December 2009

Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats

HANDBOOK

U.S. Joint Forces Command

U.S. Special Operations Command

U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Handbook

December 2009

Prepared for:

U.S. Joint Forces Command
U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

Prepared by:

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
11100 Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel, MD 20723-6099

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIGURES AND TABLES

"The way a team plays as a whole determines its success. You may have the greatest bunch of individual stars in the world, but if they don't play together, the club won't be worth a dime."

—Babe Ruth

CHAPTER 1.0 About This Handbook

1.1 What This Handbook Is

If you have picked up this handbook, or had it handed to you, you are likely an interagency team leader or team member or a military commander or civilian leader with the responsibility for setting up an interagency team. If this is your first exposure to working with the interagency, it can be a daunting prospect. This handbook is intended to provide you with a basic understanding of the interagency environment as well as insights and best practices that your team can put to use to counter irregular threats in the field or at operational level.

For the purposes of this handbook, "irregular threat" operations, both domestic and international, have been categorized into 10 broad areas:

- Counter Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
- Counternarcotics
- Counter-Threat Finance
- Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS)
- Unconventional Warfare (UW)
- Counterterrorism
- Counter Cyberwarfare
- Counterinsurgency (COIN)
- Counter-Piracy

In addition to these threats, strategic communications are beginning to emerge as a concern. Although security, stabilization, nation-building, and related efforts are not explicitly listed, these activities are integral parts of the approach to countering an irregular threat such as an insurgency.

This handbook describes ways for you and your team to effectively engage, develop, and sustain partnerships with each other. The intent is to raise awareness of some of the issues that must be addressed in such interagency teams. The handbook includes an overview of the challenges to interagency teaming, suggests best practices gleaned from research in interagency teaming as well as from the broader fields of cross-cultural communications and organizational change; and provides resources for further study. The companion CD includes a hyperlinked version of this handbook and provides copies of a small library of relevant open-source references.

To enhance readability among a diverse audience, every effort has been made to keep this handbook as free of jargon and acronyms as is reasonably possible. The acronyms that have been used are defined in Appendix A, and Appendix B provides a glossary of some of the phrases and concepts used in this handbook. As a general rule, U.S. government departments will be referred to in this handbook by their short names (e.g., Defense, State, Justice, Homeland Security) and agencies will be referred to by their acronyms (e.g., FBI, CBP).

1.2 What This Handbook Is Not

Much has been written over the past few years on the need to change the interagency structure at the U.S. national level. This handbook does not address those strategic issues other than to provide an overview for the reader not already familiar with the significant challenges that exist. In addition, clearly, this small handbook cannot hope to include all of the information about the interagency team that you might need to know, such as detailed checklists, assessment tools, lesson plans, or an exhaustive discussion and critique of historical interagency case studies.

Because the focus is on the teaming process itself, this handbook also does not address the fundamental issues associated with successfully

countering irregular threats, nor does it provide detailed guidance on such "nuts and bolts" issues as contracting and program management that also are of crucial importance to the interagency team. However, the references and companion CD do provide some additional resources for the interested reader.

This handbook does not provide a template or cookie-cutter approach to forming interagency teams. No such template exists. Rather, this handbook offers some considerations for the stakeholder to determine what the team should look like based on the mission at hand. For example, some teams will be civilian-led and others will be military-led, and they may shift between the two based on the situation. Some teams will be physically co-located, while others will be virtual in nature, or a hybrid of the two.

1.3 About This Effort

In March and May 2009, representatives from a number of departments and agencies came together to discuss problem areas and shortcomings in interagency teaming, and they agreed to explore potential steps that the interagency community could take to bridge these gaps and improve communication and information sharing. The group concluded that a handbook produced for wide U.S. government dissemination would be a useful tool for initiatives to counter irregular threats, and they outlined the key characteristics of the handbook.[1]

Research for this handbook was accomplished by a team at The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) through an online survey, interviews, site visits, and a literature review, all conducted between August and October 2009. The research team is indebted to the people and organizations who provided the vision, content, and sponsorship to make this handbook possible:

- LTC Tina Schweiss (U.S. Joint Forces Command);
- COL Fred Krawchuk (U.S. Special Operations Command); and
- Mark Hreczuck, Randy Brumit, and J. D. Zumwalt (U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group);

and to the many survey participants and interviewees who generously shared their insights and suggestions.

"It takes a network to defeat a network."

—BG Mark Kimmitt

CHAPTER 2.0 Background

2.1 Need for Interagency Teaming

The author of a recent study by the RAND Corporation on interagency teaming observed that, "Today, we face the problems of terrorism, drug smuggling, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trade issues, and other concerns that demand better integration of the instruments of national power . . . The actions of the interagency actors have become key elements of planning and selecting policy options in the international and domestic arenas."[2]

Recent history has demonstrated that the Department of Defense is not the most appropriate instrument of such non-military aspects of national power as diplomacy, economic power, or law enforcement. When an operation or conflict necessitates application of these tools, the department or agency with the appropriate mission and expertise must be brought in. For example, domestic homeland defense operations entail coordination among Defense, Homeland Security, state and local governments, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies at all levels. Overseas irregular warfare operations require coordination among Defense, State, the Intelligence Community (IC), and other federal agencies (e.g., Justice, Treasury, Commerce, or Agriculture).

Even in operations for which Defense is clearly in the lead, such as some of those described in this handbook, "the warrior will likely work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities . . . These include strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, security assistance, environmental security, human rights, democratization, civil–military relations, arms control, intelligence, war planning and termination strategy, command and control of forces, continuity of

Figure 1. DIMEFIL Elements of National Power.

government, post-conflict reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, noncombatant evacuations, and homeland defense."[3]

In order to be effective, the instruments of national power (e.g., Figure 1) must be properly coordinated and deconflicted. "Most of the important opportunities for effectively integrating the diverse instruments of U.S. and coalition power and influence are found in the theater and in the field," noted the author of a recent study of best practices:

> In particular, it is at this level where the relationship between the kinetic aspects of an operation and the nonmilitary (or noncombat) aspects most need to be related to one another, where trade-offs must be made, and where differences in priorities and activities need to be resolved (or at least deconflicted). In a combat zone, there needs to be the closest collaboration regarding the conduct of military operations against the opponent, the provision of security for noncombat and especially civilian activities, the role that civilian activities play both in facilitating military success and the success of the overall mission, and the way in which all these tasks can be melded into an effective whole that can secure overall objectives. This is also the level at which personnel coming from outside the zone of conflict are

> most likely to be able to learn about local conditions, cultures, and the requirements of the affected population; it is also the level at which the greatest sensitivities need to be shown to local customs, attitudes, and outlook: The effort to win hearts and minds involves avoiding error and insensitivity as well as building on possibilities in personal interaction.[4]

To be most effective, interagency efforts must be linked across geography, across strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and across both long- and short-term objectives.

- Vertical integration across geographic boundaries prevents the focus at one level from impeding efforts at other levels (e.g., province vs. district).[5]
- Coordination across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning "can help facilitate a mutual understanding of the overall contributions, capabilities, and capacity of each organization,"[6] as well as a coherent application of effort.
- Coordination across the initial response (short-term) and transformation (mid-term) and fostering sustainability (long-term) prevents wasted effort and ensures a sustainable strategy.[7]

If done well, this linkage can effectively synchronize all aspects of national power: "Each interorganizational partner brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, expertise, and skills to the task of coordination . . . This diversity can be made into an asset through a collective forum and process that considers the many views, capabilities, and options."[8]

2.2 Definitions

This handbook will use the official Department of Defense definition of **interagency**: "United States government agencies and departments, including Defense."[9] (Note that this definition of interagency also includes the IC.) For the purposes of this handbook the word interagency will be used synonymously with the term "whole of government." Although these two terms do not include such entities as state and local governments, host or partner nations, intergovern-

mental groups [e.g., United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)], nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; e.g., Red Crescent, Oxfam), or private contractors, those organizations possess critical capabilities, and this handbook will not ignore the importance of their participation. The phrase "interagency team" will be used broadly to include these groups wherever appropriate.

Beyond the official, and rather obvious, Defense definition of the term **interagency coordination** ("Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged U.S. government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective."),[10] the term will be used to describe two or more agencies working in concert to support national interests.[11]

Although, officially, the U.S. government is organized into a hierarchy, arguably the "real" interagency organization is the network shown in Figure 2. Under the President, the National Security Council (NSC) is responsible for managing the interagency process with respect to national security-related issues. The NSC Principals Committee is the senior agency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.[12] However, in terms of the day-to-day functioning of your team, the "interagency process" will be as good or bad as you and your teammates make it. "What clearly emerges from the various case studies is an [interagency process] that has no recognized leadership below the [President]," summed up one observer. "The NSC, with its small staff, expert in a broad range of security issues, has neither the authority nor capacity to compel action."[13]

Additional terms used in this handbook that are associated with interagency coordination are defined in Appendix B.

2.3 Key Functions of an Interagency Team

The May 2009 Interagency Workshop at JHU/APL identified the following key functions of the interagency team:

- Share information across agencies and actors
- Leverage resources, skill sets, and expertise

Figure 2. The Interagency "Network."[14]

- Coordinate and collaborate
- Distill issues for elevation to senior leaders
- Facilitate action
- Operationalize policy

This handbook will help the interagency practitioner to better understand these functions, to understand some of the challenges and potential pitfalls associated with the interagency process, and to apply tools and best practices to improve the performance of the team.

2.4 Types of Teams

There are almost as many names for interagency teams as there are missions for the interagency. Team titles include interagency task forces (IATF) or joint interagency task forces (JIATF), country teams, provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), civil–military operations centers (CMOCs), and many others.

The Executive Branch of the U.S. government has significant power in coordinating operations across U.S. government agencies. The National Security Council (NSC), established by the National Security Act (1947) and its amendments (1949), is among the top-level coordinating entities, with representatives from Defense, State, the IC, and the Executive Office of the President, along with representatives from other civilian agencies, as appropriate.[15]

In foreign affairs, the U.S. government is represented overseas by an ambassador appointed by the President. The ambassador leads the country team, with members from State and other departments, including Defense, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture or others, depending on the country and/or intentions of the United States. There also are mechanisms for other departments or agencies to set up working groups in countries when they have a significant role. For instance, Defense may set up a CMOC in a country where it is conducting stability operations. Such a center may act in many capacities to fulfill civilian needs as part of a military operation.[16]

The Executive Branch uses instruments such as Presidential Directives to organize the resources of the United States across departments and agencies. As an example, Presidential Decision Directive 14 created the Joint Interagency Task Force–East (JIATF-East), the precursor to JIATF-South. Likewise, departments and agencies under the Executive Branch may issue directives that similarly define missions and/or limits on missions that lie across multiple agencies.[17]

Your team may be formally designated or informally self-organized. In the words of a participant in the May 2009 Interagency Workshop, an informal team can "build momentum towards more formal 'authorized' actions." However, warned this participant, a problem can result

> if the informal gets out in front of the formal definition as it commits to a course too soon or closes options before they had a chance to be considered because the fuller set of resources were not yet available . . . Now the question is how to share what is being learned, seen, and concluded without being seen as condescending or making those in senior levels of the formal organizations wrong. There is an art to functioning well in the

> world of informal because you are always in relation to the formal. It is the basic tension between the core and periphery, and what is needed is a healthy relationship between the two.[18]

Informal teams do not always have a recognized or designated lead agency, a reality that many team members—particularly those in Defense who are accustomed to a more rigid organizational structure—may find disconcerting. Such a team generally operates as a network, an organizational structure that requires a different approach to leadership and collaboration than a more traditional hierarchy.

In addition to its formality, an interagency team can operate in a deliberate environment or a crisis environment, with differences that can impose special requirements on team members. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of different team structures will help you to operate more effectively in these diverse environments.

There is no single best answer regarding how to effectively collaborate, notes Michael Stouder, who recently conducted an interagency collaboration case study. He wrote, "there may be a variety of effective ways to collaborate, depending upon the situation. Different kinds of events may require different kinds of organizational collaborative processes."[19]

2.4.1 Hierarchies vs. Networks

The traditional organizational chart seen throughout Defense and most of the rest of the federal government is hierarchical; however, many if not most interagency teams are organized (or self-organized) more as networks, often without clear lines of authority. Paul Shemella, program manager for Combating Terrorism at the Center for Civil–Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School, has studied the differences between networks and hierarchies. "Unfortunately, governments are not well equipped for networked decision-making," he observed. "They have 'solved' the complexity problem by evolving large bureaucracies that centralize decision-making and reward 'stovepiping' (staying within vertical chains of command that discourage the horizontal sharing of information at all levels).

Governments thus illustrate the inflexibility that occurs when order is imposed from above . . ."[20]

In addition, although hierarchies function well in routine operations, a study of the interagency relationships that emerged following the World Trade Center disaster on 11 September 2001, observed that hierarchies are poorly suited for the pace of information-sharing and decision-making required in response to a crisis. Networks are more resilient, providing redundant paths that distribute information more efficiently and minimize the potential for failure.[21] Shemella noted that these strengths also help explain why networks are attractive to terrorist organizations.[22]

Interagency teams often have a notional, hierarchical organization that is at odds with the true nature of the team and its task. In a research report for the Air University, LTC Ted Uchida noted an "area of cultural friction [is] conflicting views over the [interagency] network or hierarchy orientation. Officially, the [interagency team] is a hierarchy . . . In this hierarchal view, information in the form of policy options flows up . . . and policies and guidance flow down for implementation." However, he observed that, in reality, "the process tends toward a network dominated orientation . . . participants spend time coordinating and consulting with various groups attempting to reconcile disparate views and achieve consensus." Unfortunately, conflict arises when different interagency participants "fail to recognize the necessity for both dimensions to operate simultaneously. Those viewing the system as predominantly a hierarchy become frustrated when it fails to produce clear objectives and end states. Alternatively, those viewing the system as dominated by networks become frustrated when results trump achieving consensus."[23]

Team members with Defense backgrounds are particularly susceptible to the former frustration, while members with State or other civilian agency backgrounds may be more susceptible to the latter. This cultural difference will be explored in more detail in chapter 3.

"The challenge to governments," Shemella observed, "is to 'flatten' their decision-making processes to develop the speed and agility

necessary to get inside the decision cycles of their terrorist adversaries." In the normal course of events, he added, "networks revert to hierarchical organizations," losing the benefits that can be accrued from the network organizational structure.[24]

2.4.2 Hastily Formed Networks

There are special considerations for teaming in crisis-management situations. The term "hastily formed network" was coined by Peter Denning, a researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School, to describe the collective action taken by the military, civilian government, and NGOs in response to crisis situations. A hastily formed network is able to more or less spontaneously leverage its distributed resources and guide collective action without waiting for direction from a central authority.[25]

George Roth of the MIT Sloan School of Management characterizes four conditions necessary for an effective hastily formed network:

1. **Pre-conditioning participants' beliefs** that they could both contribute and subscribe to common overarching goals.
2. **Mobilizing action** by behaving predictably, communicating conditions, convening people, and holding them accountable to their commitments.
3. **Relying on minimal structure**, perhaps only a virtual communication space, to assess progress and report on conditions.
4. **Leading openly** by providing direction, clarifying how decisions are made, sharing power, and enabling action by other people.

Highlighting the importance of personal relationships to the performance of a hastily formed network, Roth continued, "The ideal precondition for an HFN is having a pre-existing social network in place."[26] The critical importance of establishing these personal relationships will be explored further in chapter 4.

"Obstacles are those frightful things that appear when you take your mind off your goals."
—David Byrne

CHAPTER 3.0 The Challenge

3.1 Current Status

In order to make your interagency coordination successful, you need to understand, and be able to confront, the significant institutional, sociological, capability, capacity, and legal challenges to the interagency teaming process. The main challenges you are likely to face are summarized in this chapter.

As recent contributors to *Joint Force Quarterly* explained:

> Examples of poor interagency cooperation abound in recent U.S. operations. In Afghanistan, for instance, the process of building an international coalition was hampered by the different approaches of the Departments of State and Defense. Diplomats sought broadly based international support to include as many partners as possible in Operation *Enduring Freedom*. Military planners, on the other hand, focused on military effectiveness and wanted only militarily significant, rather than symbolic, coalition contributions. Both objectives were reasonable, but the failure to coordinate them into a single national policy meant that potential members received mixed signals, depending on which U.S. official they were talking to. This lack of unity led to diplomatic frustration and resentment and to allied reluctance to participate in stabilization efforts after the fall of the Taliban.[27]

In a recent NATO Defense College research paper, Christopher Schnaubelt wrote, "Monarchs and other rulers have long recognized a relationship between military power and diplomacy, yet the two constructs were often viewed as alternatives rather than complementary elements of power to be synchronized." He continued, "diplomats

talked to other diplomats . . . with little direct coordination between the spheres of activities other than the threat or use of military force frequently being an important diplomatic tool."[28]

3.2 Lack of a National Integration Mechanism

Numerous recent works have described the problem of a lack of a national integration mechanism. Wrote the author of one, "Under the current national security system, neither lead agencies, nor lead individuals, nor committees are effective at integrating the elements of national power routinely. This suggests that the core problem for interagency integration is the relative weakness of the integrating structures available to the President."[29] Another observed, "The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not want an efficient government . . . they deliberately and with intent set about to create a divided government, one in which power was both separate and shared in order to inhibit coordination."[30]

A report on lessons and observations from recent conflicts noted: "There appeared to be no one department, agency, or organization clearly in charge throughout the whole of Iraq . . . and by default, the military was in the lead position in SSTRO [Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations]."[31]

These previous observations indicate that this lack of coordination can result in a disjointed application of the instruments of national power; another concern is that the process of reaching a decision can be excruciatingly slow. A participant in the May 2009 Interagency Workshop observed that the absence of a coordinating mechanism can cause interagency issues to take months to resolve.[32]

Another result is that the various departments of the U.S. government are not organized to mesh together well. "Non-standard functional divisions also increase . . . friction and make it difficult to identify individual focal points within and across departments." For example, State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) include India and Pakistan in similar regions, but Defense assigns India to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and Pakistan to U.S. Central Com-

mand (CENTCOM).[33] Figure 3 illustrates some of the mismatches in alignment between State Regional Bureaus and the Combatant Commanders' (COCOMs') areas of responsibility.

3.3 Lack of Established Processes

The interagency wheel continually is being reinvented because of the dearth of formal doctrine and training. A 2007 study performed by the Joint Staff[34] revealed that 35% of Joint Staff officers were working directly with the interagency for the first time; 70% of them said that they had received no formal training in joint, multinational, or interagency activities. Seventy-six percent of senior leaders said that their staff officers required improved skills in supervising interagency personnel.

This is not a new phenomenon. Wrote one researcher:

> I looked at every U.S. occupation going back to the American Revolution, when we tried to get Canada straight, and one of the things I discovered is that we did them all exactly the same. Every one of them was an ad hoc affair, and when we were done, we immediately purged any lessons that we might have learned. And then after the next war, when transitioning from warfighters to peacekeepers, we would reflexively start all over again as though we had never done it before. I call this the rhythm of habits. Every time we do this, we basically start from scratch. We always do it the same way, and there are some things that we institutionally always do. For example, we always do a very poor job at interagency operations—getting all the federal agencies to work together. And we always use our military in much the same way. We also do a very poor job of doing post-conflict planning before and during the conflict. And we take warfighting military structures, which are not really well-suited to post-conflict operations, and we try desperately to adapt them. Eventually we figure out that our forces that fought so well in battle are not well-equipped, trained, and organized to win the peace—that using the military that won the war to win the fight for peace creates as many problems as it solves. Needless to say, though, we always, or at least usually, ad hoc our way to victory.[35]



Figure 3. State Regional Bureaus and the COCOMs' Areas of Responsibility.

UNCLASSIFIED//For Official Use Only

3.4 Organizational Mismatch

LTC Ted Uchida wrote, "Organizational mismatch is another area causing inefficiencies [in the interagency]. Organizational mismatch tasks an agency to execute policy when it does not possess the capability to perform the mission. The best example of organizational mismatch is the improper tasking and over-reliance on the military instrument of power . . . The military instrument alone is insufficient to accomplish such diverse mission areas as humanitarian assistance, nation building, and post-conflict reconstruction. However, it has become the instrument of choice."[36]

Uchida notes several reasons for this mismatch, including the significantly larger presence and funding of Defense in comparison with other departments, and the organization and capabilities of Defense's combatant commands, which provide natural hubs for the coordination of regional issues. Although Defense's combatant commands help focus on regional issues, complex threats often are transregional in nature, requiring the cooperation of two or more geographic combatant commands and multiple civilian regional bureaus.

3.5 Legal Constraints

Of the many factors inhibiting interagency collaboration, legal barriers, both real and perceived, are among the most often cited.

Article I of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that only Congress can raise revenue and appropriate funds. This means that the funds appropriated to a department must be spent on the missions of that department unless Congress has specifically directed that the money be spent in some other way. This guideline prevents, for example, Defense from spending funds on non-Defense missions or tasks.[37] Similarly, a lack of legal authority to operate overseas can prevent civilian agencies from actively participating where it would be useful. For example, as gleaned from our interviews, personnel from Education cannot be brought in to assist with the development of school systems.

In domestic matters, the Posse Comitatus Act is the most often cited legislation in restricting the role of Defense. The act was originally passed in 1878 to curtail the use of the Army for domestic enforce-

ment of government policies, a practice that had become common during Reconstruction. After World War II, the act was modified to include the Air Force, and by Defense Directive it has been applied to the Navy and Marine Corps. However, the myth of Posse Comitatus is much stronger than the real restrictions it imposes: "Through a gradual erosion of the act's prohibitions over the past 20 years," wrote Craig Trebilcock, an Army Reserve Judge Advocate General in a paper in 2000, "Posse Comitatus today is more of a procedural formality than an actual impediment to the use of U.S. military forces in homeland defense."[38]

Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are supported by legislation. One such exception is the Stafford Act, which allows the military to preserve life and property in the case of natural disaster but only for a limited time period and at the request of a state governor.[39] Another exception is provided by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which permits the designation of certain events as national security special events. Such events, considered potential targets of terrorist attacks, necessitate domestic use of military forces.[40]

Two additional major categories of legal obstacles were noted in a recent paper from the Center for Strategic and International Studies:[41]

- **Sanctions and other prohibitions**, such as economic or military penalties applied against a foreign country (or an individual or group) when it acts counter to U.S. foreign policy goals and rules, can place restrictions on how government funds can be used. For example, Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act restricts the use of foreign assistance funds for the training of foreign police. In 1993, under Operation Restore Hope, the military planned to establish a functioning Somali police force before U.S. withdrawal from the country but were delayed for 5 months while awaiting Congressional approval. "By the time training began," the authors reported, "U.S. forces were withdrawing, and the program ultimately failed. Conflict situations often require rapid response capability, and lengthy approval processes impede such flexibility."

- **Earmarks and directives** are dedicated funds from annual appropriations for a specific "project, location, or institution." Earmarks can be used by lawmakers to support pet projects or fulfill some other political goal. In aggregate, earmarks can significantly impact the amount of discretionary funds that can be spent by interagency teams, weakening the linkage between funding and strategic objectives.

3.6 Capacity and Resource Constraints

In contrast with Defense's vast resources, most civilian departments lack the capacity and funding for expeditionary missions. Wrote one respondent to our survey, "One of the critical problems affecting IA teaming is very limited staffing and resourcing for civilian agencies. All the other problems and constraints associated with IA teaming can be resolved, but absent a resolution to this resource problem, there will continue to be major shortcomings with interagency collaboration efforts." The dramatic difference in department budgets is illustrated in Figure 4.

