HANDBOOK

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Senior Leader's Guide to Transition Planning



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Senior Leader's Guide to Transition Planning

Version 3.0

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Highlights of Changes to Version 3.0

While retaining the details of versions 1.0 and 2.0 of the *Senior Leader's Guide to Transition Planning*, version 3.0 provides additional information from key leader interviews, recent publications, and other sources to provide a more complete one-stop-shop resource for planners of future transition operations.

Chapter 1 includes additional discussion of condition-based and time-driven transitions. Most of the senior leaders interviewed for this guide have agreed that a smooth transition requires the ability to balance time and conditions. This chapter also includes a paragraph on GEN Odierno's "drivers of instability" that he used as indicators or benchmarks in managing the transition plan.

Chapter 2 includes a paragraph that describes the importance of communicating the commander's intent and the actions required down to the lowest level. Translating the transition plan into actions on the ground is an art. This includes establishing a vision and recognizing that there are a number of planning processes that will be occurring simultaneously. LTG Perkins articulated some very important rules for subordinate commanders as they support the overall transition plan which is found in this chapter. A security force assistance model has also been added that will assist coalition troops in transferring security responsibility to the host-nation security forces and stay within the transition timeline.

Chapter 3 added a section on how rehearsals can be used as an effective tool to communicate what needs to be done down to the lowest level and how subordinate commanders can use it to establish critical decision points.

Chapter 4 includes a section on national caveats that many contributing nations work under and the impact that they may have on the transition operations.

Chapter 5 added a section on synchronizing interagency efforts. The discussion focused on the example that GEN Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey set during Operation New Dawn as they did everything in their power to promote teamwork and discourage activities that went against it. To set the tone for a coordinated approach to transition, they conducted a team building event that allowed their staffs to look at themselves as a team.

Senior Leader's Guide to Transition Planning Version 3.0

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Chapter 1

Understanding Transition

> "We'll get one shot at transition, and we need to get it right."
>
> — General David Petraeus, March 15, 2011

Focus of Guide

It is to be expected that nations will continue to require assistance from other states and organizations in order to recover from natural disasters, conflict, or chronic societal problems. Such assistance ends as the host nation (HN) transitions back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency and other actors transition out of their assumed roles and responsibilities. As the HN transitions back from a period of crisis to self-sufficiency, it will be faced with issues involving sovereignty, legitimacy, dependency, and social reform. Managing transitions at all levels requires close cooperation between the HN, other governments, militaries, and civil society. Although many of the lessons and best practices used in this guide are derived from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn, the intent is to provide a guide that is flexible enough to be used for transition planning of a military campaign or crisis of any size or scope.

The term "transition" implies the transitioning from one phase of military operation to another, or the transitioning of authority and responsibility from one entity to another. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, refers to transition as "an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness."

This guide primarily focuses on planning for Phases IV and V (stabilize and enable civil authority) of the joint campaign phases leading to the termination of hostilities or transitioning of responsibilities to the HN or other agencies. Arguably, Phases IV and V can be the most difficult to plan and achieve success; however, there is markedly less doctrine or guidance written on transitioning to assist the joint planner. Historically, the U.S. has not always been well prepared to conduct transitions. During the course of developing this guide, several transition lessons learned and best practices have been identified that should be highlighted. The top ten transition lessons are listed below but are discussed in more detail in Appendix A.

- **Guidance**. Clear strategic guidance with continuous interaction between senior leaders and planners is needed to synchronize the transition planning process.

- **Engaging strategic partners**. Early and continuous engagement with key strategic partners will maximize integration and synchronization and develop a sense of ownership of the transition process.
- **Flexible planning**. Early in the drawdown, the commander needs to have as many options available as possible to build flexibility into the plan.
- **Synchronization of staff and command activities**. Maintaining synchronization of staff and command activities during transition planning/operations becomes challenging.
- **Situational awareness**. Loss of situational awareness occurs as resources are transferred and/or retrograded.
- **Understanding post transition environment**. The end of named operations present unique challenges for stay-behind forces such as different U.S. authorities, HN agreements, U.N. resolutions, and national caveats.
- **Populace confidence**. The transition should be deliberate, building the HN capacity and confidence in the HN government so that it is ready to assume all the responsibilities involved with providing a secure and prosperous environment.
- **Transitioning functions to the HN**. As the transition efforts progress toward the HN's self sufficiency, it is imperative that post-conflict interdependencies do not unravel and military capacity building efforts are not lost.
- **Enablers**. As the footprint is reduced, maintaining adequate intelligence, security, and medical support for remaining forces is non-negotiable.
- **Equipment and bases**. Commanders were hesitant to accept risk in equipment and base closures to achieve strategic-level goals. HN officials were also reluctant to accept transfer of equipment and bases.

This document is the third version of *The Senior Leader's Guide to Transition Planning*. Additional information has been provided in version 3.0 to assist in planning and executing actions that decrease the military involvement in a campaign, and result in an orderly transfer of functions and responsibilities to other entities. This guide is being completed in multiple versions in order to provide the timeliest and most complete information available for current transition planning. We welcome comments or additional information for the next version.

Transition Defined

Transition may be used as a noun or a verb; however, there are a few attempts that define the term within military doctrine. One definition might be: A multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex. It is not a retrograde operation but rather a maneuver that may include multiple small-scale transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities and creating immediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.

The primary focus of transition discussed in this guide is to conduct a seamless transfer of functions from U.S. Military Forces to U.S. civilian agencies, HN government, or nongovernmental agencies to help a severely stressed government to avoid failure, recover from a devastating natural disaster, or to assist an emerging HN government to build a new domestic order following internal collapse or defeat in war. Before the transition planning begins, it may be prudent to step back and examine the current strategy and determine if policy choices or operational and tactical actions are taking the outcome in the wrong direction. It may be time to redefine success and failure. It may also be the right moment to determine if a continued buildup of security forces is the best direction or if there should be more focus on developing a social contract between the government and the people to ensure a lasting peace.

Levels of Transition

As the definition of transition above explains, transition occurs at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of military operations all at the same time. The concept of conducting transition operations at each of these levels was best described by LTG James M. Dubick (retired) in "Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside." LTG Dubik described each level in his report:

- **Tactical transitions: clear, hold, and build**. In concept, this set of tactical transitions can be described in a relatively straightforward way: friendly military and paramilitary police forces first clear out the insurgents and hand off security responsibilities to a combination of intervening and indigenous military or police forces that then hold what was gained. Finally, the legitimate government, aided by the intervening powers, can build by conducting reconstruction, governmental, and economic development activities, establishing a growing sense of normalcy.

- **Operational transition: transferring provincial control**. Once tactical transitions are complete, both the HN and the intervening forces have moved toward a radically different relationship. Fewer intervening forces may be necessary, but setbacks can still happen at the operational level. The fight is not over. Successful tactical transitions do not guarantee success at the operational level. Four elements essential for operational level success stand out: security, governance, adjudication, and reconstruction. Planning for these elements should begin as early as possible in the intervention, if not before. But the immediate antecedent roots of each lie in tactical transitions, specifically actions taken in the hold and build phases.

- **Strategic transitions: self-sustaining capacity**. At some point during the set of operational transitions, there will be the temptation to claim that the conflict is over. Unfortunately, insurgencies do not end when the fighting lulls. Seeing an end or a significant reduction in violence may indicate that battles have mostly been won, but it is not an indication that the war is over. Iraq of 2011 and early 2012 provides all the evidence needed to corroborate the fact that insurgencies are slow-dying phenomena. Therefore, successful tactical and operational transitions must be followed by a period of strategic transition that has its own set of actions to be accomplished. Strategic transitions are just as important as tactical and operational transitions. Furthermore, a period of strategic transition does not mean that a normal state-to-state relationship has been established. Ambiguity still exists as to which direction the HN will take; backsliding is still possible. The insurgents may be down, but they are not out. Setbacks can still happen at the strategic level. Strategic transitions shift the HN from the position of externally initiated or supported actions to self-initiated and supported actions. If the tactical and operational transitions have been done well enough, then this shift is not a sudden one. Rather, the government and its institutions slowly improve their proficiency, creating a growing sense of legitimacy for the population and a continual movement toward normalcy.[1]

Stability Operations and Transition

Transition during stability operations is a mixture of functions, geography, time, and conditions. It is both an end state and a process that requires careful planning and execution to be successful. Unity of effort is vital to set the conditions for a successful transition of functions and to redeploy forces.

Although combat operations may still be occurring during Phases IV and V, other functions should fall within the “five stability sectors” of stability operations. They are security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and well being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. At some point in time, these functions must be terminated, transformed, or transitioned to another entity. Lines of effort may be needed to bridge the broad concept of operations across to the more discreet tasks contained in the transition process. Continuous assessment gives commanders the information required to revise and adjust lines of operations and effort, making it possible for subordinate commanders to reallocate resources accordingly.

A visual concept of how the stability functions may transition to the HN or other entities and assume the responsibilities is represented in Figure 1-1. The process is not necessarily sequential and does not always follow a strict timeline or even stay within the campaign phases. It is also not a single event where all activities happen at once. There may be multiple transitions within a line of effort; however, it is important to maintain a continuous evaluation of on-the-ground realities to ensure the process is synchronized and the momentum is maintained. Each transition involves an inherent risk that is amplified when multiple transitions must be managed simultaneously. Commanders must stay attuned to sudden changes to adapt their forces to the dynamic conditions of transition.



Figure 1-1. Transition within Stability Operations

Campaign Phases

Phasing is a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. However, it requires detailed planning during the transition from one phase to another. Although the six-phase model (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, enable civil authority, and shape) has been accepted by most commanders for campaign planning purposes, it is not a template for all conceivable joint operations and may be tailored to the character and duration of the operation.

Phase 0	Shape
Phase I	Deter
Phase II	Seize Initiative
Phase III	Dominate
Phase IV	Stabilize
Phase V	Enable Civil Authority
Phase 0	Shape

Table 1-1. Campaign Phases

Ideally, phases are distinct in time, space, and purpose from one another, and should be planned in support of each other representing a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Realistically, transitions between phases may be blurred or overlap, even though they are designed to be distinct shifts in focus. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the commander and is therefore usually event, not time driven. Success in one transition sets the conditions for potential success in the next, but each has its own requirements and difficulties. Success in one phase does not guarantee success in the next.

Although detailed planning is required to transition between each of the six phases, the transitioning of the last two phases, and the focus of this guide, can be the most challenging since they will require the involvement of U.S. governmental agencies, HN government, HN military, and nongovernmental organizations. Planning for Phases IV and V and the eventual transition of responsibilities to the HN and other agencies should begin early in the campaign planning cycle. This should include bringing our interagency counterparts into the transition planning process as early as possible.

Make every effort to ensure continuity through transitions by avoiding major changes to leaders, staff, and organizations during significant transition events. Early engagement with key strategic partners is critical to ensure maximum integration and synchronization.

Transition Lines of Effort

Transition planning involves focusing efforts toward accomplishing the mission while carefully balancing resources, capabilities, and activities across multiple lines of effort. The simultaneous execution of activities within each line of effort reinforces the need to continuously consider activities across all lines of effort during planning and execution. Although the lines of effort may vary depending on the type of transition that is being planned, many situations might use the following three lines of effort:

- **Strengthening HN security forces**. This is essential to a smooth transition and force reduction. Security transitions, to include both internal and external security, are linked to other lines of effort and provide a necessary condition through which other transitions occur.
- **Conduct transitions** to transition designated missions and functions to the HN, other U.S. governmental agencies, and international governmental organizations. Managing transition is critical within this line of effort because the risk to losing gains made in other lines is high if the local government loses the perception of legitimacy.
- **Reposture the force**. Applying an incremental approach to consolidating headquarters, closing bases and transferring property, and redeploying forces are instrumental to conducting a responsible drawdown.

Seven Types of Transition

Complex environments will require different types of transition as hostilities subside and responsibilities are handed off to the HN or other entities. There are at least seven distinct types of transition operations that may occur during a campaign. Each of the transitions must be closely synchronized and partnerships must evolve to ensure unity of effort and a seamless overall transition. In all cases, the population must be secure and satisfied for any transition to be successful.

1. **U.S. Military to HN military**. Before the U.S. Military can hand over its responsibilities to the HN military, there are three questions that must be answered:

- First, is the HN military trained and equipped to a level of proficiency to maintain the security of the country at the existing level or better and to give the country the opportunity to continue to stabilize? This type of transition involves training the HN military to a level of proficiency that enables the U.S. Military to reduce its security forces and eventually redeploy.

- Second, is the U.S. Military prepared to turn over security and other responsibilities that will make it dependent on the HN military? As the U.S. completes the withdrawal of forces, especially in a non-permissive environment, it becomes vulnerable unless the HN can maneuver, provide fire support, and respond to attacks.

- Third, is the HN military prepared operationally and strategically? Full transition to self-reliance in external defense will prove difficult if it does not look beyond stabilization of internal security. It must also be well equipped, free of corruption, have an effective pay system, and be capable of conducting itself like a professional military organization.

Historical examples of transitioning operations to the HN military include the Vietnamization of South Vietnam's forces as the U.S. Forces assigned them to increasing combat roles. A more recent example would be the security forces assistance provided to the Iraqi Security Forces. It is critical that this type of transition is seamless and does not allow gaps that insurgents or other opposing forces can exploit.

2. **U.S. Military to HN governmental organizations**. One of the key elements of this type of transition is to identify the functions being transferring to governmental organizations and assessing whether they are ready and capable of successfully performing them. If a national government is weak, corrupt, or incompetent then transitioning functions before it is ready can seriously exacerbate an already difficult situation. Convincing the population that the HN government is ready to assume all the responsibilities involved in providing a secure and prosperous environment is also critical to this type of transition. There will always be an element of the population that does not want the U.S. to leave and will act to delay the transition. The economic effect of the transition and U.S. departure must also be considered. In most cases, a gradual and pragmatic process is preferable.

