerabilities
- How to Assist