A recent journal article described the lack of forward-based capacity in the civilian departments. "Departments (e.g., State and CIA) tend to centralize operations and generally do not operate theater based regional commands. While departments do organize regionally and functionally, these organizations tend to operate from parent headquarters. Additionally, most of these organizations do not maintain large staffs with expeditionary capability and lack the training and resources to respond to global contingency operations."[42]

Warning that Defense often has to go it alone without assistance from USAID, one recent lessons learned report complained that "USAID has neither the manpower nor the funding to send a representative to every regimental or brigade combat team in Iraq."[43]

It is common for Defense personnel to view a significant driver of shortfalls in deployed personnel to be the unwillingness of civilian members of the interagency to subject themselves to the hardships of overseas deployment. ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recently mused on the apparent incongruity of



Figure 4. FY2010 Federal Discretionary Budget (in $B).[46]

soldiers with agricultural experience being sent to perform agricultural capacity building "because employees from [Agriculture] don't expect to be sent to Afghanistan." This comment prompted a NATO analyst to observe that not only did U.S. government civilians not sign up to be subjected to mortar and rocket attacks and ambushes but also that sending Agriculture employees overseas would leave their jobs at home unfilled.[44] The capacity gap cannot be easily discounted as a matter of willingness; as a recent U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) briefing noted with irony, there are more military band members than there are State Department Foreign Service Officers.[45]

A shortfall in personnel easily can translate to a loss of oversight ability. A lessons learned report noted that, "At present, USAID staff design a program, hire a partner organization (NGO or contractor) to implement the program, and provide fiscal and programmatic

oversight of the partner until its completion. In Iraq and Afghanistan, USAID's program budgets are significant, yet staffing levels have not increased, resulting in USAID's hiring partners to manage multiple subcontracts or subgrants that USAID would normally manage directly. The outsourcing of program management authority means that USAID officers at the provincial level have virtually no influence over programs operating in their area."[47]

Capacity is not limited to personnel; funding can be equally scarce in civilian departments. Again, the problem is particularly acute in USAID; according to one report, "Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Official Development Assistance controlled by the Pentagon exploded from 3.5% to nearly 22%, while the percentage controlled by USAID shrank from 65% to 40%."[48] In addition, one interviewee added, because of the practices described in the previous section, approximately 80% of USAID funding is earmarked by Congress for specific programs, leaving the agency with little discretionary funding.

3.7 Intramural Turf Battles

Turf battles are at the root of many failed attempts at interagency teaming. "One of the most persistent elements," noted one author, "is the belief that one agency's desire to coordinate is merely an effort to control another agency's resources and agenda."[49] Another wrote, "The tensions generated by cultural differences, turf, and competition for limited resources will always be part of the interagency process,"[50] while the General Accounting Office (now called the Government Accountability Office or GAO) observed that turf battles can make "reaching a consensus on strategies and priorities difficult."[51] The same GAO report suggested that these battles are over "concerns about protecting jurisdiction over missions and control over resources."[52]

3.8 Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus

A 1998 paper first coined this phrase,[53] and little has changed in the intervening years; lessons learned reports continue to highlight misunderstandings and lack of communication resulting from the

significant differences that exist between the military culture and the culture of most U.S. agencies.[54] "The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate the national security system," noted a recent paper on cultural differences. "The former uses words to solve problems while the latter uses force packages."[55]

One subtle cultural difference, as a survey respondent reported, is that when a military commander is unavailable, the unit's second in command routinely steps in and exercises decision-making authority. This is not generally true in civilian organizations, where decision-making authority transfers up, rather than down, the chain of command: "in many civilian agencies (especially law enforcement), if the boss is not available, you go to his higher not a subordinate for action," noted a survey participant. Military members may be frustrated by what they perceive as passing the buck and conclude that civilian organizations are unable, or unwilling, to make decisions.

Another cultural difference was reported in Uchida's recent study:

> One area highlighting the impact of cultural barriers is the desire for specificity within an organization and its [e]ffect on reinforcing perceptions. This cultural difference is most pronounced between State and NSC and Defense. On one end of the spectrum, State and NSC implicitly tend to avoid specificity in an effort to keep every option 'in play' . . . One the other end, Defense explicitly seeks clear and precise guidance before engaging in various operations. These differences cause Defense officials to view State and the NSC as desiring to commit the troops without clear objectives and in areas not in the national interest. Conversely, State and NSC view Defense using lack of clear objectives as an excuse not to commit its resources . . . Another cultural barrier involves consensus versus results orientations. On one end of the spectrum, State's desire to focus on process and gaining consensus is diametrically opposed to Defense's results orientation.[56]

A participant in the May 2009 Interagency Workshop observed that "I saw a lot of military people who were too impatient to let the Embassy personnel lead . . . in their own style and timeline. Military personnel would step on toes, violate lanes, and usurp authority to try to get the job done on their timeline and in their style."[57]

Another Interagency Workshop participant described the difference in this way:

> Defense is type AAA personalities—'git 'er done. Our operations have a finite time horizon, in complex ops normally based on continued domestic support. We want to accomplish our mission and be successful before we go home. When we work with an Embassy like we did in Iraq with a Joint Campaign Plan signed by both the MNF-I Commander and the Chief of Mission, you have a set of partners in the Embassy who have a totally different time horizon—forever. They are patient and seek long-term host nation solutions to host nation problems. Also the folks in the Embassy prefer to work in a more collaborative, collegial manner, as opposed to our hierarchical culture. This caused a lot of tension and clashes.[58]

Military leaders typically advocate a hierarchical approach to whole-of-government actions, while other interagency partners emphasize collaboration and are "skeptical that [these approaches] are anything more than attempts to militarize civilian-led development and diplomatic sectors.[59] Lessons learned from JIATF-South similarly stress that someone needs to be in charge and that lines of authority and responsibility must be clear. "The JIATF must be empowered, within the missions specified, to be the [U.S. government] national authority to direct departments and agencies to collaborate, coordinate, plan, prioritize, and integrate resources provided from the [U.S. government] and willing multinational and multilateral partners."[60]

A 2008 National Defense University report observed, "Defense personnel, who live in a planning culture, often recommend more national-level planning as a solution to insufficient interagency collaboration. On the other hand, the Department of State . . . tends to regard planning as a waste of time or, worse, an exercise that empowers Defense to control outcomes based on Defense operational needs and irrespective of political developments."[61] This mismatch in approaches can make the process of interagency planning, which is discussed in chapter 5, particularly challenging.

As a result of this mismatch and other reasons, the military often leaves civilian agencies out of the planning process altogether. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) wrote:

> Military planners excluded post-conflict experts from early deliberations that determined the scope of U.S. policy . . . The way the U.S. government is structured facilitated this exclusion. Since 1947, the Departments of Defense and State—and later USAID—have operated mostly independently of one another, even though in today's world overseas missions usually require a blending of each one's strengths, along with those of other U.S. government agencies. Integrating their various capabilities was left to the President's war cabinet and the NSC staff, where joint planning is difficult to manage and tends to be subject to the personalities of those who inhabit key posts.[62]

Table 1 illustrates some of the key cultural differences between military officers and Foreign Service officers. Although such differences can never be completely overcome, the most effective interagency team members actively practice effective cross-cultural communications, as discussed in chapter 4.

Table 1. Cultural Differences Between Defense and State.[63]

Military Officers	Foreign Service Officers
Mission: Prepare for and fight war	Mission: Conduct diplomacy
Training is a major activity, important for units and individuals	Training is not a significant activity, not important for either units or individuals
Uncomfortable with ambiguity	Can deal with ambiguity
Plans and planning–both general and detailed–are important core activities	Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value flexibility and innovation
Doctrine: Important	Doctrine: Not important
Focused on discrete events and activities with plans, objectives, courses of action, and end states	Focused on ongoing processes without the expectation of an "end state"
All aspects of peace operations, including civilian/ diplomatic, are becoming more important	All aspects of peace operations, including military, are becoming more important

3.9 Lack of Understanding

Researchers at the RAND Corporation noted that

> one of the biggest complaints from the civilian agencies is the difficulty in coordinating efforts with [Defense]. The civilian agencies have found it difficult to know with whom in the military to coordinate different activities, how to navigate the many offices that have a hand in stability operations within [Defense] and the Army, and how best to coordinate among the various military-civilian efforts . . . Civilian agencies have had trouble prioritizing the many requests that they receive to participate in training exercises and, once there, struggled to integrate their efforts with the military . . . Although these may be early startup problems, connected to lack of familiarity, they will not go away automatically. To resolve them, purposeful actions to establish familiarity are required.[64]

This lack of understanding goes both ways. A recent study of complex contingency operations found that "a key lesson learned has been that personnel in the various agencies and military services involved do not possess an adequate knowledge of the function, organization, capabilities, and limitations of the other entities with which they are expected to coordinate their activities."[65]

In addition to this broad lack of knowledge, specific misunderstandings attributable to the absence of a common lexicon can be very problematic, particularly in a crisis.[66] To this end, chapter 7 provides an overview of agency capabilities and organization, and chapter 5 describes tools and practices to coordinate your interagency team's efforts.

3.10 Wicked Problems

Nancy Roberts of the Naval Postgraduate School has studied the types of problems that the U.S. government has faced in recent conflicts:

> Government officials and public managers are encountering a class of problems that defy solution, even with our most sophisticated analytical tools. These problems are called "wicked" because they have the following characteristics:

1. There is no definitive statement of the problem; in fact, there is broad disagreement on what "the problem" is.
2. Without a definitive statement of the problem, the search for solutions is open ended. Stakeholders—those who have a stake in the problem and its solution—champion alternative solutions and compete with one another to frame "the problem" in a way that directly connects their preferred solution and their preferred problem definition.
3. The problem solving process is complex because constraints, such as resources and political ramifications, are constantly changing.
4. Constraints also change because they are generated by numerous interested parties who "come and go, change their minds, fail to communicate, or otherwise change the rules by which the problem must be solved."[67]

Roberts distinguishes wicked problems from other types of problems:

> Type 1 problems, or what I call "simple problems," enjoy a consensus on a problem definition and solution. For example, a group of machinists agree that a machine has broken down and they also agree how to fix it. Problem solving is straightforward engendering little if any conflict among those involved. Given their training and experience, these problem solvers, within a short period of time, recognize what the problem is and activate established routines and standard procedures to deal with it.
>
> Type 2 problems introduce conflict to the problem solving process. I call them "complex problems". Although problem solvers agree on what the problem is, there is no consensus on how to solve it . . .
>
> Type 3 problems engender a high level of conflict among the stakeholders. In this instance, there is no agreement on the problem or its solution . . . Nothing really bounds the problem solving process—it is experienced as ambiguous, fluid, complex, political, and frustrating as hell. In short, it is wicked.[68]

Many problems faced by the interagency team, particularly those relating to irregular threats, fall into this third category. Depending on their perspectives, each team member may view an irregular threat in a different light and have a different view of the solution.

An attempt to leap into the solution space without first agreeing on the problem can lead to the kind of disjointed approach observed by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR): "the [Coalition Provisional Authority] approach to reconstruction [had] a disjointed and ad hoc quality: Get the oil flowing. Stop the smugglers. Get the electricity up and running. Clean out the sewers. Rewrite the textbooks. Change the currency. Employ more Iraqis. Focus on the cities. Focus on agriculture. Focus on security . . ."[69]

3.11 Communications Constraints

A recent study of best practices noted that there are four types of barriers to communications: hardware, software, business rules (protocols), and need to know.[70]

Some specific constraints noted in recent lessons learned reports include the following:

- "Interagencies [sic] did not have full access to the CENTRIXS system to gain a COP [common operational picture] . . . Culture, perceptions, and doctrinal issues often hampered coordination and integration."[71]
- "U.S. systems did not have an automated gateway to communicate with coalition systems. Processes are antiquated and cumbersome . . . It appears that U.S. units, organizations, and national agencies continue to overclassify products and forbid their release to coalition partners. U.S. intelligence organizations continue to use the "No Foreign Disclosure" default classification on many of their products. There was frustration related to this issue because although the issue is well-known, it remains to be unresolved."[72]
- "Complex C4I [command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence] requirements create friction and limit joint interdependence and interoperability . . ." and "Foreign disclosure, overclassification, and complex information technology systems reduce the ability to share intelligence . . ."[73]

- "Coordination with government and nongovernmental agencies/entities was problematic and presented unique challenges . . . Observations indicate that numerous agencies had essential information that was not brought into the planning process. Further, select interagencies [sic] lack the desire to exchange information with the military . . ."[74]
- "Interagency coordination is often hindered by incompatible procedures, processes, data, and computer systems."[75]
- One particularly burdensome incompatibility is Defense's near-ubiquitous use of classified networks to store and internally disseminate unclassified information. A survey participant remarked on "the tendency for many military organizations to put unclassified information on SIPR [Secure Internet Protocol Router Network] for reasons of staff convenience . . . when unclassified documents need to be sent to non-Defense agencies it is difficult to transfer them to NIPR [Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network] or other unclassified systems."

The tyranny of distance can further encumber communications if the interagency team is not collocated. Of the COIN effort in Afghanistan, LTG David Barno wrote, "Coordination between the military and interagency partners was hampered by a U.S. Embassy and military headquarters separated by over forty kilometers."[76] If your team cannot be collocated, it becomes even more critically important to establish a good information-sharing capability. Some best practices for setting up a communications infrastructure are discussed in chapter 4.

"Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing . . . after they have exhausted all other possibilities."
—Winston Churchill

CHAPTER 4.0 The Top 10 Best Practices

4.1 Get the Right People on the Team

The importance of assigning the best people to the interagency team has been noted by many lessons learned reports. "Liaison is underestimated by most leaders, perhaps because they inherited from their mentors the bad habit of assigning their most expendable people . . . Good (even brilliant) liaison officers can be the glue that holds agencies together enough to enable them to operate as networks. Liaison develops the 'weak ties' needed to counter the strong ties that bind personnel from within the same agency into like-minded groups."[77] Another researcher observed that "organizations and teams tackle goals that no single person can achieve. However, individuals are still important. Not everyone or every team in collaboration needs to be a star or first-rate player, but key people surely do."[78]

It also is important to define what capabilities are required by the team before committing to a force structure that may not be appropriate for the task.

4.1.1 Experience and Knowledge

A researcher observes that "Most situations are not wholly unprecedented and collaborators should not re-invent the wheel . . ."[79] A survey response echoed the criticality of previous experience and recommended that the team lead establish a vetting process to determine how a prospective team member/leader can contribute. Depending on the mission of your team, you will need subject-

matter experts in diverse subjects. Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) typically require experts in governance, economics, and agriculture, for example.[80]

One area worth paying particular attention to is the legal arena. When time is available for interagency planning and coordination, involve a military staff judge advocate or other legal expert in your planning. A legal expert can help resolve interagency and multinational legal issues involving authorities, international law, intelligence oversight, disaster relief and claims, contractual and fiscal law, rules of engagement and rules for use of force, and authorization for military members to support civilian authorities.[81]

4.1.2 Authority

Best practices recommend that interagency team members be sufficiently empowered to commit dedicated resources to missions.[82] Noting that "local commanders (military and civilian) are usually in the best position to assess local needs and opportunities . . . devolving authority and responsibility to the lowest level practicable not only applies to military operations; it is also important for nonmilitary activities and personnel . . . [and] will be critical for the success of hearts and minds efforts targeted at the local population."[83] This position was echoed by an attendee at the May 2009 Interagency Workshop: "A truly effective team will have presumptive control of all departments and agencies within the scope of the team's mandate (e.g., as happened with the U.S. Train and Equip Program in Bosnia)."[84]

4.1.3 Attitude

Interview subjects recommended seeking out team members with interagency experience—and, more importantly, the right attitude about interagency teaming—to provide mentorship to other team members. A researcher observed that certain individuals "are just better at reaching across and outside their own group comfort zone [to] effectively liaise with others."[85] Successful interagency team members should exhibit the characteristics listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Characteristics of Successful Interagency Team Members.

Empathy
• Ability to see things from other people's perspectives
Competence
• Expertise in one's own organization's capabilities and limitations; understanding of other organizational cultures and capabilities • Multiple stakeholder planning and implementation • Complex problem solving • Facilitation and/or negotiation skills • Capability to build and sustain networks/relationships
Cross-Sector Collaboration
• Willingness to reach out to and work with people from diverse backgrounds • Capacity to share credit and take collective responsibility • Ability to look for common ground and find mutual interests • Willingness to relate to others based on mutual concerns rather than differences
Resilience
• Patience in working with multiple stakeholders on difficult topics • Motivation to develop action plans and means to implement them in ambiguous environments and against bureaucratic obstacles • Ability to effectively deal with adversity and see obstacles as opportunities
Systems Approach
• Ability to analyze problems and opportunities from various perspectives and incorporate those perspectives in holistic solutions • Capacity to see situations in a broad context, take a long-term perspective, and appreciate the interdependence between stakeholders

4.2 Establish Good External Communications

4.2.1 Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement

A report on the importance of interagency agreements done by Argonne National Laboratory observed that "since the days of fire-fighting via bucket brigades, neighbors have pitched in to help with response to disasters. In current professional emergency management practice, such assistance is often performed according to an agreement that has been reduced to writing and signed by cognizant authorities. Most local emergency response organizations have mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions, and many also

have arrangements with other levels of government or with private organizations such as the American Red Cross or Salvation Army to provide assistance." Although such agreements can offer significant practical and legal advantages, the authors warned that "agreements that are poorly drafted or not properly authorized can negate these advantages or cause unintended consequences in the wake of a response."[86]

The authors describe five general types of agreements:

- **Intergovernmental or Interagency Agreement (IGA).** An IGA is used between different levels of government or between different agencies within the same level (e.g., different state agencies or different federal agencies).
- **Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).** An MOU is used to define general areas of understanding between two parties acting independently in pursuit of the same goal.
- **Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).** An MOA is used in place of an MOU when two parties need to closely coordinate their actions. MOAs generally are the right choice over MOUs when transfer of funds or resources is involved.
- **Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA).** Each party to an MAA agrees to provide mutual support in a specified area when requested.
- **Cooperative Assistance Agreement**, **Standby Contract, or Contingency Contract.** These are agreements that involve a commitment for a response when certain agreed-upon conditions exist. Cost reimbursement may or may not be provided for in the agreement.

MOAs also can be used to define interagency relationships and help ensure that the team lead can make appropriate input into team members' evaluations. Noted one participant at the May 2009 Interagency Workshop, MOAs can "contain details like who rates the individual and include oversight and guidance from their home agency on the writing of their evaluations so we take care of our people, no matter what agency they come from . . ."[87]

The negotiation of an interagency MOA requires an understanding of cross-cultural communication and basic negotiating skills to understand how to make concessions and still arrive at consensus. Different negotiating techniques will be appropriate for different situations (e.g., "shuttle" or back-and-forth, largely bilateral discussions between stakeholders, or getting all players around the table at one time to discuss the content of the MOA). Some MOAs can be approved at a local level, whereas others may require approval from home agencies, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the NSC. Generally, if MOAs are negotiated from the bottom up, and civilian and military stakeholders in the field are in consensus, the chances of approval from Washington are greatly increased. Legal advice can assist in ensuring that MOAs are vetted at the appropriate level. Guidance and examples of interagency MOAs are included on the companion CD.

4.2.2 Reachback

Ideally, team members will have decision-making authority and can speak authoritatively for their respective organizations. For those decisions or actions that go beyond what they are empowered to do, interagency team members must be able to reach back to key decision-makers to facilitate flat communications and timely decisions. Interviews revealed that a team member's value is based largely on this ability to reach back and that an effective liaison is not necessarily an expert on every one of the parent organizations' capabilities but is sufficiently "wired in" to be able to quickly get in touch with the right points of contact.

4.2.3 Stakeholders

Your team will have to deal with a number of external organizations, both in and out of the U.S. government. A recent lessons learned report recommended establishing "relationships with military commander[s] to U.S. and foreign governments, international and non-governmental organizations and agencies. Success depends on getting the full value from the civilian participation and expertise of USAID, [State], [Agriculture], and the Red Cross and Red Crescent and similar organizations . . ."[88]

4.2.3.1 Ambassador and Country Team

The United States is represented in a foreign country by the diplomatic mission. State provides the core staff of a mission, including the Chief of Mission (generally, the same as the Ambassador). Although the Ambassador does not exercise control over U.S. military personnel operating under the command of a geographic COCOM, he or she is the senior U.S. official in that country and is responsible for supervising all U.S. government activities and representatives posted in that country.

A participant in the May Interagency Workshop summed up the importance of establishing good relations with the country team: "Embassy buy-in is a requirement because it is the Ambassador's imperative under U.S. Code to have right-of-first-refusal of authority over any [U.S. government] bodies coming into the country."[89]

4.2.3.2 Host Nation Government (Overseas)

A survey participant observed that "The Local Government Is Sovereign. Outsiders first need to understand that they are in someone else's country. The power and position held by the outside military force and others will eventually be returned *in toto* to the local government and population. While the success of the mission will obviously be defined in major part in terms of securing U.S. interests and those of allies and other outside partners, pursuit of these interests must never lose sight of the enduring sovereignty of the local government."[90]

4.2.3.3 Local Government (Domestic)

Within the United States, state and local governments are responsible for the health and welfare of the people in their jurisdictions; U.S. government assets generally serve in a supporting role. In addition, states have significant resources, including emergency management, homeland security, police, health services, incident managers, and National Guard forces.[91] The Incident Management System described in chapter 5 can serve as a coordinating structure between these assets and U.S. government emergency responders.

4.2.3.4 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs perform critical humanitarian missions around the world, and their cooperation can be critical to the success of your team. However, NGOs operate independently and may be unwilling to cooperate or accept security protection if they fear it will cost the goodwill of the host government or the population.[92] It is important to provide a point of contact for your team to coordinate with NGOs.

4.3 Practice Cross-Cultural Communications

Simply by reading this handbook, you are becoming more aware of the differences in style among the U.S. government agencies. Interviews did not reveal a secret formula for successful communication, they but did suggest that practice, patience, and a willingness to listen to points of view unlike your own are essential.

Be aware of the words you use and their unintended effects on an audience unlike yourself—for example, phrases such as "battle rhythm" may not resonate with non-Defense team members."[93] Be aware of the differences in organizations' styles of formal communications: Defense uses fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) for the same type of information that State transmits via cable, and, unlike Defense, civilian agencies do not typically provide reports in PowerPoint format.

The authors of the paper "Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus,"—themselves a Foreign Service officer and a military officer—wrote, "the 'treatment' requires a cooperative attitude that recognizes the differences and, in fact, capitalizes on them . . . It does not mean trying to make each more like the other . . . There is a natural tendency on the part of military officers and Foreign Service officers to *think* that they understand more than they do about each other, and to discount the need for increased interaction. Constructive interaction is essential. With familiarity grows understanding (not, we hope, contempt) and with understanding comes cooperation."[94]

4.4 Keep Good Records

One of the key lessons learned passed on by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was the importance of keeping records and passing those records to your successors.[95] Because members of your interagency team may constantly be rotating in and out, depending on the assignment policies of their parent department or agency, good knowledge-management practices can maintain continuity and help to train new team members. Records need not be complex or sophisticated; in fact, the simplest system may be best.

A recent RAND Corporation study of best practices found that

> Conservation of experience, especially at the theater level and below, is also indispensable to success. In addition to assuring that relevant personnel remain engaged for a situationally significant period of time, this includes an effective capacity within ongoing operations for lessons learned, sharing of experience, and adaptation, especially regarding best practices. This should be done on a military, civilian, and combined basis, and include all actors. It should also be integrated into planning, training, and exercising for possible future operations."[96]

A potentially effective knowledge-management tool that not only creates records but provides a mechanism to resolve issues is the after action report. An attendee at the May 2009 Interagency Workshop noted that the Special Operations community does this particularly effectively: the task force "integrates analysts from the start of a planning group throughout the execution of the process. Observations and issues—both positive and negative—are captured and an after action report [is] done immediately upon completion of . . . an exercise. This is ALWAYS inclusive of a senior leader . . . and involves all the key players . . ." This report is generated within weeks of the event and is used to identify key issues that are tracked to resolution.[97]

Another workshop participant described how these reports contribute to the future planning process: "The SOF [Special Operations Forces] Joint After Action Review Support Office has years of [reports] and continually analyzes this and all additional information sources available. They then provide tailored products for planning

purposes so that, up front, hard learned lessons help in the initial planning efforts. The cycle is continuous."[98]

Good recordkeeping also should include capturing the knowledge, processes, and best practices as an interagency enterprise plans, executes, and evolves over time. Creation and maintenance of a standard operating procedure (SOP) can be key to defining the structure and processes of the team for the benefit of new members. This will require dedication of resources to ensure that someone has the tools and access to observe and collect shared experiences, lessons learned, and best practices as interagency enterprises learn and develop organizationally.