During the transition to the HN, some of the activities may fall within three subcategories in which the U.S. Embassy would maintain oversight. These subcategories are:

- ○ National Level Turnover. This is normally coordinated by the U.N. and will seek support and contributions from donor nations. These are mechanisms that can be linked to the goals set by the HN government in its economic strategy of self-sustainment.
- ○ Provincial Turnover. This will be led at the Joint Task Force (JTF) or Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) level to gain support of the HN government at the local level of governments.
- ○ Security Transition. This represents the turnover of security responsibilities at the national level. It may be led by the JTF or CJTF and is designed to build enduring security institutions and strong civilian-military partnerships. The U.S. Embassy will monitor this but is not in charge.

The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, is a historic example of a successful transition to the HN. As one of the U.S.' first significant postwar foreign policy initiatives, it was created to rebuild Europeans' prosperity as a means of bolstering the democracies against the threat of communist dictatorship. Some of the same principals used in Europe at the end of World War II were applied more recently in Iraq. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan also provides some valuable lessons. Contrary to some beliefs, the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in a coordinated, deliberate, professional manner. The withdrawal was based on a coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military plan, permitting Soviet forces to withdraw in good order and allowed the Afghan government to survive. However, failure to continue a long-term aid commitment and failure to counter the insurgency resulted in a failed transition.[2] A strong HN government supported by the people is critical in preventing subversion from outside forces and vital to a successful transition.

Some rules to remember when transitioning functions to the HN government are:

- Abrupt aid cutoffs could lead to fiscal implosion, loss of control over the security sector, collapse of political authority, and possibly civil war.
- Political stability and state consolidation are critical for successful transitions.
- Fragmented, short-term oriented factionalism can lead to endemic high levels of violence, and regional "spoilers" can perpetuate conflicts.

- Effective transitions are generally associated with robust economic growth — less successful transitions are associated with slower or negative economic growth.
- A well-managed transition is paramount.

3. **U.S. Military to U.S. governmental organizations**. Because the military has the capability to be on the ground early and in sufficient force for emerging crisis, it is often called upon to conduct missions that would normally be performed by other U.S. governmental agencies. As the situation stabilizes and the HN government continues to mature, it may be necessary to transition or transfer functions to an appropriate U.S. governmental agency or organization. It is important that this transition is well planned, seamless, and deliberate to avoid gaps or disruption of the overall stabilization process.

As functions are transferred from the U.S. Military to the U.S. Embassy, establishing an enduring presence becomes a key element. This includes activities or programs that continue to build a security force to provide security for its country's population over the long term, promote the continued advance of economic and developmental programs, and establishing a strong and representative government.

This type of transition was used in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake response in 2010 as the U.S. Military transitioned their responsibilities to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other agencies. It was also a key element of the successful transition of operations in Iraq as the U.S. State Department assumed the remaining responsibilities from the U.S. Military. Often, military planners may not appreciate the differences or understand the capabilities or limited capacity of other U.S. agencies. It may be an unrealistic expectation to ask an agency to perform the same functions as the Department of Defense when they have limited capabilities and resources. When transitioning functions to another U.S. agency, capacity must be matched to capabilities.

4. **U.S. Military to international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)**. This type of transition frequently occurs at the end of a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation in which the U.S. Military is conducting initial emergency relief operations in a permissive environment. Once the situation has stabilized and NGOs have the resources to maintain the level of effort, the military may want to transition operations to the NGOs. It should be remembered that as functions transition to an NGO and responsibilities are given up, there will also be a loss of influence.

5. **U.S. Military to international governmental organizations**. This type of transition is often found in humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations. A good example occurred during the relief effort of the Haiti earthquake. The purpose of Joint Task Force–Haiti was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the government of Haiti, the U.N., and USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for relief and reconstruction are best left to non-military governmental agencies. The military was able to quickly step in with its logistics capability and disciplined command structure to reestablish essential services. The military was able to use its extensive communication capabilities to establish and maintain liaisons with principle actors and stay engaged with the U.N. cluster system as responsibility was transferred to it. Once again, good security is vital to a successful transition of responsibilities to the U.N. or other international organizations.

6. **U.S. Military to other nations**. In some situations, it may be necessary to transition a portion or all of an operation to a member of the coalition forces to enable the U.S. Forces to refocus or reset for another mission. This would only be done if the HN is not prepared to assume full responsibility and the HN is comfortable with the nation that is assuming the mission. Before a mission can be transitioned to another nation, the relations between this country and the HN must be examined for historical, religious, or cultural differences that might disrupt the transition operations. The capability and capacity of this country must also be looked at to ensure there is not a loss of ability that would affect the overall transition.

7. **U.S. Military to private sector**. In certain stabilization and reconstruction environments, it may be necessary for the U.S. Military to restore critical infrastructure that might otherwise belong to private organizations. It is important to transition these entities back to the private sector as soon as possible, but once again security will be the key to this type of transition. It may not always be a direct transfer to the private organization. The situation may require ownership to flow through the U.S. government or the HN government for a period of time. The transition of the oil industry in Iraq was a critical milestone for the country to get back on its feet and ensure a smooth withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom they will transition to will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. The transition plan must be able to set up the HN for success. Ultimately, the HN will decide the form of government in accordance with its cultural and societal norms. We must take great care not to impose a foreign system of government on the HN; such models will impede transition and will likely empower factions that will eventually destabilize the HN. The ultimate objective should be to facilitate a system that will work for the HN and not necessarily mirror the U.S. model.

What the End State May Look Like

The end state of transition cannot be imposed by U.S. or coalition forces alone and must reflect local solutions and agreed upon standards. Even when conflict comes to an end, the U.S. government and the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. Because the strategic end state may be general or broad in nature, it may be difficult to determine whether and when military operations should be terminated. It should also be noted that "end state" is a term that the State Department does not use because of its enduring presence.

There are no specific set of end goals that will fit all transition situations; however, post-conflict transitions should ensure that the HN possesses a level of resilience to handle any future setbacks. Such resilience requires "success factors" which primarily revolve around good governance and HN capacity to handle national affairs. These success factors include:

- The structure of the government has been agreed to by its society; governance is stable.
- The government is able to provide reasonable, reliable services for its citizens.
- The government is being utilized to solve political disputes.
- The government is able to protect its borders, citizens, and national treasures.
- The government has demonstrated an ability to uphold the rule of law.
- The economy is stable; the government is able to provide regulation of the markets.
- The government has gained commitments of support for development efforts.

To maximize the HN attainment of these success factors, it is imperative that the HN gains control and proficiency in the many sectors and functions that the intervening authorities (external nations/forces) have been managing. This transfer is a gradual process that requires careful planning by the intervening authorities, followed by close partnering with HN officials.

The relationships established in the initial stages of operations, coupled with accurate assessments of progress achieved in civilian-military implementation are critical in affecting a smooth transition to civilian authority. Successes in providing security and essential public services as well as visible progress in stimulating economic development are essential to gain the popular support and perception of legitimacy needed to create the new representative forms of governance.

A continuing relationship, such as an Army National Guard State Partnership program, may be a concept to consider in certain situations to maintain a strong relationship with the HN and ensure that programs are able to continue. To facilitate enduring positive effects and improved quality of life for the HN, a seamless transition of functions is required to ensure security, justice, reconciliation, infrastructure, and economic development.

Conditions Based Versus Time Driven

Politically, we are often forced to execute a transition before the conditions are ideal. Most conditions that affect transitions are politically driven and are not the military, economic, or governance conditions of the HN. Although timelines may be politically driven, especially at the strategic level, they must be designed specifically to give the commanders on the ground the maximum amount of flexibility needed. Ensuring that transitions are conditions-based allows for the commander on the ground, the combatant commander, and the theater commander charged with the mission to help meter the transition for his civilian bosses and convey conditions that must be met to coincide with the timeline. The pace of the transition can be slow or accelerated, or it can be metered in an appropriate manner. Much of it still comes back to security. You are not going to do a precipitous withdrawal and leave your forces unsecure.

Identify key dates such as elections, international events, religious holidays, or other HN governmental dates when planning a timeline. Ensure that sufficient time is built in to obtain adequate HN security capacity and allow for continued stability. In some cases, timelines may be necessary just to change the mindset of the commanders. An example might be that after a certain date, the main focus will be on advising and assisting the HN security forces to ensure that there is sufficient time for them to achieve a level of proficiency before U.S. Forces are scheduled to begin redeployment. However, when improperly used, timelines are dysfunctional and force sub-optimal decisions in an effort to meet a given deadline. For the greatest likelihood of success, timelines should be based on ground realities and on a dialogue between the commanders and agencies on the ground and policymakers. For these reasons, a smooth and transparent transition requires the ability to balance time and conditions.

In Iraq, the commander of U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I), GEN Odierno, established what he called “drivers of instability.” These were ten or twelve indicators that covered a variety of sectors including security, civic functions, and governmental functions. These indicators helped GEN Odierno explain to his civilian authority why something could be done faster, which he obviously wanted to do whenever he could, or why something needed to be delayed, whenever that was necessary. Having benchmarks in the transition plan are essential. You must have benchmarks, conditions, or gates to go through during the transition process.

The transition planner must build flexibility into the plan to take into consideration all contingencies. Built-in decision points may be preferable to adjust the pace of transition and retain or position resources where needed based on continuing assessments of the operational environment. Although, in Iraq, many of the transitions were time based, USF–I and the U.S. Embassy worked diligently to create the conditions required to make the transitions seamless. The conditions and drivers of instability differed from region to region, necessitating varying transition timelines. Strategic guidance and operational orders established transition priorities. Below is a sample checklist of decision points for termination or transition to the HN or other agencies:

- Has the end state been achieved?
    - Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?
    - Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered and how do they influence termination planning?
    - Has the joint force commander identified post-conflict requirements?
- Can forces be safely withdrawn from the operational area? What are the force protection requirements?
    - What additional support will be required for redeployment?

  - ○ What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between post-conflict requirements and the redeployment of the joint force?
  - ○ What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the joint force?

- Has coordination for redeployment of the joint force been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
- Has consideration been given as to when reserve component forces will be released?
- Has thought been given to which contracts would be continued and which ones should be removed?
- Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, U.N., or civilian organization?
- What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the post-conflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?
- Will the joint force be expected to support these types of activities?

Endnote

1. Dubik, LTG James M. (Retired). (May 2012). *Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside*. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Report 5, Institute for the Study of War.

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Chapter 2

Beginning the Planning Process

> "Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."
>
> — General George S. Patton, Jr.

Command Emphasis

Similar to any other operation, the success of transition planning and operations will be dependent on the level of command emphasis it receives. Commanders may be consumed in current operations and may be reluctant to devote the necessary time needed to plan and execute transition operations. Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promotes early understanding of, and agreement on, planning assumptions, considerations, risks, and other key factors. Transitions are also natural breeding grounds for rumors, given the natural anxiety of change and the unknown. Transition planning must be "top driven" to provide the energy needed to prompt commanders at all levels to dedicate time and resources and to keep all those involved informed of what to expect. Transition planning should begin early and include host nation (HN) participation at all levels. The commander may have to be very explicit in defining the conditions for which functions should be transitioned. Otherwise, the energy and capacity that could have been devoted to ensuring transition is on track, may be devoted to continuing tasks that should be transitioned or terminated. Some sections may be consumed by the change while others are focused on non-transition work; there can be different levels of awareness of key transition milestones. This may necessitate frequent meetings and continuous guidance to maintain that level of energy throughout the command.

Figuring out what needs to be done at the four-star staff level is one issue. However, communicating the intent and what needs to be done at the macro level down to the lowest level, where tasks need to be executed, is a completely different issue. You may understand what you are trying to do in terms of buying time and space for your leadership to make decisions. Translating that down to actions on the ground and having the commanders and troops understand what you're trying to do and why you're trying to do it is an absolute art. In Iraq, GEN Odierno was disciplined in that the transition effort should not become "job one." Job one has always been to accomplish the mission and maintain security of the forces. He did not want the "barn door" mentality to take effect where the sentiment is "this is over and we're rolling up the tents." That is when you are the most vulnerable to the adversary and even to yourself. A lot of bad things can happen if you don't stay focused on the mission. The daily update briefings always included discussions about transition activities, but they were secondary to the day-to-day operations.

Assembling the Right Team

When assembling a transition planning team, it is advantageous to "cast the widest net possible" by including representation from as many agencies, partners, and supporting units as possible. It also provides the expertise required in order to address the multitude of complex issues involved in transition planning and gains "buy in" and increased cooperation as the plan is implemented. It may seem more efficient to use fewer people, but this may result in surprises or unanticipated events if representation of all units and partners are not included in the planning effort, even if it is only part time planners or liaison officers that attend the meetings.

Transition planners should be Functional Area (FA) 59, Strategic Plans and Policy Officers or be a School for Advanced Military Studies graduate. If possible, a Foreign Service officer should be included as part of the planning team. In addition, the planners should take the Leader Engagement Training course offered through the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). This is offered online at www.disam.dsca.mil. Any knowledge of how the State Department or other U.S. agencies operate would also be useful.

Transition planners should have enough time remaining on their tour to see the planning process through to the end. This is especially true of the full time planning leads or assistant leads. Although this may not always be possible, it can be very disruptive to lose a key planner before the plan is complete.

In most cases, the Joint Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division (J-5), the plans section of the commander's staff, is responsible for developing transition plans. However, because of the complexity of transition planning and the number of external players to coordinate with, it is possible that the current members of the staff may not have the necessary expertise or experience to achieve the level of detail or scope required. This may require using a team of experts to assist the full time planning staff. There are different ways to accomplished this depending on the situation and personnel available:

- A "Relief Team" brought in to perform the normal responsibilities of the current J-5 Staff, freeing it up to focus primarily on transition planning.

- A “Tiger Team” of experts to augment the J-5 Staff, with transition planning being its primary responsibility.

If possible, planners should see the plan executed to end. They must have a vested interest in the plan and how it impacts on the unit’s ability to execute its plan of operations.

Selecting a Planning Methodology

Because of the complexity of transition planning and the external participants involved, special consideration is given to selecting a methodology to meet the needs of the situation. Non-military actors may be participating in the planning and might not be familiar with traditional military planning processes, lexicons, or the necessary level of detail. This requires that careful consideration be given to the planning methodology to ensure it provides a rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, timely preparation of a course of action (COA), and prompt transmission of decisions to subordinate units and external players. Two methods of planning discussed in detail in Field Manual 5-0 are the joint operation planning process (JOPP) and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Design is another planning process that may be used in conjunction with JOPP and MDMP or used independently.

- **JOPP** is an orderly analytical process that consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs for conducting transitions; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The planning staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate risks involved in transition. Additional information on JOPP can be found in Joint Publication 5-0.

- **MDMP** is a single established and proven analytical process. The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving. The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a plan. The MDMP helps the commander and his staff examine a battlefield situation and reach logical decisions. The process helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach a decision. The full MDMP is a detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time-consuming process used when adequate planning time and sufficient staff support are available to thoroughly examine numerous friendly and enemy COAs. The MDMP has seven steps (see Table 2-1). Each step of the process begins with certain input that builds on the previous steps. Each step in turn has its own output that drives subsequent steps. See Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 11-19 for more detailed information on MDMP.

Step 1	Receipt of Mission
Step 2	Mission Analysis
Step 3	Course of Action Development
Step 4	Course of Action Analysis
Step 5	Course of Action Comparison
Step 6	Course of Action Approval
Step 7	Orders Production

Table 2-1. Seven Steps of the Military Decisionmaking Process

- **Design methodology** is the methodology of applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. The conceptual component is represented by the cognitive application of design. The detailed component translates broad concepts into a complete and practical plan. During transition planning, these components overlap with no clear delineation between them. Design methodology is continuous throughout planning and evolves with increased understanding throughout the operations process. Design underpins the exercise of mission command, guiding the interactive and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept is forged.

During the planning for the consolidation of headquarters to U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF–I), the planning team and the Chief of Staff agreed that an operational design would be created in order to better determine the scope and frame the problem of conducting a very diverse and complex merger of units, people, and functions while in the midst of fighting a war. The purpose of the design work was not academic in nature, but rather purposeful and focused towards ensuring that subsequent work would not be wasted upon something other than the core issues. Red Team members as well as subject matter experts from throughout the commands participated. The design work would remain informative throughout the merger process, but its most critical impact was in helping the team understand that the most difficult aspect of this merger was creating an unprecedented headquarters that could function at all three levels of war.



Figure 2-2. Design Methodology Concept

A campaign quality army requires versatile leaders — critical and creative thinkers — who recognize and manage not just transition of friendly forces but those of adversaries, as well as transition of the operational environment. Design provides the cognitive tools to recognize and manage transition by educating and training the commander. Educated and trained commanders can identify and employ adaptive innovative solutions, create and exploit opportunities, and leverage risks to their advantage during these transitions.

Planning Considerations

One of the key lessons from the transition planning process in Iraq is that transition planning should not be conducted in isolation. It must be integrated with the current campaign plans and operations to be most effective and least disruptive. The planning must start early, even if it means that some of the personnel will rotate out before the planning is complete. This will become part of the follow-on, hand-off process. The planning process should involve working with other agencies and organizations, remembering that often their planning processes may not move at the same pace as the military. Some of the planning considerations for transition should include:

- Who are the key stakeholders in the transition process? Who are the potential promoters and detractors? How can these be leveraged or mitigated respectively?
- What key political, environmental, cultural or religious milestones/events could affect the transition process?
- Which aspects of security are best transitioned as a complete function? Which are best done incrementally?
- Has the security transition been coordinated with the other lines of effort?
- What are the dependencies within the security and other lines of operation that could be affected by transition or could affect the transition process? What risks or opportunities do these present? What does it mean for the coordination and sequencing of transition of these responsibilities?
- Has a comprehensive assessment of systems been established based on measurable preconditions? Has a process for the nomination and approval of transition been established?
- How will transition affect the requirements to support the force with regard to logistics and force enablers?
- Has an information plan been established to support the transition plan? Does it address HN and coalition target audiences at the appropriate levels?
- What forces will be required to support the HN post-transition? What force structure may be required for a potential intervention to support the HN? What is the long-term plan for the further development of HN capacity?
- Logistic staff should keep in mind its responsibility for the following considerations:
    - The continued provision of unbroken support to force elements and the identification of any risks that could be mitigated by coalition partners.
    - The need to continue the development of HN logistic capability and capacity through partnering/mentoring and ensuring the sustainability of the HN institutions and supply chain.
    - Begin the planning phase for the redeployment of the force either intra or intertheater.

You may be executing the transition plan while it is being developed and refined. You will need to identify key decision points early. These are key points in time when decisions must be made. If you go beyond these points without a decision, it may be physically impossible to accomplish the mission. There may also be many complex sub-processes that will be part of the transition planning:

- Negotiating land use agreements.
- Transferring equipment to the HN.
- Working out a training program with the HN.
- Deciding when you're going to stop training and start transitioning responsibilities to the HN.

Setting Planning Timelines

One of the key tasks that needs to be done at the senior level is to take a hard look at what the requirements are and establish a vision of where you want or need to go. After you outline what needs to be done, then you need to think about how you are going to do it and in doing so, recognize that there are a number of processes that may be occuring simultaneously.

- The first process is the political process. It involves government-to-government interface. In order for some of these processes to take place, they require as much time necessary in order to negotiate agreements and allow for some progress to develop.
- You must make a good assessment of the maneuver space available, both physical (what country or location is available to move in forces and equipment) and temporal (how much time can you buy for some of the essential processes to take place between governments).
- As you are developing the plan, you must determine what your footprint is going to look like. You must provide your best military advice to senior civilian leadership, which is an entire process within itself.

Based on the commander's initial allocation of time, the Chief of Staff may develop a staff planning timeline that outlines how long headquarters can spend on each step of the MDMP. The staff planning timeline indicates which products are due, who is responsible for them, who receives them and when they should be completed. It includes times and locations for meetings and briefings. It may be advantageous to use a collaborative process of developing supporting plans at the same time the main transition plan is being worked.

Courses of Action

Having multiple options to offer to the Commander in Chief and to the Secretary of Defense is absolutely essential to transition. Early in the drawdown, the commander needs to have as many options available as possible to build flexibility into the plan. Transition operations will present a very complex and challenging environment that will test the adaptability and agility of U.S. Forces. Some rules to remember when developing options are:

- Lay out the options in a macro sense for the commander and explain in detail where the key decision points are for each.
- Do not do anything to take one of the options off the table or to make it unfeasible. As a subordinate commander, it is possible that you might make a decision at your level that could inadvertently take an option away for the senior commander.
- The longer you can keep decisions viable, the easier it is to focus on key decisions. It must be made clear what the cost will be to keep these options available to the senior commander. It is also important to remember that problems are going to happen during execution of the plan and you have to maintain enough of a buffer in your window to ensure your team can execute the plan whenever "Murphy's Law" is present.
- Not making a decision may become the decision. In the absence of a key decision at a critical decision point, it may become necessary for a commander to move forward with an action that is necessary to achieve the end state but also keeps options open for future decision points.
- What is the path of commonality? As you move down the path towards the final date and still await decisions, there are tasks that can be done to facilitate both options. If progress is not made in some of these tasks, you may take away options from the commander.

Retrograde is an operational maneuver and not a separate logistics operation. Anything that we do with regard to the retrograde of equipment, needs to be fully nested with what our intent is for the overall ground tactical plan. We are developing this plan as our country is negotiating with the HN. We continue to develop and refine the plan while we are actually executing it.

- Make decisions based on available information.
- Continually make adjustments to the footprint.

- Buy as much time as possible, but get things done as early as possible.
- Transition periods can be very hazardous, therefor, as we start to thin out the ranks and reduce the footprint, maintaining adequate security for remaining forces and providing medical support for them should always be paramount and non-negotiable.

Assumptions

An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist during the execution of the transition. It is important that these assumptions are as accurate and realistic as possible during transition planning. Commanders should use Red Teams to challenge the assumptions periodically during the planning process. Assumptions must continually be reviewed and updated as the situation on the ground changes or when sufficient information or intelligence is received that would invalidate the assumption. If an assumption involves an outside agency, then the staff may want to send them a request for information to convert that assumption to fact. The staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the operation order. Focus on what you know. People tend to define the problem on what they don't know versus understanding the essence of the problem and figuring out what they do know and how that plays into the solution. If you focus on the unknown, it creates a paralysis and people define that as the problem.

Risk Management

Determining what the risks are for transition planning is very difficult to quantify, and a range of "right" solutions are even harder to predict beforehand. The inherent nature of transition involves different organizations, agencies, and institutions that are made up of people. People do not act in predictable ways. There are countless motivations behind, and influences on human action, particularly in situations where the goals of various stakeholders are not aligned. The range of solutions that could be selected may be divergent. That is, what works for one set of stakeholders may not work for others. The challenging part is that in these kinds of situations, there has to be some level of buy-in from everyone for a solution to work.

Understand the Guidance

The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. These sources include written documents, such as the Guidance for Employment of the Force, National Military Strategy, written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other interested organizations, strategic communication guidance, and higher headquarters' orders or estimates. Strategic guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, or chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides the basis for developing the transition plan. This guidance provides the long term and intermediate or ancillary objectives. Key leaders need to be as senior as possible and capable of independently picking up the phone and calling the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, or other defense agencies to push issues through the bureaucracy when needed.

A good example of U.S. policy guidance in Iraq was set by President Obama's 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune, N.C., which reaffirmed the 2008 Security Agreement, calling for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces by Dec. 31, 2011, and the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which lays out a long-term strategic relationship between the U.S. and Iraq in the fields of diplomacy, economics, energy, security, and rule of law. It stated that the goal of the president's policy was to promote security and prosperity in Iraq, transition responsibility for security to the Iraqis, and cultivate an enduring strategic relationship with Iraq based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Achievement of strategic objectives should result in attainment of the strategic end state — the broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation.

Importance of Agreements

As military forces drawdown and the HN and other U.S. governmental agencies assume increasing responsibility, the importance of having agreements in place cannot be emphasized enough. Status of forces agreements and security cooperation agreements play a pivotal role in a successful transition. Key areas that may be impacted include: land use agreements, force protection, passport/visa requirements, air and ground movement, and Foreign Military Sales. A formal, follow-on security and status of forces agreement will have value potentially in clarifying and stabilizing HN support for day-to-day, follow-on operations and will benefit long-term relationship building. Operating without a security agreement will force the reliance on a rule of law that will be interpreted by different echelons and organization.

Identification of Tasks to be Transferred, Transformed, or Eliminated

Before tasks can be transferred, transformed, or eliminated, they must first be identified. This will be a very difficult process, but all subordinate units must determine what tasks they are currently performing. This will be a very time consuming requirement for commanders and staffs that are already consumed with current operations. It will also be necessary to establish a matrix or other tracking mechanism to ensure that tasks are not dropped.

Tasks must be identified that apply to all units, such as setting conditions for transitions of responsibilities to other entities or conducting advice and assist missions.

Specific tasks for subordinate units must also be identified and promulgated. An example might be for medical units to assess risks and adjust capabilities in order to mitigate gaps as units consolidate and redeploy.

Tasks for supporting commands must also be identified, such as coordination of capabilities to support the withdrawal of forces and equipment.

When the military transitions tasks and responsibilities to civilian agencies, there may be certain ones that are unique to the military and may be lost or severely diminished. Risks should be considered when developing transition plans. Some of these are:

- Recovering killed and wounded personnel.
- Recovering damaged vehicles.
- Recovering downed aircraft.
- Clearing travel routes.
- Operations center monitoring of private security contractors.
- Private security contractor inspection and accountability services.
- Convoy security.
- Explosive ordnance disposal.
- Counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) notification.
- Counter-battery neutralization response.

- Communications support.
- Tactical operations center dispatch of armed response teams.
- Maintaining electronic countermeasures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities.

Establishing a massive synchronization matrix may be useful to lay out all the functions to the staff and track the progress of transition. Other day-to-day services that the military depends on may disappear as a named mission transitions to a civilian lead or unnamed mission. This may affect such things as mail, Army and Air Force Exchange Services, purchases of supplies, moving cargo in and out of the country, and movement around the country. People coming into the country will also require visas, which may overload the embassy in supporting that effort.

Identification of Materiel, Services, Bases to Transfer

Identifying materials, services, and bases to transfer to the HN requires close coordination and prioritization from subordinate units. Clearly communicating this to the gaining HN agency or commander early on in the process can avoid misunderstanding or distrust at the critical point of transfer of the base or outpost. HN forces may be particularly interested in keeping the following types of property:

- Force protection barriers.
- Power generation units.
- Light sets.
- Containerized housing or security units.
- Furniture.

Commanders must comply with specific regulatory requirements when disposing of government property of any type. The HN may expect U.S. Forces to leave significant amounts of property behind for its use. Regulations clearly dictate the type and dollar amounts of U.S. government property that can be given to the HN government upon departure of U.S. Forces. Commanders of units serving jointly with HN forces or combat outposts must clearly communicate to the gaining forces what property and equipment can and cannot be left behind at the location. Commanders should ensure they understand current policies and consult a judge advocate general if they are unclear on what property and equipment can and cannot be left behind.

When closing military bases and transferring material to the HN or local population, consideration should be given to the short-term effect it will have on the economy and political situation. The local population may have been dependent on a U.S. base to provide jobs or other services. Handing over bases, material or services must be part of an overall transition plan that includes a strategic communication plan to minimize any adverse effects on the local population.

The plan should also examine what the effect of closing a base will have on the ability of the remaining U.S. Forces to function. Once a base is turned over to the HN, the U.S. Military will lose a source of intelligence, communication, and other forms of support for that area (see Appendix B).

Maintaining Situational Awareness

Good decisions cannot be made unless there is good information and facts that can be separated from opinion and speculation. One of the first casualties of U.S. or coalition forces engaging in transition operations will be the loss of situational awareness. As U.S. and coalition forces scale back local operations, contact with the population will be drastically reduced and an associated reduction in situational awareness will result.