4.5 Understand and Leverage Partner Capabilities and Expertise

A senior official interviewed for this handbook expressed it this way: you might be able to dye your own hair, but it's probably not a good idea to drill your own teeth. In other words, know when you are so far out of your area of expertise that your efforts might cause more problems than they are resolving, and find an expert from another agency who has the necessary qualifications and experience to step in.

An attendee at the May 2009 Interagency Workshop stressed that Defense needs to better understand the capabilities of the other interagency players and vice versa. "Better understanding of each others' capabilities and cultural makeup will better enable cooperation and coordination in identifying and solving whatever problem is at hand."[99]

Develop your understanding of what other agencies can bring to the table by reviewing some of the recommended resources described in chapter 8 or included in the companion CD.

4.6 Provide Adequate Resources

Interviews revealed that the most important decision about an interagency team is the distribution of resources. An inadequately resourced team is very likely to be an unsuccessful one. A survey participant observed that, "unless the interagency mission is already

underway (out of, say, a U.S. Embassy), resources will always be the first and most important issue." There are two types of resources necessary for the team—resources they need internally (e.g., workspace, staff, computers, desks, connectivity) and resources they need to carry out their mission (e.g., funding, contract vehicles, tools, and equipment).

4.7 Manage Resources Effectively

The ad hoc nature of many interagency teams means that untrained individuals may be pressed into service as finance or contracting officers. "U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel stressed the need to receive detailed training in negotiating, contract development, evaluating contractors, program funding and management, budget development, vetting and incorporating interpreters, and project turnover," observed a participant in the May 2009 Interagency Workshop.[100] A lessons learned report stressed that interagency team "leaders and staffs . . . need to have a basic understanding of resource management," and "commanders and staff officers require more training on contracts and contract management . . ."[101]

Having the skills to do these things right can avoid legal problems, bad publicity, and wasted time and money. Make sure the right people are on the team to perform these important functions, and fill in the gaps with online training, such as that discussed in chapter 9. A good reference for standards to provide accountability is the document *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, published by the GAO and provided on the companion CD.[102]

4.8 Break Down Barriers to Information Sharing

It is important to break down barriers to promote collaborative platforms (both face-to-face and virtual) in order to foster the sharing of knowledge, management of collaborative actions, and sustainment of communities of interest. A successful information-sharing strategy requires addressing all of the challenges [i.e., hardware, software, business rules (protocols), and need to know]. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which has established a highly successful interagency process, recommends "the least cumbersome and restric-

tive system for information sharing among [U.S. government] and multi-national coalition partners."[103]

In his primer on the subject,[104] Larry Wentz describes how to overcome this range of challenges to create a collaborative communications network that safeguards classified and other operational information while permitting collaboration and information sharing among the team. Some characteristics of this environment include a common operational picture that can be shared among all members of the team, simple templates for the collection of information, and a maximum dissemination of information in an unclassified, open-source environment.

The first step to establishing this collaborative information environment (Figure 5) is to conduct an assessment, including existing resources, information needs, and gaps in knowledge. A standardized



Figure 5. Collaborative Information Environment.[105]

metadata (e.g., source, date, geo-reference, definitions) approach then can be used to establish a system to pool information and use it for analysis. It is critical to dismantle institutional stovepipes and establish a collaboration road map for the near, mid-, and long term. Wentz also describes a number of best practices, both technical and non-technical, including:

- **Ensure that all reports have clear time and date stamps** to establish timelines and readily identify the most recent information.
- **Establish reporting uniformity**, e.g., miles vs. kilometers.
- **Establish procedures for translating between mapping systems**, e.g., military Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grids and commonly used civilian formats. Sophisticated geographic information systems can sometimes handle this translation.
- **Make terminology clear.** Different organizations may use the same word to have distinctly different meanings. Ensure that all team members are aware of these meanings. One example of different terminology between civilian and military actors is the term "operational," which refers in Defense to the theater combatant command level, and in civilian departments and agencies to the field or Embassy level.
- **Describe the decision to be made rather than the data required**. This procedure may help to avoid "need to know" or classification impasses as well as provide context for the information provider to understand why an information request is important or time-sensitive.
- **Understand the limitations of data**. For example, the military is better at gathering data about tangible, measurable things than it is making observations about complex social issues.
- **Establish a formal process for information sharing** to include request screening and audit and tracking capability.

- **Make arrangements for information sharing in advance of an emergency** to avoid organizations being blocked from access to critical information.
- **Prevent the spread of rumors or misinformation**, which can have a damaging impact on team cohesiveness and performance. Provide ready access to correct information and be prepared to rapidly counter false or distorted information.
- **Weigh the cost and expedience of sharing facilities against the possibility that military communications may be targeted**. In some cases, it might make sense for civilians and military to share facilities; in others it may not.

A good example of effective intrateam coordination is the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), a fusion of local, state, and federal agencies as well as private-sector railroad representatives. One of the keys to the success of the NJTTF is the fact that all of its team members share the same privileges and information accesses—there are no second-class citizens on the NJTTF.

The NJTTF also believes that its policy of co-locating its team members is critically important. This co-location permits team members to establish those all-important personal working relationships and to more readily share information with each other.[106]

A participant in the May 2009 Interagency Workshop wrote, "A team . . . should be full-time and collocated for at least a majority of the workday in order to develop team dynamics and ensure singular focus on the problem solving effort. The team will endure as long as the problem, but individual members should rotate out at intervals to ensure new blood and to make sure that the knowledge and capabilities the team members were chosen for do not become stale or outdated."[107]

"Interagency partnerships should, where possible, begin by building on existing methods of information sharing," wrote the author of a Justice report on interagency information sharing. "The partnership must also establish high levels of security to prevent the inappropriate release of information and should give extensive consideration

to training staff in the technical aspects of the information system, including all security . . . In addition to determining the appropriate strategy for sharing information in a given community or jurisdiction, it is important to identify available sources of information within each participating agency. Sources used to create a common pool of information for program participants will have to be determined by the partners in the program."[108]

4.9 Tailor Leadership Style to the Networked Team

In his study of hastily formed networks, George Roth observed that a network "does not allow leaders to push their decisions or actions through that web of relationships, as they would in an organization's reporting lines . . . When central authorities attempt to specify behaviors . . . their efforts are largely ineffective."[109]

As a survey respondent emphasized: Leadership is the essential starting point for any discussion of capabilities and resources of an interagency team. A recent interagency case study high-lighted the "importance of skilled appropriate management and/or leadership." The author noted that while collaboration in a network may be different from more traditional management in a hierarchy, it is not necessarily any easier. "Collaboration of this scale is management-intensive . . . [and] appears to require a different type of leadership, more toward the facilitative end of the scale and less toward the directive or autocratic end of the scale."

Observing that "collaborative processes do not necessarily mitigate egotistic or political behaviors on the part of those prone to those behaviors," the author cautioned that the loose organizational structure of these organizations "may in fact encourage negative behaviors. Two respondents noted the difficulty and skill required to manage, or assertively marginalize, negative behaviors and personalities within the collaboration."[110]

Echoing these findings, the Army Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Lessons Learned Report observed that "direct leaders require skills at building cohesion, coordination, and trust within teams in a variety of complex environments."[111]

Informal leadership can be every bit as critical as formal leadership. Successful networks evolve toward a collaborative discovery phase, "enabled by the actions of 'invisible' or non-traditional leaders." Such leaders "did not rely on any one authority, but looked around at what was developing, asked questions that prompted new thinking, and linked people who were doing something effective together." Such invisible leaders do not tend to seek recognition for themselves.[112]

Internal leadership is particularly critical because the team may be asked to operate fairly autonomously. A participant in the May 2009 Interagency Workshop observed that "many of the field issues must be solved in the field. They are either too small for interagency committees or not important enough to make secretary priorities. If we pass those up the chain and wait for someone else to resolve them, it will not get done." Another agreed, "Often we expect senior leaders to provide vision, direction, and policy-level decisions . . . often times some of the best ideas, however, come from the bottom up (and often our seniors want that input). Instead of waiting for a senior leader decision as the standard practice, we should consider partnering with IA stakeholders at the grassroots level and collectively send[ing] up a recommendation that the NSC or other decision-making body can use and then send back to us in the form of policy or direction. A multi-agency request going up to the NSC will probably be more welcomed that a single agency input. Moreover, the good idea that frames a problem/challenge as seen through the eyes of an expert and/or someone with a deep understanding of the local context of the problem will often be appreciated by senior leaders who are looking for good ideas to implement."[113]

Although a lack of civilian department representation will very likely have an impact on your team, the most successful interagency leaders do not accept this lack of capacity as an excuse for failure, but instead they find creative ways to use networking as a force multiplier.

4.10 Establish Personal Working Relationships

The success of a hastily formed network, noted George Roth, lies in the existence of previously established relationships that contribute to better coordination in a crisis.[114]

"Personal relationships . . . play a key role in interagency coordination, particularly where gaps exist in clear delineation and understanding of the chain of command, roles, and resources," observed the authors of a lessons learned report from recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which placed emphasis on importance of assigning military liaison officers to civilian organizations and vice versa.[115]

"If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend 59 minutes defining the problem and 1 minute resolving it."

—Albert Einstein

CHAPTER 5.0 Effective Interagency Planning and Execution

As discussed earlier in this handbook, the military approach to planning can be very different from that of most civilian agencies. Some of the interviewees have gone so far as to suggest that State views "planning" as almost a dirty word, as it connotes military control. In an observation echoed by other attendees, a participant in the March 2009 Interagency Workshop noted, "unlike the more formalized Military Decision Making Process, [State practices a] . . . less formalized decision-making cycle with a bias toward consensus-building."[116] Processes used by an interagency team will be neither purely military nor purely civilian but must be a hybrid of the two, or they must define a process to link the two together toward a common end.

This does not mean that the military decision-making process cannot add value that is appreciated by other members of the interagency. As one Defense liaison officer embedded at another federal agency stated, "One of the [team] members had written a strategic white paper on information sharing . . . In order to add clarity to the paper, I volunteered to apply the military decision-making process," to determine what functions the team would perform and the resources that would be required. The liaison officer reported that his interagency teammate was amazed by his ability to obtain and organize so many details based on the contents of the white paper.

The problems often faced by interagency teams are complex and wicked. To address these challenging threats and opportunities, interagency enterprises need to find common ground, build consensus

among stakeholders, and take collective action that fulfills mutual interests. Even when the military decision-making process is used, it must be modified for the interagency context. The problem must be viewed from the start as a whole-of-government, not a military, problem.

Effective planning is not imposed from above but originates in the field. Interagency teams are most effective when they speak to policy-makers with one voice.

The *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*[117] sets forth some useful principles characterizing successful planning:

- **Unity of Effort** between U.S. agencies, international organizations, and NGOs
- **Simplicity** by working from existing assessment structures and knowledge bases
- **Flexibility** to accommodate a wide range of scenarios
- **Consistency and Standardization of Products** to facilitate expeditious planning

The collaborative process consists of the following steps:

- Agree on the problem.
- Agree on goals and metrics.
- Determine your approach.
- Establish roles and responsibilities.
- Periodically reassess your progress and adjust your approach as necessary.

5.1 Agree on the Problem

The first—and some would argue, most critical—step in achieving unity of effort is to come to consensus on the problem that needs to be solved and the causes or underlying conditions of the problem. Writing for the NATO Defense College, Christopher Schnaubelt observed that "military planning is deductive and designed for specific set of well defined military missions . . ." He noted that the military decision-making process does not even include identifica-

tion of the problem, presumably because the problem has, at least in conventional warfare, already been defined. In contrast, civilian organizations are more accustomed to beginning the problem-solving process by identifying and framing the problem.[118]

"Analysis shapes action," wrote a survey participant, "so if you're not on the same wavelength about root causes and triggers of current conflict or security situations, then it will be hard to do joint planning about what to do about it."

Agreeing on the problem can be particularly challenging for the interagency team, because, as discussed earlier in this handbook, many of such problems can be categorized as "wicked," precluding ready application of the joint operational planning process or the military decision-making process. Nancy Roberts of the Naval Postgraduate School has found that wicked problems, such as relief and recovery efforts in Afghanistan, are best tackled in a collaborative way.[119]

The recently published pamphlet U.S. Army *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*[120] recognizes this need for unified action in response to what it terms ill-structured problems: "Achieving unity of effort through unified action is only possible if based upon a shared appreciation of the problem and a common approach to problem solving."

One way of collaborating on the problem statement would be for team members to simply sit down and exchange ideas, but this process does not ensure that disconnects will always be recognized, let alone resolved. A tool that provides a structured way to help achieve consensus is the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF).[121] This tool, created by the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in conjunction with USAID and Defense, provides a way for an interagency team to work together to assess societal and situational dynamics that affect the likelihood of violent conflict. The ICAF process is systematic and collaborative, and it helps lay the groundwork for effective interagency planning. The ICAF process, illustrated in Figure 6, consists of the following steps:

Step 1: Evaluate the Context of the Conflict. Assess how stakeholders view the situation and/or conflict at hand. Identify stubborn fault lines between communities, such as environmental conditions, poverty, history of conflict, or demographic pressures. Understanding stakeholder (local, national, and international) interest, perspectives, and priorities provides an enhanced picture of a given problem. An even more complete understanding of the context of a problem or conflict includes an appreciation for the threats, opportunities, local environment, and stakeholders' willingness and capability to take action.

Step 2: Understand core grievances and social/institutional resilience. The former is the perception by a group that their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests, or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions; the latter is their perception that social relationships, structures, or processes are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through nonviolent means.

Step 3: Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors. Drivers of conflict push a group toward violence, whereas mitigating factors result from key actors mobilizing the power of social and institutional resilience to push a group away from violence.

Step 4: Describe Opportunities for Increasing or Decreasing Conflict. These consist of windows of vulnerability—events such as elections and legislative changes that may magnify drivers of conflict, and windows of opportunity that may present openings to provide support to mitigating factors.

Although only in use a short time, the ICAF process already has a proven track record. In March 2009, it was used in Cambodia, in part to resolve a disagreement between PACOM and the embassy staff over the risk of radicalization among Cambodia's Islamic community. In concert with PACOM and embassy personnel, the ICAF team interviewed over 400 Cambodians and analyzed the data. As a result of subsequent review and discussions, the stakeholders were able to reach consensus that no significant radicalization was taking place. This shared understanding of the environment broke the impasse and enabled both sides to engage in coordinated planning.



Figure 6. The ICAF Process.[122]

ICAF documentation is included on the companion CD. For further information, visit **http://www.crs.state.gov/** or contact S/CRS at **ICAF@state.gov** or at 202-663-0302.

5.2 Agree on Goals and Metrics

Goals and metrics define what success looks like. Goals are desired end states and must generally be believed to be achievable and realistic. Metrics are the mechanism by which progress toward those goals can be measured. Members of an interagency team must agree on both.

The ability of shared goals to motivate a team has been observed by researchers.[123] A number of individuals interviewed for this handbook observed that Defense tends to favor short-term, fairly concrete goals, while the goals of civilian agencies such as State and USAID often have a longer timeline. Both types of goals have value, but problems arise when agencies fail to coordinate their plans and take actions that conflict with each other.

Unintended consequences can result when short-term fixes are imposed on long-term problems. Staff members of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) recalled an incident in which Iraqi farmers were clamoring to have their date palms sprayed to eradicate a pest. Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNC-I) used Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to spray the trees, solving the short-term problem for the farmers but undermining USAID's long-term goal to work with the Ministry of Agriculture to establish a sustainable, locally managed pest-management program.[124]

For the problem set associated with reconstruction and stabilization, the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*,[125] provided on the companion CD, articulates goals for initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability in the areas of security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. These goals do not describe how success is to be measured, and they do not provide a guarantee that actions taken in pursuit of one

goal will not conflict, at least in the short run, with progress toward another. However, they provide a place for the interagency team addressing these types of issues to begin to craft an approach.

Beyond goals, successful management of complex interagency efforts requires the use of agreed-upon, quantifiable metrics that provide a means to measure effectiveness, outcome, and performance. Metrics can tie together the relationships and expectations of stakeholders and internal team members.[126]

In 1995, Frederick Burkle, an expert in public health with extensive experience in complex emergencies and refugee care, stressed the importance of consensus on metrics:

> Complex humanitarian emergencies lack a mechanism to coordinate, communicate, assess, and evaluate response and outcome for major participants (United Nations, International Committee the Red Cross, nongovernmental organizations, and military forces). Success in these emergencies will rely on the ability to accomplish agreed upon measures of effectiveness (MOEs). A recent, civil–military humanitarian exercise demonstrated the ability of participants to develop consensus-driven MOEs. These MOEs combined security measures utilized by the military with humanitarian indicators recognized by relief organizations. Measures of effectiveness have the potential to be unifying disaster management tool and a partial solution to the communication and coordination problems inherent in these complex emergencies.[127]

Observed one analyst of the interagency process: "The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration . . . uses the weight of seized cocaine as an MOE while Defense, in an effort to develop interdiction capabilities in Latin American forces, measures its success in just the opposite way (if nothing is seized, the drug traffickers have been deterred from using a particular method of transportation)."[128] Not only does this kind of disconnect make it difficult for team members to agree when success has been achieved, it probably makes it difficult to even craft a strategy.

Shared metrics provide a better picture of what is happening on the ground, allow stakeholders and outside agencies to coordinate their

programs, and permit programs to be effectively handed to NGOs for implementation.[129] Additionally, analysis of data can be used to determine the effectiveness of specific interventions in order to document results and improve future operations.

To be effective, metrics must be observable and measurable, and gathering supporting data can be a challenge. Metrics that measure effort generally are easier to develop and measure but are of significantly less value. For example, a project could be designed with a goal to improve village health. An easy-to-measure performance metric could be the number of mosquito nets distributed, but a more useful effectiveness metric would be the decrease in the number of new cases of malaria in that village. Lessons learned have emphasized that the best metrics "assess accomplishment, not effort or money or manpower expended."[130]

The recently published *Integrated Civilian–Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan*[131] emphasizes the use of formal tools and methodologies to produce a comprehensive stability and operations assessment. Where such tools exist, your team should make use of them. However, a 2009 GAO report noted the absence of a "performance monitoring system that measures progress toward building provincial capacity to deliver essential services."[132]

Clearly, establishing metrics and a means to collect data to measure them is likely to be a challenging problem for your team. A resource for the establishment of metrics in humanitarian operations is The Sphere Project's *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*,[133] which was produced by a group of NGOs. This document, provided on the companion CD, describes minimum standards in the areas of water supply and sanitation, food security and nutrition, shelter, and health services, as well as key indicators that provide a means to measure progress.

Goals and metrics need to include internal evaluation of the interagency enterprise as well. Regular assessments on how the team is functioning, sharing information, honoring its commitments, and coordinating actions are critical to organizational learning and overall success.

5.3 Determine Your Approach

Once your team has agreed on the problem, what the desired outcome will look like, and how to measure progress toward that outcome, team members from different agencies need to coordinate their approaches to make sure they are in synch.

The approach needs to include developing the processes and the "rules of the game" for the interagency enterprise. Leaders need to establish internal procedures for resolving conflict, sharing information and resources, identifying roles and responsibilities, and negotiating other team functions. Team members also will have to inventory capabilities and the level of willingness to use those resources. These resources can include authorities, access, placement, key relationships, expertise, material, and personnel. Determining the approach also will include an understanding of the variety of cultural norms different team members bring to the interagency enterprise. Some agencies are results driven, others are more focused on process, and still others rely heavily on relationships to get the job done. Interagency teams will need to find the right balance between results, process, and relationships in order to satisfy the different needs of diverse stakeholders and clarify the team's approach to problem solving.

It is important for the interagency team to adopt a sufficiently long view, in order to avoid a "short-term orientation for strategies that really require a long-term commitment to achieve results and overemphasis on rapid military solutions when the situation requires long-term diplomatic or economic responses."[134]

Each member of the team will bring a different tool set to the problem. A successful interagency team is one in which these different tools are brought to bear in a coordinated way.

The four illustrations across the next two pages are taken from a USAID presentation used to explain to Defense personnel the USAID approach to violent extremism.[135] While recognizing the contributions of military and law enforcement approaches (the axe), the approach advocates supplementing those approaches with soft-power tools that are the domain of USAID and other civilian departments and agencies.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM HAS LOCAL CAUSES AND LOCAL SOLUTIONS



IT IS SPREAD BY ORGANIZATIONS THAT FIND SPACE IN LOCAL DISCONTENT



BUT ENABLING LOCAL POPULATIONS TO REGAIN CONFIDENCE AND OWNERSHIP IN LOCAL INSTITUTIONS WILL UNDERCUT THE ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM



LOCAL POPULATIONS NEED TOOLS TO SYSTEMATICALLY PROTECT/RECLAIM THEIR INSTITUTIONS. HOW CAN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSIST?



The USAID *Civilian–Military Cooperation Policy*, available on the companion CD,[136] describes USAID's foundation for cooperation with Defense in the areas of joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and strategic communication.

5.4 Establish Roles and Responsibilities

It is important to establish clear roles and responsibilities for each member of the team. "Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational and tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the U.S. government, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nation agencies," advises Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*. "Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, combatant commands, U.S. state and local governments, and overseas with the U.S. Chief of Mission and country team in a U.S. Embassy must be clearly understood."[137]

Much has been written in recent years on Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs) for complex operations. The reader is cautioned against stovepiping LLOs by defining them in terms of instruments of power or major pillars such as "governance," "economics," "security," or "diplomacy." Practice in interagency teaming to counter irregular threats has shown that cross-cutting LLOs such as "counter foreign fighter facilitation," which involve aspects of all elements of power and all "pillars" of an operation, are far more likely to succeed. Stovepiping is unlikely to result in strategic success, and the urge to break down and oversimplify problems must be resisted. In complex environments, those working counterterrorism must understand their impact on the stabilization or COIN component of the mission and vice versa. Teams must enmesh themselves in a "network of networks" to ensure that they can address wicked problems.

Designating roles and responsibilities also includes an appreciation of who should take what leadership role at what time. The timing and phasing of activities may shift who has a supported or supporting role to ensure that the most appropriate agency applies the right capabilities at the critical time and place. In certain situations where security

concerns dominate the environment, the military or law enforcement may have a larger role. In other situations where development or diplomacy is needed in the forefront, then other agencies and departments should be in support as required.

5.5 Periodically Reassess

A survey respondent noted, "Very seldom do we get the plan right the first time" and observed that any planning process requires periodic review and modification. Two approaches to this review and modification cycle are illustrated in Figure 7.

The USAID diagram (Upper) illustrates the longer-term commitment required of a development program, whereas the Defense OODA (observe–orient–decide–act) loop illustrates a short-term, often nearly instantaneous, command and control process. Interagency teams may have a need for both kinds of planning processes, depending on what capabilities are needed in a given situation. Ultimately, kinetic targeting (focused on threats) and development work (focused on the environment and local conditions) need to be integrated as part of a whole-of-government approach in conflict zones. They should be mutually supporting and interdependent activities.

Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD; provided on the CD) observes:

> Since a commander must answer the question "What is the problem?" before asking "What must be done about it?" the elements of CACD are described in that order. However, practitioners must keep in mind that formulating the problem and creating the solutions are complementary and simultaneous to some degree. Even when commanders and planners shift focus from understanding to solving and begin to form a coherent campaign design, they will still learn about the problem. This may require amending earlier judgments and decisions throughout the process. CACD is iterative and the order in which the "steps" have been arranged on paper must not constrain a commander from approaching them in a different sequence or iteration in practice.[138]



Figure 7. Separated at Birth? The USAID Process for Planning and Implementation[139] (Upper) and the Defense OODA Loop[140] (Lower).

5.6 Coordination Mechanisms

A large part of the interagency planning process involves bridging the gap between the disparate cultures and practices of members of the team and the environments in which they are accustomed to operating. Fortunately, tools have been developed to help with this process.

For example, in response to National Security Presidential Directive 44[141] directing the Secretary of State to coordinate civil–military

planning for stabilization activities, the S/CRS created the Interagency Management System (IMS) in 2007. The IMS consists of three elements:[142]

- Country reconstruction and stabilization group (CRSG), a Washington-based decision-making body
- Integration planning cell (IPC), a civilian planning cell deployed to the relevant geographic combatant command or multinational headquarters to integrate and synchronize civilian and military planning
- Advance civilian team that deploys to support the Chief of Mission

Planning takes place at the CRSG level and at the IPC level for coordination with Defense. Planning includes the following steps:[143]

- Situation analysis, assembling data, and performing a comprehensive interagency assessment using the ICAF
- Policy formulation and articulating policy options based on their associated risks and benefits
- Strategy development to determine prioritization and sequencing of efforts
- Interagency implementation planning to synchronize diplomatic, development, and defense planning

5.7 Emergency Response Coordination

There is a significant difference between the deliberate planning process that can take place when the interagency team has time to sit down and coordinate their planning, and the crisis response mode in which such planning time is at a minimum.

As discussed in chapter 2, the performance of hastily formed networks tends to be highly dependent on the existence of established working relationships among members of the team. In the absence of those relationships, it takes longer for the team to become productive. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a mechanism to establish a common framework into which organizations and team members can connect, reducing the amount of time it takes for them to get organized.

The Incident Command System was created in the 1970s to coordinate the efforts of firefighters battling California wildfires. The system became more widely adopted, and its capabilities grew to enable a more coordinated and effective interagency response across a spectrum of emergencies, including oil spills, law enforcement operations, and mass casualties.[144] The Incident Command System evolved into what is known today as NIMS (see Figure 8).[145]

NIMS establishes a clear chain of command for the flow of information needed to combat the emergency. The incident commander is in charge, assisted by command staff that includes a public information officer, a safety officer, and a liaison officer. Under the commander are four sections:

- **Operations** performs direct-response activities and is divided into air and ground operations branches.
- **Planning** is responsible for planning and organizing the response, beginning with a needs assessment.
- **Logistics** is responsible for moving resources to support the operation.
- **Finance/Administration** manages timekeeping for payroll purposes, procurement, and other administrative functions.



Figure 8. NIMS.

In cases where military units are involved in emergency response, these four sections align broadly with the S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 on the commander's staff, providing clear points of contact between organizations.

The NIMS and National Response Framework (NRF) documents provided on the companion CD and the NRF Resource Center described in chapter 8 provide more information on NIMS.

"By three methods we may learn wisdom:
first, by reflection, which is noblest;
second, by imitation, which is easiest; and
third, by experience, which is the most bitter."
—Confucius

CHAPTER 6.0 Historical Interagency Case Studies

The following case studies help to illustrate the key points made in this handbook and were chosen to span the problem set associated with irregular threats, both foreign and domestic, and across multiple departments and agencies.

- **Counter Trafficking in Persons (TIP):** Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC)
- **Counter WMD**: 2001 Anthrax Attack
- **Counternarcotics**: Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-South)
- **Counter-Threat Finance**: Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG)
- **HLD/HLS**: Homeland Security Task Force Southeast
- (Operation Vigilant Sentry)
- **Counterterrorism**: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
- **Counter Cyberwarfare**: Joint Functional Component Command–Network Warfare (JFCC-NW)
- **COIN**: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
- **COIN**: Operation Continuing Promise
- **Counter-Piracy**: Counter-Piracy Working Group

6.1 Counter Trafficking in Persons (TIP): Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC)[146]

Background

Established as part of the 9/11 Commission findings, the HSTC was formed as an interagency coordinating center to tackle illegal travel as it relates to support of terrorist and criminal activities. This specialized unit integrates strategy and ensures collaboration among all significant policy, law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies in order to debase and frustrate clandestine terrorist travel and facilitation of migrant smuggling and trafficking of persons (Table 3). Currently in its formative phase, the center will serve as the fusion and clearinghouse for all information sharing at the federal level. As an interagency central point for countering unlawful travel, HSTC operates from the tactical to the strategic level by preparing assessments that will both guide policy and impact illicit travel.

Table 3. Interagency Response to TIP.

Lead: Homeland Security/State/Justice
Competence
• Lead—State: Diplomatic Security/Population, Refugees, and Migration/Office to Combat and Monitor TIP • Justice: Criminal Division • USAID Regional Bureaus • Labor: Bureau of International Labor Affairs
Cross-Sector Collaboration
• Justice: FBI/Civil Rights/Criminal Division/U.S. Attorneys • Labor: Employment Standards Administration • Homeland Security: Immigration and Customs Enforcement/ Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Resilience
• Homeland Security: Citizen and Immigration Services • Health and Human Services: Administration for Children and Families • Justice: Office of Justice Programs) • Labor: Employment Training Administration/Bureau of International Labor Affairs
Systems Approach
• Intelligence Community

Additionally, in its vital link to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the HSTC must

> improve effectiveness and to convert all information available to the Federal Government relating to clandestine terrorist travel and facilitation, human smuggling, and trafficking of persons into tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence that can be used . . .
>
> **—HSTC Report to Congress**[147]

> ***"Clandestine travel is as much an enabler of terrorism as is terrorist financing."***
>
> **—HSTC Report**

The HSTC has the unique ability to leverage the powerful tools of diplomacy and international collaboration to erode dual-use activities that mask worldwide illegal travel from identity document forging and TIP.

Lessons Learned

Staffing: Compulsory commitments by participating agencies and associated administration infrastructure have caused disparity of effort at this critical interagency info sharing center.

Data connectivity: The seemingly simple requirement to ensure common access across federal databases has been a major undertaking, but once fully incorporated, it will stimulate synergy by crosscutting stovepipes of information and skill sets**.**

Legal boundaries/authorities: Allowing the effective use and access of both domestic and foreign information is vital to effective

> ***"It has become more and more difficult to distinguish clearly between terrorist groups and organized crime units, since their tactics increasingly overlap. The world has seen the birth of a new hybrid of organized crime/terrorist organizations, and it is imperative to sever the connection between crime, drugs, and terrorism now."***
>
> **—United Nations Press Release**[148]



Figure 9. Counter-TIP Interagency Coordination.

operations and communication with partner agencies with singular responsibilities. Mining/sharing of collected information without encroachment of intelligence or legal evidentiary standards requires skilled interagency expertise. Proper command and management of these skills will determine the success of illicit travel deterrence and all of its associated parasitical effects.

6.2 Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 2001 Anthrax Attack[149]

Background

In the fall of 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media personnel and congressional officials, leading to the first cases of anthrax infection related to an intentional release of anthrax in the United States. Outbreaks of the disease were concentrated in five geographical epicenters located where individuals came into contact with spores from the contaminated letters: Florida; New York; New Jersey; Connecticut; and Washington, DC—both Capitol Hill and the greater regional area, including Maryland and Virginia. A total of 22 people developed anthrax as a result of the mailings:

Table 4. Interagency Response to 2001 Anthrax Attack.

Lead Agency: Health and Human Services, Primarily Through the CDC
Outbreak Investigation and Disease Control
• Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) • Health and Human Services/Food and Drug Administration (FDA) • Health and Human Services/National Institutes of Health (NIH) • Defense/U.S. Army Medical Research Institute (USAMRID) • Defense/U.S. Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC)
Biological-Hazard Assessment, Decontamination, and Cleanup
• Defense/U.S. Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) • Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Law Enforcement
• FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit • U.S. Capitol Police • U.S. Postal Inspection Service • Local law enforcement agencies
Local Responders (Identified Potential Anthrax Cases and Provided Medical Treatment)
• Physicians, nurses, hospitals, laboratories, public health departments, emergency medical services, emergency management agencies, and fire departments

Figure 10. Interagency Involvement.

11 suffered from the inhalational form of the disease, and 5 of these people died.

Lessons Learned

Insufficient personnel, resources, and operational systems; inadequate communications technology; and underdeveloped systems for emergency procurement of critical resources all posed challenges to the interagency response.

In reviewing lessons learned, officials identified the benefits of planning and experience and the importance of effective communication, both among responders and with the general public. In many instances, city, county, and state health officials within states and across state borders had had difficulty acquiring and sharing information and harmonizing their recommendations.

State and local public officials also indicated that although their preexisting planning efforts, exercises, and previous experience in responding to emergencies had helped to promote a rapid and coordinated response, problems arose because they had not fully anticipated the extent of coordination needed among responders and they did not have all the necessary agreements in place to put the plans into operation rapidly. Even when they did have agreements in place, the aspects that had not been operationalized affected their ability to coordinate a rapid response to the anthrax incidents.

Officials said that their responses also benefited from previous experience, including that gained through exercising their plans. These experiences had allowed them to build relationships and identify areas for improvement in their plans and thus to be better prepared to respond.

6.3 Counternarcotics: Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-South)[150]

Background

In 1994, the first National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) was published to consolidate all elements of the counter-drug initiative and to establish JIATF under the authority of the Executive Office of the President to execute the plan. JIATF-South evolved from the entities established by the NICCP into a high-functioning, successful JIATF, integrating several law enforcement and intelligence agencies into a joint Defense center while cooperating with law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies from several partner nations. The primary mission of JIATF-South is to conduct counter-illicit trafficking operations through intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and hand-off suspected illicit trafficking targets. Rather than setting up traditional liaison offices between agencies, JIATF-South is structured so that interagency partners perform their appropriate jobs with all of the authority and responsibility that each job requires. Partner agencies contribute

Table 5. Interagency and Multinational Response to Counternarcotics.

Lead Agency: Defense
Supporting Agencies—Interdiction
• Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), FBI • Homeland Security: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), CBP
Supporting Agencies—Intelligence
• Intelligence Community: CIA, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Security Agency (NSA) • Office of Naval Intelligence • El Paso Intelligence Center • Counternarcotics Center • State • Homeland Security: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Supporting Agencies—Law Enforcement (Counterterrorism)
• Defense

appropriate resources at their comfort level, and credit is freely shared and acknowledged both within the task force and by the hierarchies of all partners

Lessons Learned

Emphasizing strengths of each partner: Fully integrating all participants at each agency's comfort level gives each a sense of ownership in the task force. Fairly accounting for success in metrics specific to each agency allows participants to enjoy greater achievement through interagency cooperation that is recognized by their peers and leaders.

Authorities and funding: By making the JIATF accountable directly to the Executive Office of the President, rather than to Defense or another member agency, the authority is clear and interagency agreements are designed to meet the mission of the

While DoD is the lead agency for detection and monitoring, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime interdiction and shares lead responsibilities for aviation interdiction with Customs and Border Protection. Note that comparative advantage and legal requirements drive the designations—DoD has more sensors but is prohibited by law from engaging in law enforcement activities (apprehension, production of evidence against individuals for use in court, etc.). LEAs [law enforcement agencies] have access to other intelligence and the authorities to take action leveraging DoD contributions. JIATF-South has developed synergies and innovative solutions to unify these divided authorities in operations.

—Scott Feil[151]

task force rather than just the mission of the participating agency. Similarly, a separate line-item funding stream for the headquarters alleviates the need to draw funding or resources from partner agencies that would otherwise go toward the counter-drug mission.

Information sharing: Streamlining the process for declassification allows actionable information to be shared with interagency and international partners.

6.4 Counter-Threat Finance: Terrorist Financing Working Group (TFWG)[152]

Background

In the several years since the attacks of 9/11, agencies of the U.S. government have been moving toward an interagency approach to countering threat financing. One of the major initial efforts was the TFWG, chaired by the State Department with membership from the FBI, Treasury, and Homeland Security, along with participation from the CIA, the NSC, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve Board.

In 2008, Defense issued a directive-type memorandum (DTM 08-034) instituting counter-threat financing as a Defense mission under SOCOM.[153] This DTM formalized Defense cooperation with the TFWG and other agencies—such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the DEA—and allowed the organization of the Terrorist Financing Working Group, co-lead by Treasury and Defense and hosted semi-annually by SOCOM. This structure is similar to the smaller, more

Table 6. Interagency and Multinational Response to Counter-Threat Finance.

Lead Agency: Treasury/Defense
Supporting Agency—Designation
• State
Supporting Agencies—Counternarcotics
• Justice: FBI, DEA • State • Defense • Intelligence Community
Supporting International Partners
• United Nations • Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering • World Bank

Table 7. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-Blocked Funds in the United States Relating to SDGT, SDT, and FTO Programs.*

Organization/Related Designees	Blocked as of 2007
Al Qaida	$11,324,361
Hamas	$8,658,832
Hizballah	$437,281
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization	$111,423
New People's Army	$3,750
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	$63,508
Kahane Chai	$201
Taliban	$2,648
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	$134,916
Total assets of SDGTs, SDTs, and FTOs	**$20,736,920**

*SDT, Specially Designated Terrorist; SDGT, Specially Designated Global Terrorist; FTO, Foreign Terrorist Organization.

specific Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC), which was established in 2005 to improve U.S. efforts to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence related to the financial networks of insurgents, terrorists, and militias in Iraq. The success of the ITFC has prompted Defense to institute a similar cell in Afghanistan.

An area in which a need for improvement has been noted is training, including legal parameters, and the jurisdictions and responsibilities of participating U.S. agencies.

Lessons Learned

Coordination on goal is key: The broad range of counter-threat options available—including neutralization, interdiction, arrest and seizure of assets, freezing assets, and designation as a terrorist organization by an international body—requires heightened coordination among agencies, so that one member does not interrupt the operations of another member with an inappropriate or poorly timed action.

Resolve classification barriers: If classified material needs to be shared with partners, efforts are made to reclassify it as "Law Enforcement Sensitive" (LES) and designate it "Originator Controlled" (ORCON), removing the clearance barrier and formalizing

the information as law enforcement controlled. Removing these barriers when practicable enables many of the possible counter-threat options available to partner agencies.

Security of partner agencies: Security of non-Defense personnel in high-risk areas is necessary so that law enforcement tasks, such as forensics, can take place during or soon after combat actions occur.

Extended timeline: A long-term view and significant follow-up action are necessary to maximize the effect of counter-threat financing operations. Host-nation and international law enforcement or censure often are the most effective courses of action, so appropriate procedures on evidence gathering must be followed and significant proactive information operations must occur to ensure the impact of these actions.

> ***"While some in DoD, not so many years ago, saw this effort as well outside our lane, we have since seen the positive results. For example DoD is working to duplicate, outside of Iraq, the remarkable success of the Iraq Threat Finance Cell . . . Such cells rely on fused efforts, taking intelligence to operators, who in the future, will be mostly law enforcement agents making arrests, rather than soldiers making captures or kills. Due to these successes, we are now eagerly participating in the establishment of the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell."***
>
> **—LTG David P. Fridovich, Director, SOCOM Center for Special Operations**[154]

6.5 Homeland Defense/Homeland Security: Transborder Regional Threats[155]

Background

The Homeland Security Task Force South East (HSTF-SE) was established in 2003 to fulfill Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 mandates encompassed by the wide-ranging, unified plan

Figure 11. Homeland Security Task Force South East.

(Operation Vigilant Sentry). In response to mass migration events originating in the Caribbean, this "crisis" interagency group would form an effective and efficient apparatus to provide for the safety and security of national borders and migrants alike. Although not a continually manned entity, this complex task force—when triggered by a Presidential declaration of a mass migration event in the Caribbean Basin—will team up in Miami within 24 hours under the auspices of Homeland Security to coordinate all maritime and land-based response actions.

Operation Vigilant Sentry:

A multiagency contingency plan, developed in 2003, to address a mass migration event, interdiction, and migrant camp operations outside of the continental United States.

—GAO-07-804R[156]

Table 8. Interagency and Multinational Response to Transborder Regional Threats.

Lead Agency: Homeland Security (CBP/USCG/ICE)
Medical Teams
• U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) • Health and Human Services • CDC • Florida Department of Health
Multinational Participation
• International Organization for Migration (IOM) • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Emergency Responders
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) • State Emergency Management • Florida National Guard
Other U.S. Government
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) • State Emergency Management • Florida National Guard

Lessons Learned

The extremely complex nature of mass migration events creates a unique sense of urgency and poses specific national security concerns not only to the southern U.S. border but also to a wider perspective of national security interests as a whole.

NGO social services: While mass migrations cause an enormous logistic problem, the circumstances are compounded by the wretchedness caused by deplorable physical conditions under which many migrants have lived in their native country. An integral part of HSTF-SE tasks includes screening those who have avoided blockades or seek asylum and whose care must be managed further. The interagency partners lend integral solutions for these human services that are indispensable in maintaining the refugee populace in a hospitable environment.

NGO screening and funding: Key to this effort is the participation of NGOs and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) that provide essential services at temporary holding facilities. Enormous

> *"Since 1980, the Coast Guard has interdicted over 350,000 illegal migrants at sea, including around 180,000 Cuban and Haitian migrants during mass migrations in 1980 and 1994."*
>
> —RADM Wayne Justice[157]

challenges surround the identification of these previously vetted or "clustered" NGOs and PVOs that can rapidly and efficiently field specific skill sets within the massive effort.

Additionally, it is inaccurately assumed that all NGOs and PVOs are cost-free: most require payment of not only transportation, room, and board but also compensation for services rendered. Likewise, funding authority and resource budgets for these nontraditional agencies often are overlooked.

Figure 12. Interagency Involvement in Transborder Regional Threats.

6.6 Counterterrorism: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)[158]

Background

The TSCTP was established to eliminate terrorist safe havens in northwest Africa by strengthening country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of violent extremist ideology.



Figure 13. Interagency and Intra-agency Collaboration.

Since TSCTP's inception in 2005, State, USAID, and Defense have supported a wide range of associated diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities in nine countries, and their efforts may expand to include others. State has hosted educational and cultural exchange programs intended to marginalize violent extremism; USAID has supported efforts to improve education and health; and Defense has provided counterterrorism training and distributed equipment to the program's partner countries. Additionally, Treasury and Justice and several intelligence

Table 9. Interagency Effort in TSCTP.

Key Supporting Agencies
Medical Teams
• USAID • Defense • Other State entities (including Ambassadors/Chiefs of Mission)
Other Supporting Entities
• Treasury • Justice: FBI • Intelligence Community • NGOs • Contractors
Host-Nation Governments
• Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso

agencies conduct limited counterterrorism activities in TSCTP partner countries.

Lessons Learned

Strategic plan: The program has been hampered by the absence of a strategic plan that articulates a common vision, end state, and operational guidance in terms that are shared by all interagency participants.

Integration: No comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the TSCTP program's implementation. The documents used in planning TSCTP activities lack key strategic elements required for large interagency programs, such as a clear definition of the program's goals and objectives as well as milestones linked to these objectives. As a result, State, USAID, and Defense have developed separate plans focused on their respective program activities. Although these plans reflected some collaboration, the agencies' plans are focused on their respective missions and do not comprise an integrated strategy addressing TSCTP activities in all nine countries. This disconnect has hampered their collective ability to collaboratively implement their activities.

Prioritization: The documents used in planning the activities do not prioritize proposed activities. Deconfliction of differing priorities among federal agencies has been a significant challenge. Furthermore, restrictions exist on how funding for many programs can be used, which result in stovepiped funding streams that inhibit the integration of programs and activities into comprehensive solutions and cause fluctuations in funding streams that hamper program efforts.

Metrics: The documents used in planning TSCTP activities also do not identify milestones needed to measure progress or make improvements, and definitions of success can vary. The agencies have few common metrics—such as a decrease in extremism in the targeted regions—for measuring their TSCTP activities' outcomes.

Roles and responsibilities: Disagreements about whether State should have authority over Defense personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in partner countries have led to Defense's

suspending some activities. Irresolvable at the country level, some disagreements have required higher-level guidance or intervention. For large-scale interagency efforts in which collaboration is essential, agencies should work together to define and agree on roles and responsibilities. To enable a cohesive working relationship and create the mutual trust required to enhance and sustain the collaborative effort, agencies should establish compatible policies to operate across agency boundaries.

Agreements reached at DC-based interagency meetings held to discuss TSCTP priorities and activities have not always been implemented on the ground in some partner countries because of a perceived lack of initiative worth by local interagency stakeholders. Successful TSCTP program execution depends on effective, ongoing collaboration both across and within the participating agencies.

6.7 Counter Cyberwarfare[159]

Background

In May 2009, a Cyberspace Policy Review was issued, the result of a 60-day review of existing cyberspace policy directed by President Obama. This report found issues with the current status of cyberspace defense and recovery policies and suggested that a new position be created, reporting directly to the NSC and the National Economic Council (NEC). This position would be empowered to coordinate all of the Nation's cybersecurity activities, chair the Information and Communications Infrastructure Interagency Policy Committee (ICI-IPC), and build on the mission-bridging activities of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), an effort currently directed by the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force under the Director of National Intelligence.

The recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review are focused on federal civilian network systems under the responsibility of Homeland Security. Classified federal network systems are the responsibility of NSA, while Defense is responsible for military network systems. Each service has components focused on cyber capabilities along with the capabilities developed by several Defense agencies.



Figure 14. The Cyberspace Domain.[160]

Concurrent with the Cyberspace Policy Review, Defense is reorganizing its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities into a new joint cyber command under U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). By uniting under a single commander the Joint Functional Component Command–Network Warfare (JFCC-NW), an offensive unit associated with NSA, and the Joint Task Force–Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), an organization focused on protecting military cyberoperations, the first steps toward this joint command have been taken.

Lessons Learned

Balancing security and liberty: The tension between securing information and opening networks for commerce is significant, even at the highest levels. One stumbling block in filling the position proposed in the Cyberspace Policy Review is the constraint put on the position by making it subordinate to both the NSC and the NEC.



Intradepartmental rivalries: Consolidation of capabilities, as with Defense reorganization, may be confused with consolidation of influence. In-fighting

Table 10. Interagency and Multinational Response to Cyberwarfare.

Lead Agencies: Homeland Security/Defense (STRATCOM)
Supporting Agencies—Civilian Systems
• Defense • Justice: FBI • Commerce • Energy • State • Transportation • Treasury • Intelligence Community: CIA, NSA • National Institute of Standards and Testing • Office of Management and Budget
Supporting Agencies—Military Systems
• Defense: U.S. Army Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) , U.S. Navy Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT), U.S. Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Command (MCNOSC), U.S. Air Force Network Operations and Security Center Network Security Division (AFNOSC NSD) Intelligence Community: CIA, NSA • Justice: FBI

among the Services over who "owned" cyberspace caused confusion both inside and outside of Defense on the role of the military in cybersecurity.

Information sharing: Classification of information is a major issue, with not only a broad range of federal, state, and local agencies involved in cybersecurity but also significant interaction with private industry, which controls 85% of the cyber infrastructure. Solutions have addressed this in two ways—either by making efforts to declassify information or by including outside partners on classified programs by allowing some of their employees to get the appropriate clearances.

6.8 Counterinsurgency (COIN): Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)[161]

Background

CORDS was created as an interagency headquarters that streamlined U.S. pacification efforts in support of the South Vietnamese govern-

ment and the fight against Viet Cong insurgents. Prior to the inception of CORDS, the U.S. pacification assistance mission in South Vietnam was run by the U.S. mission offices in Saigon through various partner agencies. The military advisory effort was run by Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV); however, military assets were outside the direct purview of the embassy. The U.S. government created CORDS to overcome organizational and administrative problems and to better focus U.S. interagency support behind South Vietnamese efforts at pacification.