Innovative approaches will be needed to maintain situational awareness of the operational environment during the transition. By using previously cultivated relationships, the challenges of maintaining situational awareness during security transitions can be largely overcome. The key is to undertake the planning steps and resource investments early so that as the traditional types of military intelligence are reduced, a nontraditional and local information capability can make up for some of the reductions of capability.

Mission Command

During transition operations, knowledge management becomes the commander's critical path to support his decision making. The sequence of meetings and the quality of inputs and outputs of those meetings is critical. As forces are drawn down and functions are transferred to other partners or the HN, it becomes more important to manage the information acquired before and during the transition period. Knowledge management during transition operations may be divided into three perspectives:

- Management focuses on capturing, organizing and facilitating knowledge. This may include information obtained during earlier phases of the operation that may be critical in planning a seamless transition.

- Application focuses on effective retrieval of relevant content through advanced searches and mining to conduct knowledge-related work and tasks and how to use the results for discovery. Access to this information by other partners as well as the HN becomes an important consideration. Effective access, search, and dissemination are critically dependent on the organization of knowledge, whether in technological or traditional systems.

- People focus on learning, sharing and collaboration. This is the education component of the cycle. Technology may aid them, but in the end, it is their ability to use and innovate with what is available that will create the value realized in knowledge management.

The knowledge management process must be very adaptable with venues that are able to give guidance, receive assessments, give directions, and then follow up. Effective management of information and knowledge can help increase the commander and staff's situational awareness, enabling them to make better assumptions and assessments, develop transition plans, allocate resources, and make decisions with greater understanding of the environment.

Merging Headquarters

As missions change, agreements implemented, and force numbers reduced, it becomes necessary to merge headquarters to increase efficiency and effectiveness. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, a Command and Control Transition Tiger Team (C2T) was established to develop a plan to merge six diverse warfighting headquarters into one headquarters USF-I, with one commander and one staff that could function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The C2T focused on the critical missions and functions that needed to remain intact throughout the merger process and after merger completion.

USF-I's initial operations capability was to be effective by Jan. 1, 2010, with a potential for earlier mergers. Full operational capability was to be achieved no later than March 15, 2010. As part of this capability, III Corps would conduct a relief in place/transfer of authority with I Corps in February and March 2010 into an established USF-I. Conceptually, an Army corps headquarters staff would provide the nucleus for the USF-I staff with the remainder coming as individual augmentees from throughout the U.S. Military. Additionally, it was necessary to minimize transition time without losing functionality, which would be accomplished by staying proactive. Planners must factor in force protection, sustainment, and information technology for the residual staff. The commanding general would exercise his span of control through deputy commanding generals (DCGs), consisting of DCG of operations, DCG of advising and training, and DCG of support. USF-I would build a security assistance office and institutional advising and training elements in a modular fashion to facilitate transition to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. It would be necessary to establish standard operating procedures for USF-I stand-up, and support for III Corps train-up in August and September 2009 and its subsequent mission rehearsal and exercise. Finally, a target of about 40 percent should be sought in personnel savings, including military, civilian, and contractors by analyzing the future force structure to identify necessary scope and types of missions. These guiding principles would be a constant source of reference as the C2T progressed through design, analysis, and planning.

Presidential policy guidance and direction is paramount to the decision making that leads to the merger of these headquarters. Understanding of the long-term goals, timelines, troop levels, and other political dynamics becomes critical for conducting the planning. First, conduct a detailed review of all personnel and functions to be merged that exist across all the headquarters.

Merging headquarters into one may be problematic for the staffs. They may not be trained, experienced, or organized enough to plan and conduct through strategic issues simultaneously. Although manning documents may designate planners to be of certain grade, education, or service, the reality is that those positions may not be filled with the required skills. If this is the case, it may be necessary to bring in an external team with the necessary skills to augment the staff.

There may be a need to establish a forward headquarters near the embassy or other location that requires constant collaboration to plan and execute the transition. A tactical command post may also be required to keep focus on operations during the actual merger period.

Security Cooperation Organizations

The security cooperation organizations (SCO) within U.S. Embassies are normally charged with advising, training, and equipping HN forces, supporting professional military education, and planning joint military exercises. These tasks entail administration of U.S. foreign assistance provided to the HN military through the Foreign Military Financing account and the International Military Education and Training account. In addition to foreign assistance, SCOs facilitate other forms of bilateral military engagement, most notably the Foreign Military Sales program. Although the SCO is a Department of Defense organization, it falls under chief of mission authority, and the embassy is generally responsible for providing operational support.

As U.S. Military Forces are reduced as part of the transition plan, it may be necessary to consolidate the remaining forces within the SCO. This may be necessary as a result of not having a status of forces agreement from which U.S. Forces can operate, or it may be needed to consolidate forces to gain efficiency. Either way, it may create some situations that require planning. The SCO operates under the authority of Title 22 of the U.S. Code and is the security assistance element of the embassy's country team responsible for managing the military's requests, sales, and deliveries of U.S. defense equipment, training, and services. In addition to statutory limitations on troop strength, operating under Title 22 authority also restricts the military from conducting security cooperation tasks and the resources to conduct them (see Appendix D). One example, that was identified in Iraq, was the inability of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to conduct military-to-military training or inability to even request a mobile training team to conduct staff training. In addition, it may be necessary for all SCO personnel to obtain passports and visas if they do not already have them. Understanding the operations of the embassy and its culture becomes critical when transitioning to an SCO type organization. Although transitioning functions to an SCO is one option, the embassy is not designed, funded, equipped, or trained to continue with the missions that the military has been previously conducting, and attempting to do so would result in frustration and possibly failure.

In 2009, the USF–I guidelines for achieving sustainable stability directed U.S. Forces to synchronize their efforts with interagency partners to strengthen Iraqi political, economic, diplomatic, and rule of law institutions while avoiding temporary "quick fixes" that could undermine long-term institutional viability. While strategies, orders, key staff organizations, and processes were developed to support this at Multi-National Forces-Iraq and embassy levels, the forces on the ground faced many challenges in further expanding this civil-military unity of effort.

Capacity Building

Societies emerging from conflict that have often debilitated or corrupted governance institutions, lack professional capacity for governance, and require new or reformed legal frameworks for political engagement. When the government cannot provide for the population, people will do whatever it takes to put bread on the table and ensure their own security, even if it means supporting opponents to the peace process or engaging in criminal activity. It is critical that the transition process enables the HN to continue with security, rule of law, economic, and other governmental programs that will provide the cornerstone of a stable government.

- **Security force development**. The ability of the state to provide safety and security within its territorial boundaries and to deal with armed intrusion across its borders through a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is a defining feature of state sovereignty. Security force assistance aims to establish conditions that support the HN's end state, which includes competent, capable, committed, and confident security forces. This includes bringing its military up to a professional level that will minimize the potential for a military coup or other disorder within the government. Even the best trained and professional force will wither without the institutional systems to recruit, pay, supply and equip, train and employ, and sustain them. Successful transfer of security to the HN security forces is dependent on a healthy, sustained partnership. During transition periods, security force assistance evolves from partnering, to advising, to enabling the HN security forces as they gradually assume greater responsibility.

  The Security Force Assistance (SFA) Model. This model is a phased process that allows coalition troops to facilitate the transfer of full security responsibility to HN security forces as its capabilities improve in keeping with the transition timeline. At the completion of transition, HN authorities will have full security responsibility for the entirety of their nation with limited coalition advisors required.

  ○ **SFA Stage 1**. HN security forces "developing" with international security assistance force partners and advisors present. During this stage, transition support units partner up with HN security force units. Coalition units are located close to their HN counterparts and help them plan and execute operations while they are developing their capabilities.

  ○ **SFA Stage 2**. HN security forces are "effective" with partners and have advisors present. Coalition military commanders and their HN counterparts carefully assess the ability of transitioning security force units to take more responsibility for security. When they are confident the HN forces are effective against the threat in the area, the coalition transition support unit takes a step back, effectively becoming a reserve force for the HN units. The HN security forces continue to be assisted and advised by small coalition teams.

  ○ **SFA Stage 3**. HN security forces are "effective" with advisors and have partners on standby. At this stage, the HN security forces are capable of leading operations with the coalition partnering force withdrawn to an operating base farther away than before. The HN security forces' headquarters in the transition area will have its own coalition advisory team. Overall, coalition troop numbers will reduce as a consequence of the HN forces' ability to deal effectively with the security threat.

- **SFA Stage 4**. HN security forces are "independent" with advisors and have partners withdrawn. The HN security forces are fully independent. Their advisory teams may be withdrawn and maintain less regular contact. The coalition partner unit is withdrawn to a strategic base and an advisory presence remains at the HN security forces' headquarters.[1]

> "Iraqi security capacity: The withdrawal of the U.S. Military from population centers in June 2009 left the Iraqi forces in control of all eighteen provinces. To their credit, they have withstood significant security tests, from the drawdown of over 100,000 U.S. Forces to the March 2010 parliamentary elections and the ongoing government formation process that followed."
>
> — A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 31, 2011

- **Economic development/provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)**. Good governance and sustainable economical development is crucial to any successful transition. As the transition time to HN officials arrives, it becomes important to close out all existing projects or begin to transition them to the proper HN or nongovernmental organization that can sustain them. It is critical to not leave any project undone or in a state that requires continued support without that ability in place. It is better to start early, get the HN as self-sufficient as possible, and back out as the drawdown comes to a close. PRTs or similar organizations can make a significant contribution to the HN's peace and stability. PRTs aim to develop the infrastructure necessary for the local populace to succeed in a post-conflict environment. A PRT is an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to the HN. A PRT assists local communities with reconciliation while strengthening the HN government and speeding the transition to self-reliance. However, the beginning of the transition process and the HN's assumption of its full responsibilities country-wide requires the evolution and ultimate dissolution of these entities. PRTs should evolve and be phased out based on the following guidelines:

- ○ Evolve, reinvest, and phase out. By the end of their province's transition period, PRTs will methodically hand off their functions and phase out. Each PRT's evolution plan will depend on the HN's priorities, the unique circumstances in its province, and the PRT's capabilities and structure.
- ○ Incentivize transition. PRTs should support governance and development efforts that promote the sustainability of the transition.
- ○ Set the conditions to make transition irreversible. PRTs should focus on supporting and building capacity.
- ○ Shift to technical assistance, build capacity, and improve national and sub-national linkages.
- ○ Network and reach back. PRT nations should exchange information and share expertise amongst one another to meet the needs of the HN.

- **Whole of government**. A successful transition is interdependent on the maturity and parallel development of each governmental element of the HN. The whole of government approach tries to combine the functions of multiple government agencies supporting transition initiatives to provide common definitions, frameworks, and procedures at the strategic level. This common framework assists U.S. governmental agencies in planning operational and tactical activities that complement overall strategic goals. The transition plan must ensure that U.S. governmental agencies and key stakeholders are included in the planning process to achieve coordination of all the departments of the HN.

Strategic economic transition does not require a fully functional economy. If that were the standard, then the counterinsurgency campaign would be eternal, or close to it. Transition seeks minimum conditions. For example, by the end of the period of strategic economic transition, the nation's economic infrastructure — electricity, ports of entry, and communication architecture — should be mostly repaired and functioning. Parliament and the executive branch should be working to complete the legal framework under which the nation's economy can grow. Corruption should be declining and enough of the nation's agricultural, manufacturing, construction, and public works sectors should be improving so that citizens can be increasingly hopeful. Whether the economy is completely free market or remains partially nationalized is not the issue.[2]

Endnote

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (October 2012). *International Assistance Security Force Media Backgrounder*.

2. Dubik, LTG James M. (Retired). (May 2012). *Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside*. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Report 5, Institute for the Study of War.

Chapter 3

Staffing, Verification, Wargaming (Planning)

Training the Staff

As staffs consolidate and missions change during transitional periods, the potential to have untrained personnel in key positions increases. Many of the duties may be unique to the situation, yet there may be very little formal training available to prepare staff members before they arrive in theater or to assume their responsibilities. Creative training opportunities may be required for the staff to be prepared to work with host nation (HN) officials or other U.S. governmental agencies. Understanding the HN customs and governmental procedures, and having knowledge of State Department and other agencies' culture and procedures can be very useful as operations transition. Obtaining someone from the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program or a like initiative to serve on the transition planning staff could be useful in understanding the complexities of the language, culture, processes, and challenges of the HN. They are able to identify roadblocks to progress, become catalysts in breaking those logjams, and able to serve as conduits between HN officials, local populations, and military leaders on the ground and their higher headquarters. Some training recommendations that would be useful for all staff members would include:

- "Embassy 101."
- Training in contracting.
- Extensive cultural training.
    - Understand the culture and apply it to normal leadership, problem solving, and critical thinking skills.
    - Understand how the HN government works.
    - Understand what the religious, tribal, and political impact will be on day-to-day operations of the HN.
- Foreign military sales.

If possible, the planning staff should have sufficient time left from its tour in theater to allow completion of the planning process and participation in the transition, which will help ensure that the plan is realistic and the planners are able to make adjustments to it as needed.

As staff members near the end of their tour, their replacements should be identified and contacted as soon as possible to guarantee a smooth transition. Because the staff may be reduced, there may be very little time for train-up, making it imperative that staff members receive as much training as possible before arriving to their assignment.

Methodology

Past transition planning has highlighted several tactics, techniques, and procedures that have proven to be extremely effective and should be taken into consideration.

- **Wargaming**. Deliberate planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that may exist. Wargaming is a primary means to conduct analysis of these assumptions and determines the viability of any course of action (COA). It is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities, and possible COAs, the area of operation, and other aspects of the operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based on time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. Wargaming also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and force requirements of the transition plans. When planning for transition, wargaming can assist in synchronization, help identify key tasks and functions, and determine who should perform them. Although wargaming is more commonly referred to as table top exercises within other agencies and organizations, it will help determine which tasks should be transferred to these entities and which ones are no longer required.

- **Red Teaming**. Red Teaming provides an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. Commanders use Red Teams to aid them and their staffs to provide insights and alternatives during design, planning, execution, and assessment to:

    - Broaden the understanding of the operational environment.

    - Assist the commander and staff in framing problems and defining end state conditions and challenge assumptions.

    - Consider the perspectives of the adversary and others as appropriate.

    - Aid in identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities.

  - ○ Assist in identifying areas for assessment as well as the assessment metrics.
  - ○ Anticipate the cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others.
  - ○ Conduct independent critical reviews and analyses of plans to identify potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

- **Use of Human Terrain System Teams**. When wargaming a transition plan, it can be very valuable to utilize Human Terrain System assets, if they are available. They can provide critical insight in how the local population will react to each COA. Questions to ask would be: What are people going to see? What are they going to hear? What's the media going to tell them? How is it going to affect their lives? What type of feedback are the teams providing?

- **Rehearsals**. It is important to rehearse the plan continuously with subordinate commanders as well as interagency partners. This provides a common vision throughout the process on what the plan looks like, where they fit in, and where they are in the execution of the plan. It is critical for the commanders to recognize what needs to be done, and collectively be able to communicate what needs to be done and why down to the lowest level. Rehearsals are a good tool to accomplish this. Subordinate commanders should look at their goals and objectives. Because all the political decisions may not have been made, they should look through the lens of when they absolutely have to make a decision, when do they absolutely have to make a move, and when is the point where they can go no further?

Assessment and Verification

As the transition plan is developed, a continued assessment should take place to determine weaknesses, security risks, validity of assumptions, and accuracy of timelines. The assessment should examine the likelihood of attaining the conditions laid out in the plan, an assessment of the extent to which such conditions have been met, information regarding variables that could alter that plan, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that plan. The assessment should continue to determine the preparedness of the HN security forces, the maturity of HN government agencies, and the ability of U.S. agencies to assume responsibilities (see Appendix B).

Transition planning is normally conducted at the strategic level and executed at the operational and tactical levels. Any assessments must come from the unit level to get a true picture of the progress being made in the actual transition. Commanders must continue to emphasize planning for current operations while planning and executing transition. As the drawdown continues, tactical level commanders may find themselves in a position to address strategic level issues, such as key leader engagements, that division commanders had been responsible for in the past. It is imperative to maintain these relationships and continue to conduct other activities with the local population as long as possible to maintain situational awareness. If commanders don’t have “boots on the ground”, they may lose the key nodes of information. In Iraq, a deliberate decision was made to keep a disproportionate number of general officers in the country for key leader engagements and other strategic level issues to help maintain situational awareness.

Adjustments and Execution

As the transition plan continues to develop, regular meetings should be conducted with the Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy Commanding General (DCG), Deputy Ambassador, and other key staff members to inform them on the status of the plan development, present unresolved issues, develop COAs, and resolve as many issues as possible at that level. These meetings should be followed with brief-backs to the ambassador and commanding general to report progress and any changes or adjustments that have been made to the transition plan. More critical issues can also be presented as decision briefs and any adjustments to the overall plan can be made at this time. Some of the key transition challenges that must be considered as COAs are developed and the execution begins are:

- Maintaining situational awareness and an in-depth understanding of the drivers of instability.
- Managing perceptions, both in theater and at home.
- Retaining the necessary level of influence as resources drawdown.
- Determining the appropriate pace of transition.
- Tackling complex problem sets as a partnered force.
- Training and developing the right mindset.
- Doing different with less.

The execution of a general transition must start early to facilitate a seamless handoff. Similar to taking the training wheels off a bicycle, someone must be there to help the new government when it falls off in order to help it back on. Constant meetings will be required with different sections to report on the status of the progress. At some point, those involved have to get past the hypothetical and get to the execution of the plan. As functions are transitioned from the U.S. Military to the HN, it is important to bear in mind that people are being weaned from the most capable force in the world.

The HN and other countries may not share the same timeline that U.S. Forces are working from. The timeline may become a forcing function to keep everyone on track and cannot be lost.

Accountability and Reporting Progress

If there is agreement that transition should be based on conditions on the ground and not what’s on a timeline, the ability to measure progress becomes critical. Measuring progress allows continuous adjustments to strategy and implementation to improve success. Ongoing measures should contribute to adjusting the goals, plans, and activities of all actors involved. It is important for subordinate units to continue to coordinate and report progress on the development of their individual transition plan (see Appendix B).

Chapter 4

Engaging Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational Players (Planning)

> "Partnering tends to be more mindset than skill set."
>
> — LTG Caldwell, (*A Call to Action: Command Philosophy*, June 2010)

Building Partners

During transition operations, not one problem will be strictly military based. Problems can be complicated and tied together. Strong partnerships among government, military, and nongovernmental organizations are imperative in today's post-conflict civilian transitions. There will be representatives of various agencies in theater aside from the State Department that will bring a range of capabilities to you. You must endeavor to cast a wide net and get everyone accounted for and have good visibility in what they're doing. You must make sure you have your arms around all of those people and make sure that everyone is shooting on the same target and not working against each other.

Every effort should be made to include other U.S. agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and multinational players in the entire planning process. Understand the capabilities, authorities, and restrictions of the governmental agencies, coalition partners, and host nation (HN) to which responsibilities are being transferred. Work to maintain influence on the HN and enable its success. Understand that other U.S. governmental agencies may not be empowered to make decisions on the ground as the Department of Defense (DOD) does; to compensate for this, additional time may be needed for the planning process.

Some actions that can develop partnerships and facilitate communications are:

- Build strong relationships and unity of effort with military, civilian, and HN partners. The quality of partnerships drives effectiveness and strengthens the ability to influence others.

- Military organizations need to learn how the State Department functions in order to serve the Chief of Mission properly. This will help military organizations avoid duplication of effort, information fratricide, and fiscal competition.

- Consider having "transition briefings" where all personnel, regardless of organization or section, are briefed on key elements of the planned transition.
- Form a civilian-military team synergy, leveraging the strengths of each to facilitate the development of the HN capacity.
- Facilitate cohesion and cooperation among team members and partners.
- Break down polarizing or stovepiped perspectives within and across organizational boundaries and build strategic relationships to achieve coordinated goals.

The following is a summary of the best practices for unifying civilian-military efforts from 2007 through 2010 in Iraq. However, these practices would also be useful in the planning and executing most interagency transition operations. The elements described provide a framework for a whole-of-government approach for other complex contingency operations and can point to potential ways to institutionally improve interagency coordination from the theater to the tactical level. Civilian-military coordination between the Multi-National Force–Iraq/U.S. Forces–Iraq and the U.S. Embassy was facilitated by:

- **Proximity**. Being physically collocated helped build relationships and understanding.
- **Open communication**. Honest detailed discussions facilitated the sharing of information and helped those involved work through any remaining friction.
- **Inclusivity**. Everyone was expected to participate, and efforts were made to ensure all voices were heard.
- **A focus on complementary capabilities**. Everyone brought his or her strengths to the endeavor to fill gaps in capability or to support others' capabilities.
- **Understanding**. Appreciation of and sensitivity to cultures and capabilities enabled development of innovative approaches.
- **Choosing the right personnel**. High caliber, experienced personnel was aggressively recruited and then empowered for success. The planning process provided a common understanding of the direction to take and cemented relationships among staff and organizations. The resulting organizational agility allowed the Multi-National Force–Iraq and the U.S. Embassy to adapt to the environment, facilitate cooperation, and thicken limited resources.

Close and Continuous Coordination with the HN and Allies

Understanding the HN language, culture, and history can be a valuable asset when preparing to transition operations to the HN military or civilian players. This will help better predict the behavior and actions of the people involved. Bring the HN into the transition planning as early as possible, but only after the U.S. or coalition has a good idea of how it is going to transition the operation or campaign to avoid any unnecessary confusion. Including the HN in transition planning at all levels will help in clearly communicating the intentions of coalition forces. Often, the HN does not accept or take seriously the fact that coalition forces will be leaving. As a result, the HN fails to adequately prepare for its part of the transition.

The behavior of the HN and its people may change as the transfer of responsibilities to it and the U.S. Embassy occurs. The lessons that the HN and its security forces have learned from the U.S. will only be apparent after an examination is done to determine what they chose to retain, discard, or transform. U.S. influence diminishes once the transfer of responsibilities has taken place.

Establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort is a challenge due to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies. Classification issues and limited coalition-wide secure information systems may contribute to poor information sharing with coalition forces. Different training and tactics, techniques, and procedures will also be challenging when conducting transition operations with coalition forces.

National Caveats

Transition operations will also magnify the issue of national "caveats" identified by the governments of contributing nations to limit the activities of their forces. Many NATO nations do not allow their forces to engage in offensive combat operations or to conduct detainee operations. Such restrictions also limit deployment areas and types of missions for particular national contingents, or impose other criteria that reduce effectiveness or flexibility and present additional challenges as coalition forces are withdrawn and responsibilities are transitioned to the HN.

Overcoming Choice of Words, Language Barriers

Many terms or phrases the military uses on a daily basis may not be understood or accepted by other agencies. For example, the State Department does not normally use "campaign phases" when discussing an operation and the term "end state" is not used. The military normally speaks in bullets, while the State Department speaks in fleshed-out paragraphs. The State Department has a long-term perspective that does not lend well to the U.S. Military's notion of phases or end states.

Failing to write a plan that all the players can understand causes them to get caught up in verbiage and runs the risk of derailing the transition process. Consider creating a “common lingo” site which helps cross-train military and civilians in terminology that could be populated with organizational charts, telephone lists, etc.

As forces are drawn down and staff size is reduced, it becomes critical that each staff position is effective and that each multinational staff member selected to fill a staff position possesses the necessary language skills to communicate effectively with the entire staff. Military terms can be found in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Nov. 8, 2010 or the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) Lexicon which can be found at http://cco.dodlive.mil/publications/lexicon. The U.S. State Department terms may be clarified in the *Foreign Affairs Manual* found online at http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/.

Synchronizing Interagency Efforts

Transition operations will almost always mean working with organizations or agencies outside of the U.S. Military. Therefore, establishing good relationships with other U.S. governmental agencies cannot be over emphasized. The DOD and the Department of State (DOS) are two very accomplished organizations but have completely different functions and therefore, are going to have different views in almost every case. Left to their own devices, these organizations would go in different directions in terms of how they would look at solving the same problem. In Iraq, Ambassador Jeffrey and GEN Austin agreed early on to do everything in their power to pull their organizations together and keep them together. They knew that in order to create an effective relationship between the two organizations, it would require that they say the right information and not the wrong information. Most importantly, do what is right. Doing what is right means attending meetings and reviewing products together, and sitting in on each other’s meetings whenever possible. They would do everything physically possible to demonstrate to their subordinates that they were a team and needed to reward teamwork and discourage activities that went against it. There needed to be no daylight between the ambassador and the commander. You can agree to disagree from time to time, but you need a common approach to solving problems and accomplishing objectives.

The U.S. Embassy neither perceives itself as a continuation of the U.S. Military Force before the transfer of responsibilities, nor does it perceive the transfer as a relief in place. Because each transition may be unique and does not have a textbook solution, many of the details will consist of ad hoc solutions and require patience and understanding from all the players. The locations of offices and headquarters should be planned so that they facilitate the establishment of relations. Coordination of effort and ideas between organizations is important to provide leverage for each of their programs. Because the U.S. Embassy staff was small and did not posses many of the same capabilities as the Multi-National Corps–Iraq, a colonel was assigned to help organize the transition process and serve as a conduit to work issues. The State Department is much more centralized in its decision-making process and in how it does business; therefore, the embassies may not have the authority to make decisions, which may cause delays.

The commander must have interagency buy-in and everyone must have a sense of ownership of the transition process, realizing that we're often dealing with people who do not have the same kind of planning background or culture that we are accustomed to in the Armed Forces. Make sure that interagency civilian counterparts are included early in the transition planning process (Phase 0). If you don't have them on board and take ownership early, it's going to be an uphill fight that will create disconnects as you go through the transition. When senior leaders arrive to their posts, it is critical to reassess the campaign plan jointly — military and civilian — so that the new team can feel the same level of ownership as the previous one.

Because DOD and DOS are connected to larger agencies in the U.S., you must keep in mind that there are elements within these agencies that might naturally pit them against each other. Not only do these agencies have to work together as a team in theater, but they must also work through issues within their own agencies to ensure that they facilitate teamwork. You must leverage the individual strengths of the various agencies. Imbedding planners in their organizations will help them commit to being successful. Each organization will provide some unique capabilities, insights, and strengths that we don't typically have, such as the ability to coordinate and build consensus.

In Iraq, GEN Austin and the Ambassador agreed to conduct a team-building event to assist in coordinating and building consensus. They brought in some professionals from the Center for Creative Leadership, located in Colorado, and they helped the two organizations work together through the team-building event. They spent the entire day analyzing each other as individual organizations and collectively as a team, and talked about spanning boundaries. That was absolutely beneficial throughout the entire time they were there. They both committed themselves as a team when doing tasks in that session, which etched in stone what their common goals and objectives were. What they committed to in that session, they remained committed to throughout planning and transition.

Some of the institutional barriers that could affect cooperation between organizations that will need to be overcome are:

- **Disparate organizational cultures and visions**. Differences between the planning and action-oriented military and the collaborative and long-term thinking of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development personnel, all with different missions, may lead to friction.
- **Different levels of resources**. The military's budget and manpower is considerably larger than those of the State Department and may complicate any partnering efforts and cloud responsibilities for areas where the State Department had overall organizational primacy.
- **Different lexicons**. Differences in language and the absence of interagency "doctrine" may complicate joint collaboration.
- **Security**. There are differing abilities to deploy and operate in challenging security environments.
- **Training**. Military training focuses on traditional warfighting skills and produces personnel with strong planning skills. Civilian training and education focuses on their respective tasks and not in collaboration with the military.

Contractors are an important part of the force and will play a key role in the transition, and their companies should be kept informed on the development of transition plans. Contractors operate under different rules and authorities, but may often be one of the last elements out of country. Planning must include security, support, and transportation of the contractor force as the military reduces its forces.