Lessons Learned

Unity of effort: Unity of effort is critical, so create a unified structure combining military and civilian elements.

Emphasize partners in local government: Give the local government the capability and responsibility for improving the population's livelihood, to strengthen support for the legitimate government and undermine the insurgency. Make it a priority to eliminate the underground leadership infrastructure, and develop robust intelligence capability while being open about the objective of wiping out the insurgencies' leaders via a clearly defined legal framework.

Address doctrinal differences among partners: Differences in policy and doctrine among participating agencies concerning the conduct of their personnel must be addressed openly so that issues

Table 11. Interagency and Multinational Involvement with CORDS.

Lead Agency: Defense
Supporting Agencies—Cultural Development
• State • USAID • U.S. Information Service (USIS)
Supporting Agencies—Intelligence
• CIA • Defense Intelligence Agencies
Supporting Agencies—Law Enforcement (Terrorism)
• South Vietnamese military and agencies

> *"CORDS was unique in that it placed nearly all civilian and military interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager—and then subordinated that individual to the military hierarchy as a Deputy Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam. This innovative structure provided the pacification effort nearly un-fettered access to enormous military and civilian resources."*
>
> **—Project on National Security Reform Report**

related to law enforcement or the Uniform Code of Military Justice do not create false impressions of the mission purpose. In particular, the Phoenix Program, which operated under justifiable CIA doctrine, was conflated by activists and the media as representative of all MACV and CORDS operations.

6.9 Counterinsurgency (COIN): Stability Operations (Continuing Promise)[162]

Background

The most recent Continuing Promise deployment of 2009 provides a successful example of interagency integration. Over the last 3 years, this annual embark linked medical and construction teams onboard USNS Mercy Class and U.S. Military Amphibious ships to deprived areas in Latin America and the Caribbean. The mission's primary

Table 12. Continuing Promise 2009 Services Provided.

Patients Treated	100,049
Surgeries Conducted	1,657
Prescriptions Filled	135,000
Dental Patients	15,003
Animals Treated	13,238
Seabees Completed	13 construction projects

Data from USSOUTHCOM (Jul 2009).



aim is to train embarked teams in providing a full range of health care services. The Continuing Promise missions deploy for 4–5 months and typically visit up to seven different nations where they spend 10–12 days inland with local health care professionals providing basic free medical/dental and veterinary services. The transformational inclusion of NGOs among other interagency associations has amplified the United States' social capital and similarly provided feasible humanitarian assistance through engineering

Table 13. Interagency Involvement with Continuing Promise.

Lead Agency: Defense*
Medical Teams
• USPHS • Health and Human Services • Defense: Medical, Dental, Veterinary Services • Multinational Medical Service Teams
NGOs
• Food for the Poor • International Aid • Operation Smile • Project Hope • Hugs Across America • Wheelchair Foundation • Latter Day Saints Ministries • Agua Viva
Academic Institutions
• University of California, San Diego • University of Miami

*Ships, Civil Affairs Teams, Combat Camera, Navy Seabees, U.S. Air Force (USAF) Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force

and medical outreach. These seemingly unusual military-led civil affairs events have been noticeably transformed by the estimable growth of interagency associations into clearly viable phase zero/smart power shaping events.

Lessons Learned

While the primary mission for these exercises has been training of the embarked elements, the outreach has touched thousands of needy recipients—and has optimistically changed the lens through which the United States is viewed in the region and the world.

Planning cycles: Synchronizing all of the distinct group tempos into a singular established planning cycle proved enormously imposing. Disparate planning styles and cycles created challenging scenarios to which skilled planners were forced to adapt quickly. Orchestrating a diversity of approaches into a phased logical sequence was essential to the overall success of the mission.

Strategic communication: Upholding an authentic perspective of this overseas operation was a challenge. This issue was addressed by team members with critical political–military skill sets who were able to recognize the importance of subtle cultural nuances that could directly impact local and regional perceptions. The inclusion of interagency foreign area expertise with professional cultural and regional awareness in future missions may add a considerable advantage to the strategic communications set. Including dimensions of interagency cultural shaping and focused foreign area engagement plans could provide ample grounds for more effective social capital building experiences. Integration of interagency capabilities—composed by experts attuned to local customs, traditions, and perceptions—can greatly enhance strategic communications and help navigate through nontraditional pitfalls of image-management operations abroad.

> ***"Continuing Promise offered training for U.S. military personnel and partner nation forces . . . mission provided medical treatment to more than 100,000 patients."***
>
> **—Commander, Fourth Fleet, July 2009**

6.10 Counter-Piracy: Horn of Africa[163]

Background

The Somali waters off of the Horn of Africa, including the Gulf of Aden, are a part of a critical shipping lane that is vital to global commerce—80% of which takes place by sea. Piracy has long been a problem here, but risks to the 20,000 ships that traverse these waters annually have dramatically increased because of a combination of rampant lawlessness in Somalia and the pirates' increased use of offshore "mother ships" to orchestrate strikes up to 800 miles offshore.

The goal of modern-day pirates operating in these waters primarily is to make money by taking over a ship, seizing hostages and cargo, and waiting for the shipping company to pay a ransom. Pirates can board and commandeer a ship in less than 20 minutes, an action that can eventually result in a ransom of $1–2 million.

High profits with low costs and little risk of consequences ensure almost unlimited human resources and offer a breeding ground for higher levels of instability, organized crime, and other transnational threats.

Lessons Learned

Deterrence and defense: The 2.5 million square miles of water off Somalia's coasts precludes a purely naval solution; rough estimates suggest that it would take up to 140 craft to properly patrol the Gulf of Aden, and several times that number to cover the waters around Somalia's eastern coast. Combined Task



Figure 15. Interagency and Intra-agency Collaboration.

Table 14. Interagency and Multinational Involvement in Counter-Piracy in the Horn of Africa.

Lead Agency: State (Counter-Piracy Working Group)
U.S. Government Effort
• Defense: U.S. Navy • Transportation: Maritime Administration • Homeland Security (USCG) • Justice • Intelligence Community
International Entities
• Multinational Naval Deployments, Including CTF 151 and the European Union's Operation Atlanta • CGPSC Comprising 24 United Nations Member States and Five Multinational Organizations • United Nations (via United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1846 and 1851) • Maritime State Judiciaries
Commercial Interests
• Shipping Industry • Insurance Industry
Host-Nation Proxies
• Transitional Federal Government

Force (CTF) 151 and the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPSC) are coordinating the multinational response to optimize use of the limited number of available naval vessels. Defending against piracy, however, must be the joint responsibility of governments and the shipping industry. Shippers and the insurance industry must address gaps in self-defense measures.

Legal authorities: CGPSC is exploring the tracking and freezing of pirate assets and is trying to secure the release of ships and their crews currently being held. International anti-piracy agreements should allow for more aggressive and thus more effective measures. The United Nations' mandate on piracy, for example, does not give the international fleet permission to seize hijacked ships in an effort to free hostages. Agreements such as the U.S.–Kenyan MOU, on the other hand, offer the international community a viable method to deter and punish acts of piracy.

Governance: Solving the root issue of lack of effective governance in Somalia is paramount, but effective coordination with the proxy governments has proved problematic. A diplomatic team has attempted to engage Somali government officials from the Transitional Federal Government and regional leaders in Puntland to encourage them to take action against pirates operating from bases within their territories and to improve their capacity to police their own territory.

Lack of Sustainable Strategy: Although efforts to thwart, defeat, or avoid pirates might be successful in the short term, solutions must incorporate long-term strategies to decrease incentives for young Somali men to engage in piracy. The current cost-vs.-benefit calculation must be altered not only for the pirates themselves but also for their entire support network.

Although multinational naval patrols have had some success in thwarting pirate attacks, the effort to end Somali piracy must extend beyond this to address

1. **Sustainable remedies for Somalia's extreme poverty and political fragility;**
2. **Diplomatic, military, and financial opportunities for interrupting piracy support operations ashore;**
3. **Cost-conscious options for the maritime industry; and**
4. **Jurisdictional questions.**

"Everybody is ignorant. Only on different subjects."

—Will Rogers

CHAPTER 7.0 Partner Capabilities[164]

7.1 Capability Descriptions

The following terms are used in this chapter to describe the various capabilities of members of the interagency team.

- **Civil administration:** Expertise in governance, the rule of law, and court systems
- **Communications:** The physical communications equipment and the avenues required for information coordination
- **Diplomacy:** The art of negotiating with tact and skill when dealing with people (i.e., soft power)
- **Financial expertise:** The allocation and deployment of economic resources as well as the capacity to assist in the target area's economic development
- **Funding support:** Financial backing both internally for the interagency team and, if overseas, for support of the host nation mission
- **Host-nation (HN) training:** The ability to provide for overseas training (e.g., police, military, medical personnel)
- **Infrastructure:** Basic physical structures needed to support the operation of the interagency team (i.e., workplace)
- **Intelligence:** Global and/or regional information about the area and people supported by the interagency team (as well as, when overseas, those potentially in opposition to its efforts)

- **Law enforcement:** The enforcement of local laws, including the administration of correctional facilities and processes
- **Legal issues:** Expertise in the authorities of interagency players as well as in contracts for supporting the interagency team
- **Local knowledge:** Culture, points of contact, language, ethnic groups, religion, etc., associated with the local region
- **Public health:** Disease prevention and health promotion
- **Security:** The safety and force protection of the interagency team
- **Sustainment:** Consumable goods (e.g., food, water, fuel) and non-consumable items (e.g., lodging)
- **Technological expertise:** Specialized capability to deal with advanced threats [e.g., cyber; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE)/WMD]
- **Training:** The ability to provide domestic training (of police, military, medical personnel, etc.)
- **Transportation:** Means of moving personnel, equipment, and supplies to and/or within the area requiring interagency support

7.2 U.S. Government Departments and Agencies

These departments, agencies, and offices are potential partners in your interagency teaming effort.

> ***Note:*** **Underlined** text indicates that the department, agency, or organization has strengths in this capability.

7.2.1 Department of Agriculture: http://www.usda.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: Public health

Overseas Capabilities: HN training, Public health

Agriculture's mission is to provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management. Agriculture

programs include the Foreign Agriculture Service, the Rural Development Agency, and the National Water Management Center. In addition to providing support to disaster relief operations, Agriculture is the lead department for the veterinary response for pandemic and avian influenza.

7.2.2 Department of Commerce: http://www.commerce.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: Financial expertise, Technological expertise

Overseas Capabilities: Financial expertise, **Technological expertise**

Commerce fosters, serves, and promotes the nation's economic development and technological advancement. The department has expertise in international trade databases, economic analysis, business development, and exports and imports. Key offices in Commerce include Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance (NPTC) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

7.2.3 Department of Defense: http://www.defense.gov/

Domestic Capabilities (Army National Guard and Air National Guard): Civil administration, **Communications**, Funding support, **Infrastructure**, **Security**, **Sustainment**, **Technological expertise**, **Training**, **Transportation**

Overseas Capabilities (Defense writ large): Civil administration, **Communications**, **Funding support**, **HN training**, **Infrastructure**, **Intelligence**, **Law enforcement**, Legal issues, Local knowledge, Public health, **Security**, **Sustainment**, **Technological expertise**, **Transportation**

The mission of the Defense Department is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country. Among its myriad capabilities, Defense personnel engage in warfighting, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and homeland

defense. The Defense components listed here obviously do not represent a comprehensive survey of Defense capabilities and resources. They do, however, reflect major Defense components committed to U.S. government interagency efforts.

- Services
- U.S. Air Force: **http://www.af.mil/**
  - U.S. Army: **http://www.army.mil/**
  - U.S. Marine Corps: **http://www.marines.mil/Pages/Default.aspx**
  - U.S. Navy: **http://www.navy.mil/swf/index.asp**
  - U.S. National Guard: **http://www.ng.mil/default.aspx**
- Regional Combatant Commands
  - U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): **http://www.africom.mil/**
  - U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM): **http://www.centcom.mil/**
  - U.S. European Command (EUCOM): **http://www.eucom.mil/english/index.asp**
  - U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM): **http://www.northcom.mil/**
  - U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM): **http://www.pacom.mil/**
  - U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM): **http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/index.php**
- Functional Combatant Commands
  - U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM): **http://www.jfcom.mil/**
  - U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM): **http://www.socom.mil/SOCOMHOME/Pages/default.aspx**
  - U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM): **http://www.stratcom.mil/**
  - U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM): **http://www.transcom.mil/**
- **Defense Members of Intelligence Community (IC)** (see section on IC for more information)

- Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)]: **http://www.defenselink.mil/osd/**
- Air Force Intelligence: **http://www.afisr.af.mil/**
- Army Intelligence: **http://www.inscom.army.mil**
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): **http://www.dia.mil/**
- Marine Corps Intelligence: **http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA**
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA): **http://www.nga.mil/**
- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO): **http://www.nro.gov/**
- National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service: **http://www.nsa.gov/**
- Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI): **http://www.nmic.navy.mil/**

- **Defense Agencies**
  Defense operates 16 agencies. Some of the agencies that may play a significant role in the interagency team include the following:
  - Defense Contract Management Agency: **http://www.dcma.mil/**
  - Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA): **http://www.disa.mil/**
  - Defense Logistics Agency (DLA): **http://www.dla.mil/**
  - Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): **http://www.dsca.mil/**
  - Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): **http://www.dtra.mil/**
  - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA): **http://www.darpa.mil/**

DARPA's mission is to bridge the gap between basic science and military applications. DARPA can provide the interagency team with the capability to reach-back to the scientific community to assist in the resolution of technological challenges.

7.2.4 Department of Health and Human Services: http://www.hhs.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: **Public health**, Technological expertise

Overseas Capabilities: **Public health**, Technological expertise

The mission of Health and Human Services is to protect the health of all Americans and provide essential human services. Major Health and Human Services agencies include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Other key offices and programs include the Office of Global Health Affairs (OGHA), the Office of HIV/AIDS Policy (OHAP), and U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS). In addition, Health and Human Services is the lead department for the medical response for pandemic influenza.

7.2.5 Department of Homeland Security: http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm

Domestic Capabilities: **Civil administration**, **Communications**, Diplomacy, **Funding support**, **Infrastructure**, **Intelligence**, **Law enforcement**, Legal issues, Local knowledge, Public health, **Security**, Sustainment, **Technological expertise**, **Training**, **Transportation**

Overseas Capabilities: HN training, Intelligence, Law enforcement, Technological expertise

Homeland Security came into being under the terms of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. That legislation consolidated 22 existing federal agencies and many additional federal responsibilities that were then distributed throughout Homeland Security. Homeland Security has as its primary focus securing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks as well as other man-made and natural threats. The department leads a variety of agencies whose purposes are relevant to both domestic and international counterterrorism efforts. In support of these efforts, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis focuses on threats related to border security, CBRNE (to include explosives and infectious diseases), critical infrastructure, extremists within the homeland, and travelers entering the homeland. In addition, Homeland Security is the lead department

for overall domestic incident management and federal coordination for pandemic influenza. Major Homeland Security agencies include the following:

- **Customs and Border Protection (CBP):** http://www.cbp.gov/. CBP protects our nation's borders in order to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States via contraband smuggling, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
- **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):** http://www.fema.gov/. FEMA prepares the nation for hazards, manages federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident, and administers the National Flood Insurance Program.
- **Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE):** http://www.ice.gov/index.htm. ICE is responsible for the administration of immigration and naturalization adjudication functions. ICE investigates U.S. or foreign companies selling prohibited weapons and dual-use technologies as well as illegal financial schemes—to include terrorist financing.
- **Transportation Security Administration (TSA):** http://www.tsa.gov/. Though most familiar for its presence in some 450 U.S. airports, the TSA is further engaged through the U.S. government interagency process to assist in the security of the nation's highways, railroads, buses, mass transportation systems, and ports.
- **U.S. Coast Guard (USCG):** http://www.uscg.mil/default.asp. The USCG conducts a variety of missions—including port security, search and rescue, law enforcement, maritime safety, counternarcotics, and alien migration interdiction—designed to monitor shipping traffic near and approaching U.S. shores and to secure U.S. ports, harbors, and coastline. Internationally, the USCG works with other countries to improve maritime security and law enforcement and to support U.S. diplomatic activities. The USCG's presence in ports and

along shorelines, both domestically and internationally, positions it as a source of intelligence not always available by other collection means.

- **U.S. Secret Service (USSS):** http://www.secretservice.gov/. The USSS has both protective and investigative responsibilities that cause it to engage the U.S. government interagency process for information exchanges, planning coordination, and other critical activities within the counterterrorism effort. It plays a critical role in securing the nation's financial infrastructure and money supply (e.g., counterfeit currency, credit card and bank fraud, electronic financial crimes) while protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state, and various security venues.

7.2.6 Department of Justice: http://www.usdoj.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: **Civil administration**, Funding support, **Intelligence**, **Law enforcement**, **Legal issues**, Local knowledge, **Security**, Training

Overseas Capabilities: Civil administration, **HN training**, **Intelligence**, **Law enforcement**, **Legal issues**, Local knowledge, Security, Technological expertise

The mission of the Justice Department is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law, to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic, to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime, to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior, and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. Justice includes the following entities:

- **Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF):** http://www.atf.gov/. The ATF protects communities from violent criminals, criminal organizations, the illegal use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use and storage of explosives, acts of arson and bombings, acts of terrorism, and the illegal diversion of

alcohol and tobacco products. ATF partners with communities, industries, law enforcement, and public safety agencies to safeguard the public through information sharing, training, research, and use of technology.

- **Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA):** http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm. With access to worldwide databases and expertise in drug-money connections to terrorist financing and counter-narcoterrorism, the DEA enforces the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and provides drug-related information for the IC acquired during its drug enforcement duties.
- **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):** http://www.fbi.gov/. As both an intelligence and a law enforcement agency, the FBI is responsible for understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm the United States. In coordination with the IC, law enforcement partners, and other federal, state, municipal, and international agencies, the FBI protects and defends the United States against terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, WMD proliferators, and criminal enterprises through computer forensics and electronic/document exploitation, interrogation and detainee-screening support, initial crime-scene examination of high-visibility attacks, and law enforcement capacity building for partner nations.

7.2.7 Department of Energy: http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity/

Domestic Capabilities: **Technological expertise**

Overseas Capabilities: HN training, **Intelligence**, **Technological expertise**

Energy has four overriding National Security priorities: ensuring the integrity and safety of the country's nuclear weapons, promoting international nuclear safety, advancing nuclear non-proliferation,

and continuing to provide safe, efficient, and effective nuclear power plants for the U.S. Navy. Key offices and programs in the department include the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Nuclear Weapons Incident Response program.

In support of Energy's ability to provide technology, analysis, and expertise to aid in preventing the spread or use of WMD, Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence works through the interagency IC to enable the exchange of intelligence throughout the U.S. government interagency process on energy matters and to conduct evaluations of emerging threats to U.S. economic and security interests.

7.2.8 Department of State: http://www.state.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: Diplomacy

Overseas Capabilities: Civil administration, **Communications**, **Diplomacy**, **Funding support**, **HN training**, **Infrastructure**, **Intelligence** [through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)], Law enforcement, **Legal issues**, **Local knowledge**, Public health, Security, **Sustainment**, Technological expertise, Transportation

The mission of the State Department is to advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.

Overseas, the U.S. Ambassador, or Chief of Mission, leads the Country Team, which serves as the multi-faceted "face" of the U.S. government interagency process in each country. In addition, State is the lead department for international activities for pandemic influenza. Some of the department's key organizational components include the following bureaus and offices.

- **Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT): http://www.state.gov/s/ct/.** S/CT is the lead federal agency for

counterterrorism policy overseas and includes, among other units, the Counterterrorism Finance Unit (CT Finance).

- **Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS):** http://www.state.gov/s/crs/. S/CRS is responsible for leading all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations.
- **Cultural Property:** http://culturalheritage.state.gov/. This bureau is the lead federal agency for U.S. policy on antiquities and archeological sites.
- **Coordinator for Diplomatic Security (DS):** http://www.state.gov/m/ds/. DS is the security and law enforcement arm of State. A world leader in international investigations, threat analysis, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, security technology, and protection of people, property, and information, DS coordinates high-level visits and personal security for U.S. and foreign dignitaries overseas.
- **Geographic Bureaus**
  - African Affairs (AF): http://www.state.gov/p/af
  - East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP): http://www.state.gov/p/eap
  - European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR): http://www.state.gov/p/eur
  - Near Eastern Affairs (NEA): http://www.state.gov/p/nea
  - South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA): http://www.state.gov/p/sca
  - Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA): http://www.state.gov/p/wha/
- **Intelligence and Research (INR):** http://www.state.gov/s/inr/. INR provides value-added independent analysis of events to department policymakers, ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes, and serves as the focal point in the department

for ensuring policy review of sensitive counterintelligence and law enforcement activities. INR's primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve U.S. diplomacy. The bureau also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues. INR is a member of the U.S. IC.

- **International Information Programs (IIP):** http://www.state.gov/r/iip/. IIP communicates with foreign publics, including opinion-makers and youth, about U.S. policy, society, and values. IIP has expertise in coordination of strategic communications (e.g., Voice of America).
- **International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL):** http://www.state.gov/p/inl/. INL programs aim to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States and to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.
- **International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN):** http://www.state.gov/t/isn/. ISN spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD. ISN addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, and actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- **Political–Military Affairs (PM):** http://www.state.gov/t/pm/. PM is the lead for counter-piracy, Quadrennial Defense Review, strategic planning, counterinsurgency, security sector reform, Foreign Military Sales, Global Peace Operations Initiative, and Defense exercise support and coordination. PM also manages the Political Advisor (POLAD) program that assigns diplomats as advisors to key military commanders.
- **Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM):** http://www.state.gov/g/prm/. PRM provides protection, life-sustaining relief, and durable solutions for refugees and conflict victims by working through the multilateral humanitarian system to achieve the best results for

refugees and conflict victims on behalf of the American taxpayer.

- **Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP): http://www.state.gov/g/tip/.** G/TIP provides the tools to combat TIP and assists in the coordination of anti-trafficking efforts both worldwide and domestically.
- **Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI): http://www.state.gov/t/vci.** VCI ensures that appropriate verification requirements and capabilities are fully considered and properly integrated throughout the development, negotiation, and implementation of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments and to ensure that other countries' compliance is carefully watched, rigorously assessed, appropriately reported, and resolutely enforced.

7.2.9 Department of Transportation: http://www.dot.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: Intelligence, **Transportation**

Overseas Capabilities: **Intelligence**, Transportation

The mission of the Transportation department is to ensure a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and convenient transportation system that meets U.S. vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into the future. Major Transportation agencies include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD). In addition, Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Analysis collects and processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policies and supports the department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) efforts to combat terrorist financing.

7.2.10 Department of the Treasury: http://www.treas.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: **Financial expertise**, **Funding support**, Intelligence

Overseas Capabilities: **Financial expertise**, Intelligence

Treasury's counterterrorism role focuses on counter-threat finance, ensuring the sound functioning of the U.S. and international financial systems in the face of security threats to their stability. Through participation in the U.S. government interagency process and coordination with partner nations and international organizations, Treasury targets and manages sanctions against foreign threats to U.S. financial systems while also identifying and targeting financial support networks established to sustain terrorist and other threats to national security. Treasury has expertise in tracking regime and terrorist finances and in developing financially stable systems and sound economic policies. Key offices in the department include the following:

- **Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):** http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
- **Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA):** http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/oia/
- **Office of International Affairs:** http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/
- **Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI):** http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/

7.2.11 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): http://www.epa.gov/

Domestic Capabilities: **Public health**

Overseas Capabilities: Public health

The EPA's mission is to protect human health and the environment. Key incident-response capabilities in EPA are provided via the Environmental Response Team, Regional Response Teams, and the Radiological Emergency Response Teams.