Chapter 5

Implementation/Passing the Baton

> "As a military force, this transition should be transparent and seamless — we should have sought it where the operating environment allows it. There is no red star cluster that goes up, that says we are now out of combat operations…We learned that it is better to make that a transparent distinction, so tactically you are not allowing the enemy to take advantage of your change in mission, which is not [necessarily] based on change of condition, but based on policy."
>
> — LTG Jacoby, Commander, I Corps (DCG-O, USF-I), Feb. 12, 2010

Shaping the Operational Environment

Prioritizing the transition of functions is often counterintuitive during transition planning. Some people think that the most important functions should be the last to transition. However, if a function is the most important task that is being done and will continue after we are gone, it should be the first to transition. This allows the host nation (HN) to take charge of running the function while the U.S. Forces are still in a position to provide oversight or to make sure it is moving in a positive direction, which makes for a much smoother transition. The transition should be a gradual withdrawal, building the HN's capacity and confidence. It should be gradual so that when we finally unplug completely, the HN hardly realizes we are gone.

In order to successfully conduct transition operations and maintain stability operations, there are five actions to consider in shaping the environment:

- **Maintain situational awareness**. Maintaining situational awareness, despite reduced resources and decreasing access resulting from the drawdown of U.S. Forces, will require innovative approaches.

- **Retain influence with the HN**. Partnerships and personal relationships are crucial to retain necessary influence and enable continued progress in building the HN's capacity. There is an inverse relationship between transition and influence. As transition progresses and the indigenous government gains in strength and confidence, so will the ability to influence its decline. Simply put, the HN will need the U.S. less and therefore, will listen less. Increased emphasis on building effective relationships with key players and maintaining influence through control of high-value niche capabilities are two ways to mitigate this issue.

- **Execute non-lethal targeting**. Use of non-lethal targeting can be used to solve complex problems encountered in the operational environment that affect the drivers of instability.

- **Conduct mission preparation**. It is critical for personnel to have the proper training and mindset for the phase of the campaign. Some personnel may be returning to conduct stability operations that were previously conducting counterinsurgency or combat operations. Units need to conduct home station training, joint and service training, and in-theater training to be mentally and physically prepared to conduct stability operations.

- **Master transitions**. Understanding transition and the impact on operations is important at all levels in order to plan, execute, assess, and adjust to the changing complex operational environment.

Transitioning facilities, commanders' emergency response program projects, and construction projects are very difficult. The HN has a vote and is often unprepared to take on responsibilities, which makes the transition very hard because sometimes the pace is set by the HN. In some cases, our own civilian counterparts can help in these difficult situations.

Avoiding Lost Functionalities

As the transition efforts progress toward the HN's self sufficiency, it is important that post-conflict interdependencies do not unravel and military capacity building efforts are not lost. For this to occur, the HN government officials must have a budget and the capability to use it, be able to assess the need for essential services within the province, have the ability to manage contracts to establish those services, and be able to then develop departments to sustain them. If the government cannot accomplish these tasks, it cannot provide basic needs for its people and transition may not occur successfully. This could leave the root cause of an insurgency unsolved, especially if it involves the capability of the HN government to function effectively. If the government can provide security but not basic services, then the insurgency still has a chance at manipulating the population against the government.

Whether the transition is between military units or from a military unit to a civilian agency, all those involved must clearly understand the tasks and responsibilities being passed on. Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially between organizations of different capabilities, capacities, and resources. All agencies, organizations, and units must recognize the potential for relationships to break down during transitions and actively watch for and guard against such a situation. Everyone must focus on the stated priorities and remain unified in their efforts and goals to achieve them.

Synchronization of Staff and Command Activities

Conducting a handoff with the incoming staff during a transition period can be extremely difficult. Maintaining synchronization of staff and command activities becomes very important especially when each staff will have a different focus. This may take place at the same time the staff is learning to work with the State Department or another agency while familiarizing itself with a foreign culture. One tool that was used by Multi-National Forces–Iraq to keep everyone updated was the bimonthly, Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq's "all hands" brief. This was a personal update brief from the commanding general to the members of the command. It was broadcast live and posted on the command's internal web portal for asynchronous viewing. Its agenda included a status update, a description of where the command had progressed, a discussion of obstacles faced and what was being done to deal with the obstacles. It also included a question and answer period (see Appendix C).[1]

As the transition process gets closer to the target completion date, it may be necessary to conduct rehearsal of concept drills with representatives from all commands to synchronize actions and to ensure a smooth and responsible conclusion into the transition. This should include representatives from commands outside the area of responsibility that are supporting the movement of equipment and forces. Other synchronization forums were used by U.S. Forces–Iraq, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate during the transition process to ensure everything stayed in alignment. They consisted of the following:

- **Equipment Drawdown Synchronization Board**. Conducted every evening to determine what units and equipment were leaving, what was in the Redistribution Property Assistant Team yards, and what the priority was for equipment flowing out. Trucks arrived to take equipment out, making sure that they were at the right place at the right time and equipment was not removed, which might have affected current operations.

- **Operational Maneuver Chemical Protective Over Garment**. The group met twice a week to ensure it had the movement process, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, route clearance, and force protection requirements in place. This included base closures and convoys, considering that one of the most vulnerable times occurs during base closures and reduced security capabilities.

- **Sustainment Council of Colonels and Executive Sustainment Board General Officer Committee**. Weekly meetings chaired by the deputy commander for support to identify major issues and synchronization of effort.

- **Large Base Transition Group**. This was a weekly meeting to look at the large bases and how they would conduct the transitions. The process would start 180 days in advance to make sure they would stay on schedule. The commanding general was the only one that could close a base early.
- **Embassy Support and Enduring Site Transition Board**. This meeting was held weekly and included the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, Joint Engineering Directorate, Department of State, and the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq. The organizations met to determine how they would transition each of the sites and functions to the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq. They focused on logistics issues and obtaining approvals or authority on whether or not to leave certain equipment.
- **Operational Synchronization Board**. Monthly meetings chaired by the commanding general and division commanders. Division commanders reported their transition plans back to the commanding general and determined how they would synchronize plans and keep everyone in alignment.

Redeploy Forces

One of the responsibilities of the military during a transition period is to provide and preserve options and COAs for the decision makers. If the number of troops or capabilities were reduced too soon, then the number of COAs would be limited. Transition of responsibilities must be started well in advance of any redeployment of major forces.

During the planning process for drawdown, planners should use the minimum number of forces that may be left after combat operations and after troops leave. In most cases, the actual number of forces remaining in the HN will be determined at the national level and it will be easier to determine task distribution and assignments if the lower end of the planning range is used.

During transition, difficulty and complexity are not necessarily linear. Moving forces out of theater is a relatively easy process until you get to the last 50,000 personnel. As the drawdown progresses, it becomes more difficult to accomplish tasks that were taken for granted. One example from Iraq was trying to move contractors out of the country. In many cases, the contractors were the last to leave and can only fly on military aircraft in a space A status. Because they could not battle roster for airlift, they had to get special permission to manifest them.

Base Disposition

The base transition process encompasses a series of actions to prepare, document, execute, and finally close or transfer bases. The entire process could take between 90 to 365 days. The individual tasks are broken down into four parallel lines of effort that lead to the end state of documentation and final transfer. The four parallel processes are:

- Real Estate Management.
- Environmental Oversight.
- Property Distribution.
- Contracting.

Additional processes applicable to some bases include the Army and Air Force Exchange Service transition, HN Business Industrial Zone coordination, and Memorial Disposition that occurs in parallel with these processes. Estimated Regional Command’s transition timelines for planning purposes are 365 days for a strategic base, 180 days for an operational base, and 90 days for a tactical base.

Once a base is opened, there are three types of disposition:

- Closure is the complete removal of all base functions, removal or destruction of all structures and equipment, remediation of all environmental hazards, and return of the real estate to the owner.
- Transfer involves turning over all or portions of the personal and real property of the base to an official entity within the HN for its occupation and use. In the case of transfers, the personal and real property to be “donated” to the HN is negotiated, approved, and documented by the appropriate executive agents of the countries involved.
- A form of transfer is the partial transfer in which only portions of a base are transferred to the HN while other portions are closed or remain active.



Figure 5-1. Base Transition Process[2]

Base closures and transitions should not be hasty and should be well planned to avoid the appearance that the local population is being abandoned. There should be a well thought out strategic information plan incorporated in the overall base closure plan. If there is to be a base closure ceremony, it should be conducted well ahead of the planned closure date with a gradual phasing of the closure.

Property Disposition

The key to understanding how to dispose of U.S. government property is to first classify the type of property as either real property or personal property. Second, if property is personal property, then determine the type. Not all types of personal property can be disposed of in the same manner. Once the type of personal property has been identified, determine the correct statutory authorities, regulatory guidance, and Department of Defense policies applicable to that type of personal property.

The identification, accounting, disposition, and final transfer of real property and excess personal property comprise a large portion of the time and process required for the responsible transition of facilities and areas to the HN. This process needs to begin as early as possible and progress until final transfer. Property distribution starts with inventory, so the base mayor gains visibility of what is on hand. Then the property will be accounted for to receive final disposition. The majority of property on transitioning bases will receive disposition through the Foreign Excess Personal

Property Process. This process may end with the approved transfer of real and personal property to the HN in conjunction with final base transition. The total value of personal property that military units may transfer in conjunction with the closure or return of a single base is limited to $30 million. Owning units must calculate the value of each piece of personal property based on its depreciated value, not on acquisition cost.

The decision to transfer serviceable equipment to the HN should not be exclusively for the purpose of cost savings or convenience for U.S. Forces. The decision should be based on the HN's needs for the equipment or property. It should also be determined if the HN is, or will be trained on the equipment, if it is capable of servicing the equipment, and if it will have access to replacement parts. Transferring property to the HN, when it cannot operate or maintain it, could jeopardize the public's sense of legitimacy toward the government and hinder a smooth transition.

Authorities and commerce restrictions must also be considered and planned. In Iraq for example, there were 1,000 up-armored trucks that were to be transferred to the government of Iraq. It was determined that because of the up-armor, they were restricted items according to the U.S. Department of Commerce and either had to be shipped back to the U.S. or have the armor removed before turning them over to the government of Iraq. Both options were going to be very expensive but it was determined that U.S. Congress could grant approval to leave the trucks; however, this process took over nine months to get approved.

Property disposition may become complicated during transition periods, especially with security forces engaged or conducting missions that may have difficulty in complying with property disposal and turn-in timelines. Other units may be reluctant to turn in equipment until the last minute, creating a burden on the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate. Transition planning must address this situation and explore ways to maintain security while maintaining accountability of property during non-permissive environments.

Contracting

As the transition process proceeds, the importance of the contracting office will increase proportionately. Some actions the contracting office might be expected to take are:

- Identify critical services and decreasing requirements. Non-critical service portions of base life support contracts will require reduction throughout the transition process in order to allow the contractor's personnel adequate time to demobilize.

- Determine disposition of contractor managed government owned and contractor acquired government owned equipment. Numerous regulations many prohibit such assets from being directly transferred to the HN.
- Contract officer representatives should identify and evaluate all of the existing contracts. Requirement owners should assess the scope of their requirement, ensure it is properly aligned to the contract, and coordinate with the contracting agency to properly de-scope according to reduction plans.
- Determine requirements for new contracts and task orders. Prepare new contracts as required.
- Coordinate transition timelines to cessation of contract services to ensure adequate time for the contractor to execute the demobilization plan.
- Determine the status of all contractors in the HN.

All of these actions will require close coordination with the contracting office. The more training or experience the staff has in contracting, the easier the transition.

Land Management/Ownership

Returning property to pre-conflict owners may seem logical and just, but it may involve evicting families or businesses that took occupancy during the conflict, which could cause destabilizing if not carefully planned. Coalition forces, the HN government, and international agencies must plan for property dispute mechanisms, compensation arrangements, and other means to address this issue.

In post-conflict settings, land disputes often appear as a factor that, without due attention and interventions, can endanger peace and stability. Transitioning land at the end of conflict involves more than accountability and environmental issues, it can result in a return to instability unless it is addressed early. Land deeds must be verified to ensure that no one has a claim on the land. In some cases, there may be unexpected claims to land from outsiders. The free-for-all impulse of the war years may continue. Land grabbing is the most common symptom and is difficult to undo. This requires working with the HN to establish the validity of those claims. Give the “property project” the priority it needs — and from the outset. This means ensuring that it is placed high on the peace-making agenda.

Security/Risk

Risk is inherent in transition periods. While end states can be clearly defined, policy-dictated deadlines and operational constraints limit courses of action to mitigate drivers of instability and reacting to miscalculations while transferring responsibility to fragile or immature HN institutions. Planning for base closure, hand-off, or repositioning of U.S. Forces in a non-permissive environment must emphasize operational security and deception. Innovation will be needed to mask or create uncertainty about expected base closure actions, such as release of contract employees, cancellation of services, or other tell tale signs of an impending departure.

Transition is an inherently risky business and it is unlikely to go precisely according to plan. All partners must be prepared to accept that the process can go backwards as well as forwards, with all that it implies, especially in the battle for the narrative at strategic and operational levels.

Monitoring Timelines and Reporting Progress

As well as outlining the conditions for each stage of the transition, the plan must also include the metrics used to measure each condition. These metrics will need to be developed in more detail as they get closer to the point of delivery. It is likely that each condition will have a number of metrics that will be used to measure the conditions. It is to be expected that the measurement of progress will include both objective and subjective metrics. Ideally, there should be more objective measurements because any subjective measurements can be misinterpreted and are subject to personal bias. However, objective metrics can be misleading. For example, the HN may have trained a defined number of security forces in the operations plan, but it may not be equipped or ready to perform the mission. Using the right metrics and interpreting them correctly will provide commanders with an awareness of how far they have progressed towards preparing for the next phase of the transition. Assessments should be rigorous, honest and free of any political pressure to show more progress than what actually exists.

The success of a transition is directly correlated to actions and accomplishments of the HN. The military cannot be successful on its own. It is part of a team made up of HN, U.S. agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other agencies working towards a common goal. A critical criterion to assess is the local government's ability to effectively harness funds, generated from within its borders, and those funds provided from the federal government to improve infrastructure (roads, electricity, etc.) that can attract foreign investment and further develop the HN's infrastructure and ability to deliver essential services to the population. The military may need to request a third-party assessment/analysis team to study the effectiveness of the transition effort (i.e., what success looks like in one year, two years, three years, etc.). The military will not have time to devote the resources to study that issue.