7.2.12 Intelligence Community (IC): http://www.intelligence.gov/index.shtml

Domestic Capabilities: **Intelligence**, Technological expertise

Overseas Capabilities: HN training, **Intelligence**, **Local knowledge**, Technological expertise

The IC is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States. With the exception of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the CIA, intelligence offices or agencies are components of cabinet departments with other roles and missions. The intelligence organizations of the four military services concentrate largely on concerns related to their specific missions. Their analytical products, along with those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), supplement the work of CIA analysts and provide greater depth on key technical issues. The members of the IC are as follows:

Director of National Intelligence (DNI): http://www.dni.gov/. The DNI serves as the head of the IC; acts as the principal advisor to the President, the NSC, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security; and oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP).

Defense/Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)]: http://www.defenselink.mil/osd/. The USD(I) coordinates with the DNI on intelligence matters related to Defense; serves as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on all intelligence, counterintelligence and security, and other intelligence-related matters; and provides oversight and policy guidance for all Defense intelligence activities.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): https://www.cia.gov/. The CIA collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates foreign intelligence to assist government policymakers in making decisions related to national security. CIA has all-source analytical capabilities that cover the whole world outside U.S. borders.

Homeland Security/Coast Guard Intelligence: http://www.uscg.mil/. The Coast Guard's presence in ports and along shorelines, both domestically and internationally, positions it as a source of intelligence not always available by other collection means.

Homeland Security/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis: http://www.dhs.gov/. The Homeland Security Act provided Homeland Security responsibilities for fusing law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate in Homeland Security participates in the interagency counterterrorism efforts and, along with the FBI, has focused on ensuring that state and local law enforcement officials receive information on terrorist threats from national-level intelligence agencies. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis focuses on threats related to border security, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, conventional explosives and infectious diseases, critical infrastructure, extremists within the United States, and travelers entering the United States.

Defense/Air Force Intelligence: http://www.afisr.af.mil/.

Defense/Army Intelligence: http://www.inscom.army.mil/.

Defense/Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): http://www.dia.mil/. The DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence, providing assessments of foreign military intentions and capabilities to U.S. military commanders and civilian policymakers. DIA performs five core intelligence functions: human intelligence collection, all-source analysis, counterintelligence, technical intelligence collection, and document and media exploitation.

Defense/Marine Corps Intelligence: http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA.

Defense/National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA): http://www.nga.mil/. The NGA collects, creates, and develops imagery and map-based intelligence solutions for U.S. national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation.

Defense/National Reconnaissance Office (NRO): http://www.nro.gov/. The NRO designs, builds, and operates the nation's signals and imagery reconnaissance satellites. Information collected using NRO satellites is used for a variety of tasks, such as warning of potential foreign military aggression, monitoring WMD programs,

enforcing arms control and environmental treaties, and assessing the impact of natural and manmade disasters.

Defense/National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service: http://www.nsa.gov/. NSA is the United States' cryptologic organization, with responsibility for protecting the U.S. government's information systems and producing foreign signals intelligence information. Areas of expertise include cryptanalysis, cryptography, mathematics, computer science, and foreign language analysis.

Defense/Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI): http://www.nmic.navy.mil/.

Energy/Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence: http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity. Energy focuses on assessing worldwide nuclear terrorism threats, nuclear proliferation, and evaluation foreign technology threats.

Justice/Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)/Office of National Security Intelligence: http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm. The DEA enforces the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and provides drug-related information for the IC acquired during its drug enforcement duties.

Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)/National Security Branch: http://www.fbi.gov/. As both an intelligence and a law enforcement agency, the FBI is responsible for understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm the United States. The FBI coordinates these efforts with its IC and law enforcement partners and focuses on terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, WMD proliferators, and criminal enterprises.

State/Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR): http://www.state.gov/s/inr. INR provides interpretative analysis of global developments to the State Department and contributes its unique perspective to the IC's National Intelligence Estimates and other products. INR's written products cover the full range of geographic and functional areas of expertise. It serves as the focal point within the

department for all policy issues and activities involving the IC and is the Secretary of State's principal adviser on all intelligence matters.

Treasury/Office of Intelligence and Analysis: http://www.treasury.gov/. Treasury collects and processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Treasury also covers terrorist financing.

7.2.13 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): http://www.usaid.gov/

Overseas Capabilities: Communications, **Diplomacy**, **Financial Expertise**, **Civil administration**, Funding support, **HN training**, **Infrastructure**, **Local knowledge**, **Public health**, **Sustainment**, Transportation

USAID is an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. As such, USAID is the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. USAID has placed senior development advisors at each of the geographic combatant commands.

- **Geographic Bureaus**
  - Asia (A): http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/
  - Europe and Eurasia (E&E): http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/
  - Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/
  - Middle East (ME): http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR): http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/
- **Functional Bureaus**
  - Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
  - Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
  - Global Health

7.3 Non-U.S. Government Organizations

These organizations, agencies, and entities collectively have many capabilities that are integral to most successful interagency teaming efforts.

7.3.1 Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

Overseas Capabilities: Civil administration, Diplomacy, Financial expertise, Funding support, **HN training**, Infrastructure, Local knowledge, Public health, Security, Sustainment, Transportation

IGOs differ in function, membership, and membership criteria. They have various goals and scopes, often outlined in the treaty or charter. Common stated aims are to preserve peace through conflict resolution and better international relations, to promote international cooperation on matters such as environmental protection, to promote human rights, to promote social development (e.g., education, health care), to render humanitarian aid, and to advance economic development. Common types include worldwide/global organizations; regional organizations; cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, or historical organizations; and economic organizations. The Union of International Associations (**http://www.uia.be/**) identifies on its website 5,900 IGOs and IGO networks. Some of the more well-known IGOs include the following:

- African Union (AU): **http://www.africa-union.org/**
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): **http://www.aseansec.org/**
- European Union (EU): **http://europa.eu/**
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL): **http://www.interpol.int/**
- International Monetary Fund (IMF): **http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm**
- Organization of American States (OAS): **http://www.oas.org/**
- United Nations: **http://www.un.org/english/**
- World Bank: **http://www.worldbank.org/**
- World Trade Organization (WTO): **http://www.wto.org/**

7.3.2 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

Domestic Capabilities: Local knowledge, Public health

Overseas Capabilities: Civil administration, Diplomacy, Financial expertise, Funding support, **HN training**, Infrastructure, **Local knowledge**, **Public health**, Sustainment, Transportation

NGOs are independent, mostly privately funded and managed organizations whose typical purposes are to improve the human condition. The Union of International Associations (**http://www.uia.be/**) identifies on its website 38,000 International Associations–NGOs. Some of the more well-known international NGOs include the following:

- Catholic Relief Services (CRS): **http://www.crs.org/**
- Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE): **http://www.care.org/**
- Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF): **http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/**
- Refugees International (RI): **http://www.refugeesinternational.org/**

7.3.3 State and Local Agencies

Domestic Capabilities: Civil administration, **Communications**, Diplomacy, Financial expertise, **Funding support**, **Infrastructure**, **Law enforcement**, Legal issues, **Local knowledge**, **Public health**, **Security**, **Sustainment**, **Training**, **Transportation**

State and local agencies are invaluable resources in domestic interagency teams, and in many cases, U.S. government agencies play a supporting role to state and local leads. Planning and coordination that includes them is integral to successful teaming efforts.

7.3.4 Host Nation and Local Agencies

Overseas Capabilities: Civil administration, **Communications**, **Diplomacy**, Financial expertise, **Funding support**, **Infrastructure**, **Intelligence**, **Law enforcement**, **Legal issues**, **Local knowledge**, Public health, **Security**, **Sustainment**, **Transportation**

Overseas, interagency teaming efforts must include the host nation and local agencies in their planning and coordination.

7.3.5 Private Contractors

Domestic Capabilities: **Communications**, Financial expertise, **Infrastructure**, Local knowledge, Security, **Sustainment**, Technological expertise, **Training**, **Transportation**

Overseas Capabilities: Communications, **HN training**, **Infrastructure**, Local knowledge, **Security**, **Sustainment**, Technological expertise, **Transportation**

Both domestically and overseas, interagency teaming efforts often can fill holes in their collective skill set by contracting out for certain capabilities. In order to take advantage of this resource, however, the interagency team must be able to have the time and the legal and fiscal authorities necessary to bring contractors into the support effort.

7.3.6 Interagency Coordinating Bodies

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC): http://www.nctc.gov/. A center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence staffed by more than 500 personnel from more than 16 departments and agencies, the NCTC leads our nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. Through classified websites, NCTC makes counterterrorism products and articles available to users across approximately 75 U.S. government agencies, departments, military services, and major commands.

State/Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS): http://www.state.gov/s/crs/. S/CRS coordinates and leads integrated U.S. government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. Involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, S/CRS was created explicitly to enhance our nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies. The focal point for the whole-of-government approach

for reconstruction and stabilization is the Interagency Management System (IMS). Currently, S/CRS staff come from State, USAID, Defense (including JFCOM and the Army Corps of Engineers), and Justice.

U.S. Embassy Country Teams: The American Ambassador is the chief of the U.S. mission to the country and is credentialed as the personal representative of the President. Unless directed by the President, agencies in the interagency (to include Defense) are not authorized to take actions in a foreign country without coordinating with the Ambassador. A typical country team organization is shown in Figure 16.

Country teams in U.S. embassies around the world are made up of key figures from State and other agencies that work under the direction of the Ambassador and meet regularly to share information and coordinate their actions. The "Country Team" concept is not codified in law but rather is an executive measure to assist the Ambassador in coordinating U.S. government activities to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in the country to which he or



Figure 16. The Country Team.[165]

she is assigned. Depending on embassy size and the nature of U.S. interests in a country, each country team may be configured differently—some may include more than 40 agencies.

Iraq and Afghanistan Threat Finance Cells: Threat finance includes efforts undertaken to identify and disrupt enemy financial networks, including terrorist and insurgent networks, state-sponsored terrorist support networks, organized crime networks (i.e., narcotics-traffickers, smugglers, extortionists), black market arms dealers, and proliferation networks for WMD and missile technologies. These efforts require an interagency approach, utilizing expertise in intelligence, law enforcement, targeted economic sanctions (e.g., trade restrictions, regulations), international cooperation with the United Nations and Allies, and private sector assistance (e.g., banking).

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF): Each JIATF is a cross-functional organization composed of intelligence, operations, and interagency experts who orchestrate persistent, coordinated, and synchronized effects across multiple Defense and U.S. government departments and agencies. Their mission is to integrate interagency knowledge and capabilities in order to enable partners to conduct counter-narcotic operations, combat terrorist networks, or shape the global environment. The JIATF serves as a catalyst and platform for Defense and U.S. government departments/agencies, the private sector, and academia collaboration and coordination.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): PRTs are the political and economic action arm of the interagency team. Normally, key tasks include finding, organizing, empowering, encouraging, and preserving moderates; demonstrating the benefits of supporting the government and the disadvantages of supporting violent extremists; bringing economic benefits to the local population; building cross-sectarian shared interests within communities; coordinating and supporting reconstruction projects; and helping communities develop competent, non-sectarian institutions.

A number of under-developed countries currently have Civil–Military Support Elements (CMSEs), which are interagency teams smaller in size but similar in function to PRTs.

Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs): A HOC is an interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations or under a U.S. government agency during a U.S. unilateral operation. The HOC typically consists of representatives from the host nation, the U.S. Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, NGOs, IGOs, and other major players in the operation.

Civil–Military Operations Centers (CMOCs): A CMOC, normally based upon the operations center of the supporting Civil Affairs unit, is a mechanism that can serve as the primary interface for regional and local-level coordination between a joint force commander and other stakeholders. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of the U.S. military, other government agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, and NGOs.

Interagency Partnership Program (IAPP): IAPP places full-time SOCOM personnel at Defense and non-Defense agencies where SOCOM has a requirement to synchronize planning and coordinate activities. The IAPP was created to be part of an inclusive, unified network that includes the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other agencies to accomplish mutually assigned tasks and to prepare for future situations.

Table 15 and Table 16 provide mapping of departments, agencies, or organizations to their capabilities.

Table 15. Mapping Departments, Agencies, or Organizations to Overseas Capabilities.

Table 16. Mapping Overseas Capabilities to Departments, Agencies, or Organizations.

"It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But, above all, try something."
—Franklin Delano Roosevelt

CHAPTER 8.0 Bibliography and Resources

8.1 Contents of the Companion CD

Many valuable references used in the writing of this handbook are provided in the companion CD. These references contain much greater detail on a variety of subjects than space permitted to be included here.

8.1.1 Interagency Lessons Learned and Best Practices

Barno, David W., "Fighting 'The Other War': Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005," *Military Review*, Sep–Oct: 32–44 (2007).

Bensahel, Nora, and Anne M. Moisan, "Repairing the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 44: 106–108 (2007).

Binnendijk, Hans, and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: The National Defense University, 2008).

Bowen, Stuart W., Jr. (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 Feb 2009).

Carafano, James J., "Learning from the Past and Leaning Forward: Principles for Action in Undertaking Complex Activities," in *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies, Colloquium Report*, Kaufmann, Greg, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 166–179.

Chollet, Derek, Mark Irvine, and Bradley Larson, *A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States. A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mar 2008).

Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009).

Crowther, Glen A., "Tailoring a U.S. Embassy for Stability and Reconstruction Operations," in *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies*, Colloquium Report, Kaufmann, Greg, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 215–229.

Feil, Scott, *Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force–South* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2008).

Gott, Kendall D., and Michael G. Brooks, eds., "The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives," *Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2008 Military History Symposium* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Dec 2008).

Gray, Colin S., *After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).

Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008).

Kaufmann, Greg, ed., *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies*, Colloquium Report, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008).

Kelleher, Patrick N., "Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 2002: 104–110 (2002).

Krawchuk, Fred T., *Combating Terrorism: A Joint Interagency Approach*, Landpower Essay No. 05-1 (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Jan 2005).

Levitt, Matthew, and Jacobson, Michael, *The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances*, Policy Focus #89 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Nov 2008), **http://www.cicentre.com/reports/PolicyFocus89_Money_Trail_Terrorism_18nov08.pdf**.

Malan, Mark, "U.S. Civil–Military Imbalance for Global Engagement : Lessons from the Operational Level in Africa," *Development Experience Clearinghouse* (Washington DC: USAID, Jul 2008), **http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search.getCitation&rec_no=151166**.

Malkasian, Carter, and Gerald Meyerle, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).

Marcella, Gabriel, ed., *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008).

O'Connor, Jennifer, ed., "Collaboration in the National Security Arena: Myths and Reality—What Science and Experience Can Contribute to its Success," *Topical Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in Support of Counter-Terrorism and*

Counter-WMD, executed by STRATCOM/GISC and OSD/DDRE/RRTO (Jun 2009).

Schnaubelt, Christopher M., "Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots," *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Summer 1997: 88–109 (1997).

Schnaubelt, Christopher M., ed., *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments*, NDC Forum Paper 9 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, Jun 2009).

Shemella, Paul, "Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4): 449–457 (2006).

Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009).

Szayna, Thomas S., Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA474502.

Tussing, Bert B., and Kent Hughes Butts, *The Annual Collins Center Senior Symposium: Aligning the Interagency Process for the War on Terrorism*, Issue Paper, Vol. 11-05 (Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Jun 2005).

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "Interagency Reader," *Military Review*, Combined Arms Center Special Edition (Jun 2008).

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination*, GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000).

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies*, GAO-06-15 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005).

Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005).

Vickers, Michael, "Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems," Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 15 Mar 2006).

8.1.2 Handbooks, Manuals, and Other Practical Guidance

Abdallah, Saade, and Gilbert Burnham, eds., "Incident Management System (IMS)," Chap. 10 in *The Johns Hopkins and Red Cross/Red Crescent Public Health Guide for Emergencies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, 2008).

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook: Techniques and Procedures*, Handbook 06-08 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, May 2006).

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Handbook 09-27 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Apr 2009).

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Commander's Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Handbook 09-22 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Mar 2009).

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Handbook 07-34 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, Sep 2007).

Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004).

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, 14 Jul 2008).

Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), *Special Operation Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual*, 1st Edition (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, Mar 2009).

Lidy, Martin, and Marney McNall, *Worldwide Humanitarian Assistance Logistics System (WHALS) Handbook*, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Document D-2963 (Mar 2004).

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT), *Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP)*, Version 2.4 (Camp Smith, HI: U.S. Pacific Command, 4 Jan 2009).

National Defense University, *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Jan 2003).

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response*, Version 4.0 (Washington, DC: USAID, Sep 2005).

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Civilian–Military Cooperation Policy*, PD-ACL-777 (Washington, DC: USAID, Jul 2008).

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 (FM 3-07), *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Oct 2008).

U.S. Army Field Manual Interim 3-07.1 (FMI 3-07.1), *Security Force Assistance*, Final Draft (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 12 Feb 2009).

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The United States Army Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, Version 1.0, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 28 Jan 2008).

U.S. Army, *Coordination with Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations*, CAEL 335X, Student Study Guide (Mar 2007).

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: GAO, Nov 1999).

U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, Jan 2009).

U.S. Government, *CONPLAN: U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan* (Jan 2001).

U.S. Government, *Integrated Civilian–Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* (10 Aug 2009).

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, and Joint Innovation and Experimentation Directorate, *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* (1 Mar 2007).

U.S. Marine Corps, *A Concept for Interagency Campaign Design* (U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, 5 May 2007).

8.1.3 Communications

Kapucu, Naim, "Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies: Boundary Spanners in Multiagency Coordination," *The American Review of Public Administration*, 36(2): 207–225 (2006).

Mait, Joseph N., *Making IT Happen: Transforming Military Information Technology*, (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Sep 2005).

Starr, Stuart H., *The Challenges Associated with Achieving Interoperability in Support of Net-Centric Operations* (Falls Church, VA: Barcroft Research Institute, Jun 2005).

Wentz, Larry, *An ICT Primer: Information and Communication Technologies for Civil–Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Jun 2006).

8.1.4 U.S. Government

Lidy, Martin, David J. Baratto, Daniel Langberg, and William J. Shelby, *A Snapshot of Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies*, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Document D-3269 (Mar 2007).

Mills, John R., "'All Elements of National Power': Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War," *Strategic Insights*, V(6): Online (Jul 2006).

National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization (Washington, DC: The White House, 7 Dec 2005).

Trebilcock, Craig T., "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," *Journal of Homeland Security* (Oct 2000), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm.

U.S. Office of the President, Executive Order 13434 of May 17, 2007, "National Security Professional Development," *Federal Register*, 72(98): 28583–28585 (22 May 2007).

8.1.5 Glossaries and Acronyms

Interagency Acronyms (composite list gleaned from other references), Excel file (Dec 2009).

Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001, as amended through 19 Aug 2009).

Lidy, A. Martin, and Daniel R. Langberg, *Glossary of Key Civilian and Military Terms for U.S. National Security Management*, Working Draft, Version 3.0, (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 25 Sep 2009).

U.S. Department of State, "Glossary of Terms and Acronyms," in *Foreign Service Assignment Notebook: What Do I Do Now* (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute Transition Center), Ch. 26: 201–215 (2003 updated 2007).

8.1.6 Framework Documents

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *ICAF: Assembling an Interagency Conflict Assessment Team*, Draft (Washington, DC: S/CRS, U.S. Department of State, 18 Mar 2008).

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* (Washington, DC: S/CRS, U.S. Department of State), http://www.crs.state.gov/shortcut.cfm/C6WW.

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* (Washington, DC: S/CRS, U.S. Department of State, Apr 2005).

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System* (Dec 2008).

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Jan 2008).

U.S. Department of State, *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation* (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 13 May 2008).

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat*, GAO-03-165 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003).

U.S. Joint Forces Command J7, *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, Version 1.0 (1 Dec 2005).

8.1.7 Strategy Documents

National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, The White House, Jun 2008).

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 Feb 2006).

National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, The White House, Mar 2006).

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, The White House, Feb 2003).

Unified Command Plan (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, The White House, 17 Dec 2008). FOUO

8.1.8 Joint Publications and Joint Operating Concepts

Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Sep 2006, incorporating change 1, 13 Feb 2008).

Joint Publication 3-05 (JP 3-05), *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Dec 2003).

Joint Publication 3-07.3 (JP 3-07.3), *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007).

Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vols. I and II (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Mar 2006).

Joint Publication 3-16 (JP 3-16), *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 Mar 2007).

Joint Publication 3-26 (JP 3-26), *Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 Aug 2005).

Joint Publication 3-27 (JP 3-27), *Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Jul 2007).

Joint Publication 3-28 (JP 3-28), *Civil Support* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 Sep 2007).

Joint Publication 3-41 (JP 3-41), *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 Oct 2006).

Joint Publication 3-57 (JP 3-57), *Civil–Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Jul 2008).

U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 1.0. (11 Sep 2007).

U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0 (Dec 2006).

8.1.9 Department of Defense Directives

U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (28 Nov 2005).

U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)* (1 Dec 2008).

8.1.10 Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement

Lerner, Ken, Mary Beth Vasco, and George Yantosik, *Use of Inter-Agency Agreements to Enhance Emergency Preparedness*, White Paper (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory).

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *USAID Functional Series 300: Acquisition and Assistance, ADS Chapter 306: Interagency Agreements* (Washington, DC: USAID, Sep 2003).

Sample Memoranda:

- MOA between the Department of Commerce, NOAA, and the Department of Homeland Security, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection for the Purpose Disseminating Emergency Messages on NOAA Weather Radio.
- MOA between the U.S. Coast Guard and the State of Maine Marine Patrol Regarding the Enforcement of Maritime Safety and Security Zones.
- MOA between the U.S. Coast Guard and the State of New Jersey Regarding the Enforcement of Maritime Safety and Security Zones.
- MOA between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the Inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense.
- MOA between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the U.S. Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security.

8.1.11 Miscellany

Getting Started in HARMONIEWeb, http://www.harmonieweb.org/Pages/Default.aspx.

Hansen, Rosemary, and Rick Rife, *Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 1998).

Hilley, Steve, *Interagency Tutorial for SOCOM*, PowerPoint Presentation (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Knowledge and Futures, J-7 Training Division (SOKF-J7-T), 1 Sep 2009).

Irregular Warfare and Security Force Assistance Reference Sheet, Version 1 (11 Jun 2008).

Joint Staff J-7, *Joint Staff Officer Study: Preliminary Findings*, PowerPoint Presentation (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 10 Mar 2008).

The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (Geneva, Switzerland: The Sphere Project, 2004).

U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report*, Publication No. 11407 (Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Jun 2009.)

Weiss, Martin A., *Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and Inter-Agency Coordination*, Report RL33020 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 3 Aug 2005).

8.2 Other References

Other valuable resources could not be included on the companion CD because of copyright limitations or unavailability of digital copies.

Anklam, Patti, *Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work and in the World* (Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007).

Brafman, Ori, and Rod Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (New York, NY: Portfolio Hardcover, 2006).

Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

Fisher, Roger, Bruce M. Patton, and William L. Ury, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1991).

Gratton, Lynda, and Tamara J. Erickson, "Eight Ways to Build Collaborative Teams," *Harvard Business Review* (Nov 2007).

Holman, Peggy, Tom Devane, and Steven Cady, *The Change Handbook: The Definitive Resource on Today's Best Methods for Engaging Whole Systems* (New York, NY: Berrett-Koehler, 2007).

Holohan, Anne, *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

Roberts, Nancy, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," *International Public Management Review* ,1(1): 1–19 (2000), **http://www.idt.unisg.ch/org/idt/ipmr.nsf/Issues/1F3BCAD88F16E7C6C1256C76004BE2C4?OpenDocument**.

Roth, George, "Learning and Performing through Hastily Formed Networks," *Reflections: The SOL Journal*, 9(3/4): 20–35 (2009), **https://www.solonline.org/reflections/** (by subscription).

Straus, David, *How to Make Collaboration Work Powerful Ways to Build Consensus, Solve Problems, and Make Decisions* (New York, NY: Berrett-Koehler, 2002).

8.3 Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats Forum: *https://www.harmonieweb.org/sites/harmoniewebprivate/EventSiteDirectory/oitf/default.aspx*

Readers of this handbook are invited to join the Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats forum, providing continuing access to resources of interest to the interagency team.

The forum is being hosted on HARMONIEWeb (**http://www.harmonieweb.org**), a site designed to provide a means to share stability, security, transition, and reconstruction information across the civil–military boundary, to include U.S. government, NGOs, and foreign governments and organizations. This membership-restricted portal also provides other tools, including real-time meeting software with voice, video, and file sharing; virtual mapping with satellite overlays and custom icons; and text chat that can be translated into 15 languages.

Instructions for requesting a HARMONIEWeb account are included on the companion CD.[166] As of the writing of this handbook, a SIPRnet portal is being set up, and the URL for this site will be provided on the Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats forum.

8.4 Other Websites

8.4.1 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS): http://www.nps.edu

- **Center for Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CTIW): http://www.nps.edu/academics/centers/ctiw/index.html**. In addition to its courses on terrorism and irregular warfare, the center hosts the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Program (**http://www.nps.edu/Research/CoreLab/index.html**), which performs analysis in support of field operatives engaged in irregular warfare.
- **Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS): http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/index.html**.

CCS is a collaborative effort to provide current open-source information to PRTs, mission commanders, academics, and the general public. Covering tribes, politics, trends, and people, this website—a 21st century gazetteer—provides data, analysis, and maps not available anywhere else.

8.4.2 Center for Complex Operations (CCO): http://www.ccoportal.org/

CCO is an interagency partnership of Defense, State, and USAID to enhance unity of effort across U.S. government agencies. The membership-restricted CCO portal provides blogs, newsletters, and a comprehensive list of related training as well as housing a lessons learned repository and links to other domestic and international lessons learned sites.

8.4.3 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL): http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp

A number of CALL handbooks and other products are available on CALL's public site, including several that have been downloaded to the companion CD:

- Handbook 07-34: [Provincial Reconstruction Team] *PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*
- Handbook 06-08: *Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook: Techniques and Procedures*
- Handbook 09-22: *Commander's Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*
- Handbook 09-27: *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*

Access to the full CALL site, which includes lessons learned and a "lessons learned" course is available only to Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account holders (civilian account holders must access the site with a Common Access Card).

8.4.4 United Nations Peacekeeping Resource Hub: http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org

This hub contains a library of best practices and training materials for the United Nations and external partners.

8.4.5 InfraGard: http://www.infragard.net

InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis partnership between the FBI and the private sector. An association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the United States, InfraGard also supports Homeland Security's mission of Critical Infrastructure Protection. InfraGard Chapters are geographically linked with FBI Field Office territories.

The InfraGard secure website provides members with information about recent intrusions, research related to critical infrastructure protection, and the capability to communicate securely with other members.

8.4.6 Project on National Security Reform (PNSR): http://www.pnsr.org

PNSR is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization funded by Congress and private entities. The goal of PNSR is to modernize U.S. national security. The PNSR website contains a large library of case studies, briefs, and white papers on irregular threats and other topics of interest to the interagency team.

8.4.7 Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI): https://pksoi.army.mil

PKSOI is "the U.S. Military's Premier Center of Excellence for mastering stability and peace operations at the strategic and operational levels in . . . order to improve military, civilian agency, international, and multinational capabilities and execution." The site contains a library of United Nations, U.S., IGO, and NGO policy documents.

8.4.8 Joint Lessons Learned Information System Portal: https://www.jllis.mil/jscc/index.cfm

This site provides links to the individual lessons learned websites of the combatant commands, military services, combat support agencies, National Guard Bureau, and other U.S. government agencies. Account access requires a Common Access Card or a State Department Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) card.[167]

8.4.9 USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC): http://dec.usaid.gov/

DEC is a repository for more than 68,900 electronically downloadable USAID technical and program documents, including planning documents (organized by country/region), best practices, and lessons learned.

8.4.10 U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center): http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/COIN/index.asp

The Army and Marine Corps COIN Center website hosts a blog, a knowledge center, a SharePoint community site (SharePoint access requires a Common Access Card), and *The Small Wars Journal.*

8.4.11 ReliefWeb: http://www.reliefweb.int

Administered by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ReliefWeb provides information to coordinate humanitarian responses to emergencies and disasters.

8.4.12 Federal Emergency Management Agency National Response Framework (NRF) Resource Center: http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/

This website is the gateway to a number of Homeland Security/FEMA resources, including the following:

- **Information and Documents**, including the NRF and NIMS documents.
- **Lessons Learned Information Sharing** (https://www.llis.dhs.gov) is open to emergency response providers

and homeland security officials from the local, state, and federal levels. It provides lessons learned, best practices, and preparedness guidelines.

- **Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)** (https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx) provides a standardized methodology for the development of exercises.

8.4.13 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): http://www.oecd.org

OECD is an international organization of member countries developing democracy and sustainable economic growth around the world. The portal contains data and analysis of economic indicators, best practices, and lessons learned.

OECD works on global issues in the areas of economy (e.g., competition, growth, agriculture, rural and urban development, trade), development, governance (e.g., corporate, public, corruption, regulatory reform), sustainability (e.g., energy, environment, fisheries), society (e.g., education, employment, health, migration), finance, and innovation.

8.4.14 Asymmetric Warfare Group SIPRnet Portal: http://army.daiis.mi.army/org/aawo/awg/default.aspx

Team members with access to SIPRnet will find useful information on this portal hosted by the Asymmetric Warfare Group.

"It's all to do with the training: you can do a lot if you're properly trained."

—Elizabeth II

CHAPTER 9.0 Education and Training

9.1 Online Training

A recent lessons learned report recommended: "Leverage Web-based knowledge and [distributed learning] platforms to train leaders and staffs. These platforms provide the quickest return on investment."[168]

9.1.1 Joint Knowledge Online (JKO): http://jko.jfcom.mil/

The JKO portal is designed as a one-stop location for online training courses for Defense military, civilian, and contractor personnel. Pre-registration on AKO or Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) is required (civilians and contractors are eligible for sponsored accounts). Follow the instructions below to register on **http://jko.jfcom.mil**.

Recommendations for working in AKO/JKO:

- Use Internet Explorer for full functionality of the portal.
- Take the user training available at **https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/139150**.
- Select *My Account* from the black bar at the top. Select *Workspace* from the pull-down menu. In the *Toolbox* in the upper right area under *My Workspace*, select *Edit Notification Settings*, and set all of the items at the bottom of the page to *Immediately*. Select *Update Notification Settings* to save.
- From *My Account*, you can register your Common Access Card by selecting *CAC/Cert Registration* from the left pane.
- From *My Account*, select *Mail Options*, and forward e-mail to your real e-mail address. Notifications will be forwarded

To create a Joint Knowledge Online Account,
go to: http://jko.jfcom.mil/

Select "New User"



If you are Active Duty, Reserve, National Guard, or Civil Service click "Joint Account"

Otherwise, click "Sponsored Account"

In the sponsor field enter: joint training



All fields with red asterisks are required. When complete, click "Next" and finish the process. You will receive an e-mail when your account has been set up.

to *Your Workspace*. (Note: JKO will not allow forwarding to a commercial e-mail address.)

- Make liberal use of making everything you like part of your favorites.

Online courses:

USAID 101 J3OP-US345 [1 hr]: The fundamental workings of USAID and how it operates within the interagency process.

Department of State 101 J3OP-US298 [1 hr]: The fundamental workings of the Department of State and how it operates within the interagency process.

Department of Health and Human Services J3OP-US421 [1 hr]: The fundamental workings of the Department of Health and Human Services and how it operates within the interagency process.

Interagency Coordination J3SN-US013-11 [2 hr]: Provides a fundamental understanding of interagency coordination to the joint force commander and staff in order to organize the joint task force and execute the mission in a manner that ensures unity of effort.

Multinational Operations J3SN-US013-12 [2 hr]: Basic background information on multinational operations for a joint task force. The module also includes fundamentals of joint operations, the focus of a joint task force within this environment, and the initial challenges of executing joint task force missions at the operational level.

Introduction to the United Nations Security Council Course J3ST-MN044 [6 hr]: Introduction to the United Nations Security Council, its main responsibilities, functions, powers, structure, and other basic facts.

The Interagency Process: Full-Spectrum Implementation Presentation J3OP-US094 [1 hr]: Review of the national-level interagency process, including highlights of the major issues within the interagency process and examination of some of the new organizational tools developed to improve interagency coordination. The course also introduces the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept.

The Interagency Process Course J3ST-MN056 [20 hr]: A look at complex emergencies, political–military planning, the mechanics of interagency coordination at the national (executive) level, and best practices for facilitating collaboration among multiple government and nongovernment agencies and the military.

Civil–Military Relations in an Interagency Context J3OP-MN248 [20 hr]: Introduction to the major theories and issues surrounding civil–military relations in today's world, including possible means for improvement. The course is presented by the Inter-American Defense College and has been developed in conjunction with Florida International University.

9.1.2 Department of Defense Online Doctrine Networked Education and Training (DOCNET): http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/courselist.html

DOCNET is developed under the direction of Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-7, Joint Education and Doctrine Division, Joint Doctrine Branch.

DOCNET presentations are drawn directly from Joint doctrine and are available to Defense and other government employees. Courses may be taken for college credit.

Multinational Operations [1 hr]: Fundamentals of multinational operations; overview of joint doctrine and considerations guiding command and control, planning, and conduct of multinational operations.[169]

Homeland Security [3 hr]: Framework for homeland security, mission areas, missions, related supporting operations, and enabling activities; homeland security legal authorities; joint force, multinational, and interagency relationships; command and control; planning and execution; training and resource considerations.[170]

Interagency Coordination: Reviews the nature of military, IGOs, and NGOs; steps that support building interagency coordination; roles and responsibilities of participants in the interagency coordination process; Defense's role in interagency coordination for domestic and foreign operations; and joint task force commander interagency coordination tools and planning documents.[171]

9.1.3 Defense Acquisition University (DAU): http://www.dau.mil

This training resource primarily supports the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics workforce, but all Defense personnel may attend DAU classes, and non-Defense federal employees and contractors may attend classes on a space-available basis. Two DAU courses are particularly targeted to the interagency team:

Essentials of Interagency Acquisitions/Fair Opportunity CLC030 [2.5 hr]: This course is designed to provide a better understanding of appropriate use of non-Defense contracting. It provides an overview of current policy; key concepts and requirements on scope, competition, and fiscal law; and the roles and responsibilities of the requesting activities and assisting agencies.

Interagency Acquisitions: Realizing the Value FAC034 [1 hr]: This training covers interagency acquisition, describes the different types of interagency acquisitions, and provides foundational understanding of what is required to make the decision to use this method, how to get started, keys to success, and resources available to support interagency acquisition activities.

9.1.4 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS): http://www.chds.us/?special/info&pgm=Noncredit

CHDS offers non-credit, self-study courses online. These courses are developed by the NPS CHDS teaching faculty and are derived from course content (lecture material and course readings) from the Center's homeland security master's degree curriculum. The courses, offered at no cost, are designed for homeland defense and security professionals who wish to enhance their understanding of key homeland security concepts and require the flexibility of self-paced instruction.

9.1.5 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute (EMI): http://training.fema.gov/EMICourses/

EMI offers resident courses at the main campus in Emmitsburg, MD, as well as satellite campuses around the country. EMI offers a wide variety of self-paced courses that are open to the general public. Topic areas include incident management, operational planning, disaster logistics, emergency communications, service to disaster victims, continuity programs, public disaster communications, integrated preparedness, and hazard mitigation.

9.1.6 U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP): http://www.usip.org

USIP is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help

- Prevent and resolve violent international conflicts
- Promote post-conflict stability and development
- Increase conflict-management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide

USIP does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peace-building efforts around the globe. In addition to the free courses listed below, this site includes an extensive library of materials relating to conflicts, diplomacy, negotiation, and mediation, including practitioner tools, online courses, and a bookstore.

Certificate Course in Conflict Analysis: This course presents an introduction to the subject of conflict analysis, illustrating analytical tools used, with reference to two extended case studies, the conflict in Kosovo and the genocide in Rwanda.

Certificate Course in Interfaith Conflict Resolution: This course applies general principles of faith-based peace-making to two case studies, highlighting interfaith peace-making efforts between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria as well as the role that various faith communities played in helping to bring an end to the 36-year internal armed conflict in Guatemala.

9.1.7 United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction (UNITAR-POCI): http://www.unitarpoci.org

UNITAR-POCI provides 22 distance learning courses for military and civilian peacekeepers, police, and humanitarian relief workers. The website also includes an online library and a bookstore.

Online courses:

- An Introduction to the United Nations System
- Civil–Military Coordination (CIMIC)
- Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention and Management in Peacekeeping Operations
- Ethics in Peacekeeping
- Gender Perspectives in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- Global Terrorism
- History of United Nations Peacekeeping 1945–1987
- History of United Nations Peacekeeping 1988–1996
- History of United Nations Peacekeeping 1997–2006
- International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
- Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- Operational Logistical Support
- Advanced Topics in United Nations Logistics: The Provision of Troops and Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) and the Method for Reimbursement
- Mine Action: Humanitarian Impact, Technical Aspects, and Global Initiatives
- Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution
- Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia: Dayton–Kosovo

- Principles of Peace Support Operations
- Security Measures for United Nations Peacekeepers
- United Nations Military Observers
- United Nations Police: Restoring Civil Order Following Hostilities

9.2 Resident Courses

Resident courses of potential interest to the interagency community are far too numerous to list exhaustively. This section highlights a few institutions offering short-term, intensive classes that are likely to be more accessible to the interagency team member.

In addition to the listings in this handbook, the Center for Complex Operations (**http://www.ccoportal.org/**) maintains a searchable list of courses in interagency planning/coordination, stability operations/peace operations, international/multilateral organizations, irregular warfare, and other related topics.

CHDS also maintains a list of colleges and universities (**http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions**) offering homeland security degree or certificate programs.

9.2.1 Joint Special Operations University (JSOU): https://jsoupublic.socom.mil

Interagency Collaboration Course (Course SOED-SOFIACC): This 4½-day course, taught at the Secret level, is designed for military field-grade officers, warrant officers, senior noncommissioned officers, and mid-career civil service personnel who will participate in or support special operations. The course features guest speakers from different organizations integral to successful special operations forces–interagency collaboration. Lecture presentations and discussions are used to provide an overview of the doctrine, planning, coordination, integration, employment, and implementation of effective collaboration in activities at the operational level of conflict or crisis resolution. The course ends with an interactive problem-solving exercise in which the students role-play members of an interagency working group developing a concept for employing a joint interagency task force in a combating terrorism complex contingency. Students interested in attending must be accepted by the Course Director. For details, see **https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/catalog.php**.

9.2.2 U.S. Department of State, Interagency Training and Education: http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=CSZJ

The mission of the Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Training and Education Division is to improve and maintain the operational readiness of the Civilian Response Corps and other personnel who are involved in implementing reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Through the Training and Education Division and in collaboration with the interagency community, S/CRS provides a robust training, education, and exercise program to further develop skills and knowledge needed to address identified performance gaps for the full range of potential reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

The training is designed for the Civilian Response Corps and military and civilian personnel working in and supporting planning for implementation of operations. These may include: U.S. Embassy/mission staff, regional/functional bureau staff, S/CRS staff, members of the strategic or implementation planning teams (including the NSC), U.S. government civilian agencies, and counterparts within military and international institutions.

9.2.3 U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI): https://pksoi.army.mil/

PKSOI provides training in stability operations for members of U.S. military services, interagency programs, civilian organizations, foreign militaries, IGOs, and NGOs.

9.2.4 National Defense University: http://www.ndu.edu/

The Joint Interagency Multinational Planner's Course at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC): This course is a specialized short course addressing the dynamic challenges confronting mid-grade civilian and military planners who conduct interagency coordination for complex contingencies overseas. The 5-day-long course educates officers in the transforming organizations and processes that are being developed to improve a whole-of-government comprehensive approach to solving complex contingencies. This course educates officers in the latest developments in interagency coordination and serves as a forum for an exchange of best practices. See **http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jimpc/default.asp**.

CHAPTER 10.0 Handbook Feedback

The sponsors at JFCOM, SOCOM, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group would appreciate your feedback, including suggestions for additional products of use to the interagency community and future changes or additions to this handbook. Please address your comments to:

awgia@us.army.mil.

APPENDIX A: Acronyms

AF	State Bureau of African Affairs
AFNOSC NSD	U.S. Air Force Network Operations and Security Center Network Security Division
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
AKO	Army Knowledge Online
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
AU	African Union
CACD	Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBIRF	Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive
CCO	Center for Complex Operations
CCS	Culture and Conflict Studies
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CERT	U.S. Army Computer Emergency Response Team
CGPSC	Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia
CHDS	Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	Civil–Military Coordination
CMOC	Civil–Military Operations Center
CMSE	Civil–Military Support Element
CNCI	Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
COCOM	Combatant Commander
COE	Contingent-Owned Equipment
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CORE	Common Operational Research Environment
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CT Finance	Counterterrorism Finance Unit
CTF	Combined Task Force
CTIW	Center for Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIMEFIL	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement
DKO	Defense Knowledge Online

DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DOCNET	Department of Defense Online Doctrine Networked Education and Training
DS	Coordinator for Diplomatic Security
DTM	Directive-Type Memorandum
EAP	State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
EMI	Emergency Management Institute
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EU	European Union
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
EUR	State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
G/TIP	State Bureau of Trafficking in Persons
GAO	U.S. General Accounting Office (10 Jun 1921–6 Jul 2004) U.S. Government Accountability Office (7 Jul 2004–present)
HLD/HLS	Homeland Defense/Homeland Security
HN Training	Host-Nation Training
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
HSTC	Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
IAPP	Interagency Partnership Program
IATF	Interagency Task Force
IC	Intelligence Community
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICI-IPC	Information and Communications Infrastructure Interagency Policy Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGA	Intergovernmental or Interagency Agreement
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IIP	State Bureau of International Information Programs
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMS	Interagency Management System
INL	State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INR	State Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IPC	Integration Planning Cell
ISN	State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
ITFC	Iraq Threat Finance Cell
JFCC-NW	Joint Functional Component Command–Network Warfare
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command

JFSC	Joint Forces Staff College
JHU/APL	The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
JKO	Joint Knowledge Online
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JTF-GNO	Joint Task Force–Global Network Operations
LES	Law Enforcement Sensitive
LLO	Logical Lines of Operation
MAA	Mutual Aid Agreement
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MCNOSC	U.S. Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Command
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps Iraq
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCIRT	U.S. Navy Computer Incident Response Team
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NEA	State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NEC	National Economic Council
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NICCP	National Interdiction Command and Control Plan
NIH	National Institutes of Health
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIP	National Intelligence Program
NIPR/NIPRnet	Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
NJTTF	National Joint Terrorism Task Force
NMRC	U.S. Navy Medical Research Center
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
NPTC	Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance
NRF	National Response Framework
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control

OGHA	Office of Global Health Affairs
OHAP	Office of HIV/AIDS Policy
OIA	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ONI	Office of Navy Intelligence
OODA	Observe–Orient–Decide–Act
ORCON	Originator Controlled
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PKSOI	U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PM	State Bureau of Political–Military Affairs
PNSR	Project on National Security Reform
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRM	State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
RI	Refugees International
S/CRS	State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
S/CT	Coordinator for Counterterrorism
SCA	State Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SIPR/SIPRnet	Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
SSTRO	Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations
STRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
TFI	Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
TFWG	Terrorist Financing Working Group
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
TRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSCP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR-POCI	United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAMRID	U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USD(I)	Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
USIP	U.S. Institute of Peace
USIS	U.S. Information Service
USPHS	U.S. Public Health Service

USSS	U.S. Secret Service
UW	Unconventional Warfare
VCI	State Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation
WHA	State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

APPENDIX B: Glossary

Civil Affairs Operations	Military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that • Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; • Require coordination with other interagency organizations, IGOs, NGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and • Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government.[172]
Civil–Military Operations	The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil–military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil–military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.[173]
Counterinsurgency (COIN)	Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.[174]
Counterterrorism	Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.[175]
Foreign Internal Defense	Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.[176]

Hybrid Warfare	Warfare involving diverse actors, especially non-state actors, frequently operating covertly or as proxies for states, not bound by internationally recognized norms of behavior and resistant to traditional means of deterrence. Intentions of these actors—who are likely to shift their alliances and approaches over time to avoid our strengths—will be difficult to discern. The resulting hybrid threats—diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities—will make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of national power.[177]
Intelligence Community (IC)	A federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United States. Members: • Director of National Intelligence • Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence • Air Force Intelligence • Army Intelligence • Central Intelligence Agency • Coast Guard Intelligence • Defense Intelligence Agency • Department of Energy • Department of Homeland Security • Department of State • Department of the Treasury • Drug Enforcement Administration • Federal Bureau of Investigation • Marine Corps Intelligence • National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency • National Reconnaissance Office • National Security Agency • Navy Intelligence[178]
Interagency	U.S. government agencies and departments, including Defense.[179]

Interagency Coordination	Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.[180]
Intergovernmental Organization (IGO)	An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, NATO, and the African Union.[181]
Irregular Warfare	A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.[182]
Lead Federal Agency	The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. Designation and responsibilities of a lead federal agency vary according to the type of emergency and the agency's statutory authority.[183] See also *Primary Agency*.
Metric	A unit of measure that coincides with a specific method or procedure or analysis. A quantitative measure of the degree to which a system, component, or process possesses a given attribute.
Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction	Defense activities that support U.S. government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.[184]
Mission	Any Foreign Service post designated as an embassy or legation and maintained to conduct continuing diplomatic relations between the United States and other governments ("missions to countries") or between the United States and public international organizations ("missions to international organizations").[185]

Multinational Operations	A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.[186]
Nongovernmental Organization (NGO)	A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.[187]
Peace Operations	A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace-making, peace-building, and conflict-prevention efforts.[188]
Primary Agency	The federal department or agency assigned primary responsibility for managing and coordinating a specific emergency support function in the National Response Plan.[189] See also *Lead Federal Agency*.
Reconstruction	The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.[190]
Reconstruction Operations	Operations to establish or rebuild the critical political, social, and economic systems or infrastructure necessary to facilitate long-term security and the transition to legitimate local governance in an operational area.[191] See also *Stability Operations*.

Rule of Law	A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.[192]
Security	The establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local populace, host-nation military and civilian organizations, as well as U.S. government and coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTR [Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction] operations.[193]
Security Cooperation	All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.[194]
Security Force Assistance	Unified action of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) community to generate, employ, sustain, and assist host-nation and regional security forces in support of legitimate authority. Security Force Assistance includes the tasks of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising foreign security forces and foreign security institutions.[195]
Stability Operations	An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[196] See also *Reconstruction Operations*.

Stabilization	Activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions; to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems; to create stability in the host nation or region; and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts.[197]
Traditional Warfare	A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.[198]
Train, Advise, and Assist	Actions taken to provide training for, offer advice to, or provide assistance to foreign security forces and partners at the ministerial, service, and tactical levels to ensure security in their sovereign territory or to contribute forces to operations elsewhere.[199]
Transition	The process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from the intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation. Transitions are event driven and will occur within the major mission elements at that point when the entity assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out the relevant activities.[200]
Unconventional Warfare (UW)	These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a special operation that can either be conducted as part of a geographic COCOM's overall theater campaign or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political–military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements.[201]
Whole-of-Government Approach	An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

APPENDIX C: References and Notes

Chapter 1

[1] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

Chapter 2

[2] Marcella, Gabriel, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1–52. CD

[3] Marcella, Gabriel, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1–52. CD

[4] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[5] Roper, Dan, *Counterinsurgency SITREP 30 November 2008* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, 2008).

[6] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning*, GAO-07-549 (Washington, DC: GAO, May 2007), 27.