Systematic Information Flow

Transition must be accompanied by a detailed and multifaceted influence campaign that starts well in advance to indicate the rationale for the transfer and to support the establishment of HN institutions and agencies as legitimate, credible entities. Effective communication will help shape the environment and demonstrate the HN government's improving capacity and competence. Expectation management is an important aspect of the overall transition plan:

- Aggressively seek to control the narrative.
- Clearly articulate intentions to U.S. Forces, civilian partners, HN partners and population, regional audiences, and the American public.
- Use specific, clearly defined language to avoid miscommunication.
- Consistently engage HN leadership at strategic/national through tactical/local levels.

Information sharing, using a wide range of traditional and non-traditional entities facilitates a broader understanding of the organizational effectiveness.

Virtual Staff Concept

As forces are drawn down and consolidated to reduce the footprint or comply with force caps, valuable manpower and expertise will be lost. One concept to make up for this loss is to create a reach-back capability or "virtual staff" that is dedicated to supporting the remaining staff in the country. Today's communication and collaboration capabilities make the virtual staff a realistic and reliable concept during stability operations. The virtual staff would be responsible for researching information, preparing reports, and other duties to free up the in-country staff to maintain situational awareness, conduct on-the-ground coordination, and implement the strategy of the commander.

A virtual staff could be a core staff at a central location dedicated to full time support of the deployed forces, or it could be a network of identified personnel with specific expertise or skills from multiple organizations who support the deployed staff in addition to other responsibilities. The virtual staff can provide access to an increased amount of expertise, increased flexibility, and less risk while requiring less logistical effort to deploy, maintain, and move. Staff members in reachback must be well informed with the situation on the ground and preferably includes those who have worked in the HN and in similar positions to which they were supporting.

Reconciliation and Reintegration

Reconciliation is defined as strategic diplomatic efforts by respective leaderships to arrange an overarching political settlement that ends the fighting. The goal of these efforts is to persuade insurgent leaders and groups to terminate their armed resistance and assume a legitimate role in the future of the country.

Political reintegration is the process of the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the country. In Iraq, political reintegration was a particularly important challenge, relating both to the armed forces of the disposed regime and to the Kurdish and Shia militias eager to play a role in the new political system.

Reintegration is an essential part of the counterinsurgency campaign. It is a social and economic process in which ex-combatants return to community life and engage in livelihood alternatives to violence. Reintegration is enabled by local agreements where communities (supported by the government) reach out to insurgents, work to resolve grievances, and encourage them to stop fighting and rejoin their communities peacefully and permanently. Integrating ex-combatants into civilian life gives them a stake in the peace and reduces the likelihood that they will turn to insurgent or criminal activity to support themselves if they cannot find gainful employment. It is important to have a reintegration in place early so that when the time is right, it can provide an effective exit from conflict for those who are willing to take it. An effective reintegration program brings lasting reintegration through three stages:

1. Social Outreach.
    - Strategic communications.
    - Negotiation and grievance resolution.
    - Sub-national governance and outreach.
    - Detainee release.

2. Demobilization.
   - ○ Vetting, registration (intent form, survey, biometrics).
   - ○ Weapons management and community security.
   - ○ Transition assistance and disengagement training.
3. Consolidation of peace and community recovery.
   - ○ Community and district small grants.
   - ○ Agriculture, infrastructure, and demining programs.
   - ○ Literacy, religious, and vocational education and training.

It may be difficult to get communities to accept ex-combatants, especially perpetrators of atrocities. Most will have little to offer by way of education, employment, or training. Successful reintegration depends on the support of communities, families, local leaders, women, and youth groups. Encourage these groups to get involved in planning for the return of ex-combatants. Implement a strong public information campaign to spread awareness about the goals of reintegration.

Arbitration Process

Establishing a sustainable arbitration process is one of the most important items that a commander can do for the local population to ensure that U.S. efforts are carried on after his forces withdraw. Up until this point, any solutions to disputes between various factions have been built around U.S. involvement. An effective arbitration process must be something that will work without U.S. involvement and be culturally acceptable to the HN, the local tribes, or factions. A sustainable arbitration process establishes and strengthens political and social institutions for the peaceful resolution of disputes and enables successful transition.

Endnotes

1. Dubik, LTG James M. (Retired). (May 2012). *Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside*. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Report 5, Institute for the Study of War.

2. United States Forces–Afghanistan. (January 2012). *Base Transition Smartbook*.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Transition is a shared responsibility and collaborative act among the supporting nations and organizations as well as the host nation government. Transition at any level or in any area always involves the transfer of responsibility, authority, power (capabilities, resources, and influence), and accountability. The better the transfer is integrated and negotiated at the various levels and among the various internal and external actors, the higher the probability of a successful transition. Failure to adequately plan and resource strategic and operational transitions will endanger the accomplishment of the overall mission.

Remember that you will not be able to solve all the problems before you leave. Some problems may have existed long before you arrived and will still not be resolved when you leave. This is difficult for some military and political leaders to accept, but the reality of solving problems that have existed for hundreds of years is not always feasible and not necessarily in our best interest. The goal of any transition should be the peaceful and prosperous stability within the host nation and in that state's relationships within the international order.

Appendix A

Top Ten Transition Lessons Learned

Guidance

Observation: Clear strategic guidance with frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners is needed to maintain synchronization.

Discussion:

- Understanding the long-term goals, timelines, troop levels, and other political dynamics becomes critical information for conducting transition planning.
- In most cases, the conditions that would influence decisions are political and we may be forced to execute a transition before the conditions are known or established. This requires commanders to develop plans with multiple options and limited information.
- Strategic framework agreements should establish long-term strategic relationship between the U.S. and the host nation (HN) in the areas of diplomacy, economics, energy, security, and rule of law.

Recommendation: Planners must incorporate guidance from the administration, Congress, and the Pentagon into the transition plan. Key leaders need to be as senior as possible and capable of independently picking up the phone and calling the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, or other defense agencies to push issues through the bureaucracy when needed.

Engaging Strategic Partners

Observation: Early and continuous engagement with key strategic partners will maximize integration and synchronization and develop a sense of ownership of the transition process.

Discussion:

- Strong partnerships among government, military, and nongovernmental organizations are imperative in today's post-conflict civilian transitions.
- Understand that we are often dealing with people who do not have the same kind of planning background or culture that we are accustomed to in the Armed Forces.

- The senior military commander and ambassador agreed early on that they would do everything physically possible to demonstrate to their subordinates that they were a team and needed to reward teamwork and discourage activities that went against it.
- Because each transition may be unique and does not have a textbook solution, many of the details will consist of ad hoc solutions and require patience and understanding from all the players.

Recommendation: Every effort should be made to include other U.S. agencies, nongovernmental organizations, senior contractor representatives, and multinational players in the entire planning process.

Flexible Planning

Observation: Early in the drawdown, the commander needs to have as many options available to build flexibility into the plan.

Discussion:

Transition operations will present a very complex and challenging environment that will test the adaptability and agility of our forces.

- Lay out the options in a macro sense for the commander and explain in detail where the key decision points are for each.
- Subordinate commanders must avoid making decisions that could inadvertently take an option away from senior commanders.
- One of the most important items to remember in transition planning is to focus on the end state and understand the essence of the problem.

Recommendation: The transition must be well planned, seamless, and deliberate to avoid gaps or disruption of the overall stabilization process. Having multiple options that you can offer to the Commander in Chief and to the Secretary of Defense is absolutely essential to transition.

Synchronization of Staff and Command Activities

Observation: Maintaining synchronization of staff and command activities during transition planning/operations becomes challenging.

Discussion:

- Conducting a handoff with the incoming staff during a transition period can be extremely difficult.

- It is critical to ensure communications, command, and control exists during transition. One of the first tasks that needs to be planned for during transition is maintaining functionality of mission command networks and systems.
- Turning senior-level commander's intent and goals into actions at the tactical level is difficult; subordinate commanders must translate higher headquarters' intent into actions.

Recommendation: Conduct weekly or monthly synchronization sessions or rehearsal of concept drills to visually show the transition over the next 30 to 60 days. As the transition process gets closer to the target completion date, it may be necessary to conduct rehearsal of concept drills with representatives from all commands to synchronize actions and to ensure a smooth and responsible conclusion to the transition.

Situational Awareness

Observation: Loss of situational awareness occurs as resources are transferred and/or retrograded.

Discussion:

- Maintaining situational awareness, despite reduced resources and decreasing access resulting from the drawdown of U.S. Forces will require innovative approaches.
- Good decisions cannot be made unless there is good information and facts that can be separated from opinion and speculation.
- Partnerships and personal relationships are crucial to retain necessary influence and enable continued progress in building the HN's capacity.
- As transition progresses and the indigenous government gains strength and confidence, so will the ability to influence its decline.

Recommendation: Undertake planning steps and resource investments early so that as the traditional types of military intelligence are reduced, a nontraditional and local information capability can make up for some of the reductions of capability.

Understanding Post-Transition Environment

Observation: The end of named operations present unique challenges for stay-behind forces, such as different U.S. authorities, HN agreements, national caveats, and U.N. resolutions.

Discussion:

- U.S. Authorities — Title 10 versus Title 22 creates a mismatch between security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA) that may limit military-to-military contact, use of military training teams, and resources.
- HN agreements address land use agreements, force protection, passport/visa requirements, air and ground movement, and foreign military sales.
- National caveats may limit deployment areas and types of missions for particular national contingents or impose other criteria that reduce the effectiveness or flexibility and present additional challenges as coalition forces are withdrawn and responsibilities are transitioned to the HN.
- U.N. resolutions — as functions transition to an international organization and responsibilities are given up, there will also be a loss of influence.

Recommendation: Resolve the doctrine and authorities mismatch that exists in the SC/SA organizations. Formalize follow-on security and status of forces agreements to clarify and stabilize HN support for day-to-day operations and boost long-term relationship building.

Population Confidence

Observation: The transition should be deliberate when building the HN capacity and confidence so that the HN government is ready to assume all the responsibilities involved with providing a secure and prosperous environment.

Discussion:

- The transition process should enable the HN to continue with security, rule of law, economic, and other governmental programs that will provide the cornerstone of a stable government.
- Often, the HN does not accept or take seriously the fact that coalition forces will be leaving. As a result, the HN fails to adequately prepare for its part of the transition.
- U.S. influence diminishes once the transfer of responsibilities has taken place.
- The lessons that the HN and its security forces have learned from the U.S. will only be apparent after an examination is done to determine what they chose to retain, discard, or transform.

Recommendation: Effective communication will help shape the environment and demonstrate the HN government's improving capacity and competence.

Transitioning Functions to the Host Nation

Observation: As the transition efforts progress toward the HN's self sufficiency, it is imperative that post-conflict interdependencies do not unravel and military capacity building efforts are not lost.

Discussion:

- If the government can provide security but not basic services, then the insurgency still has a chance at manipulating the population against the government.
- The HN government must have a budget and the capability to use it, be able to assess the need for essential services, have the ability to manage contracts to establish those services, and develop departments to sustain them.
- If a function is the most important task that we are doing and will continue after we are gone, then that should be the first task that should be transitioned. This will allow the HN to take charge of running the function while the U.S. Forces are still in a position to provide oversight.

Recommendation: Transition the critical tasks first; this allows commanders to oversee and support the HN while manpower, time, and resources remain and enable the U.S. to step back in and regain control if the situation dictates.

Enablers

Observation: As the footprint is reduced, maintaining adequate security and medical support for remaining forces is non-negotiable.

Discussion:

- When the military transitions tasks and responsibilities to civilian agencies, there may be certain tasks that are unique to the military and may be lost or severely diminished.
- Some functions that must be planned for during transition operations are:
    - Recovering killed and wounded personnel.
    - Recovering damaged vehicles.

- ○ Recovering downed aircraft.
- ○ Clearing travel routes.
- ○ Operations center monitoring of private security contractors.
- ○ Convoy security.
- ○ Explosive ordnance disposal.
- ○ Counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) notification.
- ○ Counter-battery neutralization response.
- ○ Communications support.
- ○ Tactical operations center dispatch of armed response teams.
- ○ Maintaining electronic countermeasures, threat intelligence, and technology capabilities.

Recommendation: Ensure that sufficient enablers are coordinated to support stay-behind forces.

Equipment and Bases

Observation: The retrograde of equipment and transfer of bases must be fully nested with the overall ground tactical plan.

Discussion:

- Retrograde is an operational maneuver and not a separate logistics operation.
- HN officials were not always notified or prepared to conduct the transfer and occupation of equipment and bases at the critical point of transfer.

Recommendation: Establish an Equipment Drawdown Synchronization Board to determine what units and equipment will be leaving, what is in the Redistribution Property Assistant Team yards, and what the priority is for equipment flowing out. Identify excess equipment early and follow disposition instructions to remove property. Establish clear communications with the gaining HN agency or commander to avoid misunderstanding or distrust at the critical point of transfer.

Appendix B

Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

___Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

___Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?

___Who will fund the transition?

___What is the new mission?

___What U.S. Forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?

___What will be the command relationship for U.S. Forces that remain behind?

___What will be the communications requirements for U.S. Forces that remain behind?

___Who will support U.S. Forces that remain behind?

___Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?

___Will new rules of engagement be established?

___Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?

___Will the U.S. be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or organization?

___Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the joint force?

___What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?

___Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?

___How will the turnover be accomplished?

___Who will handle public affairs for the transition?

___Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the U. S. Transportation Command?

___What is the best way to task organize for transition operations?

Appendix C

Sample Transition Battle Rhythm

This is a sample meeting rhythm that was used by senior leaders in Iraq.

Daily

Multi-National Force–Iraq's (MNF–I) morning battle update followed by two smaller group sessions with senior civilian and military leaders.