[7] Marcella, Gabriel, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1–52. CD

[8] Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Revision First Draft (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Aug 2009). CD

[9] Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001, as amended through 19 Aug 2009).

[10] Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001, as amended through 19 Aug 2009).

[11] Hilley, Steve, *Interagency Tutorial for SOCOM*, PowerPoint Presentation (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Knowledge and Futures, J-7 Training Division (SOKF-J7-T), 1 Sep 2009). CD

[12] Hilley, Steve, *Interagency Tutorial for SOCOM*, PowerPoint Presentation (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Knowledge and Futures, J-7 Training Division (SOKF-J7-T), 1 Sep 2009). CD

[13] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[14] Hilley, Steve, *Interagency Tutorial for SOCOM*, PowerPoint Presentation (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Knowledge and Futures, J-7 Training Division (SOKF-J7-T), 1 Sep 2009). CD

[15] Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004). CD

[16] Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004). CD

[17] Presidential Decision Directive 14 (PDD 14), *Counternarcotics* (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 3 Nov 1993).

[18] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[19] Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009). CD

[20] Shemella, Paul, "Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4): 449–457 (2006). CD

[21] Kapucu, Naim, "Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies: Boundary Spanners in Multiagency Coordination," *The American Review of Public Administration*, 36(2): 207–225 (2006).

[22] Shemella, Paul, "Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4): 449–457 (2006). CD

[23] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[24] Shemella, Paul, "Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4): 449–457 (2006). CD

[25] Roth, George, "Learning and Performing through Hastily Formed Networks," *Reflections: The SOL Journal*, 9(3/4): 20–35 (2009), https://www.solonline.org/reflections/.

[26] Roth, George, "Learning and Performing through Hastily Formed Networks," *Reflections: The SOL Journal*, 9(3/4): 20–35 (2009), https://www.solonline.org/reflections/.

Chapter 3

[27] Bensahel, Nora, and Anne M. Moisan, "Repairing the Interagency Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 44: 106–108 (2007). CD

[28] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., ed., *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments*, NDC Forum Paper 9 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, Jun 2009). CD

[29] Binnendijk, Hans, and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: The National Defense University, 2008). CD

[30] Olson, William J., "Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 215–254. CD

[31] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

[32] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[33] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[34] Joint Staff J-7, *Joint Staff Officer Study: Preliminary Findings*, PowerPoint Presentation (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 Mar 2008). CD

[35] Carafano, James J., "Learning from the Past and Leaning Forward: Principles for Action in Undertaking Complex Activities," in *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies*, Colloquium Report, Kaufmann, Greg, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 166–179. CD

[36] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[37] Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004). CD

[38] Trebilcock, Craig T., "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," *Journal of Homeland Security* (Oct 2000), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm. CD

[39] Trebilcock, Craig T., "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," *Journal of Homeland Security* (Oct 2000), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm. CD

Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Sep 2006, incorporating change 1, 13 Feb 2008). CD

[40] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection* (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 17 Dec 2003).

[41] Chollet, Derek, Mark Irvine, and Bradley Larson, *A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States. A Report of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mar 2008). CD

[42] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[43] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

[44] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., ed., *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments*, NDC Forum Paper 9 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, Jun 2009). CD

[45] Hilley, Steve, *Interagency Tutorial for SOCOM*, PowerPoint Presentation (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Knowledge and Futures, J-7 Training Division (SOKF-J7-T), 1 Sep 2009). CD

[46] FY10 proposed budget data (including contingency operations) are from U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf.

[47] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[48] Malan, Mark, "U.S. Civil–Military Imbalance for Global Engagement : Lessons from the Operational Level in Africa," *Development Experience Clearinghouse* (Washington DC: USAID, Jul 2008), http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search.getCitation&rec_no=151166.

[49] Olson, William J., "Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 215–254. CD

[50] Marcella, Gabriel, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1–52. CD

[51] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination*, GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000). CD

[52] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination*, GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000). CD

[53] Hansen, Rosemary, and Rick Rife, *Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 1998). CD

[54] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[55] Marcella, Gabriel, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1–52. CD

[56] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[57] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[58] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[59] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., ed., *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments*, NDC Forum Paper 9 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, Jun 2009). CD

[60] Feil, Scott, *Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force–South* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2008). CD

[61] Binnendijk, Hans, and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations*, Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: The National Defense University, 2008). CD

[62] Bowen, Stuart W., Jr. (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 Feb 2009). CD

[63] Marcella, Gabriel, "Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Marcella, Gabriel, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 1–52. CD

[64] Szayna, Thomas S., Derek Eaton, and Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA474502. CD

[65] Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004). CD

[66] Abdallah, Saade, and Gilbert Burnham, eds., "Incident Management System (IMS)," Chap. 10 in *The Johns Hopkins and Red Cross/Red Crescent Public Health Guide for Emergencies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, 2008). CD

[67] Roberts, Nancy, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," *International Public Management Review* ,1(1): 1–19 (2000), http://www.idt.unisg.ch/org/idt/ipmr.nsf/Issues/1F3BCAD88F16E7C6C1256C76004BE2C4?OpenDocument.

[68] Roberts, Nancy, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," *International Public Management Review* ,1(1): 1–19 (2000), http://www.idt.unisg.ch/org/idt/ipmr.nsf/Issues/1F3BCAD88F16E7C6C1256C76004BE2C4?OpenDocument.

[69] Bowen, Stuart W., Jr. (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 Feb 2009). CD

[70] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[71] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[72] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[73] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[74] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[75] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination*, GAO/GGD-00-106 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2000). CD

[76] Barno, David W., "Fighting 'The Other War': Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005," *Military Review*, Sep–Oct: 32–44 (2007). CD

Chapter 4

[77] Shemella, Paul, "Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4): 449–457 (2006). CD

[78] Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009). CD

[79] Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009). CD

[80] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

[81] Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Revision First Draft (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Aug 2009). CD

[82] Feil, Scott, *Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force–South* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2008). CD

[83] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[84] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[85] Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009). CD

[86] Lerner, Ken, Mary Beth Vasco, and George Yantosik, *Use of Inter-Agency Agreements to Enhance Emergency Preparedness*, White Paper (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory). CD

[87] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[88] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

[89] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of*

Analysis and Findings, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[90] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[91] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Jan 2008). CD

[92] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[93] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[94] Hansen, Rosemary, and Rick Rife, *Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 1998). CD

[95] Interviews with SIGIR staff.

[96] Hunter, Robert E., *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2008). CD

[97] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[98] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[99] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[100] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

[101] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[102] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: GAO, Nov 1999). CD

[103] Feil, Scott, *Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force–South* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2008). CD

[104] Wentz, Larry, *An ICT Primer: Information and Communication Technologies for Civil–Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Jun 2006). CD

[105] Wentz, Larry, *An ICT Primer: Information and Communication Technologies for Civil–Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Jun 2006). CD

[106] Interviews with NJTTF staff.

[107] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[108] Slayton, Julie, "Establishing and Maintaining Interagency Information Sharing," *Bulletin: Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) Program* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Mar 2000).

[109] Roth, George, "Learning and Performing through Hastily Formed Networks," *Reflections: The SOL Journal*, 9(3/4): 20–35 (2009), https://www.solonline.org/reflections/.

[110] Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009). CD

[111] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[112] Roth, George, "Learning and Performing through Hastily Formed Networks," *Reflections: The SOL Journal*, 9(3/4): 20–35 (2009), https://www.solonline.org/reflections/.

[113] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[114] Roth, George, "Learning and Performing through Hastily Formed Networks," *Reflections: The SOL Journal*, 9(3/4): 20–35 (2009), https://www.solonline.org/reflections/.

[115] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

Chapter 5

[116] Crownover, William B., Chris M. Cook, William R. McDaniel, Julie M. Rubi, and Scott D. Simpkins, *Interagency Teaming Workshop: Final Report of Analysis and Findings*, Rep. NSAD-R-2009-171 (Laurel, MD: JHU/APL, 2009). CD

[117] U.S. Joint Forces Command J7, *US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, Version 1.0 (1 Dec 2005). CD

[118] Schnaubelt, Christopher M., ed., *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments*, NDC Forum Paper 9 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, Jun 2009). CD

[119] Roberts, Nancy, "Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution," *International Public Management Review* ,1(1): 1–19 (2000), http://www.idt.unisg.ch/org/idt/ipmr.nsf/Issues/1F3BCAD88F16E7C6C1256C76004BE2C4?OpenDocument.

[120] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The United States Army Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, Version 1.0, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 28 Jan 2008). CD

[121] Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* (Washington, DC: S/CRS, U.S. Department of State), http://www.crs.state.gov/shortcut.cfm/C6WW. CD

[122] Illustration reprinted from Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* (Washington, DC: S/CRS, U.S. Department of State), p. 7, http://www.crs.state.gov/shortcut.cfm/C6WW. CD

[123] Stouder, Michael D., *SMA Interagency Limited Objectives Experiment: Interagency Collaboration Case Study* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 25 Aug 2009). CD

[124] Interviews with SIGIR staff.

[125] Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* (Washington, DC: S/CRS, U.S. Department of State, Apr 2005). CD

[126] Feil, Scott, *Report on Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources at Joint Interagency Task Force–South* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2008). CD

[127] Burkle, F. M., Jr., K. A. McGrady, S. L. Newett, J. J. Nelson, J. T. Dworken, W. H. Lyerly, Jr., A. S. Natsios, and S. R. Lillibridge, "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: III, Measures of Effectiveness," *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 10(1): 48–56 (1995).

[128] Shemella, Paul, "Interagency Coordination: The Other Side of CIMIC," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17(4): 449–457 (2006). CD

[129] Burkle, Frederick M., "Measuring Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts," *The Lancet*, 371(9608): 189–190 (19 Jan 2008), doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(08)60118-X.

[130] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) and Interagency Integration: Lessons and Observations from OIF/OEF* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 2008).

[131] U.S. Government, *Integrated Civilian–Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* (10 Aug 2009). CD

[132] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Rebuilding Iraq: Improved Management Controls and Iraqi Commitments Needed for Key State and USAID Capacity-Building Programs*, GAO-09-526 (Washington, DC: GAO, Jun 2009).

[133] The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (Geneva, Switzerland: The Sphere Project, 2004). CD

[134] Uchida, Ted T., *Reforming the Interagency Process*, Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2005). CD

[135] Jeffers, William A., "Violent Extremism has Local Causes and Local Solutions," USAID PowerPoint Presentation.

[136] U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Civilian–Military Cooperation Policy*, PD-ACL-777 (Washington, DC: USAID, Jul 2008). CD

[137] Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vols. I and II (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Mar 2006). CD

[138] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *The United States Army Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, Version 1.0, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 28 Jan 2008). CD

[139] Illustration adapted from Jeffers, William A., "Violent Extremism has Local Causes and Local Solutions," USAID PowerPoint Presentation.

[140] Illustration adapted from U.S. Marine Corps, *MCPD-6: Command and Control* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 4 Oct 1996).

[141] National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: The White House, 7 Dec 2005). CD

[142] U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 (FM 3-07), *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Oct 2008). CD

[143] U.S. Department of State, *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation* (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 13 May 2008). CD

[144] Abdallah, Saade, and Gilbert Burnham, eds., "Incident Management System (IMS)," Chap. 10 in *The Johns Hopkins and Red Cross/Red Crescent Public Health Guide for Emergencies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, 2008). CD

[145] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System* (Dec 2008). CD

Chapter 6

[146] Langberg, Daniel R., "U.S. Governmental Response to Human Trafficking in the 21st Century," in *Project on National Security Reform, Case Studies*, Richard Weitz, ed. (Washington DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008), Vol. 1:131–171.

Ryan, J. Kelly, "Global and Regional Trends in Trafficking in Persons," *Developing a Coordinated Inter-Agency National Action Plan to Eradicate Trafficking in Persons* (Bali Process Workshop, Tokyo, Japan , 27 Jun 2005), Speech, http://www.baliprocess.net/files/ConferenceDocumentation/2005/K%20Ryan%20Bali%20Process%20Mtng%20Tokyo%20TIP.pdf.

U.S. Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report*, Publication No. 11407 (Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs and Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Jun 2009.)

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108–458, Title VII—Implementation of 9/11 Commission Recommendations, Subtitle B, § 7202 (17 Dec 2004).

[147] Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), *Establishment of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center: A Report to Congress* (16 Jun 2005).

[148] United Nations, *UN Warns About Nexus Between Drugs, Crime, and Terrorism*, Press Release SOC/CP/311 (10 Jan 2004).

[149] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001*, GAO-04-152 (Washington, DC: GAO, Oct 2003).

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 1(2): 67–150 (Jun 2003). Entire Issue.

Gursy, Elin, Thomas V. Inglesby, and Tara O'Toole, "Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response," *Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science*, 1(2): 97–100 (Jun 2003).

[150] Yeatman, Richard M., "JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Jul 2006).

Feil, Scott, *IDA "Quick Look" Study on Best Practices of Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-S) Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources* (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, Mar 2008).

Joint Publication 3-07.4 (JP 3-07.4), *Joint Counterdrug Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jun 2007).

"National Drug Control Strategy," The White House, Feb 2007. "Joint Interagency Task Force," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jitf.htm.

[151] Feil, Scott, *IDA "Quick Look" Study on Best Practices of Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-S) Coordination Authorities, Processes, Organization, and Resources* (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, Mar 2008).

[152] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Terrorism Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad*, GAO-06-19 (Washington, DC: GAO, Oct 2005).

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Terrorism Financing: Agencies Can Improve Effort to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad*, GAO-06-632T (Washington, DC: GAO, Apr 2006).

Morehart , Michael F. A., "Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who Investigates and How Effective Are They," Testimony Before the Congressional Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources (11 May 2004), http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/media/god01_terrorfinancing.html.

Working Group on Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering, *Best Practices Paper on Special Recommendation III* (30 Jun 2009), www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/pdf/SR-III_062009.pdf.

Levitt, Matthew, and Jacobson, Michael, *The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances*, Policy Focus #89 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Nov 2008), http://www.cicentre.com/reports/PolicyFocus89_Money_Trail_Terrorism_18nov08.pdf. CD

Directive-Type Memorandum 08-034 (DTM 08-034), *DoD Counter-Threat Finance (CTF) Policy* (Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 2 Dec 2008). CD

U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Terrorist Assets Report: Calendar Year 2007: Sixteenth Annual Report to Congress on Assets in the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees* (Washington, DC: Office of Foreign Asset Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007).

Lormel, Dennis M., "Combating Terrorist Financing at the Agency and Interagency Levels," *CTC Sentinel*, 1(4): 5 (Mar 2008), http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss4.pdf.

[153] Directive-Type Memorandum 08-034 (DTM 08-034), *DoD Counter-Threat Finance (CTF) Policy* (Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 2 Dec 2008). CD

[154] Fridovich, David P., "Tracking and Disrupting Terrorist Financial Networks: A Potential Model for Inter-Agency Success," Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of

the House Armed Services Committee (11 Mar 2009), http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC031109/Fridovich_Testimony031109.pdf.

[155] Justice, Wayne, "Overview of Coast Guard Drug and Migrant Interdiction," Testimony Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation (11 Mar 2009).

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Fact Sheet—Homeland Security Task Force Southeast* (2 Mar 2007), http://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/1038/148643/.

State of Florida, *Standard Operating Procedure for Mass Migration Response*, Rev. (1 Mar 2006).

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin*, GAO-07-804R (Washington, DC: GAO, 29 Jun 2007).

[156] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin*, GAO-07-804R (Washington, DC: GAO, 29 Jun 2007).

[157] Justice, Wayne, "Overview of Coast Guard Drug and Migrant Interdiction," Testimony Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation (11 Mar 2009).

[158] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership*, GAO-08-860 (Washington, DC: GAO, Jul 2008).

Boudali , Lianne Kennedy, *The North Africa Project: The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership* (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center, Apr 2007).

Choate, Mary Jo, *Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative: Balance of Power* , Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA : U.S. Army War College, Mar 2007).

[159] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *National Cybersecurity Strategy: Key Improvements Are Needed to Strengthen the Nation's Posture*, GAO-09-432T (Washington, DC: GAO, Mar 2009).

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan, Cyber Incident Annex*, CYB-1–CYB-10 (Dec 2004).

"Assessing Cybersecurity Planning at NIST and DHS," Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation (25 Jun 2009).

Alexander, Keith, "Statement for the Record," Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities Subcommittee (5 May 2009).

National Cybersecurity Review (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, The White House, Apr 2009).

Gorman, Siobhan, "Security Cyber Czar Steps Down," *Wall Street Journal* (4 Aug 2009).

Lasker, John, "U.S. Military's Elite Hacker Crew," *Wired Magazine* (18 Apr 2005).

Shachtman, Noah, "Air Force Will Fight Online, Without Cyber Command," *Wired Magazine* (8 Oct 2008).

Dilley, Chelsea, "Countdown to Air Force Cyber Command Stopped," *Center for Defense Information* (29 Aug 2008), http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4366.

Miller, Jason, "DoD's Cyber Command Would Be Next Step in Evolution," *Federal News Radio* (24 Apr 2009).

[160] *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dec 2006).

[161] Richard Weitz, ed., *Project on National Security Reform, Case Studies* (Washington DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2008).

Project on National Security Reform, "CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification" (2008), http://pnsr.org/web/page/652/sectionid/579/pagelevel/2/interior.asp.

Andrade, Dale, and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (Mar–Apr 2006), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_2_86/ai_n16462383/?tag=content;col1.

Andrade, Dale, "Three Lessons from Vietnam," *The Washington Post* (29 Dec 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/28/AR2005122801144.html.

Finlayson, Andrew R., "A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations: The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969–70," *Studies in Intelligence*, 51(2): 59–69 (Jun 2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/a-retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html.

[162] Axe, David, "Navy Ship Encounters Obstacles on South American 'Soft Power' Mission," *World Politics Review* (13 Aug 2008), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2562 (accessed 16 Sep 2009).

Axe, David, "U.S. Navy's Soft-Power Strategy: 'Perception is Reality,'" *War Is Boring* (29 Oct 2008), http://warisboring.com/?p=1441 (accessed 14 Sep 2009).

Maclay, Jeffrey D., Matthew Potter, Robert R. Scott, and Matthew W. Sibley, *The Fourth Fleet: A Tool of U.S. Engagement in the Americas* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).

Patterson, Pat, "SOUTHCOM Turns to Soft Power," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 134(7): 1265 (Jul 2008).

"Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Captain Robert Lineberry. U.S. Navy, Mission Commander for Continuing Promise 2009, Via Teleconference; Subject: The Scope and Accomplishments of Continuing Promise 2009 and the Strategic Importance of U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) Humanitarian Mission;Time: 9:30 a.m. EDT; Date: Tuesday, May 12, 2009," Federal News Service, Inc., http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/BloggerAssets/2009-05/05120915490020090512_Lineberry_transcript.pdf (accessed 13 Sep 2009).

"Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Admiral Joseph Kernan, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and the 4th Fleet, Via Teleconference; Time: 10:04 a.m. EST; Date: Thursday, December 11, 2008," Federal News Service, Inc., http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/BloggerAssets/2008-12/12120810041020081211_RearAdmKernan_transcript.pdf (accessed 13 Sep 2009).

U.S. Southern Command, "Continuing Promise 2009," *Fact Files* (13 Aug 2009), http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=103.

El Nuevo Diario, "Llega Gigantesco Barco Hospital a Puerto Corinto," *Desde Chinandega* (4 Jul 2009), http://www.desdechinandega.com/economia/llega-gigantesco-barco-hospital-a-puerto-corinto.html (accessed 8 Sep 2009).

Gates , Robert M., Speech as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington, DC, 15 Jul 2008), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262.

[163] Hulbert, Matthew, "Making Waves: Piracy Floods the Horn of Africa," *Center for Security Studies (CSS) Analyses in Security Policy*, No. 55 (Jun 2009).

Clinton, Hillary Rodham, "Announcement of Counter-Piracy Initiatives," Office of the Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (15 Apr 2009).

Carafano, James Jay, Richard Weitz, and Martin Edwin Andersen, *Maritime Security: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond*, Heritage Foundation, Special Report 59 (Jun 2009).

Chapter 7

[164] Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), *Special Operation Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual*, 1st Edition (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU Press, Mar 2009). CD

Lidy, Martin, David J. Baratto, Daniel Langberg, and William J. Shelby, *A Snapshot of Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies*, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Document D-3269 (Mar 2007). CD

Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004). CD

[165] Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: JCISFA, 14 Jul 2008). CD

Chapter 8

[166] Getting Started in HARMONIEWeb, http://www.harmonieweb.org/Pages/Default.aspx. CD

[167] Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, "From the Director: Interagency Lessons Learned Portal," *Newsletter*, 4(8): 2 (Aug 2008), http://www.logcom.usmc.mil/specialstaff/safety/file/MCCLL/Newsletter%20Aug%202008.pdf

Chapter 9

[168] Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Lessons Learned Report 2007: Joint Context Training and Knowledge Gaps* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 16 Mar 2007).

[169] Joint Publication 3-16 (JP 3-16), *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 Mar 2007). CD

[170] Joint Publication 3-26 (JP 3-26), *Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 Aug 2005). CD

[171] Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Revision First Draft (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Aug 2009). CD

Appendix B

[172] Joint Publication 3-57 (JP 3-57), *Civil–Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Jul 2008). CD

[173] Joint Publication 3-57 (JP 3-57), *Civil–Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Jul 2008). CD

[174] U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, Jan 2009). CD

[175] Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Sep 2006, incorporating change 1, 13 Feb 2008). CD

[176] Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001, as amended through 19 Aug 2009).

[177] Geren, Pete, and George W. Casey, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2009*, Submitted to the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 111th Congress (7 May 2009), http://www.army.mil/aps/09/strategic_context.html.

[178] U.S. Intelligence Community, "Definition of the Intelligence Community (IC)," http://www.intelligence.gov/1-definition.shtml (accessed 30 Nov 2009).

[179] Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001, as amended through 19 Aug 2009).

[180] Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Sep 2006, incorporating change 1, 13 Feb 2008). CD

[181] Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Revision First Draft (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Aug 2009). CD

[182] U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 1.0 (11 Sep 2007), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf.

[183] Joint Publication 3-41 (JP 3-41), *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 Oct 2006). CD

[184] U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (28 Nov 2005). CD

[185] Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook* (24 Feb 2004). CD

[186] Joint Publication 3-16 (JP 3-16), *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 Mar 2007). CD

[187] Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, Revision First Draft (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 Aug 2009). CD

[188] Joint Publication 3-07.3 (JP 3-07.3), *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007).

[189] Joint Publication 3-28 (JP 3-28), *Civil Support* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 Sep 2007). CD

[190] U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0 (Dec 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/sstro_joc_v20.doc.

[191] Derived from U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0 (Dec 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/sstro_joc_v20.doc.

[192] United Nations, "United Nations and the Rule of Law," http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (accessed 30 Nov 2009).

[193] U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0 (Dec 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/sstro_joc_v20.doc.

[194] U.S. Army Field Manual Interim 3-07.1 (FMI 3-07.1), *Security Force Assistance*, Final Draft (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 12 Feb 2009). CD

[195] *Irregular Warfare and Security Force Assistance Reference Sheet*, Version 1 (11 Jun 2008). CD

[196] Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Sep 2006, incorporating change 1, 13 Feb 2008). CD

[197] U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0 (Dec 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/sstro_joc_v20.doc.

[198] U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)* (1 Dec 2008). CD

[199] U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)* (1 Dec 2008). CD

[200] U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0 (Dec 2006), http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/sstro_joc_v20.doc.

[201] Joint Publication 3-05 (JP 3-05), *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 Dec 2003). CD

Attach CD Sleeve Here

U.S. Joint Forces Command

U.S. Special Operations Command

U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

U.S. Joint Forces Command

U.S. Special Operations Command

U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

Disclaimer: This is not current U.S. policy. Always rely on existing doctrine. Examine and use the information herein in light of your mission, operational environment, the Law of War, and other situational factors.