Weekly

- Battlefield circulations. Some visits were scheduled, while others were coordinated at the last minute. Most involved visiting one or more of the 70 plus locations where the Iraqi Security Forces trained. Other visits included locations where the Iraqis and coalition forces were fighting to see the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces firsthand. Many also involved visits to coalition forces to get their assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces operating in their sectors. Still other visits were to U.S. Forces with whom I had served before or who were commanded by officers who had been in one of my commands. Some visits were conducted over multiple days, but others lasted only hours.

- Meetings with Iraq's Chief of Defense, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Interior (these meetings were commonly in each official's office, but they were sometimes in their homes or in conjunction with visits to Iraqi military or police in the field).

- Iraqi Security Force budget and program review for all force generation and force replenishment programs. These included review of Foreign Military Sales cases, equipment purchases not made through the Foreign Military Sales program, and all major construction projects.

- The Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq's update to the commanding general, MNF–I. The subject of this weekly meeting rotated. The first week concerned the development of the Iraqi military forces; the second, the Iraqi police forces; the third, Iraqi Intelligence and Special Operations Forces; and the fourth week, a special topic of the commanding general's interest.

- Private meeting with the commanding general, Multi-National Corps–Iraq.

- The commanding general, MNF–I's Board of Directors meeting. This meeting included all major subordinate commanders and principal staff officers.

- Iraqi Ministerial Council for National Security. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chaired this meeting, and his national security advisor and principal ministers associated with national security attended, as well as the U.S. Ambassador.
- The U.S. Ambassador's security core group. This meeting was held in the ambassador's office, and a very small group attended.
- Engagement or discussion with groups visiting Iraq — Congressional, media, academic, think tank, or some combination thereof.

Monthly

- Meeting with the NATO Training Mission–Iraq's (NTM–I) deputy commander and staff. Sometimes we met at the NTM–I headquarters in Baghdad and other times at one of the training sites for which NTM–I was responsible.
- Secure video conference on engagement and reconciliation. This video conference was internal to Iraq but included nodes from throughout the country. Often it did include nodes within the U.S.
- Meeting with Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq's general and flag officers and senior executives. This was a private, executive level discussion of what the command was doing, what was working, what was not, and how we should adapt.
- Secure video conference with the NATO command responsible for Iraq. This command was headquartered in Naples, Italy.
- Budget execution briefings. There were three of these briefings: one with the comptroller, Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq; a second with the command's budget review board; and a third with the command's subordinate leaders and staff.
- Senior leaders of Multi-National Corps–Iraq and Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq.
- Update to the minister-counselor for political-military affairs, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad. This was scheduled monthly, but given the constant interchange among senior leaders, we often met more frequently.

Bimonthly

- MNF–I's commander's conference. The senior military commanders and senior embassy leaders attended these meetings, which centered on the discussion of best practices.

- Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Board.
- Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq's "all hands" brief. This was a personal update brief from the commanding general to the members of the command. It was broadcast live and posted on the command's internal web portal for asynchronous viewing. Its agenda included a status update, a description of where the command had progressed, and a discussion of obstacles faced and what we were trying to do to deal with these obstacles. It also included a question-and-answer period.

Quarterly

- Social event with senior Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq leaders, selected leaders from the embassy, other coalition commands, senior leaders from the Iraqi Joint Force Headquarters, and the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior.
- Review of ministerial development in the Ministries of Defense and Interior. This was first conducted with each minister, then with the commanding general, MNF–I.
- Dinner with the Multi-National Security and Transition Command–Iraq's command sergeant major and selected soldiers and noncommissioned officers. This was a formal program of recognition, but the command sergeant major and I often ate with soldiers and junior leaders informally.
- Update or visit with the prime minister and appropriate representative from the U.S. Embassy and Iraqi Ministry. Similar to other meetings, these were scheduled quarterly, but they often occurred more frequently.
- Luncheon with NATO ambassadors.[1]

Endnote

1. Dubik, LTG James M. (Retired). (May 2012). *Operational Art in Counterinsurgency: A View from the Inside*. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, Report 5, Institute for the Study of War.

Appendix D

Practical Considerations of Title 10 and Title 22 of Security Forces Assistance Activities

Observation and Background

Before planning begins, planners should have an understanding of the resources available to the combatant command (CCMD) to support the implementation of the theater campaign plan. One of the main objectives of the theater campaign planning construct is to provide a framework for the combatant commanders (CCDRs) to identify and articulate resource requirements so they can execute the steady state activities needed to implement their theater strategy. A thorough understanding of the types and quantities of resources available should inform, but not constrain, mission analysis and concept design (*Theater Campaign Planning Planners' Handbook*, February 2012).

When planning for security force assistance (SFA) activities, the planner must bear in mind that there are differences in Title 10 and Title 22 funding. These objectives and requirements will not provide an all-inclusive list of the differences but will discuss the following: purpose, time, and funding authority.

Insights and Discussion

Most fiscal issues concerning the funding of "operations" will follow the traditional purpose-time-amount analysis. Primarily, this is an in-depth analysis of the "purpose" prong with special emphasis on contingency operations and funding foreign militaries, foreign governments, and other entities not traditionally funded by the military departments (Operational and Maintenance Funds, *2012 Fiscal Law Deskbook*).

Purpose:

"A good idea without funding is just a good idea and a good idea without the right kind of funding is illegal" (*U.S. Marine Corps SC Handbook*).

The key point is that appropriated funds of any type can only be used for the purposes intended. Framing the "purpose" therefore impacts what funding may be used.

Security assistance (SA) is a group of programs, authorized under Title 22 authorities, by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease in furtherance of national policies and objectives. All SA programs are subject to the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State to best serve U.S. foreign policy interests. However, programs are variously administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) or Department of State (DOS) (*2012 Fiscal Law Deskbook*).

Generally, DOD may only obligate appropriated Operational and Maintenance and Procurement Funds when the primary purpose is to benefit the U.S. Military directly. The DOD may only conduct foreign assistance under the following two exceptions: (1) Little "t" training and (2) specific appropriation or authorization from Congress for the DOD to conduct foreign assistance (*2012 Fiscal Law Deskbook*).

The Honorable Bill Alexander provided that: "[M]inor amounts of interoperability and safety instruction [do] not constitute "training" as that term is used in the context of security assistance, and could therefore be financed with Operational and Maintenance appropriations (*2012 Fiscal Law Deskbook*).

Examples from the *2012 Fiscal Law Deskbook* on the difference between little "t" and big "T" training follows:

A. Little "t" training: A two-hour block of safety instruction on C-130 entry and egress for already airborne qualified foreign troops who are participating in a one month combined airborne parachute exercise. The training is of short duration, the cost is low, and the level of training is not significantly enhanced for trainees because they are already airborne qualified. The exercise is funded with DOD Operational and Maintenance Funds.

B. Big "T" training: Training foreign troops to become airborne qualified during a one month airborne school. The duration of the training is long, the cost is likely significant, and most importantly, the level of training of the foreign troops is significantly increased. The training is funded with DOS appropriations/authorizations because this is security assistance training, unless the DOD has separate authority to conduct this training approved by Congress.

Another difference between Title 10 and Title 22 funding to consider is time:

There are two considerations for time: (1) the time allowed to use the funding and (2) the time it takes to arrange to receive the funding.

The annual DOD Appropriations Act typically contains the following provision: "No part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall remain available for obligation beyond the current fiscal year, unless expressly so provide herein." See DOD Appropriations Act, 2011, Publication L. No. 112-10, 8003, 125 Stat. 38, 55.

Basically, Title 10 funding is typically yearly unlike Title 22 SA funding. However, Title 10 funding tends to be more flexible, which allows funding to be scheduled faster than Title 22 funding.

As stated in the Secretary of Defense Memo, "DOD Review of Building the Security Capacity of Partner Nations", Jun 18, 2009: "Traditional security assistance authorities are plagued by shortfalls in funding, earmarks that impede flexibility, and cumbersome processes that create a lag-time from concept to execution of three to four years or more."

The knowledge of how timing impacts funding is very important because as stated in the *Theater Campaign Planning Planners' Handbook*, February 2012: "If resource availability is highly constrained in the near-term, the scope of Theater Campaign Plan objectives and activities will likely have to be limited. In the mid- and long-term, planners have greater latitude in identifying activities that require additional resources because those resources can be requested. Thus, Theater Campaign Plans and Country Plans can influence force allocation, authorities, funding, posture, and other resources toward future combatant command activities and meeting overall theater strategic end states."

Lastly, it is important to note the difference in Funding Authority between Title 10 and Title 22:

Funding Authority: The Funding Authority is the organization that controls and oversees management of funds for the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) program. When BCP program funding is provided by a DOD appropriation, one of the military departments, as in the case of the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, or the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, policy will serve as the Funding Authority. Non-DOD agencies serve as the funding authority for appropriations they provide to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. *E-Security Assistance Management Manual*, http://www.dsca.mil/ESAMM/C15/15..htm.

Under the Federal Aviation Administration, Arms Export Control Act and Executive Order 11958, the Secretary of State is responsible for continuous supervision and general direction of SA programs. This includes determining whether and when there will be a program or sale for a particular country or activity (to include international military education and training) and, if so, its size and scope. It also includes the determination of budget requests and allocation of funds for military assistance.

Some visibility on planned activities (especially in the FY+3 timeframe) can help inform DOS planning and resource allocation processes (*Theater Campaign Planning Planners' Handbook*, February 2012).

Annual levels of a given resource are, in some cases, established independent of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls plans, but may be apportioned among the committee's programs based on its priorities, relative expected benefit, or other factors. This is particularly true of resources funded through public law or through agencies outside of the DOD such as the DOS (*Fiscal Year 2012 U.S. European Command Theater Security Cooperation Handbook*).

Other funding sources, notable the Service Components' Operational and Maintenance accounts contribute to the execution of many activities in the security cooperation portfolio but are difficult to estimate in advance or attribute to these activities after the fact (*Fiscal Year 2012 U.S. European Command Theater Security Cooperation Handbook*).

Recommendation:

Planners should leverage and integrate the expertise and functions of the staff (e.g., the staff judge advocate, G8, G4, etc.) to coordinate the planning for funding SFA.

Look at what the others are doing. For example, a review of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) demonstrates it uses both Title 10 and Title 22 to fund SFA across its theater campaign plan and country plans.

In addition to traditional contingency operations, the U.S. Military implements a number of efforts aimed at increasing African militaries' capacities to provide security and stability for their own countries and the region as a whole. Several of these DOD-implemented initiatives are part of foreign military assistance programs funded by the State Department that "help to promote the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law." In addition to providing funding, the State Department gives overall guidance and direction for the programs. The U.S. Military also occasionally provides advisors to peacekeeping missions on the continent; U.S. Military advisors from Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa have assisted peacekeepers deployed to Sudan and Somalia. U.S. Forces routinely conduct a variety of bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with African militaries through such programs as the Joint Combined Exchange Training. U.S. Forces also conduct joint exercises as part of disaster assistance and maritime security training (Lauren Ploch, Congressional Research Service, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," July 22, 2011).

U.S. AFRICOM stated that it had access to 15 different funding sources to fund its activities in fiscal year 2009. In addition, U.S. AFRICOM reported that it influences other State and U.S. Agency for International Development funding sources — such as funds for State's Global Peacekeeping and Operations Initiative and international military education and training, and U.S. Agency for International Development's Pandemic Response Program — but these funding sources are not managed by the command (Government Accountability Office Report 10-794, "Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa," Jul 2010).

Appendix E

Terms and Abbreviations

corrective action plan (CAP): The plan generated by the environmental control officer and the Boss Operations Support–Integrator after the initial Environmental Site Closure Survey (ESCS) and subsequent ESCSs, as necessary, that detail the cleanup process necessary to correct any environmental issues identified.

contractor managed government owned (CMGO): U.S. government owned property managed by the contractor during the execution of its contract. CMGO includes government furnished equipment (GFE) provided by the government to the contractor to perform his duties, and contractor acquired property, purchased by the contractor with U.S. government funds to execute the contract; this is also called contractor acquired government owned (CAGO) property.

contracting officer representative (COR): An individual designated and authorized in writing by the contracting officer to perform specific technical or administrative function on contracts or orders.

central receiving and shipping point (CRSP): Provides checks and balances for managing mass cargo flowing into theater.

end state: The broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation.

environmental site closure survey (ESCS): A process that identifies a base's environmental areas of concern within a base footprint.

foreign excess personal property (FEPP): Any U.S. owned personal property determined to be excess and no longer required by the owning Department of Defense activity that is located outside the U.S., American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Virgin Islands.

foreign excess real property (FERP): Any U.S. owned excess real property located outside the U.S., American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Virgin Islands. When the Department of Defense ceases contingency operations in the area and no longer needs the property for use, the property becomes excess.

foreign military sales (FMS): That part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal agreements between the U.S. government and an authorized foreign purchaser or international organization.

knowledge management (KM): A strategic approach to achieving defense objectives by leveraging the value of collective knowledge through the processes of creating, gathering, organizing, sharing and transferring knowledge into action. It requires processes that are robust and reliable within operational contexts, content and intellectual assets that are focused, precise, reliable, with suitable levels of recall, and knowledge creation and conversion processes that match the pace of operations.

nongovernmental organization (NGO): National or multi-national organizations of private citizens active in the area of interest. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, religious groups, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in supporting humanitarian assistance activities.

permissive environment: Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

non-permissive environment: One in which some level of lawlessness or heightened risk is assumed due to a breakdown in host country military and law enforcement capability.

reconciliation: The process of bringing two or more opposing groups to agreeable terms for future cooperation.

reconstruction: The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure to create the foundation for long-term development.

reintegration: The process of the transformation of armed groups into political actors willing to participate peacefully in the political future of the country.

Retrograde Property Assistance Team (RPAT): They normally operate in yards in the vicinity of CRSP. Property is turned in to the RPAT via a supply transaction and the item is removed from the losing unit's accountable record. Army Material Command then has the ability to distribute the equipment in a manner that is in accordance with defense acquisition fielding guidance, shortages, or operational needs statement requirements.

security assistance: A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

security cooperation: All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. They are designed to support a combatant commander's theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan.

security force assistance: The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

stabilization: The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.

strategic communication: The focused U.S. government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.

transition: A multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms.

Appendix F

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